05301269
PPROVED FOR RELEASED|
« DATE: 01-04.2010
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Despite widespread media publicity in 1975, almost all aspects of the Hughes
Glomar Explorer project are stil clastified, and it is important that they remain
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remains important °
ion,
(C40 protect sources aad methods which may have Future
In the course of continuing litigation related to the project—principally
concerning California State tax lability, Freedom of Information Act matters,
4 ‘and a patent infringement clatm—seoeral facts about the Glomar Explorer project
have been acknowledged tn court by the U.S. Government. These include the fact
of CIA sponsorship of the project for “intelligence collection purposes;” the
participation of Hughes Tool Company, the Summa Corporation, and Global
‘Marine, Inc; and the actions of senior CIA officials in 1975 to attempt to persuade
‘members of the media not to broadcast or publish reports concerning the project.
Beyond these few details, however, it is still firm U.S. Government policy that
nothing further about the project is to be sald or acknowledged. This prokibition
‘was recently reaffirmed by the President's Adoisor for National Security Affairs, the
Secretaries of State and Defense, and the DCI. It applies particularly to the
‘specific purpose of the AZORIAN mission; the degree of success; operational details;
participation of other contractors, government organizations, and indtolduals;
classified technology; and project funding matters
‘The following article ts being’ published becouse tt now is possible to discuss
most of the foregoing matters and other classified project details at the SECRET
—+— NOFORN level rather thon tn the TOP SECRET compartmentation which _
previously applied to all aspects of the AZORIAN project. Nevertheless, there has
been no relasation of the necessity to keep most of the details of the AZORIAN
project classified for the foreseeable future.
PROJECT AZORIAN
- THE STORY OF THE HUGHES GLOMAR EXPLORER
In March 1968 a Soviet submarine of the G-II class was lost with all hands, 16,500
feet below the surface of the Pacific Ocean,
(On 8 Angust_1974{ that submarine was brought to the
surface in| Ja recovery system designed and developed specifically
for that nISTOn- =
| ‘The story of the more than six years intervening is the story of Project AZORIAN,
that is, the story of the Hughes Glomar Explorer.*
AZORIAN ranks in the forefront of imaginative and bold operations undertaken
in the long history of intelligence collection. It combined immense size and scope,
advanced technological development, complex systems engineering and testing,
unusually severe cover and security requirements, a demanding mission scenario in an
unforgiving marine environment, the potential for 2 serious confrontation with the
Soviet Union, a difficult and technically unusual exploitation phase, and high cost.
‘The project became widely known to the media in early 1975. At time when the
Central Intelligence Agency was under investigation by two committees of Congress
and many members of the press, the CIA was credited in some newspaper editorials
Tho fll name ofthe ships the MV Hughes Glomar Explorer, 2 shown in Figure 8, Global Marine,
no, operates & number of ships with the word Glomer in their names.
BecRer 1
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as
Seer ’The Glomar Story
with pursuing its tradecraft in a most imaginative manner and doing what intelligence
organizations are supposed to do—collect intelligence. Other articles were critical of
the project, its cost, and method of operation.
Many senior US. Government officials, including three Directors of Central
Intelligence, two Secretaries of Defense, two Secretaries of Stato, and two Presidents,
were personally knowledgeable of the program and reoognized it as an innovative
undertaking of reat magnitude and complexity. Key members of four Congressional
‘committees were also kept informed of project progress and reviewed budget requests
for the project.
Because the AZORIAN Project was of such huge dimensions in cost, risk, and
intelligence value, it sometimes caused difficult problems for the officials who had to
make the major decisions affecting it. Some of the questions did not lend themselves to
clear-cut unequivocal answers: the intelligence value of the target after six years on
the ocean floor, for example, or the political or physical response of the Russians if
they should learn of the recovery effort. Because of these difficult questions, there
could not be and was not unanimity of opinion among senior officials in CIA, Defense,
State, the White House, and other agencies collectively responsible for AZORIAN and
the decision on whether or not to proceed. Difforences of opinion were expressed anid
debated in appropriate forums, both before the project was initiated and during its
lifetime. These differences are expressed candidly in this article in. several places
In March 1975, columnist Jack Anderson disclosed the existenée of the Hughes
Glamat_ Explorer (HGE) project on national te nd radio. The original nress_
Teak had occurred in the Los Angeles Times in February 1975. The Times story was
‘unspecific, and wrong in important facts, but it gradually developed into a widespread
seeurity problem for the program before the Anderson disclosure.
