The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton - Jerrold M. Post
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton - Jerrold M. Post
"
—Jane Mayer, The New Yorker
THE P S Y C H O L O G I C A L A S S E S S M E N T
OF POLITICAL LEADERS
With Profiles of
Saddam Bill
Hussein Clinton
Edited by Jerrold M. Post, M.D.
THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT
OF POLITICAL LEADERS
With Profiles of
A OP catalog record for this book is available from the British Library.
B. Trait Analyses
C. Cognitive Analyses
B. Saddam Hussein
References 413
Contributors 443
Index 447
Preface
Jerrold M. Post
would first describe his or her method and then apply the method,
was born. Indeed, a unique feature of the book, chosen by its con-
tributors, is to illustrate these methods using two leaders from radi-
cally different societies, William Jefferson Clinton for a democratic
society and Saddam Hussein for a closed totalitarian system, showing
how personality manifests itself in such different systems. Renshon
and Peter Suedfeld, professor of social psychology at the University
of British Columbia, both major figures in the field of at-a-distance
personality assessment, were also invited to contribute.
This book represents the fulfillment of a long-cherished dream: to
bring together within the covers of one volume the specialized meth-
ods for psychologically evaluating the personality and political
behavior of world leaders pioneered by a small group of specialists,
many of whom I have been working with for nearly thirty years.
1. Profiling Political Leaders:
An Introduction
seemed that the powerful forces of the rival Western and Eastern
blocs significantly reduced and constrained the capacity of individual
leaders to affect the course of events in the arena of foreign policy.
Yet few would doubt that the leadership actions of John F. Kennedy,
Fidel Castro, and Nikita Khrushchev in October 1962; of Richard
Nixon in China; of Jimmy Carter at Camp David; and of Ronald
Reagan, Mikhail Gorbachev, and Boris Yeltsin in the twilight of the
cold war made a difference.
David G. Winter
11
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
Doing Psychobiography
What is a psychobiography or clinical at-a-distance assessment? One
useful definition, based on Glad 1973, is that psychobiography
involves the systematic application of psychological theory or con-
Assessing Leaders' Personalities
Wilson's Phenomenology
If ever there was a leader whose performance in office called for psy-
chological interpretation, surely it is Woodrow Wilson. There is
general agreement on what needs to be explained. From his presi-
dency of Princeton University through his participation in the Ver-
sailles Peace Conference to his final speaking campaign urging Sen-
ate ratification of the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations,
Wilson showed a consistent pattern in which he seemed to undercut
his remarkable leadership skills and defeat or undo his considerable
accomplishments. In its fullest manifestations, this pattern included
the following elements: (i) Wilson articulated visionary goals in the
sweeping language of moralistic oratory. (2) When faced with oppo-
sition, however, he would not compromise, even when compromise
would clearly further his ultimate goals. (3) On the other hand, he
also refused to play hardball and fight back directly and aggressively.
(4) Rather, he counterattacked with renewed and exhausting speech-
making campaigns. (5) In the process, Wilson often became suspi-
cious of people who had been close supporters, even aggressively
turning against them. (6) In the end, his original goals were often
lost in the scrimmages of politics. (7) Even victory usually brought
him little sense of satisfaction. Put simply: Wilson defeated himself,
again and again.
Wilson's behavior during and after the Versailles Peace Confer-
ence illustrates most of the elements of this sequence. First, he was
reluctant to use American economic and military power to overturn
the Allied war aims and secret treaties and thereby bring about his
goal of a "just peace." Instead, he poured his energy into writing and
refining the visionary language of the League of Nations Covenant.
Advice to compromise, given by his close aide Colonel House, only
led to rupture of their relationship. Later, when Republicans led by
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
and was further tempered by (3) needs for approval and respect. Often he
succeeded, especially when he was moving along the path to power.
When this combination aroused (4) a reaction-formation against aggres-
sion and (5) disruptive anxiety at the prospect of opposition, however,
he avoided a fight. When an issue had become emotionally charged,
however, his (6) insatiable achievement aspirations and (7) compulsive
stubbornness led to (8) denial and distorted perception. When this hap-
pened, he usually failed.
tation.3 Like the Georges, Freud and Bullitt focused on the promi-
nent role of Wilson's father. Woodrow, they argued, "never solved
the major dilemma of the Oedipus complex" (306). As a result, he
both identified strongly with his father (resulting in a harsh super-
ego) and yet had repressed aggression toward his father, which he
typically displaced onto associates who were symbolic "younger
brothers." More latent was his passivity, the result of a latent
identification with his mother.
Interpretation by Weinstein
Weinstein (1970, 1981, 1983) and his colleagues (Weinstein,
Anderson, and Link 1978—79) were very clear about the underlying
cause of Wilson's foreign policy behavior: he was, they argue, suffer-
ing from cerebral vascular disease, manifested in periodic strokes and
culminating in the final, massive stroke of 1919. These medical con-
ditions, Weinstein (1981, esp. chaps. 10, 20, and 21) argues, precip-
itated a series of personality changes that contributed to Wilson's
self-defeating pattern: euphoric overconfidence, stubbornness and
irritability, suspiciousness, and delusions.
From the available biographical evidence it is clear that Wilson
suffered from a variety of vaguely described physical complaints
throughout his life. However, as Post (1983^ observed, we lack the
kind of detailed medical records that could definitively prove many
of the details of Weinstein's hypotheses—hypotheses that Weinstein
treated as established facts. On the basis of an independent review of
the available evidence, a number of medical experts doubted Wein-
stein's diagnosis (e.g., Marmor 1982, 1983; Monroe n.d., cited by
George and George 1998, 5-6, see also 10—n; Post 1983^. Others
have argued that even if Weinstein was correct, the medical condi-
tions he attributed to Wilson do not adequately explain what Wein-
stein thought they explained (see George and George 1981-82,
1983; Post 1983^ Ross 1982).
Validated Variables
At-a-distance researchers typically use operationally defined person-
ality variables, the validity of which has been established through
systematic research. Elms (1986), for example, analyzed the person-
alities and public behavior of four key twentieth-century U.S. for-
eign policy advisers (House, Dulles, Kissinger, and Haig) in terms of
Machiavellianism, ego idealism, and authoritarianism—three vari-
ables with well-established, research-based validity credentials.
Compared to the vagaries of ordinary language that are inherent in
words such as stubbornness (as in the case of Wilson discussed previ-
ously), these three terms have relatively precise, operationally
defined, and delimited meanings.
The sections that follow review research relating political behav-
ior and outcomes to various single personality variables. For conve-
nience, the basic elements of personality can be grouped under three
broad headings (see also Schafer 2000, 516—18).
Measuring Motives
For Freud, free association and the interpretation of dreams was the
"royal road" to an understanding of people's motives, since anxiety
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
and the operation of defense are likely to block their own awareness
of their true motives. In later years, psychologists have also added
social desirability, impression management, and simple inaccessibil-
ity of implicit mental processes (Greenwald and Banaji 1995; Nis-
bett and Wilson 1977) as factors that severely limit the validity of
self-reports about motives. To measure motives, therefore, many
psychologists have turned to indirect means. Many such methods are
based on the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), developed by Mor-
gan and Murray (1935; see also Murray 1938), in which people tell
stories to a series of vague or ambiguous pictures. (Apperception means
assigning meaning to a stimulus, in contrast to perception, which
refers to sensing and labeling the stimulus.)
TAT-Based Measures
Since the experimentally derived technique for scoring motives in
the TAT developed by McClelland and his associates (McClelland et
al. 1953; Smith 1992; Winter 1998a) has been the basis for most of
the objective measurement of motives at a distance in political psy-
chology, including chapters 7 (Winter) and 8 (Hermann) in this vol-
ume, its essential features can be briefly described here. To develop a
measure of any particular motive, that motive is first aroused, prefer-
ably through several different experimental procedures. For example,
the power motive has been aroused by testing candidates for student
government while votes were being counted, by showing a film of
President John F. Kennedy's inauguration, and by role-playing a
protest group about to confront the police (Winter 1973, chap. 3).
TAT stories written by people under these different motive-arousing
conditions are then compared to TAT stories written by people in a
neutral, nonaroused group. After considerable reworking and
refinement, the differences between the two groups of stories become
the basis of the scoring system. Experimentally derived scoring sys-
tems of this type have been developed for the two fundamental
dimensions of affiliation and power motivation, as well as a third
dimension of achievement motivation. Political psychology
researchers have adapted these TAT scoring systems to score motive
imagery in a wide variety of other kinds of verbal material, including
speeches, interviews, popular literature, diplomatic documents,
dream reports, folktales, and even television programs (Winter
Assessing Leaders' Personalities
1991; see also Hermann 1979, 198oa, 198ob, which use only the
affiliation and power measures). These motive imagery scores are
usually unrelated to people's conscious beliefs or statements about
their goals (see Weinberger and McClelland 1990). Among politi-
cians, moreover, motive imagery scores are usually unrelated to pol-
icy statements: in other words, it is possible to speak or write for or
against any particular political goal or program, with or without
using achievement, affiliation, and/or power imagery.
Political leaders studied with this technique include U.S. presi-
dents and Supreme Court justices; leaders from several countries and
factions in sub-Saharan and southern Africa during the mid-1970s;
general secretaries of the Communist party of the Soviet Union, as
well as members of the Politburo of the Party's Central Committee;
and various groups of significant world leaders. Systematic and
objective motive imagery content analysis has also been used as part
of the psychobiographical study of individual leaders, ranging from
U.S. presidents Woodrow Wilson and Richard Nixon to former
Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and former Italian leader Benito
Mussolini.
Psychoanalytic Measures
Using a quite different theoretical and methodological approach,
Luck (1974) developed a priori objective measures of certain basic
psychoanalytic motivational concepts (such as orality and anal-
sadism) and carried out a comparative study of Hitler, Stalin, Mao
Zedong, and Liu Shao-ch'i (Liu Shaoqi).
Operational Codes
In his classic study of the premises of Soviet thinking, Leites (1951)
introduced the concept of "operational code" to refer to the set of
axioms, postulates, and premises that appear to constitute the foun-
dation of more specific beliefs and practices. In Leites's work, opera-
tional codes were intuitively extracted from political writings. In
later years, George (1969), Holsti (1970, 1977), and Walker (1983,
1990) have refined the operational code concept, suggesting several
standard dimensions or typologies of issues around which opera-
tional codes of specific individuals could be constructed. Two classes
Assessing Leaders' Personalities
of beliefs have been refined and elaborated: those concerned with the
leader's philosophical beliefs about the nature of the political uni-
verse and those concerned with the leader's choices and instrumental
tactics (George 1969).
As originally formulated, operational codes are like portraits: at
their best, they faithfully reflect the individual being portrayed, but
different portraits of different leaders cannot readily be compared.
Thus Walker (1986) reconstructed an operational code for Woodrow
Wilson, confirming some of Post's (1983a, 1983^ analyses based on
more traditional psychobiographical methods. More recently,
Walker and his colleagues (e.g., Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998)
have developed objective quantitative methods for assessing opera-
tional codes. These have been used in studies of several U. S. presi-
dents from the latter half of the twentieth century (Schafer 2000; see
also chapter 20 of this volume for a general discussion of operational
codes).
Cognitive Style
Cognitive Complexity
Cognitive Mapping
The technique of cognitive mapping (Axelrod 1976) is a way of rep-
resenting the structure of causal beliefs or assertions of individual
political leaders, particularly as they involve relationships between
policies, goals, and outcomes or effects. Maps of different leaders can
be evaluated and compared in terms of characteristics such as density
(the number of causal links), balance, links between peripheral and
policy variables, and so forth. Hart (1977) used this technique to
study Latin American leaders, and Hart and Greenstein (1977) ana-
lyzed the cognitive maps of U.S. presidents Wilson and Eisenhower.
Bonham (1993) cites applications of cognitive mapping to the analy-
sis of diplomatic events such as the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference
and the 19705 arms reduction negotiations. Walker and Watson
(1992) discussed the relationship between cognitive mapping and
various measures of cognitive complexity in a study of British lead-
ers during the crises of 1938—39.
Explanatory Style
The concept of explanatory style grows out of decades of research on
variables such as internal versus external locus of control and patterns
of causal attribution. An optimistic explanatory style involves
explaining "bad" events by external, specific, and temporary factors.
It is related to feelings of zest, persistence, and good performance. (In
contrast, the pessimistic style, where bad events are seen as the result
of internal, global, and enduring factors, leads to depression, avoid-
ance, and failure.)
Zullow et al. (1988) found that Lyndon Johnson showed a highly
optimistic explanatory style during the Gulf of Tonkin incident and
subsequent American military Vietnam War buildup. During the
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
The domain of traits refers to the public, visible, stylistic (or adver-
bial) aspects of personality.6 In recent years, personality psycholo-
gists have reached some consensus on the importance of five trait fac-
tors or dimensions: extraversion (or surgency), agreeableness,
conscientiousness, emotional stability, and openness to experience
(see John and Srivastava 1999). Rubenzer, Faschingbauer, and Ones
(2000) measured these five trait dimensions among all forty-one U.S.
presidents from Washington through Clinton by asking 115 authors
of presidential biographies (both historians and public figures) to fill
out three different standard instruments (a questionnaire, an adjec-
tive checklist, and a Q-sort). They discussed the trait profiles of
Washington and Lincoln and reported moderate correlations, among
all presidents, between the "openness to experience" dimension and
ratings of presidential performance.
Simonton (1986, 1988) also measured a variety of trait factors of
U.S. presidents, in this case by asking student raters, who had read
brief personality descriptions excerpted from presidential biogra-
phies (with identifying information removed), to fill out adjective
checklists or lists of trait phrases.
Several researchers have studied particular traits of various groups
of political leaders. Etheredge (1978) used questionnaires and stan-
dard personality tests to measure traits directly in a study of over two
hundred male United States foreign service officers, military officers,
and domestic affairs specialists. He found that men who scored high
on the traits of dominance and competitiveness were (when the research
was carried out, in 1971-72) more likely to view Soviet foreign pol-
icy as "active," "powerful," and "menacing." Consistent with these
perceptions, they were also more likely to advocate the use of force
across a series of different scenarios involving hypothetical interna-
tional unrest or Soviet "expansion." In contrast, men who scored
high on interpersonal trust and self-esteem (variables that also involve
cognitive beliefs) were against the use of force.
Etheredge then confirmed these results with an at-a-distance
study of twentieth-century American presidents and foreign policy
advisers. Traits were rated by judges who read excerpts of standard
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
Notes
This chapter draws significantly on Winter 199212. The reviews of literatures are
intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive.
1. Even journalists sometimes feel the need for assistance from psychology (at
least retrospectively). For example, in reviewing two biographies of Mao 2'e-
dong, Burns (2000) confessed that "For myself, I wish now that in covering
China, South Africa under apartheid, the Soviet Union and wars in Afghanistan
and the former Yugoslavia, among other places—scars, all, on the conscience of
the 2Oth century—I had made fuller allowance for, or understood better, the role
of wounded psyches in producing the Maos, Stalins, Vorsters, Najibullahs,
Karadzics and Arkans I wrote about along the way" (7).
2. While Lasswell's formulation is a popular and widely cited interpretation
of power strivings, there are alternative interpretations that emphasize the role of
direct early reinforcement of power behaviors rather than perceived weakness or
inferiority (see Winter 1999).
3. Most psychoanalysts are embarrassed by the crudeness and hostility of the
Freud and Bullitt interpretation (see, e.g., Erikson 1967); many have questioned
whether Freud actually contributed much to the interpretation or writing. In his
preface, Bullitt wrote that he and Freud worked on the book for over ten years,
finally completing a manuscript in 1932, but with subsequent revisions in 1938.
According to Freud's biographer, Ernest Jones, who read the book in manu-
script, the book was written in 1930—31 and "although a joint work it is not
hard to distinguish the analytical contributions of the one author [Freud] from
the political contributions of the other [Bullitt}" (1953-57, 3:160, see also
3:i73)-
4. Some researchers have been able to administer tests and questionnaires to
leaders as high as the level of members of state legislatures (Altemeyer 1996) or
members of national parliaments (DiRenzo 1967), although of course they did
not report the scores of named individuals. One major exception to this general-
ization are the psychological tests given to Nazi leaders at Niirnberg (see Zillrner
et al. 1995), but of course they were prisoners at the time.
5. Of course, most documents and speeches that bear the name of a major
political leader are actually written by one or more speechwriters, and even
"spontaneous" press conference responses to questions and "informal" comments
may be highly scripted. Thus one may ask whether a content analysis of such
materials produces personality estimates of the leader or of the speech writers.
Suedfeld (1994) and Winter (1995) discuss this issue and conclude that because
leaders select speech writers and review their drafts, and speech writers "know"
their clients, personality scores based on content analysis (at least of major
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
Jerrold M. Post
In contrast to the later study, The Mind of Adolf Hitler, the first
study, Adolf Hitler, is for the most part descriptive and not analytic.
Indeed, it is rather incoherent, jumping back and forth from descrip-
tion to analysis, with no apparent rhyme or reason; it would not be
clear to a policy official what to make of this study or how to employ
it. That may be the reason for commissioning the later study by
Langer, who was apparently not aware of or privy to the earlier study.
Because Adolf Hitler has not previously been published, as a matter of
39
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
Adolf Hitler
Background
The sixty-eight page document is introduced by a remarkably brief
(three-page) background note, which describes the unhappy mar-
riage of his parents and documents that his father, Alois Schickel-
gruber, was physically sadistic, "in the habit of beating his dog until
the dog wet the carpet." Twenty-three years older than his wife,
Clara, Hitler's mother, Hitler's father was fifty-two years old when
Adolf Hitler was born in 1889. It was a marriage between a hated
sadistic father and a suppressed mother, who "quite possibly enjoyed
this treatment." As an adolescent, Hitler was "constitutionally
opposed to his father" (cf. Mein K a m p f ) the result of this domestic
situation on Hitler was a mixture of Narcissus and Oedipus com-
plexes. The author goes on to emphasize the important influence of
his mother upon his life, quoting Hitler on the occasion of her death,
when he was twenty: "The greatest loss I ever had."
Education
Hitler's education is only briefly addressed in the study, with the
observation that "Hitler always despised education, having had so
little himself." Under this general heading, the study comments
upon Hitler's writing, reading, concentration, and conversation. The
author observes that "it is obvious that Hitler only reads to confirm
his own ideas." He is described as attracted to works that offer out-
standing examples of rhetoric and historic epigrams, being drawn,
among others, to Solon, Alexander the Great, Brutus, Caesar, Henry
VIII, Frederick the Great, Jesus Christ, Mohammed, Moses, Luther,
Cromwell, Napoleon, Richard Wagner, and Bismarck. His reading
of these figures is confined to the "demagogic, propagandistic and
militaristic side." One good phrase or catchword, which could be
used in a later speech, is described as being worth much more to him
Leader Personality Assessments in Support of Government Policy
Physique
In this section, the report considers Hitler's personal appearance,
cleanliness, endurance, exercise, sight, voice, sleep, and reactions.
Observing Hitler's meticulous concern with his physical appearance,
the report cites his reaction to his physician's attempt to get him to
extend the width of his moustache: "Do not worry about my mus-
tache. If it is not the fashion now, it will be later because I wear it!"
His endurance was described as remarkable, putting in twenty-hour
days with his staff for weeks at end in 1932. It was noted that he
slept very badly following his imprisonment at Landsberg, taking
"some sleeping draft every night." He often was unable to sleep until
dawn. Under the subject of reactions, he was characterized as "a mix-
ture between a fox and a wolf. He plays the fox as long as possible
and sometimes even a lamb, but in the end the wolf is always ready
to emerge." He was described as "astonishingly brave," as someone
who could remain "calm and collected even in emergencies."
The next four sections—diet, personal protection, entertainment,
and information—briefly address these various elements of Hitler's
persona. The author notes that Hitler gave up beer and wine follow-
ing his imprisonment in Landsberg. The report also notes that, after
an accidental injury incurred by one of his aides in which a nearby
physician by prompt intervention saved his life, Hitler insisted on
having a private doctor near him at all times. Personal security
became increasingly more important to Adolf Hitler: "guarding of
his person has become such an important problem that he is virtually
a prisoner and he knows it." The protection of his motor vehicle pro-
cession was modeled after that afforded to President Woodrow Wil-
son. When Hitler went out on walks, five or six armed guards in
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
Religion
Hitler was profoundly influenced by the Catholic Church, which, in
his view, according to the author, "knows how to build up a mental
world, by a constant repetition throughout the Church year of cer-
tain passages in the Scriptures," which "leads to these chapters
assuming a slogan-like concentration in the brains of the hearers."
Hitler eloquently used this method in developing his mass influence
upon the Hitler youth.
Metamorphosis in Landsberg
Hitler was released from Landsberg Prison in 1924 after serving a
term for political agitation. His time in prison was a powerful shap-
ing experience according to the author of the study. While in prison,
Hitler was deeply influenced by Rudolph Hess. After his release in
1926, despite having developed a personal relationship while in
prison, Hess always referred to Hitler as "Mein Fuhrer." The author
Leader Personality Assessments in Support of Government Policy
suggests that the affinity with Hess might have bordered on the sex-
ual, confirmed for the author when he learned that in 1934 Hess
attended homosexual balls dressed in women's attire. It was also dur-
ing Hitler's time in prison that he developed a great admiration for
the Italian leader Benito Mussolini.
Sexual Life
In this section, the author considers the Vienna period, which began
in 1909, when Hitler was twenty years old. The author develops two
significant issues in this section. First is the observation by the
author that, by reading between the lines of Mem Kampf, one can
speculate that Hitler became infected with a venereal disease after
spending time with a Jewish prostitute. Second, there is some dis-
cussion of Hitler's involvement in homosexual circles.
In analyzing this period, the author observes that Hitler's "sex life
is as dual as is his political outlook. He is both homosexual and het-
erosexual; both Socialist and fervent Nationalist; both man and
woman." Inferring that what Hitler sought was "half mother and
half sweetheart," the author suggests that the frustration Hitler
experienced as a result of not finding the woman he needed led him
to escape into "brooding isolation and artificially dramatized public
life." When asked by his physician why he did not marry, Hitler
responded: "Marriage is not for me and never will be. My only bride
is my Motherland."
