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UNITED STATES v. WILLIAM SOTO-BENÍQUEZ, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JUAN SOTO-RAMÍREZ, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. EDUARDO ALICEA-TORRES, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. RAMON FERNÁNDEZ-MALAVÉ, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. CARMELO VEGA-PACHECO, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. ARMANDO GARCÍA-GARCÍA, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JOSE LUIS DE LEÓN MAYSONET, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. RENE GONZALEZ-AYALA, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JUAN ENRIQUE CINTRÓN-CARABALLO, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MIGUEL VEGA-COLÓN, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MIGUEL VEGA-COSME, 356 F.3d 1, 1st Cir. (2004)
UNITED STATES v. WILLIAM SOTO-BENÍQUEZ, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JUAN SOTO-RAMÍREZ, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. EDUARDO ALICEA-TORRES, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. RAMON FERNÁNDEZ-MALAVÉ, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. CARMELO VEGA-PACHECO, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. ARMANDO GARCÍA-GARCÍA, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JOSE LUIS DE LEÓN MAYSONET, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. RENE GONZALEZ-AYALA, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JUAN ENRIQUE CINTRÓN-CARABALLO, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MIGUEL VEGA-COLÓN, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MIGUEL VEGA-COSME, 356 F.3d 1, 1st Cir. (2004)
3d 1
No. 01-1619.
No. 01-1674.
No. 00-1547.
No. 01-1620.
No. 00-1464.
No. 00-1488.
No. 00-1470.
No. 00-1362.
No. 00-1543.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Puerto
Rico, Daniel R. Dominguez, J. COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
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Apontes-Cabrera for appellant Soto-Benquez.
Miriam Ramos-Grateroles for appellant Soto-Ramrez.
Raymond Rivera Esteves for appellant Alicea-Torres.
Luz M. Rios-Rosario for appellant Fernndez-Malav.
Javier Morales-Ramos for appellant Vega-Pacheco.
Rachel Brill for appellant Garca-Garca.
This massive drug conspiracy case from Puerto Rico involved a six-month trial
and resulted in convictions of the eleven defendants who appeal, eight of whom
received life sentences and three of whom received sentences of more than
twenty years.
The original twenty-two defendants were separated into two groups. The first
group of eleven, comprised of those who the government said were more major
players in the conspiracy, were tried before a jury from December 28, 1998 to
June 25, 1999. The jury convicted all eleven defendants on all counts with
The two CCE defendants were sentenced to life imprisonment on Count One,
the CCE count, while Count Two, the conspiracy count, was dismissed as to
them under the rule of Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 116 S.Ct. 1241,
134 L.Ed.2d 419 (1996). Six other defendants were also sentenced to life
imprisonment: Alicea-Torres, Fernndez-Malav, Vega-Pacheco, GarcaGarca, Vega-Cosme, and Cintrn-Caraballo. The remaining three VegaColn, Gonzalez-Ayala, and de Len Maysonet were each sentenced to 292
months of imprisonment.
The defendants also complain, with justification, about the government's poor
record of pre-trial production of required materials, as well as its belated
springing of requested sentencing enhancements on certain defendants after the
Pre-Sentence Investigative Report (PSR) had been prepared and the defendants'
objections to it had been served. The trial court was obviously frustrated with
the government's conduct in this case and threatened three times to dismiss the
indictment, but in the end did not. Post-trial, the court also found the evidence
sufficient to support the convictions.
Over twenty-five issues are raised in these appeals and are discussed in the
sequence of events leading to and through trial, with the exception of the
multiple conspiracies issue, which we discuss first.
I.
8
The facts are stated, for sufficiency of the evidence purposes, as a reasonable
jury could have found them, in the light most favorable to the verdict.
The government's case turned on the testimony of several cooperating coconspirators Ramn Cesrio-Soto, Victor Negrn-Maldonado (a/k/a
Pitosito), and Luis Torrens Alicea (a/k/a Pito Salsa) as well as the testimony
of police officers and investigators.
10
The case centers around six drug points in the Bitumul Ward of Hato Rey, San
Juan, Puerto Rico: (1) Callejn Nueve, operated by Juan Soto Ramrez and
later by Negrn-Maldonado, (2) La Pared, also operated by Soto-Ramrez, (3)
Street B between La Pared and Callejn Nueve, operated by Juan CintrnCaraballo and supplied by Soto-Ramrez, (4) El Palo on Laguna Street,
operated by Alberto Santiago-Figueroa, a defendant not participating in this
trial, and supplied by Soto-Ramrez, (5) Cuba Street, which included two
distribution points operated by Soto-Benquez and Soto Ramrez, and (6)
Laguna Street, operated by Miguel Vega-Cosme. These points, which began
operation around 1990, dealt in crack cocaine, cocaine, heroin, and marijuana.
11
Soto-Ramrez and Soto-Benquez were the leaders of the operation. SotoRamrez operated or supplied almost all of the drug points. His house at
Callejn Dos was used by various defendants to prepare crack and heroin for
distribution at the six drug points and to store weapons to defend and acquire
territory for the drug points. When defendant Miguel Vega-Cosme established
his drug point on Laguna Street with his son, defendant Miguel Vega-Coln, he
first requested permission from Soto-Ramrez.
12
13
The remaining defendants were involved in running one or more of the six drug
points. Eduardo Alicea-Torres sold drugs at the Cuba Street and Callejn Dos
drug points from 1990 until at least 1991, and later began his own drug point.
Ramon Fernndez-Malav packaged crack and cocaine for Soto-Ramrez and
cooperating government witness Negrn-Maldonado in 1992. Carmelo VegaPacheco packaged drugs for Soto-Ramrez and Negrn-Maldonado through
1992, and sold narcotics at the Cuba Street drug points in 1990 and 1991.
Armando Garca-Garca sold narcotics at the Cuba Street drug points from
1990 to 1991, packaged drugs in 1992, and sold drugs at Callejn Nueve in
1993. From 1990 to 1992, Jose de Len Maysonet stored narcotics and
weapons for the drug points, and after 1992, he sold narcotics at Callejn
Nueve. Juan Cintrn-Caraballo operated the Street B drug point throughout the
charged conspiracy. Miguel Vega-Cosme supplied Soto-Ramrez with narcotics
and operated a drug point at Laguna Street from 1990 until 1994 with SotoRamrez's permission. Vega-Cosme also supplied ammunition used in shootings
of rival gang members in 1992 and 1993, and negotiated on behalf of the group
in seeking to resolve its differences with the rival Chacho gang. Miguel VegaColn, the son of Vega-Cosme, packaged crack cocaine, heroin, and marijuana
for his father and stood as an armed guard at the Callejn Nueve drug point, a
point separate from the one his father ran on Laguna Street.
14
15
16
On December 20, 1992, gang warfare broke out between the group and
members of a rival gang led by "Chacho." A shootout occurred between the
two gangs, in which Angel Rivera-Pagn, a member of Soto-Ramrez's and
Soto-Benquez's group, was killed. Eight days later, Negrn-Maldonado,
Rodrguez-Lpez, and others retaliated by murdering Roberto VasalloMorninglane, a member of the Chacho gang.
18
The gang warfare continued, and several days later, on January 10, 1993,
defendant Vega-Pacheco, government witnesses Cesrio-Soto and NegrnMaldonado, Rodrguez-Lpez, and others went to the Quintana housing project
and killed five more people, two of whom were members of the Chacho gang.
Vega-Pacheco later pled guilty in a Puerto Rico court to participating in those
five murders, which came to be known as the Quintana massacre.
19
Yet another murder took place on March 7, 1993, when defendant FernndezMalav killed Tito Dones-Sanchez. Negrn-Maldonado and Cesrio-Soto
testified that Fernndez-Malav opened fire on a white van after CintrnCaraballo and other dealers at the Callejn Nueve drug point saw it driving
nearby and suspected that those inside were members of the rival El Visco
gang. Dones-Sanchez was later found dead inside a white van of the same
description, which a municipal police officer had witnessed leaving the Bitumul
area. Fernndez-Malav pled guilty in a Puerto Rico court to the murder of
Dones-Sanchez.
