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Fiscal Policy Formatted FINAL
Fiscal Policy Formatted FINAL
Table of Contents
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................... i
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................ ii
List of Acronyms ................................................................................................................. iii
I. Introduction .......................................................................................................... 1
II. Fiscal Policy Statement ......................................................................................... 4
III. Principals of Tax and Expenditure Policy .............................................................. 5
III‐i: Principles of Tax Policy ................................................................................... 5
III‐ii: Principles of Expenditure Policy .................................................................... 6
IV. Fiscal Policy Developments ................................................................................... 7
IV‐i: Fiscal Performance during 2008‐09 ............................................................... 10
IV‐i‐a: FBR Tax Collection and Refunds during 2008‐09 ........................................ 13
Direct Taxes .................................................................................................. 15
Indirect Taxes ................................................................................................ 18
Sales Tax ............................................................................................... 18
Custom Duty ......................................................................................... 20
Federal Excise Duties (FED) .................................................................. 21
Projections for Fiscal Year 2009‐10 ...................................................... 22
IV‐i‐b: Review of Expenditure during 2008‐09 ..................................................... 23
IV‐i‐c: Slippages in Budget 2008‐09 ...................................................................... 26
IV‐ii: Fiscal Projections for 2009‐10 ...................................................................... 30
IV‐iii: Revenue and Expenditure during July‐September 2009 ............................. 32
V. Review of Public Debt ........................................................................................... 34
Servicing of Public Debt ........................................................................................ 37
VI. Sustainability of Fiscal Policy ................................................................................. 39
VII. Medium‐Term Budgetary Framework (MTBF) ...................................................... 39
VIII. Public – Private Partnership .................................................................................. 40
IX. Report on Compliance with FRDL Act 2005 .......................................................... 42
X. Concluding Remarks .............................................................................................. 44
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Acknowledgements
This Policy Statement has been prepared to fulfill the requirement laid out under Section 6 of the
Fiscal Responsibility and Debt Limitation Act 2005. I would like to acknowledge the input of various
Ministries, Departments, Divisions and Agencies, particularly, timely data provision by Budget Wing
(MoF), Corporate Finance Wing (MoF), and the Federal Board of Revenue. I would like to recognize
the effort put in by Syed Jaffer Askari, Economist (DPCO), and Mehwish Ashraf, Financial Analyst
(DPCO) in the realization of this comprehensive document. This report also benefited from the
input of Zafar‐ul‐Hassan, DS‐EF (Programme) and Fahd Zaidi, formerly of the DPCO.
Masroor Ahmed Qureshi
Director General
Debt Policy Coordination Office
Ministry of Finance
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List of Acronyms
AEDB Alternative Energy Development Board
AOP Association of Persons
BOP Balance of Payment
CDNS Central Directorate of National Savings
CDR Currency to Deposit Ratio
COD Collection on Demand
DSC Defence Savings Certificates
DPCO Debt Policy Coordination Office
FED Federal Excise Duties
FPS Fiscal Policy Statement
FRDL Act Fiscal Responsibility and Debt Limitation Act
FY Fiscal Year
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GST General Sales Tax
IDPs Internally Displaced Persons
IMF International Monetary Fund
IPDF Infrastructure Project Development Facility
IPFF Infrastructure Project Financing Fund
IPPs Independent Power Producers
IRS Inland Revenue Service
KESC Karachi Electric Supply Company
LTUs Large Taxpayer Units
MOF Ministry of Finance
MTBF Medium‐Term Budget Framework
MTDF Medium Term Development Framework
NSS National Saving Schemes
NTN National Tax Numbers
PASSCO Pakistan Agricultural Storage and Services Corporation Ltd.
PIFRA Project for Improving Financial Reporting and Auditing
POL Petroleum, Oil and Lubricant
PPIB Private Power Infrastructure Board
PPP Public‐Private Partnerships
PRGF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
PSEs Public Sector Enterprises
R&D Research and Development
RTOs Regional Tax Offices
SBA Stand by Agreement
SBP State Bank of Pakistan
SED Special Excise Duty
TCP Trading Corporation of Pakistan
TPD Total Public Debt
USAS Universal Self Assessment Scheme
VAT Value‐Added Tax
VP Voluntary Payments
WAPDA Water and Power Development Authority
WHT Withholding Taxes
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I. Introduction
The economic policy of a government is centered on ensuring macroeconomic prosperity in order
to uplift the living standards of its people. Thus, sustainable economic growth is an essential
ingredient for job creation, poverty alleviation and developing physical and human infrastructure in
the country. Given this backdrop, it is vital for a country like Pakistan to achieve macroeconomic
stability over the long term through a prudent fiscal policy that instills the responsibility of fiscal
discipline for future governments as well.
Countries that enjoy fiscal freedom have adopted vigilant fiscal regulations and implemented them
effectively. These nations have also made their system more transparent which can be reflected by
cheaper access to financial markets and greater electoral support. Emerging market economies
often face considerably greater macroeconomic volatility, as is the case with Pakistan. This inherent
volatility combined with poor macroeconomic management can have devastating consequences for
economic activity, employment, and the overall welfare of the state. Accordingly, the
establishment of rules signals a commitment to sound fiscal policy and to macroeconomic stability
that both present and future governments will be responsible for.
Given the overwhelming need to inculcate fiscal discipline in Pakistan, the Fiscal Responsibility and
Debt Limitation (FRDL) Act 2005 was passed in Parliament in June 2005. The Act requires the
government to commit to fiscal prudence and a reduction in the debt burden. The rules stress the
need for achieving objectives of macroeconomic stability, long‐term sustainability of growth,
support for and the harmonization between different government policies, as well as policy
transparency and credibility.
Fiscal year 2008‐09 saw some mitigation in the macroeconomic imbalances that were carried from
the legacy of previous years, which yet again reinforces the importance of fiscal prudence for
sustainable economic growth. The overlooking of power sector over the years has piled up
immense pressure on the fiscal account and it could not be abruptly undone. Fiscal year 2008‐09
saw elimination of many subsidies but fiscal year 2009‐10 has been assigned to undo all power
tariffs. Fiscal adjustment to the tune of 2.4 percentage points was done amidst crucial
developments. Fiscal consolidation efforts on behalf of the government were constantly challenged
by deteriorating security environment; domestic political uncertainties; deepening of the global
financial crisis; persistent inflationary pressures in the economy; monetary overhang of previous
years; supply‐side shocks; massive exchange rate adjustment; and an uncertain macroeconomic
environment. Lax fiscal stance of the last eight years has a definite bearing not only on the fiscal
adjustment process but macroeconomic stability as well. The period 2000‐07 was the best period
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for expenditure rationalization and resource management efforts which was not capitalized upon
and hence, put additional strain on fiscal policy in 2008‐09. The outgoing fiscal year was not best
suited for fiscal adjustment because all sorts of internal and external pressures were testing
resilience of the economy.
The monetary tightening started since April 2005 but fiscal expansion neutralized gains from
tightening. The loose coordination between monetary and fiscal policies as well as short‐fall in
government revenues complicated the macroeconomic stabilization efforts. The maturity of high
cost zero‐coupon Defence Savings Certificates (DSCs) sold in the aftermath of Nuclear detonation of
1998, undermined the fiscal deficit in the past but overstated the fiscal deficit in recent years. In a
bid to revive a struggling economy, Pakistan entered into a stabilization program with the IMF in
November 2008 as major macroeconomic indicators were at precarious levels. The government
recognizes the consequences of fiscal indiscipline and has committed to a policy of fiscal
consolidation, which is placed at the top of their overall macroeconomic stabilization agenda.
The need for fiscal discipline cannot be overstated as many years of fiscal profligacy in the past
ultimately led to unsustainable macroeconomic imbalance in 2007‐08. Had there been
rationalization of superfluous expenditures during the fiscal comfort period of 2000‐07, the extent
of adjustment seen during 2008‐09 could have been less painful. The fiscal response and crisis
management measures and the subsequent improvement in macroeconomic stability have been
remarkable. However, there is a need to re‐orient policy towards resource management. Successful
resource management, as opposed to adjustments made in response to crises, will play a
fundamental role in addressing structural weaknesses of the economy. Such policy orientation will
also limit the need for adjustments in times of distress as these adjustments pose serious
implications for investment‐hungry infrastructure bottlenecks. Economic growth fell drastically in
2008‐09 owing to factors like widening of the fiscal and current account deficits, double‐digit
inflation, high cost of doing business associated with high interest rates, low levels of foreign
exchange reserves, an ever‐rising debt burden and widespread poverty and unemployment in the
county. Going forward, we need to strike a balance in development expenditure on account of
infrastructure and improvement in social sector indicators to align expenditure with social
responsibility.
In fiscal year 2008‐09, under the IMF‐SBA, the government took several budgetary measures to
achieve fiscal consolidation. Such measures included a net‐zero borrowing strategy from the State
Bank of Pakistan (SBP) for budgetary support at the end of each quarter, the gradual removal of oil
and power subsidies by partial pass‐on to end‐users, and curtailing of development expenditure.
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FISCAL POLICY STATEMENT 2009‐10
These measures brought down the fiscal deficit to 5.2 percent of GDP for 2008‐09 as compared to
7.6 percent of GDP in 2007‐08. It is pertinent to note that out of the total fiscal deficit of 5.2
percent of GDP, 0.9 percentage points were contributed by exogenous expenditures that were not
budgeted. For instance, 0.7 percentage points were added because the Punjab government over‐
drafted Rs 99 billion from the State Bank of Pakistan in the last quarter of fiscal year 2008‐09, while
0.2 percentage points were added to accommodate expenditure on Internally Displaced Persons
(IDPs) due to the on‐going operation against terrorism in the country. Otherwise, the government
remained committed to underlying fiscal deficit of 4.3 percent of GDP for 2008‐09.
However, there remains much room for improvement; given its potential, Pakistan needs to
significantly increase its revenues from both tax and non‐tax sources. The Federal Board of Revenue
(FBR) missed both its original and revised collection targets in fiscal year 2008‐09. The FBR collected
Rs 440.3 billion in Direct Taxes as compared to the revised target of Rs 461 billion while Sales Tax
(Rs 452.3 billion) also missed its revised target (Rs 457 billion) mainly on account of less collection
from oil. On the other hand, Federal Excise Duty (Rs 116.1 billion) and Customs Duties (Rs 148.4
billion) surpassed their revised targets of Rs 116 billion and Rs 145 billion, respectively. Overall, the
FBR missed its revised target of Rs 1,179 billion and ended the year with a total collection of Rs
1,157 billion primarily due to erosion of base.
Being a developing economy, Pakistan needs to augment its development efforts. Development
efforts crucially hinge upon additional resource mobilization that can be generated by extending
the tax net to untapped areas of the economy. FBR is responsible for a major portion of revenues
and currently it is undergoing a tax reforms program. The restructuring of the FBR has taken place
and the establishment of the Inland Revenue Service (IRS) will serve as a single entity within the
FBR that will merge the tasks of all domestic taxes, namely the sales tax, income tax, and excise
taxes. This harmonized tax administration will include an integrated tax management structure and
a unified database that will improve efficiency and help increase the tax‐to‐GDP ratio in the
medium term.
This Fiscal Policy Statement (FPS) will review the overall fiscal developments during fiscal year
2008‐09 in order to fulfill the legal requirement of Section 6 of the FRDL Act 2005. Furthermore, the
Act requires the FPS to analyze the performance of some key fiscal indicators such as the total
revenues, overall fiscal deficit, primary and revenue deficits, as well as the public debt burden. The
Act also requires that the FPS analyze whether there was any deviation from the fiscal targets and if
federal government policies have remained in conformity with the principles of sound fiscal and
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debt management, and the targets set forth in the medium‐term budgetary statement in Section 5
of the Act.
II. Fiscal Policy Statement
The Fiscal Policy Statement is presented to fulfill the requirement in Section 6 of the Fiscal
Responsibility and Debt Limitation (FRDL) Act 2005. The statement provides an overview of
government revenues and expenditures during the course of the fiscal year and explains the
changes in key macroeconomic indicators during 2008‐09. Section 6 of the FRDL Act 2005 requires
that:
1) The Federal Government shall cause to be laid before the National Assembly the Fiscal
Policy Statement by the end of January each year.
2) The Fiscal Policy Statement shall, inter alia, analyze the following key macroeconomic
indicators, namely:‐
a) Total expenditures;
b) Total revenues;
c) Total fiscal deficit;
d) Revenue deficit; and
e) Total public debt
3) The Federal Government shall explain how fiscal indicators accord with the principles of
sound fiscal and debt management.
4) The Fiscal Policy Statement shall also contain:‐
a) The key measures and rationale for any major deviation in fiscal measures
pertaining to taxation, subsidy, expenditure, administrated pricing and
borrowing;
b) An update on key information regarding macroeconomic indicators;
c) The strategic priorities of the Federal Government for the financial year in the
fiscal area;
d) The analysis to the fullest extent possible of all policy decisions made by the
Federal Government and all other circumstances that may have a material effect
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FISCAL POLICY STATEMENT 2009‐10
on meeting the targets for economic indicators for that fiscal year as specified in
the Medium‐Term Budgetary Statement; and
e) An evaluation as to how the current policies of the Federal Government are in
conformity with the principle of sound fiscal and debt management and the
targets set forth in the Medium‐Term Budgetary Statement.