In discussions with a beautiful blonde married woman with whom
he was temporarily infatuated, Hitler spoke of his reaction of disgust
to the "wanton display and the Jewish materialism" that he experi-
enced in Berlin, adding, "I nearly imagined myself to be Jesus Christ
when he came to his Father's Temple." The author sees this as the
first indication of the "Messiah complex" that is believed to have
increasingly consumed Hitler. Ridiculed by the German and Conti-
nental press that spoke of Hitler as the "vest-pocket Mussolini," his
failure to march on Berlin led Hitler to see himself "in the role of the
Messiah with a scourge marching on that Babel of sin [Berlin] at the
head of a small gang of desperados who would inevitably be followed
by more and more of the dissatisfied elements throughout the
Reich."
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
Self-Identification Patterns
This section is concerned with "the important role of auto-sugges-
tion in the career of Hitler." In the fall of 1918, while the soldier
Hitler was recovering in the infirmary, "he received a command from
another world above to save his unhappy country. This vocation
reached Hitler in the form of a supernatural vision. He decided to
become a politician then and there. He felt that his mission was to
free Germany."
Among the self-identifications he used in fulfilling that mission
were the following:
Speechmaking Technique
Listed under the final heading of "speechmaking technique" were the
following topics: preparation of speech, entrance, interruptions,
speech, posture, oratory, end of speech, avoidance of names and per-
sonages, and exit technique.
Recognizing the power of his oratory, Hitler was meticulous in
the preparation of his speeches, working on each one for four to six
hours and using cues on ten or twelve foolscap sheets. The notes were
for cuing only; he would never read a speech, recognizing that to do
so would lose spontaneity. He was extremely concerned with audi-
ence reaction, so each aspect of his speech—the entrance, the exit,
the martial music—was carefully orchestrated. The average length of
a speech was two and one-half to three hours, during which time he
was not concerned with applause but instead sought to convert the
audience to his ideas. There was a rhythm to his speeches, with the
first two-thirds in march time. Often questioning his own ideas, he
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
Comment
Much of this material is quite interesting, particularly Hitler's pre-
occupation with himself as political actor, with meticulous concern
for his self-presentation, and his increasing Messiah complex, his
identification with himself as the savior of the German people. And
while the policymaker reading this assessment may feel that he bet-
ter understands Hitler after this account, how to translate these
understandings into policy prescriptions is not at all clear, which was
perhaps the reason for commissioning the Langer study.
years talk his way into the highest political offices, hoodwink the
experienced leaders of the major powers, turn millions of highly civ-
ilized people into barbarians, order the extermination of a large seg-
ment of the population, build and control the mightiest war
machine ever known, and plunge the world into history's most dev-
astating war?" (Langer 1972, n). With the aid of three psychoana-
lytically trained researchers in New York, who reviewed the litera-
ture on file in the New York Public Library, Langer scoured the
United States and Canada for persons who had had contact with
Hitler and personally interviewed each of them. Under immense
time pressure, Langer prepared a study that was disseminated within
government circles in the fall of 1943 but was not declassified until
1969. Psychobiographic in approach, the study examines the forma-
tive events in Hitler's life and how they shaped his emerging per-
sonality, positing the powerful psychodynamic forces that were ,to
play out so destructively upon the political stage.
The design of Langer's study is instructive. The first section,
"Hitler as He Believes Himself to Be," is followed by "Hitler as the
German People Know Him," "Hitler as His Associates Know Him,"
and "Hitler as He Knows Himself." It is only after examination of
Hitler through these four lenses that Langer depicts "Hitler, Psy-
chological Analysis and Reconstruction," ending with "Hitler, His
Probable Behavior in the Future."
In presenting the section "Hitler as He Knows Himself," Langer
selected language from Hitler's writings and commentary to his
associates. The selection was guided by Langer's psychoanalytic
framework. He observed that Hitler's sense of his own destiny was
remarkable. When early in Hitler's career during a policy discussion
Strasser suggested that Hitler was mistaken, Hitler responded: 'I
cannot be mistaken. What I say and do is historical" (Langer 1972,
30). His exalted self-image, Langer observed, was not confined to his
role as statesman. On the field of battle, Hitler believed he had spe-
cial gifts as well. "I do not play at war. I do not allow the generals' to
give me orders. The war is conducted by me." And he considered
himself supremely gifted as a jurist. "For the last twenty-four hours,
/ was the supreme court of the German people" (original emphasis).
Commenting on Hitler's exalted belief in his own powers, Rausch-
ning observed, "He feels no one in German history is as equipped as
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
Khrushchev at a Distance
When Nikita Khrushchev burst on the political scene in 1953, his
political persona differed dramatically from that of his predecessor,
Josef Stalin. The CIA convened a conference in 1960 for the specific
purpose of assessing this complicated leader for the Kennedy admin-
Leader Personality Assessments in Support of Government Policy
istration. The CIA had amassed a great deal of open material, includ-
ing films as well as interviews and articles. The panel of some twenty
psychiatrists, psychologists, and internal medicine specialists
immersed themselves in the films, speeches, and interviews and
developed assessments of his political personality and health.
In 1961, when President Kennedy was to meet with First Party
secretary Khrushchev in Vienna in a major summit meeting, Bryant
Wedge, a psychoanalytically trained psychiatrist who was a member
of the panel, wrote Kennedy a memo summarizing the conference
findings, with emphasis on implications for negotiations.1
Khrushchev was described as a stable hypomanic character, which
Wedge characterized as a chronic optimistic opportunist. Yet his
impulsivity was noted too. While it was opined that Khrushchev
could tolerate disagreement, there was no point in trying to persuade
or convince him of it. Wedge also advanced recommendations for
dealing with him when he was being thoroughly unreasonable. He
also emphasized the fundamental differences between Khrushchev
and Stalin.
It is important to observe that the conference of clinicians con-
cluded that Khrushchev had a recognizable clinical character type,
based on what was essentially a phenomenological analysis. The clear
personality type on which they consensually agreed has important
implications for negotiations. Unlike the Langer study of Hitler,
which was heavily psychobiographic in approach and combined with
a phenomenological portrait to infer the psychological conflicts driv-
ing political behavior, the Khrushchev study was a detailed descrip-
tion of Khrushchev's personality style based on intensive study of his
present-day leadership functioning. Wedge observes that he does not
know who read his memo or to what uses it was put.
Notes
63
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
Jerrold M. Post
69
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
to integrate the life experiences that shaped and gave form to that
political personality. As Brewster-Smith (1968) has emphasized,
that goes beyond the family environment and must encompass the
historical, political, and cultural context as well. This emphasis on
the life course and the entirety of the political personality, integrat-
ing longitudinal life course analysis with the cross-sectional analysis
of personality, stands in contrast to the approaches of political psy-
chology scholars who have focused on particular elements of political
personality, such as political cognition, political drives and motives,
and other traits.
Cultural, Role
Socio-political
Personality
and Familial
Environment
Political Actor
I. Historical Milieu
II. The Social Environment
IV.The Immediate Situation
III.
The Person
Character V.
Id-Ego-Superego Political
Attitudes Behavior
Skills
Group Identities
Mood
(here and now)
(neighborhood, church, school, family, peers)
identification with Joan of Arc. She marched the soldiers into a fire
again and again, suggesting the early foundation of her career long
bent for conflict, perhaps presaging her ultimate martyr's death in
her assassination by Sikh bodyguards in the Golden Temple. It is
instructive to observe that she was characterized as "the goddess of
destruction" by her political opponents and was seen as a leader who
regularly promoted political conflict, lacking her parents' concilia-
tory skills.
tent and setting the stage for Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamic revolu-
tion. In his rush to accomplish his dreams before he died, the Shah
superimposed his personal timetable on the political timetable.
ality puts constraints upon information processing, the range of beliefs and
attitudes, and the nature of relationships with the leadership circle, includ-
ing who is chosen to serve in the inner circle, all of which influence political
decision making.
Again, as with the longitudinal analysis and psychobiographic
reconstruction in the previous section, careful attention is given to
all of the traditional elements considered in the clinical case study,1
but additional elements particular to political leadership are exam-
ined as well. Traditional elements of particular importance to polit-
ical personality include intelligence; knowledge; drives and affects,
including anxiety, aggression, hostility, activity and passivity, and
shame and guilt; evaluation of reality; judgment; interpersonal rela-
tions, including capacity for empathy; identity and ambivalence; and
characteristic ego defenses.2 The additional elements applicable to
political leaders include health (energy level, working hours, drink-
ing, drugs); cognitive/intellectual style; and the drives for power,
achievement, and affiliation. The latter are important in attempting
to identify whether the leaders sought their leadership role in order
to wield power, to be recorded on the pages of history, or merely to
occupy the seat of power with the attendant place in the limelight.
nition and adulation that drives these individuals springs from their
excessive self-absorption, their intense ambition, and their grandiose
fantasies. But underlying and impelling this quest is an inner empti-
ness and uncertainty about identity. Helen Tartakoff, for example,
has written of the Nobel Prize complex, the search for acclaim by
intellectually gifted narcissists (Tartakoff 1966).
The interpersonal relationships of narcissists are regularly and
characteristically disturbed. There is a quality of personal exploitive-
ness, with a disregard for the feelings and needs of others. The nar-
cissist surrounds himself with admirers and requires a constant
stream of adulation from them. Yet it is a one-way street, and when
the loyal followers are no longer useful to the psychological economy
of the narcissist, they can be dropped suddenly without a backward
glance. This precipitous fall from grace will frequently be bewilder-
ing to the individuals dropped, who mistakenly believed they were
highly valued by their hero. Indeed, their provision of psychological
supplies of adulation was valued, but they had not been seen as sep-
arate individuals, with needs of their own, but rather as an extension
of the narcissist. The narcissist is often extremely charming and
delightful to be with, contributing to the false spell cast over his
intimates. Thus there is a characteristic difficulty in sustaining loyal
relationships over time.
The mirror image of the quest for adulation is sensitivity to slight
and criticism. The narcissist is vulnerable, easily hurt, and goes
through complicated maneuvers to avoid being hurt. The narcissist
can put on a mask of cold indifference and can envelop himself in
what Volkan (1980) has called "the glass bubble." Like the Little
Prince, the narcissists feel they live by themselves in splendid isola-
tion, a glorious but lonely existence, enclosed by an impervious but
transparent protection.
Because narcissists are so vulnerable to injury psychologically,
they cannot afford to acknowledge ignorance. This in turn leads to
major difficulties with learning, for the learning process carries with
it an implicit assumption of lack of knowledge and it inhibits pro-
foundly the acceptance of constructive criticism. Dogmatic certainty
with no foundation of knowledge is a posture frequently struck by
the narcissist. This discomfort with learning is related to the sensi-
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
narcissist is the centrality of the self. What is good for him is good for his
country. The interesting point here is that this attitude goes beyond
"naked" self-interest. The individual comes to believe that the
national interest and national security are in fact crucially contingent
upon his reelection or reappointment.
The central tendency has interesting implications for the narcis-
sist's image of the adversary. For one thing, the narcissistic personal-
ity has a profound inability to empathize or to understand different
points of view, interests, or perspectives. Perhaps even more impor-
tant, the narcissist tends to greatly exaggerate the degree of influence
one can have on the internal politics or external actions of other
nations. By far the most important cognitive heuristic for the narcis-
sistic personality in trying to understand the world is with reference
to his own personal experiences.
These characteristics of the narcissist make for certain serious
problems in information processing and problem solving. Unlike the
paranoid, who imagines problems that don't exist, or the obsessive-
compulsive, who responds to real problems but in a futile, counter-
productive manner, the narcissistic responds to a totally different
sort of agenda. For the narcissist, the problems are not "What are the
threats to our nation?" and "What can be done to meet these
threats?" but "How can I use this situation to either preserve or
enhance my own reputation?" Information search is undertaken in as
public a manner as possible with a view toward eliciting public
admiration and making the leader "look good."
Generally speaking, the narcissistic personality would show a
preference for a style of management in which he or she is at the cen-
ter and there is a heavy emphasis on support and teamwork from
group members. Because of the narcissist's sensitivity to slight and
the underlying fragility of his or her self-esteem, there would be
strong pressure to avoid dissension to help meet this person's need
for reassurance and to prevent the narcissist in power from looking
bad. Moreover, because of the narcissist's need to be omniscient, to
know everything, it is hard to present the consummate narcissist
with new information. Such action would indicate his ignorance,
which is unacceptable. The purpose of the group is not to generate
new options or to provide additional cognitive capacity for evaluat-
ing these options and not even primarily for reasons of division of
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
vidual to lose perspective of the overall picture "not seeing the forest
for the trees."
Decision making is either avoided, postponed, or protracted. This
springs from an inordinate fear of making a mistake, for the over-
weaning goal of the O-C personality is to leave no room for error, to
not make mistakes, to achieve perfection.
The O-C personality places a major positive value on work and
productivity, to the exclusion of pleasure and the value of interper-
sonal relationships. When pleasure is contemplated, such as a vaca-
tion, it requires a great deal of planning and must be worked for. It
is not uncommon for such individuals to keep postponing activities
that are supposed to be pleasurable. The ranks of workaholics are
heavily populated with O-C characters. But while there is intense
preoccupation with work, it is often busywork, because of the ten-
dency to become preoccupied with details. Thus an individual may
spend hours locating a misplaced list rather than recreate the list
from memory in a few minutes.
Frequently such individuals are excessively conscientious, moral-
istic, scrupulous, and judgmental of self and of others. Location in
the interpersonal hierarchy is of great importance to individuals with
this character type, and they are preoccupied with their relative sta-
tus in dominant-submissive relationships. Although oppositional
when subjected to the will of others, they stubbornly insist that oth-
ers submit to their way of doing things and are unaware of the
resentment their behavior induces in others.
These individuals have considerable difficulty showing warm and
tender feelings and are stingy both with their emotions and with
their material possessions. Their everyday relationships tend to be
serious, formal, and conventional, lacking charm, grace, spontaneity,
and humor. Wilhelm Reich (1933) has described these individuals
as "living machines."
In his classic Neurotic Styles, David Shapiro (1967) focuses on three
particular aspects of O-C cognitive style: rigidity, autonomy, and
loss of reality. The rigidity of the compulsive character leads them to
be described as dogmatic or opinionated. Such individuals are per-
ceived as uninfluenceable. It is not that they oppose contrasting
views; rather, they actively disattend to them in the service of perse-
vering with their own views. The O-C will have a sharp focus, will
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
indeed in examining the situation get the facts, but in getting the
facts will not get the picture. As noted earlier, the individual "loses
the forest for the trees."
The preoccupation with productivity and concentration imparts a
special cast to the cognitive style and life-style of these individuals.
They are immensely productive and show impressive abilities to con-
centrate on their work, often cranking out huge volumes of work,
especially in technical areas. But everything seems laborious, deter-
mined, tense, and deliberate; there is a quality of effortfulness, lead-
ing to the frequent characterization of the O-C as "driven." Yet, as
Shapiro notes, if the individual is driven, then he or she is the driver,
for the O-C very much marches to his or her own drummer, is his or
her own harsh taskmaster. The O-C is dominated by shoulds and
oughts. These individuals regularly tell themselves (and others) what
they should do; the language of "wants" is alien. There is a necessity
to maintain a rigid and continuous state of purposeful activity.
The O-Cs then are not free men. While these directives, to which
the O-C is subjected, are on the one hand burdensome, they also pro-
vide clear guidelines for behavior. These individuals do not feel com-
fortable with any nonpurposive activity. To relax for the sake of
relaxation is unthinkable, indeed anxiety producing—thus the grav-
ity with which leisure time activity is planned. The guarded state of
attention, the inability to relax, the preoccupation with "should" are
all in the service of avoiding the loss of control. There is a tight lid
on feelings, an avoidance of impulse or whim.
The O-C personality has major consequences for decision making.
The preoccupation with doing what is "right" places a premium on
avoiding mistakes. O-Cs accordingly often have difficulty coming to
decisional closure, searching for additional evidence to ensure they
are not making a mistake. But they live in a world of ambivalence
and mixed feelings, and their decision making is like that of the
"fiddler on the roof"- -"on the one hand, on the other hand." To
travel through a decision-making process with a thoroughgoing
O-C is an exhausting journey. And just as they apparently are com-
ing to a decision, all of the doubts rush up to question, and often
undo, the conclusion.
This decisional agony can be forestalled if there is a rule that can
be applied. Thus if the elements of a situation fit a psychological
Assessing Leaders at a Distance
with the paranoid personality, whose beliefs are fixed.) The exact
nature of these processes may vary from individual to individual;
nevertheless, one can identify some commonalities among all O-Cs.
One commonality is the decisional imperative: "Act only after gath-
ering as much information as possible." Another related imperative
is to "Preserve one's options as long as possible." Like the paranoid
individual, the O-C individual will want to receive raw data. How-
ever, both the scope and the magnitude of these information requests
are much greater in the O-C. The O-C will want to see the minutiae
about almost everything. The strong preference here is to act later
rather than sooner, preferring procrastination rather than the dan-
gers of hasty action or "premature closure." Due to this lack of cer-
tainty, the O-C will have a strong tendency to opt, by default, for the
status quo or perhaps make incremental change. The O-C has a
strong bias for satisficing rather than optimizing.
The O-C personality will have a tendency to focus on concrete and
quantifiable data rather than the abstract, nonquantifiable dimen-
sions. This is an ironic development for the personality type, which
more than any other tends to recognize the complexity of the world
and tends to want to avoid "simplistic" understandings of issues. It
is important to understand that the process the O-C adopts is coun-
terproductive. When confronted with uncertainty (essentially, when
faced with any policy decision), the O-C responds by becoming
immersed in as many details as possible in a quixotic quest to some-
how "fully understand" the issue. What happens is that this drive is
so obsessive, and the data search and immersion in minutiae so
extensive, that the O-C begins to lose perspective. Paradoxically, in
the drive to understand the subtleties of the situations, the O-C is
forced, unconsciously, to place a heavy reliance on very simplistic
cognitive shortcuts, most particularly, to focus on concrete and
quantifiable data rather than on abstract data. Eventually, he simply
becomes overwhelmed with minutiae and raw data, and he begins to
think of issues in terms of data. The use of quantifiable indices
becomes a convenient and readily available shorthand for under-
standing the issue. Unlike the paranoid, who is more belief driven,
the O-C is more data driven. The absence of definitive data is
extremely anxiety producing.
Most O-Cs tend to prefer a formalistic style of management. This
Assessing Leaders at a Distance
slighted. They continually scan the environment for clues that vali-
date their original prejudicial ideas, attitudes, or biases. Their affec-
tive experience is severely limited.
In Neurotic Styles, Shapiro (1967) describes in detail formal fea-
tures of suspicious thinking, the sine qua non of the paranoid per-
sonality. A striking quality is pervasive rigidity. Suspicious people
have something on their mind, and they search repetitively, and
only, for confirmation of it. Suspicious people do not ignore new data
but examine them extremely carefully. The goal of the examination
is to find confirmation of their suppositions, dismissing evidence
that disconfirms their fearful views and seizing upon what appar-
ently confirms them.
In many life circumstances, being suspicious and on guard is both
appropriate and adaptive. However, psychologically healthy individ-
uals can abandon their suspicions when they are presented with con-
vincing contradictory evidence. Paranoid individuals, in contrast,
have a firm conclusion in search of evidence. Hostile, stubborn, and
defensive, they will reject evidence that disproves their suspicions.
Indeed, well-meaning attempts to reassure them or reason with them
will usually provoke anger, and the "helpful one" may become the
object of suspicions as well. Paranoids are hypervigilant, ever alert to
a hostile interpersonal environment, always expecting plots and
betrayal. They have a readiness to see themselves alone, surrounded
by enemies. This explains why paranoia is the most political of men-
tal disorders, because of the requirement for enemies.6
Paranoids tend to be rigid and unwilling to compromise. In a new
situation, they intensely and narrowly search for confirmation of
their bias with a loss of appreciation of the total context. They usu-
ally find what they anticipated finding. Theirs is a world of hidden
motives and special meanings. They have a readiness to counterat-
tack against a perceived threat and can become excited over small
matters, "making mountains out of molehills."
Priding themselves on always being objective, unemotional, and
rational, they are uncomfortable with passive, soft, sentimental, and
tender feelings. They avoid intimacy except with those they
absolutely trust, a minute population. They show an exaggerated
need to be self-sufficient, relying on no one. They avoid participating
in a group setting unless they are in a dominant position. Keenly
Assessing Leaders at a Distance
aware of rank and power and superiority or inferiority, they are often
jealous of and rivalrous with people in power. Their wary hypervigi-
lance and readiness to retaliate often generate fear and uneasiness in
others. One treads carefully around a paranoid, "walks on eggshells,"
lest he or she become upset.
Thus pervasive suspiciousness is at the core of paranoid individu-
als and colors every aspect of their behavior and thinking. The suspi-
cious cognitive style of the paranoid has a number of formal charac-
teristics, of which Shapiro (1967) considers rigidity the most
fundamental one. Paranoids look at the world with fixed expecta-
tions. They know the Truth in advance and accordingly know what
they are looking for. They will examine data extremely carefully,
"seeing through" what does not confirm their expectations and seiz-
ing on the elements of the data that confirm their fixed beliefs. This
rigidity, as Shapiro notes, has the quality of directedness. Their ideas
are not the mere product of an overactive imagination but are the
result of disproportionate attention to confirmatory details that are
the result of intense and penetrating observation. What is the under-
lying premise that is being confirmed by this directed attention? It
is the premise of external danger. Thus the essential cognitive feature
of the paranoid is a rigid, intentional search for external danger. Because
the premise of external danger is a fixed conclusion in search of
confirmatory evidence, there is at the same time intentional disregard
of disconfirming evidence.
In addition to the qualities of rigidity and intentionality, another
key quality of paranoid individuals that influences their cognitive
style is hyperalertness and hypersensitivity. Always on the alert for dan-
ger, their antennae constantly sweeping the horizon for signs of
threat, paranoids will mobilize their rigid intentional cognitive
mode in the face of anything unusual or out of the ordinary. Thus
anything surprising is extremely distressing to an individual with
this mind-set. Their world has been disturbed, their structure
undone. A goal of the searching that is mobilized is to bring that
which was out of control under control.
Clearly, insofar as paranoid individuals intentionally seek out only
data that confirm their premise of external danger and systematically
exclude evidence to the contrary, their evaluation of reality is often
skewed. In effect, their views of external reality are distorted by their
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
cious lens and are continually seeking to confirm their core premise
of external danger, against which they must defend themselves, have
significant constraints on their interpretation of the political world
and their manner of dealing with it.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that there are many simi-
larities between the O-C personality and the paranoid personality.
