Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Toward A Theory of Deception
Toward A Theory of Deception
To cite this Article Bell, J. Bowyer(2003)'Toward a Theory of Deception',International Journal of Intelligence and
CounterIntelligence,16:2,244 — 279
To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/08850600390198742
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08850600390198742
This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or
systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or
distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.
The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents
will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses
should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss,
actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly
or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 16: 244–279, 2003
Copyright # 2003 Taylor & Francis
0885-0607/03 $12.00 + .00
DOI: 10.1080/08850600390198742
J. BOWYER BELL
Dr. J. Bowyer Bell is President of the International Analysis Center, New York
City, and a member of the Editorial Board of Studies in Conflict & Terrorism:
The author of numerous books and articles on terrorism and guerrilla warfare,
his most recent work is Murders on the Nile : The World Trade Center and
Global Terror (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2003).
But the most common examples in nature are those illusions that have
evolved over time, to the advantage of a specific species. The deceptive
characteristics or behaviors are patterns that deceive enemies, attract
friends, encourage breeding, or offer some advantage. A zebra’s stripes,
very visible in broad daylight, hide the animal at the twilight hunting
hours. The cuckoo finds a surrogate mother for its egg. The evolutionary
process has resulted in an adaptation that aids in survival, but the cuckoo
did not plan the coloring of the egg or the zebra the stripes.
These natural phenomena lie outside deception planning concerns. They
may be useful as examples or analogies for the planner, just as optical
illusions may be useful; but deception is a human construction, not a
Downloaded By: [American Public University System] At: 05:55 12 October 2008
DEFINING DECEPTION
Downloaded By: [American Public University System] At: 05:55 12 October 2008
not as vintage as imagined. The art world is replete with painters copying
their earlier and more valuable work, denying earlier work they no longer
like, and galleries running off unauthorized prints. What is seen is a matter
of desire and consensus rather than objective reality.
In fact, all realist paintings are illusions: perspective or likeness achieved by
the ruses of paint on a flat surface, optical illusions in the service of art. And
like the art world, the real world is not easily modeled, categories merge, and
distinctions have muddled edges. The contemporary artist Kosabi has a
studio assistant paint ‘‘his’’ paintings and limits himself to deciding on the
title. An assistant who tried to sell his own ‘‘Kosabi’’ work was
successfully sued. Dan Flavin made light sculptures out of fluorescent
Downloaded By: [American Public University System] At: 05:55 12 October 2008
DECEPTION PROCESS
Deception is a conscious process that mingles the psychological and, in some
cases, the physiological to offer a target an alternative reality—if accepted, an
illusion—to achieve advantage. The illusion may be a Man Ray print bought
as vintage, gaming dice shaved in ancient Egypt, or the Arab assumption in
June 1967 that the Israelis would not attack. An individual may buy
worthless stock or visitors may be impressed with the powerful voice of the
Wizard of Oz. They are deceived about the nature of reality. And the
deception planner anticipates gain—a sale or power and influence in Oz.
Objective reality is the physical world as perceived. What is really there.
Perceived reality is determined by the observer, and may be identical with
objective reality, or an illusion, or a mix. In all cases, observers seek
coherence, want patterns, continuity, certainty. They prefer to see what
they expect to see, so much so that at times, when the ruse is revealed, they
persist in believing the illusion.
The familiar has an enormous hold on perception. Even novelty is apt to
be adjusted to a congenial pattern or simply ignored. Deception planners can
often rely on the target to adjust to expectations of arena, pattern, and
preference, or to absorb as illusion, even novelty, without discovering the
ruse. Even the alert have a predisposition to accept perceived reality —
almost any ‘‘surprise’’ attack, even against the forewarned, comes as a
surprise: the conviction is that tomorrow will be like yesterday.
Even in the physical sciences, the perception of patterns—usually assumed
as a facet of objective reality—there is a tendency to adjust the accepted to
Downloaded By: [American Public University System] At: 05:55 12 October 2008
Perception at Work
Perceived reality can even repel hard evidence. In 1921, The New York Times
revealed that the widely circulated document The Protocols of the Elders of
Zion that offered evidence of a malevolent Jewish plot for world
domination was a forgery. The motor car magnate, Henry Ford, who had
long cited the work, noted after the revelation that ‘‘The only statement I
care to make about the Protocols is that they fit with what is going on.
They have fitted the world situation up to this time. They fit now.’’ Thus
to Ford, what ‘‘fitted’’ his predisposition was true—or at least valid.
The pattern expected is the pattern perceived. The innocent eye does not
notice that there is a bonding design in brick walls composed of the
headers (short ends) and stretchers (the long side), but sees merely
‘‘bricks.’’ When the pattern is disclosed, the eye is no longer innocent and
no subsequent brick wall is perceived the same. Perception of reality has
changed. For a millennium, no one perceived that women had the same
number of ribs as men, since all knew that Adam had lost a rib for Eve. There
was no need to adjust to the problem of the unexpected rib, only to see what
was expected. In the first case, the observer did not observe closely, out of
habit, and in the second, need not observe, because reality was already
known.
The Arab states in June 1967 felt no need to go on alert, in part because
their own threat was not intended to lead to a real war, and so Israeli
deception ruses had a ready audience. In fact, the deception planner may
rely on not only the power of existing patterns, but the predilections of the
target — in some cases so intrusive as to be delusory. So, there is always
the prospect that the target of any deception plan will be self-deceived, or
Downloaded By: [American Public University System] At: 05:55 12 October 2008
Classic Ruses
For a generation, the Soviet Union largely destroyed British intelligence
because of the reports of a few hidden agents working only for ultimate
sanctuary. On the other hand, for two years the Allies invested enormous
effort in hiding the nature of Operation Overlord, the invasion of France,
offering false options, using hundreds of channels for thousands of ruses.