III. Principles of Tax and Expenditure Policy
For a developing country like Pakistan, resource mobilization is vital for economic and social
development over a sustained period of time. However, throughout its economic past, like a typical
developing country there has almost always remained a revenue‐expenditure gap that hinders
social welfare programs while stifling development projects. This requires additional resource
mobilization that adds to the public debt stock. The current expenditure of the government depicts
an inelastic behavior because of some committed expenditures such as defence spending and debt
servicing. Consequently development spending has always borne the brunt of fiscal adjustment
which is a counterproductive strategy as it hampers growth. Going forward, the government needs
to boost its revenue generation capacity, streamline and prioritize its expenditures while
overcoming structural weaknesses and internal inefficiencies.
III‐i: Principles of Tax Policy
In Pakistan, the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) is primarily responsible for levying and collection of
almost all federal taxes. Over the years, gradual changes to the tax structure have produced mixed
results which are far from the desirable objectives and properties of an efficient tax system. In the
recent past, some new initiatives like the development of a strong taxpayer facilitation culture with
a view to promote voluntary tax compliance in a self‐assessment system of tax administration;
taxpayer education and facilitation; development of IT systems in some critical areas; significant
progress in e‐filling and establishment of a modern Large Taxpayer Units (LTUs) / Regional Tax
Offices (RTO’s) with upgraded infrastructure at many centers have raised the standards of the tax
system. But despite these changes, the system continues to under‐perform as the challenge to raise
adequate revenues each year falls short of expectations, mainly because the bases of major
revenue spinners — personal and corporate income taxes and the General Sales Tax (GST),
continue to be very narrow in addition to the level of tax evasion.
The Inland Revenue Service (IRS) will include a harmonized tax management structure and an
integrated database that will improve efficiency and help increase the tax‐to‐GDP ratio to 12‐14
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percent in the medium‐term. The purpose of this harmonized structure is to increase the efficiency
of tax administration and lay the foundation for the implementation of the Value‐Added Tax (VAT).
The implementation of the VAT is a central component of the government’s revenue enhancing
strategy over the medium to long term to help finance the needed increase in public outlays
without having to recourse towards external borrowing or crowding out private sector investment.
The goal of these measures will be to boost revenue collection in the short term while reinforcing
the long‐term objectives of increasing the effectiveness, efficiency, fairness and flexibility of the
overall tax system
III‐ii: Principles of Expenditure Policy
Public expenditure is one of the critical components of a country’s development goals that include
economic and social objectives. To make expenditure policy effective, it is necessary that resource
allocation decisions are based on the availability of timely and precise financial data, a set
framework of financial and accounting principles that are recognized internationally, and a system
of public accountability that is backed by audit legislation. The government is committed to
strengthen its expenditure controls through implementing the Medium‐Term Budget Framework
(MTBF) where policies are considered in a medium‐ term context which will provide greater
predictability in the budgetary process.
The government is also committed to extending the operations of the Project for Improving
Financial Reporting and Auditing (PIFRA) to monthly federal and provincial fiscal reporting. PIFRA
was introduced to computerize the whole accounting and auditing system of the country. The idea
is to generate timely, accurate and reliable financial statements; monitor the fiscal deficit; forecast
the flow of cash; manage public debt; achieve effective financial controls and the auditing all
transactions of the Federal, Provincial and District governments relating to Public Accounts through
the Auditor General of Pakistan. Also, the transition to a Treasury Single Account will be completed
gradually. The government has already introduced key elements of a Treasury Single Account,
requiring that all disbursements pass through a zero balance assignment account. The private
sector can also aid the government in development projects through Public‐Private Partnerships
(PPP) where each has a comparative advantage in their specific areas.
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FISCAL POLICY STATEMENT 2009‐10
IV. Fiscal Policy Developments
For every government, achieving high economic growth rate is a primary national objective as it
helps in accomplishing the extremely important socio‐economic goals of expanding employment
and reducing poverty. Fiscal Policy should focus on generating primary surplus and ensuring that
real rate of growth of revenues should be higher than the real growth in debt servicing obligation.
The fiscal policy should explore opportunities for augmenting the resource envelop rather than
cutting down the expenses, however the expenses should be rationalised and non‐productive
expenditure should be curtailed that bring improvement in the national investment climate, saving
incentives and opportunities and competitiveness of the real economy. Institutionalization of policy
coordination cannot be overemphasized for growth and sustainability of national economy.
Pakistan’s fiscal deficit vastly improved over the years after averaging 7.0 percent of GDP during the
1980s and 1990s, to 4.0 percent on average during 2000‐2007. Given the predicament being faced
by Pakistan’s economy during fiscal year 2007‐08 and its effects carried forward into 2008‐09, the
fiscal policy stance of the government remained geared towards fiscal consolidation and
stabilization.
Revenue growth in real terms has been an underlying concern over the past years. While real
growth in non‐interest expenditure has remained substantial, growth of revenues in real terms has
lagged behind (See Table‐1), contributing to the high deficit registered in the 2007‐08.
Furthermore, the persistence of a high saving‐investment gap has meant that crucial investments
have had to be financed through debt creation as opposed to access to increased savings. The
impact of these two vital developments is not only reflected in the fiscal deficit, but also the
increasing debt burden of the country. Additionally, as the outstanding stock of debt increases at a
faster pace than real revenues, the drain placed by debt servicing on government resources has
also become more severe. The presence of significant primary and revenue deficits further
illustrates the consequences of lackluster performance of revenues and the inability to increase the
national savings pool in order to meet the investment needs of the economy.
The artificially maintained fiscal prudence exploded in 2007‐08 and absence of policy response
further complicated the problem of fiscal adjustment in 2008‐09. The financial improvement plan
of major power companies during 2000‐2004 under Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF)
was seriously jeopardized by the premature withdrawal from PRGF program with the IMF in
December 2004, contributing to the abandonment of restructuring program of the power sector
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which continues to pose serious implications for fiscal deficit as well as elimination of tariff
differential in 2009‐10.
Table‐1: Selected Fiscal Indicators
FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09
Real Growth of Debt ‐3.2% 2.6% 8.5% 1.7%
Real Growth of Revenues 9.1% 12.9% ‐0.7% ‐1.5%
Real Growth of Tax Revenue 11.4% 3.0% 1.9% ‐10.2%
Real Growth in Non‐interest Exp. 16.5% 6.7% 9.0% ‐19.2%
Real Growth of GDP 5.8% 6.8% 4.1% 2.0%
Saving Investment Gap ‐4.4% ‐5.1% ‐8.6% ‐5.4%
Primary Balance ‐2.3% ‐1.5% ‐2.8% ‐0.3%
Revenue Balance 0.6% ‐0.9% ‐3.5% ‐1.5%
Public Debt/ GDP 57.2% 55.5% 58.4% 58.1%
Debt/Revenue 405.3 370.8 400.2 410.5
Debt Service / Revenue 39.4% 41.5% 45.3% 43.5%
Source: Budget Wing, and DPCO Staff Calculations
Fiscal year 2008‐09 also saw the fiscal deficit target being missed. Initially set at 4.7 percent of GDP,
the fiscal deficit target was revised down to 4.3 percent of GDP but eventually stood at 5.2 percent
of GDP by the end of the year owing to combination of factors like intensification of war on terror
and over‐draft from Punjab government in the final quarter. If it were not for these additional
expenditures, the fiscal deficit could have been contained at 4.3 percent of GDP for 2008‐09.
Table‐2 illustrates the historical trend of some important fiscal indicators with respect to GDP. On
the revenue side, the tax‐to‐GDP as well as revenue‐to‐GDP ratios have either remained stagnant
or shown a steady decline because of structural deficiencies in the tax system and the way it is
administered, both in federal and provincial governments. Being a developing country, Pakistan
needs resources that can contribute towards uplifting physical and human infrastructure. In this
regard, the tax to GDP ratio must improve to 12‐14 percent over the medium term. The provincial
governments’ contribution to tax‐to‐GDP is stagnated at 0.4 percent which is well below their
potential. Nevertheless, with reforms in the tax system envisaged, this ratio should improve by 0.6
percentage points each year over the next few years.
During 1999‐2000 to 2008‐09, revenues depicted topsy‐turvy behavior with fluctuations from 14%
to 15% of GDP while spike in expenditures remained unabated from 2003‐04 to 2007‐08 with
consequent persistent rise in the fiscal deficit. The onus of fiscal adjustment indiscriminately
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FISCAL POLICY STATEMENT 2009‐10
Table‐2: Fiscal Indicators as Percent of GDP
Overall Expenditure Revenue
Real GDP
Year Fiscal Develop‐
Growth Total Current Total Tax Non‐Tax
Deficit ment
FY91 5.4 8.8 25.7 19.3 6.4 16.9 12.7 4.2
FY92 7.6 7.5 26.7 19.1 7.6 19.2 13.7 5.5
FY93 2.1 8.1 26.2 20.5 5.7 18.1 13.4 4.7
FY94 4.4 5.9 23.4 18.8 4.6 17.5 13.4 4.1
FY95 5.1 5.6 22.9 18.5 4.4 17.3 13.8 3.5
FY96 6.6 6.5 24.4 20.0 4.4 17.9 14.4 3.5
FY97 1.7 6.4† 22.3 18.8 3.5 15.8 13.4 2.4
FY98 3.5 7.7 23.7 19.8 3.9 16.0 13.2 2.8
FY99 4.2 6.1 22.0 18.6 3.4 15.9 13.3 2.7
FY00 3.9 5.4 18.7 16.5 2.2 13.5 10.7 2.8
FY01 1.8 4.3† 17.2 15.5 1.7 13.3 10.6 2.7
FY02 3.1 4.3† 18.8 15.9 2.9 14.2 10.9 3.3
FY03 4.7 3.7 18.6 16.3 2.3 14.9 11.5 3.4
FY04 7.5 2.4 16.7 13.5 3.2 14.3 11.0 3.3
FY05 9.0 3.3† 18.4 14.5 3.9 13.8 10.1 3.7
FY06 5.8 4.2*† 18.7 14.4 4.3 14.2 10.4 3.8
FY07 6.8 4.3*† 20.2 15.8 4.4 14.9 11.0 3.9
FY08 4.1 7.6 22.2 18.1 4.1 14.6 10.6 4.0
FY09 2.0 5.2 19.3 15.6 3.5 14.1 9.2 4.9
FY10(T) 3.3 4.9 19.4 14.2 5.2 14.5 10.5 4.0
Note 1: The base of Pakistan’s GDP has been changed from 1980‐81 to 1999‐2000, therefore, wherever GDP appears in
denominator the numbers prior to 1999‐2000 are not comparable.
†
Statistical discrepancy (both positive and negative) has been adjusted in arriving at overall fiscal deficit numbers.
* Include earthquake related expenditure worth 0.8 and 0.5 percent of GDP for 2005‐06 and 2006‐07 respectively.
fell on the development expenditure in 2008‐09 with rigidity in current expenditure and stagnancy
in revenues. Fiscal year 2008‐09 saw a consolidation of the government’s fiscal position at the
expense of development expenditures. Encouragingly, the revenue deficit improved considerably
and going forward, the government will need to ensure that total revenues should be enough to at
least finance their current expenditures. In the coming years, a greater effort is needed to reduce
the fiscal deficit through higher revenues, generated primarily through an efficient and well
structured tax system, as opposed to cutting back on development expenditures.
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Fig. 1: Total Expenditures and Revenues as % of GDP
52.0 1990‐91 to 2009‐10 (T)
47.0
Total Expenditures
42.0
37.0
% 32.0
27.0 BUDGET DEFICIT
22.0
17.0 Total Revenues
12.0
Fig. 2: Trends in Fiscal Indicators (As % of GDP)
9.0
8.0
7.0
6.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
‐1.0
‐2.0
‐3.0
‐4.0
‐5.0
FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09
Fiscal Deficit Development Expenditure Revenue Balance
IV‐i: Fiscal Performance during 2008‐09
Pakistan’s economy faced headwinds like political instability, a deteriorating law and order
environment, supply shocks, a weakening of external demand, turmoil in international financial
markets and high prices for oil, food and other commodities during fiscal year 2008‐09 resulting in
modest GDP growth of 2.0 percent which is relatively satisfactory, when looked at in the context of
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FISCAL POLICY STATEMENT 2009‐10
the prevalent global financial crisis and economic slowdown. In addition, monetary overhang from
previous years due to excessive government borrowing from the central bank to finance the large
fiscal deficit led to inflationary pressures in the economy and the crowding out of the private
sector. The fiscal deficit was financed mainly through combination of non‐bank and commercial
banks financing which replaced SBP financing. However, due to non‐existence of appetite from the
private sector, the crowding out impact was not a cause for concern. After keeping exchange rate
artificially low during 2004‐08, the exchange rate plunged by around 22 percent in the period of
July‐October 2008. Such a massive depreciation had potential threat to culminate into a balance of
payment crisis. The depreciation of the rupee and a rapid draw‐down of reserves at a pace of
almost over $1 billion per month threatened macroeconomic stability of the country.
