Crim Pro Cases
Crim Pro Cases
August 2, 1990
They did now know what its contents were. The said
circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant.
However, there are many instances where a warrant and
seizure can be effected without necessarily being
preceded by an arrest, foremost of which is the "stop and
search" without a search warrant at military or police
checkpoints, the constitutionality or validity of which has
been upheld by this Court in Valmonte vs. de Villa, 7 as
follows:
the
following
xxx xxx
xxx
Yes.
xxx xxx
xxx xxx
xxx
Yes.
No.
xxx
Q And you
Acquiatan?
Q And despite that fact, you did not find ways and
means to contact the CLAO or Atty. Acquiatan in
order to assist Salangga in the interview?
aware
about
Atty.
Mat(i)as
are
No.
No." 16
September 4, 1986
xxx
appeared and declared categorically, that the abovequestions embraced in the numbers allegedly stated in the
extrajudicial confession of accused, involving her to such
NPA personalities, as Jamper, Pol, Anthony, etc., were not
true because on the date referred on April 28, 1982, none
of the persons mentioned came to her house for
treatment, neither did she meet the accused nor able to
talk with him. (TSN, pages 118- 121, Hearing-May 18,
1983)
She, however, admitted being familiar with one
Oscar Gomez, and that she was personally charged with
subversion in the Office of the Provincial Commander,
Philippine Constabulary, Digos, Davao del Sur, but said
charge was dismissed without reaching the Court. She
likewise stated that her son, Rogelio Arellano, was likewise
charged for subversion filed in the Municipal Trial Court of
Digos, Davao del Sur, but was likewise dismissed for lack
of sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. (TSN,
pages 121-122, in relation to her cross-examination,
Hearing-May 18, 1983)
To support accused's denial of the charge against
him, Barangay Captain of Tiguman, Digos, Davao del Sur,
Salvador qqqGalaraga was presented, who declared, he
was not personally aware of any subversive activities of
accused, being his neighbor and member of his barrio. On
the contrary, he can personally attest to his good
character and reputation, as a law abiding citizen of his
barrio, being a carpenter and farmer thereat. (TSl pages
128-129, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
He however, admitted in cross-examination, that
there were a lot of arrests made by the authorities in his
barrio involving subversive activities but they were
released and were not formally charged in Court because
they publicly took their oath of allegiance with the
government. (TSN, pages 133-134, in relation to page 136,
Hearing-May 18, 1983)
Finally, to support accused's denial of the subject
firearm, his wife, Urbana Burgos, was presented and who
testified that the subject firearm was left in their house by
Cesar Masamlok and one Pedipol on May 10, 1982. It was
night time, when the two left the gun, alleging that it was
not in order, and that they will leave it behind, temporarily
for them to claim it later. They were the ones who buried
it. She said, her husband, the accused, was not in their
house at that time and that she did not inform him about
said firearm neither did she report the matter to the
authorities, for fear of the life of her husband. (TSN, page
24, November 22, 1983)
On cross-examination, she said, even if Masamlok
during the recovery of the firearm, was wearing a mask,
she can still Identify him. (TSN, page 6, Hearing-November
22, 1983)
After the above-testimony, accused through counsel
formally rested his case in support of accused's through
counsel manifestation for the demurrer to evidence of the
prosecution, or in the alternative for violation merely of
simple illegal possession of firearm, 'under the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4,
reflected in the manifestation of counsel for accused.
(TSN, pages 113-114, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
Accused-appellant Ruben Burgos now raises the
following assignments of error, to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT (SIC)
THE ARREST OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT WITHOUT VALID
WARRANT TO BE LAWFUL.
II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE
SEARCH IN THE HOUSE OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR
FIREARM WITHOUT VALID WARRANT TO BE LAWFUL.
III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING ACCUSEDAPPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR
VIOLATION OF P.D. No. 9 IN RELATION TO GENERAL
ORDERS NOS. 6 AND 7
Was the arrest of Ruben Burgos lawful? Were the
search of his house and the subsequent confiscation of a
firearm and documents allegedly found therein conducted
in a lawful and valid manner? Does the evidence
sustaining the crime charged meet the test of proving guilt
beyond reasonable doubt?
