Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Michael Pagano v. Anthony M. Frank, Postmaster General, Etc., 983 F.2d 343, 1st Cir. (1993)
Michael Pagano v. Anthony M. Frank, Postmaster General, Etc., 983 F.2d 343, 1st Cir. (1993)
2d 343
60 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 969,
60 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 41,960, 24 Fed.R.Serv.3d 979
Norman Jackman, with whom Martha M. Wishart and Jackman & Roth,
Boston, MA, were on brief, for plaintiff, appellant.
David G. Karro, Atty., Office of Labor Law, U.S. Postal Service,
Washington, DC, with whom A. John Pappalardo, U.S. Atty., and Annette
Forde, Asst. U.S. Atty., Boston, MA, were on brief, for defendant,
appellee.
Before SELYA, Circuit Judge, COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge, and CYR,
Circuit Judge.
SELYA, Circuit Judge.
The United States Postal Service prides itself on surmounting obstacles that
nature places in its path.1 In this bitterly contested case, plaintiff-appellant
Michael Pagano, a veteran postal worker, complains that, whatever success the
Service may have encountered in its struggle with the elements, it has been
unable to surmount a man-made obstacle: prejudice in the workplace. The
district court ruled in favor of the defendant. Finding appellant's arguments to
be unpersuasive, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
The Lynnfield Post Office hired appellant as a part-time mail carrier in 1973.
He became a full-time employee two years later, working primarily as a clerk at
a branch office. In 1983, appellant became a dispatcher at the main post office
under the direct supervision of James Walsh. Walsh and Pagano did not enjoy a
cordial working relationship--a situation that perhaps stemmed from the latter's
propensity for unauthorized absences.
10
In this instance, Pagano did not object to the magistrate's denial of the motion to
amend. That ends the matter. Congress granted the courts of appeals
jurisdiction to hear appeals "from all final decisions of the district courts of the
United States." 28 U.S.C. 1291. We have held that for a magistrate's decision
to be "final" within the meaning of the statute it "must have been reviewed by
the district court, which retains ultimate decision-making power." United States
v. Ecker, 923 F.2d 7, 8 (1st Cir.1991) (quoting Siers v. Morrash, 700 F.2d 113,
115 (3d Cir.1983)).4 In other words, when, as now, a litigant could have tested
a magistrate's ruling by bringing it before the district judge, but failed to do so
within the allotted ten-day period, he cannot later leapfrog the trial court and
appeal the ruling directly to the court of appeals. See Unauthorized Practice of
Law Comm. v. Gordon, 979 F.2d 11, 13-14 (1st Cir.1992) (per curiam);
McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 799 (9th Cir.1991); Singletary v. B.R.X.,
Inc., 828 F.2d 1135, 1137 (5th Cir.1987); Siers, 700 F.2d at 116; see also
Ecker, 923 F.2d at 9 (holding that the court of appeals cannot undertake direct
review of a magistrate's order on a nondispositive pretrial motion in a criminal
case); United States v. Renfro, 620 F.2d 497, 500 (5th Cir.) (same), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 921, 101 S.Ct. 321, 66 L.Ed.2d 149 (1980).
11
Because appellant took no steps to have the district judge review the
magistrate's denial of the motion to amend, he is precluded from contesting the
merits of that order in the present proceeding. See Rittenhouse v. Mabry, 832
F.2d 1380, 1387 (5th Cir.1987) (refusing to entertain a plaintiff's challenge to a
magistrate's denial of his motion to amend his complaint because "no appeal
therefrom to the district court was ever taken or attempted and the district court
did not in any way review or confirm th[e] order").
We divide our examination of the summary judgment entered below into two
segments. We begin by outlining the Rule 56 standard and then proceed to the
underlying Title VII claim.
15
On issues where the nonmovant bears the ultimate burden of proof at trial, he
may not defeat a motion for summary judgment by relying upon evidence that
is "merely colorable" or "not significantly probative." Anderson, 477 U.S. at
249-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. To the contrary, the nonmovant must "present
definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion." Mesnick v. General Elec.
Co., 950 F.2d 816, 822 (1st Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 2965,
119 L.Ed.2d 586 (1992). Even when elusive concepts like motive or intent are
in play, "summary judgment may be appropriate if the non-moving party rests
merely upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported
speculation." Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st
Cir.1990).
16
Title VII renders it unlawful for an employer to "discharge any individual ...
