Tablarin V Gutierrez
Tablarin V Gutierrez
Ponente: Feliciano
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari
Petitioners: Teresita Tablarin, et al, on their behalf and in behalf of applicants for
admission into Medical Colleges during the school year 1987-1988 and future years
who have not yet taken or successfully hurdled the NMAT
Respondents: Hon. Judge Angelina S. Gutierrez (RTC Branch XXXVII, Manila), Sec.
Lourdes Quisumbing, in her capacity as Chair of the Board of Medical Education and
the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM)
FACTS
- 1959: RA 2382, or the Medical Act of 1959 was enacted. This was later amended
by RAs 4224 and 5946.
~ Sec. 1 Objectives – This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the
standardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination for
registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the
practice of medicine in the Philippines.
- 1985: Minister of Education, Culture and Sports issues MECS Order No. 52,
establishing the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as a standardized test for
admission into medical schools. No applicant would be issued a Certificate of
Eligibility for Admission (CEA) without having taken and passed the NMAT.
- March 5, 1987: Petitioners filed a petition for declaratory judgment and prohibition
with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, to stop
the enforcement of MECS Order No. 52 requiring the NMAT for admission into
medical colleges
- April 20, 1987: Judge Gutierrez dismissed the petition, and the NMAT was
conducted as scheduled on April 27, 1987
- Petitioners elevated the issue to the SC, raised the issue of whether or not a
preliminary injunction may be issued to stop the conduction of the NMAT pending
the case. SC said that the case of unconstitutionality must be strong enough for the
court to issue such an injunction.
ISSUES
1. Are Sec. 5 (a) and (f), together with MECS Order No. 52, unconstitutional?
2. Are Sec. 5 (a) and (f), together with MECS Order No. 52, and undue delegation of
legislative power?
3. Is the NMAT an unfair, unreasonable and inequitable admission requirement?
4. Is the MECS Order No. 52 a violation of equal protection?
- Petitioner invokes Sec. 11, 13, and 17 of Art II (State Policies) and Sec. 3 and 5 (3)
of Art XIV (Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture and Sports), but the
Court held that the petitioners did not present even a prima facie case for Sec. 11,
13 and 17.
- The Court also held that Sec. 3 and Sec. 5 (3) of Art. XIV, in the context of
professional education, should be to say that the State should take appropriate
steps to make quality education accessible to all who qualify under fair, reasonable
and equitable admission and academic requirements.
- Citing the decision in Pangasinan Transport Co., Inc. v. The Public Service
Commission penned by Justice Laurel, the Court held that there was a constantly
growing tendency towards the delegation of legislative power due to the growing
complexities of modern society, and that there was an accompanying trend of
acceptance by the courts.
- Citing Justice Fernando in Edu v. Ericta, the Court also held that the standards set
for subordinate legislation may be explicit or implied. In the case of an implied
standard, it can be deduced from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a
whole. In the case of the Medical Act, the standards are set by the Act’s objectives,
considering Sec. 5 (a) and Sec. 7 of the same Act, and taking into consideration the
body of the Act itself.
RATIO 3a: The Supreme Court cannot rule on the desirability or wisdom of a piece of
legislation or administrative regulation.
- The Court held that they cannot rule on the petitioner’s argument that the NMAT is
an unnecessary requirement for admission into medical schools on top of all of the
other existing requirements. This is a question of the wisdom of having the NMAT as
such an additional requirement, which is outside the jurisdiction of the Court to
decide.
RATIO 3b: The valid exercise of police power shall include the regulation of access
to medical schools.
- The Court held that the important State interest in limiting access to medical
schools is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of
incompetence and ignorance in medical practitioners. The NMAT, as an additional
requirement for admission, is a tool to help upgrade the selection process of those
seeking to enter medical schools.
- The Court held that the portion of the MECS order allowing the Board of Medical
Education to determine the NMAT cutoff score every year is not a violation of equal
protection. Far from being arbitrary and capricious, different cutoff scores for
different school years may be dictated by the changing circumstances and
conditions surrounding the medical industry. Thus, the clause allows the Board of
Medical Education some flexibility needed to meet such changing circumstances.