20
While these murders were occurring in 1992 and 1993, some changes occurred
in the leadership of the group. On January 8, 1992, Soto-Ramrez was
incarcerated after pleading guilty in a Puerto Rico court to various crimes,
including attempted murder. After Soto-Benquez was shot in an assassination
attempt, he ceased activities in Bitumul in December 1992 and moved to
Florida in 1993. While Soto-Ramrez was in prison, Cosme-Sobrado managed
three of Soto-Ramrez's drug points until Cosme-Sobrado was killed on May
12, 1992. Negrn-Maldonado then took over managing the points until he left
for Philadelphia in June or July 1993. When managing the points, both CosmeSobrado and Negrn-Maldonado took instructions from Soto-Ramrez through
telephone calls from prison and forwarded the proceeds from the drug points to
Soto-Ramrez's wife.
21
22
23
II.
24
On April 10, 1997, a federal grand jury in Puerto Rico returned a two-count
indictment against the eleven appellants, along with ten other defendants.
Count One charged Soto-Benquez and Soto-Ramrez with engaging in a
26
On December 28, 1998, the district court divided the twenty-two defendants
into two groups for trial purposes. At that point, sixteen of the original twentytwo defendants were slated to go to trial. The district court selected the eleven
appellants as the first group to be tried. After an eighty-six-day trial, the jury
returned a guilty verdict as to all eleven defendants on all counts for which they
were charged.
27
III.
28
29
To join a drug conspiracy, a defendant must agree with others to advance the
aim of the conspiracy here, to possess drugs for distribution. United States v.
Garcia-Torres, 280 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2002). Advancing the aim of the
conspiracy can involve performing ancillary functions such as processing and
cooking drugs, procuring weapons, collecting monies, enforcing discipline,
chastising rivals, accounting, and the like, as long as such actions are performed
with the aim of furthering the conspiracy. See id. To hold that defendants have
"joined" a conspiracy, there must be sufficient evidence both that they knew
about the conspiracy and that they knew the ancillary service would advance
that conspiracy. Id.
30
Special issues arise when defendants argue that there were multiple
conspiracies and that their activities were not part of the conspiracy charged.
The initial issue and the only issue we need to reach here is whether the
government proved the conspiracy charged in the indictment. This issue,
assuming a properly instructed jury, resolves into a sufficiency-of-evidence
question. United States v. Martinez-Medina, 279 F.3d 105, 113 & n. 2 (1st
Cir.2002); United States v. Wihbey, 75 F.3d 761, 773-74 (1st Cir.1996). If the
evidence is sufficient to support the jury's finding that all the defendants are
guilty of the single conspiracy charged, then no error has occurred.1
31
32
34
35
The evidence supports the jury's finding that each of the defendants joined in
this common enterprise. First, the evidence establishes that each defendant
joined in the common defense of the points. Seven of the defendants SotoRamrez, Soto-Benquez, Alicea-Torres, Vega-Pacheco, Fernndez-Malav,
Garca-Garca, and Cintrn-Caraballo ordered or participated in murders to
protect the drug points. Soto-Ramrez and Alicea-Torres killed a police officer
and a government informant who were about to discover the group's stash of
weapons used to protect the drug points. Soto-Ramrez ordered the murder of
one of his drug dealers when some cocaine and a machine gun disappeared,
sending the message that those who broke ranks and stole from the group
would be punished. See United States v. Rodriguez, 162 F.3d 135, 143 (1st
Cir.1998) (finding the beating of a member of the conspiracy suspected of
being an informant to be in furtherance of the conspiracy because it served to
"maintain[] discipline in [the conspiracy's] ranks"). On Soto-Benquez's orders,
Cintrn-Caraballo kidnapped Rivera-Gonzlez and brought him to Bitumul to
be killed to avenge the death of Cosme-Sobrado. Vega-Pacheco participated in
the Quintana massacre to avenge the death of Rivera-Pagn, a member of the
group. While defending the group's territory at Callejn Nueve, FernndezMalav killed Tito Dones-Sanchez by opening fire on a van suspected of
containing rival gang members. Garca-Garca killed a member of the rival
Chacho gang who threatened Rodrguez-Lpez.
36
37
39
The three defendants argue that later events centered around a separate
conspiracy, led by Rodrguez-Lpez. Rodrguez-Lpez, who had originally
been part of the conspiracy headed by Soto-Ramrez and Soto-Benquez, left
Bitumul for Fajardo in the summer of 1993 to avoid being arrested for his
involvement in the Quintana massacre. While in Fajardo, he stole a 200
kilogram shipment of cocaine. Upon his return to San Juan in June or July of
1993, and without consulting anyone in Bitumul, Rodrguez-Lpez
reestablished a drug point at Callejn Nueve with the stolen cocaine, employing
outsiders from Fajardo to operate the point. Negrn-Maldonado testified that
while he was in Philadelphia, he had telephone conversations with people in
Bitumul, including Cintrn-Caraballo, who wanted to kill Rodrguez-Lpez for
bringing outsiders into the Bitumul operation; Torrens-Alicea confirmed that
some members of the original group "were out to kill" Rodrguez-Lpez.
40
Each of the three defendants argues that the multiple conspiracies theory affects
his liability in a different way. Gonzalez-Ayala contends that, at most, he was a
member only of a later uncharged conspiracy headed by Rodrguez-Lpez; he
did not join any conspiracy at all until the summer of 1993, when he helped
Rodrguez-Lpez steal the shipment of cocaine and returned with RodrguezLpez to set up the drug point at Callejn Nueve. Gonzalez-Ayala thus
contends that no evidence ties him to the other Bitumul drug points or the
42
43
The jury was instructed on multiple conspiracies, at the request of the defense.
The district court informed the jury that it must acquit "[e]ven if the evidence
in the case shows that defendants were a member of some conspiracy, and not
the single conspiracy charged in the indictment." As noted earlier, where the
jury was properly instructed and found the defendants guilty of conspiracy, its
verdict is reviewable only for sufficiency of evidence. David, 940 F.2d at 732.
44
On the evidence, a jury could have concluded that there was a later, rival
conspiracy, but it was not compelled to do so. There is sufficient evidence to
support the jury's verdict of guilt, as well as its implicit finding that a single
conspiracy existed that extended through the summer of 1993. The jury could
plausibly have found that Rodrguez-Lpez was a member of the original
conspiracy, that the reestablishment of the Callejn Nueve drug point in the
small neighborhood of Bitumul was part of an agreed-upon general operation to
sell drugs and to control the drug trade in Bitumul, that the tension among the
members of the overarching group did not destroy the overall agreement, that
those tensions were worked out, and that the cooperation worked to everyone's
benefit and continued to provide a system of common defense.
45
continued to transact and meet with Rodrguez-Lpez after his return. NegrnMaldonado bought heroin on credit from Rodrguez-Lpez on at least one
occasion, and "cooked" crack cocaine for Rodrguez-Lpez. "Peter," who
managed Soto-Ramrez's point, Alicea-Torres, and Vega-Cosme all distributed
kilograms of cocaine for Rodrguez-Lpez after his return. On September 12,
1993, Garca-Garca, de Len Maysonet, and two other members of the original
Bitumul group joined together with newcomers Gonzalez-Ayala and TorrensAlicea to find and kill Vitito, who had been hired to kill those who had stolen
the 200 kilogram shipment of cocaine in Fajardo. Furthermore, after
Rodrguez-Lpez's return, Soto-Ramrez, Vega-Cosme, Cintrn-Caraballo, and
Negrn-Maldonado all continued to operate the same drug points, and GarcaGarca, de Len Maysonet, Alicea-Torres, Fernndez-Malav, and two other
members of the original conspiracy continued to work at those points.
46
47
Because the record supports the jury's finding of a single conspiracy, the three
defendants are liable for their participation. Although Gonzalez-Ayala may
have joined the conspiracy late, as long as he did so knowingly, he is liable for
the conspiracy itself and earlier acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. David,
940 F.2d at 735. A jury could easily have found that he joined knowingly.
Gonzalez-Ayala was present at the meeting of Negrn-Maldonado, CintrnCaraballo, and Rodrguez-Lpez in August or September of 1993, in which they
worked out their differences. He also participated in the trip to Fajardo to kill
Vitito. Mere association with conspirators does not establish a knowing intent to
join a conspiracy. United States v. Gomez-Pabon, 911 F.2d 847, 853 (1st
Cir.1990). But, in this situation, the jury could have reasonably inferred from
Gonzalez-Ayala's presence at negotiations between major players in the gang
and from his participation in the hunt for Vitito that he knew or learned of "the
essential nature of the plan" to distribute narcotics in Bitumul and the violent
tactics used to carry out that distribution. Mena-Robles, 4 F.3d at 1032 (quoting
United States v. O'Campo, 973 F.2d 1015, 1019 (1st Cir.1992)).