Plan Bodyguard created notional armies, deployed illusory radio networks,
false documents, used captured spies as channels and constructed tanks
and airplanes out of canvass, rubber, and plywood. Some of the ruses
became classics: Monty’s Double or the Man-Who-Never-Was and, in
Operation Fortitude’s ‘‘Quicksilver’’ plan — the ‘‘Army Group Patton’’
(FUSAG), seemingly based in East Anglia waiting—even after D-Day—to
strike at Calais. There were rigid constraints: the Germans knew that an
invasion could use only certain beaches at certain times of the year, and
only when the tide was right. Unlike the Arabs in 1967, the Germans knew
there would be an attack in 1944, and were aware of the need for both keen
observation and counterdeception. Many in the Allied command did not
believe it possible to ‘‘hide an invasion’’ — just as there are those who
believe that space is too empty to hide a satellite, or that magicians can
make an elephant disappear on stage.
For the Allies, a successful invasion meant the war would be won, and for
the Germans, lost. Deception was worth the price — and advocated on the
highest level. Thus, Allied deception was strategic, complex, and extensive,
offered many ruses and channels. Yet, the deception effort was a bargain:
one percent of the D-Day effort, according to Barton Whaley’s estimate.
The results were well worth the investment. Even after D day, the impact
Downloaded By: [American Public University System] At: 05:55 12 October 2008
DECEPTION CYCLE
In deception, the first step is the recognition by a potential planner of the
need or opportunity to deceive a target. What must be done in deception,
and often is not, is to determine the result desired from a successful
illusion. Mere acceptance of a ruse as an illusion may not be advanta-
geous, and may in fact prove costly. Thus, to deceive is not sufficient.
What is wanted is a proper response — the target to do something or
nothing. To this end follows the planning and construction of a ruse that
can be channeled within a decision-arena. The channel can be as complex
as the ruse, and both will be entangled in the decision-arena. There, the
target either accepts all or part—or none—of the ruse as an illusion. There
is a spectrum of responses to the illusion that can be discerned by the
deception planner only through feedback.
The planner’s analysis of the target’s response through a spectrum of
feedback may lead to immediate success or failure, or the construction of
further ruses, a shift in channels, new and parallel ruses, the persistent
dispatch of the existing ruse that may or may not be altered, or elaborated
passing through the channel that, in turn, may or may not be adjusted by
the analysis of the feedback. Thus, a cycle moves from the desire to
deceive by means of a ruse that is channeled to establish an illusion, on to
the planner’s response to the success or limitations of the target’s response
to the illusion.
Entry at the planning stage of the cycle offers the opportunities and
limitation of objective reality, the dangers of self-deception, and the
counter-deception actions of the target, as well the impact of past
(1) Deception Planning: objective goal, cost benefit, commitment, and choice of
both ruse and channel. The goal may be to protect airplanes against
Downloaded By: [American Public University System] At: 05:55 12 October 2008
antiaircraft fire and so, if painted to blend with the sky, should be invisible.
(2) Ruse Construction: the combination of factors necessary. These factors —
characteristics (charcs) — when combined generate a basic ruse. For example,
to suggest great strength, radio traffic is created that mimics a larger army.
What is needed is the time or radio operators and the false messages, but
what is crucial is the channel, i.e., the radio broadcast.
(3) Channeling Selection: the projection of the ruse by use of effective means. The
channel (the medium as message) entangles the constructed ruse with a means
of display that may be contrived or natural or both: e.g., a radio broadcast
meant to be monitored, codes that are meant to be broken, gossip spread, or
an open safe filled with false documents. An effective channel may validate
an ineffectual ruse, or the reverse.
(4) Ruse-Channeled: at this point the ruse is projected to impose a change in the
perceived reality of the target.
(5) The Decision-Arena: where the ruse, visible to the target, is offered for reception
as an illusion. The illusion is not dispatched but created within the decision-
arena. For example, an army emerges out of radio broadcasts or air
reconnaissance photographs or the reports of false spies.
(6) The Illusion is accepted, and the target thus adjusts to the imposed pattern as an
aspect of objective reality-acceptance. This automatically assures some sort of
adjustment, even doing nothing — sometimes, especially doing nothing. Here,
the planes will be hidden from the radar, and so the antiaircraft guns cannot fire.
(7) The Target-Response and Response-Spectrum: to the intended imperatives of the
illusion or to the perceived imperatives of the illusion. The crews flying the
‘‘hidden’’ bombers report that antiaircraft fire is at times directed effectively
at the camouflaged airplanes.
(8) The Illusion-Impact and Analysis of the Feedback is conducted by the deception
planner of the target response.
(9) A Decision to Respond to feedback: The weather, the angle of the sun, and the
height of the planes must be considered when the camouflage is chosen. If the
illusion is to be effective, changes will have to be made. In all cases, the ruse can
be adjusted, confirmed, or discarded. Further channels and ruses can be
considered.
(10) The Cycle Continued, with the deception planner adjusting or maintaining the
goal. Further planning and commitment can be given to additional, parallel,
Counter-Deception
The planner hopes that the target may not be in a position to exploit the
revelation of the illusion, having already responded, according to the
aspiration of the deception planner; but at times the target can initiate a
duplicitous response to the illusion, and so not only counter the deception
but also exploit it. Thus, there can be a counter-cycle by the target when
the illusion is revealed or discovered. The now-former target can seek to
project a counter-ruse that will offer an illusion to the original planner as
to the impact of the original ruse.
An illustration of this follows. The spy dispatched is taken as a recruit until a
background check reveals that, in reality, he is an enemy of the state, but then,
instead of execution, the spy is either monitored or turned, and so continues to
offer to the original planner the illusion that the ruse has been maintained, the
spy is secure, and his report valid. Deception has been countered and an
alternative cycle, no different in structure, initiated by the target.
DECEPTION PLANNING
Deception planning begins with the aspiration to adjust existing reality to the
advantage and the agenda of the planner. What is wanted is perceived as a
deception-goal, achieved through duplicity, guile, and cunning. What the
planner seeks from the beginning is a means to offer a convincing option—
a pattern—that will impose a new reality on the target, and so manipulate a
desirable response.