A weak Rupee compounded the problem of inflation which also posed a serious threat to the
economy and society at large during 2008‐09. The inflation rate averaged a substantial 20.8 percent
for the fiscal year as against 12.0 percent in the last year. The factors that contributed to the surge
and then persistence of high inflation in 2008‐09 included monetary overhang from the previous
years; supply shocks in commodity markets; an upward adjustment in the support price of wheat;
depreciation of the rupee against the dollar; and the gradual withdrawal of subsidies on gas, POL
products and electricity. Pakistan needs a low and stable inflation to persist over a sustained period
in order to stay on a desirable growth path.
Fiscal consolidation crucially hinges upon improvement in the power sector. Pakistan has to
rationalize the generation mix for provision of cost effective energy supplies. The government has
to eliminate power tariff differential either through financial improvement, cost efficiency and
complete pass‐through to attract more investment in the sector. The fiscal cost of the power sector
may jeopardize the macroeconomic stability in the country; devastate prudent debt management
and result in unbearable consequences for economic growth. The power sector has become a
thorny issue of economic management and to leap forward we need to resolve this issue as early as
possible.
Pressure on fiscal account may also be lowered through increasing savings ratio in the country.
Savings is a vital component of a country’s economy in terms of creating a pool of available
resources to finance macro‐economic objectives. Pakistan has historically witnessed a substantial
saving investment gap. Over the years this gap as a percent of GDP has widened from 1.6 percent in
2004‐05 to 5.4 percent in 2008‐09 (See Table‐3). A low level of savings has contributed to this
vacuum over the years and this decline reflects a build‐up of inflationary pressures in the economy.
This plunge also speaks of the non availability of innovative financial instruments and
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underdeveloped secondary markets in the country. The government has been a primary
contributor to this mismatch between saving and investment. The private sector has, to some
extent, compensated for this dis‐saving behavior of the government. However, efforts should be
made to reduce government dis‐saving on one hand while increasing the pool of private sector
saving in the economy on the other. The cash deposit ratio, calculated by dividing the currency in
circulation by the total deposits in the banking sector of a country, is a true measure of the idle
resources being piled up out of the system.
Table‐3: Saving‐Investment Gap, FY05‐FY09
(In percent of GDP) FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09
Total National Savings 17.5 17.7 17.4 13.4 14.3
Public Sector 3.4 2.3 0.8 (1.8) 1.2
Private Sector 14.1 15.4 16.6 15.1 13.2
Gross Total Investment 19.1 22.1 22.5 22.0 19.7
Changes in Stock 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
Total Fixed Investment Public Sector 4.3 4.8 5.6 5.4 4.9
Total Fixed Investment Private Sector 13.1 15.7 15.4 15.0 13.2
Saving‐Investment Gap (1.6) (4.4) (5.1) (8.6) (5.4)
Source: SBP and DPCO Staff Calculations
Pakistan has experienced a surge in the currency to deposit ratio (CDR) since 2007‐08, indicating
significant funds lying in the informal sector (see Table‐4). Soaring inflation coupled with a
relatively weak intermediary role of banks resulted in a deceleration in deposit growth and an
increase in currency in circulation growth during 2007‐08 and 2008‐09. The returns offered on
deposits appeared negative in real terms and led to a liquidity preference of holding currency
among the masses. Therefore, a large amount of resource was available out of the system which
was not capitalized upon.
In order to lower the cost of borrowing and broaden the financial resource base of the country, a
strong need is felt on the part of the banks to offer innovative or diversified instruments. To this
end positive real interest rates over a sustained period are very crucial. The banking sector enjoys
high earning spreads alongwith shrinking liquidity and may capitalize upon the idle resources of the
economy by increasing financial penetration and outreach and incentivizing the high rural
population to unlock their potential savings. There is a dire need to introduce mortgage refinancing
schemes, funded pension plans, Islamic financial products and property tax proposals. Moreover,
the institutionalization of the informal sectors of economy will help augment the banking system.
With a current money multiplier of 3.14 (as of December 5, 2009), transfer of even a small amount
12
FISCAL POLICY STATEMENT 2009‐10
of out‐of‐the‐system money to the formal banking channels will enhance the regeneration capacity
of the monetary system to more than three times. Such efforts will help bridge the saving
investment gap, make fiscal and monetary policy more effective, while simultaneously developing
the resource envelope. Going forward, a reasonable compensation for savings is a prerequisite in
this regard.
Table‐4: Currency to Deposit Ratio and Money Multiplier
FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10P
Currency in Circulation (Rs Billion) 666 740 840 982 1,152 1,308
Total Private & PSE Deposits 2,291 2,662 3,218 3,703 3,980 4,445
Currency to Deposit Ratio (%) 29.1% 27.8% 26.1% 26.5% 28.9% 29.4%
Broad Money (Rs Billion) 2,961 3,407 4,065 4,689 5,137 5,753
Reserve Money (Rs Billion) 909 1,001 1,210 1,480 1,508 1,732
Money Multiplier 3.26 3.40 3.36 3.17 3.41 3.32
P: Projections Source: State Bank of Pakistan Annual Report 2008‐09
FY10 Projections from IMF Country Report January 2010
IV‐i‐a: FBR Tax Collection and Refunds during 2008‐09
Fiscal year 2008‐09 was a challenging year for the economy as a whole as most of the
macroeconomic targets fixed for fiscal year 2008‐09 were missed. Since revenue realization is
linked with the macroeconomic framework of the country, the adverse impact on the economy
disturbed revenue realization to a great extent during the course of the year. The FBR was assigned
a challenging revenue target of Rs 1250 billion, requiring a growth of 24% over the collection of Rs.
1008.1 billion during fiscal year 2007‐08. This target was then revised down to Rs. 1179 billion.
However, despite best efforts, the FBR fell short of this target, to record Rs. 1157 billion at the end
of the fiscal year, which constitutes 98 percent of the revised target.
It is clear from Table‐5 that the performance of the FBR was broad based as all the taxes exhibited
double digit growth during fiscal year 2008‐09, except for custom duties. Sales tax has regained top
position in the collection of federal taxes due to a better performance from the domestic sales tax
component.
It is relevant to mention that while the increase in the FBR tax receipts has been substantial in
absolute terms, it has however lagged behind the growth in nominal GDP, thereby exhibiting a
decline in FBR tax‐to‐GDP ratio from 9.8 percent in 2007‐08 to only 8.8 percent in 2008‐09.
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DEBT POLICY COORDINATION OFFICE
Table‐5: Net Tax Collection (in Rs Billion)
Collection Difference
Revenue Heads
FY09 FY08 Absolute Percent
Direct Taxes 440.3 387.9 52.4 13.5
Indirect Taxes 716.8 620.2 96.6 15.6
‐ Sales Tax (GST) 452.3 377.4 74.9 19.8
‐ Federal Excise 116.1 92.1 24.0 26.1
‐ Customs Duties 148.4 150.7 ‐2.3 ‐1.5
Total Taxes 1,157.1 1,008.1 149.0 14.8
Source: Federal Board of Revenue
The low tax‐to‐GDP ratio highlights a few key issues in the economy’s tax structure, and the
inability to translate higher economic growth in to increased tax revenue collection. When taken in
real terms, tax revenue has grown by a meager average of 1.4 percent for the last five years, as
compared to average real GDP growth of 5.5 percent during the same period (See Table‐6).
Table‐6: Real Growth of Tax Revenue
Tax Revenue Real Growth of Tax
Real GDP Growth (%)
(Rs Billion) Revenue (%)
2004‐05 659.4 0.9 9.0
2005‐06 803.7 11.4 5.8
2006‐07 889.7 3.0 6.8
2007‐08 1,050.7 1.9 4.1
2008‐09 1,204.7 ‐10.2 2.0
2009‐10* 1,380.0 3.6 3.0
*Projections Source: DPCO Staff Calculations
Periods of high economic growth have not been translated into higher revenue collection.
Consequently, the tax‐to‐GDP ratio has declined from 10.1 percent in 2004‐05 to 9.2 percent in
2008‐09 (See Figure‐3). This may be attributed to the tax structure of Pakistan; specifically the issue
of major contributors to GDP growth being outside the purview of the tax net. In order to realize
the gains from economic growth, facilitate its transmission into increased revenues, and to ensure
availability of ample resources going forward, major contributors of economic growth must be
brought in to the tax system. By doing so, the government will be able to increase its tax‐to‐GDP
ratio, align its goals of higher economic growth and increased revenue collection, while creating
sustainable fiscal space.
14
FISCAL POLICY STATEMENT 2009‐10
Fig. 3: Trend in Real Revenue Collection vs. Real GDP Growth
14
‐1
2004‐05 2005‐06 2006‐07 2007‐08 2008‐09 2009‐10*
‐6
‐11
DIRECT TAXES
The direct tax has contributed 38.1 percent in total tax receipts during fiscal year 2008‐09 with a
net collection of Rs. 440.3 billion against the target of Rs. 461 billion. An amount of Rs. 38.8 billion
refunds has been paid back to the claimants as against Rs. 25.8 billion during fiscal year 2007‐08.
If we look at the performance of direct taxes in a historical perspective, the improved tax effort and
effective implementation of tax policy and administrative reforms has geared up the collection over
the years. The share of direct taxes in total federal tax receipts has increased from around 15
percent in early 1990s to 32 percent in fiscal year 2000‐01. It has touched new heights of 39.4
percent in fiscal year 2006‐07, but declined slightly to 38.1 percent in fiscal year 2008‐09. Similarly,
the growth pattern had an increasing trend during the past few years rising from 7.0 percent in
fiscal year 2004‐05 to 27.0 percent in 2005‐06 and further to 48.3 percent in 2006‐07. However, the
rate then showed a declining trend as it fell to 22.3 percent in fiscal year 2007‐08 and further to 7.9
percent in 2008‐09. A number of reasons can be attributed to this slowdown in revenue realization:
apart from the general economic slowdown and load‐shedding during the period under review, the
major set back has been due to significant reduction in voluntary compliance. The fluctuations in
the growth rate can also be attributed to the base effect. This means that if the growth in direct
taxes from one year started from a lower level, it will generate a higher growth number for the
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DEBT POLICY COORDINATION OFFICE
following year. Consequently, growth rates for the next year will start from a higher base effect,
causing a lower growth number the following year.
Fig. 4:Trends in Direct Taxes
50 42
45
Share in Total Taxes (%)
40 39
Growth Rate (%)
35 36
30
25 33
20
15 30
10 27
5
0 24
FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09
Growth Rate Share %
It may be recalled that the collection of direct taxes includes income tax and other direct taxes such
as capital value tax, worker welfare fund and worker participatory fund. However, the contribution
of income tax in total direct taxes has been 95.6 percent, making it our main focus.
Table‐7: Head‐wise Performance of Direct Taxes (Rs Million)
2008‐09 2007‐08 Change (%)
Voluntary Payments 141,680 145,616 ‐2.7
Collection on Demand 77,166 42,779 80.4
Deductions at Source (WHT) 240,546 205,144 17.3
Miscellaneous 255 242 5.4
Gross income tax Receipts 459,647 393,782 16.7
Refunds 38,798 25,822 50.2
Other DT 19,442 19,902 ‐2.4
Net Direct Taxes 440,291 387,862 13.5
Source: FBR Data Bank
The structure of income tax is based on withholding taxes (WHT), voluntary payments (VP) and
collection on demand (COD). The collection during fiscal year 2008‐09 shows that the share of WHT,
16
FISCAL POLICY STATEMENT 2009‐10
VP and COD in gross collection has been 52.3 percent, 30.8 percent and 16.8 percent respectively.
Details of these components of income tax are presented in Table‐7.
Voluntary Payments (VP)
This component includes payments with returns and advances. In net terms, Rs. 141.6 billion were
generated during fiscal year 2008‐09 as compared to Rs. 145.6 billion in the corresponding period
last year, registering a 2.7 percent decline. It is pertinent to note that the basic objective behind the
implementation of the Universal Self Assessment Scheme (USAS) was to minimize the interface
between taxpayers and the tax administration in order to repose confidence in the system and
eliminate the element of corruption.
Income Tax Returns Analysis
The number of income tax returns and statements received by the end of fiscal year 2008‐09 were
2,214,561, higher by 75,164 as compared to the corresponding period last year, indicating a growth
of about 3.5%. The number of corporate returns increased from last year, yielding Rs. 6.6 billion in
collection. A similar outcome has been noticed for other categories of taxpayers including
individuals and Association of Persons (AOPs).
It seems that the USAS is on track as it has been functioning successfully for the past few years
yielding substantial revenue through it. However, the problem lies with audit which needs to be
initiated for selected corporate cases. Unfortunately, the enormous gap between corporations who
have got National Tax Numbers (NTN) and those who actually file returns continues to derail
voluntary compliance. It is essential that the audit teams take a leadership role, which regrettably
remains the missing link in the entire equation.