For both, there is a focus on detail, an emphasis on autonomy, and a
guarded rigidity. But these qualities have significant differences too.
The O-C fixes on details, while the paranoid searches for clues. The
O-C is searching for certainty, while the paranoid is searching for
confirmation of a fixed conclusion of danger. While the O-C is stub-
born and obstinate, the paranoid is touchy and guarded. The O-C is
dominated by conscience, by what he or she should do, whereas the
paranoid is dominated by fear and is in a constant state of perceived
external danger. There are many points of continuity, but the para-
noid style is more extreme, more unstable, and more psychologically
primitive.
Concluding Thoughts
What the single case studies provide that is particularly valuable is a
longitudinal perspective that offers a framework for understanding
the manner in which previous life experiences help shape and
influence political behavior and help distinguish between political
behaviors that are role dependent and those that reflect strong per-
sonality influences, where leader personality is particularly engaged
by the political circumstances. A key aspect linking the psychobio-
graphic and psychodynamic approaches is understanding psycholog-
Assessing Leaders at a Distance
Jerrold Post
PART I. Psychobiographic Discussion: The Development of the Individual in
the Context of the Nation's History (use parallel time lines)*
1. Cultural and historical background. Describe constraints of the political
culture on the role of leader.
2. Family origins and early years
a. Family constellation—grandparents, parents, siblings;
relationships—politics of family
b. Heroes and models
3. Education and Socialization
a. Climate in country
b. Student years, examples of leadership
4. Professional career
a. Mentors
b. Early career
c. Successes and failures
5. The subject as leader
a. Key events
b. Crises
c. Key political relationships, influences
6. Family and friends
PART n. Personality
1. General personal description
a. Appearance and personal characteristics (include description of
lifestyle, work/personal life balance, working hours, hobbies,
recreation)
b. Health (include energy level, drinking, drug use)
2. Intellectual capacity and style
a. Intelligence
a
The analyst is required to develop two time lines, one indicating key events
in the life of the subject, the second indicating key events in the nation's history.
By moving these lines parallel, a visual representation is created of the impact of
historical events on individual development.
Assessing Leaders at a Distance
b. Judgment
c. Knowledge
d. Cognitive complexity
3. Emotional reactions
a. Moods, mood variability
b. Impulses and impulse control
4. Drives and character structure
a. Identify personality type (if possible)
b. Psychodynamics
i. Self-concept/self-esteem
ii. Basic identification
iii. Neurotic conflicts
c. Reality (sense of/testing/adaptation to)
d. Ego defense mechanisms
e. Conscience and scruples
f. Psychological drives, needs, motives (discriminate to degree possible
among drive for power, for achievement, for affiliation)
g. Motivation for seeking leadership role (to wield power, to occupy seat
of power, to achieve place in history)
5. Interpersonal relationships
a. Identify key relationships and characterize nature of relationships
i. Inner circle, including unofficial advisors, "kitchen cabinet"
ii. Superiors
iii. Political subordinates
iv. Political allies, domestic and international
v. Political rivalries, international adversaries
PART in. Worldview
1. Perceptions of political reality (include cultural influences/biases)
2. Core beliefs (include concept of leadership, power)
3. Political philosophy, ideology, goals, and policy views (domestic, foreign,
and economic policy views and view of U.S. Include discussion of which
issues most interest the leader, in which issue areas his or her experience
lies, and which issues are particularly salient for the leader's political psy-
chology). Note that not all leaders have a core political philosophy or
body of governing political ideas.
4. Nationalism and identification with country
PART iv. Leadership Style
i. General characteristics (include discussion of the role expectations—both
general public and elite—placed on the individual, emphasizing the
leader's political and cultural determinants and skill in fulfilling them)
a. How subject defines his or her role
b. Relationship with public
c. Oratorical skill and rhetoric
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
Notes
Stanley A. Renshon
105
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
After all, as the public has become more concerned with the personal
qualities of its leaders, they in turn have become increasingly sophis-
ticated in presenting themselves as they would prefer to be seen
rather than as they are.
Any answer to the question of what personal qualities are impor-
tant in a president necessarily directs to psychology to help answer
the question. However, as Greenstein (1969) pointed out some years
ago in his seminal consideration of the dilemmas that political sci-
entists face in turning to psychology, they more often find rival the-
ories and unanswered questions than easily borrowed solutions.
Moreover, deciding which psychological theory or theories to use
does not fully resolve all the issues involved in such an effort. One
needs not only a theory of psychology but a theory of leadership per-
formance with which to link it.
development and the ways in which they have become a part of, but
not synonymous with, adult behavior. In the absence of any real
capacity to meticulously trace events and their subjective meaning to
the person, the analysis of unconscious motivation is speculative.
Public Data
ers anxious to discover who they are. Almost every major modern
presidential candidate has generated at least one major biography
and often more.
Moreover, in spite of laments about campaign coverage, at least
two of the nation's national newspapers (the Washington Post and the
New York Times} have produced major series tracing the biographies
and careers of the major presidential candidates, and excellent bio-
graphical material is often available in local papers from a candi-
date's home state (e.g., Baker 1999 or the reporting on John
McCain's temper in the Arizona Republic}.
Candidate autobiographies are also becoming a staple of political
campaigns. Sometimes these are written by the candidate and a cho-
sen "helper," as in the case of George W. Bush's (1999) and B>ob
Dole's (1988) autobiographies. Sometimes the autobiographies are
written (for the most part) by the candidates themselves, as appears
to be the case with 2000 Democratic presidential candidate EJill
Bradley. These documents must be treated like any other element of
information used to assemble an understanding of a leader; and,
though often criticized as idealized, they can provide information
and descriptions that can be used to develop an understanding of the
person. While George W. Bush's autobiography has been character-
ized as little more than a campaign vehicle (which, of course, it is),
in it his real love of flying jets as an Air National Guard pilot and his
real attachment to his wife are clearly evident.
A second use of such information is to convey the leader's under-
standing of the events and people that shaped him. Clearly, cam-
paign autobiographies are written for a purpose and often reflect
strategy as well as candor, nonsense as well as insight. It is only in
relation to other sources that particular elements can be judged.
What other sources might these be? Surprisingly, books and inter-
views by close family members provide a range of useful information.
No one who wants to explore the family circumstances in which
Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush grew up can
afford not to read his mother's memoir (Bush 1994). That can be
supplemented with interviews given to major news shows by his
mother and wife (Bush and Bush 1999). Similarly, anyone who
wants to understand the circumstances that gave rise to President
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
Behind-the-Scenes Accounts
My (1996a) psychologically framed biography of Bill Clinton made
use of yet another good source for the political psychology of leaders:
the behind-the-scenes account. Several (Drew 1994; Woodward
1994) such accounts became available early in his presidency as the
book was being written. These accounts and similar ones generally
rely on intensive and extensive interviews with high- (and more
modest-) ranking members of the White House staff, including
those with daily and direct access to the president. They are primar-
ily descriptive. As Drew says of her book,
Robert Dole in the New Republic and the New Yorker. His later
appointment and conduct as a top personal aide to President Clinton
cast some doubt on his objectivity and independence during the
campaign.
It is important as well to know more about who the candidate or
leader selects to represent or advocate his interests. For example, it is
useful to know that Al Gore's campaign manager, Donna Brazile,
was fired from her role in the 1988 Dukakis campaign for spreading
rumors about then President Bush's extramarital affairs. Knowing
this information helps in uncovering what appears to be a pattern of
harsh rhetoric and questionable judgment. This pattern in turn
raises questions about the judgment and strategy of the candidate
who selected her. It is also instructive, once the analyst uncovers such
a pattern and it becomes a public issue (Mitchell 2000), to see what
the candidate does in response.4
In short, there is no substitute for immersion in the facts of circum-
stances and relationships when gathering and evaluating the informa-
tion that forms the basis of psychoanalytically formed analysis.
Anecdotal Evidence
Biography and other forms of history, like the insider political histo-
ries noted previously, often rely on the accumulation of narrative
incidents. The person in question may tell of the incident; a friend or
someone who was present at the time may do so; or a person may
even report what others say they have seen or heard. The weight of
these accumulated narrative stories can often be used to usefully con-
tribute to a psychologically framed portrait or analysis.
Such materials have played an important but controversial role in
the psychological analysis of presidents and their presidencies. Some
critics object that such narratives are merely anecdotal. The implica-
tion of the "anecdotal" label is that such data are inherently suspect.
Psychoanalytically oriented analysts who make use of anecdotal case
material must, like their statistical data—oriented counterparts,
address the issue of the quality of the data. There are essentially four
areas of concern raised by the use of such material: validity, degree of
representation, consequence, and meaning.
An anecdote is a story put forward to support a characterization.
The first question that must be addressed is whether the story is true.
Psychoanalytic Assessments of Character and Performance
But establishing that a particular event did take place is only the first
step. Who is telling the story? Were they there, or are they repeat-
ing what they have heard elsewhere? What is the relationship of the
person telling the story to the person about whom it is told? What is
his or her motivation for telling the story?
The next question is how representative the incident is and of
what? Consider in this regard the various stories regarding President
Clinton's anger. Woodward reports a number of instances of Clin-
ton's anger (1994, 33, 54, 133, 255, 278). So does Drew (1994, 96,
218). When one totals up these incidents and adds to them other
public displays of temper, including the outburst of rage and indig-
nation during the Rolling Stone interview (Wenner and Greider
1993) that took place during the campaign, it seems clear that this
is an element in Clinton's psychology that warrants attention and
explanation. The density of the anecdotal material supports the view
that there is indeed something present to be explained. The question
then arises as to whether the element is consequential, and if so what
does it mean?
This can happen because the analyst either admires or dislikes, or has
some other set of feelings about, his or her subject. Beyond such
basic biases, and less appreciated, is the role that the analyst's own
psychology, for good or ill, can play in distorting the analysis, just: as
a psychoanalyst's own unresolved conflicts can distort the treatment
of his or her patients.
The analyst, especially one who makes use of and is trained in psy-
choanalytic psychology, has a particular obligation to be clear in
these matters. That is why I revealed that I had voted for Bill Clin-
ton and my basis for doing so in the course of my biographic analy-
sis of him (1996a, 318). No analyst can avoid personal reactions to
the materials with which he or she constructs an analysis, but one can
try to be as explicit as possible about one's own potential biases. In
that explicitness lies at least a partial solution to unintended or,
worse, systematic bias.
In the end, the analyst's work must stand on its merits, not the
feelings it evokes in political partisans. Ultimately what matters is
not the analyst's stance toward his or her subject, examined or not.
Rather, what matters is the following: Does the analytic framework
of analysis put forward appear to cover the most important aspects of
what needs to be explained psychologically? Is the evidence for
putting forward those categories of analysis persuasive? And, finally,
are the implications drawn regarding these characteristics found in
the real world of the president's actual behavior?
making—and (2) a tendency to infer too much from too little data
and a tendency to rely on psychological theory that is not well devel-
oped or explicated in the study.
Even among those united by their use of psychoanalytically
framed theory and biographical history to analyze the performance of
presidents there is disagreement about whether prediction is possi-
ble. In his study of then president Richard Nixon, Mazlish (1972,
162) gives an example of true prediction: "If, as in the natural sci-
ences, the psychohistorian could predict with utter certainty that
Nixon's personality would compel him to keep Agnew as his Vice-
President in 1972, that would be a 'true prediction.'" "Utter cer-
tainty" is a high standard. Not surprisingly, Mazlish concludes
(1972, 162, 165) that such a prediction is not possible and that the
fusion of psychology and contemporary historical analysis "cannot
give us the sort of certainty involved in true prediction. Above all it
cannot predict a specific act, such as visiting Peking. . . . psychohis-
tory is basically a retrospective enterprise."
Barber ({1972} 1992), on the other hand, subtitles his book "Pre-
dicting Performance in the White House." His view, not a particu-
larly radical one, is that if we can trace the pattern of a person's life
before he enters the oval office, we are better able to estimate his
likely patterns once in it (2). He acknowledges, rightly, that such
predictions are "not easy" and will require "some sharp tools and
close attention to their use" (3, 4). Yet, he thinks them worth the
risk both because the questions they address (the quality of those in
our highest office) are critical and because the theories that attempt
to answer them can best be refined through practice. But to estimate
a likely pattern or tendency is much softer than hard prediction.
The fundamental basis of psychological prediction is the consis-
tency of behavior. A prediction is a test of our understanding of three
areas: the psychology that underlies a person's behavior, the circum-
stances that will affect it, and the relationship between them.
Unlike a person's attitudes or personality traits, character reflects
a person's basic and habitual ways of relating to circumstance. So, to
the extent that a person's character has become psychologically con-
solidated, we can expect significant consistency in his or her behav-
ior. It is this consistency that provides the basis for any confidence in
our expectations about how someone will act.6
Psychoanalytic Assessments of Character and Performance
Conclusion
The psychological analysis of presidents and other leaders is likely to
persist, in spite of all of its controversies and difficulties, for two very
fundamental and important reasons. First, the underlying psychol-
ogy that motivates how presidents see and try to shape the world is
related to their exercise of power. If we want to understand what they
do, we had better have useful theories of why they do it. Second, vari-
ations in the psychology that presidents and leaders bring to their
positions affect what they will, won't, or can't do. In short, there is
an enormous practical set of implications to leaders' levels of ambi-
tion and the skills (or lack thereof) that accompany them; their ideals
and values, along with their capacity to remain faithful to them; and
how the leaders truly feel about the many kinds of relationships with
which they must contend.
It is hard to imagine that any theoretical stance that does not
require of its practitioner that he or she be immersed in the details of
a leader's ongoing life will bring the level of confidence in the theo-
retical understanding or validity required by this critical task. Sixty
years ago Lasswell (1930, i) observed, "political science without
biography is a form of taxidermy."
Since Lasswell wrote those words, developments in psychoanalytic
theory and its increasingly sophisticated application in a variety of
settings have brought us to the point where we might well add the
Psychoanalytic Assessments of Character and Performance
Notes
Walter Weintraub
137
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
passive and softer "Mary was loved by John." In fact, some of our pre-
vious work indicates that inactive or helpless psychiatric patients do
have a preference for certain passive grammatical structures.
Qualifiers
The category of qualifiers includes expressions of uncertainty ("/
think I'll go to the ball game today"); modifiers that weaken state-
ments without adding information ("That old house is kind of
spooky"); and phrases that contribute a sense of vagueness or loose-
ness to a statement ("Then we enjoyed what you might call an evening
of relaxation").
Qualifiers are almost always uttered before the complete verb is
spoken. The message is, therefore, discounted before it is transmit-
ted. When they occur frequently, qualifiers indicate a lack of deci-
siveness or an avoidance of commitment. The use of qualifiers has
also been said to increase with anxiety (Lalljee and Cook 1975). In
my study of the speech patterns of post-World War II presidents,
Gerald Ford used significantly more qualifiers than the other chief
executives, giving his style of speaking a halting, indecisive flavor
(Weintraub 1989, 161). A very low frequency of qualifiers conveys a
dogmatic flavor to speech.
It is important that speech samples be gathered in the same way
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
Retractors
Retractors, also referred to as adversative expressions, weaken or
reverse previously spoken remarks. They include expressions such as
but, the most commonly used retractor, however, and nevertheless. The
frequent use of retractors suggests a difficulty in adhering to previ-
ously made decisions and imparts a flavor of impulsivity to the
speaker's style (Weintraub and Aronson 1964). Compared to other
post—World War II presidents, Richard Nixon used significantly
more retractors (Weintraub 1981, 130—31). This was particularly
true during the anti-Vietnam demonstrations, when Nixon showed
marked mercurial behavior.
Impulsivity is not the only personality trait associated with the
frequent use of retractors. Many speakers use retractors to achieve
"pseudo-consensus," an apparent but not genuine agreement with
another speaker's point of view. An example of pseudo-consensus is
the following statement: "I agree that your grade deserves to be
raised from "B" to "A," but, as principal of the school, I must support
your teacher."
/ and We
In political discourse, a speaker's use of I and we seems to reflect a need
to present himself either as his own person (high / score, low we score)
or as a speaker for a party or cause (low / score, high we score). The use
of the imperial we, a habit of kings and emperors, is unusual for Amer-
ican politicians. Lyndon Johnson occasionally used this device. Leaders
of communist countries effect a certain political humility by using we
as their preferred personal pronoun. One sign indicating that Gor-
bachev was a "new" Soviet leader was his relatively frequent use of /
when interviewed by journalists (Winter et al. 1991a).
Verbal Behavior and Personality Assessment
Me
The pronoun me, the grammatical recipient of action, tends to be
used most by passive speakers, such as children, women, elderly peo-
ple, and certain patient groups (Weintraub 1989, 12). When
attacked, Bill Clinton is apt to adopt the role of victim and will use
the pronoun me quite frequently.
Negatives
The most common examples of the use of the negative category are
not, never, and nothing. Speakers who use many negatives tend to be
oppositional and stubborn. They may also be using the coping mech-
anisms of negation and denial excessively. In my study of the Water-
gate transcripts, I reported that H. R. Haldeman, known in Wash-
ington political circles as the "Abominable No-Man," used negatives
significantly more frequently than the other Watergate conspirators
(Weintraub 1981, 124).
Explainers
The category of explainers includes words and expressions that sug-
gest causal connections or justification of the speaker's thoughts and
actions. The most common explainer is because. Other frequently
used explainers include therefore and since. Speakers who use many
explainers have a didactic, apologetic, or rationalizing verbal style
(Lorenz 1953). Those who use few explainers may be seen as categor-
ical and dogmatic. Part of Hillary Clinton's didactic speaking style
is due to her frequent use of explainers.
Expressions of Feeling
All clauses in which the speaker attributes feelings to himself or her-
self are scored. Examples are "I like to work outdoors" and "Jack's
behavior frustrates me." High expressions of feeling scores are often
associated in the listener's mind with the expression of emotion
(Weintraub 1989, 49—72). (As explained later, expressions of feeling
is not the only category associated with emotional speaking). Low
expressions of feeling scores reflect an aloof, cool verbal style. Ronald
Reagan's cool, unflappable speaking style was due, in part, to his
infrequent use of expressions of feeling.
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
Adverbial Intensifiers
Adverbial intensifies include all adverbs that increase the force of a
statement. Commonly used adverbial intensifies are very, really, so,
and such. Adverbial intensifies add color to a speaker's remarks.
When used frequently, they produce a dramatic, histrionic effect.
Speakers who use very few adverbial intensifies are perceived by lis-
teners as dull and bland. Among normal speakers, those in the
midadolescent age group (fifteen to seventeen) have the highest fre-
quency of occurrence of adverbial intensifies. Women use this cate-
gory significantly more frequently than men among both normal and
psychiatric patient groups. Depressed patients use this category
more than other patient groups (Weintraub 1989, 64—70). Eisen-
hower was the most dramatic of the post—World War II presidential
speakers judging by his use of adverbial intensifies.
Direct References
Direct references include all explicit references to the interviewer,
the interviewing process, or the physical surroundings. Examples are
"As I said in answer to your previous question, I do not intend to run
for public office in 1996" and "It's a pleasure to meet with you in
such a beautiful conference room."
A high direct references score reflects the verbal behavior of an
engaging, perhaps manipulative speaker, one who avoids a particular
topic by talking about the interviewing process. When the frequency
of remarks directed at the interviewer is very high, the speaker may
appear to be intrusive and controlling. A very low direct references
score may indicate that the speaker is shy or aloof. In my study of
post—World War II presidents, I found that the greatest use of direct
references was by the friendly and engaging presidents Eisenhower
and Reagan. Not surprisingly, the somewhat shy and aloof Jimmy
Carter scored lowest in this category (Weintraub 1989, 170).
Among psychiatric patients, depressed and impulsive patients make
the most direct references because they make demands upon the
interviewer for assistance (Weintraub 1981, 31).
Nonpersonal References
Personal references are clauses whose subjects include the speaker
and people known to him. "I liked President Kennedy" and "Gerald
Verbal Behavior and Personality Assessment
Emotional Speech
Previously we identified expressions of feelings as a category that
conveys emotion, but it is not the only such category. Listeners asso-
ciate the following categories as also conveying emotion: (i) the use
of 7 rather than we; (2) adverbial intensifies; (3) direct references; and
(4) personal rather than nonpersonal references. Most emotional
speakers will use several of the feelings categories to convey warmth.
always used as the object of a verb and is, therefore, the recipient
rather than the initiator of action. Investigations of both normal and
deviant speakers have shown that me is used significantly more by
individuals who are thought of as having passive tendencies, that is,
small children, elderly people, women, and depressive and compul-
sive patients (Weintraub 1981, 103—6).
12. Domineering behavior. Verbosity, the use of many connectives
(qualifiers, retractors, and explainers), and interruptions best charac-
terize domineering conversational behavior. When domineering
behavior becomes intimidating, commands and obscenities may
appear in the speaker's verbal behavior. Of the post-World War II
presidents, Lyndon Johnson was the most domineering in his verbal
behavior.
13. Creativity. How can we measure verbal creativity? According
to Richard Ohmann (1967), there are three ways in which creativity
can be expressed in language. A writer or speaker can create new
words; can make new syntactic associations, that is, put words
together in novel ways; and can express himself or herself in original
metaphors. The most common way most creative speakers use any or
all of these devices is through wit.
Does verbal creativity reflect other forms of creativity, or is it sim-
ply a characteristic of people with a natural facility for writing or
speaking? Although some association between verbal creativity and
other forms of originality seems likely, little systematic research on
the subject has been carried out.
14. Familiar behavior. The verbal manifestations of familiar
behavior include the use of first names, a favorite device of Ronald
Reagan (Weintraub 1989, 174-75), comments about the inter-
viewer's personal life, and allusions to events or persons conceivably
known to the interviewee but not through shared experiences with
the interviewer. These verbal mannerisms may be reflected in a high
direct references score. Familiar individuals frequently use teasing
and clowning in their relationships with others, a tactic many listen-
ers find embarrassing and inappropriate. Lyndon Johnson was the
most familiar of the post—World War II presidents (Weintraub
1989, 144).