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
Rather than disclose this information immediately, the prosecution waited and
56
The unknowing presentation of perjured testimony before the grand jury was
harmless and does not warrant any remedial action. "[A]s a general matter, a
district court may not dismiss an indictment for errors in grand jury proceedings
unless such errors prejudiced the defendants." Bank of Nova Scotia v. United
States, 487 U.S. 250, 254, 108 S.Ct. 2369, 101 L.Ed.2d 228 (1988); see also
United States v. Flores-Rivera, 56 F.3d 319, 328 (1st Cir.1995). Here, the
district court specifically found that "[d]efendants can hardly show prejudice
when the matter was later explained to the Grand Jury and the perjured
testimony has not been used in trial." We review this conclusion only for an
abuse of discretion. See United States v. Maceo, 873 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 840, 110 S.Ct. 125, 107 L.Ed.2d 86 (1989). No such abuse
was present here.
57
First, the grand jury returned a superseding indictment after learning of the
perjured testimony, thereby demonstrating that sufficient evidence existed to
indict the defendants even absent the testimony of Rodrguez-Lpez.
58
Of even greater import, a petit jury subsequently found the defendants guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of the charges alleged in the indictment. Such a
finding "demonstrates a fortiori that there was probable cause to charge the
defendants with the offenses for which they were convicted." United States v.
Soto-Benquez and Soto-Ramrez argue that the indictment should have been
dismissed because the government delayed in obtaining it. As discussed infra,
the indictment complied with the statute of limitations, which is the primary
safeguard against pre-indictment delay. When the statute of limitations has been
met, a defendant seeking reversal of his conviction based on pre-indictment
delay "bears the heavy burden of showing not only that the pre-indictment
delay caused him actual, substantial prejudice, but also that the prosecution
orchestrated the delay to gain a tactical advantage over him." United States v.
Stokes, 124 F.3d 39, 46-47 (1st Cir.1997); see also United States v. Marion,
404 U.S. 307, 324, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971). Soto-Benquez and
Soto-Ramrez have not attempted to make such a showing.
due process rights were violated because they were deprived of adequate notice
of the predicate offenses underlying the CCE charge. Where the CCE count of
an indictment does not list the specific predicate offenses but those offenses are
alleged in other counts of the indictment, courts have generally held that
defendants have received actual notice of the charges and no reversible error
has occurred. United States v. Staggs, 881 F.2d 1527, 1530-31 (10th Cir.1989)
(finding indictment adequate where no underlying violations were specified in
the CCE count but at least three underlying violations were listed elsewhere in
the indictment); United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 752 (7th
Cir.1988); United States v. Becton, 751 F.2d 250, 256-57 (8th Cir.1984). We
think it preferable for predicate offenses to be alleged in the CCE count. But, at
least where the CCE count incorporates by reference predicate offenses charged
elsewhere in the indictment, failure to list predicate offenses in the CCE count
itself is not reversible error because the defendant has been provided fair notice.
Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d at 752; Becton, 751 F.2d at 256-57.
64
Here, while the CCE count did not explicitly set forth three CCE predicate
offenses, it incorporated Count Two, the conspiracy count. Count Two did
provide such notice. Count Two states that "at divers times" between January 1,
1990 and March 7, 1994, the defendants distributed and possessed with intent to
distribute heroin, cocaine, crack cocaine, and marijuana. It further states that
the defendants "would purchase multi-kilogram quantities of heroin, cocaine
and marijuana at wholesale prices, ... would cut, divide, and package [the
drugs] in small packages for subsequent sale at drug points, [and]... would sell
packaged [drugs] in small quantities to customers at drug points." That count
also alleges specifically that Soto-Ramrez and Soto-Benquez supervised the
"supply [of] sellers with the drugs to be sold ... and [the sale of] narcotics at
drug point," and that they would "personally deliver packaged narcotics to
[their] runners and sellers."
65
Defendants argue (1) that the acts described in Count Two are insufficient to
provide notice because they establish only one predicate offense, namely, the
conspiracy to distribute narcotics,5 and (2) that the acts are insufficiently
described. Both assertions are incorrect. As to the defendants' first contention,
each act of distribution described in the indictment constitutes a separate
predicate offense. See, e.g., United States v. Escobar-de Jesus, 187 F.3d 148,
160 n. 6 (1st Cir.1999) (treating two different incidents of possession with the
intent to distribute as two separate predicate offenses). Multiple acts of
distribution, certainly three or more, are alleged. As to their second contention,
the time period and acts are alleged in sufficient detail to provide adequate
notice.
66
Defendants then argue that the indictment failed to specify either the amount of
drugs distributed or the amount of "substantial income" received by the
defendants, thus depriving them of notice as to whether they were charged
under 21 U.S.C. 848(a) or (b). Section 848(a) carries a sentence of thirty
years to life, whereas 848(b) carries a mandatory life sentence. We reject
defendants' argument. Defendants, merely by reading the indictment, were on
notice of the possibility of a life sentence. Section 848(b) requires life
imprisonment for the "principal... leaders" of the continuing criminal enterprise
if their violation of the drug laws involved more than 300 times the quantity
described in 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B). The indictment identified Soto-Ramrez
and Soto-Benquez as the two "leader[s]... of the drug-trafficking organization
described in Counts One and Two." It also identified them as conspiring to
distribute, inter alia, more than five kilograms of cocaine base, which is more
than 300 times the five grams of cocaine base described in 841(b)(1)(B).
67
Defendants also argue that in the indictment the predicate offenses for the CCE
charge were based on the conspiracy count, but at trial, the government used
evidence of uncharged narcotics offenses to establish the predicate offenses.
Thus, defendants argue, although the CCE charge remained the same, the facts
used to prove the series element of the charge were different from those set
forth in the indictment.
68
Soto-Benquez and Soto-Ramrez next argue that their prosecution under the
CCE statute is contrary to legislative intent. That intent, they contend, is to
enhance punishment for large-scale drug kingpins. Defendants argue that the
evidence did not show them to be kingpins because they lived modestly. The
government argues that we should not entertain this argument because the
crime charged is within the statutory language and that ends the inquiry. If the
crime charged is literally within the words of the statute, there is not usually
occasion to inquire into intent. See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544,
551, 99 S.Ct. 2470, 61 L.Ed.2d 68 (1979). That is the case here.
71
74
The parties dispute which acts count as predicate offenses for purposes of
determining whether the statute of limitations has run. Soto-Benquez and SotoRamrez argue, by analogy to the RICO statute, that only the acts of the parties
charged with the CCE count, and not those of their co-conspirators, may be
considered. See United States v. Torres Lopez, 851 F.2d 520, 524-25 (1st
Cir.1988) (applying this rule to substantive RICO charges). The government
argues that it need only demonstrate that acts in furtherance of the conspiracy
occurred within the five-year limitations period and that the defendants failed to
withdraw from the conspiracy.
75
We need not resolve this issue because the evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, is sufficient to support the conclusion that both
Soto-Ramrez and Soto-Benquez themselves committed predicate offenses
after April 12, 1992. Although Soto-Ramrez was incarcerated on January 8,
1992, the government presented evidence that he still controlled and managed
the drug points at La Pared, Callejn Nueve, and Cuba Street. While he was in
prison, he employed Cosme-Sobrado to manage the points until May 1992.
77
78
79
80
Gonzalez-Ayala and de Len Maysonet appeal from the district court's denial
of their motions to be severed and tried with the second group of defendants.
On December 28, 1998, the day on which jury selection began, the district
court decided to split the sixteen defendants who planned to go to trial into two
groups. The government proposed that the first ten defendants on the
indictment become the first group to go to trial. The government's reasoning
was that this division would allow the prosecution to "try[] the senior
conspirators together, that is the principal leaders, and the organizers and
supervisors of the conspiracy" and to "try[] the conspirators who planned and
carried [out] numerous acts of violence within the conspiracy together." The
district court initially accepted this proposal but then severed one defendant to
allow for a mental competency hearing, another defendant because he was on
bond, and yet another defendant because his counsel withdrew from the case on
that day. Two other defendants were severed because they could not yet
proceed to trial; one was still a fugitive and the other, Rodrguez-Lpez, had
been indicted only two weeks earlier. Having severed five defendants, the
district court was left with the eleven appellants and decided to proceed to trial
with all eleven.