The planner must define what is wanted, what ruse may work to that effect,
the costs related to the benefits, and the appropriate means to offer a change
in pattern that will be accepted as an illusion, and thus manipulate the target
to respond as desired. The less information about the planner in the
possession of the target, generally the better. Secrecy is necessary to guard
the nature of the ruse. If the target possesses an insight into the planner’s
capacity and habits, deception is more difficult, but such knowledge may be
of advantage if properly exploited.
Formal planning stresses the need for secrecy, the cost of deception, the
means, and the returns. On the other hand, the runner in a football game
merely and without thought offers options — misdirection — to avoid
tacklers: soldiers hide if possible when under fire, and poker players
protect their hand, both physically and psychologically. At times there is
little planning, an almost spontaneous display of a ruse that is immediately
accepted as an illusion that provokes target response, and so a swift
analysis of the response. The deception cycle may be all but instant, barely
Downloaded By: [American Public University System] At: 05:55 12 October 2008
planned, and yet effective for the planner or the work of hundreds over a
period of months, as was the Bodyguard plan.
A planner may be able to predict the possible response to a specific ruse
by the target through analyzing past practice and predilections. Finally, a
clever ruse may create a cunning illusion, but the new reality must also
convince the target to respond to the advantage of the planner: what is
wanted is to shape a reaction to the illusion, not merely to have an illusion
acceptance. At all times, the pleasure of deceit may hide the vital necessity
of the purpose of deceit. And only a desired reaction indicates successful
deception planning.
There is, as well, self-deception when an illusion is preferred over objective
reality, or otherwise compelling evidence to reality, by the target. The returns
of the investment in a pyramid scheme may be so compelling that caution is
discarded — and logic. Then, as noted, the potential target prefers the
reflection from a mirror to the confusion of objective reality. A deception
planner may be aware of the target’s propensity for certain illusions, but
must still create and deploy a ruse to generate a compelling illusion. The
investment must come with a certificate, and be sold with enough
conviction to convince even the greedy. But the dynamics of self-deception
differ from those of deception, and are often irrelevant to most deception
planning. This is not true with the target’s specific prejudices, experience,
habits, and predilections. These may be of vital use to the planner in
understanding the target. These predispositions may arise from an
institutionalized self-deception, may be the universals of perception, or
may arise from personal and private perspectives. The deceiver can thus
count on the natural attraction of apparent gain or reassurance, the
particular habits of the target, at times the target’s commitment to a
preferred reality, as well as the skillful composition of the channeled ruse.
Rarely does a planner examine existing problems with a deception
checklist to hand. Most deception appears to the involved to come
naturally, but not to the magicians who have a doctrine, not to those who
paint camouflage, or to those selling fake oil stock or offering three-card
there are a variety of adjustments that the deception planner can make
to the ruse or to the arena: (a) retie the fly or (b) reconsider the impact
of the time of day, the weather, the cycles of the moon, the degree of
weed, the temperature of the water, the wind, or the noise level.
What is attractive to the deception planner is the careful construction
of a ruse, the skills required to channel it by casting, and the problematic
results that set in motion further deception cycles. The uncertainly of
feedback and the impact of intangibles and variants assure a constant
challenge to be met with skill, cunning, and flexibility.
Those involved often find the actual construction and channeling of
the ruse equal to evidence of effect; the difficulty for the deception
planner is that the reasons for refusal can only be extrapolated and
never discovered, given the secretive nature of a trout’s decisionmaking
process. The fly may not have been seen, may have been noted by a
trout not feeding, been denied because of the time of day, the degree of
light, the flow of the current, the amount of weed in the water, the
temperature, the ambient noise — or the contingent and unforeseen.
At rare times the trout can be seen to deny the lure, but this offers little
explanation as to why. Repeated refusals of the same lure are taken as
evidence that the ruse cannot create an illusion, just as repeated strikes
indicate to the planner that the lure works, the deluded trout striking
at an illusion.
Each stage offers the planner desirable opportunities: the skill
deployed to tie the fly, the skill displayed in channeling the lure with a
casting rod — and the intellectual challenge of when and where and
how this is done and then the analysis of the limited feedback result —
and so the effort to build a better trout fly.
For the fly fisherman, as well as the Allies with Operation Bodyguard, for
the card shark, the philanderer, the officer charged with hiding the Suez
Canal, for the liar or the magician, planning usually shapes the ruse to a
perceived need. In all cases, the ruse is created by a planner deploying
skill, analysis, guile, cunning, ingenuity and practice — and at times
innocence, desperation, and ignorance.
RUSE-CHANNEL PLANNING
If some ruses are offered nearly spontaneously, naturally, without great
thought, many require detailed planning. The planner should have an
insight into what ruse would be most effective to achieve the desired
purpose, not merely to have the ruse channeled and accepted as illusion. A
military planner, for example, must, as well, take into account the existing
reality: the weather, the terrain, the course of battle, the attitude of allies,
the tides, and troop morale, the habits of the senior commanders, and the
enemy’s dispositions, as well as his position. The liar lies almost
automatically, denies the truth, hides past action or future intention, and
offers a simple ruse, a falsehood. The falsehood, appealing or unappealing,
Downloaded By: [American Public University System] At: 05:55 12 October 2008
relies on acceptance in part by the reputation of the channel, the liar. The
channel may be as important as the ruse—the liar as convincing as the lie.
And, the channel must be not only acceptable and convincing, but also
capable of imposing a ruse within the decision-arena.
The British could hide the Suez Canal from the Germans with Maskelyne’s
ruses because the channel — aerial reconnaissance — was vulnerable to
manipulation. A channel is at times more crucial than the ruse, and more
easily neglected by the planners. There is no use in sending duplicitous
semaphore signals to the blind, or building dummy tanks that are not
noticed by enemy air reconnaissance.