15. Resilience. Resilience is the ability to recover quickly from
misfortune. This characteristic can be assessed by measuring the
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
ability of a speaker to lose and then regain his or her verbal style dur-
ing the course of an interview or, even better, over the course of sev-
eral interviews spanning days or weeks. A vulnerable speaker may be
so traumatized by a failed verbal performance that his or her ability
to respond publicly to questions may be affected for a time. Richard
Nixon temporarily lost his usual speaking style during the Water-
gate scandal. His verbal behavior resembled that of a depressed
patient. Following the resolution of the crisis, he regained his cus-
tomary manner of speaking.
16. Response to stress. This trait is best measured when the verbal
data have been gathered during stress interviews. The speaker's
responses to challenging questions are scored and compared with the
individual's other scores when answering more neutral questions. If,
for example, a speaker's use of both qualifiers and retractors increases
in response to stress questions, we may conclude that the speaker
becomes less decisive in crisis situations. If, in response to confronta-
tional questions, a speaker uses the pronoun / more and the pronoun
we less, it is likely that in crisis situations that individual will rely
more on his or her own resources and less on help from others. On the
other hand, a speaker who cannot accept sole responsibility for crisis
situations is apt to react in the opposite way, by using more of the
pronoun we and less of the pronoun I.
/. Measuring the Motives of
Political Actors at a Distance
David G. Winter
Political leaders deal in power, but they act out of many different
motives. Some seek power for its own sake, of course, but many do
not. Recall the farmer Cincinnatus, who in the early years of the
Roman Republic was twice given dictatorial powers during an emer-
gency. When the emergency was over, each time he gladly returned
to his farm. President Harry Truman found the renunciation of
power at the end of his presidential years in the "White Prison" (his
term) a welcome experience (Miller 1974). Other leaders may be
seeking assurance that they are loved or trying to bolster their self-
esteem through accomplishments and public acclaim. Motives sup-
ply direction and energy for action. (In contrast, traits reflect style.)
Motives influence how leaders construe the leadership role; they sen-
sitize perceptions of opportunity and danger; they affect the accessi-
bility of different styles and skills; and they determine sources of
leadership satisfaction, stress, frustration, and vulnerability. Thus
assessing a leader's motives is an important part of profiling a leader's
personality. Yet it is by no means easy to know a political leader's
motives. Motives cannot necessarily be inferred directly from actions
or outcomes. They wax and wane (often outside of conscious aware-
ness) in response to external incentives and internal dynamics.
Finally, they are subject to distortion, deception (including self-
deception), and rationalization. For these reasons, motives are often
measured indirectly, through content analysis of people's imagina-
tive verbal behavior. Such an assessment technique readily lends
itself to measuring the motives of political leaders at a distance.
153
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
vice. They are more innovative and are quicker and better at using
information to modify performance. They are restless and travel
around a lot, have high but realistic aspirations, carefully calculate
probabilities, and (so long as the chances for success are at least mod-
erate) work with energy and persistence. Thus in such business set-
tings, they usually end up performing well. Achievement motivation
is not related to success, however, in academic or scientific settings,
in the professions, or in large bureaucratic corporations.
Achievement-motivated people can control themselves and delay
gratification, perhaps because they have a sense of time as moving
faster and stretching farther into the future. They prefer subdued,
even somber styles. On the other hand, they are not always tightly
controlled "law and order" types: when they perceive it to be neces-
U.S. Presidents
Extending the original work of Donley (Donley 1968; Donley and
Winter 1970), Winter (i^Sya) published motive scores of the first
inaugural addresses of American presidents from Washington
through Reagan, subsequently (Winter, in press) adding scores for
Bush and Clinton. Table 7.3 presents these scores.
Winter's (1991) review and extension of these studies, illustrated
in table 7.4, suggest that presidential motive imagery scores corre-
late with presidential behaviors and outcomes in predictable ways.
These results can be summarized as follows. Power-motivated presi-
dents are rated as "great" by historians. (Along these same lines,
House, Spangler, and Woycke {1991} found a relationship between
presidential power motivation and objective measures of presidential
charisma.) On the other hand, presidential power motivation is also
associated with involving the country in war—though, of course, the
causal linkage between an individual president's motive imagery and
U.S. war entry is complex and tenuous. Affiliation-motivated presi-
dents seek peace but are vulnerable to the influence of self-seeking
subordinates and, hence, scandal. Finally, the idealistic restlessness
of achievement-motivated presidents often leads them to frustration
in the amorphous mire of political intrigue and bargaining.
Since achievement-motivated leaders do well in business as entre-
preneurs, it is interesting to consider why this same motive creates
problems in politics. American corporate culture is a "command and
compliance" culture, in which a chief executive can insist on the "one
best solution" to any problem. Once there is a single best solution,
further discussion is often preempted. After all (in the words of
Jimmy Carter's 1975 presidential campaign autobiography), "Why
TABLE 7.3. MOTIVE IMAGERY SCORES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1789-1993
Raw Scores Standardized Scores
(images per 1 ,000 words) (M = 50, SD = 10)
Ach Aff Pow Ach Aff Pow
Washington 1789 3.85 3.85 4.62 39 52 41
Adams, J. 1797 3.89 3.03 4.76 39 48 41
Jefferson 1801 5.65 3.30 6.59 48 49 51
Madison 1809 6.84 3.42 7.69 54 50 56
Monroe 1817 7.22 2.41 6.62 56 45 51
Adams, J. Q. 1825 5.43 3.40 3.74 47 50 36
Jackson 1829 4.48 2.69 5.38 42 47 44
Van Buren 1837 4.38 2.83 4.38 42 47 40
Harrison, W. H. 1841 2.56 1.52 4.31 32 41 39
Polk 1845 2.65 1.43 6.32 33 41 49
Taylor 1849 6.39 3.65 4.56 52 51 40
Pierce 1853 5.72 2.11 6.33 48 44 49
Buchanan 1857 5.05 2.53 4.69 45 46 41
Lincoln 1861 3.34 2.23 6.97 36 45 52
Grant 1869 7.02 2.63 3-51 55 46 35
Hayes 1877 6.07 2.83 6.07 50 47 48
Garfield 1881 5.09 0.34 6.10 45 36 48
Cleveland 1885 6.52 2.37 8.89 52 45 62
Harrison, B. 1889 3.49 2.18 5.45 37 44 45
McKinley 1897 5.30 1.51 5.55 46 41 45
Roosevelt, T. 1905 8.14 1.02 4.07 61 39 38
Taft 1909 4.79 0.92 7.93 44 39 57
Wilson 1913 8.83 2.94 7.06 64 48 53
Harding 1921 5.41 4.51 4.81 47 55 42
Coolidge 1925 4.69 2.47 5.43 43 46 45
Hoover 1929 9.18 2.16 5.94 66 44 47
Roosevelt, F. 1933 6.37 2.12 8.50 52 44 60
Truman 1949 6.91 5.99 11.98 54 61 77
Eisenhower 1953 4.50 4.50 6.14 42 55 48
Kennedy 1961 5.90 9.59 11.81 49 78 77
Johnson, L. 1965 6.77 4.74 6.09 54 56 48
Nixon 1969 8.94 8.00 7.06 65 70 52
Carter 1977 10.60 4.89 8.16 73 56 58
Reagan 1981 7.78 3.28 9.01 59 49 63
Bush 1989 7.35 10.81 7.35 57 83 54
Clinton 1993 10.23 5.75 9.59 71 60 65
spent money (rather than time) on the crucial New Hampshire pri-
mary, and stayed in the race only as long as their chances of success
were moderate. All of these results are consistent with the laboratory
studies summarized in table 7.2, which portray achievement-moti-
vated people as efficient entrepreneurs who take moderate risks. In
contrast, power-motivated candidates took more extreme ideological
positions, concentrated on small donors (perhaps as a means of mobi-
lizing grassroots support), spent considerable time (rather than only
money) in New Hampshire before that state's critical primary elec-
tion, and stayed in the race longer overall.
While these results may be specific to the 1976 campaign and
national political environment, Adkins (1994) studied the 1992
presidential candidates and found similar relationships between can-
didates' achievement and power motives and the level of risk of their
campaign strategy.
The relationship between candidates' motive imagery profile and
their electoral success is somewhat more complicated. Winter
(1987a) found that the greater congruence between a president's
motive imagery profile and the profile of American society at that
time (measured through content analysis of popular literature), the
higher the percentage of popular vote received, the greater the mar-
gin of victory, and the more likely the president was to be reelected.
In other words, electoral success—though not necessarily rated success in
Soviet Leaders
Hermann (198ob) further illustrated these relationships in a study of
the motives of Soviet Politburo members in the late 19705. Members
scoring high in affiliation and low in power were relatively more
prodetente than were members with the opposite motive pattern.
Schmitt and Winter (1998) scored the reports given by each of the
general secretaries of the Communist party of the Soviet Union
(Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev) to the first
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
party congress after their accession to power and related each leader's
score to his leadership style.
African Leaders
Winter (1980) scored interview transcripts from twenty-two politi-
cal leaders from various southern Africa countries, including heads of
state, cabinet ministers, and exiled nationalist guerilla leaders. As
expected from laboratory studies, power-motivated leaders were
rated by a panel of experts as more likely "to initiate, support, or con-
tinue armed conflict" (R = . ~ / i , p < .001). It is interesting to note
that these ratings of propensity for violence were unrelated (R = .14,
p - ns.) to ratings of power motivation made by these same expert
judges, although on grounds of shared method variance one might
have expected that they would be.
Hermann (1987^ scored interview transcripts from twelve sub-
Saharan Africa heads of government and related the results to their
foreign policy styles and role orientations, confirming her earlier
findings on world leaders (Hermann 198oa).
phies. They found that Nixon showed almost all of the correlates of
achievement and affiliation motivation, as would be expected by his
very high scores on those two motives. In contrast, he showed only
some correlates (slightly fewer than half) of the power motive, again
as would be expected by his average score on that motive.
Hermann used power and affiliation motive imagery scores, along
with other personality characteristics measured at a distance, to con-
struct personality portraits of Ronald Reagan (1983) and Syrian
leader Hafez al-Assad (1988a). Along these same lines, Snare has
constructed portraits of Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi (1992a)
and post-Khomeini Iranian leaders (1990, 1992^.
In another quantitative idiographic study, N. J. G. Winter (1992)
scored selected speeches of Mussolini and found a significant increase
in power motivation and decrease in affiliation after his September
1937 meeting with Hitler that marked the beginning of their close
relationship. Such changes may help to explain the marked decrease
in the wisdom and success of Mussolini's policies from that same
time onward.
Other leaders who have been studied through the use of motive
imagery scores include U.S. president George H. W. Bush and for-
mer Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev (Winter et al. 1991b,
1991a); Bill Clinton (Winter 1998b); Woodrow Wilson (Watson
and Winter 1997); and (more briefly) John F. Kennedy (Winter
1991, in press).
any other source, based on any other kind of material.3 The decision
of which comparison group to use is critical in two respects. First, it
establishes the normative population against which the particular
person being studied will be compared. Second, the standardization
group decision also affects the selection of actual documents to be
scored, since the scores of all persons in the standardization group
should be based on the same kinds of documents. The process of
identifying comparison groups is subsequently illustrated with some
examples.
Texts
Scoring should be done on verbatim texts. For U.S. research, the Pub-
lic Papers of the Presidents series (and its more quickly available serial
form, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents) provides a verba-
tim record of every word that the president speaks "on the record."
This series goes back as far as Herbert Hoover; before that time, the
series A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents includes
major presidential speeches and papers. For the U.S. Congress there
is the Congressional Record and its predecessor, the Congressional Globe.
Measuring the Motives of Political Actors at a Distance
Preparation of Documents
Several steps can be taken to improve the objectivity of scoring. To
the maximum extent possible, scorers should be blind to the research
hypothesis and to the differences among the different documents
(sources, comparisons to be made, etc.). In some cases it may even be
appropriate to mask information that could identify the source or in
some other way bias the scoring, such as names of persons or coun-
tries, dates, and so forth. The entire set of material to be scored (for
example, the speeches of all candidates or the documents from both
war and nonwar crises) should be randomly mixed together to reduce
effects of serial position, scorer fatigue, and similar factors. (True
randomization can easily be carried out by assigning four- or five-
digit serial numbers from a table of random numbers and then sort-
ing the documents by serial number.)
Scoring
The complete manual "Integrated System for Scoring Motives in
Running Text," together with instructions for learning, several dif-
ferent kinds of practice materials, expert scoring, and documenta-
tion, can be obtained at cost from the author. 5 The original versions
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
Reliability
Since the motive imagery content analysis system was derived from
TAT scoring systems, which have a reputation for low test-retest
reliability (see Entwisle 1972), many readers may wonder whether
this at-a-distance technique is reliable. Actually, several researchers
have shown that the common impression of low TAT reliability is
not, in fact, accurate (Smith 1992, 126-39; Winter and Stewart
1977b). Moreover, Winter (1991, 70—71) has shown that the at-a-
distance adaptation of these scoring systems gives split-half over-
time reliability coefficients in the range of .62 to .77, which suggests
considerable temporal stability.
Translation
The research that has been done on the effects of translation on
motive imagery scores (Hermann 198ob, 352 n. 2; Winter 1973,
92-93) suggests that translated documents yield about the same
scores as originals, so long as the translation was a careful one.
Final Cautions
While the motive imagery scoring procedure has furnished useful
insights in case studies and useful generalizations in research on
groups, some final cautions about the technique are in order. We
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
Such nuances may be crucial to meaning and action, but they are not
likely to be picked up by the motive imagery scoring systems.
Finally, some things do not even have to be said in so many words;
they operate, in Joll's (1968) term, as "unspoken assumptions." For
all these reasons, the content of the available written record may not
always be isomorphic with the psychological states of political lead-
ers, groups, and peoples, and so we are obliged to use content analy-
sis of that record with caution and humility.
Notes
1. Much of the material in this section is based on Winter 1996 (chap. 5),
which contains an extensive list of further references.
2. The difference between the achievement and power motives can be
phrased in terms of the old proverb "Build a better mousetrap and the world will
beat a path to your door." People high in achievement motivation might indeed
build the better mousetrap, but power-motivated people would try to get the
world coming to their door without having to build the better mousetrap first—
perhaps by buying, renting, or appropriating someone else's mousetrap.
3. Standardization does have the effect of setting the overall standardized
means and standard deviations of each group that has been standardized equal to
each other. Thus, while it would be possible to compare the standardized motive
imagery scores of any two or more presidents with each other, or any president
with any candidate from a candidate standardization group, the presidents as a
whole, and the candidates as a whole, will have the same mean and standard devi-
ation. Thus we cannot determine motive imagery differences between two dif-
ferent standardization groups as wholes.
4. The assumption that only passages relevant to the crisis should be selected
can, of course, be debated.
5. Requests for this material can be sent to the following address: David G.
Winter, Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, 525 E. University
Avenue, Ann Arbor, MI 48109—1109, U.S.A.
8. Assessing Leadership Style:
Trait Analysis
Margaret G. Hermann
More often than not when conversation turns to politics and politi-
cians, discussion focuses on personalities. There is a certain fascina-
tion with analyzing political leaders. As a result, biographies on cur-
rent political figures become best-sellers and the triumphs as well as
the tragedies of political leaders become newspaper headlines. A
major reason for our curiosity about the personal characteristics of
such leaders is the realization that their preferences, the things they
believe in and work for, and the ways they go about making deci-
sions can influence our lives.
But how can we learn about the personalities and, in particular,
the leadership styles of political leaders in more than a cursory fash-
ion? It is hard to conceive of giving people like Tony Blair, Saddam
Hussein, or Boris Yeltsin a battery of psychological tests or having
them submit to a series of clinical interviews. Not only would they
not have time for, or tolerate, such procedures, they would be wary
that the results, if made public, might prove politically damaging to
them.
One way of learning more about political leaders that does not
require their cooperation is by examining what they say. Only movie
stars, hit rock groups, and athletes probably leave more traces of
their behavior in the public arena than politicians. U.S. presidents'
movements and statements, for example, are generally recorded by
the mass media; little of what a U.S. president does escapes notice.
Such materials provide a basis for assessment.
By analyzing the content of what political leaders say, we can
178
Assessing Leadership Style
Leadership Style
As the world grows more complex and an increasing number of
agencies, organizations, and people participate in policy-making,
both at the domestic and international levels, political leaders face
several dilemmas in affecting policy, such as how to maintain control
over policy while still delegating authority (or having it delegated
for them) to other actors in the government and how to shape the
policy agenda when situations are being defined and problems as
well as opportunities are being perceived and structured by others in
the political system. The particular leadership style that leaders
adopt can affect the manner in which they deal with these dilemmas
and, in turn, the nature of the decision-making process. Barber
(1977) has argued that leadership style often results from those
behaviors that were useful in securing the leader's first political suc-
cess; these actions become reinforced across time as the leader relies
on them to achieve the second, third, and so forth successes. The
term leadership style means the ways in which leaders relate to those
around them—whether constituents, advisers, or other leaders—and
how they structure interactions and the norms, rules, and principles
they use to guide such interactions.
In assessing the individual differences of 122 national leaders
across the past two decades (e.g., Hermann 198oa, 198ob, 1984a,
1987^ 1988b, 1993; Hermann and Hermann 1989; Kaarbo and
Hermann 1998), I have uncovered a set of leadership styles that
appears to guide how presidents, prime ministers, kings, and dicta-
tors interact with those they lead or with whom they share power.
These leadership styles are built around the answers to three ques-
tions: (i) How do leaders react to political constraints in their envi-
ronment—do they respect or challenge such constraints? (2) How
open are leaders to incoming information—do they selectively use
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
mann 1980)3, 1984a, 1987(3; Bass 1981; Walker 1983; Snyder 1987;
Hermann and Hermann 1989; Stewart, Hermann, and Hermann
1989; Winter et al. 1991; Suedfeld 1992; Winter 1992; Kaarbo and
Hermann 1998), these seven traits provide information that is rele-
vant to assessing how political leaders respond to the constraints in
their environment, how they process information, and what moti-
vates them to action. Knowledge about the degree to which leaders
believe that they can influence what happens and their need for
power suggests whether they will challenge or respect the con-
straints that they perceive in any setting in which they find them-
selves. Assessing leaders' conceptual complexity and self-confidence
helps us determine how open they will be to information. And mea-
suring the extent of their in-group bias, general distrust of others,
and tendency to prefer problem-solving functions to those involving
group maintenance assists us in learning what motivates leaders. In
what follows, we will describe how each trait can be determined
through content analysis of leaders' interview responses, as well as
indicate what scores on the various traits mean for leadership style,
both singly and in combination.
In this trait analysis, an assumption is made that the more fre-
quently leaders use certain words and phrases in their interview
responses, the more salient such content is to them. In effect, the
trait analysis is quantitative in nature and employs frequency counts.
At issue is what percentage of the time in responding to interview-
ers' questions when leaders could exhibit particular words and
phrases are they, indeed, used. The percentages that result for one
leader can currently be compared to those for 87 heads of state from
around the world or to those for 122 political leaders filling a range
of positions in governments in countries in the Middle East, Africa,
the former Soviet Union, and Western industrialized democracies.
Through such comparisons, the researcher or analyst can determine
whether the particular leader is high or low on a trait. This procedure
will become clearer after we describe how to code for the seven traits.
Currently a computer program is being developed that will auto-
matically code for the traits discussed here. Entitled "Profiler"
(Young, forthcoming), the program will provide a researcher or ana-
lyst with the trait scores for a specific leader based on either speeches
Assessing Leadership Style
fashion, rather than out in the open. Such leaders are especially good
in settings where they are the "power behind the throne," where they
can pull the strings but are less accountable for the result.
Table 8.2 summarizes this discussion. In previous research (e.g.,
Hermann 19803, 198ob, 19843, 1987^ Hermann and Hermann
1989; Hermann and Preston 1994; Kaarbo and Hermann 1998), as
noted earlier, I have collected data on the personality traits described
here of 122 political leaders, some 87 of them being heads of gov-
ernment. The leaders in that sample span the years 1945—99 and
represent all regions of the world. For this group of leaders, scores on
the belief in one's own ability to control events are correlated with
those on the need for power—0.17 in the sample of 87 heads of state
and 0.21 for the 122 political leaders. These correlations indicate
that the two characteristics are distinctive and that there will be
instances where the individual being studied is high on one trait and
low on the other. To put this discussion into context, let us now
define the two traits in more detail.
The belief in one's own ability to control events is a view of the world
in which leaders perceive some degree of control over the situations
ity for anything too daring and out of the ordinary. Such leaders
want to participate and lead in contexts where there is at least a 50
percent chance of success. They are willing to delegate authority,
hoping others may have more luck than they seem to have in
influencing outcomes. As a result, such leaders are also able to shift
the blame when something goes wrong. Unlike their counterparts
who think they can affect their external environments, these leaders
do not shoulder responsibility and move on but, rather, are quick to
accuse others of making it difficult for them to act. For political lead-
ers who do not believe they can control what happens, fear of failure
may supersede and crowd out sense of timing.
They are good at sizing up situations and sensing what tactics will
work to achieve their goals. Indeed, they are highly Machiavellian,
often working behind the scenes to ensure that their positions pre-
vail. Leaders high in the need for power are generally daring and
charming—the dashing hero. But they have little real regard for
those around them or for people in general. In effect, other people
and groups are viewed as instruments for the leader's ends; guile and
deceit are perceived as part of the game of politics. Such leaders set
up rules to ensure conformity to their ideas—rules that can change
abruptly if the leader's goals or interests change. At first followers are
beguiled by leaders who are high in this motive since they are able to
produce results and are charismatic, but the "bloom often leaves the
rose" over time as such leaders exploit their followers and as their
goals diverge from what the people want or feel they need.
Leaders high in the need for power will test the limits before
adhering to a course of action, bartering and bargaining up until the
last moment in order to see what is possible and what the conse-
quences will be of pushing further toward their goals. These leaders
are more skillful in such negotiations when they can interact directly
with those involved; without face-to-face interaction, such leaders
can misjudge the assumptions the other party is making and how far
they are willing to go.
When the need for power is low, leaders have less need to be in
charge; they can be one among several who have influence. It is per-
fectly OK with them that others receive credit for what happens.
Indeed, empowering others is important for such a leader. They are
willing to sacrifice their own interests for those of the group, since in
their view what is good for the group is, in truth, good for them.