81
Gonzalez-Ayala and de Len Maysonet contend that the district court erred in
refusing to sever their cases. Rule 14, Fed.R.Crim.P., allows a trial court to
sever defendants when joinder would prejudice them. Gonzalez-Ayala and de
Len Maysonet argue that the joinder prejudiced them by forcing them to go to
trial with more senior conspirators. They contend that the complexity of the
case and the markedly different degrees of culpability between them and their
co-defendants, many of whom committed murders or held leadership positions
in the conspiracy, created the potential for jury confusion. Moreover, they
argue that they were prejudiced by the presentation of spillover evidence
regarding fifteen murders committed by their co-defendants, in which they did
not participate.
82
We review the district court's denial of defendants' motions for severance under
Fed.R.Crim.P. 14 for abuse of discretion. United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438,
449 n. 12, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986); United States v. DeLuca, 137
F.3d 24, 36 (1st Cir.1998). To demonstrate abuse of discretion, defendants must
show that joinder deprived them of a fair trial, resulting in a miscarriage of
justice. United States v. Baltas, 236 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir.2001). Because the
general rule is that those indicted together are tried together to prevent
inconsistent verdicts and to conserve judicial and prosecutorial resources,
severance is particularly difficult to obtain where, as here, multiple defendants
share a single indictment. United States v. O'Bryant, 998 F.2d 21, 25 (1st
Cir.1993).
83
Defendants have not made such a strong showing of prejudice. As to the murder
evidence, defendants cannot complain of an improper spillover effect where
evidence is independently admissible against them. United States v. Brandon,
17 F.3d 409, 440 (1st Cir.1994); O'Bryant, 998 F.2d at 26. Because conspiracy
cases often involve evidence that is admissible against all members of the
conspiracy, "in the context of conspiracy, severance will rarely, if ever, be
required." DeLuca, 137 F.3d at 36 (quoting Flores-Rivera, 56 F.3d at 325
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Here, the murder evidence
would likely be admissible against Gonzalez-Ayala and de Len Maysonet even
in a separate trial in order to demonstrate the operation and development of the
conspiracy's system of common defense.
84
As to the complexity of the case and the potential for jury confusion, there is
no indication that the jury was unable to distinguish the evidence and acts
relating to each defendant. The court instructed the jury that each defendant
must be judged separately based on the evidence admissible against him.
Defendants are not entitled to severance solely on the basis that their codefendants were more culpable. See Flores-Rivera, 56 F.3d at 325; Brandon, 17
F.3d at 440-41.
85
86
87
88
89
The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to dismiss the
indictment due to the prosecution's discovery violations. Rather than resort to
the drastic remedy of dismissal, the district court wisely addressed the
prosecution's failures to comply with discovery deadlines on a situation-bysituation basis in order to prevent or remedy any prejudice that those violations
may have had on the defendants. Cf. United States v. Santana, 6 F.3d 1, 11 (1st
Cir.1993) (suggesting that a court should not dismiss an indictment when
prosecutorial misconduct is "redressable through the utilization of less drastic
disciplinary tools"). For instance, in response to the government's failure to
comply with one discovery order, the district court chastised the prosecution
and ordered the government to provide the defendants with information not
normally covered by Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Addressing another violation, the district court set an accelerated discovery
timetable and warned the prosecution that "[i]f the government fails to comply,
the court will dismiss the indictment." In a third instance, the court refused to
admit into evidence a photograph that the prosecution had not adequately
disclosed to the defense. Each of these responses to the government's discovery
violations helped mitigate any prejudice to the defendants that might otherwise
have resulted from the government's apparent inability to meet discovery
deadlines. Given this solution, the district court's continual denials of the
defendants' motions to dismiss the indictment due to the government's
discovery violations were certainly not abuses of discretion. That conclusion is
not a condonation of the government's behavior; it is just a recognition that
reversal of the conviction is not warranted, given the district court's imposition
of other sanctions.
C. Alleged Trial Errors
1. Evidentiary Rulings
92
The district court's ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Old Chief v.
United States, 519 U.S. 172, 183 n. 7, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997).
The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. CosmeSobrado's murder was relevant to demonstrate a motive for an overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy: the kidnapping and murder of Herberto RiveraGonzlez. Members of the conspiracy killed Rivera-Gonzlez because he was a
suspected participant in Cosme-Sobrado's murder. Cosme-Sobrado's death was
also important to demonstrate that conspirators from different drug points
would come together to avenge the death of a member of their gang. Similarly,
the killings of Rivera-Pagn and Millan-Soto in shootings by the Chacho gang
were relevant to demonstrate the basis for gang warfare with Chacho. This gang
warfare led to two overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy: the murder of
Roberto Vasallo-Morninglane, who was a member of the Chacho gang, and the
Quintana massacre.
93
Three defendants contend that evidence of murders should not have been
admitted against them because the government did not establish a connection
between any of the murders and the charged conspiracy. They argue that the
murders were not shown to be in furtherance of the charged conspiracy. They
also argue that even if the murders were in furtherance of a conspiracy headed
by Soto-Ramrez and Soto-Benquez from 1990 until the summer of 1993,
those murders did not advance the interests of the later conspiracy headed by
Rodrguez-Lpez. These errors regarding the admission of the murder
evidence, they contend, cannot be harmless because the murders constituted
about seventy-five percent of the government's evidence at trial.
96
Review is for abuse of discretion. No abuse occurred here. The three murders
discussed in the previous section were admissible to demonstrate the motive for
subsequent overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. The remaining murders
were admissible as acts in furtherance of the conspiracy.
97
A reasonable factfinder could infer that the murder of Dagoberto RoblesRodrguez was in furtherance of the conspiracy. Soto-Ramrez and SotoBenquez worked for Robles-Rodrguez, who owned the drug point on Cuba
Street, at the time of the murder. Negrn-Maldonado testified that Soto-
It is also a reasonable inference that government informant Ana Luz DonesArroyo and undercover police officer Efrain Hernndez de Len were killed in
furtherance of the conspiracy to prevent their discovery of the group's
weapons stash. The two were gunned down as Dones-Arroyo was leading the
officer to the location of the stash.
99
Fernando Agosto-Villegas was killed on Soto-Ramrez's orders because twoeighths of a kilogram of cocaine and a machine gun belonging to Soto-Ramrez
were missing. The murder furthered the conspiracy by sending the message that
those suspected of stealing from the conspiracy would be treated harshly.
Rodriguez, 162 F.3d at 143.
100 Herberto Rivera-Gonzlez was killed in retribution for the death of CosmeSobrado, who had been managing Soto-Ramrez's drug point for him while he
was in prison. The defendants correctly note that the government never proved
that Rivera-Gonzlez was actually a member of a rival gang or participated in
killing Cosme-Sobrado. But the government met its burden when it presented
testimony that the conspirators believed, even if incorrectly, that RiveraGonzlez was responsible and that they killed him for that reason. See, e.g.,
United States v. Mayes, 917 F.2d 457, 464 (10th Cir.1990) (explaining that to
be "in furtherance" of a conspiracy, an act must be intended to promote
conspiratorial objectives but need not actually succeed in furthering the
conspiracy).
101 Reynaldo Cancel-Robles was killed because he seized control of a drug point
located outside Bitumul in the Vista Hermosa housing project that was supplied
by Soto-Benquez. His murder furthered the conspiracy by protecting its
customer base and thus ensuring a stronger market for its narcotics.
102 Robert Vasallo-Morninglane and the five victims of the Quintana Massacre
were killed in retribution for the death of Angel Rivera-Pagn. Rivera-Pagn
had died in a shootout in Bitumul with the rival Chacho gang, to which VasalloMorninglane and two of the five victims of the Quintana Massacre belonged.
These murders furthered the conspiracy's goal of defending its territory and its
seized when he was arrested on April 9, 1993. He contends that the photograph
was taken after Officers Rosa-Lopez and Victor-Rivera illegally entered and
searched his apartment without a warrant.