Withholding Taxes (WHT)
WHT continues to be the leading source of direct tax receipts. However, despite its large
contribution, there is ample scope to enhance this collection further. The WHT collection during
fiscal year 2008‐09 has been Rs. 240.5 billion against Rs. 205.1 billion during fiscal year 2007‐08,
indicating a healthy growth of 17.3 percent (see Table‐8). The nine major sources of withholding
tax contributed around 93 percent of total collection. These include: contracts, imports, salary,
telephone, export, bank interest/securities, electricity, cash withdrawal and dividends.
Rationalization of income tax rate for the salaried individuals and enhanced salary packages,
especially in the private sector, has yielded higher revenue.
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DEBT POLICY COORDINATION OFFICE
Table‐8: Withholding Tax Collection (Rs Million)
2008‐09 2007‐08 Change (%)
Contracts 82,507 77,166 6.9
Imports 30,101 27,675 8.8
Salary 27,405 22,651 19.2
Exports 14,360 11,502 24.9
Telephone Bills 21,726 18,146 19.7
Bank Interest/Securities 16,119 9,682 14.4
Electricity Bills 12,722 5,894 115.8
Dividends 6,565 6,483 1.3
Cash Withdrawal 11,338 4,098 176.7
Sub‐Total 222,430 187,699 18.5
Other WHT 18,116 17,445 3.8
Total WHT 240,546 205,144 17.3
Source: FBR Data Bank
INDIRECT TAXES
Contributing nearly two thirds to overall tax collection, indirect taxes recorded a healthy growth of
15.6 percent in 2008‐09 over last year’s collection (See Table 8). Indirect taxes consist of Sales Tax,
Custom Duty and Federal Excise Duty. The major revenue spinners in indirect taxes are petroleum,
telecom, automobiles, edible oil and cigarettes which have traditionally contributed nearly half of
the gross collection. This is evidence that the tax base in Pakistan is too narrow and in the long run,
tax collection cannot increase substantially without bringing more areas of the economy under the
tax net.
I. Sales Tax:
General Sales Tax (GST) has again emerged as the top revenue generation source of the country
constituting 39.1 percent of the total collection of federal taxes. A growth of around 20 percent has
been recorded in the net collection of sales tax. The collection of sales tax has two components i.e.
sales tax on imports and sales tax on domestic activity. Due to better performance by the domestic
sales tax, especially petroleum products during 2008‐09, its share in total sales tax has improved
from 48.1 percent to around 55 percent in 2008‐09. On the other hand, slow down in imports
during 2008‐09 has vastly affected the collection of sales tax from imports. (See Table‐9)
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FISCAL POLICY STATEMENT 2009‐10
Table‐9: Collection and Growth of Sales Tax: Fiscal Year 2008‐09 (Rs Billion)
Collection/ Refunds Growth (%)
Sources of GST
Gross Refund Net Gross Refund Net
Import Stage 203.3 0.1 203.3 3.7 ‐29.2 3.7
Domestic Stage 275.9 26.9 249.0 31.7 ‐4.1 37.3
GST (Total) 479.2 26.9 452.2 18.2 ‐4.2 19.8
Source: FBR Data Bank
I. i. Sales Tax: Domestic Collection
There are ten major commodities that contribute 89.3 percent of the total sales tax domestic
sector. These include petroleum products, telecom services, natural gas, sugar, cigarettes, services,
electrical energy, beverages, cement and tea (See Table‐10).
Table‐10: Comparison of Sales Tax Domestic (Net) Collection by Major Commodity (Rs Million)
Collection Collection Growth Share (%) Share (%)
Major Commodities
2008‐09 2007‐08 Realized (%) 2008‐09 2007‐08
POL Products 106,812 57,160 86.9 42.9 31.5
Services by Telecom Sector 50,087 45,105 11.0 20.1 24.9
Natural Gas 18,799 13,219 42.2 7.5 7.3
Sugar 11,969 12,117 ‐1.2 4.8 6.7
Cigarettes 9,642 7,861 22.7 3.9 4.3
Electrical Energy 6,391 2,398 166.5 2.6 1.3
Services 6,357 6,193 2.6 2.6 3.4
Cement 4,506 3,578 25.9 1.8 2.0
Beverages 4,242 4,409 ‐3.8 1.7 2.4
Tea 3,671 2,879 27.5 1.5 1.6
Sub‐Total 222,476 154,919 43.6 89.3 85.4
Others 26,554 26,477 0.3 10.7 14.6
Net Collection 249,030 181,396 37.3 100 100
Source: FBR Data Bank
I. ii. Sales Tax: At Import Stage
Sales tax on import is an important source of collection of federal taxes. It has contributed 44.9
percent, 28.4 percent and 19.9 percent in sales tax, indirect taxes and total federal taxes
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DEBT POLICY COORDINATION OFFICE
respectively during 2008‐09. The collection of sales tax has posted an increase of only 3.7 percent
during 2008‐09 mainly due to the slow down in imports and the zero‐rating of crude oil for sales tax
purpose effective November 30, 2007. Like sales tax domestic, the receipts of sales tax on imports
are also concentrated in a few sectors. Petroleum products alone contributed around 37.4 percent
of overall collection of sales tax on imports. Similarly, ten major spinners including petroleum
constituted 80.9 percent of the sales tax import (See Table‐11).
Table‐11: Collection of Sales Tax (Import) ‐ Major Items (Rs Million)
Collection Collection Realized
Description Share (%) Share (%)
2008‐09 2007‐08 Growth (%)
POL Products (27) 76,081 74,266 2.4 37.4 37.9
Edible Oil (15) 17,824 15,440 15.4 8.8 7.9
Plastic (39) 16,606 14,627 13.5 8.2 7.5
Vehicles and Parts (87) 10,736 13,538 ‐20.7 5.3 6.9
Iron and Steel (72) 15,117 11,573 30.6 7.4 5.9
Mechanical Machinery (84) 6,813 7,383 ‐7.7 3.4 3.8
Electrical Machinery (85) 5,883 6,964 ‐15.5 2.9 3.6
Organic Chemicals (29) 5,917 5,313 11.4 2.9 2.7
Paper & P. Board (48) 5,829 4,835 20.6 2.9 2.5
Oil seeds etc (12) 3,763 3,783 ‐0.5 1.9 1.9
Sub Total 164,569 157,722 4.3 80.9 80.4
Other 38,758 38,401 0.9 19.1 19.6
Gross 203,327 196,123 3.7 100 100
Refund/Rebate 63 89 ‐29.2
Net 203,264 196,034 3.7
Source: FBR Data Bank
II. Custom Duty
The collection of other taxes on imports like sales tax imports, WHT and FED, depends on the
collection of customs duty as it is a component of their bases. During 2008‐09, custom duty
contributed 12.8 percent of the federal taxes and 32.8 percent of indirect taxes. The collection of
customs duty surpassed the revised target of Rs. 145 billion by collecting Rs. 148.4 billion. On the
other hand, the net collection of customs duty has reduced from Rs. 150.7 billion in 2007‐08 to Rs.
148.4 billion during 2008‐09 yielding negative growth of 1.5 percent. The reasons for this reduction
20
FISCAL POLICY STATEMENT 2009‐10
are exemption of wheat from customs duty, decline in international petroleum prices (especially
High Speed Diesel) in the second half of 2008‐09 and the overall slowdown in the imports.
Major part of the receipts of customs duty has been contributed by 15 major revenue spinners. The
collection of these fifteen leading commodities is highlighted in Table‐12. Around three‐forth of the
collection has been fetched from these items during 2008‐09. Apart from collection, these items
shared 74.1 percent of the total imports and 84.7 percent of the dutiable imports.
Table‐12: Collection of Customs Duties during 2008‐09 (Rs Million)
Collection Collection Realized Share (%) Share (%)
Description
2008‐09 2007‐08 Growth (%) During 08‐09 During 07‐08
1. POL Products (27) 19,369 24,032 ‐19.4 12.4 14.7
2. Vehicles and Parts (87) 17,554 25,810 ‐32 11.3 15.8
3. Edible Oil (15) 17,134 17,213 ‐0.5 11 10.6
4. Mechanical Machinery (84) 13,794 11,634 18.6 8.8 7.1
5. Electrical Machinery (85) 13,334 13,568 ‐1.7 8.5 8.3
6. Iron and Steel (72) 7,887 6,198 27.2 5.1 3.8
7. Plastic (39) 6,784 6,379 6.4 4.3 3.9
8. Paper & P. Board (48) 5,120 4,390 16.6 3.3 2.7
9. Organic Chemicals (29) 3,743 3,586 4.4 2.4 2.2
10. Articles of Iron & Steel (73) 2,899 2,438 18.9 1.9 1.5
11. Dyes and Paints(32) 2,238 2,005 11.6 1.4 1.2
12. Coffee, Tea, and Spices (9) 2,193 1,860 17.9 1.4 1.1
13. Misc Chemicals Products (38)) 2,190 1,714 27.8 1.4 1.1
14. Cosmetic and Perfumery(33) 2,162 1,319 63.9 1.4 0.8
15. Soap and Artificial Waxes (34) 2,046 1,720 19 1.3 1.1
Sub Total 118,447 123,866 ‐4.4 75.9 76
Other 37,582 39,206 ‐4.2 24.1 24
Gross 156,029 163,071 ‐4.3 100 100
Refund/Rebate 7,647 12,408 ‐38.4
Net 148,382 150,663 ‐1.5
Source: FBR Data Bank
III. Federal Excise Duties (FED)
Among all the taxes, the collection of federal excise has manifested the highest growth of 26
percent during 2008‐09 as compared to the previous year. Moreover, the revised target of Rs.116
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DEBT POLICY COORDINATION OFFICE
billion was also achieved. The collection of Rs 116.1 billion was realized as FED against 92.1 billion
collected in fiscal year 2007‐08 (See Table‐13).
Apart from the traditional major revenue spinners, it is encouraging that the services sector
emerged as the third highest revenue spinner of FED. Only six major items contributed around 80
percent of the collection during 2008‐09. Among these major items, cigarette was the top most
revenue generator with around 31.8 percent share in FED collection, followed by cement (15.2%),
services (15.1%), beverages (9.1%), natural gas (5.3%) and POL products (3.6%).
Table‐13: FED Collection from Major Commodities (Rs Million)
Difference Share(%) Share(%)
Commodities 2008‐09 2007‐08
Absolute Percent 2008‐09 2007‐08
Cigarettes 36,860 28,538 8,322 29.2 31.8 31.0
Cement 17,618 15,094 2,524 16.7 15.2 16.4
Services 17,485 12,418 5,067 40.8 15.1 13.5
Beverages 10,587 7,241 3,346 46.2 9.1 7.9
Natural Gas 61,04 5,866 238 4.1 5.3 6.4
POL Products 41,21 3,181 940 29.6 3.6 3.5
Sub Total 92,775 72,338 20,437 28.3 79.9 78.5
Other 23,280 19,799 3,481 17.6 20.1 21.5
Total 116,055 92,137 23,918 26.0 100 100
Source: FBR Data Bank
1% Special Excise Duty (SED)
An amount of Rs. 14.2 billion has been realized as special excise duty during 2008‐09 reflecting a
growth of around 30 percent as compared to previous year collection of Rs 10.9 billion. Details of
SED on domestic and imports are spotlighted in Table‐14.
Table‐14: Collection from 1 % SED (Rs Billion)
1% SED Domestic 2008‐09 2007‐08 Growth (%)
SED Domestic 6.2 4.0 55.0
SED Imports 8.0 6.9 15.9
Total 14.2 10.9 30.3
Source: FBR Data Bank
Projections for Fiscal Year 2009‐10
Foreseeing that the economy will improve and major taxes will display some buoyancy, the
budgetary target for fiscal year 2009‐10 has been set at Rs. 1,380 billion, requiring an increase of
22
FISCAL POLICY STATEMENT 2009‐10
19.3 percent over the provisional collection of Rs. 1,157 billion of fiscal year 2008‐09 (See Table‐15).
Furthermore, the projections for fiscal year 2009‐10 also include the impact of budgetary and relief
measures announced at the time of Federal Budget.
Table‐15: A Comparison of Baseline Collection and Projections (Rs Billion)
Prov. Collection Projections
Addition Growth (%)
2008‐09 2009‐10
Direct Taxes 440.3 565.6 125.3 28.5
Sales Tax 452.3 499.4 47.1 10.4
Federal Excise 116.1 152.8 36.7 31.6
Customs Duties 148.4 162.2 13.8 9.3
All Taxes 1,157.1 1,380.0 222.9 19.3
Source: FBR Data Bank
The projections for fiscal year 2009‐10 will result into following tax mix of federal taxes: direct taxes
41.0 percent, sales tax 36.2 percent, federal excise duty 11.1 percent and customs duty 11.8
percent.