Leaders low in the need for power enable their followers to feel
strong and responsible by empowering them to act as emissaries and
expand the group or the group's assets. Through this process these
leaders engender high morale in their followers and a sense of team
spirit and goal clarity. Such leaders also have a sense of justice. They
deal with people evenhandedly based on the norms of the group;
they play no favorites so people know where they stand and what will
happen if they violate the norms. Their intent is to build a relation-
ship of trust with their followers and a sense of shared responsibility
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
Self-Confidence
Self-confidence indicates one's sense of self-importance, an individ-
ual's image of his or her ability to cope adequately with objects and
persons in the environment. Indeed, self-confidence "is that compo-
nent of the self system which is involved in regulating the extent to
which the self system is maintained under conditions of strain such
as occur during the processing of new information relative to the
self (Ziller et al. 1977, 177; see also Ziller 1973). Stimuli from the
environment are mediated by a person's sense of self. Since people
tend to develop their self-confidence as a result of evaluating them-
selves in comparison with others and their experiences, this trait
often becomes the frame of reference for positioning one's self in a
particular context.
In coding for self-confidence, the focus is on the pronouns my,
myself, I, me, and mine. When speakers interject these pronouns into
their speech, how important do they see themselves compared to
what is happening? Does the use of the pronoun reflect that the
leader is instigating an activity (e.g., "I am going to . . . " or "That is
my plan of action"), should be viewed as an authority figure on this
issue (e.g., "If it were up to me . . ." or "Let me explain what we
mean"), or is the recipient of a positive response from another person
or group (e.g., "You flatter me with your praise" or "My position was
accepted")? In each of these instances, there is an enhanced sense of
Conceptual Complexity
Conceptual complexity is the degree of differentiation that an indi-
vidual shows in describing or discussing other people, places, poli-
cies, ideas, or things. The conceptually complex individual can see
varying reasons for a particular position, is willing to entertain the
possibility that there is ambiguity in the environment, and is flexi-
ble in reacting to objects or ideas. In the opposite manner, the con-
ceptually simple individual tends to classify objects and ideas into
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
the task done and the other extreme an emphasis on group mainte-
nance. Task focus suggests the relative emphasis a leader places in
interactions with others on dealing with the problems that face the
government as opposed to focusing on the feelings and needs of rel-
evant and important constituents. For leaders who emphasize the
problem, moving the group (nation, government, ethnic group, reli-
gious group, union, etc.) forward toward a goal is their principal
purpose for assuming leadership. For those who emphasize group
maintenance and establishing relationships, keeping the loyalty of
constituents and morale high are the central functions of leadership.
Research (e.g., Byars 1972, 1973; Hermann and Kogan 1977; Bass
1981) has suggested that charismatic leaders are those who fall in the
middle of this continuum, focusing on the problem when that is
appropriate to the situation at hand and on building relationships
when that seems more relevant. The charismatic leader senses when
the context calls for each of these functions and focuses on it at that
point in time. Table 8.4 summarizes this discussion.
In coding for task focus, just like in coding for conceptual com-
plexity, attention is directed toward counting specific words, in this
case words that indicate work on a task or instrumental activity, as
well as words that center around concern for another's feelings,
desires, and satisfaction. Examples of the task-oriented words are
accomplishment, achievement), plan, position, proposal, recommendation,
and tactic. Illustrative of the group-maintenance types of words are
appreciation, amnesty, collaboration, disappoint(ment), forgive(ness), harm,
liberation, and suffering. The score for task focus is determined by cal-
culating the percentage of task-oriented words relative to the total
number of task-oriented and group-maintenance words in a particu-
lar interview response. The overall score is the average percentage
across the interview responses examined.
ceive in the environment and the more focused they will be on con-
fronting those responsible. Leaders who are not so intense in this
desire are capable of seeing the possibilities for win-win agreements
and for building relationships in international politics since the
world is viewed as containing opportunities as well as threats.
The two traits, in-group bias and distrust of others, are correlated
0.62 in my sample of 87 heads of state and 0.29 in the broader sam-
ple of 122 leaders. In the head of state sample, the rather high corre-
lation indicates that, when such leaders are highly identified with
their country, they are also probably highly distrustful and vice
versa. In other words, just as in common parlance, heads of state tend
to be hawks or doves, hardliners or accommodationists—more threat
and problem oriented or more opportunity and relationship ori-
ented.
In-group bias is a view of the world in which one's own group
(social, political, ethnic, etc.) holds center stage. There are strong
emotional attachments to this in-group, and it is perceived as the
best. Moreover, there is an emphasis on the importance of maintain-
ing in-group culture and status. Any decisions that are made favor
the in-group. In coding for in-group bias, the unit of analysis is a
word or phrase referring to the particular leader's own group. Of
interest is ascertaining the following information when the leader
makes a reference to his or her own group: are the modifiers used
favorable (e.g., great, peace-loving, progressive, successful, prosperous); do
they suggest strength (e.g., powerful, capable, made great advances, has
boundless resources); or do they indicate the need to maintain group
honor and identity (e.g., "need to defend firmly our borders," "must
maintain our own interpretation," "decide our own policies")? If any
of these modifiers are present, the phrase indicates in-group bias.
The score for in-group bias is the percentage of times in an interview
response that a leader refers to in-groups that meet the criteria just
outlined. The leader's overall score is the average of these percentages
across all the interview responses under examination.
Political leaders high in in-group bias are interested in maintain-
ing the separate identity of their groups at all costs. They become
quite concerned when other groups, organizations, governments, or
countries try to meddle in what they perceive are the internal affairs
of their group. The higher the score, the more isomorphic the leader
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
doing? Does the leader show concern about what these persons or
groups are doing and perceive such actions to be harmful, wrong, or
detrimental to himself or herself, an ally, a friend, or a cause impor-
tant to the leader? If either of these conditions is present, the noun or
noun phrase is coded as indicating distrust. A leader's score on this
trait is the percentage of times in an interview response that he or she
exhibits distrust toward other groups or persons; the overall score is
the average of these percentages across the interview responses being
studied.
Leaders who are high in distrust of others are given to being suspi-
cious about the motives and actions of others, particularly those oth-
ers who are viewed as competitors for their positions or against their
cause or ideology. These others can do nothing right; whatever they
do is easily perceived as for ulterior motives and designs. In its
extreme, distrust of others becomes paranoia in which there is a well-
developed rationale for being suspicious of certain individuals,
groups, or countries. Distrust of others often makes leaders not rely
on others but do things on their own to prevent any sabotage of what
they want done. Loyalty becomes a sine qua non of working with the
leader and participating in policy-making. And such leaders often
shuffle their advisers around, making sure that none of them is acquir-
ing a large enough power base to challenge the leader's authority. To
some extent distrust of others may grow out of a zero-sum view of the
world—when someone wins, someone else loses. The desire not to
lose makes the leader question and assess others' motives. Leaders who
distrust others tend to be hypersensitive to criticism—often seeing
criticism where others would not—and they are vigilant, always on
the lookout for a challenge to their authority or self.
Some wariness of others' motives may be an occupational hazard of
political leaders. But leaders low in distrust of others tend to put it
into perspective. Trust and distrust are more likely to be based on
past experience with the people involved and on the nature of the
current situation. A person is distrusted based on more realistic cues
and not in a blanket fashion.
Constructing a Profile
Once a leader's interview responses have been coded and overall
scores have been calculated for each of the seven traits described here,
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
from all parts of the globe; the 122 leaders are drawn from forty-
eight countries and include, in addition to the 87 heads of state,
members of cabinets, revolutionary leaders, legislative leaders, lead-
ers of opposition parties, and terrorist leaders. The sample includes
leaders who held positions of authority from 1945 to the present.
Scores for particular regional, country, or cultural groups embedded
in these 122 leaders are available from the author.
Once the analyst has determined how a leader's scores compare to
those of other leaders, it is feasible to use the tables and discussion
presented earlier on the traits and leadership styles to develop a
profile of the leader. How is the leader likely to respond to con-
straints (scores on the belief he or she can control events and the need
for power)? How open is he or she likely to be to information (scores
on self-confidence and conceptual complexity)? What is the nature of
the leader's motivation for seeking authority and influence (score on
task focus as well as on in-group bias and distrust of others)? By not-
ing whether a leader is more likely to respect or challenge con-
straints, to be more or less open to information, and to be more inter-
nally or externally driven, the analyst can ascertain the particular
leadership style (see table 8.1) that leader is likely to exhibit.
Thus, for example, suppose we were developing a profile of Hafez
al-Assad, current head of state of Syria. And suppose his scores when
compared to the other eighty-seven heads of state show that he (i) is
high in the belief he can control events and in the need for power,
indicating he is likely to challenge constraints (see table 8.2); (2) has
a conceptual complexity score that is higher than his score for self-
confidence, suggesting he is open to incoming information (see table
8.3); (3) is high in task focus, denoting that his attention is more
centered around the problem rather than relationships; and (4) has an
in-group bias though he is relatively low in distrust of others, lead-
ing to a focus on being strategic in the way he deals with problems
(see table 8.5). According to table 8.1, Assad will evidence an
actively independent leadership style. He will be highly interested
in maintaining his own and Syria's maneuverability and indepen-
dence in a world that he perceives continually tries to limit both.
Although Assad perceives that the world is conflict prone, he also
views all countries as being somewhat constrained by international
norms, affording him some flexibility in what he can do. However,
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
Contextualizingthe Profile
Much of the research on personality suggests that some people use
contextual cues to determine what they do and, thus, may evidence
changes in their trait scores depending on the nature of the situation.
Other people's personalities are fairly stable across situations. By
examining diverse material on a political leader, it is possible to
determine how stable his or her leadership traits are. By analyzing
material that cuts across a period of time, across different substantive
topics, across different audiences, and is inside or outside of the lead-
ership group (or political unit), we can determine the stability of the
leadership traits. Moreover, by examining different aspects of the
context such as the topic, audience, and whether the focus of atten-
tion is on the domestic or international domains, we can learn if lead-
ers are sensitive to certain cues in their environment but not to oth-
ers. If there is variability in the scores, then, we can determine if the
differences give us insights into how the leader's public images dif-
fer—the various ways political leaders adapt to the situations in
which they find themselves. We gain cues about how they are likely
to change their behavior and what contextual features generate such
change.
nomic issues}. Generic topics that are often discussed by heads of state
are military issues, economic issues, relations with another country,
relations with an enemy, domestic political stability, and regional
politics. Topics that are covered only sporadically in the material are
good candidates for combining into more generic categories.
Nature of Audience
Interviews with political leaders are done in a variety of settings and,
thus, are often targeted toward different audiences. To examine the
effects of audience on a leader's scores, it becomes important to note
who is doing the interview and in what setting. For example, in
profiling a head of state, an analyst will want to record if the inter-
view involves the domestic or international press. If it is the domes-
tic press, is the interviewer closely affiliated with the particular
leader, more affiliated with that leader's opposition, or neutral in ori-
entation? If it is the international press, to whom is the interview
likely to be reported—people in an adversary's country, an ally's
country, a country whose government the leader would like to
influence, or a fairly neutral source? Of interest is whether the
leader's trait scores show a pattern of change across these various
types of audiences.
ance will provide such data. Most statistical packages for personal
computers have a one-way analysis of variance procedure that can
easily be applied to exploring this question. If the one-way analyses
of variance "F-tests"are significant (have a probability value of .05 or
less), then the leader's scores differ on that trait for that context fac-
tor (time, topic, audience); in effect, the leader is being adaptive in
that type of situation. By noting where a leader's scores change, the
analyst can put the leadership profile into context. One can note if
the leader puts on a different face when dealing with foreign diplo-
mats than when interacting inside his or her own country; if the
leader has different strategies for dealing with different types of
problems; if he or she adapts to being a political leader in a different
way with experience and a longer tenure in the position. This con-
textual analysis adds depth and nuance to the more general profile
constructed
ity of the leader's scores, trying to ascertain how sensitive the leader
is to the political context. Both kinds of reliability have been deter-
mined for the coding system described here.
Across a number of studies (e.g., Hermann 198oa, 198ob, 1984a,
1987^ Hermann and Hermann 1989), the intercoder agreement for
the seven traits described in this chapter has ranged from .78 to i.oo
between a set of coders and the author. Where there were disagree-
ments, the discussions that followed between coders permitted
refinements of the coding system. Generally, a coder currently is not
permitted to content analyze a leader's interview responses to be
included in the larger data set until he or she achieves intercoder reli-
abilities with the author on all traits that are .90 or higher. As the
automated coding system is being developed, similar types of relia-
bility coefficients are being calculated to determine how accurately
that coding system is in reflecting the original intent of the author.
Information about the leader can be gained by assessing trait reli-
abilities for that particular person. By correlating a leader's odd- and
even-numbered interview responses, the analyst can ascertain how
stable the traits are across time and issues. This index provides
another way of determining how open and closed the leader is likely
to be to contextual information (see, e.g., Hermann 198oa, 1984a).
One of the questions often raised about content analysis coding
systems that use translated material, which we are often forced to do,
regards the effect of the translation on the resulting scores. To ascer-
tain whether there were any effects and the nature of such effects, in
several instances intercoder agreement has been calculated between a
native speaker coding text in the original language and the author
focusing on the translated text. The languages were Russian and
French. In both cases, agreement averaged .92 across the seven traits
(Hermann 198ob, 198ya, 1987^.
Conclusion
By doing a trait analysis of seven dimensions of personality, I have
proposed that it is possible for a researcher or analyst to develop a
profile of the leadership style a particular political leader is likely to
exhibit. The seven personal characteristics provide information
about whether the leader will respect or challenge constraints, will
be open or closed to information from the environment, will focus
more on solving problems or building community, and will be more
hardline or more accommodationist. The traits also interrelate to
suggest which leadership style from a rather wide range is likely to
be dominant in any leader. Constructing such a profile has become
more feasible with the design of computer software that can analyze
leaders' interview responses and with the collection of trait data on
122 political leaders from around the world that comprise a norming
group with which to compare any one leader's scores.
Not only is it feasible now to construct a general profile of a par-
ticular leader, but it is also possible to place such a profile into per-
spective by examining a number of contextual factors that indicate
how stable the characteristics are with certain kinds of changes in the
situation. We can ascertain what the leader is like in general and,
then, what kinds of information he or she is likely to be responsive to
in the political environment. Thus, the general profile indicates
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
Note
I would like to thank Social Science Automation, Inc., for a grant that supported
the writing of this chapter. I am also grateful to Kent Kille, Thomas Preston,
Charles Snare, and Michael Young for comments on earlier drafts of this chapter
and for their help in refining the coding system and the theoretical underpin-
nings of this assessment-at-a-distance technique.
C. Cognitive Analyses
9. Profiling the Operational Codes of
Political Leaders
215
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
P-2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one's
fundamental values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must
one be pessimistic on this score; and in what respects the one and/or
the other?
P-3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?
P-4. How much "control" or "mastery" can one have over historical
development? What is one's role in "moving" and "shaping" history
in the desired direction?
1-1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for
political action?
1-3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and
accepted?
1-5. What are the utility and role of different means for advancing one's
interests?
High
Nuclear nAch
Self (Ideals)
Conflict is permanent, caused by human nature Conflict is temporary, caused by warlike states;
(D); nationalism (E), or international anarchy (F). miscalculation and appeasement are the major
Power disequilibria are major dangers of war. causes of war. Opponents are rational and
Opponents may vary, and responses to conciliation deterrable. Optimism is warranted regarding
or firmness are uncertain. Optimism declines over realization of goals. The political future is
the long run and in the short run depends upon the relatively predictable, and control over historical
quality of leadership and a power equilibrium. development is possible. One should seek
Predictability is limited, as is control over optimal goals vigorously within a
historical development. Seek limited goals comprehensive framework. Control risks by
flexibly with moderate means. Use military limiting means rather than ends. Any tactic
force if the opponent and circumstances require and resource may be appropriate, including the
it, but only as a final resource. use of force when it offers prospect; for large
gains with limited risk.
TYPE DEE
TYPE B
(Ambition)
High
nPow
in degree over time and for different issue areas in the political uni-
verse (Walker and Falkowski 198413; Walker, Schafer, and Young
1998, 1999; Schafer, Young, and Walker 1995; Crichlow 1998;
Walker and Schafer 2000; Schafer and Crichlow 2000; Marfleet
2000; Dille 2000). As representations of reality, philosophical
beliefs are more prone to fluctuation by domain and over time in
response to changes in context (Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998;
Schafer and Crichlow 2000). A leader's instrumental beliefs are less
volatile, making the internal consistency between philosophical and
instrumental beliefs difficult to maintain (Walker, Schafer, and
Young 1998, 1999).
the four types in figure 9.2 differed in the motivational imagery asso-
ciated with them. Type A's beliefs contained images of affiliation,
while the beliefs for type DBF expressed images of power. The other
two types shared an image of achievement while differing in their
images of power (type B) and affiliation (type C). The four quadrants
in figure 9.2 represent not only the ideal types of belief systems in
the Holsti typology but also a two-dimensional simplification of
what is really a three-dimensional personality structure in which the
beliefs are embedded in a motivational foundation established by the
needs for power, affiliation, and achievement emanating from the
nuclear self (Winter and Stewart 197ya; Walker 1983, 2002; Kohut
1971, 1977, 1984; Walker).
In the application of these belief systems to real leaders, Walker
and Falkowski (1984a, 1984^ found that the operational code
beliefs of U.S. presidents and secretaries of state contained the moti-
vational imagery regarding the needs for power, affiliation, and
achievement attributed to them by other analysts. Their belief sys-
tems were hybrids containing beliefs that were not internally consis-
tent with any one of the ideal types in Holsti's typology of opera-
tional codes. The relative frequency of beliefs from each type of belief
system tended to correlate with independent measures of their moti-
vational imagery. The findings support the interpretation that lead-
ers are "structured individuals" whose needs for power, affiliation,
and achievement are related to their belief systems in theoretically
and empirically consistent patterns (Walker and Falkowski 1984a,
1984b; see also Walker, Schafer, Young 1999).
These results reenforced the Leites (1953) hypothesis, noted later
by George (1969), that character and cognition were linked. The
cognitive scripts for political action in the leader's operational code
beliefs may also be character prescriptions that express the identity
of the leader as an actor in the political universe. If so, then the oper-
ational code beliefs of political leaders are not merely diagnostic aids
for processing information from the social environment. They also
include internalized prescriptions that act as causal mechanisms of
political action by virtue of their normative power to express such
motivations as the needs for power, affiliation, and achievement
(Walker 1983).
Profiling the Operational Codes of Political Leaders
SELF OR OTHER
WORDS OR OR
DOMESTIC OR FOREIGN
AN EXAMPLE
A quote taken from President Carter's address to the nation on January 4, 1980:
"Massive Soviet military forces have invaded the small, non-aligned, sovereign
nation of Afghanistan."
2. Tense and category . The verb phrase "have invaded" is in the past tense and
is a negative deed coded, therefore, as punish.
3. Domain. The action involves an actor (Soviet military forces) external to the
speaker's state (the United States); therefore, the domain is foreign.
The complete data line for this statement is other -3 foreign past afghanistan
soviet-afghanistan-conflict-1979-88.
Fig. 9.3. Steps in the Verbs in Context System for coding verbs
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
pretation based on the distance between the score and the nearest
descriptor.
For example, a score of—.21 is anchored to the descriptor "Some-
what Hostile" on the nature of the political universe scale for P- r,
because it is closest to -.25 on the continuum of possible balance
scores. A score of +.41 is anchored to the descriptor "Definitely
Cooperative" on the direction of strategy scale for I-i, because it is
closest to +.50 on the continuum of possible scores. The interpreta-
tion of these two scores for a leader takes the following form: "He or
she believes that the political universe is somewhat hostile, and he or she also
believes that a definitely cooperation-oriented direction is the best strategy in
this universe."
The central tendency indices for the leader's beliefs about the
prospects for realizing political values (P-2) and his or her beliefs
about the intensity of tactics (1-2) also vary between —i.o (e.g.,
Extremely Pessimistic) and +1.0 (e.g., Extremely Optimistic). The
indices are calculated by multiplying each verb by the scale values
associated with its coding category, summing the results, then cal-
culating the average (mean) score and dividing it by three. The fol-
lowing scale shows the range of values and descriptors for these two
indices, which anchor the scores with an interpretation. The inter-
pretation rule for the (P-2) and (1-2) indices is the same as for the
(P-i) and (I-i) indices: assign the descriptor that is closest to the score.
For example, if a leader's P-2 score is —.31, then he or she is
"Somewhat Pessimistic" about the prospects for realizing fundamen-
tal political goals. An 1-2 score of +.27 would indicate that he or she
believes in "Somewhat Cooperative" tactics. The interpretation of
these two scores for a leader takes the following form: "He or she
believes that the prospects for realizing fundamental political goals are some-
what pessimistic, and he or she also believes that somewhat cooperative tactics
are best under this condition."
A series of proportion indices measure the leader's beliefs regarding
control over historical development and the relative utility of differ-
ent ways of exercising political power. The number of self or other
attributions as a percentage of the total number of self and other
attributions varies between o.o (Very Low) and i.o (Very High).
This index measures the locus of control attributed to self (P-4a) over
historical development while the number of other attributions as a
percentage of the total number of self and other attributions (or i
minus 4a) is the locus of control (P-4b) attributed to others. As in
the case of the balance and central tendency indices, the actual scores
for a leader are anchored with a descriptor that is closest to its value.
So a leader with a P-^a score of .53 believes that he or she has a medium
degree of control over historical development while also attributing a medium
level of control (P~4b = .47) to others in the political universe.
The same basic logic applies for calculating and interpreting the
utility of means indices. With six categories for the exercise of polit-
ical power rather than two categories for the locus of historical con-
trol, however, the medium proportion of equal utility for each one is
.16 (1.0/6) instead of .50 (1.0/2). Proportions that exceed or fail to
vations among the six categories for self and others. Calculated sepa-
rately for self and other attributions, the IQV score is subtracted
from i.o to estimate the predictability of the political future (pre-
dictability of others' behavior) and one's own risk orientation (the
predictability of one's own behavior). The higher the estimates from
these calculations, respectively, the more predictable are the political
future and one's own risk orientation. For example, a leader's beliefs
with scores of .08 for P-j and .03 for I-3 attribute very low predictability
to others and to self.
not only with the corresponding philosophical beliefs (P) in the Hol-
sti typology but with the others as well, there are a total of sixteen
types of belief systems possible in figure 9.2.