119 The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the suppression motion and
held that the warrantless entry was justified by exigent circumstances. The
court made the following factual determinations. Officer Rosa-Lopez was on
routine patrol during the evening of April 9, 1993 when he saw a person
carrying a nickel-plated gun in his hand. Before he could respond, the
individual noticed Officer Rosa-Lopez (who was in uniform) and began to run
in the opposite direction. Officer Rosa-Lopez pursued the suspect up a nearby
stairway between two houses, but lost sight of him when he apparently jumped
onto an adjacent patio. Meanwhile, Officer Victor-Rivera was patrolling the
same area when he received notice on his police radio of the pursuit involving
Officer Rosa-Lopez. While he was approaching the area to provide back-up, he
observed an individual carrying a black gun. That individual, on spotting
Officer Victor-Rivera (who was in uniform), immediately turned around and
ran into a house behind him. Officer Victor-Rivera followed the person, later
identified as Fernndez-Malav, into the house and pursued him up the
stairway. Officer Rosa-Lopez, still searching for the first suspect outside, heard
a window open. He turned toward the noise and saw someone drop a gun and a
plastic bag containing drugs out of the window. When he looked through the
window, he saw Fernndez-Malav inside. He then seized the drugs and the
weapon. After a third officer told him that Officer Victor-Rivera was inside,
Officer Rosa-Lopez went to the front of the house. Officer Rosa-Lopez
explained to Officer Victor-Rivera that he had just observed Fernndez-Malav
drop the seized drugs and weapon out of the back window, and FernndezMalav was placed under arrest.
120 This court reviews the district court's findings of fact for clear error and its
ultimate Fourth Amendment conclusion de novo. Ornelas v. United States, 517
U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). The district court's
rendition of facts is not clearly erroneous. Fernndez-Malav unsuccessfully
attempts to discredit the court's findings by noting that much of Officer RosaLopez's testimony was not included in an earlier sworn statement of his. There
are multiple explanations for why Officer Rosa-Lopez might not have reported
certain details about his encounter with Fernndez-Malav in his sworn
statement, including his belief at the time that those details were not important.
The absence of those details does not establish clear error.
121 The district court's Fourth Amendment conclusion was correct. Once
Fernndez-Malav abandoned the weapon and drugs by throwing them out of
125 Cintrn-Caraballo argues that the court should have excluded the testimony of
eleven witnesses because they provided expert testimony but, he says, were not
disclosed as experts under Rule 702.8 These witnesses included eight forensic
examiners (Ruben Diaz-De Len, Alfredo Roman-Rodriguez, Virginia Cortes,
Luis Batista-Maldonado, Nelson Morales-Huerta, Luis Mercedes-Rodriguez,
Francisco Ramos-Seda, and Cesar W. Ostolaza-Perez), two pathologists (Dr.
Yocasta Brougal-Mena and Dr. Francisco Cortes), and a firearms examiner
(Juan B. Maldonado). This was prejudicial, Cintrn-Caraballo argues, because
the defendants would have been entitled to summaries of the witnesses'
testimony if they had been designated as experts. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(a)(1)
(G)(defendants are entitled to summaries of all expert testimony, which must
include "the witness's opinions, the bases and reasons for those opinions, and
the witness's qualifications").
126 The district court correctly determined that none of the eight forensic
examiners provided expert testimony. Witnesses who testify only about their
perceptions of an event, or about lay opinions arising out of those perceptions,
see Fed R. Evid. 701, are not experts under Rule 702 regardless of any
specialized training or experience they may possess. See United States v. Paiva,
892 F.2d 148, 157 (1st Cir.1989) ("[T]he individual experience and knowledge
of a lay witness may establish his or her competence, without qualification as
an expert, to express an opinion on a particular subject outside the realm of
common knowledge."); see also United States v. Rivera-Santiago, 107 F.3d
960, 968 (1st Cir. 1997). That rule is dispositive here: the court permitted each
of the witnesses to testify only about their observations at the various crime
scenes they personally investigated. Indeed, the court consistently reminded
both the witnesses and the lawyers that if any of these witnesses' testimony
"sound[ed] like a 702 [opinion] ... [he would] not admit it." Although at points
the district court faced difficult decisions about the side of the Rule 701 / Rule
702 divide on which a witness's opinion fell, there was no abuse of discretion in
the court's resolution of these issues. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526
U.S. 137, 152, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999) (review of a district
court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony is for abuse of discretion).
127 Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in allowing the expert testimony of
the two pathologists, Drs. Cortes and Brugel-Mena. The district court found,
despite the government's failure to label the witnesses' testimony and reports as
Rule 702 material in its pre-trial disclosure, that the government had effectively
complied with the applicable disclosure requirements. In particular, the
government had informed defendants before trial that both pathologists would
be testifying about several autopsies and provided the defendants with copies of
all of these autopsy reports. Although Dr. Cortes testified about one autopsy
report that he did not personally prepare, the district court permitted this
substitution because the pathologist who had prepared that report was
unavailable to testify due to serious illness. There is no generalized prohibition
on allowing experts to testify about autopsy reports that they did not personally
prepare. See Manocchio v. Moran, 919 F.2d 770, 780 (1st Cir.1990).
128 The government failed to formally designate the last witness, Juan Maldonado,
as an "expert", but it did inform the defendants that Maldonado would be
testifying about ballistics and provided the defense with all of Maldonado's
notes on his testimony. And once again, the district court permitted
Maldonado's testimony due to the lack of prejudice to the defense. Here,
though, the court compensated the defendants for the government's failure to
adhere to the technical requirements of Fed.R.Crim.P. 16 by certifying the
witness only as a ballistics expert, and refusing to also certify him as a
"firearms expert." This decision was an appropriate sanction against the
government and undercuts the defendant's prejudice argument.
g) Rule 404(b) "Bad Act" Evidence (Cintrn-Caraballo)
129
130 Cintrn-Caraballo argues that the court erred in admitting evidence of his
March 8, 1994 arrest by Puerto Rico police, and of the contemporaneous
seizure of a gun that he was carrying. He argues that this evidence was
impermissible bad act evidence under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) because it was not
relevant to demonstrating his participation in the conspiracy, which, according
to the indictment, had ended one day earlier, on March 7. Cintrn-Caraballo
also argues that the firearms evidence should have been excluded as unreliable
because the firearm had been destroyed by Puerto Rico authorities.
131 These arguments are unavailing. Evidence of Cintrn-Caraballo's arrest was
admissible under Rule 404(b) because the arrest was for activities evidencing
his participation in the conspiracy charged in the indictment. The arrest took
place on Street B, where the drug point that the government alleged CintrnCaraballo supervised was located. This evidence demonstrated an overt act in
furtherance of the alleged conspiracy and Rule 404(b) explicitly provides that
evidence of bad acts is admissible for purposes other than showing actions in
conformity with those acts. See Fed.R.Evid. 404(b).
132 The fact that the indictment charged the conspiracy with ending "on or about"
March 7 does not change this conclusion. The "on or about" language left the
district court leeway to conclude that the arrest fit within this time frame, and
thus that the arrest was evidence of an act directly in furtherance of the
conspiracy. Cf. Portela, 167 F.3d at 704 (indictment charging defendant with
138 Soto-Ramrez also argues that Maldonado's testimony in rebuttal should have
been excluded because it was expert firearms testimony that the district court
had specifically excluded during the government's case-in-chief. The court
rejected this argument, concluding that the defendants had sufficient notice that
Maldonado would testify to this issue and thus that its previous holding limiting
Maldonado's testimony to ballistics was not applicable. This conclusion was
sound. The defendants were provided with a report before trial that Maldonado
would testify that the same weapons were used in the Robles-Rodrguez and
Dones-Arroyo murders.
139 2. Brady and Giglio Claims (Soto-Benquez, Soto-Ramrez, Alicea-Torres)
140 Defendants contend that there were multiple Brady and Giglio violations. See
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963);
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104
(1972). First, several defendants challenge the government's failure to reveal
the apparent inconsistencies in Rodrguez-Lpez's story when it first became
aware of them in the summer of 1998. At that time, all the prosecution knew
was that Rodrguez-Lpez had lied to the FBI (not the grand jury) about being
present at Rivera-Gonzlez's murder. He had not testified to the grand jury
about that murder. Although the prosecution must reveal material information
that is favorable to the accused, the fact that Rodrguez-Lpez may not have
been present at the Rivera-Gonzlez murder is not exculpatory evidence.
