People vs. Macalaba, GR No. 146284-86 (Case) PDF
People vs. Macalaba, GR No. 146284-86 (Case) PDF
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 146284-86
grams (3 medium sized transparent plastic bags and 1 big heat-sealed transparent
plastic bag).
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
The three cases were consolidated and raffled to Branch 31 of said court. Upon his
arraignment, ABDUL entered in each case a plea of not guilty.
At the trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses SPO1 Generoso Pandez, PO3 Ernani
Mendez, Police Inspector Anacleta Cultura and Police Inspector Lorna Tria. ABDUL was the
sole witness for the defense.
SPO1 Pandez, a PNP member of the Laguna Criminal Investigation Detection Group
(CIDG), testified that on 12 April 1999, at 5:15 p.m., Major R Win Pagkalinawan ordered
the search of ABDUL, alias "Boy Muslim," based on a verified information that the latter was
driving a carnapped Mitsubishi olive green car with Plate No. UPV 511 and was a drugpusher in San Pedro, Laguna. Two teams were formed for the search. The first was headed by
Major Pagkalinawan, with SPO4 Aberion and five others as members; and the second was
led by Capt. Percival Rumbaoa, with SPO1 Pandez and PO3 Mendez as members. 6
Between 6:30 p.m. and 7:00 p.m., the two groups proceeded to Barangay Nueva, San Pedro,
Laguna, on board a car and a van. They went to ABDULs apartment where he was
reportedly selling shabu, but they learned that ABDUL had already left. While looking for
ABDUL, they saw the suspected carnapped car somewhere at Pacita Complex I, San Pedro,
Laguna, going towards the Poblacion. When it stopped due to the red traffic light, the CIDG
officers alighted from their vehicles. Capt. Rumbaoa positioned himself at the passenger side
of the suspected carnapped car, while Major Pagkalinawan stood in front of the car. SPO1
Pandez, with PO3 Mendez beside him, went straight to the driver and knocked at the drivers
window. ABDUL, who was driving the car, lowered the glass window. SPO1 Pandez
introduced himself as a member of the Laguna CIDG and asked ABDUL to turn on the light
and show them the cars certificate of registration.7
When the light was already on, SPO1 Pandez saw a black Norinco .45 caliber gun8 inside an
open black clutch/belt bag placed on the right side of the drivers seat near the gear. He asked
ABDUL for the supporting papers of the gun, apart from the cars certificate of registration,
but the latter failed to show them any.9 When ABDUL opened the zipper of the clutch/belt
bag, the CIDG officers saw inside it four plastic sachets of what appeared to be shabu. They
likewise found a self-sealing plastic bag which contained the following items: two fake
P1,000 bills, a list of names of persons, a magazine and five ammunitions for a .45 caliber
gun. They confiscated the gun, the shabu, and the fake P1,000 bills and thereafter brought
ABDUL to the CIDG office.10
PO3 Mendez substantially corroborated the testimony of SPO1 Pandez.11
The two P1,000 bills were found to be counterfeit after an examination conducted by Police
Inspector Anacleta Cultura,12 a document examiner at Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba, Laguna.
The white crystalline substance contained in the four small plastic bags was subjected to
physical and laboratory examination conducted by Police Inspector Lorna Tria, a Forensic
Chemist at the PNP Crime Laboratory, Region IV, Camp Vicente Lim. Her findings 13 were
as follows: (a) the three small plastic sachets weighed 29.46 grams, while the big plastic
sachet weighed 197.21 grams, or a total weight of 226.67 grams; (b) representative samples
taken from the specimens thereof were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu, a regulated drug; and (c) the improvised tooter and the rolled aluminum foil with
residue found in the self-sealing plastic bag were also positive of the presence for shabu
residue.