Some channels are, in fact, composed of ruses: the ambassador’s safe at the
embassy, regularly rifled by a spy, is filled not with secret papers but forgeries
to achieve advantage. The authenticity of the false documents is accepted
because the channel is very convincing. In World War II, the British-
controlled German agents reported back through their usual channels so
that their false information was validated by the means of transmission. In
the course of a complex deception effort, some channels may contradict
others, some may be compromised, and some may work as intended.
The combined impact of the channeled-ruse, no matter how complex, is
always found in the response; contradictory ruses may be taken as
authentic because they are contradictory, and so the whole illusion is
accepted. A ruse may be intended to create an illusion that, for the target,
will be unnoticed, benign, desirable, unappealing or dangerous: each
initiating a desired response.
(1) To be unnoticed the illusion must integrate the illusion into the existing pattern of
perceived reality: all continues to appear normal, no new troops on the move, no
ships at sea, no break in the routine or standard operating procedures. The spy
as clerk — a mole — does nothing, has no control, no communication with his
leaders, is merely a clerk until activated. This special clerk, until activated, is
no different from other clerks, one penny among a pile, absolutely hidden
since there is nothing to hide but potential.
On the other hand, inept ruse planning may lead to swift discovery: Recently,
Canadian forces in the Afghanistan campaign used camouflage uniforms that
made them more rather than less visible.
(2) Deception is often used to transform something into an irrelevant form, rather
than simply hide one’s assets or intentions. A military ship may be made not
invisible by camouflage, but rather into an irrelevant tramp steamer.
(3) A mirage of an oasis is a natural illusion that offers a desirable illusion
(salvation) to the desperate traveler. False battleships may offer the enemy air
force a target, absorbing their interests and assets — and, perhaps, allowing
secret maneuvers by the real battleships. Most forgeries and fakes hope to be
taken as desirable and thus generate same advantage for the planner: sales,
prestige, vengeance.
Downloaded By: [American Public University System] At: 05:55 12 October 2008
(4) A planner can operate through a ruse intended to create an unappealing illusion.
A mine field may be marked as such to deflect an enemy’s line of advance
because removal of the ‘‘mines’’ is not worth the effort. The channel may be
‘‘coded’’ but easily penetrated to give further authenticity: no signs on the
mine field but its position leaked by agents.
(5) The planner may also seek the acceptance of an illusion that will be perceived
as dangerous by the target and so generate a desired response: a false secret-
weapon, a false armada, or merely a football formation organized for a pass
when the defense is prepared for a run. A feeble lion with a large growl
may deceive a hunter who on past experience takes the decibels as an
indication of power.
RUSE-ILLUSION TAXONOMY
Within each major division in a deception taxonomy, the spectrum runs from
the least complicated to the most complex, but can more effectively be shaped
to the three stages: mimicry, innovation, and ambiguity. The most effective
ruse is simply a clone of reality —exactly the same but different, one more
grain of sand in the Sahara. Denial, however, is often less compelling as a
means to force a target response, so that innovation is often a planner’s
choice, just as is ambiguity, if the target is aware that a ruse is being
offered. A clone — an almost exact copy of a Picasso, easy to commission
or compose, offered through a legitimate dealer — risks comparison with
the real. An innovative creation of a ‘‘new’’ Picasso, when the style is
copied, has a better chance of success, as long as the channel is convincing,
the provenance being as important as the impact of the image. And, if
neither the talent nor provenance is available to the planner, he may offer
patent fakes with false signatures at an auction where ‘‘bargains’’ are
available and the bidding dazzling — the target becomes involved in the
process of acquisition and the ‘‘Picasso’’ becomes less visible.
The three states might be to hide by offering a ruse of one grain of sand
among many, and then hiding, by creating a false cactus and finally by
relying on a ‘‘mirage’’ to confuse existing reality. Thus the ruse may (1) copy
reality, or (2) create a novel reality, or in the last resort (3) blur reality. To do
so, each illusion will either hide or show and, in all cases, the ruse and the
illusion may be composed of a few simple elements —the hat-on-a-stick —
or a huge and complex bundle of ruses employing various channels, and
so a complex, strategic illusion.
In the placement of a ruse in a taxonomy, a key factor is the degree
of change in perceived reality. While it is obviously more productive of
the investment of assets to opt for a simple ruse to shape a simple
illusion—one hat on one stick—there is an intellectual challenge in seeking
to impose a greater change on the perceived reality of the target: all ruses
Downloaded By: [American Public University System] At: 05:55 12 October 2008
may not be economical. But all ruses seek to create an illusion that will
offer varying degrees of change in the pattern perceived by the target: from
nothing generated by effective camouflage to a major strategic initiative —
in World War II the Allied attempt to hide the time, location, and strength
of the 1944 Normandy invasion, or in the twenties the Germans’ hiding of
their air capacity to evade a treaty obligation, and later the Nazi regime
exaggerated the Luftwaffe’s capacity so as to intimidate potential enemies.
These strategic ruses are bundles of other ruses, often so many that the
discovery of a few does not prevent acceptance of the one-great-ruse. In
fact, in some cases, discovery may assist in validation.
The planning, composition, and deployment of deception-ruses may
incorporate an enormous investment: with each ruse composed of a
complex of ruse-factors, and those as well rising from more basic
structures. Such an investment, however, is almost always less than the
cost of having no illusion accepted. The deception planner is aware that he
can multiply his forces or hide them, confuse or intimidate an enemy with
a smaller investment than the advantages of an increase in his forces, the
lack of secrecy, or a prepared enemy will cost.
Each ruse, as well, once channeled into the decision-arena, will also
interact with objective reality before an illusion is accepted or rejected.
This pattern of simulative and dissimulative factors, the intrusion of
reality, and the contingent and unforeseen, varies in each case, but can be
placed close to one of the three foci of a long spectrum from the least shift
in the pattern of perceived reality to the greatest shift. The ideal for the
deception planner is the core-mimicry, with ambiguity on one side with
reality blurred, and innovation on the other with reality created.