Admittedly, the analysis might have been different if the government had
ultimately called Rodrguez-Lpez as a witness at trial: his earlier lies to the
government would certainly have constituted a basis for impeaching him. See
Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153-54, 92 S.Ct. 763; Moreno-Morales v. United States, 334
F.3d 140, 145 (1st Cir.2003). But the government did not call RodrguezLpez. Furthermore, as the trial court noted, the defendants knew a month
before trial that Rodrguez-Lpez had lied, so they had sufficient time to
interview him and have him testify if they so desired.
141 Several defendants also argue that the government failed to fully disclose the
extent of Negrn-Maldonado's plea and cooperation agreement with the
government. After testifying on direct examination about ten murders, NegrnMaldonado admitted during redirect examination that the government had
promised him favorable treatment in his related state court proceedings in
exchange for his testimony. Counsel for Soto-Benquez and Soto-Ramrez
immediately moved for a mistrial, telling the court that the prosecution had
never disclosed its intervention in the Puerto Rico courts on behalf of the
witness. (The prosecution had disclosed the existence of a plea arrangement
innocence and the prosecution's duty to convince the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt, see, e.g., Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483-85, 98 S.Ct. 1930, 56
L.Ed.2d 468 (1978) (noting the scholarly debate concerning whether the
presumption of innocence is analytically distinct from the requirement that the
government prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt); McCormick on Evidence
346 (5th ed.1999) (suggesting that the presumption of innocence is "a
convenient introduction to the statement of the burdens upon the prosecution"),
due process requires that both of these principles guide the jury in reaching its
verdict. Taylor, 436 U.S. at 483-86, 98 S.Ct. 1930; Coffin v. United States, 156
U.S. 432, 453, 461, 15 S.Ct. 394, 39 L.Ed. 481 (1895). To undercut one, even if
the other remains standing, is improper. It is for precisely this reason that a
district court's failure to instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence may
violate due process even when the jury has been properly informed of the
prosecution's burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Taylor, 436
U.S. at 488-89, 98 S.Ct. 1930.
163 The prosecution's contention that the statements were a justified response to the
argument of defense counsel is also incorrect. Although it is true that, in certain
circumstances, a prosecutor's otherwise impermissible statements during
closing argument may be allowable because they were "invited" by defense
counsel, United States v. Henderson, 320 F.3d 92, 107 (1st Cir.2003), this was
clearly not such a case. Defense counsel's argument that the defendants' pleas of
not guilty in federal court were particularly trustworthy because the defendants
had formerly pled guilty in state court was not improper and did not justify the
prosecutor's response.
164 Not every prosecutorial error in making closing argument justifies a new trial,
even when that error undermines constitutional rights. No reversible error
occurs when the reviewing court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the
constitutional error was harmless. Wihbey, 75 F.3d at 772 n. 6; see also United
States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 510-11, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983).
As the Supreme Court has clarified, the relevant question "is not what effect the
constitutional error might generally be expected to have upon a reasonable jury,
but rather what effect it had upon the guilty verdict in the case at hand."
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182
(1993); see United States v. Rivera-Santiago, 107 F.3d 960, 967 (1st Cir. 1997).
165 We conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecutor's improper closing
argument did not prejudice the defendants in this case. The court gave curative
instructions that established the presumption of innocence immediately after
the prosecutor's first improper statement (the only time the defense made the
appropriate objection). It then reinforced the presumption in its general
instructions to the jury, noting that it "is a cardinal principle of our system that
every person accused of a crime is presumed to be innocent unless and until
his/her guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt." Given those instructions
and the strong evidence of guilt, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that
the statements did not affect the ultimate outcome of the case, especially when
they occupied only several seconds in a six-month long trial.
166 4. Cumulative Effect of Errors (Soto-Benquez, Soto-Ramrez)
167 A series of errors, each one of which is individually "harmless," may have a
cumulative effect that requires a new trial. United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d
1161, 1195-96 (1st Cir.1993).
168 Defendants rely on this proposition, arguing that, considered as a whole, the
prosecution's missteps warrant a new trial. To this point, we have concluded
that the prosecution erred in repeatedly failing to meet discovery deadlines, in
neglecting to disclose the extent of its plea arrangement with NegrnMaldonado, and in making inappropriate remarks during closing arguments.
This conduct is blameworthy and the government should take steps to see that it
does not recur.
169 Still, the government's bad behavior does not require that the jury's verdict of
guilt be set aside. At a minimum, to overturn a verdict, the prosecution's bad
behavior must have prejudiced the defendants. See, e.g., United States v.
Joyner, 191 F.3d 47, 53 (1st Cir.1999) (in evaluating allegations of
prosecutorial misconduct, "the unavoidable bottom line" is "whether we deem
it likely, or not, that any prejudice affected the outcome of the case"). Although
the frustrations of defense counsel are understandable, that test is not met here.
170 The defense was not demonstrably prejudiced by any of the government's
violations, and sometimes even gained an advantage from them. The defendants
ultimately received the necessary discovery and were provided with
compensation such as additional discovery and the exclusion of otherwise
admissible evidence. When the defendants learned of the federal prosecution's
intervention in state court on behalf of Negrn-Maldonado, the court offered
them additional time to cross-examine the witness. And while the court's
curative instruction during the prosecutor's closing arguments was concise, it
was sufficient in the context of the overall instructions to assure that the jury
was properly appraised of the import of the presumption of innocence. The
totality of errors argument is unsuccessful.
D. Post Trial
171 1. Sufficiency of Evidence as to CCE Count (Soto-Benquez, Soto-Ramrez)
172 Soto-Benquez and Soto-Ramrez argue that there is insufficient evidence to
support their convictions. They offer no further explanation, except to cite to
their filings before the district court. Their argument as to sufficiency of
evidence has been waived. See Grella, 42 F.3d at 36. "If counsel desires our
consideration of a particular argument, the argument must appear within the
four corners of the brief filed in this court." Executive Leasing Corp. v. Banco
Popular de P.R., 48 F.3d 66, 67-68 (1st Cir.1995). Attorneys cannot
circumvent this requirement by referencing their district court filings. Id. at 68.
173 2. Sufficiency of Evidence as to Conspiracy Count (Cintrn-Caraballo, VegaCosme, Vega-Coln)
174 Vega-Cosme and Vega-Coln argue that the evidence is insufficient to tie them
to the charged conspiracy. We reject this claim.
175 The government presented overwhelming evidence of Vega-Cosme's
participation in the conspiracy. Government witnesses testified that VegaCosme had a series of agreements with other members of the conspiracy to
maximize drug revenue. He negotiated with the Chacho gang on behalf of the
drug points to end the warfare that was interfering with drug sales, met with
Negrn-Maldonado to coordinate the colors of crack capsule caps to avoid
competition between the points, and arranged the opening of his own drug
point on Laguna Street with Soto Ramrez. Although Vega-Cosme correctly
notes that there is no evidence that Soto-Ramrez acted as his supplier, the
government did present testimony that Vega-Cosme supplied narcotics to SotoRamrez, along with ammunition used in shootings of rival gang members in
1992 and 1993.
176 The record also shows sufficient evidence of the participation of Vega-Cosme's
son, Miguel Vega-Coln. Vega-Coln packaged crack cocaine, heroin, and
marijuana for his father's point. He also stood armed guard at the Callejn
Nueve drug point, which was owned by Rodrguez-Lpez. Both of those
activities were in furtherance of the conspiracy. Moreover, based on VegaColn's presence at meetings between Vega-Cosme and Soto-Ramrez, a
reasonable jury could have concluded that he joined the conspiracy knowingly
and voluntarily.
177 Vega-Cosme and Vega-Coln also argue that their convictions are based on
unreliable testimony from co-conspirators who "had clear incentives to testify
untruthfully." In assessing the sufficiency of evidence, credibility
determinations must be resolved in favor of the verdict. United States v.
Guerra-Garcia, 336 F.3d 19, 22 (1st Cir.2003). Credibility judgments are the
province of the jury, not of this court.
178 Cintrn-Caraballo also makes an insufficiency of evidence argument. He argues
that the district court erred in admitting certain expert testimony and Rule
404(b) "bad act" evidence, and contends that without this evidence, the only
evidence tying him to the conspiracy is the uncorroborated testimony of coconspirators. This argument fails. The contested evidence was properly
admitted. See Part III.B(f)-(g). Moreover, even if Cintrn-Caraballo's
conviction rested only on co-conspirator testimony, the jury was entitled to
credit such testimony and convict him on that basis. See United States v.
Torres-Galindo, 206 F.3d 136, 140 (1st Cir.2000).