As expected, ABDUL had a different story to tell. He testified that on 12 April 1999, between
6:50 and 7:00 p.m., he was driving a borrowed Mitsubishi Galant Car with Plate No. UPV
501 somewhere in San Pedro, Laguna. With him was Rose, his live-in partner, whom he
fetched from Angeles City, Pampanga. He had borrowed the car from his friend Ferdinand
Navares, who instructed him to return it in front of the latters store at San Pedro Public
Market.14
ABDUL was about to park the car when a man knocked hard on the glass window on the
drivers side of the car and pointed at the former a .45 caliber pistol. Another one who was
armed with an armalite rifle positioned himself in front of the car, while the third one
positioned himself near the window on the passenger side and pointed a gun at his live-in
partner Rose. ABDUL then lowered the cars window. The man near him opened the door,
held him, and told him to alight. When the man asked him whether he was "Boy Muslim," he
answered in the negative. The same man opened the back door of the car and boarded at the
back seat. Rose remained seated at the front passenger seat. 15
The other men likewise boarded the car, which was thereafter driven by one of them. While
inside the car, they saw a .45 caliber pistol at the edge of the drivers seat. They asked him
whether he had a license. He showed his gun license and permit to carry. After taking his
gun, license, and permit to carry, they tried to remove his belt bag from his waist, but he did
not allow them.16
Upon reaching the headquarters, ABDUL learned that these people were C.I.S. agents. There,
he was told to surrender the belt bag to the officer who would issue a receipt for it. He did as
he was told, and the money inside his belt bag was counted and it amounted to P42,000. They
then got his money and the cellular phone, which was also inside the bag, together with some
other pieces of paper. They also took another cell phone from the car. He was never issued a
receipt for these items.17
Thereafter, a man entered the office with a white plastic bag allegedly taken from the
borrowed car. ABDUL denied ownership over the plastic bag. That same man then told him
that it contained shabu. ABDUL and Rose were detained at the headquarters. The next
morning, Rose was allowed to get out; and in the afternoon, he was transferred to San Pedro
Municipal Jail.18
After the trial, the trial court acquitted ABDUL in Criminal Cases Nos. 1236 and 1237 for
violations of Presidential Decree No. 1866 and Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code,
respectively, due to insufficiency of evidence. However, it convicted him in Criminal Case
No. 1238 for violation of Section 16, Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
(Republic Act No. 6425), as amended,19 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000, as well as the costs of the suit.
Dissatisfied with the judgment, ABDUL interposed the present appeal, alleging that the trial
court erred in (1) convicting him for violation of Section 16 of Article III of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, despite insufficiency of evidence; and (2) admitting the
evidence presented by the prosecution although it was obtained in violation of his
constitutional rights.
In his first assigned error, ABDUL argues that the prosecution failed to prove the material
allegations in the information. The information charges him, among other things, that
"without being authorized by law, [he] did then and there willfully and feloniously have in
his possession, custody and control methamphetamine hydrochloride." However, the
prosecution did not present any certification from the concerned government agency, like the
Dangerous Drugs Board, to the effect that he was not authorized to possess shabu, which is a
regulated drug. Thus, his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
In his second assigned error, ABDUL asserts that he was not committing a crime when the
CIS agents boarded his car, searched the same and ultimately arrested him. He was about to
park his borrowed car per instruction by the owner when he was harassed by the operatives at
gunpoint. The gun seen was properly documented; thus, there was no reason for the CIS
agents to bring him and his companion to the headquarters. The shabu allegedly found in the
car was brought in by somebody at the time he was under interrogation. It was taken in
violation of his constitutional right against illegal search and seizure. Being a "fruit of a
poisonous tree" it should not have been admitted in evidence.
Moreover, the members of the CIDG merely relied on the information received from an
anonymous telephone caller who said that ABDUL was driving a carnapped vehicle. They
had no personal knowledge of the veracity of the information. Consequently, there was no
legal basis for his warrantless arrest.
In the Appellees Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that ABDUL had
the burden of proving that he was authorized to possess shabu, but he failed to discharge such
burden. Therefore, it is presumed that he had no authority; consequently, he is liable for
violation of Section 16, Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. The
OSG likewise refutes ABDULs argument that there was a violation of his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
The general rule is that if a criminal charge is predicated on a negative allegation, or that a
negative averment is an essential element of a crime, the prosecution has the burden of
proving the charge. However, this rule is not without an exception. Thus, we have held:
Where the negative of an issue does not permit of direct proof, or where the facts are
more immediately within the knowledge of the accused, the onus probandi rests upon
him. Stated otherwise, it is not incumbent upon the prosecution to adduce positive
evidence to support a negative averment the truth of which is fairly indicated by
established circumstances and which, if untrue, could readily be disproved by the
production of documents or other evidence within the defendants knowledge or
control. For example, where a charge is made that a defendant carried on a certain
business without a license (as in the case at bar, where the accused is charged with the
selling of a regulated drug without authority), the fact that he has a license is a matter
which is peculiarly within his knowledge and he must establish that fact or suffer
conviction.20
In the instant case, the negative averment that ABDUL had no license or authority to possess
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug, has been fairly indicated by the
following facts proven by the testimonies of the CIDG officers and the forensic chemist: (a)
ABDUL was driving the suspected carnapped vehicle when he was caught, and he appeared
to be healthy and not indisposed as to require the use of shabu as medicine; (b) the contents
of the sachets found in ABDULs open clutch bag inside the car were prima facie determined
by the CIDG officers to be shabu; and (c) the said contents were conclusively found to be
shabu by the forensic chemist. With these established facts, the burden of evidence was
shifted to ABDUL. He could have easily disproved the damning circumstances by presenting
a doctors prescription for said drug or a copy of his license or authority to possess the
regulated drug. Yet, he offered nothing.