The records of the case disclose that when the police
authorities went to the house of Ruben Burgos for the
purpose of arresting him upon information given by Cesar
Masamlok that the accused allegedly recruited him to join
the New People's Army (NPA), they did not have any
warrant of arrest or search warrant with them (TSN, p. 25,
October 14, 1982; and TSN, p. 61, November 15, 1982).
Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible
officer as may be authorized by law, after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
The constitutional provision is a safeguard against
wanton and unreasonable invasion of the privacy and
liberty of a citizen as to his person, papers and effects.
This Court explained in Villanueva vs. Querubin (48 SCRA
345) why this right is so important:
It is deference to one's personality that lies at the
core of this right, but it could be also looked upon as a
recognition of a constitutionally protected area, primarily
one's home, but not necessarily thereto confined. (Cf.
Hoffa v. United States, 385 US 293 [19661) What is sought
to be guarded is a man's prerogative to choose who is
allowed entry to his residence. In that haven of refuge, his
individuality can assert itself not only in the choice of who
shall be welcome but likewise in the kind of objects he
wants around him. There the state, however powerful,
does not as such have access except under the
circumstances above noted, for in the traditional
formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle.
Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by
government, which is called upon to refrain from any
invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his
life, (Cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 US 757 [1966],
Brennan, J. and Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616, 630
[1886]). In the same vein, Landynski in his authoritative
work (Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court [1966],
could fitly characterize this constitutional right as the
embodiment of a 'spiritual concept: the belief that to value
xxx
None Sir.
called
for
Ruben
Burgos
you
Yes Sir.
No Sir.
A I did not.
Q
Yes Sir.
gun?
Yes Sir.
xxx
xxx
Cost de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay and Paras, JJ.,
concur.
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
plaintiffappellee, vs. FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO, and
VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "NENETH," accusedappellants.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
On December 7, 1995, accused-appellants Florencio
Doria y Bolado and Violeta Gaddao y Catama @ "Neneth"
were charged with violation of Section 4, in relation to
Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.[1] The
information reads:
"That on or about the 5th day of December, 1995 in
the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
and aiding one another and without having been
authorized by law, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously sell, administer, deliver and give away to
another eleven (11) plastic bags of suspected marijuana
fruiting tops weighing 7,641.08 grams in violation of the
above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW."[2]
The prosecution contends the offense was
committed as follows: In November 1995, members of the
North Metropolitan District, Philippine National Police (PNP)
Narcotics Command (Narcom), received information from
two (2) civilian informants (CI) that one "Jun" was engaged
in illegal drug activities in Mandaluyong City. The Narcom
agents decided to entrap and arrest "Jun" in a buy-bust
operation. As arranged by one of the CI's, a meeting
between the Narcom agents and "Jun" was scheduled on
December 5, 1995 at E. Jacinto Street in Mandaluyong
City.
On December 5, 1995, at 6:00 in the morning, the CI
went to the PNP Headquarters at EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon
City to prepare for the buy-bust operation. The Narcom
agents formed Team Alpha composed of P/Insp. Nolasco
Cortes as team leader and PO3 Celso Manlangit, SPO1
Edmund Badua and four (4) other policemen as members.
P/Insp. Cortes designated PO3 Manlangit as the poseurbuyer and SPO1 Badua as his back-up, and the rest of the
team as perimeter security. Superintendent Pedro
Alcantara, Chief of the North Metropolitan District PNP
Narcom, gave the team P2,000.00 to cover operational
expenses. From this sum, PO3 Manlangit set aside
P1,600.00-- a one thousand peso bill and six (6) one
hundred peso bills[3]-- as money for the buy-bust
operation. The market price of one kilo of marijuana was
then P1,600.00. PO3 Manlangit marked the bills with his
initials and listed their serial numbers in the police blotter.
[4] The team rode in two cars and headed for the target
area.
At 7:20 of the same morning, "Jun" appeared and the
CI introduced PO3 Manlangit as interested in buying one
(1) kilo of marijuana. PO3 Manlangit handed "Jun" the
marked bills worth P1,600.00. "Jun" instructed PO3
Accused-appellant Doria further declared that his coaccused, Violeta Gaddao, is the wife of his acquaintance,
Totoy Gaddao. He said that he and Totoy Gaddao
sometimes drank together at the neighborhood store. This
closeness, however, did not extend to Violeta, Totoy's wife.