Holsti's four pairs are as follows: A(I) with A(P), B(I) with B(P),
C(I) with C(P), and DEF(I) with DEF(P). The twelve additional
hybrids are A(I) with DEF(P), A(I) with B(P), A(I) with C(P), DEF(I)
with B(P), DEF(I) with C(P), DEF (I) with A(P), B(I) with C(P), B(I)
with A(P), B(I) with DEF(P), C(I) with A(P), C(I) with DEF(P), and
C(I) with B(P). Collectively, these combinations of beliefs map dif-
ferent definitions of the "self-in-situation" in which different levels
of decision are made.
Key VICS indices locate the "self-in-situation" coordinates of a
leader's operational code within the template in figure 9.4. Two
indices are used to place Self in one of the four quadrants associated
with Holsti's four types of belief systems. They are the strategic (I-i)
index plus Self s locus of historical control (P-4a) index. They are
mapped in figure 9.4 to parallel the axes formed by the power, affilia-
tion, and achievement axes in the Holsti typology of belief systems
in figure 9.2. The VICS strategic index (I-i) scores are plotted on the
vertical axis, and the VICS scores for the locus of control (P-4a) index
are plotted along the horizontal axis.
The association of nPow with conflict (—), nAff with cooperation
( + ), and nAch with greater control over outcomes is consistent with
previous research on the cognitive and behavioral correlates of these
motivations (Winter and Stewart 1977a). The intersection of the
locus of control index for Self (P-4a) with the strategic (I-i) index
determines the leader's location in one of the four quadrants in figure
9.4. The verbal interpretation of the leader's scores should resemble
more closely the instrumental beliefs for the Holsti ideal type
located in this quadrant than the instrumental beliefs for the other
types.
The indices for the philosophical beliefs of this leader may or may
not be located in the same quadrant as the indices for his or her
instrumental beliefs. The indices for the nature of the political uni-
verse (P-i) are plotted on the vertical axis, and Other's locus of con-
trol (P-4b) index is plotted on the horizontal axis. They locate Other
in the political universe.
Once a leader's self-image is located in one of the four quadrants
TYPE A QUADRANT TYPE C QUADRANT
p-l/I-1
Axis
Appease Reward Reward Exploit
DED ODD ODD DDE
FOLLOW/COOPERATE COOPERATE/LEAD
STRATEGIES STRATEGIES
P-4
+0.00 Axis
SUBMIT/CONFLICT CONFLICT/DOMINATE
STRATEGIES STRATEGIES
P-l/I-1
Axis
Note: Key indices of beliefs in the operational code typology are scaled along the vertical
and horizonatal axes to locate a leader's generalized images of self and other in a quadrant.
Reward, Deter, Punish, and Compel tactics are variants of a general strategy of
reciprocity in which Self initiates either an escalatory (E) move or de-escalatory (D)
move and then responds in kind to whether Other escalates (E) or de-escalates (D) in
response to Self s initial move. Appease, Bluff, Exploit, and Bully tactics are variants of a
general strategy of cooperation or conflict in which Self initiates either an escalatory (E)
move or de-escalatory (D) move and then violates the norm of reciprocity after Other
escalates (E) or de-escalates (D) in response to Self s initial move.
Fig. 9.4. Prediction template for key VICS indices. (Data from
Walker, Schafer, and Marfleet 2001.)
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
only for a particular issue toward a specific target and (b) to detect
learning effects on the leader's beliefs over time. As the following
example reveals, this effort may or may not significantly refine the
predictions.
In a study of President Jimmy Carter's operational code (Walker,
Schafer, and Young 1998), the results indicate that the elements of
Carter's belief system remained relatively stable over time for much
of his administration. No statistically significant changes in the
VICS indices occurred for his general operational code until after the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (see table 9.2). Even then, the key
VICS indices that locate Carter in the type C quadrant (I-i and 1-2)
did not change enough to move him unequivocably to a different
quadrant; however, the key indices that summarize the nature of the
political universe (P-i and P-2) did clearly move from type A in the
direction of the type DBF quadrant.
The effect of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on Carter's opera-
tional code toward the Soviet Union was more dramatic, shifting
Carter's beliefs about Soviet-American relations into different quad-
rants of the operational code template. Shifts in the key VICS indices
for Carter's diagnostic propensities from cooperation to conflict plus
a change in the balance of control over historical development relo-
cated Soviet-American relations. The data in table 9.3 show that
Carter's view of the Soviet Union shifted from an extremely friendly
orientation to a somewhat hostile orientation. This shift was accom-
panied by a decrease in the cooperation of his strategic and tactical
choice propensities toward the USSR and a strong increase in his
propensities to shift between conflict and cooperation and between
words and deeds.
(Crichlow 1998). The two leaders of the Labor party in Israel exhib-
ited different operational codes in the earlier decade and moved
toward convergence in the later decade.
In the early 19705 Rabin and Peres viewed the political universe
as definitely hostile but with different degrees of pessimism. While
Peres was not significantly more pessimistic than Rabin, he was
significantly less confident about the ability to control historical
development (Crichlow 1998). This difference in diagnostic propen-
sities located the two leaders in different quadrants of the political
universe for this time period. Moreover, a statistically significant self
difference in strategic choice propensities in the earlier decade
(Crichlow 1998) bolsters the different predictions for moves, tactics,
and strategies by the two leaders during the 19705. These differences
are summarized in table 9.4.
In contrast, the remaining data in table 9.4 indicate that the diag-
nostic propensities of the two leaders converged during the early
19905. They agreed that the nature of the political universe was a
mixture of friendly and hostile forces, shared a mixture of optimism
and pessimism about the realization of political goals, and were
highly confident in their ability to control historical development.
Their strategic and tactical choice propensities also converged in a
definitely cooperative orientation. While both leaders shifted their
views of the political universe, Peres shifted his strategic and tactical
orientations toward agreement with Rabin, who exhibited relatively
little change across the decades (Crichlow 1998).
TABLE 9.4. KEY VICS INDICES FOR ISRAELI LEADERS RABIN AND PERES, 1970S VS.
1990S
1970sa 1990sa
Rabin Peres Rabin Peres
Diagnostic Propensities
P-l. Nature of the political universe -.48 -.60 + .04 06
(definite) (mixed)
P-2. Realization of political values -.36 -.47 -.05 03
(somewhat) (definite) (mixed)
P-4. Control over historical development
a. Self s control .69 -39 .72 66
(high) (medium) (high)
b. Other's control .31 .61 .28 ,34
(low) (medium) (low)
Other's Predicted Quadrant Type DBF B A or DEF
table 9.1 for Rusk's 1961 speech before the American Historical
Association.
Based on his philosophical beliefs, Dean Rusk will have a
propensity to diagnose the political universe as somewhat hos-
tile, be somewhat pessimistic regarding the realization of polit-
ical values, view the predictability of the political future as very
low, believe that he has a medium level of control over histori-
cal development, and attribute a very high role to chance.
Based on his instrumental beliefs, Dean Rusk will have a
propensity to choose a definitely cooperative strategy in the
political universe and implement it with somewhat cooperative
tactics. He will be very low in his orientation toward accepting
risk and will manage risk by being moderately flexible in his
propensity to shift between conflict and cooperation and between
words and deeds in executing his strategy and tactics. He has a
very high propensity to choose appeals and support statements, a
high propensity to choose rewards, a medium propensity to
choose promises or expressions of opposition or resistance, and a
low propensity to choose threats and punishments.
Level 2. Complex Assessments of Comparative Cases
It is possible to compare the operational codes of one or more leaders
over time and to predict corresponding similarities or differences in
behavior. We have demonstrated these possibilities first with the
comparative analysis of President Jimmy Carter's general operational
code profile in table 9.2. Scanning this table, it is easy to identify sta-
tistically significant changes in the philosophical and instrumental
elements of his operational code that forecast changes in his diagnos-
tic, choice, and shift propensities. These changes can then be formu-
lated as a narrative text in the future tense, as illustrated previously
in the case of Dean Rusk, to make forecasts about changes in his
behavior. Or they may take the format of statistical comparisons, as
in table 9.2 for Carter. The same logic can be applied to two leaders
in the same time period and also for each one over time.
Conclusion
No matter what assessment strategy is employed, it is important to
keep some cautions in mind about the validity of the results. These
injunctions take the form of several comparisons that are desirable to
make when it is feasible to do so. Some of them are possible within
the framework of operational code analysis while others require addi-
tional resources.
1. Compare the VICS indices for a leader based on public
statements with VICS indices from private sources and
with assessments of the leader from other sources, for
example, forecasts from other personality profiling meth-
ods or qualitative interpretations based on biographical
analysis.
2. Compare the VICS indices for the leader with the same
indices for advisers and others in the government to see if
there is a consensus. This step is particularly important if
there is doubt about whether the sources for the original
analysis represent the views of a single leader or the pre-
vailing view within a government.
3. Compare the VICS indices from public and private sources
for different policy domains, issue areas, and targets in
order to refine the assessments. Use tests of statistical
significance as criteria for determining how likely differ-
ences in VICS indices could have occurred by chance.
4. Compare the assessments from an operational code analy-
sis against rival predictive models, for example, models of
foreign policy decision making that emphasize other
domestic or external variables than the ones captured by
the VICS indices. They could be forecasts from geographic
area experts or from other schools of international rela-
tions theory.
All of these comparisons are potentially useful in deciding
whether operational code assessments are consistent with other evi-
dence and reside within the mainstream of conventional wisdom.
When the forecasts are outside an existing consensus, or when there
is no consensus from the application of different kinds of forecasting
Profiling the Operational Codes of Political Leaders
246
Assessing Integrative Complexity at a Distance
focused on the internal and external factors that govern the level of
complexity at which a person is functioning at a specific time and in
a specific situation. Although, as is explained in more detail later, it
is recognized that the level of complexity has both trait ("conceptual
complexity") and state ("integrative complexity") characteristics, the
research emphasis is on the latter—partly to counterbalance the
more common orientation toward the former.
Scores on integrative or conceptual complexity assess the differen-
tiation and integration of information processing (Schroder, Driver,
and Streufert 1967; Suedfeld, Tetlock, and Streufert 1992). Unlike
most approaches in this area, the procedure for scoring these two
components has been adapted for use with almost any connected ver-
bal material, such as speeches and interviews. This is what makes the
system applicable to "measuring personality at a distance." Differen-
tiation refers to an individual's or group's recognition of different
perspectives, characteristics, or dimensions of stimuli (which may be
people, events, theories, policies, etc.); integration is the perception
of connections among those differentiated perspectives, characteris-
tics, or dimensions. Differentiation is indicated when a passage
makes references to alternative characteristics or viewpoints, at least
two of which are viewed as legitimate. Integration is indicated when
the passage makes references to trade-offs between alternatives, con-
structs a synthesis that combines them, or situates them in an over-
arching contextual structure. Both of these variables can be assessed
from most kinds of connected verbal material.
Trait Complexity
A longitudinal examination of Robert E. Lee's integrative complex-
ity (Suedfeld, Corteen, and McCormick 1986) effectively confirms
the dual trait and state nature of information processing complexity.
Lee's complexity was generally high throughout most of his adult
life but declined as the adversities of prolonged war against an enemy
of superior strength became more and more severe. With the end of
the Civil War, it recovered its previous high level.
Suedfeld suggests that the trait component of complexity predis-
poses people to react to environmental factors with different levels of
state complexity. The subsequent level of state complexity is jointly
determined by trait complexity and the characteristics of the prob-
lem situation. This, the cognitive manager model (Suedfeld 1992a),
argues that complexity is adjusted on the basis of the importance and
urgency of the problem, other problems having to be solved in the
same time frame, the individual's intellectual and other relevant
resources, and the environmental and social factors discussed later in
this chapter.
An alternative explanation is that state complexity affects the rela-
tionship between trait complexity and behavior—that is, as a mod-
erator variable (Tellegen, Kamp, and Watson 1982). Clearly,
research on how these components interact in a variety of contexts,
both replicating and expanding the findings concerning General
Lee's pattern, would be desirable.
In formulations of conceptual complexity, differentiation and
integration are stable personality traits of information processing
style that vary among individuals (Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
State Complexity
Researchers have explored a range of possible influences on the level
of complexity exhibited in any specific situation. These include
intrapsychic factors as well as several categories of situational factors:
the environment, social or political considerations, and the nature of
the task.
Intrapsychic Factors
A number of intrapsychic factors can be viewed as intervening
between stable and pervasive trait complexity and the more dynamic
and responsive dimension of state complexity. Although content and
structure are generally independent, such internal characteristics
may also act to increase the correlation between them.
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
for the purpose of enhancing national defense. One key lesson of the
value pluralism model is, therefore, not to expect reliable main
effects of ideology. Rather, the model predicts ideology by issue
interactions in which the point of maximal complexity of reasoning
shifts as a function of both the value priorities of the respondents and
the perceived relevance of "issue framing" to highly ranked values.
The left-right spectrum is not the only foundation for differential
value conflict. For example, pre—Civil War moderates who were
opposed to slavery but also wanted to preserve the Union were obvi-
ously in more conflict and, as predicted, showed higher integrative
complexity than either radical abolitionists or supporters of slavery
(Tetlock, Armor, and Peterson 1994). In another archival study, the
provincial government of British Columbia and a panel of scientists
that it had appointed to develop forest management policy in a sen-
sitive old-growth area were caught in the midst of a controversy
between groups wanting to maintain the economic benefits of log-
ging and those wanting to ensure the protection of forested wilder-
ness (Lavallee and Suedfeld 1997). As Tetlock's model predicted, the
government and its scientists showed higher complexity than did
environmental activists and representatives of timber companies. In
an experimental setting, students also write significantly more com-
plex essays discussing the relation between two values that they
rated as highly conflicting (e.g., preserving the environment vs. a
growing economy) than in discussing two not very conflicting values
(e.g., a growing economy and the preservation of human life) (Sued-
feld and Wallbaum 1992).
Value pluralism, then, will lead to higher levels of complexity
when there are two or more values that are fairly well balanced in
importance, so that any resolution must accept the legitimacy of
both. The situation must be such that maximization of either would
lead to infringement of the other; the only way out is to try to see
how they can be related and what kind of trade-off or compromise
could obtain at least some reasonably satisfactory level of both. This
is, of course, the very definition of a complex solution to a problem.
By contrast, those who must advance only one important value do
not need to develop such compromise positions.
Lavallee and Suedfeld (1997) have suggested that a similar mech-
anism affects complexity levels in situations that evoke motive plural-
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
Situational Characteristics
Situational characteristics whose impact on complexity has been
investigated include the severity of environmental stressors, social
factors, and the nature of the task. The measure of integrative com-
plexity captures environmental influences such as domain and task
complexity. Building on this research, cognitive management and
metacomplexity theorists need further to examine the ways in which
individuals are able (or choose) to bring psychological propensities
such as compartmentalization and attribution to bear on particular
problem situations.
Social Factors
A variety of social factors are relevant to complexity, including the
desire to project a certain image, the nature and perceived opinions
of the audience in a persuasion situation, the source's position, which
also determines accountability, and intragroup cohesiveness and
diversity.
Impression Management
Most of the integrative complexity research reviewed in this chapter
assumes that complexity reveals intrapsychic processes: that people
who speak or write in integratively simple or complex ways are
thinking about the issue in roughly equivalent simple or complex
ways. By contrast, an impression management explanation asserts that
the way people speak and write is a function of the political goals
they have in the interpersonal or institutional world they inhabit. In
this view, an issue may be discussed not at the level of complexity at
which the source actually thinks about it but rather at the level that
the source believes will create the desired impression on the target
audience. For example, Tetlock (19853., 1985^ has argued that
deliberate simplification of statements can be used to signal firmness
to an opponent, while more complex formulations could be used to
project a misleading image of reasonableness and willingness to lis-
ten to the other side. One may also want to allay or avoid criticism
Assessing Integrative Complexity at a Distance
Other Factors
Another relevant social factor is the nature and perceived opinions of
the audience in a persuasion situation (Guttieri, Suedfeld, and Wal-
lace 1995; Suedfeld and Wallbaum 1992; Tetlock 1985^, which
influences perceived accountability for one's position (Tetlock and
Boettger 1989, 1994). In several experiments, integrative complex-
ity was found to increase when students were expected to have to dis-
cuss their ideas later with another student, whose opinions on the
topics they did not know (Tetlock, Skitka, and Boettger 1989), or
with an expert who might judge the quality of their responses (Tet-
lock and Boettger 1994; Tetlock and Kim 1987). Incidentally,
accountability also enhances other cognitive maneuvers such as pass-
ing the buck to other decision makers, procrastinating, and paying
increased attention to irrelevant information (Tetlock and Boettger
1989). In these studies, the opinion of the eventual audience was
unknown to the subject; it is interesting to note that when students
were made accountable to an audience either known to agree with
them or known to disagree, the former condition evoked higher
Assessing Integrative Complexity at a Distance
Problem Characteristics
The nature of the problems being faced or the decisions having to be
made is important. As the cognitive manager model predicts, greater
complexity is brought to bear on tasks that are both important and
difficult. Maoz and Shayer (1987), for example, showed that Israeli
prime ministers used more complex arguments when trying to per-
suade the Knesset to adopt a conciliatory rather than a bellicose
stance toward Arab adversaries. This may be viewed as a rhetorical
strategy as well as the prime ministers' perception of the conciliatory
persuasion task "as more difficult and demanding" (Maoz and Shayer
1987, 575). As Ceci and Ruiz (1992) have pointed out, tasks that are
not highly motivating lead to underestimations of the person's
capacity for complexity.
Different problems being addressed in the same time period may
evoke different complexity levels. Tetlock (1985a, 1988) found that
Soviet leaders varied in the complexity with which they approached
a variety of foreign and domestic issues, the level varying with
(among other factors) the severity of difficulties at a given time.
Mikhail Gorbachev, in particular, was consistently more complex in
foreign policy contexts than in regard to internal economics and pol-
itics (Wallace, Suedfeld, and Thachuk 1996).
Personal crises, such as a marital breakup, the death of someone
close, occupational setbacks, and illness, seem to evoke a different
pattern from societal hazards such as actual or impending war. It
may be that the latter are seen as less amenable to the individual's
control or coping strategies. At least among men, personal crises are
accompanied by increases in complexity (Suedfeld and Bluck 1993;
Suedfeld and Granatstein 1995), which disappear after the crisis
ends. Women's complexity has not shown such variability in
response to personal problems.
Some interesting data have been collected concerning materials
that deal with either past or future events. One case study showed
Assessing Integrative Complexity at a Distance
Technical Aspects
A number of technical issues raised in critiques of the integrative
complexity approach have not yet been fully settled.
Source Identity
It is sometimes difficult to establish how completely the material
being scored is actually the product of the supposed source. The two
most frequently encountered questions are whether the material may
have been generated by an assistant, such as a ghostwriter, speech
writer, or public relations specialist, and whether the material trans-
lated from another language into English can be trusted to reflect the
complexity of the source rather than of the translator.
The answer to the first question can only be tentative. In studies
that scored both personal letters and public statements of the same
political leader, issued in the same time period, no significant com-
plexity differences have been found (e.g., Suedfeld and Rank 1976).
Many of the documents scored for complexity either have been holo-
graphs or showed extensive editing and annotation in the hand of the
named source; the conclusion has generally been that, at least in the
case of important statements, leaders either write much of the mate-
rial themselves (although they may allow others to "polish" the
product), set firm guidelines for the writer that embody their own
cognitive approach, modify the final product to be compatible with
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
how they think about the issue, or select writers whose thinking
closely matches their own (Suedfeld, Tetlock, and Ramirez 1977;
Suedfeld, Tetlock, and Streufert 1992). Last, no consistent differ-
ences have been found as a function of whether the material appears
in personal or public communications, the latter including those
directed to a small group of colleagues as well as those intended for
widespread dissemination. On the other hand, as indicated previ-
ously, it has been argued that, among eminent people, the realization
that even diaries and personal letters may someday be published
erodes the border between public and private utterances. The net
result of these factors should be a good fit between the information-
processing complexity of the named source and the integrative com-
plexity reflected in the product. It is important, however, to be aware
of individual and cultural differences: for example, even today some
eminent statesmen always write their own material (e.g., Vaclav
Havel), and in some cultures a person in a prominent position merely
delivers utterances written by functionaries (e.g., the British and
Canadian Speeches from the Throne and the speeches of Japanese
prime ministers).
The matter of translations is easier to deal with. In a number of
studies where both the original statement (in Russian, German,
Hungarian, French, or Spanish) and an "official" English translation
have been scored, no significant difference has ever been found in the
complexity of the two versions. It may be that such differences could
emerge if the original were in a non-European language, but there is
no a priori reason to expect this to happen. In the absence of evidence
to the contrary, we may assume that professional translators are able
to reproduce the complexity level of the original statement.
Scorer Knowledge
Another issue is how much background or contextual information a
scorer should have (see, e.g., Suedfeld and Bluck 1996). This is par-
ticularly problematic when dealing with historical, biographical,
and political materials. There is no universal answer to this question,
because it is quite feasible for scorers who know nothing about con-
text nevertheless to score passages validly; the problem arises when
the scorer's understanding or ignorance of allusions or connotations
in the text might alter the score. We have conducted tests with both
Assessing Integrative Complexity at a Distance
Measurement
The material in this section is excerpted from "The Conceptual/Inte-
grative Complexity Scoring Manual" (Baker-Brown et al. 1992).
Integrative complexity scoring proceeds on a 1-7 scale (see
table 10.1). Scores of i indicate no evidence of either differentia-
tion or integration. The author relies on unidimensional and eval-
uatively consistent rules for processing information. Scores of 3
indicate moderate or even high differentiation, but no integration.
The passage shows recognition of at least two distinct dimensions
of judgment but fails to consider possible conceptual connections
between these dimensions. Scores of 5 indicate moderate to high
differentiation and moderate integration. The author notes the
existence of conceptual connections between differentiated dimen-
sions of judgment. These integrative cognitions can take a variety
of forms: the identification of a superordinate category linking two
concepts, insights into the shared attributes of differentiated
dimensions, the recognition of conflicting goals or value trade-offs,
the specification of interactive effects or causes for an event, and
the elaboration of possible reasons why reasonable people view the
same event in different ways. Scores of 7 indicate high differentia-
tion and high integration. A general principle provides a concep-
tual framework for understanding specific interactions among dif-
ferentiated dimensions. This type of systemic analysis yields
second-order integration principles that place in context, and per-
haps reveal, limits on the generalizability of integration rules that
operate at the scale value of 5. Scores of 2, 4, and 6 represent tran-
sitional levels in conceptual structure. Here the dimensions of dif-
ferentiation or integration that would, if clearly stated, justify the
next higher score are implicit and emergent rather than explicit
and fully articulated.