179 3. Special Verdict and Jury Instructions for CCE Count (Soto-Benquez, SotoRamrez)
180 Soto-Benquez and Soto-Ramrez claim that the district court committed
reversible error when it failed to instruct the jury to determine the quantity and
type of drugs. First, they argue that the drug amount is an element of the CCE
offense and that the jury was not otherwise instructed to find a minimum drug
amount. Second, they argue that Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120
S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), requires that the drug amount be proven to
the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The standard of review for alleged jury
instruction errors involving the interpretation of the elements of a statutory
offense is de novo. United States v. Shea, 150 F.3d 44, 49-50 (1st Cir.1998).
181 We reject both arguments. As to the claim that the drug amount is an element
of the CCE offense, the CCE statute plainly does not require a minimum drug
amount for a conviction.
182 As to Soto-Ramrez and Soto-Benquez's Apprendi argument, Apprendi
requires that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 530 U.S. at 490,
120 S.Ct. 2348. Here, absent a finding of drug quantity, the statutory maximum
for CCE is already life imprisonment: the statute authorizes a sentence of
twenty years to life imprisonment regardless of drug amount. 21 U.S.C.
848(a)-(c). A drug amount above a certain level can result in a mandatory life
sentence, 848(b), but does not change the statutory maximum. Hence, no
Apprendi violation has occurred with regard to the CCE convictions.9
183 4. Special Verdict for Conspiracy Count (Alicea-Torres, Fernndez-Malav)
184 Alicea-Torres and Fernndez-Malav argue that the trial court erred in not
providing the jury with a special verdict form requiring it to determine the
quantity and type of drugs as to each defendant. They argue that a special
verdict form was necessary to ensure that the jury was unanimous as to drug
type and quantity. This argument is based on Apprendi and is discussed later.
E. Sentencing
1. Apprendi and Related Issues
a) Apprendi Error (Alicea-Torres, Fernndez-Malav, Vega-Pacheco, Vega-Cosme,
Vega-Coln)
185 Five of the non-CCE defendants Alicea-Torres, Fernndez-Malav, VegaPacheco, Vega-Cosme, and Vega-Coln assert that their sentences violated
the rule of Apprendi. They argue that the amount of drugs distributed by the
conspiracy was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury, that the drug
amount raised the statutory maximum, and that their sentences must be vacated
as a result. We conclude that Apprendi error did occur, but that the error was
harmless.
186 The jury instructions in this case did not make direct reference to drug amount
or quantity. Instead, the jury was instructed that, to find the defendants guilty of
the conspiracy count, it had to find that the government proved the conspiracy
charged in the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury was provided
with a copy of the indictment, which charged the defendants with knowingly
and intentionally distributing more than five kilograms of heroin, more than
five kilograms of cocaine, more than five kilograms of crack cocaine, and more
than 100 kilograms of marijuana. However, the jury was also instructed that the
actual amount of drugs need not be proven, and that the government need only
prove that defendants distributed or possessed with intent to distribute a
"measurable amount" of drugs.
187 The latter part of these instructions resulted in Apprendi error. This case
presents an even stronger case of Apprendi error than United States v. Nelson-
Rodriguez, 319 F.3d 12 (1st Cir.2003). In that case, as here, the jury was given
a copy of the indictment and instructed that to find the defendants guilty on the
conspiracy count, it had to find them guilty of the conspiracy in the indictment.
Id. at 45. The indictment in Nelson-Rodriguez, as here, specified drug types and
quantities sufficient to support the defendants' sentences. Id. We concluded that
this instruction was insufficient to elicit a jury determination of the threshold
drug amount and quantity. Id. The same analysis applies here with greater force
because the jury was specifically instructed that it need only find a "measurable
amount" of drugs.
188 All five defendants who raise the Apprendi issue were sentenced above the
default statutory maximum. Absent a jury determination of drug amount or
type, the default statutory maximum is based on the distribution of unspecified
amounts of marijuana, which results in a maximum sentence of five years for
first-time felony drug convictions and ten years if a prior such conviction
exists. 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(D), 846. Alicea-Torres, Fernndez-Malav,
Vega-Pacheco, and Vega-Cosme were sentenced to life imprisonment, and
Vega-Coln was sentenced to 292 months, or about twenty-five years, of
imprisonment.
189 The existence of an Apprendi error, however, does not end the inquiry. If the
defendants failed to preserve their Apprendi objection below, their sentences
are vacated only if we find plain error. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625,
631, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002). If they did preserve their
objection, their sentences are vacated only if we find that the error was not
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Nelson-Rodriguez, 319 F.3d at 49.
190 Fernndez-Malav preserved his Apprendi objection, and we assume without
deciding that the remaining defendants did the same, as it makes no difference
to the outcome. Defendants' trial took place from December 1998 to June 1999,
before Apprendi was decided. At the time, several defendants requested a
special verdict form requiring the jury to determine the drug amount and type
as to each defendant. But only Fernndez-Malav, who was the sole non-CCE
defendant sentenced after Apprendi was decided, challenged his sentence
before the district court on this basis. The question whether the remaining
defendants' special verdict request was sufficient to preserve an Apprendi
objection, absent a separate objection at sentencing, is a complex one. NelsonRodriguez, 319 F.3d at 48. Here, as in Nelson-Rodriguez, we prefer to assume
without deciding that the objection was preserved and the harmless error
standard applies. Id.
191 The Apprendi error in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. An
Cosme contends that this instruction changed the conjunctive term "and" in the
indictment into the disjunctive term "or." This argument is meritless. First, this
definition should not have affected the jury's consideration of the conspiracy
charge. The conspiracy count of the indictment and the jury instructions
regarding the elements of conspiracy require the jury to find that defendants
conspired to "distribute" controlled substances to return a guilty verdict;
nowhere does the term "possession with intent to distribute" appear. Second,
even if the term had appeared, the definition requires the government to prove
that the defendants did in fact possess specific drugs, even if they did not know
which drugs they possessed. Thus, the government must still show that the
defendant possessed cocaine and cocaine base and heroin and marijuana, even
if the defendant himself did not know the specific drugs that he had in his
possession. Finally, even if a multi-object conspiracy were charged and an
Apprendi error therefore occurred, Vega-Cosme admits that review would be
for plain error because he did not preserve this argument below. We have
already determined that any Apprendi error as to drug amount or type would be
harmless; a fortiori, no plain error occurred.
201 On petition for rehearing, Miguel Vega-Cosme clarified and expanded on his
original claim that a multi-object conspiracy was charged. Although it is likely
that Vega-Cosme's discussion in his original appellate brief of Edwards v.
United States, 523 U.S. 511, 118 S.Ct. 1475, 140 L.Ed.2d 703 (1998), without
developed argument as to why the jury instructions gave rise to a multi-object
conspiracy charge, waived the issue, we still reach the issue because what is at
stake is the difference between the life sentence Vega-Cosme received and the
forty-year maximum for marijuana-only conspiracy.
202 Review is for plain error because Vega-Cosme did not object on this ground to
the jury instructions. Assuming arguendo that a multi-object conspiracy error
did occur as a result of the instructions, we still conclude that the error was not
plain because it did not affect Vega-Cosme's substantial rights. To affect
substantial rights, an error must "affect[] the outcome of the district court
proceedings." United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 735, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123
L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). This inquiry is similar to the harmless error analysis,
except that the defendant rather than the government bears the burden of
persuasion as to prejudice. Id. Here, as noted above, the outcome was not
affected because the evidence of drug type and quantity was overwhelming,
whether the issue is viewed under the rubric of plain error or of harmless error.
203 Vega-Cosme seeks to avoid this result by suggesting, without explanation, in
his petition for rehearing that a multi-object conspiracy error is always plain,
regardless of the amount of evidence showing drug type. This argument
208 The district court's determinations of drug amounts were not clearly erroneous.
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, each defendant must be sentenced based on
the amount of drugs that he handled, negotiated, saw, or could reasonably have
foreseen to be embraced by the conspiracy. Rodriguez, 162 F.3d at 149;
U.S.S.G. 1B1.3 & cmt. 2. Applying this standard, the district court attributed
at least 1.5 kilograms of crack cocaine to each of the five defendants, resulting
in a base offense level of 38 for each.