[11]
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT
GUILTY AND SENTENCING HER TO DEATH DESPITE THE
MANIFESTLY IRRECONCILABLE INCONSISTENCIES IN THE
VERSIONS OF THE POLICE AS TO HOW AND BY WHOM THE
ALLEGED BUY-BUST MONEY WAS RECOVERED FROM HER,
WHICH IN CONSEQUENCE RESULTS IN THE EVIDENCE, OF
RETRIEVAL FROM HER OF THE SAME, NEBULOUS, AT BEST,
NIL, AT WORST.
IV
SO ORDERED."[13]
Before this Court, accused-appellant Doria assigns
two errors, thus:
"I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING
WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESSES FOR THE
PROSECUTION WHEN THEIR TESTIMONIES WERE SHOT
WITH DISCREPANCIES, INCONSISTENCIES AND THAT THE
CORPUS DELICTI OF THE MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY TAKEN
FROM APPELLANT WAS NOT POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY
THE POSEUR-BUYER.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS
EVIDENCE THE MARIJUANA FRUITINGS FOUND INSIDE THE
CARTON BOX AS THESE WERE OBTAINED THROUGH A
WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND DOES NOT COME WITHIN THE
PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE."[14]
Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao contends:
"I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT
GUILTY DESPITE THE INCREDIBILITY OF THE POLICE
VERSION OF THE MANNER THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST AS
CONDUCTED.
II
THE PNP OFFICERS' VERSIONS AS TO WHERE THE
BUY-BUST MONEY CAME FROM ARE INCONSISTENT WITH
ONE ANOTHER AND ALSO REEKS WITH INCREDIBILITY.
COURT Noted.
Q How about this one?
Q Now tell the court, how did you know that those
are the eleven bricks?
x x x.
A This CLM, the date and the time and the Exhibit
"A," I was the one who made these markings, sir.
Q Whereat?
Q Whereat?
A At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto Street, sir.
Q But the fact is, Mr. Witness, when you reached the
house of Aling Neneth, Aling Neneth was there?
Q You did not even know who got the money from
Aling Neneth?
A Yes, sir.
PROSECUTOR:
Q As far as you can see, she was just inside her
house?
Sustained.
Q Alright. I will ask you a question and I expect an
honest answer. According to the records, the amount of
P1,600.00 was recovered from the person of Aling Neneth.
That's right?
A Yes, sir, the buy-bust money.
Q What you are now saying for certain and for the
record is the fact that you were not the one who retrieved
the money from Aling Neneth, it was Manlangit maybe?
A I saw it, sir.
Q It was Manlangit who got the money from Aling
Neneth?
A The buy-bust money was recovered from the house
of Aling Neneth, sir.
"ATTY. VALDEZ:
So here we are. When you and Badua arrived, Aling
Neneth was inside the house?
A Yes, sir.
Q Badua demanded from Aling Neneth the buy-bust
money?
A Yes, sir.
Q At that particular instance, you saw the carton?
A Yes, sir.
Q This carton, according to you was under a table?
A Yes, sir, dining table.
Q I noticed that this carton has a cover?
A Yes, sir.
Q I ask you were the flaps of the cover raised or
closed?
A It was open, sir. Not like that.
COURT
Go down there. Show to the court.
INTERPRETER
Witness went down
approached a carton box.
the
witness
stand
and
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
PROSECUTOR
PROSECUTOR
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. VALDEZ
Q At that particular point in time, you did not know if
the alleged buy-bust money was already retrieved by
Badua?
A Yes, sir.
Q You went inside the house?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. VALDEZ
A Yes, sir.
PROSECUTOR
Q In fact, there was nothing yet as far as you were
concerned to validate the fact that Mrs. Gadao was in
possession of the buy-bust money because according to
you, you did not know whether Badua already retrieved
the buy-bust money from her?
A Yes, sir.
Leave that to the court.
Q How far was this from the door?
PROSECUTOR
A Two and a half meters from the door, sir. It was in
plain view.
Q Under the table according to you?
A Yes, sir, dining table.