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
The PCT (Schroder et al. 1967) was the method of choice in the
conceptual complexity research. For the PCT, research participants
were asked to complete six sentence stems (i.e., write six paragraphs)
addressing important domains of the social cognition: interpersonal
conflict (e.g., "When I am criticized . . ."), uncertainty (e.g., "When
I don't know what to do . . ."), and orientation toward authority
(e.g., "Rules . . ."). Typically one to two minutes were allocated per
completion. Subsequent variations on these instructions modified
the specific topics, as well as the number of paragraphs to be written,
and significantly lengthened the amount of time allowed per stem to
as much as ten minutes, in order to use the PCT as a power test
rather than as a speed test.
A significant variation, originated by Claunch (1964), has been to
present participants with a single topic on which they are asked to
write an essay. De Vries and Walker (1987) had participants write an
essay on capital punishment, and de Vries (1988) had individuals
respond to the question, "Who am I?" More recently, Streufert (e.g.,
Streufert and Swezey 1986) has used a lengthy guided interview as
the basis for the assessment of complexity. Tasks of this sort, when
material is being generated specifically in the course of the study,
require careful instructions both to ensure that respondents evaluate
the materials on which they are writing and do not merely provide
descriptive accounts, which are unscorable, and to ensure that the
format does not bias the responses in the direction of either low or
high complexity.
Comparisons of data-generating techniques such as the PCT,
essays, or guided interviews show only minor variations in mean
complexity scores. In general, higher complexity scores are found in
material that has been generated after some thought or planning has
taken place and under conditions of little or no time constraint.
Lower complexity scores are found in material that was generated
with little prior thought and under strict time-limiting conditions.
Written accounts tend to have higher scores than oral material (i.e.,
transcriptions of interviews), probably because the latter are more
spontaneous (less carefully thought out in advance) as well as subject
to shorter time schemata.
The basic qualification for becoming a trained complexity coder is
to reach a correlation of at least r = 0.85 with an expert coder. This
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
271
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
Stanley A. Renshon
277
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
two important events occurred for her and young Bill Clinton. First,
she met and began to date Roger ("Dude") Clinton, a seemingly
well-heeled man about town whose family owned a Buick dealership
in Hot Springs. Then, in the fall of 1947, Mrs. Kelley left Hope for
New Orleans to train to become a nurse-anesthetist. She was gone
from Hope for approximately two years, during which time young
Bill Clinton was left in the care of his grandparents, Edith and
Eldridge Cassidy. Thus young Bill Clinton not only lost his father
before he was born but was psychologically abandoned by his mother
during the crucial developmental period between the ages of one and
three.
Mrs. Kelley returned to Hope and her family's home after com-
pleting her training and settled into a work and social life that
increasingly revolved around Roger Clinton. They were married on
June 9, 1950, at which time young Bill was just shy of his fourth
birthday, his mother was twenty-seven, and Roger was forty. The
marriage was tempestuous. A major reason was Roger Clinton's alco-
holism, but there were other problems as well.
the best brief summary of her life and persona is the portrait of her as
a woman who
worked hard and played hard, with an affinity for the night-
clubs and the thoroughbred horse-racing tracks. . . . In later
years, her flightiness and raucous laughter coupled with her
love of flashy and multiple pieces of jewelry and colorful ensem-
bles gave her an Auntie Mame quality as surely as her jutting
jaw, spidery false eyelashes, and quarter- moon grin gave her an
uncanny resemblance to Bette Midler. (Oakley 1994, 23)
Mrs. Kelley had ambition and possessed the ability and determi-
nation to accomplish her purposes. A major purpose early on was to
find a way out of her mother's home and the tensions that existed in
it. She seems to have identified strongly with her gentle, people-lov-
ing father and rebelled against any identification with a mother she
saw as angry and vindictive (especially toward her father).2
A central feature of her psychology was her narcissism. One form
this took was her great concern with appearances—hers and others.
From the vision of how she would look in the crisp white uniform of
the profession she chose in part because of this image, to her concern
with the outward appearance of the men she married and the woman
her son brought home from Yale, appearance, not substance, seemed
to play a major role.
Another form her narcissism took was her desire to be noticed,
indeed, to be the center of attention and doing whatever was neces-
sary to ensure that position. From carefully constructing her Auntie
Mame persona to joining entertainers on stage, Mrs. Kelley liked the
spotlight. As she says of her partying in Hot Springs, "I was obvi-
ously born with a flashy streak inside me, just waiting to burst out,
and Hot Springs let me be me with a vengeance" (1994a, 107).
Her narcissism was also reflected in the men she chose, men whose
own narcissistic charm masked questionable character and behavior.
Mrs. Kelley found Roger Clinton's
vast vanity charming. I like a man who likes himself, and
Roger Clinton certainly seemed to approve of Roger Clinton.
He was always trying to catch his reflection in a mirror or a
window. And when he was playing host, you've never seen such
strutting in your life. (19943, 81)
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
energy, they were certainly strong rivals. The effect of her attach-
ment to partying must also be considered in the context of the loss of
Clinton's father. Given that one effect of losing a parent at an earlier
age is a tendency to turn more forcefully to the remaining parent,
Mrs. Kelley needed to be all the more available to her son. Yet she
neglected him for her own pursuits.
Mrs. Kelley recalls that her son "never gave any overt indication
that he didn't approve of my gambling, or of our social drinking;
he just simply moved quietly in the other direction" (1994a, 138).
What she doesn't mention is that she apparently tried to reduce her
conflict between partying and mothering by bringing her son with
her on her nocturnal rounds. There were a number of local "night-
clubs[,} like the Vapors Supper Club, the Southern Club and the
Pines, [which] were among the most popular watering holes, and
Bill Clinton's mother, Virginia, made the rounds whenever possi-
ble, occasionally dragging her son Billy on the night's merriment" (Oak-
ley 1994, 27, 96, emphasis added; see also Sheehy 1992, 214). Mrs.
Kelley said she only took her son "to nightclubs to listen to jazz,
[but] he was offended by the smoke and the drinking" (Wills
1992, 63).
A similar conflict between her own pleasures and her responsibil-
ities was found in her professional life. Mrs. Kelley recalls that she
went to the track every day it was in session (1994a, 109). Both the
gambling and the scene attracted her. The problem was that, as a
nurse, she was frequently on call. As a solution to this problem, she
scheduled her cases in the mornings during racing season so she
could go to the track in the afternoons. This is assuredly a dramatic
reflection of the relative weight that Mrs. Kelley gave to her profes-
sion and her personal pleasure.
Mrs. Kelley's narcissism raises the question of her adoration for
her son: What portion stemmed from her own needs and how much
was a real appreciation of his accomplishments? The children of nar-
cissistic adults are often viewed by the parent as extensions of them-
selves, reflective of their own sterling qualities. In doing well, the
child reflects positively on the specialness of the parent. When Mrs.
Kelley notes, "I'm a shameless reveler in my son's careers and accom-
plishments," her words suggest something more than just pride
(1994a, 14).
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
The interpersonal style of both Virginia Kelley and her son Bill is
characterized by a movement toward people. Mrs. Kelley has charac-
terized herself as a person who trusted others and was, if anything,
too trusting. She and others have characterized Clinton in the same
way.
However, one important lesson of Clinton's early experiences was
that it was unwise to invest too much of oneself in individual rela-
tionships and to turn to a broad range of others to seek personal
confirmation. The origin of Clinton's turn toward others can be
traced to the loss of his biological father and the loss of his mother
when she went to New Orleans for two years to study, a fact that his
traumatic memories of their infrequent visits attest was an impor-
tant early experience.
A child who loses a parent often longs for him or her and can
become "object hungry" (Neubauer 1960, 68). That is, they search
for persons (objects) able to provide what is missed in the absent par-
ent (in this case parents). Clinton's growing realization that he didn't
have a father, coupled with the simultaneous absence of his mother,
was a powerful inducement for him to seek out other people.4
As powerful as they were, these early lessons do not, in and of
themselves, fully account for the nature of Clinton's interpersonal
relationships and the low levels of trust that underlie them. To do so,
we must examine the relationship among Clinton, his mother, and
his stepfather.
Parental irregularity, lack of reliability, and concern with plea-
sures at the expense of a commitment to a firmly rooted family life
can be seen by a child as a form of betrayal. Clinton's stepfather was
no more reliable than his mother. He often went out and left his
stepson at home alone in the evening or all night (1994a, 111, 124).
Clinton could count on neither parent, individually or as a couple.
By the mid-1950s, when Bill Clinton was in adolescence, Mrs. Kel-
ley's husband was drunk "nearly every single day" (1994a, 117). The
fights between them escalated: verbal abuse sometimes turned phys-
ical. Mrs. Kelley began to secretly put away money. It is from this
period that the dramatic stories date about Clinton standing up to
his stepfather to protect his mother and young brother. Even Clin-
William Jefferson Clinton's Psychology
doing everything. 'Why are we here if we don't go for it?' she asked
at the end" (Woodward 1994, T 10-1 : )-
It was Hillary Clinton who championed the large, mismanaged,
and many believed unnecessary, government program to purchase
vaccines for children. It was also Hillary Clinton who was the chief
architect and strategist for the administration's complex health care
proposal that went down to ignominious defeat.
The problem of who will say no to the president is compounded
by the problem of who can say no to his wife. Given her capac-
ity to be sarcastic and angry with those who disagree with her,
her tendency to retain her anger, and her obvious power in the
administration, her views and recommendations are rarely chal-
lenged. A congressional aide who has dealt with her has said her
staff is "terrified of her. . . . they are very loyal . . . but they are
scared to death . . . she will fire them if they tell her the truth.
(Bruck 1994, 88)
he does to see who's with you, who's against you, and to make
sure they don't take advantage of you. He's not expecting to be
jumped, but she always is. So she's on the defensive. (Bruck
1994,63)
She "has long been inclined toward bunker mentality. She tolerates
critics much less graciously than her husband. . . . she assigns parti-
san evil to most detraction" (Brummett 1994, 244).
High Ambition
There could be little mistaking Bill Clinton's substantial level of
ambition (used here in a purely descriptive sense). His path from
Hope, a small town in rural Arkansas, to 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
in Washington, DC, is a chronicle of, and a testament to, his per-
sonal and political ambitions.
There was also little doubt that Clinton had the skills to accom-
plish his ambition—a great reserve of energy, strong intelligence,
and a capacity to persist in his investment in his success and work.
Historically there are numerous accounts of Clinton's high level of
activity, beginning with his high school years and extending
through college at Georgetown University; Oxford University,
which he attended as a Rhodes Scholar; and Yale Law School. The
energy to fund his psychological investments was evident during his
presidential campaign. Describing Governor Clinton's frenetic
schedule during the presidential campaign, Senator David Pryor, a
good friend, noted that he had
enormous energy. . . . His schedule defied human tolerance.
. . . On February 17, the day before the New Hampshire pri-
mary vote, he made 17 stops over the state. At 11:30 that
night, schedule completed, he asked, "Isn't there a bowling
alley that's open all night? We need to shake some hands." (in
Levin 1992)
Character Integrity
The second basic element of character—integrity—requires us to ask
of Bill Clinton, What is the relationship between the ideals and val-
ues that truly define who he is and the person he presents himself to
be?
There was evidence in the campaign that Clinton entertained few
doubts about his motives, values, and candor. Plagued by questions
about his integrity and honesty during the campaign, he responded
by presenting himself as a man of conviction, determination, and
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
Relatedness
On the face of it, it seems clear that Clinton's interpersonal style
reflects movement toward people. Much has been made of his empa-
thy and natural friendliness, and to a substantial degree (with some
very important caveats) these characterizations appear accurate.
Much has also been written about Clinton's difficulty in saying
"no" and his eagerness to please. Both are often attributed to "Clin-
ton's well-known need to be liked." Indeed, the brief biography of
Governor Clinton that appeared on the front page of the New York
Times (Kelly 1992) on the day of his election was entitled "A Man
Who Wants to Be Liked and Is."
But the idea of a "need to be liked" does not fully come to grips
with another psychological tributary of Clinton's political style—his
tendency to build up and then lash out against institutions or groups
who oppose his policies. The press is one example of such a group,
but there are others, including lobbyists, special interests, "profiteer-
ing drug companies," "greedy doctors," "muscle-bound labor
unions," and so on. Presidents, like others, can be known by, and can
benefit from, having certain kinds of enemies. However, for a man
who is said to have such a strong need to be liked, his list of enemies
is rather long and inclusive, and the characterizations are often some-
what harsh. It appears that Clinton does not want to be liked so
much as be validated. He wants others to accept the view of himself
that he holds, and when they don't, he disowns them and turns
against them angrily.
William Jefferson Clinton's Psychology
Persistence
Impatience
Bill Clinton is a man in a hurry. When asked by Dan Rather what
his biggest disappointment in the presidency had been, he
responded, "How hard it is to do everything I want to do as quickly
as I want to do it. . . . I {still] get frustrated. . . . I'm an impatient
person by nature, and I want to do things" (1993c, 479).
David Mathews, who has known Clinton for over twenty years,
observed of his first term as governor, "When he began his adminis-
tration in 1979, Bill was like a man in a hurry to accomplish many
things in a short time. . . . I think somehow Bill felt that, through
his sheer energy, he could change our state overnight" (in Levin
1992, 133).
In his presidency, a large number of public deadlines were self-
imposed and unnecessary. For example, Clinton had publicly vowed
to pick his whole cabinet by Christmas, a promise that led to a "mad
scramble" (Drew 1994, 31). Appearing on Larry King Live on June 4,
1992, Clinton said, "I know I can pass a sweeping package of legis-
lation during the first hundred days of my administration." In a May
1992 Fortune magazine article, Clinton is quoted as saying he will
"put together a transition team to 'hit the ground running/ result-
ing in one of those great 100 days in which Congress would adopt
my health care and education policies, my energy and economic ini-
tiatives."
The point here is not to criticize Clinton because of delays or slip-
pages in the schedules he announced but rather to underscore that
the time limits placed on him were of his own making and, strictly
speaking, were not necessary. It seems clear that the president's time
frame was unrealistic, given the complexity of what he was under-
taking. It was also unnecessary and counterproductive to make such
commitments publicly and prematurely. There is no evidence that
the public expected or demanded that he produce detailed legisla-
tion in a variety of areas, some of which would be complex and con-
tentious, and that it be passed or submitted to Congress within his
first one hundred days in office.
The Need to Be Special
Bill Clinton was a very public president and most likely will continue
to be a very public ex-president. For him to be appreciated, others,
William Jefferson Clinton's Psychology
especially the public, must know all he is doing. Clinton is a man with
strong analytic capacities and a mastery of facts that comes from
decades of immersion in policy, and he wants the public to know it,
Consider in this regard the economic conference staged by the
newly elected president and his staff in December 1992 in Little
Rock during the transition period. Some advisers argued against it,
believing (correctly, it turned out) that it would take time away from
other important matters of planning and implementation. However,
soon-to-be president Clinton wanted to make a strong impression as
someone who had mastered the complexity of the American econ-
omy. "Professor" Clinton demonstrated at length his grasp of policy
detail, putting his intelligence on display in a setting structured to
be supportive of ideas he had presented during the campaign. "Clin-
ton got to do what he loves most: talk policy and show off his knowl-
edge" (Drew 1994, 27).
It is not surprising that someone with Clinton's large and success-
ful ambitions, sometimes realized against great odds, would come to
think of himself as somewhat special and unique. And I believe that
he did see himself as uniquely experienced and qualified to provide
this country with leadership. Both views, of course, had their origins
in Clinton's early experience with his mother's view of him.
The sense of being special can also be reflected in the view that one
has been singled out and treated differently, whether for good or for
bad. For Clinton, this often takes the form of pointing out the
impossible standards to which he is held. For example, when the
issue of his marital fidelity was raised during the campaign, Clinton
was suffused with a sense of his own victimization and a sense of
being singled out for martyrdom. He complained loudly to his trav-
eling companions, "No one has ever been through what I've been
through in this thing" (Goldman et al. 1994, 118). In the famous
Rolling Stone interview (Wenner and Greider 1993, 81), he corn-
plained of being held to "an impossible standard" and of "never" get-
ting credit for his accomplishments in spite of having "fought my
guts out." He conveys a sense of being above the law because of his
special gifts.
The sense of having been singled out became of the important,
major, or unusual nature of what one is trying to accomplish calls
attention to one's efforts and to the valiant struggle one is waging. It
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
has the effect of underscoring the unique and selfless nature of one's
efforts. Both of these views are consistent with Clinton's idealized
view of his own behavior, motives, and policy ambitions.
Taking Risks
Clinton's risk taking, like his character, contains inconsistent ele-
ments. In some areas he is not reckless and many of his risks are
hedged. His frequent attempts to have it both ways are one strategy
for managing these larger risks. On the other hand, the combination
of strong ambition, high self-confidence, and feelings of being spe-
cial and above the rules that govern others frequently pushes him
toward substantial risk taking, often of a self-absorbed type.
On occasion, Clinton's belief that he can accomplish what has
eluded others leads him to take large risks and to attempt to mask
rather than hedge them. One prime example is the president's ambi-
tious and complex health care plan. It should be kept in mind that
this plan represented a risk, not only for President Clinton but for
the public. He was willing to take a large policy gamble that his
untried plan would work as promised, that it would not result in
William Jefferson Clinton's Psychology
Taking Responsibility
Competition
Clinton's psychology combines an intense desire to accomplish with
a highly competitive nature. This trait has been part of his behavior
from childhood and has been observed over many years of Clinton's
life in differing contexts.
Individuals vary substantially in the degree to which they derive
satisfaction from triumphing over others, from winning, or from
accomplishing the goal itself. For some people, the enjoyment of
what they accomplish outweighs whatever satisfaction they receive
from winning or beating others. For others the reverse is true. In
Clinton's psychology the three types of satisfaction are closely
linked. His desire to win by having things done totally his way sug-
gests that his reputation as a man too ready to compromise is not
always deserved.
Achievement
By a number of different measures, Clinton is highly motivated to
achieve. Ambition is the foundation of achievement but is not syn-
onymous with it. There must be a match between the level of one's
ambition and the level and applicability of the skills one has to
accomplish it. Ordinarily, a strong need for achievement is a desir-
able trait in a president. A president who lacks a desire to achieve
will also lack a strong sense of what he wants to accomplish and the
conviction to follow through, resulting in presidential drift. There
are, however, costs involved in having too much achievement moti-
vation (Winter 1995, 127-28).
One of the most important questions here is how a president
defines accomplishment. How much is "good"? How much is
"enough"? What functions does accomplishment serve in the presi-
dent's overall psychology?
The combination of intense ambition, high self-confidence, and
strong self-regard leads Clinton to be very directed toward achieve-
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
Notes
abusive and provided legal papers that helped his mother get divorced. At any
rate, to whatever extent his behavior represented some aspect of an oedipal situ-
ation his victory was short lived. Clinton's real rival during the oedipal period
(roughly four through six) was not only his stepfather but his mother's immer-
sion in Hot Springs nightlife.
3. Since Hempsted County, in which Hope was located, was a dry town,
Roger's whiskey making was illegal (Kelley 1994a, 80). He also apparently ran
a bookie joint in Hope (76).
4. It is also possible that there is some biologically based aspect to Clinton's
early sociability; however, the only (inconclusive) data his mother presents that
is relevant to this possibility is that he slept a lot in the first year or so of his life
(Kelley 1994a, 70).
5. There are obviously oedipal overtones in this situation. One could view it as
Clinton's unconscious attempt to replace his father and win his oedipal victory.
6. In Clinton's court affidavit, he wrote that his stepfather threatened "1:0
mash my face in if I took her {his mother's] part" (Kelley 1994a, 147).
7. This is one primary trait that creates an interpersonal mismatch in the
Clinton relationship: he wants validation and the emotional support of others,
but she is not able to easily give it to him. There are, throughout the materials
analyzed in conjunction with this book, a number of instances that reflect this
basic psychological mismatch (Brummett 1994, 37, 50; see also Bruck 1993,
72). One friend who had known Clinton a long time said:
Clinton needs reinforcement all the time . . . {and} looks for affirmation in
even the smallest things. Sometimes you can see that Clinton needs this
affirmation and Hillary doesn't give it to him. During the campaign you
could see her be aloof when he needed . . . just a little warmth. She can be
very cold. He's alone a lot. Hillary isn't the one to provide approval. (Drew
1994, 2 33)
The other side of that issue is that joining together two very smart, very
ambitious people who are highly self-confident about the virtues of their partic-
ular views—one who tends to be very disorganized and one who doesn't—ca.n
also create strains. In Arkansas, to protect her husband, Hillary Clinton, along
with two other Clinton aides—Betsey Wright and Joan Roberts—put up a pro-
tective cordon around him, which had the effect of not only protecting Clinton
but limiting him. For a person who dislikes boundaries, the result was pre-
dictable. When Wright insisted that a policeman accompany the governor on his
early morning jogs, Clinton shouted, "I won't have it! I won't have it!" (Maraniss
1995,427).
Over the years, Hillary Clinton has had to take on many roles in their life,
some no doubt less congenial to her than others. Before Leon Panetta became
chief of staff, she had been the one in charge of organizing her husband's time
and staff (Drew 1994, 49, 137, 254). Since their time in the governor's mansion,
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
she had become his gatekeeper, especially after his 1980 reelection defeat, and
she increasingly took on the role in the Clinton family of breadwinner.
8. The issue of Clinton's extramarital relationships came up several times
during the presidential campaign and again after Clinton was in office. Extra-
marital relationships occur for many reasons and take many forms. The issues
involved in such behavior ordinarily go well beyond the simple question of
whether or not a president or candidate had a sexual relationship outside of his
marriage (Renshon 1996a).