The FBR revenue target for fiscal year 2008‐09 was fixed at Rs. 1,250 billion which was higher by
24.1 percent over the collection of fiscal year 2007‐08. The target was subsequently revised twice;
first upwards from Rs. 1250 billion to Rs. 1360 billion and then downwards to Rs. 1179 billion. The
earlier enhancement in target was done in the wake of promising growth witnessed in the first
quarter (July‐September, 2008) of the fiscal year. However, due to the global economic meltdown
and resultant adverse effects on Pakistan’s economy, the target was again revised, this time
downwards, to Rs. 1179 billion. Even this target appeared to be ambitious in view of continued
shrinkages in imports and negative growth in the domestic large‐scale manufacturing sector.
However, with great efforts, FBR collected Rs 1157 billion at the end of the year 2008‐09. The tax‐
to‐GDP ratio ended with a very low level of 8.8 percent, lower by 1 percent point as compared to
last year. The declining tax‐to‐GDP ratio is an alarming situation for the country and needs to be
addressed if higher revenues are to be generated in the future.
IV‐i‐b: Review of Expenditure during 2008‐09
Total expenditures stood at Rs. 2531.3 billion for the fiscal year 2008‐09, up from Rs 2281 billion
last year, thus registering an increase of 11.0 percent. Total expenditures as a percentage of GDP
stood at 19.3 percent — down from 22.2 percent last year. The original target for total expenditure
in 2008‐09 was Rs. 2391.5 billion or 19.5 percent of GDP, which was exceeded by Rs. 139.8 billion
23
DEBT POLICY COORDINATION OFFICE
by the end of fiscal year 2008‐09. Total expenditure consists of current and development
expenditures.
Current expenditures for fiscal year 2008‐09, current expenditures stood at Rs 2041.6 billion
against the budgeted amount of Rs. 1875.8 billion, and last years level of Rs 1858 billion. The 9.9
percent increase in current expenditures from last year was contributed by both the federal
government, whose share was Rs 1495.9 billion, as well as the provincial governments whose
contribution was Rs. 545.7 billion. Resultantly, current expenditures for entire fiscal year suffered a
slippage of Rs 165.8 billion over the budgeted amount for 2008‐09 (See Table‐16).
Table‐16: Consolidated Revenue & Expenditure of the Government (Rs Billion)
Prov. Actual Budget Prov. Actual Budget
July‐June Estimate July‐June Estimate
2007‐08 2008‐09 2008‐09 2009‐10
A. Total Revenue 1499.4 1809.2 1850.9 2155.4
a) Tax Revenue 1050.9 1308.5 1204.7 1563.6
‐ Federal 1009.9 1251.5 1158.6 1493.6
of which FBR Revenue 1007.0 1250.0 1157.0 1380.0
‐ Provincial 41.0 57.0 46.1 70.0
b) Non‐Tax Revenue 414.0 500.8 646.2 591.8
‐ Federal 336.0 410.8 562.4 496.8
‐ Provincial 78.0 90.0 83.8 95.0
B. Total Expenditure 2281.0 2391.5 2531.3 2877.4
a) Current Expenditure 1858.0 1875.8 2041.6 2103.8
‐ Federal 1420.0 1358.8 1495.9 1513.8
of which: Interest Payments 489.7 523.2 637.8 647.1
‐ Domestic 430.2 459.1 558.7 576.8
‐ Foreign 59.5 64.1 79.1 70.3
Defense Expenditure 285.0 296.1 329.9 342.9
‐ Provincial 437.1 517.0 545.7 590.0
b) Development Expenditure 452.0 516.6 448.8 763.1
‐ PSDP 452.0 549.7 397.5 646.0
Federal 238.0 373.0 195.7 421.0
ERRA ‐ 26.7 ‐ 25.0
Provincial 214.0 150.0 201.8 200.0
‐ Other Development Expenditure ‐ 43.9 51.3 157.1
Net Lending ‐28.0 ‐1.0 6.9 10.5
C. Overall Fiscal Deficit 777.2 582.3 680.4 722.1
‐ As % of GDP 7.6% 4.7% 5.2% 4.9%
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FISCAL POLICY STATEMENT 2009‐10
Table‐16: Consolidated Revenue & Expenditure of the Government (Rs Billion)
Prov. Actual Budget Prov. Actual Budget
July‐June Estimate July‐June Estimate
2007‐08 2008‐09 2008‐09 2009‐10
D. Financing of Fiscal Deficit 777.2 582.3 680.4 722.1
a) External Sources 151.3 165.2 149.7 312.3
b) Domestic 625.9 391.9 530.8 390.4
‐ Bank 519.9 149.0 305.6 144.1
‐ Non‐Bank 106.0 242.9 223.8 246.3
c) Privatization Proceeds ‐ 25.1 1.3 19.4
E. GDP at Market Prices 10,284 12,280 13,095 14,972
Memo Items
Revenue Deficit ‐358.6 ‐66.6 ‐190.7 51.5
‐ As % of GDP ‐3.5 ‐0.5 ‐1.5 0.3
Primary Deficit ‐291.9 ‐59.1 ‐42.6 ‐74.9
‐ As % of GDP ‐2.8 ‐0.5 ‐0.3 ‐0.5
Source: Budget Wing, Ministry of Finance
Development expenditure (after adjusting for net lending) was targeted at Rs 516.6 billion in 2008‐
09 — 14.3 percent higher than last year. However, significant slippages in current expenditure
forced the government to cut development spending by Rs. 67.8 billion to Rs. 448.8 billion – which
is lower than the fiscal year 2007‐08 level. On the basis of revenue and expenditure for the year,
the overall fiscal deficit was Rs 680.4 billion or 5.2 percent of GDP against Rs 777.2 billion or 7.6
percent from last year. As stated earlier, the main reasons for slippage in fiscal deficit were
unanticipated overdraft from the Punjab government and additional expenditure on account of
IDPs.
As opposed to fiscal year 2007‐08, the current fiscal year saw a change in the composition of
government borrowing for budgetary financing. Instead of heavy borrowing from the State Bank of
Pakistan, which is highly inflationary in nature, the government was able to tap commercial banks
as well as non‐bank sources. The borrowing from commercial banks was not responsible for
crowding out private sector mainly because of limited appetite for credit during the year. Larger
than expected inflows from National Saving Schemes brought the non‐bank sources contribution in
domestic financing up from just 16.9 percent in 2007‐08 to 42.2 percent in 2008‐09. The bulk of this
increase occurred in the second half of 2008‐09, as the market perception of an interest rate peak
25
DEBT POLICY COORDINATION OFFICE
in the economy and relatively higher rates offered on various schemes under the NSS provided an
arbitrage opportunity.
IV‐i‐c: Slippages in Budget 2008‐09
The performance of Pakistan’s economy in fiscal year 2008‐09 has been vastly influenced by the
macroeconomic imbalances created in the past few years. As a result of social, political and
economic shocks on both external and internal fronts, Pakistan’s economy was impacted with
regards to its overall performance resulting in moderate slippages in the budget (See Table‐17).
Table‐17: Variation in Budget 2008‐09 (Rs Billion)
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Original Revised
Prov. Actual Variations
Budget 2008‐ Budget 2008‐
2008‐09 (III) ‐ (I)
09 09
A. Total Revenue 1809.2 1882.5 1850.9 41.7
‐ Tax Revenue 1308.5 1231.5 1204.7 ‐103.8
Of which FBR Revenue 1250.0 1179.0 1157.0 ‐93
‐ Non‐Tax Revenue 500.8 651.0 646.2 145.4
B. Total Expenditure 2391.5 2445.3 2531.3 139.8
‐ Current Expenditure 1875.8 2004.3 2041.6 165.8
Of which ‐ Interest Payment 523.2 630.3 637.8 114.6
‐ Subsidies 295.2 252.0 257.0 ‐38.2
a) Power Sector 88.4 111.5 109.2 20.8
‐ WAPDA 74.6 92.8 90.5 15.9
‐ KESC 13.8 18.7 18.7 4.9
b) Oil 140.0 70.0 67.7 ‐72.3
c) Wheat 20.0 20.0 20.0 0
d) R & D Textile 5.7 4.8 3.1 ‐2.6
e) Fertilizer 32.0 28.7 26.3 ‐5.7
f) TCP (Sugar) 6.3 6.3 6.3 0
‐ Development Expenditure 516.6 437.8 448.8 ‐67.8
‐ Budget Deficit (A‐B) 582.3 562.8 680.4 98.1
As % of GDP 4.7 4.3 5.2 0.5
Source: Budget Wing
26
FISCAL POLICY STATEMENT 2009‐10
Total expenditure for fiscal year 2008‐09 was targeted at Rs 2391.5 billion, however the year ended
with Rs 2531.3 billion expenditure ‐‐ Rs 139.8 billion more than the target, mostly due to over
spending of Rs 165.8 billion in current expenditures. Interest payment is the single largest
component of current expenditure. A sum of Rs 523.2 was budgeted for interest payments in 2008‐
09 but the year, however, ended with interest payments surpassing the target by Rs 114.6 billion to
Rs 637.8 billion. The increase in domestic debt servicing is partly the result of a tight monetary
stance taken in order to arrest the monetary overhang caused by previous policies. The attractive
zero‐coupon DSCs of the late 1990s started maturing in the last three years, exerting persistent
pressure on the government budget. The reclaim on account of this liability can not be forecasted
or budgeted with accuracy. Also, the profit rates on major NSS instruments increased thrice in
2008‐09 translating into higher interest payments, but there was some respite as a cut in profit
rates in the last quarter of 2008‐09 eased the interest payments pressure.
In sheer contrast to fiscal year 2007‐08, the variation in subsidies positively contributed on the
budget in fiscal year 2008‐09 by the extent of Rs 38.2 billion. Having entered into an IMF program in
November 2008, Pakistan committed itself to the gradual elimination of subsidies in the oil and
power sector. However, because of public pressure, there is hesitance in complete elimination of
power subsidy until end of fiscal year 2009‐10. Nevertheless, given the drastic fall in international
oil prices over the course of fiscal year 2008‐09, and the planned withdrawal of oil subsidies, the
government found itself saving Rs 72.3 billion from the budgeted Rs 140 billion for the oil sector.
Power sector subsidies, in contrast, had a slippage of Rs 20.8 billion, mainly due to the logjam of
circular debt problem that has engulfed the industry.
Owing to the intensification of war on terror during the course of 2008‐09, the government had to
spend Rs 33.8 billion more than the budgeted amount on defence related expenditures. As a result
of all these developments, current expenditure surged to Rs 2041.6 billion – Rs 165.8 billion more
than the targeted amount.
In order to adjust the slippages in current expenditure, development expenditure was cut for the
second consecutive year to the extent of Rs 67.8 billion by postponing various slow moving projects
as well as by rationalizing expenditure.
On the revenue side, the FBR failed to meet its target collection amount of Rs 1250 billion and
ended the year collecting Rs 1157 billion, a slippage of Rs 93 billion which contributed to the overall
slippage in tax revenue to the extent of Rs 103.8. However, the government made significant
efforts in non‐tax revenue and collected an impressive Rs 145.4 billion more than the targeted
amount. This was mainly contributed by more than anticipated SBP profit as well as collection of
27
DEBT POLICY COORDINATION OFFICE
PDL on oil. Resultantly, total revenue passed its budgeted amount by Rs 41.7 billion which
mitigated the slippages on expenditure side to that extent. Notwithstanding, fiscal year 2008‐09
ended with a revenue‐expenditure gap of Rs 680.4 billion – Rs 98.1 billion more than the target for
the year. In other words, fiscal deficit for 2008‐09 as percentage of GDP stood at 5.2 percent
against the targeted value of 4.7 percent, which is still a marked improvement from fiscal year
2007‐08 fiscal deficit of 7.6 percent. Expenditure cuts have allowed the government some space to
achieve fiscal consolidation. However, reductions in expenditure, particularly development and
social sector outlays, have direct consequences for future economic growth and social
development. To achieve the government’s goals of growth and development, while maintaining a
sound and sustainable fiscal position, emphasis must be placed on revenue generation as opposed
to expenditure cuts. Fiscal sustainability can only be ensured when real growth of revenue outpaces
the growth in real expenditures over a period of time.
External resource inflows fell short of their target during fiscal year 2008‐09 due to global financial
meltdown, and the non‐materialization of anticipated inflows from multilateral and bilateral
donors. As against the budgeted external financing of Rs 165.2 billion, Rs 149.7 billion could be
materialized. Thus, the burden of adjustments for financing fell on domestic sources. The
borrowing requirements from domestic sources increased from Rs 391.9 billion to Rs 530.8 billion
(with negligible privatization proceeds) — an increase of Rs 138.9 billion. Pakistan has successfully
attained one of the conditions of the IMF program which was to have net zero borrowing from the
State Bank of Pakistan on a quarterly basis. Thus, only 42 percent of domestic financing came from
bank sources while the majority came from non‐bank sources.
The Revenue balance, which is defined as the difference between the total revenue and current
expenditures, representing the government’s savings or dis‐savings behavior, was in deficit to the
extent of Rs 190.7 billion or 1.5 percent of GDP in fiscal year 2008‐09 against the targeted deficit of
0.5 percent of GDP. Under the FRDL Act 2005, the government was required to achieve zero
revenue deficit. In other words, total revenue should have been sufficient to finance current
expenditure by June 30, 2008. The government was compelled by the internal and external
developments in 2008‐09 to breach this very important parameter.