Q Somewhere here?
A Yes, sir.
PROSECUTOR
Q Siopao?
A Yes, sir.
it?
Q Canned goods?
A Here, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q What you see is a carton?
"(a)
When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;"
"(b)
When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
. . .'
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 123872. January 30, 1998]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
RUBEN MONTILLA y GATDULA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Accused-Appellant Ruben Montilla y Gatdula, alias "Joy,"
was charged on August 22, 1994 for violating Section 4,
Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, before
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, of Dasmarias, Cavite
in an information which alleges:
That on or about the 20th day of June 1994, at Barangay
Salitran, Municipality of Dasmarias, Province of Cavite,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by
law, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, administer, transport, and deliver twenty-eight
(28) kilos of dried marijuana leaves, which are considered
prohibited drugs, in violation of the provisions of R.A. 6425
thereby causing damage and prejudice to the public
interest.[1]
The consequent arraignment conducted on September 14,
1994 elicited a plea of not guilty from appellant who was
assisted therein by his counsel de parte.[2] Trial was held
on scheduled dates thereafter, which culminated in a
verdict of guilty in a decision of the trial court dated June
8, 1995 and which imposed the extreme penalty of death
on appellant. He was further ordered to pay a fine in the
amount of P500,000.00 and to pay the costs of the
proceedings.[3]
It appears from the evidence of the prosecution that
appellant was apprehended at around 4:00 A.M. of June
20, 1994 near a waiting shed located at Barangay Salitran,
Dasmarias, Cavite by SPO1 Concordio Talingting and SPO1
Armando Clarin, both members of the Cavite Philippine
National Police Command based in Dasmarias. Appellant,
according to the two officers, was caught transporting 28
marijuana bricks contained in a traveling bag and a carton
box, which marijuana bricks had a total weight of 28 kilos.
These two officers later asserted in court that they were
aided by an informer in the arrest of appellant. That
informer, according to Talingting and Clarin, had informed
them the day before, or on June 19, 1994 at about 2:00
P.M., that a drug courier, whom said informer could
recognize, would be arriving somewhere in Barangay
Salitran,
Dasmarias
from
Baguio
City
with
an
undetermined amount of marijuana. It was the same
informer who pinpointed to the arresting officers the
appellant when the latter alighted from a passenger
jeepney on the aforestated day, hour, and place.[4]
Upon the other hand, appellant disavowed ownership of
the prohibited drugs. He claimed during the trial that while
he indeed came all the way from Baguio City, he traveled
to Dasmarias, Cavite with only some pocket money and
without any luggage. His sole purpose in going there was
to look up his cousin who had earlier offered a prospective
job at a garment factory in said locality, after which he
MELO, J.:
Two passengers who were apprehended after they
supposedly staged a hold-up inside a passenger jeepney
on September 29, 1990 were haled to court, not for the
felonious asportation, but for possession of the two
unlicensed firearms and bullets recovered from them
which were instrumental in the commission of the robo
(pp. 7-8, Rollo.)
Of the two persons accused, only Pio Boses interposed an
appeal from the trial court's judgment (p. 23, Rollo)
inasmuch as Tirso Acol y Barnubal had escaped from
incarceration (p. 5, Brief for the Accused-Appellant, p. 60,
Rollo ) thereby abating any review of his culpability for the
misdeed.
The People's inculpatory accusations during the joint trial
were to the effect that at around 3:45 in the morning of
September 29, 1990, when Percival Tan was driving his
jeepney, two men boarded the vehicle in Cubao. When
they crossed Pasay Road, the two wayfarers, together with
two other companions, announced a hold-up. Percival Tan
was instructed to proceed atop the Magallanes
interchange where the other passengers were divested of
their personal belongings, including the jacket of
passenger Rene Araneta. Thereafter, the robbers alighted
at the Shell Gas Station near the Magallanes Commercial
Center after which Percival Tan and his passengers went to
Fort Bonifacio to report the crime. A CAPCOM team was
forthwith formed to track down the culprits. Victim Rene
Araneta who went with the responding police officers,
upon seeing four persons, one of whom was wearing his
stolen jacket, walking casually towards Fort Bonifacio, told
the police authorities to accost said persons. After the
CAPCOM officers introduced themselves, the four men
scampered to different directions but three of them,
namely, Tirso Acol, Pio Boses, and Albert Blanco, were
apprehended. Tirso Acol and Pio Boses were each found in
possession of an unlicensed .38 caliber revolver with
bullets. After the arrest, the three men were brought to
Fort Bonifacio and were identified by Percival Tan and the
passengers who ganged up on the accused.
