Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Westcott Construction Corp. v. Firemen's Fund of New Jersey, 996 F.2d 14, 1st Cir. (1993)
Westcott Construction Corp. v. Firemen's Fund of New Jersey, 996 F.2d 14, 1st Cir. (1993)
2d 14
Crouse's duty to indemnify and that, therefore, this question is open to the
courts to decide. Westcott initially petitioned the arbitrators to reconsider the
award. After that request was denied, Westcott unsuccessfully sought to vacate
or modify the award in the Rhode Island state courts on the ground that the
award failed to consider Westcott's indemnification claim against Crouse.
Westcott then sought relief against Firemen's, Crouse's surety on the
performance bond, in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode
Island, and after losing there, now seeks redress in this court. We find
Westcott's appeal clearly foreclosed by res judicata, in fact so clearly that we
award double costs on behalf of Firemen's.
BACKGROUND
3
Westcott then sought to modify or vacate the award in state court, arguing that
the award had failed to pass through the $314,000 in damages to Crouse. The
Superior Court's denial of Westcott's motion was affirmed by the Rhode Island
Supreme Court, Westcott Constr. Corp. v. City of Cranston, 586 A.2d 542
(R.I.1991) (per curiam), which concluded that Westcott had submitted its
claims for additional damages to the arbitrators and therefore the claim was not
open to the court to decide.
Westcott then brought suit against Firemen's as Crouse's surety in the District of
Rhode Island. The claim was dismissed. Westcott now appeals.
DISCUSSION
6
by the arbitrators or by the state courts. The district court ruled against
Westcott, finding this claim foreclosed by res judicata. As the district court
stated, "[i]t seems abundantly clear to me that the Rhode Island Supreme Court
has already considered and decided the controversy." We agree with the district
court's assessment. That the Rhode Island Supreme Court considered this issue
is clear from the language of the opinion. As that court noted, "Westcott argues
that the $1,000-per-day award to the city should have been 'passed through' to
Crouse and that, therefore, the arbitrators' award is imperfect." Westcott
Construction Corp., 586 A.2d at 543. We fail to see how Westcott's state court
claim differs from its federal one. Indeed, it seems clear that this issue was
submitted to the arbitrators as well. Westcott itself, in its motion to the
arbitrators for reconsideration and modification of their decision, admitted that
"[t]he parties agreed at the initial hearing on September 5, 1986 that all matters
between Cranston, Westcott, Crouse and the other subcontractors would be
decided." As Firemen's notes, this statement demonstrates that the arbitrators
were to consider Westcott's claim against Crouse.
7
Res Judicata bars Westcott's claim. See Coates v. Coleman, 72 R.I. 304, 51
A.2d 81, 85 (1947). "[A] state court judgment commands the same res judicata
effects in federal court that it would have in the court that entered it." 18
Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and
Procedure 4469, at 659-60 (1981). In Griffin v. State of R.I., 760 F.2d 359
(1st Cir.) (applying Rhode Island law), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 845, 106 S.Ct.
134, 88 L.Ed.2d 111 (1985), the First Circuit explained that res judicata
operates as an absolute bar to the relitigation of the same cause of action
between parties (or their privies) and that a prior judgment rendered on the
merits is conclusive not only to the issues which were determined but as to all
matters which might have been determined as well. Id. 760 F.2d at 360; see also
Corrado v. Providence Redevelopment Agency, 113 R.I. 274, 320 A.2d 331,
332 (1974).
All the requirements for applying res judicata are met in this case. As in
Griffin, the appellant "contends that the 'causes of action' in Rhode Island and
federal courts differed, and thus argues that res judicata does not bar her federal
court action." 760 F.2d at 360. And, as in Griffin, "[a]n analysis of the cause of
action here and in the prior state proceedings clearly establishes that both are
essentially the same." Id. at 361. The federal case involves the same subject
matter and the same parties as did the state case, and contests the same point:
that the arbitrators did not consider Westcott's indemnity claim against Crouse.
Firemen's, as surety, is only liable to the extent its principal, Crouse, is liable.
See Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 789 F.2d 74,
77-79 (1st Cir.1986). Firemen's benefits just as Crouse does from the
application of res judicata. Id. at 77. Thus, Firemen's, as surety for Crouse, is
not legally bound to pay the $314,000 Westcott seeks.
10
11
12
CONCLUSION
13