(1) In the first example what is seen is what is expected — nothing but
rocks or normal radio traffic or a beach without defenses. The best lie is
the truth. The deception planner hardly plans at all in some cases, so
obvious is the necessity to hide the moment of attack, to rig for silent
running when the destroyers are searching for the submarine, to appear as
small as possible when under fire: ‘‘naturally,’’ in World War I, all those
who had to attack across an open field leaned forward to reduce their
apparent size—blurring that proved futile but persisted for four years as a
natural response.
(2) In the second case, what is seen is beyond expectation: the addition of
new but mock rockets in a parade to reveal nonexistent capacity.
In all cases, the ruse and so the illusion can fit into a taxonomy that offers
spectrums of simulation and dissimulation, and the primary means to shape
such a pattern. No pattern is pure, but the categories contain all the potential
ruses and illusions.
Mimicry
To transform the real by offering a false copy of the real transforming what is
to be hidden. Mimicry tends to hide by displaying a pattern that resembles in
all necessary ways perceived realty (an illusion): tanks camouflaged as trucks,
airplanes painted to blend with the ground when seen from above, or with the
sky when seen from below. The target of the ruse looks up or down and
perceives what is expected. The real is repackaged as another sort of reality.
Innovation
The creating of an illusion that changes unexpectedly the objective reality of
the target, offering novelty to either disguise the real or to adjust perceived
reality. A false army, an undiscovered Picasso, a dangerous shoal, or a
leaked battle plan are innovations created to appear real. What is hidden is
that they are false.
Ambiguity
When the target is aware, in whole or in part, of an effort to impose an
alternative pattern on objective reality, the planner may choose to confuse
the observer — blur the edges, suggest other valid options, display a
distraction, increase the noise or the data or the number of channels. The
target, thus, may be aware that a channeled-ruse is being offered but the
illusion and reality flicker.
Misdirection
Hiding the real within groups of the potentially real.
Dazzle
Showing real distractions to blur reality.
Few ruse planners have a neat checklist to mix a bit of dazzle with some
mimicry. Most shape a ruse or a channel pragmatically. Some recognize
that there are factors involved other than the characteristics of the ruse or the
cunning of the channel to consider. And the purpose of the ruse often
determines the components and the result. A desirable, dangerous, or
unappealing illusion is more likely to offer the planner a visible response
by the target than those intended to be unnoticed or benign. Thus, as long
as the Birnam Woods merely hid MacBeth’s enemies, no response was
necessary or visible — but when the ‘‘woods’’ began to move on him,
dazzling him with the improbable, he had to respond. In any case, each of
the categories of illusion arises from the effectiveness of the ruse, and the
ruse from the skills and insights of the planner choosing from items within
the taxonomy.
Downloaded By: [American Public University System] At: 05:55 12 October 2008
show must hide something. And each ruse may contain aspects of one of the
three major categories in the taxonomy: a military message in code, when
monitored, can offer the dazzle of other broadcasts and the reality of
encrypted message — the listener knows that he hears a military message
but the content is hidden. Thus the radio orders to the Patton ‘‘divisions’’
dazzled — to counter-dazzle, the target must discover which messages are
real and which false, and then what is the content of the messages — the
last may be difficult, but deploying past patterns of broadcast behavior
may give an insight on which Patton army is which. The urgency of the
task — delay meant that discovery would be too late for an effective
response—was thus hampered by a ruse that combined hiding and showing.
Downloaded By: [American Public University System] At: 05:55 12 October 2008
RUSE-CHANNEL CONSTRUCTION
Each ruse is composed of a variety of characteristics (charcs) that offer a
pattern meshing simulation and dissimulation — hiding or showing. An
admiral in the eighteenth century may have painted extra gun ports on his
ships to deceive the target as to his fleet’s firepower. The enemy would
‘‘see’’ capacity where none existed. A forger may also forge the documents
that authenticate a copy of a painting — a copy made real by using old
canvass, an antique frame, paint without modern chemicals, as well as the
style of the artist — and to make the ruse more effective by planning the
new provenance within a museum’s records, a channel that offers spurious
authenticity where even the suspicious would look only for reassurance. In
the first case, the planner expects the target to respond to the illusion of
power, and in the second, not to respond at all to the possibility that the
landscape is a forgery. Both ruses hide the real— the capacity of the ships
and the forgery, and sow the false: more guns and another masterpiece.
One hides the weakness of the navy, and the other shows the buyer a
means to acquire, if at cost, a masterpiece. In each case, the predominant
intent of the ruse is intended by the deception planner and, if accepted, the
illusion is defined by the target.
Camouflage is meant to hide and, if it does not fail, be a ruse of
dissimulation, while the Trojan horse devised by the Greek warrior Epeus
was meant to offer a new reality, simulate novelty as well as hide the
Greek soldiers, and was so accepted by the Trojans. The creator and the
observer determine if the ruse or illusion is dissimulative or simulative,
although all ruses and all illusions offer both components.
Each ruse must involve both hiding and showing, but the planner usually
offers a construct that is intended to either hide reality from the target or
offer an alternative reality, hide the fake painting or show the false gun
ports. The planner and then the target’s assumptions tend to make the
ruse either simulative or dissimulative—a matter of degree.
accumulating the charcs, exhibiting cunning, and spending less time on the
channel, unless it too is perceived as a clever ruse. In retrospect, the
analytical focus is often on the actual construction of the ruse — the false
gun ports, a notional Allied invasion of Norway, or an attack through the
Balkans — all the tricks and wiles, the romantic ‘‘charc’’ of rubber
tanks and dazzling radio traffic, the rubber paratroopers dropped over
Normandy, or the false documents leaked.