209 The record at trial and sentencing supports this calculation. Negrn-Maldonado
testified that Soto-Ramrez sold 300 crack capsules to Cintrn-Caraballo on at
least ten occasions in 1990, which amounts to 450 grams of crack cocaine. He
also testified that at the beginning of 1990, Soto-Ramrez supplied him with
1000 to 1500 crack capsules, or about 150 to 200 grams, per week. Assuming
that these purchases continued for at least seven weeks, Soto-Ramrez would
have distributed 1.5 kilograms of crack cocaine just from sales to CintrnCaraballo and Negrn-Maldonado in 1990. Furthermore, according to NegrnMaldonado's testimony, during early 1992, Negrn-Maldonado "cooked" one to
three kilograms of cocaine into crack cocaine per week for Soto-Ramrez's
points. In one and a half weeks, Negrn-Maldonado would have packaged at
least 1.5 kilograms of crack cocaine for distribution at Soto Ramrez's points.
Although Soto-Ramrez was in prison at this time, the drug quantity was
reasonably foreseeable to him because he was still supervising his drug points
by telephone.
210 The government presented evidence that Soto-Benquez supplied other
members of the conspiracy with cocaine, which they converted into at least 1.5
kilograms of crack cocaine and distributed at their respective drug points.
Negrn-Maldonado testified that each week in early 1992, he bought one to
three kilograms of cocaine from Soto-Benquez and converted it into crack
cocaine. Over two weeks, this would exceed the required 1.5 kilograms.
Negrn-Maldonado also testified that Soto-Benquez supplied CintrnCaraballo with 125 grams of cocaine per week and Negrn-Maldonado with 75
to 125 grams of cocaine per week, which was converted into crack cocaine for
sale at their respective drug points. Over eight weeks, this would exceed the
required 1.5 kilograms. Soto-Benquez protests that he could not have
reasonably foreseen that the cocaine he supplied would be converted into crack
cocaine. The district court had sufficient evidence to conclude otherwise.
Negrn-Maldonado testified that Soto-Benquez's house was used, repeatedly,
as a location for converting cocaine into crack cocaine. He also testified that
when Cosme-Sobrado was killed, Soto-Benquez picked up the proceeds from
Soto-Ramrez's crack cocaine point and determined that money was missing.
Bitumul is a small community; given Soto-Benquez's involvement, it would be
difficult for him to be wholly ignorant that his co-conspirators were producing
crack cocaine. These activities and Soto-Benquez's leadership role in the
conspiracy are sufficient to support the conclusion that Soto-Benquez knew
Negrn-Maldonado and Cintrn-Caraballo sold crack cocaine at their points
and that he could have reasonably foreseen that the cocaine he supplied to them
would be converted into crack cocaine.
211 Cintrn-Caraballo's crack cocaine point was in operation throughout the
duration of the conspiracy, according to Negrn-Maldonado's testimony.
Negrn-Maldonado testified that Cintrn-Caraballo purchased over 90 grams of
crack cocaine per week for distribution at his point in 1990, 125 grams per
week in 1991, 125 grams on a regular basis in 1992, and over 150 grams per
week in early 1993. Assuming that Cintrn-Caraballo's drug point operated at
least four weeks each year, the total amount of crack cocaine purchased for
distribution would exceed 1.5 kilograms.
212 Negrn-Maldonado testified that the drug point operated by Vega-Cosme and
Vega-Coln sold crack cocaine in 1990, 1992, and 1993. Negrn-Maldonado
estimated that one drug point distributing crack cocaine would usually sell at
least one kilogram per month. That volume of sales alone is sufficient to exceed
the required 1.5 kilograms. In addition, the government presented evidence
indicating that the quantity of crack cocaine sold by Negrn-Maldonado and
Cintrn-Caraballo was reasonably foreseeable to Vega-Cosme. Vega-Cosme
met at least three times with the others to coordinate the color of the caps on
their respective crack capsules. These meetings are evidence that Vega-Cosme
had some awareness of his co-conspirators' crack cocaine sales and that, after
color-coding was instituted, he had some way of tracking their activities.
213 In response, all five defendants argue that this evidence is unreliable because it
is based on the testimony of cooperating co-conspirators and was
uncorroborated. Vega-Coln and Vega-Cosme argue in their brief that absent a
rule requiring corroboration of such evidence, "unsuspecting defendants would
be entirely at the mercy of cooperating co-defendants, who have all the
incentive in the world to testify in a manner [whether truthful or not] that will
assist the government in obtaining a larger sentence." That risk is real, but
vacating their sentences for lack of corroboration is not the answer.11 Here, the
cooperating co-defendants were vigorously cross-examined, and defense
counsel had the opportunity to present evidence of the witnesses's plea
agreements, grants of immunity, and receipt of government money. If the
government's dilatory production of discovery materials had impeded the crossexamination, the situation might be different. But it did not. The jury found the
co-conspirators credible, and, for sentencing purposes, so did the trial court.
ongoing role in the packaging and sale of those drugs, that Gonzalez-Ayala was
not a minor participant.
222 5. Grant of Upward Adjustment (Cintrn-Caraballo)
223 Cintrn-Caraballo argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the
district court's grant of a three-level sentencing enhancement for his role as a
supervisor in the conspiracy under U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(b). Under the Sentencing
Guidelines, a three-level enhancement is permissible "[i]f the defendant was a
manager or supervisor (but not an organizer or leader) and the criminal activity
involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive." U.S.S.G.
3B1.1(b). Review of this determination is for clear error. United States v.
Brown, 298 F.3d 120, 122 (1st Cir.2002).
224 The district court correctly counted the eleven defendants convicted in the trial
as meeting the "five or more participants" prong. The more serious question is
whether Cintrn-Caraballo was a manager or supervisor, terms not defined in
the Sentencing Guidelines but described in U.S.S.G. 3B1.1 cmt. 4 as
involving:
225 the exercise of decision making authority, the nature of participation in the
commission of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to
a larger share of the fruits of the crime, the degree of participation in planning
or organizing the offense, the nature and scope of the illegal activity, and the
degree of control and authority exercised over others.
226 Cintrn-Caraballo argues that there was no firm evidence that he was a
supervisor; there was only rumor and innuendo. But the government presented
testimony at trial that Cintrn-Caraballo controlled a drug point at Street B that
sold crack cocaine and that he had "Nanito, ... Bennie's little brothers, and other
persons" selling for him. He also had Negrn-Maldonado cook cocaine into
crack for his drug point. The district court did not clearly err in finding that
Cintrn-Caraballo acted as a supervisor in running his drug point.
227 6. Denial of Downward Departure (Soto-Ramrez)
228 Soto-Ramrez challenges the district court's denial of a downward departure
based on his upbringing. The record contained well-documented evidence that
Soto-Ramrez had suffered severe neglect and sexual abuse as a child. A denial
of a downward departure is generally non-reviewable unless the lower court's
failure to depart stemmed from a misapprehension of its authority under the
Notes:
1
If the evidence instead establishes agreements different from those charged, the
next issue is variance. The reviewing court asks whether the evidence is
sufficient to permit a properly instructed jury to convict the defendant of a
similar related conspiracy, and if so, whether the variance between the two
conspiracies affected the substantial rights of the defendantUnited States v.
Glenn, 828 F.2d 855, 858 (1st Cir.1987); see also Kotteakos v. United States,
328 U.S. 750, 774, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946). We need not reach
this step of the inquiry in this case because we find sufficient evidence to
support the finding of a single conspiracy.
In some cases, the indictment itself sets forth different, often sequential
conspiracies in multiple countsSee, e.g., United States v. David, 940 F.2d 722
(1st Cir.1991). Defendants then may argue that there is only one conspiracy,
not two, and that they may not be sentenced for two conspiracies without
violating the double jeopardy clause. Id. at 732. This court uses a similar
totality of the circumstances, multi-factored approach in analyzing a claim of
that type. Id. at 734.
The defendants also argue briefly that the convictions were inadmissible
hearsay because they did not fall within Rule 803(22). This argument is not
developed in the defendants' brief, and, in any case, is not meritoriousSee
Fed.R.Evid. 803(22) (exception to hearsay rule for "[e]vidence of a final
judgment, entered after a trial or upon a plea of guilty ... adjudging a person
guilty of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, to
prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment").
The trial in this case took place in 1999, before the December 1, 2000 effective
date of the amendments to Rules 701 and 702. Accordingly, we apply the preamendment Rules and case law
10
The indictment did not need to specify the exact amount of drugs involved in