The revenue balance signifies the inter‐generational distribution of resources because borrowing
for current consumption places additional burden on future generations while borrowing for
development spending or building assets is justified when viewed in the context of future
consumption. The additional expenditure requirements are created in security related matters or
interest payments which means current expenditure is to go up. The revenue balance is revenue‐
28
FISCAL POLICY STATEMENT 2009‐10
current expenditure gap, thus without commensurate increase in revenues, any increase in the
current spending will put strain on the revenue balance. The extraordinary developments in 2008‐
09 do permit temporary breach, but this must be balanced in the longer horizon. This reinforces the
need to generate additional revenues in the medium‐to‐long run.
Fig. 5:Trends in Revenue and Primary Balances
2.4 1999‐00 to 2008‐09
1.4
0.4
‐0.6
‐1.6
‐2.6
‐3.6
FY 00 FY 01 FY 02 FY 03 FY 04 FY 05 FY 06 FY 07 FY 08 FY 09
Revenue Balance Primary Balance
The Primary balance, which is the difference between the total revenues and non‐interest‐total
expenditure, measures the current fiscal policy stance of the government affecting the country’s
indebtedness. During the fiscal year 2008‐09, the primary balance remained in deficit to the extent
of Rs. 42.6 billion or 0.3 percent of GDP. In order to stabilize or reduce public debt, it is necessary
for the government to maintain a primary surplus. However, with smaller slippages in total
expenditure, the primary deficit for 2008‐09 is a vast improvement from last year when the primary
deficit stood at 2.7 percent of GDP. Nonetheless, the sooner Pakistan achieves a primary surplus,
the better it is for stabilizing the country’s debt burden.
The economy needs resources for recovery and as long as revenue resources do not finance
expenditures, there will be pressure on debt burden in the country. Going forward, public debt
management will be very crucial. To professionally manage public debt, there is dire need to
enhance cooperation among various stakeholders. The Debt Management Committee (DMC) has
29
DEBT POLICY COORDINATION OFFICE
already been constituted with a mandate to take important decisions regarding public debt
management and suggest fiscal measures which entails reorientation of prudent revenue‐
expenditure decisions, so that it can exert less pressure on debt management.
IV‐ii: Fiscal Projections for 2009‐10
The lessons learnt from fiscal year 2007‐08 and the consolidation and stabilization agenda pursued
by the government has contained the fiscal deficit for 2008‐09. Budget 2009‐10 has been prepared
with a view to further consolidate the fiscal position while moving towards a higher economic
growth path and enhanced tolerance of deficit financed by increased external inflows.
Table‐18: Consolidated Government Budget July‐Sept 2009 (Rs Billion)
July‐Sept 2009 July‐Sept 2009 2009‐10 2009‐10
Items Revised
(Prov. Actual) (Target) (Projection)
Projections
427.3 490 2155.4 2187.0
Total Revenue
2.9 (62.7) 14.5 14.6
Tax Revenue 298.8 334 1563.6 1600.0
2.0 (35.20) 10.5 10.7
‐ FBR Revenue 262.6 286 1380.0 1396.0
1.8 (23.40) 9.3 9.3
Total Expenditure 650.9 684 2877.4 2913.0
4.4 (33.10) 19.4 19.5
‐ Current 521.0 576 2103.8 2403.0
3.5 (55.00) 14.2 16.0
‐ Development 115.7 134 763.1 510.0
0.8 (18.30) 5.1 3.4
Fiscal Deficit 223.7 194 722.1 740.0
‐ as % of GDP 1.5 (‐29.7) 4.9 4.9
Note: Figures in italics are as percentage of GDP, Figures in paranthesis are variation from target
Source: Budget Wing, Finance Division
The fiscal deficit is projected to decline to 4.9percent of GDP in 2009‐10 down from 5.2percent in
2008‐09. In order to achieve fiscal deficit target for the year 2009‐10, tax revenue is targeted to
increase by 1.5 percentage points to 10.7 percent and current expenditure is projected to decline
30
FISCAL POLICY STATEMENT 2009‐10
by 0.6 percentage point of GDP, mainly through the elimination of power subsidies by June 2010. At
the same time, the size of development expenditures in 2009‐10 is set to remain at3.4 percent of
GDP, the same level in the last year. Key fiscal targets for the fiscal year 2009‐10 are documented in
Table‐18.
Table‐19: Comparison of Revenue (Rs Billion)
2009‐10 2009‐10
2008‐09 R.E Budget Revised Growth (%)
Estimates Projections.
Total Revenue 1,851 2,156 2,187 18.2
‐ Tax Revenue 1,205 1,563 1,600 32.8
‐ FBR Revenue 1,157 1,380 1,396 20.6
a) Direct Taxes 440 566 522 18.6
b) Indirect Taxes 717 814 874 21.9
‐ Sales Tax 452 499 547 20.9
‐ Federal Excise 116 153 161 38.7
‐ Customs Duty 148 162 166 11.9
Source: Federal Board of Revenue
31
DEBT POLICY COORDINATION OFFICE
IV‐iii: Revenue and Expenditure during July‐September 2009
Reflecting the extent of the slowdown in the economy in 2008‐09, and the impact of a change in
tax filing dates, FBR tax collection for the first quarter of 2009‐10 is up nominally. A sharp fall in
sales and corporate profitability in prior periods, a 19 percent decline in the value of dutiable
imports during July to September 2009, the impact of the internal restructuring of FBR, the fall out
of the internal security situation on business conditions, and a change in the dates for filing
advance tax (from September 30 to October 15), have all contributed to a nominal increase of 0.2
percent in overall tax collection (See Table‐20). The total amount of tax collection by the FBR has
now reached Rs. 262.6 billion as against a first quarter target of Rs. 286 billion. The slippage in tax
revenue is solely due to direct taxes failing to meet the target set for the first quarter by Rs. 32
billion.
However, tax collection for the first quarter should be viewed in the context of a 35 percent
increase during July‐September 2008 (versus corresponding period 2007), providing an unusually
high base for comparison. In addition, adjusted for the estimated impact of advance tax collection
shifted to next quarter (approximately Rs. 25‐29 billion), the tax collection effort has been above
par under challenging circumstances. A pick up in economic activity, an early resolution of the
energy crisis, an improvement in the internal security situation, a continuation of the trend of
improvement in the global economy, and results of the restructuring of tax administration should
all contribute towards achievement of the full year tax revenue target.
Table‐20: FBR Tax Collection July‐September 2009
Revenue Head Target 2009‐10 July‐Sept % Change
2008‐09 2009‐10
Direct Tax 522 88.2 84.1 ‐4.7
Sales Tax 547 110.2 117.1 6.2
Federal Excise 161 25.5 28.4 11.5
Customs Duty 166 38.2 33.1 ‐13.4
Total Collection 1396 262.1 262.6 0.2
Source: FBR
Total revenue collection, which includes FBR collection, provincial taxes, and non‐tax revenues,
reached Rs. 427.3 billion by end‐September 2009. As a percentage of projected GDP for the year,
total revenues at the end of Q1FY10 stood at 2.9 percent. However, with regards to revenue
generation, the government missed its quarterly target of Rs. 490 billion by approximately Rs. 62.7
32
FISCAL POLICY STATEMENT 2009‐10
billion. With the economic slowdown taking its toll, this slippage can be attributed to lower than
expected performance of federal and provincial tax collection, as well as non‐tax revenue.
On the expenditure side, total expenditure during the first three months of the current fiscal year
amounted to Rs. 651 billion as opposed to a first quarter target of Rs. 684 billion. Out of this total,
Rs. 521 billion was on account of current expenditure, whereas Rs.115.7 billion and Rs. 14.2 billion
were classified as development expenditure and unidentified expenditure respectively. While major
heads of expenditure have been reduced, the brunt of fiscal adjustment has been borne by current
expenditure, which was Rs. 55 billion lower than its targeted amount. Consequently, a relatively
smaller adjustment of Rs. 18.3 billion was made with respect to development expenditure.
Given the substantial gap between expenditure and revenue during the first quarter of 2009‐10,
the budget deficit stood at Rs. 223.7 billion, or approximately 1.5 percent of the projected GDP for
the year (See Table‐18). The government’s quarterly fiscal deficit target was set at Rs.. 194 billion,
highlighting a slippage of approximately Rs. 30 billion, mostly on account of lower than expected
revenue collection. The government registered a revenue deficit of approximately Rs. 93.3 billion or
0.6 percent of GDP during the same period, whereas the primary balance was in deficit by Rs.. 67.6
billion or 0.45 percent of projected GDP for 2009‐10. The advance salary payments in light of Eid‐ul‐
Fitar are also reflected in the first quarter deficit.
Owing to a higher than anticipated deficit in the first quarter, and lower than expected external
inflows, the deficit financing targets have not been achieved in the first three months of 2009‐10.
Originally, the targeted deficit of Rs. 159 billion was to be financed mostly through external inflows
of Rs. 100 billion, with the remainder being split between domestic bank (Rs. 32 billion) and non‐
bank sources (Rs.. 28 billion). However, with the first quarter deficit reaching Rs. 223.7 billion, and
with expected external inflows not materializing, a greater emphasis has been placed on domestic
sources, which accounted for Rs. 146.6 billion of the financing (See Table‐21 ). Rs. 39 billion of
budgetary borrowings were from bank sources, whereas non‐bank borrowing amounted to Rs. 107
billion. With private sector credit demand currently at low levels, the government has been able to
borrow from the banking sector; however the consequences of such borrowing will be more severe
once private sector credit demand is revitalized. Furthermore, the added emphasis placed on non‐
bank sources, primarily the CDNS, has highlighted the need to reform this institution in order to
efficiently access low‐cost financing. Such borrowing tendency may prove to be counter‐productive
for the monetary policy goals of the government. In the absence of policy coordination and
persistent domestic borrowing, there remains an upward pressure on interest rates even if the SBP
continues to relax its monetary policy stance.
33
DEBT POLICY COORDINATION OFFICE
Table‐ 21: Budgetary Financing, July‐September 2009
(In billions of Rs.)
July‐Sept 2009 July‐Sept 2009
(Prov. Actual) (Target)
Financing of Fiscal Deficit 223.7 159.0
a) External Sources 77.1 100.0
b) Domestic 146.6 59.0
‐ Bank 39.0 32.0
‐ Non Bank 107.6 27.0
c) Privatization Proceeds 0.0 0.0
Source: Budget Wing, Finance Division
V. Review of Public Debt
Total public debt (TPD) is a measure of government indebtedness. It includes all government and
government guaranteed Rupee debt as well as foreign currency denominated debt, excluding
private sector external debt which is not guaranteed by the government.
Developments in TPD during 2008‐09 have been driven mainly by a combination of five distinct
factors. Increased demands on the government budget during 2008‐09 for purposes of security and
war on terror meant that expenditure was fairly rigid even in the face of a committed effort to
rationalize expenditure and curtail the fiscal deficit. Secondly, lower than expected GDP growth,
acute energy shortages, and a high cost of doing business led to a revenue shortfall. The global
economic slowdown, and the resultant fall in commodity prices, had a positive impact on Pakistan’s
trade balance. In addition to these external developments, import compression measures reduced
the import bill significantly. Exports also witnessed a deceleration as demand from advanced
economies contracted, along with a slump in domestic productivity. However, the fall in imports
has outpaced the drop in exports. Still, a fairly high current account deficit, although falling,
prevailed throughout the year. In the absence of ample domestic resources and an unfavorable
environment in international capital markets and limited foreign non‐debt creating flows, the
government entered into a Stand by Agreement (SBA) with the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
paving the way for an inflow of financing to reverse a drawdown of foreign exchange reserves and
provide much needed economic stability. Lastly, depreciation of the Rupee against the US dollar
throughout the year ended in a substantial increase in the existing stock of foreign currency
denominated public debt expressed in Rupee terms.
34
FISCAL POLICY STATEMENT 2009‐10
Table‐222. Public Debtt, FY05‐FY10QQ1*
FY05 FY06 FY07 7 FY08 FY09 FY10 0Q1*
(In billions of Rs.)
