05301269 PPROVED FOR RELEASED| « DATE: 01-04.2010 RET , NOFO} Despite widespread media publicity in 1975, almost all aspects of the Hughes Glomar Explorer project are stil clastified, and it is important that they remain 80. The wides tai ‘and ext remains important ° ion, (C40 protect sources aad methods which may have Future In the course of continuing litigation related to the project—principally concerning California State tax lability, Freedom of Information Act matters, 4 ‘and a patent infringement clatm—seoeral facts about the Glomar Explorer project have been acknowledged tn court by the U.S. Government. These include the fact of CIA sponsorship of the project for “intelligence collection purposes;” the participation of Hughes Tool Company, the Summa Corporation, and Global ‘Marine, Inc; and the actions of senior CIA officials in 1975 to attempt to persuade ‘members of the media not to broadcast or publish reports concerning the project. Beyond these few details, however, it is still firm U.S. Government policy that nothing further about the project is to be sald or acknowledged. This prokibition ‘was recently reaffirmed by the President's Adoisor for National Security Affairs, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the DCI. It applies particularly to the ‘specific purpose of the AZORIAN mission; the degree of success; operational details; participation of other contractors, government organizations, and indtolduals; classified technology; and project funding matters ‘The following article ts being’ published becouse tt now is possible to discuss most of the foregoing matters and other classified project details at the SECRET —+— NOFORN level rather thon tn the TOP SECRET compartmentation which _ previously applied to all aspects of the AZORIAN project. Nevertheless, there has been no relasation of the necessity to keep most of the details of the AZORIAN project classified for the foreseeable future. PROJECT AZORIAN - THE STORY OF THE HUGHES GLOMAR EXPLORER In March 1968 a Soviet submarine of the G-II class was lost with all hands, 16,500 feet below the surface of the Pacific Ocean, (On 8 Angust_1974{ that submarine was brought to the surface in| Ja recovery system designed and developed specifically for that nISTOn- = | ‘The story of the more than six years intervening is the story of Project AZORIAN, that is, the story of the Hughes Glomar Explorer.* AZORIAN ranks in the forefront of imaginative and bold operations undertaken in the long history of intelligence collection. It combined immense size and scope, advanced technological development, complex systems engineering and testing, unusually severe cover and security requirements, a demanding mission scenario in an unforgiving marine environment, the potential for 2 serious confrontation with the Soviet Union, a difficult and technically unusual exploitation phase, and high cost. ‘The project became widely known to the media in early 1975. At time when the Central Intelligence Agency was under investigation by two committees of Congress and many members of the press, the CIA was credited in some newspaper editorials Tho fll name ofthe ships the MV Hughes Glomar Explorer, 2 shown in Figure 8, Global Marine, no, operates & number of ships with the word Glomer in their names. BecRer 1 Shot) (ove)C05301269 as Seer ’The Glomar Story with pursuing its tradecraft in a most imaginative manner and doing what intelligence organizations are supposed to do—collect intelligence. Other articles were critical of the project, its cost, and method of operation. Many senior US. Government officials, including three Directors of Central Intelligence, two Secretaries of Defense, two Secretaries of Stato, and two Presidents, were personally knowledgeable of the program and reoognized it as an innovative undertaking of reat magnitude and complexity. Key members of four Congressional ‘committees were also kept informed of project progress and reviewed budget requests for the project. Because the AZORIAN Project was of such huge dimensions in cost, risk, and intelligence value, it sometimes caused difficult problems for the officials who had to make the major decisions affecting it. Some of the questions did not lend themselves to clear-cut unequivocal answers: the intelligence value of the target after six years on the ocean floor, for example, or the political or physical response of the Russians if they should learn of the recovery effort. Because of these difficult questions, there could not be and was not unanimity of opinion among senior officials in CIA, Defense, State, the White House, and other agencies collectively responsible for AZORIAN and the decision on