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United States v. Julio Ernesto Arias-Santana, 964 F.2d 1262, 1st Cir. (1992)
United States v. Julio Ernesto Arias-Santana, 964 F.2d 1262, 1st Cir. (1992)
2d 1262
35 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1392
2* BACKGROUND
3
The next day, the police obtained a warrant to search the apartment. A third
officer, Detective McMillan, participated in the execution of the warrant.
Shortly after the search party knocked and announced its presence, McMillan
heard people running inside the apartment. The officers broke down the heavily
reinforced front door with a battering ram and found four persons inside the
apartment: a "maintenance man," appellant, appellant's girlfriend, and
codefendant Diaz.1
Within minutes after the occupants were handcuffed and placed face down on
the kitchen floor, Detectives Warot and Dubois arrived at the apartment and
identified appellant and Diaz as the persons from whom they had purchased
cocaine on February 6 and March 14.2 Detectives Warot and Dubois filed
reports detailing their March 15 observations and identifications of appellant
shortly after his arrest. At appellant's detention hearing on April 1, 1991, Warot
testified to his March 15 identification of appellant. Following their five-day
jury trial, appellant and Diaz were convicted of conspiring to distribute cocaine
and distributing cocaine within 1000 feet of a school.
II
DISCUSSION
A. Admissibility of Police Records
6
The district court allowed Detective Warot to read to the jury the detailed
physical description of appellant contained in the February 7 police report filed
by Warot following the first undercover drug buy at the apartment on February
6. See Fed.R.Evid. 803(8)(B) (statements by police officers normally constitute
inadmissible hearsay in a criminal case). Even though explicit reference was
made to the February 7 police report during codefendant Diaz's crossexamination of Warot, which clearly opened the door to the introduction of
those portions of the report that described Diaz, appellant contends that it was
improper to admit the report against him since he had avoided any mention of
the February 7 report in cross-examining Warot. See, e.g., United States v.
White, 887 F.2d 267, 270 (D.C.Cir.1989) ("The prosecution may not gain,
through the device of a joint trial, admission against one defendant of otherwise
inadmissible evidence on the happenstance that the door to admitting the
evidence has been opened by a co-defendant").
Abreu, 952 F.2d 1458, 1467 (1st Cir.1992); United States v. Newton, 891 F.2d
944, 946 (1st Cir.1989), but may affirm a district court decision on any ground
supported by the record. See United States v. Mendoza-Acevedo, 950 F.2d 1, 3
(1st Cir.1991). As a general rule, police reports are inadmissible in a criminal
case when offered by the prosecution. United States v. DePeri, 778 F.2d 963,
976 (3d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1110, 106 S.Ct. 1518, 89 L.Ed.2d 916
and 476 U.S. 1159, 106 S.Ct. 2277, 90 L.Ed.2d 720 (1986); United States v.
Grady, 544 F.2d 598, 604 (2d Cir.1976). Nonetheless, the Federal Rules of
Evidence permit a consistent prior statement by a trial witness to be admitted
into evidence if "offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the
witness of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive." Fed.R.Evid.
801(d)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
8
Quite apart from codefendant Diaz's direct use of the February 7 report,
appellant's cross-examination independently raised an implied charge of recent
fabrication by Detective Warot. In attempting to establish that Warot had not
observed appellant's face on March 15, appellant's cross-examination invited
the jury to infer that Warot identified and arrested appellant on March 15
merely because appellant happened to be in the apartment at the time of the raid
and without regard to whether appellant was the same person from whom
Warot bought cocaine at the apartment on February 6. To rebut the implied
charge of recent fabrication, the government introduced the earlier physical
description contained in Warot's February 7 report, in an effort to demonstrate a
physical likeness between the individual from whom Warot bought cocaine on
February 6 and the individual arrested on March 15. The challenged evidence
ultimately was designed to diminish the likelihood that Warot falsified the
identification and description in the March 15 report, since there would have
been little need to do so in light of its similarity to the information in the
February 7 report. As appellant opened the door, he cannot be heard to
complain that the invitation was accepted by the prosecutor.
B. Witness Sequestration Agreement
10
Appellant contends that the government orally agreed, without the imprimatur
of the court, to sequester all witnesses at trial, but violated its agreement when
it permitted Detective McMillan to consult with Detective Dubois. According to
appellant, Dubois, who had already testified, "coached" McMillan to testify that
appellant had turned his face toward Dubois and Warot at the time of their
identifications on March 15. Appellant argues that the district court should have
permitted a voir dire examination to ascertain the exact terms of the alleged
oral sequestration agreement in order to determine an appropriate sanction (the
exclusion of the assertedly "collusive" testimony or the declaration of a
mistrial) for its violation.
11
12
landlord and was in the apartment at the time appellant was arrested on March
15, 1991.
15
16
The landlord testified that neither the appellant nor Diaz was a tenant, thereby
intimating that they may have been innocent visitors to the apartment at the
time of the raid. The landlord testified that the maintenance man was hired to
repair the plumbing in the apartment, thus advancing a plausible explanation to
counteract the officers' testimony that the running water in the bathroom may
have been related to an attempt to destroy contraband as the search party was
forcing its way through the front door. See supra note 2. Finally, the landlord
contradicted the officers' testimony that the front door had been reinforced to
hinder forcible entry.