To reinforce the theory of unauthorized possession of
firearms, Sgt. Garcia presented a certification (Exhibit I)
issued by the Firearms and Explosives Unit stating that the
accused are not licensed firearm holders.
On the other hand, Pio Boses and Tirso Acol pleaded
innocent to the charges levelled against them, proferring a
general denial.
Accused-appellant Pio Boses asserted on the witness stand
that after establishing his residence at Pasay City for
about six months, he engaged in the business of vending
"balut". During the incident in question, he recalled that
while so engaged in his trade, three persons allegedly
acosted him, took his money, "balut" and "penoy", and
that he was thereafter brought to a cell where he was
forced to confess ownership of one gun which was shown
to him. He nonetheless denied participation in the hold up.
For his part, Tirso Acol, a laborer and at that time having
resided in Metro Manila for about two months, recollected
"(1) One .357 Caliber revolver, Smith and Wesson, SN32919 with six (6) live ammunitions;
"(3) One .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A 35723 Y with clip and
eight (8) ammunitions; and
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 121917. March 12, 1997]
ROBIN CARIO PADILLA @ ROBINHOOD PADILLA,
petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE of
the PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:
On October 26, 1992, high-powered firearms with live
ammunitions were found in the possession of petitioner
Robin Padilla @ Robinhood Padilla, i.e.:
"(2) One M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four
(4) long and one (1) short magazine with ammunitions;
are
sanctioned
in
the
following
"Q. And the firearms that were the subject of this case are
not listed in the names of the accused in this case?
"A. Yes, sir.[77]
xxx xxx xxx
PADILLA, J.:
The
information
indicting
the
accused-appellants
(hereinafter referred to as the appellants) reads:
------------------------FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 93828 December 11, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SANTIAGO EVARISTO and NOLI CARILLO, accusedappellants.
(1)
....
(2)
Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.
It is to be noted that what the above constitutional
provisions prohibit are unreasonable searches and
seizures. For a search to be reasonable under the law,
there must, as a rule, be a search warrant validly issued
by an appropriate judicial officer. Yet, the rule that
searches and seizures must be supported by a valid
search warrant is not an absolute and inflexible rule, for
jurisprudence has recognized several exceptions to the
search warrant requirement. Among
these exceptions is the seizure of evidence in plain view,
adopted by this jurisdiction from the pronouncements of
the United States Supreme Court in Harris vs. U.S. 4 and
Coolidge vs. New Hampshire. 5 Thus, it is recognized that
objects inadvertently falling in the plain view of an officer
who has the right to be in the position to have that view,
are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence.
6
The records in this case show that Sgt. Romerosa
was granted permission by the appellant Evaristo to
enter his house. The officer's purpose was to apprehend
Rosillo whom he saw had sought refuge therein. Therefore,
it is clear that the search for firearms was not Romerosa's
purpose in entering the house, thereby rendering his
2.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SEARCH OF A MOVING VEHICLE,
AN EXCEPTION. The constitutional proscription against
warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain
exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest,
a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of a
moving vehicle, and the seizure of evidence in plain view.
With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had
been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor
vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched
to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought.
3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITE. This in no
way, however, gives the police officers unlimited
discretion to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles
in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is
stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a
warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long
as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or
probable cause to believe before the search that they will
find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime,
in the vehicle to be searched.
4.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICATION IN CASE AT
BAR. The NARCOM officers in the case at bar had
probable cause to stop and search all vehicles coming
from the north at Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the
confidential information they received from their regular
informant that a woman having the same appearance as
that of accused-appellant would be bringing marijuana
from up north. They likewise have probable cause to
search accused-appellants belongings since she fits the
description given by the NARCOM informant. Since there
was a valid warrantless search by the NARCOM agents,
any evidence obtained during the course of said search is
admissible against Accused-Appellant.