‘The original leak resulted from an improbable series of events following a break-
in and robbery in June 1974 at Summa Corporation headquarters in Los Angeles. It
‘was thought that among the stolen documents there might be a memorandum from a
senior Hughes official to Howard Hughes describing a proposed CIA attempt to
recover a sunken Soviet submarine and requesting Hughes’ approval for Hughes
Company participation. Thus it became necessary to brief several persons involved in
the investigation in order to protect the document from disclosure i it were recovered
While the source of the leak was never identified, the circumstances became known to
reporters who were covering the story and-were disolosed.in the Los Angeles Times
story. Extraordinary efforts by DCI Colby and others were able to contain the spread
of the story for a time, but it eventually became widely known in press circles, and
Anderson decided to break it.
This article describes how the Glomar project—code-named AZORIAN, not
“JENNIFER” as stated in the press—came about, -how’ it was managed and
conducted, and fo what extent it met its anal, Subsequent articles will describe how the
lcover aspects of the AZORIAN/
“MATADOR proaram, and other relat
Project Origin
“The diesel-powered Soviet GlL-cas ballistic mise submarine pendant T2__]
failed from Petropavlovsk on about 1 March 1968 to take a patrol station
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song | The Glomar Story
northeast of Hawaii, off the west coast of the United States, where it would be
available for nuclear attack on US. targets in event of war. The submarine suffered an
accident—cause unknown—and sank 1,560 miles northwest of Hawaii. With the 722
‘out of contact and overdue, the Soviets undertook a massive two-month search effort
covering a broad area from Petropavlovsk to the patrol area northeast of Hawaii. The
Soviet search was fruitlesé |
E Senior officials in the Department of Defense and GIA recognized that
if it were feasible to devise a plan to recover important components of the submarine,
‘extremely valuable information on Soviet strategic capabilites would be obtained,
Organizing for Recovery
Discussions regarding the feasibility of recovering components of the G-722 took
place between technical representatives of CIA and the Department of Defense
during the latter months of 1968 and in early 1969, These talks resulted in a letter to
the Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms, from the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, David Packard, on 1 April 1969, Packard, referring to the sunken submarine,
asked for a study of what could be done in the next gant
components, He asked CIA to take the lead| nd
designated Dr, John Foster, Director of Defense Research and Enainecring
(DD/R&E) as the point for coordination. Mr, Helms designated Carl Duckett, Deputy
Director for Selenoe and Technology (DD/S&T) as the CIA focal point
eh 9 Corsa i John Parangosky and
lworked| develop a plan for a
program & the submarine, This plan was
Soclinaiad and aonmat emit aa
CT
‘On 17 July 1969, Helms advised Packard that considerable work had been
accomplished| \to undertake submarine recovery; that Duckett
hhad met wi Jel work War in progress to develop a charter for it, that an
Agency task force was studying the retrieval problems associated with the sunken G-IL
submarine
On 8 August 1969,[ Joutlined to a high-level Executive Committee
(consisting of Packard as Chairman; Helms; and the Science Advisor to the President,
Dr. Lee DuBridge) the proposed organization for the submarine recovery effort,
including structure, management, assets, personnel assignments, and intelligence
objective.
ExCom approved the establishment of the new organization and the allocation of
resources and personnel, and agreed that the President should be advised of its
establishment. This was done in a from Dr. Kissinger to President
Nixon, which the President ay Ernest “Zeke” Zellmer, a senior CLA.
official from the DDS&T, w! ‘Academy graduate anda submarine
officer during World War Deputy Director,
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