whether or not to proceed. Difforences of opinion were expressed anid debated in appropriate forums, both before the project was initiated and during its lifetime. These differences are expressed candidly in this article in. several places In March 1975, columnist Jack Anderson disclosed the existenée of the Hughes Glamat_ Explorer (HGE) project on national te nd radio. The original nress_ Teak had occurred in the Los Angeles Times in February 1975. The Times story was ‘unspecific, and wrong in important facts, but it gradually developed into a widespread seeurity problem for the program before the Anderson disclosure. ‘The original leak resulted from an improbable series of events following a break- in and robbery in June 1974 at Summa Corporation headquarters in Los Angeles. It ‘was thought that among the stolen documents there might be a memorandum from a senior Hughes official to Howard Hughes describing a proposed CIA attempt to recover a sunken Soviet submarine and requesting Hughes’ approval for Hughes Company participation. Thus it became necessary to brief several persons involved in the investigation in order to protect the document from disclosure i it were recovered While the source of the leak was never identified, the circumstances became known to reporters who were covering the story and-were disolosed.in the Los Angeles Times story. Extraordinary efforts by DCI Colby and others were able to contain the spread of the story for a time, but it eventually became widely known in press circles, and Anderson decided to break it. This article describes how the Glomar project—code-named AZORIAN, not “JENNIFER” as stated in the press—came about, -how’ it was managed and conducted, and fo what extent it met its anal, Subsequent articles will describe how the lcover aspects of the AZORIAN/ “MATADOR proaram, and other relat Project Origin “The diesel-powered Soviet GlL-cas ballistic mise submarine pendant T2__] failed from Petropavlovsk on about 1 March 1968 to take a patrol station 2 aoe0530126905301269 song | The Glomar Story northeast of Hawaii, off the west coast of the United States, where it would be available for nuclear attack on US. targets in event of war. The submarine suffered an accident—cause unknown—and sank 1,560 miles northwest of Hawaii. With the 722 ‘out of contact and overdue, the Soviets undertook a massive two-month search effort covering a broad area from Petropavlovsk to the patrol area northeast of Hawaii. The Soviet search was fruitlesé | E Senior officials in the Department of Defense and GIA recognized that if it were feasible to devise a plan to recover important components of the submarine, ‘extremely valuable information on Soviet strategic capabilites would be obtained, Organizing for Recovery Discussions regarding the feasibility of recovering components of the G-722 took place between technical representatives of CIA and the Department of Defense during the latter months of 1968 and in early 1969, These talks resulted in a letter to the Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms, from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, David Packard, on 1 April 1969, Packard, referring to the sunken submarine, asked for a study of what could be done in the next gant components, He asked CIA to take the lead| nd designated Dr, John Foster, Director of Defense Research and Enainecring (DD/R&E) as the point for coordination. Mr, Helms designated Carl Duckett, Deputy Director for Selenoe and Technology (DD/S&T) as the CIA focal point eh 9 Corsa i John Parangosky and lworked| develop a plan for a program & the submarine, This plan was Soclinaiad and aonmat emit aa CT ‘On 17 July 1969, Helms advised Packard that considerable work had been accomplished| \to undertake submarine recovery; that Duckett hhad met wi Jel work War in progress to develop a charter for it, that an Agency task force was studying the retrieval problems associated with the sunken G-IL submarine On 8 August 1969,[ Joutlined to a high-level Executive Committee (consisting of Packard as Chairman; Helms; and the Science Advisor to the President, Dr. Lee DuBridge) the proposed organization for the submarine recovery effort, including structure, management, assets, personnel assignments, and intelligence objective. ExCom approved the establishment of the new organization and the allocation of resources and personnel, and agreed that the President should be advised of its establishment. This was done in a from Dr. Kissinger to President Nixon, which the President ay Ernest “Zeke” Zellmer, a senior CLA. official from the DDS&T, w! ‘Academy graduate anda submarine officer during World War Deputy Director, 4 : ae