5.
REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF
WITNESS; FINDINGS OF TRIAL JUDGE; RULE AND
EXCEPTION; CASE AT BAR. The prosecution had shown,
primarily through the positive testimony of Sgt. Parajas,
that the bag containing the dried marijuana leaves was
taken from accused-appellants possession. She denies
this fact and contends that the bag in question was
actually taken from the luggage carrier above the
passenger seats and not from her. Indisputably, We have
two opposing versions of what actually happened at the
checkpoint in Km. 16, Acop, Tublay, Benguet, resulting in
the accused-appellants apprehension, that of the
prosecution and that of the defense. In situations like this,
the matter of assigning values to the testimony of
witnesses is best performed by the trial courts because,
unlike appellate courts, they can weigh such testimony in
the light of the demeanor, conduct and attitude of the
witnesses at the trial. The exception is when the trial court
has overlooked certain facts of substance and value that,
if considered, might affect the result, which We do not find
in the instant case.
6.
ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT AFFECTED BY MINOR
DISCREPANCIES; CASE AT BAR. As to the alleged
discrepancies in the prosecutions case, such as the color
of the stripes of the bag which contained the marijuana
and whether the items seized from accused-appellant
were marijuana leaves or marijuana fruit tops, these are
minor in character and do not detract from the
prosecutions case since it was shown by the Receipt of
Property Seized, which was signed by accused-appellant,
that these were the very items taken from her at the time
of her arrest.
She denies this fact and contends that the bag in question
was actually taken from the luggage carrier above the
passenger seats and not from her. Indisputably, We have
HECTOR
MAQUEDA
@
PUTOL,
and
RENE
SAGVAMAIJTE
(at
large),
Accused,
HECTOR
MAQUEDA @ PUTOL, Accused-Appellant.
The motion to drop Malig was granted and warrants for the
arrest of accused Salvamante and Maqueda were issued.
Maqueda was subsequently arrested on 4 March 1992, and
on 9 April 1992, he filed an application for bail. 4 He
categorically stated therein that "he is willing and
volunteering to be a State witness in the above-entitled
case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the
accused in this case."
xxx
xxx
(People vs. Fule, G.R. No. 83027, February 28, 1992, 206
SCRA 652). 18
(3)
Any confession or admission obtained in violation
of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.
(4)
He and Rene Salvamante were together in
Guinyangan, Quezon, and both left the place sometime in
September 1991;
(5)
He was arrested in Guinyangan, Quezon, on 4
March 1992; and
(3)
(6)
He freely and voluntarily offered to be a state
witness stating that "he is the least guilty."
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that
circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a)
(b)
The facts from which the inferences are derived
are
proven; and
(c)
the combination of all the circumstances is such
as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Or, as jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be
upheld only if the circumstances proved constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of
all others, as the guilty person, i.e. the circumstances
proved must be consistent with each other, consistent
with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the
same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except
that of guilty. 33 We do not hesitate to rule that all the
requisites of Section 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court are
present in this case.
This conclusion having been reached, the defense of alibi
put up by the appellant must fail. The trial court correctly
rejected such defense. The rule is settled that for the
defense of alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and
place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that
the accused was somewhere else when the crime was
committed, he must demonstrate that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime
at the time of its commission. 34 Through the unrebutted
testimony of Mike Tayaban, which Maqueda does not
controvert in his brief, it was positively established that
Maqueda and a companion were seen at 7:00 a.m. of 27
August 1991 at the waiting shed in Aguyad, Tuba,
Benguet, a place barely a kilometer away from the house
of the Barkers. It was not then impossible for Maqueda and
his companion to have been at the Barker house at the
time the crime was committed. Moreover, Fredisminda
Castrence categorically declared that Maqueda started
working in her polvoron factory in Sukat only on 7 October
1991, thereby belying his, testimony that he started
working on 5 July 1991 and continuously until 27 August
1991.
WHEREFORE, in of the foregoing, the instant appeal is
DISMISSED and the appealed decision Of Branch 10 of the
Regional Trial Court Of Benguet in Criminal Case, No.91CR-1206 is AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against accused-appellant HECTOR MAQUEDA @
PUTOL.
SO ORDERED,