And now on the second issue. The Constitution enshrines in its Bill of Rights the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose.21 To give full protection to it, the Bill of
Rights also ordains the exclusionary principle that any evidence obtained in violation of said
right is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.22
It is obvious from Section 2 of the Bill of Rights that reasonable searches and seizures are not
proscribed. If conducted by virtue of a valid search warrant issued in compliance with the
guidelines prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court, the search and
seizure is valid.
The interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute. The recognized
exceptions established by jurisprudence are (1) search of moving vehicles; (2) seizure in plain
view; (3) customs search; (4) waiver or consented search; (5) stop and frisk situation (Terry
search); and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless
search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an
arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court
recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests
effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrests of escaped prisoners.23 Another exception is a search
made pursuant to routine airport security procedure, which is authorized under Section 9 of
R.A. No. 6235.24
The warrantless arrest of, or warrantless search and seizure conducted on, ABDUL constitute
a valid exemption from the warrant requirement. The evidence clearly shows that on the basis
of an intelligence information that a carnapped vehicle was driven by ABDUL, who was also
a suspect of drug pushing, the members of the CIDG of Laguna went around looking for the
carnapped car.25 They spotted the suspected carnapped car, which was indeed driven by
ABDUL. While ABDUL was fumbling about in his clutch bag for the registration papers of
the car the CIDG agents saw four transparent sachets of shabu.26 These sachets of shabu were
therefore in "plain view" of the law enforcers.
Under the "plain view" doctrine, unlawful objects within the plain view of an officer who has
the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented in
evidence. Nonetheless, the seizure of evidence in plain view must comply with the following
requirements: (a) a prior valid intrusion in which the police are legally present in the pursuit
of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had
the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) the
plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. 27
We are convinced beyond any shadow of doubt under the circumstances above discussed that
all the elements of seizure in plain view exist in the case at bar. Thus, the warrantless search
and seizure conducted on ABDUL, as well as his warrantless arrest, did not transgress his
constitutional rights.
ABDULs sole defense of denial is unsubstantiated. We have time and again ruled that mere
denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of a witness. A mere denial, just like alibi, is
a self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than
the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. As between a
categorical testimony that rings of truth on one hand, and a bare denial on the other, the
former is generally held to prevail.28
On the issue of credibility between ABDULs testimony and the declarations of the CIDG
officers, we hold for the latter. As has been repeatedly held, credence shall be given to the
narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers
who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there be
evidence to the contrary; moreover in the absence of proof of motive to falsely impute such a
serious crime against the accused, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, shall prevail over
accuseds self-serving and uncorroborated claim of having been framed.29 ABDUL miserably
failed to rebut this presumption and to prove any ulterior motive on the part of the
prosecution witnesses.
Unauthorized possession of 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine
hydrochloride is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under Section 16 of Article III, in
relation to Section 20 of Article IV, of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No.
6425), as amended by P.D. Nos. 44, 1675, 1683, and 1707; Batas Pambansa Blg. 179; and
R.A. No. 7659 (now further amended by R.A. No. 9165). These sections provide as follows:
SEC.16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. -- The penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death and fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall
be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the
corresponding license or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
is reclusion perpetua. The penalty imposed by the trial court, including the fine, is, therefore,
in order.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, in
Criminal Case No. 1238 convicting appellant ABDUL MACALABA y DIGAYON of the
violation of Section 16 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as
amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
P500,000 and the costs of the suit, is hereby affirmed in toto.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
Illegal Possession and use of false treasury or bank notes and other instruments of
credit.
3
Id., 2.
Id., 3.
Id., 6-8.
Id., 9.
10
11
12
13
OR, 9.
14
15
16
Id., 4-6.
17
Id, 4-9.
18
19
20
People v. Manalo, 230 SCRA 309 [1994], cited in People v. Fernandez, G.R. Nos.
143850-53, 18 December 2001.
21
22
23
People v. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 432, 444 [1999]; People v. Figueroa, 335
SCRA 249, 263 [2000].
24
25
26
27
28
29