Thus, the channel is often assumed to be part of the ruse, and at other
times fails. German aerial reconnaissance was flown over the notional
Patton Army Group in East Anglia but the analysis of the result was never
done, and bad weather can hide the most cunningly painted gun ports.
In real life, the ruse and channel become entangled in the decision-arena. All
ruses must have a channel, but once the ruse is channeled, then the deception
planner loses control, acceptance depends on the effectiveness of the
construct and the analysis of the target. In all cases, the deception process
follows a clear path from perceived need and/or possibility, and the decision
to construct and dispatch a ruse. Since a ruse requires not only commitment,
time, and effort but also offers the planner the sense of power, construction
tends to overshadow the other aspects of the deception cycle. What is wanted
seems obvious, but how to persuade the target to make this possible is more
challenging, and the challenge within reach is the construction of the ruse—
and the channel. Acceptance of a ruse as an illusion ends control, and for
some, foresight. To deceive seems sufficient. With or without a doctrine,
others recognize the key is the response of the target, and knowledge of that
response. A ruse may be costly and clever and ineffectual and so on to the
channel. What matters is what is made to matter.
TARGET RESPONSE
The Action-Arena: Denial, Ignorance, Acceptance
The ruse or the channel may be unconvincing — the magician’s fingers
fumble, the painted gun ports improbable given the size of the vessel, or
the trick play used too often to confuse the defense. Even if the ruse is
channeled into the decision-arena, the target may simply overlook the
offered change of pattern, and not notice the honey or the pot. The target
may benefit from a conscious and cunning counter-deception policy, from
the ineptitude of the planner, from an advantageous change in objective
reality within the decision-arena, or from the contingent and the
unforeseen, and so be immune to the proposed illusion.
A variety of factors may facilitate the acceptance of a ruse as an illusion—
one that will generate the desired response. Each case varies, but the
predilections of the target, the reputation of the planner, and the apparent
direction of reality can be exploited or disguised.
Downloaded By: [American Public University System] At: 05:55 12 October 2008
made happen. In the case of the enemy ships, the hidden admiral could see
the response — the enemy sailing where wanted or unexpectedly in the
wrong direction. It was more difficult to decide how effective World War
II’s Plan Bodyguard was at any given moment: there were so many ruses,
so many channels, so many illusions to monitor, and the feedback could
never be precise: some Germans believed some illusions at some times, and
some action was often taken, adjusted, canceled. Others, for various
reasons, were not deceived, even if they accepted the illusions. What could
be seen — the position of troops, the content of the coded traffic read by
Enigma, the thousands of bits and pieces of evidence acquired by the
resistance, by observation, by assumptions — gave encouragement but not
Downloaded By: [American Public University System] At: 05:55 12 October 2008
assurance that the great illusion was effective: the Germans had not
accepted Normandy as the site of the invasion.
Once there is feedback on the response to the deception, the planner may
initiate a further deception-cycle. In the case of Plan Bodyguard, this was a
constant process. In the case of a football play, the result is instant: the
feedback arrives in a gain or a loss. The deception planner then must
consider the new reality. The quarterback may adjust his play calling, and
the planners of Bodyguard continued to devise new ruses and channels.
At some stage, the illusion fails or is revealed too late for the target to act
effectively. If the ruse succeeds, the planner moves on and the illusion
disappears. This may take longer than imagined, as was the case with Plan
Bodyguard, shaped to work until a day or two before 6 June 1944, that in
part lasted for eight weeks after D-Day. Most illusions are thus self-
liquidating, some are exposed. In a few cases the illusion persists, becomes
part of objective reality. The creating of the Piltdown Man ruse sought
acceptance of a revolutionary, evolutionary discovery, thus revealing the
limits of the target scientists—the planner gained private pleasure once the
illusion was accepted and the scientists were involved, and knew as well
that at any time in the future, when the ruse was revealed, there would be
further evidence, and so further pleasure at the flaws within the scientific
community. Acceptance would assure pleasure as well as ultimate
revelation — The Donation of Constantine lasted for a millennium —
because the pattern was congenial, and The Protocols of Zion still circulate
among anti-Semites because some always choose to see what they want.
For a deception planner, success or failure is apt to come swiftly.
In the case of the Greeks at Troy, the deception goal was to hide the
Greek soldiers from the Trojans so as to allow the ten-year siege to be
broken by unexpected access within the walls to the locked gates.
(1) The Greeks might have chosen to hide their soldiers’ exact numbers
and location from Trojan observers by mixing them with civilians, setting
up clouds of dust, creating ambiguities of number and place over time, so
as to make Trojan choices less certain: introduce ambiguity into objective
reality.
(2) Then, a more complex option would be to disguise the soldiers as
civilians, and so permit their arrival at the gate to be hidden because they
mimicked the existing patterns observed by the Trojans. The Greeks
would be adding more to reality and thus hide their army until the
illusion collapsed (a moment of surprise) and swords were drawn.
(3) A far more complex and compelling ruse was actually employed to
create a new reality that would, as illusion, produce the desired response.
The Greeks would apparently withdraw for good, sail over the horizon,
and yet leave behind a giant horse — a horse that the Trojans had been
warned should not be taken into the city. The Greek soldiers would be
hidden in a giant, wooden horse that, assumed benign and desirable,
would be taken into the city because the warning was assumed
duplicitous. Then the Greek navy would return the army just as the
soldiers in the great horse opened the gates.
The purpose of the ruse was to create an accepted illusion that would
hide the real by offering a Greek withdrawal of an appealing illusion and
a novel creation —the horse —as an additional and acceptable aspect of
perceived reality. Warnings would parallel the revelation of the horse to
validate Trojan prejudices.
Thus, the crucial categories are those arising from the degree of change in
objective reality imposed by an accepted illusion. The planner chooses a ruse
that is largely simulative or dissimulative, and channels it into the decision
arena where the target accepts it, convinced by the simulation or the
dissimulation. The involved determine the category of the ruse and the
illusion.