Domestic Currency Debt 2152 2320 260 00 3266 3853 4010
Foreign C
Currency Deb bt 1913 2041 221 13 2739 3752 4090
Total Public Debt 4064 4361 481 14 6005 7605 8100
(In pe
ercent of GDP
P)
Rupees DDebt 33.1 30.4 30.0 31.8 29.4 26.8
Foreign C
Currency Deb bt 29.4 26.8 25.5 26.6 28.7 27.3
Total Public Debt 62.5 57.2 55.5 58.4 58.1 54.1
(In perccent of Revennue)
Rupees DDebt 239 215 2000 218 208 183
Foreign C
Currency Deb bt 212 190 1770 183 203 187
Total Public Debt 452 405 3771 401 411 370
(In perccent of Total Debt)
Rupees DDebt 52.9 53.2 54.0 54.4 50.7 49.5
Foreign C
Currency Deb bt 47.1 46.8 46.0 45.6 49.3 50.5
Memo:
Foreign C
Currency Deb bt (in US$ Billion) 32.1 33.9 36.5 40.7 46.3 49.4
Exchange Rate (Rs./U US$, E.O.P) 59.7 60.2 60.6 67.3 81.0 82.8
GDP (in Rs. Billion) 6500 7623 867
73 10284 13095 149
972**
Total Revvenue (in Rs. Billion)
900 1077 129
98 1499 1851 21
187**
* Provision
nal ** Projected for FY10 Source: EAD, SBP, EA W
Wing, MoF and D
DPCO staff calculations
Durinng the year 22008‐09, total public debt increased byy Rs. 1600 billion (26.6 peercent). As off end‐
June 2009, Pakistan’s total public debtt stood at Rs. R 7605 billion (See Table‐ 22). Rupee
R
deno ominated pub blic debt increeased from Rss. 3266 billion n to Rs. 3853 billion duringg the same peeriod,
increeasing by Rs. 587 billion or 18 perccent during the
t period. The
T increasee in the dom
mestic
comp ponent of public debt acco ounted for 37 7 percent of the total increease in public debt.
The primary sourrce of increase in public debt during 2008‐09 hass been a rap
pid increase in the
foreign currency component which accounted for 63 percent of the t total incrrease in TPD. This
comp ponent grew by Rs. 1013 billion or 37 percent due to increased foreign publlic debt inflow ws on
one h hand, and siggnificant deprreciation of thhe Rupee vs. the US dollar on the otheer hand. The rrupee
lost aapproximatelly 20 percentt of its value against the U US dollar duriing 2008‐09. An increase of Rs.
633 billion, apprroximately 399.6 percent of the total increase in TPD, was solely
s due to
o the
depreciation of th he Rupee against the US D Dollar. Furtherrmore, depreeciation of thee US Dollar aggainst
35
DEBT POLICY COORDINATION OFFICE
other major currencies caused the foreign currency component of public debt to increase by US
$53 million. This capital loss on foreign currency debt, however, is mitigated by the strong
concessionality element associated with Pakistan’s external loans. Although the increase in the
foreign currency component of TPD might appear to be alarming, it must be noted that the
increased inflows mainly in the form of the IMF SBA have been used not to fund budgetary
operations, but to strengthen Pakistan’s foreign exchange reserves.
Similar changes have been witnessed to the stock of Pakistan’s TPD during the first three months of
the current fiscal year. Outstanding TPD rose to Rs. 8100 billion, registering an increase of Rs. 495
billion or 6.5 percent, mostly on account of considerable inflows of foreign currency denominated
debt. Disbursements under the third tranche of the IMF‐SBA and from multilaterals caused the
foreign currency component of TPD to increase by Rs. 338 billion by end‐September 2009. The
funds from the IMF SBA have been used primarily to shore up the foreign exchange reserves of the
country. However, out of the third tranche of US$ 1.2 billion which was disbursed in August 2009,
approximately $745 million has been allocated for budget financing. Depreciation of the rupee
against the US dollar caused the foreign currency component to increase by Rs. 91 billion,
approximately 18.4 percent of the total increase in TPD. The remaining increase of approximately
Rs. 157 billion was on account of domestic borrowing.
The composition of TPD underwent a significant shift during 2008‐09; as the share of foreign
currency denominated debt increased for the first time since 2001‐02, rising from 45.6 percent of
TPD in 2007‐08 to 49.3 percent in 2008‐09. The share of Rupee denominated debt at 50.7 percent
of TPD is significantly lower than the contribution of 54.4 percent during 2007‐08. A coordinated
effort to reduce borrowing from the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) and substantial foreign currency
inflows through the IMF SBA program to avert a BoP crisis, are the major causes behind this shift in
composition. While limiting the increases in SBP borrowing will help in controlling inflationary
pressures, the increase in foreign currency component will leave the economy more vulnerable to
external shocks, specifically, the effect of Rupee depreciation on the outstanding stock of TPD.
However, the impact of any currency shock should not be looked at in isolation, but rather be
analyzed in the context of interest rate differential.
Total public debt as a percentage of GDP was as high as 62.5 percent at the end of 2004‐05, but
steadily reduced to 55.5 percent by the end of 2006‐07. Following the volatile economic conditions
witnessed in 2007‐08 accentuated by policy inaction on key expenditures (i.e. energy subsidy), a
burgeoning fiscal deficit led to a rapid escalation of TPD as a percentage of GDP, reaching 58.4
percent by end‐June 2007‐08. Fiscal consolidation, rationalization of expenditure, and a net zero
36
FISCAL POLICY STATEMENT 2009‐10
quarterly limit on borrowing from the SBP have all assisted in restraining total public debt to GDP
ratio even in the face of lower than expected growth. By end‐June 2009, TPD stood at 58.1 percent
of GDP.
Fig‐6: Trends in Public Debt
650.0 95.0
600.0 85.0
(As % of Revenue)
550.0
(As % of GDP)
75.0
500.0
65.0
450.0
55.0
400.0
350.0 45.0
300.0 35.0
Year
1980
1990
1995
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
TR GDP
A similar historic trend is seen in TPD as a percentage of Government Revenues, with TPD falling
from as high as 4.52 times of the Government Revenues in 2004‐05 to 3.71 times by 2006‐07.
However due to the prevalent conditions in the economy, both domestic and international, TPD
increased to 4.01 times of Government Revenues by the end of 2007‐08. Government policies
restricted the increase in TPD during 2008‐09, but less than expected tax collection has further
deteriorated this indicator to 4.11 times, i.e. TPD is now more than four times the government’s tax
revenue (See Figure‐6).
Servicing of Public Debt
Increases in the outstanding stock of Total Public Debt have implications for the economy in the
shape of a greater amount of resource allocation towards debt servicing in the future. In order to
meet debt servicing obligations, an extra burden is placed on limited government resources and
might have costs in the shape of foregone public investment or expenditure in other sectors of the
economy.
37
DEBT POLICY COORDINATION OFFICE
Figure 7: Trends in Debt Servicing
50.0%
45.0%
as % of TR and CE
40.0%
35.0%
30.0%
25.0%
FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09
% of Current Expenditure % of Total Revenue
During the year 2008‐09, servicing of public debt amounted to Rs. 807.8 billion as opposed to a
budgeted amount of Rs. 619.4 billion. The slippage of Rs. 188.4 billion has mostly been due to
depreciation of the rupee, which increased the amount used for interest and principal repayments
of foreign loans in rupee terms. The more than budgeted increase in fiscal deficit of 2007‐08 also
translated into higher debt servicing. Repayment of foreign loans stood at Rs. 158.4 billion as
opposed to a target of Rs. 96.2 billion; while interest payments on foreign loans, which were
budgeted at Rs. 64 billion, reached to Rs. 69.4 billion by end‐June 2009. At its root, the currency
depreciation, which led to the slippages in debt servicing targets, should be viewed as an
adjustment against the unsustainable parity of the Rupee vis‐à‐vis the US dollar witnessed during
2001‐2007. An amount of Rs. 580 billion was spent on account of servicing of domestic debt against
the budgeted estimate of Rs. 459.1 billion. The increase in domestic debt servicing is partly the
result of a tight monetary stance taken in order to arrest the monetary overhang caused by
previous policies. Additionally, the high cost zero‐coupon Defence Savings Certificates (DSCs) sold in
the late 1990s led to an inaccurate budgeting on interest payments. These instruments started
maturing in the last three years, undermining the servicing of domestic debt in the initial years of
their issue but inflated the service payments on domestic front in recent years as the interest is
paid at maturity.
38
FISCAL POLICY STATEMENT 2009‐10
VI. Sustainability of Fiscal Policy
Sustainability of fiscal policy is vital for a sustainable debt path. The fiscal deficit is a key indicator as
it has significant ramifications on a country’s macroeconomic position. The shortfall in revenues is
usually bridged by domestic and foreign borrowings by the government causing the accumulation
of debt. The primary balance measures how the current fiscal policy stance of the government
affects the net indebtedness of a country. Hence, in order to reduce public debt, it is necessary for
the government to maintain a primary surplus. The government recognizes that in order to have a
sustainable fiscal policy, the fiscal deficit needs to be reduced over the medium term. The revenue‐
expenditure gap that Pakistan has faced over the years needs to be addressed by generating higher
revenues while containing its expenditures.
The government, through the FBR, is in the process of taking measures that will improve revenue
generation in the country by broadening the tax base and improving the overall tax system and
administration. The high cost of interest payments deters resources from the priority sectors in the
economy such as social welfare and development projects. Consequently, in order to achieve a
primary surplus, a reduction in the interest burden is also important. All in all, a prudent fiscal
policy comprises of (i) a balanced tax structure based on rational and affordable rates with minimal
exemptions covering a broad range of taxpayers, (ii) an expenditure policy that aims to moderate
growth in non‐developmental expenditure and adequately accommodate the pressing social and
infrastructure needs of a developing economy, and (iii) a prudent debt management policy.
VII. Medium‐Term Budgetary Framework (MTBF)
The Budget 2009‐10 has been prepared within the Medium Term Budgetary Framework (MTBF)
which is consistent with the country’s overall macroeconomic framework and legal obligation under
Section‐5 and 6 of the Fiscal Responsibility and Debt Limitation Act 2005. The current budgeting
system in Pakistan makes it difficult to align budgetary resources with strategic priorities. The aim
of the MTBF is to make the budget system better. The MTBF will help channel resources to the
Government’s key strategic priorities. It will make more transparent the link between resources
allocated through the federal budget and the results to be achieved in terms of service delivery
(outputs) and impact (outcomes). It will facilitate the scrutiny of the existing allocation of resources
through the federal budget in terms of economy, efficiency and effectiveness ‐ by the relevant
ministry, the Ministry of Finance, the Planning Commission, the Cabinet, the National Assembly,
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and by other stakeholders including the general public. In this way, the MTBF aims to support and
strengthen the delivery of public services by the Federal Government.
The MTBF has three main objectives:
I. To further strengthen fiscal discipline by creating an orderly framework for management of
the annual budget over the medium term;
II. To strengthen the alignment of federal resources by the government to the government’s
policies and strategies;
III. To build the capacity in federal ministries to prepare and manage their budgets in a
manner which provides cost‐effective service delivery (outputs) and efficient use of public
funds (value for money).
At the individual ministry level, the MTBF hopes to improve methodologies for aligning budgets
with available resources and encourage ministries to take greater control of their own financial
management. As far as provinces are concerned, the MTBF will not directly address issues of
budget reform, since provincial governments are responsible for their own initiatives. However,
appropriate linkages are being made by the MTBF to provincial budget reforms.
When taken together, the outputs of the MTBF will help to ensure that policy objectives determine
the overall framework for the budgetary process and individual budgetary allocations are more
clearly linked to strategic priorities. Thus, policies are considered in a medium‐to‐long term context
which will provide greater predictability in the budgetary process.
VIII. Public – Private Partnership
The Government recognizes the importance of improving and expanding infrastructure services for
sustaining economic and social development in its Medium Term Development Framework 2005‐
2010 (MTDF). Improved quality and service coverage in power and water supply, sewerage
treatment, transport and logistics are vital for Pakistan’s economy and the livelihood of its people.
Tight fiscal constraints require innovative approaches ‐ away from the traditional role of the
Government as the service provider ‐ to ensure that the massive investment needs are financed
with the assistance of the private sector. A combination of policy reforms, institutional support,
incentives and financing modalities is required to encourage private‐sector participation in
financing, constructing and managing infrastructure projects.
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Public‐Private Partnerships (PPPs) permit the public sector to reduce their capital expenditure (and
redirect to promote urgent social needs) and convert the infrastructure costs into affordable
operating expenditure spread over time. PPPs allow each partner to concentrate on activities that
best suit their skills. For the public sector that would mean focusing on developing policies and
identifying service needs, while for the private sector the key is to deliver those needs efficiently
and effectively.
The government has set up the Infrastructure Project Development Facility (IPDF) under the
auspices of the Ministry of Finance (MoF), to generate projects with public sector institutions (line
ministries, provincial governments, local bodies, state owned enterprises etc.) undertaking PPPs.
IPDF provides direct access to a professional PPP Unit that will help institutions to improve
proposals and prepare them for tendering, without becoming a contract signatory to those
transactions. Once approved by IPDF's Project Feasibility Committee, the project may be submitted
for any necessary complementary financing to a proposed independent financing body – the
Infrastructure Project Financing Fund (IPFF) – for any ‘residual’ financing needs that are not
available in the market. Both IPDF and IPFF are tasked to provide easy and timely access for
institutions, to ensure that viable good quality PPP deals are concluded in a timely manner to meet
Pakistan’s increasing infrastructure demands. The day to day operations of both institutions will be
independent from the government and reporting to the government will be made through their
respective Board of Directors.
PPP project evaluations will focus on, but will not be limited to, the following sectors:
• Transport and logistics including provincial and municipal roads, rail, seaports, airports,
fishing harbors as well as warehousing, wholesale markets, slaughter houses and cold
storage.
• Mass Urban Public Transport including buses, and intra and intercity rail.
• Municipal Services including water supply and sanitation; solid waste management; low
cost housing, and health / education facilities.