17
Appellant's attempt to elicit information from the landlord was not aimed at
impeaching the landlord or any government witness. Rather, appellant sought
information that might have led to the discovery of evidence (favorable or
unfavorable) plainly available to appellant prior to trial.5 Appellant was not
entitled to postpone pretrial discovery until trial under the guise of a claimed
right to confront a witness whose testimony was not adverse to appellant.6
The district court refused three jury instructions requested by appellant: (1) a
"missing witness" instruction; (2) a cautionary instruction to scrutinize the outof-court identifications of appellant by Detectives Warot and Dubois; and (3) a
cautionary instruction that the jury consider its verdicts on the charges against
appellant independently of its verdicts as to Diaz.
19
Appellant did not preserve these claims as required under Fed.R.Crim.P. 30,
which mandates that objections to jury instructions be asserted after the court
delivers its charge to the jury but before the jury retires. See United States v.
Wilkinson, 926 F.2d 22, 26 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2813,
115 L.Ed.2d 985 (1991) ("we have repeatedly held, Fed.R.Crim.P. 30 means
what it says."); United States v. Coady, 809 F.2d 119, 123 (1st Cir.1987)
(Criminal rule 30 is "strictly ... applied."); United States v. Fuller, 768 F.2d
343, 345 (1st Cir.1985) (same); cf. Elgabri v. Lekas, 964 F.2d 1255, 1259 (1st
Cir.1991) (requiring strict application of Fed.R.Civ.P. 51, the civil rule
counterpart to criminal rule 30). Notwithstanding our unwavering insistence on
strict adherence to the literal requirements of Criminal Rule 30, appellant failed
to assert any objection to the delivered charge until after the district court had
allowed the jury to retire for its deliberations.7 Accordingly, we review these
claims for plain error.
20
21
The district court denied appellant's request on the ground that there was no
evidence as to the maintenance man's availability to testify. Since the substance
of the anticipated testimony from the "missing witness" was unknown,
appellant had to establish its presumptive advantageousness to the defense by
producing competent evidence that the "missing witness" was either "peculiarly
available" to the government or within its "exclusive control." Id.; United States
v. Ariza-Ibarra, 651 F.2d 2, 15-16 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895, 102
S.Ct. 392, 70 L.Ed.2d 209 (1981); see also United States v. Rollins, 862 F.2d
1282, 1298 (7th Cir.) (a witness is not "peculiarly available" to the government
simply because the witness has chosen not to discuss the case with the defense),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1074, 109 S.Ct. 2084, 104 L.Ed.2d 648 (1988).
22
The only information relating to availability was that the maintenance man
refused to cooperate with the police, and the government concluded that his
testimony would not aid its case. However, although appellant was well aware
that the maintenance man was in the apartment at the time of his arrest, even
now, on appeal, appellant attempts no explanation for the failure to take
reasonable efforts to subpoena the "missing witness" to testify for the defense.
Nor does he suggest that the government in any way prevented him from
identifying or procuring the witness. See Cameo Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v.
Senn, 738 F.2d 836, 844 (7th Cir.1984) ("justification for the missing witness
instruction disminishes [sic] with the availability of the tools of discovery"),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106, 105 S.Ct. 780, 83 L.Ed.2d 775 (1985). There was
no error in the denial of a "missing witness" instruction.
23
Finally, because the jury charge covered the substance of appellant's two
remaining requests, we discern no error, plain or otherwise, in the refusal to
charge the jury in haec verba. See United States v. Passos-Paternina, 918 F.2d
979, 984 (1st Cir.1990) (court need not "instruct the jury in the precise form
and language requested"), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1637, 113
L.Ed.2d 732 and cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, ----, 111 S.Ct. 2808, 2809, 115
L.Ed.2d 980, 981 (1991). As concerns appellant's request for a "mistaken
identification" instruction, the court adequately apprised the jury of its
obligation to adjudge the demeanor, credibility, and reliability of the
government witnesses, including the police officers who identified appellant.
As for the request that the jury be cautioned to consider their verdicts as to
appellant independently of those relating to codefendant Diaz, the court
expressly admonished the jury that "[t]he fact that you may find an accused
guilty ... should not control your verdicts ... as to the offenses charged against
another defendant." The court need have gone no further.
24
Affirmed.
The government concedes that it agreed to bar witnesses from the courtroom
prior to their testimony, but denies any agreement that government witnesses
Appellant argues that the landlord was an "adverse" witness because Diaz's
counsel, by failing to elicit testimony as to the identity of the maintenance man,
implicitly supported the government's position that the "missing witness" was
immaterial to the defense. There are two serious flaws in appellant's argument.
First, testimony can be characterized as "adverse" only on the basis of what the
witness says, or does not say, in response to a particular question. The landlord
neither expressed nor implied an opinion as to the materiality of the
maintenance man's testimony. Second, the maintenance man's testimony could
be material to appellant's case only insofar as it might entitle appellant to obtain
a "missing witness" instruction. Since appellant did not establish that the
maintenance man was "unavailable" to testify for the defense, however,
appellant would not have been entitled to a "missing witness" instruction. See
infra pp. 1268-69
The district court noted that appellant previously had rested his case without
presenting a defense. Appellant even now tenders no contention that he could
not have called the landlord as a witness, or that he could not have asked the
court to allow him to reopen his defense for that purpose. See, e.g., United
States v. Cohen, 888 F.2d 770, 775 (11th Cir.1989) (request to reopen case is
committed to trial court's sound discretion)
We recognize that the district court did not invite objections before the jury
retired. Nevertheless, we find no indication in the record that counsel were in
any way prevented from interposing objections at the proper time. Before
delivering its charge, the district court advised counsel: "You can take an
exception and an objection to my instructions after I've given them."