The target response in all cases is to the illusion, not to the ruse, and so
acceptance is beyond reach of the deception planner who must rely on
feedback, visible or not, to determine the impact. The illusion as accepted,
then, need not be the intent of the ruse as deployed, nor initiate the
response intended. Effective deception is, then, a category of intentional
deception that may be shaped by target self-deception, flaws in creation
and transmission, and the contingent and unforeseen. The difference
between ineffectual deception is that the latter initiates an unwanted or
useless—unexpected—response to the illusion as accepted.
The deception planner’s goal of manipulating the target through the
creation of the illusion—an alternative reality —by means of channeling a
compelling ruse is achieved only if the illusion generates, or largely so, the
desired response by the target—and, in rare cases, generates an unexpected
but advantageous response.
CHANNELS
The dispatched ruse-image, to have any effect, must arrive through channels
created, adapted, or integrated by the planner. These channels are integrated
into the transmission, and so the illusion may be quite conventional: a line of
sight, or a vast complex of allied strands — each a special ruse — offered
through a spectrum of real and notional devices.
The key concern in channels is that they neither exist separably from the
ruse nor play a lesser role: all are integrated into the ruse, and some may
be more deceptive, more complex, and even more effective than the ruse. A
ruse-image cannot be transformed into an illusion without effective
Ruse-Illusion Transformation
For the planner, the key moment is, when in transit within the transmission
channel, the illusion is perceived by the target within a decision-arena (part
physical and part psychological). The ruse-image offers an alternative
reality. The reality received as an illusion is never exactly the ruse fully
Downloaded By: [American Public University System] At: 05:55 12 October 2008
TARGET REACTIONS
Experience, standard operating procedures, prejudice and habit, the power of
inertia, the congenial and comfortable, and the deception-assumptions of the
target will shape responses to projected reality, to the acceptance of the ruse
as illusion and the subsequent response. The deception planner has or has not
factored this into the ruse. A planner wants an imperative illusion, one that
manipulates, not merely one that is accepted.
The ruse may offer unconvincing or confusing patterns, appear anomalous
to experience and expectation. A target is apt to be suspicious of perceived
reality, containing anomalies and paradoxes. Most effective are integrative
patterns, even for novel constructs, rather than incongruities. A variant is
in the intentional construction of ruses of misdirection or dazzle, where the
incongruities of the pattern are intended to blur reality—a group of purple
cows driven across a battlefield may attract the eye and so hide the
movement of the cavalry. If the cavalry are to be disguised as cows, purple
would not be the most effective choice of color to achieve mimicry. During
the battle of Bastogne, orders were sent from headquarters to two
‘‘different’’ Patton Third Armies, thus dazzling the Germans monitoring
American radio signals.
It is possible to change the arena without the target’s knowledge—focused
on the probable course of action, the target ignores less likely options. Thus,
troops can be moved in impossible weather, attack from unexpected
directions, go to war while offering peace. In this case, the planner exploits
the assumed predilections of the target, but, in many cases, more complex
stratagems must be devised and constructed. The deception planner must
record. In a few cases, the target may hide the discovery of the illusion, and
exploit the continuing convictions of the planner that the illusion
is still taken as real. A new cycle begins, but the target is the original planner.
Agents are turned and kept reporting, as the Germans did in World War II
with nearly all of the British agents dropped into Holland. Their coded
messages back to headquarters were accepted as real by British control,
even when hidden warnings were included. The desire of the deception
planners for a network overrode the disaster that the warnings implied.
The evidence of German control was taken as ambiguous — and too
dreadful to imagine—and discounted.3 So more agents were sent, captured
and were soon reporting back. Revelation of the German deception was
constantly enforced by further ruses. The process of British realization was
slow, not swift, and so, at the end, not a surprise. Mostly, however, there
is surprise and consternation of the collapse of an illusion, and in a few
cases, a feeling of betrayal or outrage.
In a deception-cycle, when the illusion collapses, surprise is almost always
a collateral result: reality is suddenly not as previously perceived. The target
is surprised. The purpose of a deception ruse, however, is not ‘‘surprise,’’ but
rather that the target responds to the illusion as intended. ‘‘Surprise’’ is
merely the reaction of the target to revelation, a by-product. A magician
offers ruses to an audience eager to accept illusions, and to be awed and
‘‘surprised’’ at the seeming violation of objective reality by the skill of the
performer. The audience knows that the elephant did not really disappear
onstage, but yet there is no longer an elephant: the surprise is at the skill,
not the illusion, and the goal of the magician to delight is so achieved.
A military deception planner wants the illusion accepted as a matter of
course, and the target so manipulated — surprise may come when the
illusion is discovered for whatever reason. The deception-goal is not
‘‘surprise,‘‘ but an advantageous disposition of enemy forces because the
illusion has been accepted as real. The Greeks did not care whether the
Trojans were surprised when the soldiers came out of the horse, only that
the gates were opened to victory.
opposition.
The identification of surprise with deception is to misunderstand the
nature and intent of the illusion that creates an alternative reality —
‘‘surprise’’ comes when the illusion is no longer needed to achieve
deception goals or implodes for any other reason. The key is the response
to the illusion that relies on secrecy until revealed, and so surprises the
target.
In sum, a deception-cycle occurs when the planner’s agenda suggests the
use of deceit as a means, and ends, if at all, when the deception process
aborts, ends, or continues without adjustment. At times, a variety of ruses
employing various channels are used to engender a variety of illusions that,
in whole or in part, will impose a new pattern on the target’s sense of
perceived reality. This illusion then requires an extensive and=or extended
response, constant reinforcement and validation, additional channels,
fine-tuning, and repeated feedback. There are a variety of obstacles to any
deception-planner’s success: flawed analysis, lack of resources, persistent
illusions about objective reality, ignorance, excess optimism, a poorly
designed ruse or channel, and the defenses of the target. Of these, the use
of counter-deception parallels a deception cycle, and may indeed initiate a
target’s deception cycle, but also may persist, not as a mirror image of
deception, but as an independent process.