• Small Scale Energy Projects such as hydroelectric and captive power generation projects ‐
other than those being facilitated by Private Power Infrastructure Board (PPIB) and the
Alternative Energy Development Board (AEDB).
Although PPPs will become an integral component of the government’s overall strategy for the
provision of public services and public infrastructure across all sectors, this does not imply they are
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the preferred option for improving the efficiency of services delivery but that they enjoy equal
status among a range of possible service delivery options available to the government.
IX. Report on Compliance with FRDL Act 2005
The Fiscal Responsibility and Debt Limitation (FRDL) Act, 2005 was approved on 13 June 2005. The
FRDL Act, 2005 requires that the federal government take measures to reduce total public debt and
maintain it within prudent limits thereof. The following sections identifies the various limits
prescribed by the FRDL Act 2005 and reports on progress thereof.
89. The FRDL Act 2005 requires the following:
(1) Reducing the revenue deficit to nil not later than the thirtieth June, 2008 and
thereafter maintaining a revenue surplus
Revenue balance (Total Revenue minus current expenditure) breached the performance target in
fiscal year 2007‐08 as it did not achieve a revenue deficit of zero but, infact, deteriorated
significantly to 3.4 percent of GDP. Fiscal year 2008‐09 saw a vast improvement in the revenue
deficit as it was brought down to 1.5 percent of GDP or Rs. 190.7 billion. Revenue deficit is
considered the dis‐saving of the government which contributed to reducing overall national saving
rate (national savings as percent of GDP). Serious corrective measures are required to bring current
expenditures at least at the level of total revenue. In other words, total revenue should be
sufficient to finance at least the current expenditure and if there is a need to borrow, the
government can borrow for development purposes.
90. (2) Ensure “that within a period of ten financial year, beginning from the first July,
2003 and ending on thirtieth June, 2013, the total public debt at the end of the
tenth financial year does not exceed sixty percent of the estimated gross domestic
product for that year and thereafter maintaining the total public debt below sixty
percent of gross domestic product for any given year.”
Government has already met and actually exceeded the requirement on the level of public debt as
a percentage of GDP. The Government has achieved the goal of reducing public debt as percentage
of GDP below 60 percent well ahead of time. Furthermore, this limit has been realized within three
financial years instead of ten years as envisaged by the FRDL Act. At the beginning of July 2003, the
total public debt stood at 75.1 percent of GDP while at the end of June 2009, the same figure stood
at 58.1 percent of GDP. However, public debt is better analyzed in relation to total revenue, as GDP
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FISCAL POLICY STATEMENT 2009‐10
is only a measure of size of the economy and does not necessarily translate to easily accessible
resources. The erosion of this indicator emphasizes the need to concentrate efforts on revenue
generation in order to meet the additional requirements placed by increasing amounts of debt.
91. (3) Ensure “that in every financial year, beginning from the first July, 2003, and ending
on the thirtieth June 2013, the total public debt is reduced by no less than two and a
half percent of the estimated gross domestic product for any given year, provided that
social and poverty alleviation related expenditures are not reduced below 4.5 percent
of the estimated gross domestic product for any given year and budgetary allocation
to education and health, will be doubled from the existing level in terms of percentage
of gross domestic product during the next ten years.”
This requirement of the FRDL Act 2005 was meant to be a vehicle in achieving the more important
target of reducing the public debt‐to‐GDP ratio to less than 60 percent within a ten year span.
Achieving the target of debt‐to‐GDP ratio ahead of time notwithstanding, the reversal of the
declining trend in debt burden during 2007‐08 and again in 2008‐09 is a cause for concern. The
government should be vigilant in ensuring that the rise in the debt to GDP ratio during 2007‐08 is
not allowed to continue otherwise it will breach the 60 percent targeted level as required by the
FRDL Act 2005. Public debt stood at 58.4 percent of GDP by end June 2008, and declined to 58.1
percent by end‐June 2009. Fiscal restraint and a limit on borrowing from SBP enabled the
government to reduce the public debt‐to‐GDP ratio following the increase in 2007‐08, thus avoiding
a sustained deterioration of this indicator. These efforts have been commendable given the fact
that GDP growth was slower than expected.
Social sector and poverty related expenditure (as given by Pro‐poor budgetary expenditure
excluding outlays on law and order) remained well above the target of 4.5 percent of GDP as laid
out in the FRDL Act 2005. These expenditures stood at 6.7 percent of GDP in 2008‐09; a remarkable
fact given the higher amount of outlays required on behalf of law and order. However, expenditure
on health and education remains a cause for concern. The FRDL Act 2005 requires that these
outlays as a percentage of GDP reach 1.18 percent and 3.72 percent of GDP respectively by 2013;
effectively doubling the allocation towards these sectors from the levels of F2002‐03. In sharp
contrast to the target, expenditure on health and education in 2008‐09 at 0.3 percent and 1.5
percent respectively, has been lower than 2002‐03. If the government is to meet this target, it is
necessary that superfluous expenditure be substituted with targeted and effective investments in
health and education.
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92. (4) Not issue “new guarantees, including those for rupee lending, bonds, rates of
return, output purchase agreements and all other claims and commitments that may
be prescribed, from time to time, for any amount exceeding two percent of the
estimated gross domestic product in any financial year: Provided that the renewal of
existing guarantees shall be considered as issuing a new guarantee.”
New guarantees issued by the government to Public Sector Enterprises in 2008‐09 amounted to Rs
274.3 billion or 2.09 percent of GDP, which was higher than the stipulated limit of 2 percent
imposed by the Fiscal Responsibility and Debt Limitation Act 2005. Finance Division has been
issuing continuing guarantees against the commodity financing operations undertaken by TCP,
PASSCO, and provincial governments. Commodity financing is secured against hypothecation of
commodities and letter of comfort from the Finance Division. The quantum of these guarantees
depends on the supply‐demand gap of various commodities, their price stabilization objectives,
volume procured, and domestic and international prices, therefore these guarantees were never
included in the limit of 2 percent imposed by the FRDL Act 2005. For 2008‐09, Rs. 192.6 billion
worth of new guarantees were issued on behalf of commodity financing operations.
The government intends to introduce world class warehousing facilities in the near future that will
allow the entities involved in the commodity operations to secure financing against the warehouse
receipt without explicit guarantee or letter of comfort from the government.
X. Concluding Remarks
For every government, achieving high economic growth rate is a primary national objective as it
helps in accomplishing the extremely important socio‐economic goals of expanding employment
and reducing poverty. Fiscal Policy should focus on generating primary surplus and ensuring that
real rate of growth of revenues should be higher than the real growth in debt servicing obligation.
The fiscal policy should explore opportunities for augmenting the resource envelop rather than
cutting down the expenses. At the same time, the expenses should be rationalised and non‐
productive expenditure should be curtailed that will bring improvement in the national investment
climate, saving incentives and opportunities, and competitiveness of the real economy.
Institutionalization of policy coordination cannot be overemphasized for growth and sustainability
of national economy.
Fiscal consolidation has been one of the main themes of 2008‐09. The consequences of a lax fiscal
attitude over the years, exacerbated by a non‐conducive external environment, meant that crucial
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FISCAL POLICY STATEMENT 2009‐10
fiscal adjustments had to be made by the government to align itself on a sustainable fiscal path. A
reduction in expenditure and gradual withdrawal of subsidies (in addition to lower commodity
prices which eased pressure on government resources) translated to a deficit of 5.2 percent of GDP.
When compared to a deficit of 7.6 percent in 2007‐08, the extent of this adjustment is highlighted.
Although the government was not able to meet its initial deficit target, the circumstances causing
the slippage were mostly unprecedented and exogenous.
Revenue collection, however, remained weak throughout the year. Lower than expected economic
growth; volatile trade environment; and domestic disruptions caused by the power crisis and
security concerns have all hampered revenue generation efforts of the government. Pakistan’s tax‐
to‐GDP ratio is now at a precariously low level of 9.2 percent. Growth in real revenues is a
prerequisite to successful implementation of the government’s socio‐economic targets. The
performance of Pakistan’s revenue collection in real terms has been weak at best. When taken in
real terms, tax revenue has grown by a meager average of 1.4 percent for the last five years, as
compared to average real GDP growth of 5.5 percent during the same period leading to an erosion
of the tax‐to‐GDP ratio. Furthermore, real growth in expenditure has been higher than the real
growth of revenues which has had significant consequences for the fiscal deficit. Persistent
divergence between growth of revenues and expenditure has led to escalating revenue deficit to
the tune of 1.5 percent of GDP. The primary balance, although vastly improved from 2007‐08,
remains in deficit by 0.3 percent of GDP. Going forward, significant growth in real revenues is
essential to maintain fiscal sustainability, and to finance the government’s economic plans.
The implementation of the government’s recovery efforts and gradual resurgence of economic
stability has been remarkable. However, in the course of the recent economic performance, a few
key issues have emerged. Firstly, the importance of addressing key structural issues during times of
relative fiscal soundness has been highlighted. While giving due credit to the government’s crisis
management efforts, it must be noted that had there been an implementation of resource
management and revenue generation efforts in periods of relative stability, the consequences of
fiscal adjustment would have been less severe. Proactive efforts need to be concentrated on
addressing these weaknesses, as opposed to tackling difficult economic situations witnessed in the
previous two years in a re‐active mode. By doing so, the government will be able to ensure that
periods of high economic growth, stable domestic environment, and substantial external inflows
can be translated to rising real revenues and creation of ample fiscal space. By shifting from a
reactionary stance to reform and efficiency oriented resource management policies, the
government will be able to rid the system of the inefficiencies that are painfully brought to the
surface in times of crisis.
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Secondly, emphasis must be placed on revenue generation, instead of adjustments made through
cuts in expenditure. Inability to translate relative economic prosperity into a structural
advancement of revenue generation has meant that fiscal adjustments have been made by
reduction in outlays, which hampers future prospects and might have dire consequences for socio‐
economic development. Changes in the tax structure to include major sectors of the economy that
have so far not matched their contribution to economic growth by a proportionate increase in tax
revenue will be a significant step in this regard.
On the expenditure side, long‐run sustainability can be ensured not by cutting down on
expenditure during times of economic turmoil, but by undertaking a thorough classification and
rationalization of expenses. The dampening effects on economic conditions placed by drastic cuts in
expenditure have been highlighted in 2008‐09. Progressing in the future, the government intends
to employ fiscal outlays as a stimulus to regain growth momentum and to increase the access and
quality of facilities provided to the most vulnerable. By quantifying development expenditures,
removing superfluous outlays, making targeted and efficient investments in crucial areas, while
maintaining the integrity of pro‐poor and social sector activities, the government will be able to
meet these goals and avoid placing strains on its resources as severe as those recently witnessed.
A considerable drain on government resources has been an increasing burden of contingent
liabilities in order to cover the losses incurred by public sector enterprises (PSEs). Accordingly, the
contingent responsibility of the government has, most of the times, transformed to a reality as
these bodies lacked the capacity to service their obligations. In order to allow efficient fiscal
adjustments, the root cause of these public sector entities’ losses must be tackled by
comprehensive restructuring and introduction of corporate management structures, rather than
absorbing their liabilities into the government budget. In essence, encouragement to explore and
develop alternate financing mechanisms is a viable solution to this problem. Increasing the capacity
for financial management as well as ensuring private sector participation will allow for cost‐efficient
access to funds to cover the obligations of the PSEs, as well as to finance infrastructure upgrades.
Envisaged future investments in key sectors and budgetary outlays will be essential in regaining the
lost growth momentum of the economy, improving the business environment, and ensuring
sustained social development. To overcome the savings‐investment gap present in the economy
and finance these outlays, broadening the resource envelope of the economy will play a vital role.
While enhanced tax revenue effort from the center as well as the provinces will be welcome
measures, financial innovation and positive real interest rates will also assist in increasing the
savings pool of the economy. Attractive financing schemes, deeper penetration of financial
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institutions in rural areas, and increasing the incentives provided to the public will enable
substantial funds lying outside the system in to formal banking channels. With a money multiplier
of 3.14 (as of December 2009), even a small injection of funds in to the formal financial sector will
translate in to a greater resource envelope of the economy, and provide space for planned
investments to be made efficiently.
Most importantly, in attempting these reforms, a holistic policy approach and thorough
coordination is required. The goals of increased revenue generation and targeted budgetary
investments must be brought in line with the monetary policy objectives. The pool of national
savings must be enhanced, allowing for required investments to be made without jeopardizing the
government’s fiscal position. Positive real interest rates are essential as they will attract substantial
funds currently outside the purview of the official monetary system. Moreover, budgetary
borrowing options need to be revisited to ensure that financing of future deficits does not dilute
monetary policy’s efforts to keep money supply in check and tackle inflation. In this regard,
amplified revenue generation and reduction in primary deficit will also limit the emphasis placed on
debt creation. By placing a high priority on structural reform and revenue generation, and
establishing a comprehensive framework for management of PSEs, the government will be able to
finance the envisaged expenditure which will be crucial in the coming years, while containing
excessive borrowing and maintaining fiscal sustainability.
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