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United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit
2d 46
12 Fed.R.Serv.3d 57
This is an appeal from the district court's refusal (1) to dismiss a forfeiture
action brought by the government and (2) to set aside a default judgment
subsequently entered against appellants in that action. Because we find no
abuse of discretion, we affirm.
I.
2
On May 20, 1987, the government moved to strike appellant's claim and
answer, principally on the ground that it was untimely. On June 23, the district
court, having received no response from appellant, granted the government's
motion to strike as unopposed, pursuant to Local Rule 12(a)(2) ("no objection
having been timely filed"). A week later, the government filed a motion for
default on the ground that appellant's claim and answer had been stricken.
Claimant never responded to the government's motion for default but did file a
motion to vacate the court's order striking his claim and answer.1 The district
court referred both motions to the magistrate, who refused to set aside the
court's order and granted the government's motion for default, finding no
satisfactory reason for claimant's tardiness. The magistrate also noted sua
sponte that claimant had on two occasions violated Local Rule 5(d) requiring
the signature of local counsel on all pleadings.
In response to claimant's objections, the district court remanded the case to the
magistrate for reconsideration. The magistrate affirmed her earlier
recommendation, basing her decision only on claimant's failure to respond on
time or at all to the government's motions and not on the absence of local
counsel's signature. The district court adopted the magistrate's recommendation
and entered a default judgment.
Appellant raises two issues on appeal. First, he argues that the district court
abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the default judgment pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1). Second, he puts forth two arguments
relating to the government's voluntary dismissal of an identical complaint in
New Jersey. He contends that the district court abused its discretion in refusing
to dismiss this action since the government's earlier complaint in New Jersey
had been dismissed with prejudice. In the alternative, he argues that if the
government's mistake in dismissing its complaint with prejudice can be
overlooked, justice demands that his mistake also be forgiven.
II.
6
Rule 60(b)(1) permits a district court to set aside an order or judgment upon a
finding of "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." To prevail on
a Rule 60(b) motion, the party seeking to have the judgment vacated bears the
heavy burden of showing both a good reason for the default and the existence of
a meritorious defense. American & Foreign Ins. Ass'n v. Commercial Ins., 575
F.2d 980, 983 (1st Cir.1978). In reviewing such motions, the district court has
broad discretion. Id. at 982. We review only for an abuse of that discretion. Id.;
see also Corey v. Mast Road Grain and Bldg. Materials Co., 738 F.2d 11, 12
(1st Cir.1984).
In this case, claimant violated Local Rule 12(a)(2) by failing to respond within
10 days to the government's motion to strike his claim and answer. In addition,
he failed to respond at all to the government's subsequent motion for default.
The district court based its refusal to set aside its order on both of these
violations, but in its analysis, focused solely on the first of the two errors. We
also focus only on that error since "[i]t is well settled that when reviewing a
district court's order for abuse of discretion, '[i]f a single ground supports the ...
order, it is not reversible.' " Corey, 738 F.2d at 13 (quoting Juneau Square
Corp. v. First Wisconsin National Bank, 624 F.2d 798, 809 (7th Cir.1980)).
Claimant's excuse for missing the filing deadline is that he relied on erroneous
advice from local counsel. He argues that this reliance, combined with the
absence of substantial prejudice to the government and any culpability on his
part (as opposed to his attorney's), requires a finding of excusable neglect or
mistake under Rule 60(b)(1).
We need not decide whether reliance on local counsel would ever require a
finding of excusable neglect because in this case we believe the reliance was
unreasonable. Local counsel advised lead counsel that there was no specific
date by which their opposition papers had to be filed. This advice should have
been viewed with at least some skepticism by an experienced attorney. As the
magistrate noted, "[t]he concept of time limitations for filing is a basic one."
10
Claimant further argues that the sanction of default was too harsh considering
10
11
Claimant further argues that the sanction of default was too harsh considering
the relative lack of prejudice to the government and the absence of client
blameworthiness. While we agree that both of these are legitimate factors for a
district court to consider in ruling on a 60(b) motion, we decline to hold that
they require a finding of excusable neglect. This circuit has followed the
teachings of the Supreme Court in Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34,
82 S.Ct. 1386, 1390-91, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962), and "turned a deaf ear" to the
claim that the client should not suffer for the attorney's sins. Damiani v. Rhode
Island Hosp., 704 F.2d 12, 16-17 (1st Cir.1983); Parrilla-Lopez v. United
States, 841 F.2d 16, 20 (1st Cir.1988). See also Kaercher v. Trustees of Health
& Hosp. of Boston, 834 F.2d 31, 34 (1st Cir.1987) (noting client
blameworthiness but stating attorney culpability sufficient). We also agree with
the district court that a default judgment may stand even where there has been
no showing of substantial prejudice to the party benefiting from the default. A
district court simply may insist upon compliance with its local rules. Corey,
738 F.2d at 12 (failure to comply with local rule requiring opposition papers
within 10 days).
Because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing
to find excusable neglect, we need not decide whether claimant's defense is
meritorious.
III.
12
13
AFFIRMED.