COUNTER-DECEPTION
The dynamics of counter-deception are not the same as those of the deceiver,
but are usually integrated into any deception planner’s considerations. Like
deception, counter-deception is a conventional aspect of everyday
perception; one weighs the card player’s bid, seeks to discover the path
hidden in the dark, or the implication of the social lie. An individual must
constantly scan objective reality to discover potential harm hidden by
intent or nature, and to prosper, to focus suspicion on likely deceit — a
devise codes that cannot easily be broken, or analyze the unforeseen and
unusual, the break in pattern, or the emergence of a new patter.
Counter-deception focuses not simply on offered illusions, but on the
possibility of deceit, the existence of deception ruses and channels, and the
prospect of an illusion. After the siege of Troy, many were wary of Greeks
bearing gifts, just as during the Cold War most Western security services
were wary of any Soviet bloc initiative that could hide duplicity.
Obviously, the most effective defense would be a successful penetration of
deception planning — a spy who could offer feedback; but, although
deception is universal and common, and deception planning a constant,
only a limited number of illusions is offered. The target is in many cases
aware that such illusions are available — the enemy camouflage, their
maneuvers misleading, the flood of radio traffic dazzling — and so the
sweep through objective reality focuses on previous experience, on an
analysis of the agenda and capacity of the suspected deceiver, and on
unexpected aberrations — a Trojan horse or a confidential clerk who
purchases a luxury car. Passive counter-deception is precautionary.
Everyone in the department is given a lie detector test, the guerrilla
country is swept with infrared sensors to find what might be hidden, and
diplomatic codes are updated. A lie detector may be used to scan
everyone, or merely some, or only the suspect: each and all are potential
agents, and so are illusions in place.
The most active measures seek to counter the particular rather than the
general, focusing on patterns that may be ruse-generated. The lie detector is
used as one among many means to determine if a suspect is, indeed, loyal.
And, on a more complex level, counter-deception seeks to discover major
threats. Can Moscow read Washington’s mail? What kind of access might
exist? What kind of agents would be involved? What do Russian moves
indicate? Can a Russian be suborned or their own communications invaded?
What are the odds? How great should the investment in discovery be?
The most effective counter-deception prospect is to have penetrated the
enemy planning, or at least to be able to monitor the creation of a ruse.
discovered and thus create a deeper illusion—the ruse will not work unless
channeled to be make discovery likely — a piggyback ruse. Counter-
deception, then, tends to be involved in the construction of defenses
against the prospect of duplicity, and measures shaped to seek out
potential illusions that, when successful, may lead to deception planning.
Counter-deception, unlike deception, is focused mainly on maintaining the
normal arena of perception—perceived reality— cleared of illusions, while
deception-planning, unlike many counter-deception actions, seeks to adjust
that arena by establishing illusions that make objective reality into falsely
perceived reality for the target.
A FORCE MULTIPLIER
Deception is a means to adjust perceived reality to the advantage of the
planner, by the creation of a compelling ruse and an effective channel that
will offer an illusion acceptable to the target and, if effective, a desirable
response. Such a strategy may benefit from the attitudes of the target —
self-deception—and the lack of counter-measures—counter-deception. But
the key component is to assure a desirable target response to the illusion:
merely to deceive, or have an illusion accepted is insufficient for a
competent deception-planner.
To assure such a response, parallel and congruent ruses and channels may
be employed, adjustments made to shifting conditions and the deception-
cycle adjusted, expanded, changed, and continued. Thus, the original
channeled-ruse may be elaborated, reinforced, or multiplied to maintain an
illusion or reinforce the original. Almost surely, in time the illusion will be
revealed, to the surprise of the deceived, but, if successful, after the desired
response has been achieved.
This cycle may offer at any one time a continuum of action, adjustments,
the imposition of changing objective reality, and contradictory and
ambiguous actions. The contingent and unforeseen will assure, at times, an
impact on the cycle, as can the delusions and flawed interpretation of the
target. And, at times, the target may counter such deception by passive or
active responses, and then may initiate another deception-cycle. The
planner estimates effects and special costs, the target may deny or accept
an illusion in whole, in part, or through error, as well as by rational
analysis. Some among the target decisionmakers may deny the illusion, in
all or in part. Others, however, may have the power to respond to an
illusion taken as reality. The deception planner may be of divided
counsel — the cycle is seldom static, if for no other reason than objective
reality assures constant, if often minor, adjustments to the perception
process of all concerned. The cycle takes place within a large perceptual
context that often imposes adjustments. Even success or failure may be a
Downloaded By: [American Public University System] At: 05:55 12 October 2008
REFERENCES
1
This text toward a theory is based in part on the work done in Dublin and
Washington between 1979 and 1981, funded by Mathmatica, by the author and
Dr. Barton Whaley who published the preliminary results as ‘‘Toward a
Theory of Deception,’’ The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 178–
192; also see J. Bowyer Barton (Bell and Whaley) Cheating, New York, St.
Martin’s Press, 1982, and now in print as Cheating and Deception (New
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Press, 1991). See also Whaley’s earlier seminal
work in Deception and Surprise in War (Cambridge, MA: Center of
International Studies, MIT, 1969).
This text has benefited from the comments of Professor Robert Jervis, Columbia
University; Jim Yuill, North Carolina State; and Barton Whaley, San Diego and
Palm Springs, who are consultants on an analysis of deception as a means to
defend electronic communications funded by the Office of Net Assessment,
United States Department of Defense.
2
The original title of the Whaley=Bell book Cheating was How to Cheat until the
major bookstore chains indicated that they would not order a book with such a
title.
3
A most compelling narrative of the entanglement of bureaucracy and deception
planning in this matter can be found in Leo Marks, Between Silk and Cyanide,
A Codemaker’s War, 1941–1945, (London: HarperCollins, 1998).