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin...." 42
U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1). To prevail on a Title VII claim, a plaintiff must prove
that the defendant discriminated against him for a proscribed reason. See
Cumpiano v. Banco Santander Puerto Rico, 902 F.2d 148, 153 (1st Cir.1990).
Because appellant produced no direct evidence of discriminatory intent, we
must initially analyze his claim under the burden-shifting framework of
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817,
1824-26, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). 5
19
McDonnell Douglas requires, first, that the claimant state a prima facie case.
This showing transfers the burden of production, requiring the employer to
articulate (but not necessarily prove) some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
justifying the adverse employment action. Cumpiano, 902 F.2d at 153.
Satisfying this burden of production effectively dissolves the inference of
discrimination arising from the plaintiff's prima facie case.6 See White v.
Vathally, 732 F.2d 1037, 1040 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 933, 105 S.Ct.
331, 83 L.Ed.2d 267 (1984). Once the parties reach this stage, therefore, the
plaintiff, if he is to defeat a properly documented motion for summary
judgment, "must offer some minimally sufficient evidence, direct or indirect,
both of pretext and of the employer's discriminatory animus." Mesnick, 950
F.2d at 825; accord Villanueva v. Wellesley College, 930 F.2d 124, 127-28 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 181, 116 L.Ed.2d 143 (1991); Lipsett
v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 895 (1st Cir.1988).
20
In this case, the district court apparently assumed that appellant stated a prima
facie case 7 and that the employer articulated a facially valid, nondiscriminatory
reason (chronic absenteeism and tardiness) for the dismissal. From that starting
point, the court ruled against appellant on two bases. First, the court determined
that appellant failed to submit evidence of pretext. Second, the court found that
"there is no evidence in the record ... that would justify even a circumstantial
inference that plaintiff was dismissed because of his Italian heritage." Either
conclusion would have warranted brevis disposition. Having scrutinized the
record, we are persuaded that both are supportable.
21
22
23
In contending that he and Rafferty were "similarly situated," appellant limits his
analysis to the number of times the two men were late during a finite period.
Yet, appellant had a substantially longer and more varied history of attendance
problems than did Rafferty and appellant, unlike Rafferty, failed to mend his
ways following receipt of formal warnings. Appellant also racked up many
more violations of the Postal Service's attendance policy than did Rafferty
when items such as sick time, absences without leave, and the like are taken
into account.8
24
In short, the record shows beyond hope of contradiction that the two men were
not similarly situated vis-a-vis overall attendance and that Rafferty, like
Pagano, was disciplined for provable infractions at a level corresponding to the
infractions' severity. In the absence of any other evidence that the Postal
Service applied the attendance rules unevenly, the district court did not err in
holding that there was no genuine issue of material fact on the question of
pretext.9 See Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 109 (1st Cir.1988).
25
26
IV. CONCLUSION
27
28
Affirmed.
An inscription on the exterior of the main New York City post office, often
An inscription on the exterior of the main New York City post office, often
thought to be the Postal Service's motto, reads: "Neither snow, nor rain, nor
heat, nor gloom of night stays these couriers from their appointed rounds."
(adapted from VIII Herodotus, Histories 98)
In general, the McDonnell Douglas model operates in the same way for Title
VII cases as for cases brought under the federal Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621-634 (1988). See Villanueva v.
Wellesley College, 930 F.2d 124, 127 n. 2 (1st Cir.) cert. denied, --- U.S. ----,
112 S.Ct. 181, 116 L.Ed.2d 143 (1991); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003,
1015 (1st Cir.1979). Hence, we cite interchangeably to Title VII and ADEA
decisions in the succedent analysis
Relatedly, appellant asserts that there is a fact dispute about whether the Postal
Service consistently recorded every instance of employee lateness or absence.
Even if such a question exists, however, it is not material to this case. Appellant
adduced no proof that the Service either failed to record transgressions based
upon employees' national origin or placed ersatz infractions on his work record.
Indeed, his evidence suggests that the Service may have been somewhat
charitable in not recording all violations of the attendance rules. If this is so,
appellant, as a habitual latecomer, likely benefitted from the employer's laxity
10
In view of this ruling, we need not reach, and, thus, take no view anent, the
district court's alternative holding that Walsh's comments, even if probative of
ethnic hostility, were inconsequential absent evidence that he had some input
into, or impact upon, Hentschel's decision to end appellant's employment. See,
e.g., Medina-Munoz, 896 F.2d at 10 ("The biases of one who neither makes nor
influences the challenged personnel decision are not probative in an
employment discrimination case.")