Did Clinton have extramarital relationships? A substantial body of evidence
suggests he did. Betsey Wright, long-time aide to Clinton over several decades,
recalls having felt in 1988, before Clinton was set to announce his plan to run
that year for president, that
the time had come to get past what she considered his self-denying ten-
dencies and face the issue squarely. For years, she told friends later, she had
been covering up for him. She was convinced that some state troopers were
soliciting women for him. . . . "Okay," she said to him . . . then started list-
ing the names of women he had allegedly had affairs with and the places
where they were said to have occurred. "Now, I want you to tell me the
truth about each one." She went over the list twice with Clinton, accord-
ing to her later account, the second time trying to determine whether any
of the women might tell their stories to the press. At the end . . . she sug-
gested that he should not get into the race, (quoted in Maraniss 1995,
440-41)
Roger Starr, managing editor of the Arkansas Democrat for most of Clinton's
tenure as governor, recalls: "We were talking about the Gary Hart factor in pol-
itics, and I asked him something to the effect of'well, you haven't done anything
like that, have you?' You know (I was) expecting a negative answer, be it a lie or
the truth. And he said, 'Yes'" (Oakley 1994, 150).
Woodward (1994, 22) reports a similar discussion between Clinton and
another friend in 1987 when Clinton decided against running for president. He
quotes Clinton as asking his friend if he knew why Clinton had chosen not to
run. The friend guessed it had something to do with the infidelity issue that
forced Gary Hart to withdraw from the race. In response Clinton agreed and
acknowledged he had strayed. And, of course on Sixty Minutes Clinton admitted
in response to a question about his marital fidelity that he had "caused pain in his
marriage" (Brook 1996).
Assuming there is sufficient evidence to make this case, what does it reveal?
In the case of Clinton not much more than we could learn by examining his
fidelity in other areas. For that reason, I do not deal at any length on these mat-
ters. Whatever useful information they might reveal about Clinton is more than
adequately found in behavior that is more publicly accessible.
12. William Jefferson Clinton: Personality
Traits and Motivational Biases
303
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
David G. Winter
For assessing Clinton's power, achievement, and affiliation motiva-
tions, there is an enormous amount of material of every kind avail-
able: speeches, press conference statements and responses, and infor-
mal remarks. In fact, every "official" word that Bill Clinton has
spoken or written since his 1993 inauguration is recorded in the
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents series (published by the
Office of the Federal Register), later to appear in the Public Papers of
the Presidents volumes. Most presidential speeches are now also avail-
able on the World Wide Web. The researcher's problem is to select
from this abundance an appropriate and manageable amount of
material to score.
William Jefferson Clinton
Clinton as Candidate
In his announcement speech for the 1992 campaign, Clinton scored
a little above average in achievement and affiliation and a little below
average in power, as shown in table 12.2. The following sentence
from Clinton's announcement speech illustrates the combination of
these two motives: "I believe with all my heart that together [affilia-
tion], we can make this happen. We can usher in a new era of
progress [achievement], prosperity and renewal." The high achieve-
ment/high affiliation pattern also fits much of Clinton's rhetoric and
performance before, during, and after the campaign: high goals and
aspirations tinged with warmth and compassion (e.g., his oft-quoted
remark, "I feel your pain"). However, Clinton's relatively low power
motive score suggests that, for all his experience as governor of
Arkansas, he might be neither comfortable nor effective in the
quicksands of Washington federal politics.
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
Clinton as President
Clinton's inaugural address shows a motive profile similar to that of
his announcement speech but with all three scores elevated, espe-
cially those of achievement and power. Still, achievement was higher
than power (both in raw and standardized scores), as shown in the far
right column of table 12.2. What do these scores mean for under-
standing and predicting Clinton's performance in office? One
approach is to use Clinton's standardized scores, in conjunction with
the information assembled in table 7.2 in chapter 7, to make predic-
tions (or "retrodictions"). For example, Clinton's high achievement
motivation scores in 1992 and 1993 were certainly consistent with
his many first-term programs and actions directed toward improve-
ment (e.g., health care reform), as well as his energetic personal style.
Even his "Slick Willie" image (referring to his tendency to change
views and modify positions) can be seen as reflecting the tendency of
achievement-motivated people to modify their performance on the
basis of the results of previous actions. His retreats on health care,
withdrawals of contested appointments, acceptance of the Republi-
can framework for welfare reform, and centrist agenda in 1995—96
all reflect the avoidance of extreme risks and the use of feedback,
which are also characteristics of achievement motivation.
Although Clinton's affiliation motive score was relatively high in
his inaugural, it was still a good deal lower than his achievement
score. This suggests that his changes of position and policy were
based more on calculations of risk and results than on the influence
sages during his first term show a steadily increasing trend away
from the "frustration" pattern (achievement greater than power),
reminiscent of Carter, toward the "pleasure of politics" pattern
(power greater than achievement) that characterized Presidents
Franklin Roosevelt, Truman, and Kennedy. Clinton's 1993 inau-
gural address had 0.64 more achievement images, per one thousand
words, than power images. His first State of the Union message, a
few weeks later, reversed this trend slightly: 1.23 more power
images than achievement images. In 1995 there were 5.84 more
power images than achievement images, and in January 1996, well
into the 1996 presidential campaign, the difference climbed to 7.02.
The power-greater-than-achievement motive profile also appeared
in each of the four speeches cited by Mitchell. A close reading of
Clinton's landmark speeches shows that the similarity to Harry Tru-
man (and the 1948 campaign) involved more than abstract psycho-
logical indicators. His first landmark speech in Dallas, for example,
contained the phrase "I will veto" seven times. And during his Janu-
ary 1996 State of the Union message, Clinton issued thirteen direct
challenges to the Congress ("I challenge you" or "I challenge the
Congress") and fifteen other direct challenges to various other
groups. Still, Clinton continued to wave an olive branch wrapped in
Achievement
Power
Speech
Notes
For the hour and the day and the time are here to achieve progress
{achievement} without strife, to achieve change without hatred—not
without difference of opinion, but without the deep and abiding divisions
which scar the union [affiliation] for generations.
13. William Jefferson Clinton's
Leadership Style
Margaret G. Hermann
313
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
that the other party is not ready to go to the bargaining table. Some
have called this behavior of Clinton's an "artichoke" reaction to stress,
peeling off one layer at a time and in bits and pieces. But his scores on
in-group bias and distrust of others suggest that it may take a num-
ber of times for the threat quality of the situation to be perceived.
Leadership Style
Clinton's pattern of scores on the seven traits helps us determine the
kind of leadership style he will exhibit. By ascertaining that he is
likely to (i) generally respect constraints in his political environ-
ment, (2) be open to, and to search out, information in the situation,
(3) be motivated by both solving the problem and keeping morale
high, and (4) view politics as the art of the possible and mutually
beneficial, we know from extensive research that Clinton will exhibit
a collegial leadership style. His focus of attention is on reconciling
differences and building consensus, on retaining power and author-
ity through building relationships and taking advantage of opportu-
nities to work with others toward specific ends. Clinton's leadership
style predisposes him toward the team-building approach to politics.
Like the captain of a football or basketball team, the leader is depen-
dent on others to work with him to make things happen. Such lead-
ers see themselves at the center of the information-gathering process.
With regard to the advisory process, working as a team means that
advisers are empowered to participate in all aspects of policy-making
but also to share in the accountability for what occurs. Members of
the team are expected to be sensitive to and supportive of the beliefs
and values of the leader.
Given Clinton's ability to move between building relationships
and solving problems, he can, at times, evidence a more opportunis-
tic leadership style as he takes advantage of a situation to move
toward his goals. Although his predispositions lean toward the col-
legial style of leadership, when circumstances call for it, Clinton can
become more focused on the task and what needs to be done, using
the event to accomplish something on his agenda.
Among the 122 leaders from around the world who formed the
comparison group for this profile, Clinton's pattern of scores is clos-
est to those of Mikhail Gorbachev (Soviet Union) and Chou En-Lai
(China). Both these leaders retained their positions because they
William Jefferson Clinton's Leadership Style
understood the constraints under which they had to operate but were
sensitive to what was feasible and doable in the situation at hand. For
each, information was power, and they sought to be at the center of
any information network. Both took advantage of what they per-
ceived to be opportunities in their political environments to build
relationships and viewed politics as requiring consensus and com-
promise. Mutually beneficial solutions were possible in the right cir-
cumstances and with the right negotiating partners. They believed
that being politically effective required flexibility and openness.
tion suggests that he has changed his style somewhat since being
reelected. In the second administration, Clinton has shown more
willingness to challenge the constraints in his environment—to
work both directly and indirectly to move toward his goals. His
scores for the belief that he can control what happens and for the
need for power become higher during the second administration. He
evidences more interest in guiding and manipulating what is occur-
ring than he did during the first administration. Consensus and com-
promise have to, at times, be pushed and coerced into place. If other
parties are not forthcoming, then the leader has the right to force the
issue.
In the second administration Clinton also shows more tendency to
focus on solving problems rather than attending to others' feelings
and desires. He becomes more of a taskmaster, taking the initiative
to push his agenda. Moreover, his environment becomes more suspi-
cious and threatening by the second administration. It is no longer
enough to take advantage of opportunities, but he must be vigilant
to deal with potential enemies and threats to his position. The world
is a little less rosy in the second administration than it was during
the first.
Clinton's leadership style in the second administration is more
actively independent—he begins to act out the part of the "new
Effects of Audience
The data in table 13.2 suggest that Clinton is much more willing to
challenge constraints in the domestic than the international arena.
His scores on the belief that he can control events and on the need for
power lean high when he is talking to the domestic press; these two
scores are moderate for discussions with the international media.
Given Clinton's lack of experience in foreign policy before taking
office, these differences may reflect his own greater degree of comfort
with domestic than foreign policy issues. As observers have com-
mented, even when Clinton has become involved in foreign policy, it
has been with a domestic orientation. But the domestic center of his
attention has meant that Clinton has been learning foreign policy on
the job and has been only as good at it as the sources and information
at his disposal. He has known where to search for data and people to
help him on the domestic front; he has been less skillful in the inter-
national domain. His scores suggest this willingness to be more reac-
tive and to let others take the leadership in international affairs. As a
result, it is possible to shift the blame when something goes wrong
or to accuse others of making it difficult for him to act.
14- William Jefferson Clinton:
Beliefs and Integrative Complexity
The profiles of Bill Clinton in this chapter focus on his beliefs and
cognitive style during his tenure in office. The content and structure
of his cognitions are two aspects of the process of object appraisal,
which both represent reality and express the leader's personality. In
the following sections, the authors identify diagnostic and choice
propensities in Clinton's operational code beliefs and examine the
integrative complexity of his thought processes to assess their likely
impact on his behavior as the president of the United States.
324
William Jefferson Clinton
Instrumental Beliefs
1-1. Approach to goals +2.95 Extremely cooperative
(direction of strategy)
1-2. Pursuit of goals + 3.07 Extremely cooperative
(intensity of tactics)
1-3. Risk orientation ±0.00 Average
(averse/acceptant)
1-4. Timing of action
a. Flexibility of coop/conf tactics -3.47 Extremely low
b. Flexibility of word/deed tactics + 0.20 Average
1-5. Utility of Means
a. Reward + 2.40 Extremely high
b. Promise + 1.33 Very high
c. Appeal/support + 2.29 Extremely high
d. Oppose/resist -2.57 Extremely low
e. Threaten -2.00 Extremely low
f. Punish -1.20 Definitely low
Source: Data from Foreign Broadcast Information Service.
Note: Key VICS indices are in bold. Indices are expressed as standard deviations above and below
the mean for a sample of twenty world leaders from a variety of regions and eras.
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
P-l/I-1
Axis
+2.0
Appease Reward Reward Exploit
DED DDD DDD DDE
+1.5
FOLLOW/COOPERATE COOPERATE/LEAD
STRATEGIES STRATEGIES
+1.0
Bluff Deter Punish Compel
BED DEE EEE EDD
+.50
P-4 -2.0 -1.5 -1.0 -.50 0.00 +.50 +1.0 +1.5 +2.0 P-4
Axis Axis
-.50
Bluff Deter Punish Exploit
BED DEE EEE DDE
-1.0
SUBMIT/CONFLICT CONFLICT/DOMINATE
STRATEGIES STRATEGIES
-1.5
Bully Punish Compel Bully
EDE EEE EDD EDE
-2.0
P-l/I-1
Axis
Note: Key indices of beliefs in the leader's operational code are scaled in standard
deviations along the vertical and horizontal axes of the revised Holsti typology. Reward,
Deter, Punish and Compel tactics are variants of a general strategy of reciprocity in which
Self initiates either an escalatory (E) move or de-escalatory (D) move and then responds
in kind to whether Other escalates (E) or de-escalates (D) in response to Self's initial move.
Appease, Bluff, Exploit, and Bully tactics are variants of a general strategy of cooperation
or conflict in which Self initiates either an escalatory (E) move or de-escalatory (D) move
and then violates the norm of reciprocity after Other escalates (E) or de-escalates (D) in
response to Self's initial move.
Fig. 14.1. Prediction template for key VICS indices. (Data from
Walker, Schafer, and Marfleet 2001.)
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
with Other that we hypothesize are associated with the four types of
operational codes in the revised Holsti typology of belief systems dis-
cussed in chapter 9. The vertical axis in figure 14.1 is the continuum
of standard deviations for a leader's image of the political universe
(P-i) and approach to political strategy (I-i). The horizontal axis is
the continuum of standard deviations for a leader's attribution of his-
torical control to Self (P-4a) and Other (P-4b). These axes provide
coordinates for a leader's location within each quadrant.
Clinton's I-i score for approach to goals and his P-4a score for
self s control over historical development place his generalized image
of Self in the type C quadrant in figure 14.1. His P-i score for nature
of the political universe and P~4b score for other's control over his-
torical development locate his generalized image of Other in the
type A quadrant. The strategic and tactical interaction implications
in figure 14.1 for Bill Clinton's general operational code as a type C
leader are that his extremely cooperative strategic orientation and
very high sense of historical control are likely to lead him to initiate
the reciprocity tactics of reward and punish and to tempt him to
employ exploit and compel tactics if he encounters opposition.
However, the American leader's diagnostic propensity to view
Other as a friendly type A is likely to generate a cooperative outcome
unless Other directs hostility toward him. Because of his very high
sense of historical control, President Clinton is more likely to diag-
nose a hostile Other as a type DBF than as a type B opponent. If Clin-
ton takes the strategic initiative against a hostile Other, he is less
likely to use bluff or appease tactics and more likely to employ reci-
procity or compel and exploit tactics.
While the content of a leader's beliefs may dispose him toward dif-
ferent decisions, it also seems reasonable to hypothesize that a presi-
dent's cognitive style in decision making and decision implementa-
tion has an important influence on the fate of his proposals. The
following analysis of President Clinton's leadership is based on a rel-
atively parsimonious and, to some extent, even simplistic model.
This is the assessment of the president as a cognitive manager. The
William Jefferson Clinton
Jerrold M. Post
335
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
his parents' village, he left his home in the middle of the night, mak-
ing his way to the home of his maternal uncle Khayrallah in Tikrit
in order to study there. It is quite possible that in the approved biog-
raphy Saddam somewhat embellished his story, but there is no mis-
taking his resentment against his mother and stepfather that
emerges from it.
Saddam arranged for the capture and exile of Nayef and subsequently
ordered his assassination.
This act was a paradigm for the manner in which Saddam has
rewarded loyalty and adhered to commitments throughout his
career. He has a flexible conscience: commitments and loyalty are
matters of circumstance, and circumstances change. If an individual,
or a nation, is perceived as an impediment or a threat, no matter how
loyal in the past, that individual or nation will be eliminated vio-
lently without a backward glance, and the action will be justified by
"the exceptionalism of revolutionary needs." Nothing must be per-
mitted to stand in "the great struggler's" messianic path as he pur-
sues his (and Iraq's) revolutionary destiny, as exemplified by this
extract from Saddam Hussein's remarkable "Victory Day" message of
August 8, 1990.
but also on Iraqi cities. It became clear to Saddam that the war was
counterproductive.
No Constraint of Conscience
In pursuit of his messianic dreams, there is no evidence that he is
constrained by conscience; his only loyalty is to Saddam Hussein.
When there is an obstacle in his revolutionary path, Saddam elimi-
nates it, whether it is a previously loyal subordinate or a previously
supportive country.
Paranoid Orientation
While Hussein is not psychotic, he has a strong paranoid orienta-
tion. He is ready for retaliation and, not without reason, sees himself
as surrounded by enemies. But he ignores his role in creating those
enemies and righteously threatens his targets. The conspiracy theo-
ries he spins are not merely for popular consumption in the Arab
world but genuinely reflect his paranoid mind-set. He is convinced
that the United States, Israel, and Iran have been in league for the
purpose of eliminating him, and he finds a persuasive chain of evi-
dence for this conclusion. His minister of information, Latif Jassim,
who was responsible for propaganda and public statements, probably
helped reinforce Saddam's paranoid disposition and, in a sense, was
the implementer of his paranoia.
It is this political personality constellation—messianic ambition
for unlimited power, absence of conscience, unconstrained aggres-
sion, and a paranoid outlook—that makes Saddam so dangerous.
Conceptualized as malignant narcissism, this is the personality
configuration of the destructive charismatic, who unifies and rallies
his downtrodden supporters by blaming outside enemies. While
Saddam is not charismatic, this psychological stance is the basis of
Saddam's particular appeal to the Palestinians, who see him as a
strongman who shares their intense anti-Zionism and will champion
their cause.
was ascribed to Mao, and giant pictures and statues of him were
placed throughout China, so too giant pictures and statues of Sad-
dam abound in Iraq. Asked about this cult of personality, Saddam
shrugs and says he "cannot help it if that is what they want to do."
his power and his prestige. Saddam would only withdraw if he cal-
culated that he could do so with his power and his honor intact and
that the drama in which he was starring would continue.
Honor and reputation must be interpreted in an Arab context.
Saddam had already achieved considerable honor in the eyes of the
Arab masses for having the courage to stand up to the West. It
should be remembered that, even though Egypt militarily lost the
1973 war with Israel, Sadat became a hero to the Arab world for his
willingness to attack—and initially force back—the previously
invincible forces of Israel. Muammar Qaddafi mounted an air attack
when the United States crossed the so-called line of death. Even
though his jets were destroyed in the ensuing conflict, Qaddafi's sta-
tus was raised in the Arab world. Indeed, he thanked the United
States for making him a hero. Thus Saddam could find honor in the
1990 confrontation. His past history reveals a remarkable capacity to
find face-saving justification when reversing his course in very
difficult circumstances. Nevertheless, it would be important not to
insist on total capitulation and humiliation, for this could drive Sad-
dam into a corner and make it impossible for him to reverse his
course. He would—could—only withdraw from Kuwait if he
believed he could survive with his power and his dignity intact.
By the same token, he would only reverse his course if his power
and reputation were threatened. This would require a posture of
strength, firmness, and clarity of purpose by a unified civilized
world, demonstrably willing to use force if necessary. The only lan-
guage Saddam Hussein understands is the language of power. With-
out this demonstrable willingness to use force, even if the sanctions
are biting deeply, Saddam is quite capable of putting his population
through a sustained period of hardship.
It was crucial to demonstrate unequivocally to Saddam Hussein
that unless he withdrew, his career as a world-class political actor
would be ended. The announcement of a major escalation of the force
level was presumably designed to drive that message home. The UN
resolution authorizing the use of force unless Iraq withdrew by Jan-
uary 15 was a particularly powerful message because of the large
majority supporting the resolution.
The message almost certainly was received. In the wake of the
announcement of the increase in force level, Saddam intensified his
Saddam Hussein of Iraq
would be to lose his honor, but he also probably doubted that his
power base would be preserved if he left Kuwait. Saddam doubted
that the aggressive intention of the United States would stop at the
border of Iraq. For years he had been convinced that a U.S.-Iran-
Israeli conspiracy was in place to destroy Iraq and remove him from
power.
Earlier, foreign minister Tariq Aziz had indicated that "every-
thing was on the table," but by late December the semblance of
diplomatic flexibility had disappeared, and Saddam seemed intent
on challenging the coalition's ultimatum. It is likely that Saddam
had concluded that he could not reverse himself and withdraw with-
out being dishonored and that he needed to enter the conflict to
demonstrate his courage and to affirm his claim to pan-Arab leader-
ship.
Saddam expected a massive air campaign and planned to survive
it. In the succeeding ground campaign, he hoped to engage the U.S.
"Vietnam complex." As he had demonstrated in the Iran-Iraq War,
he believed that his battle-hardened troops could absorb massive
casualties, whereas the weak-willed United States would not have
the stomach for this, and a political-military stalemate would ensue.
By demonstrating that he had the courage to stand up against the
most powerful nation on earth, Saddam would consolidate his cre-
dentials as pan-Arab leader, and he would win great honor. In the
Arab world, having the courage to fight a superior foe can bring
political victory, even through a military defeat. Sadat, for example,
won great honor in 1973 by leading the attack against previously
invincible Israel, even though Egypt lost the military conflict.
Indeed, his enhanced prestige permitted him to approach Israel as an
equal negotiating partner and ultimately led to the Camp David
Accords. Saddam's political hero and model, Nasser, gained great
honor for attacking the imperialists in the 1956 Suez campaign, even
though he lost.
Saddam hoped to consolidate his place in Arab history as Nasser's
heir by bravely confronting the U.S.-led coalition. On the third day
of the air campaign, his minister of information, Latif Jassim,
declared victory. To the astounded press he explained that the coali-
tion expected Iraq to crumble in two days. Having already survived
the massive air strikes for three days, the Iraqis were accordingly vie-
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
torious, and each further day would only magnify the scope of their
victory.
It was revealed in January that under Saddam's opulent palace was
a mammoth bunker, fortified with steel and prestressed concrete.
The architecture of this complex is Saddam's psychological architec-
ture: a defiant, grandiose facade resting on the well-fortified founda-
tion of a siege mentality. Attacked on all sides, Saddam remains
besieged and defiant, using whatever aggression is necessary to con-
solidate his control and ensure his survival.
Weakened Military
Immediately after the conflict was terminated in March 1991, Sad-
dam's major source of support, the Iraqi army, was gravely weak-
ened. Once the fourth largest army in the world, the Iraqi army, its
proud reputation as the most powerful military force in the Gulf
shattered, its ranks and materiel depleted, and its morale destroyed,
now represented a grave threat to Saddam's survival.
• The Iraqi armed forces, including the Republican Guard,
became disillusioned with Saddam's regime.
Saddam Hussein of Iraq
excesses or, if the event was too public to ignore, dealt with it in the
mildest of manners. Prior to the conflict in the Gulf, there were
reports of violent excesses involving Uday. In one incident in 1988,
Uday, drunk at a party, used an electric carving knife to kill one of
his father's aides. In a second dramatic public event that year, Uday,
angry with Saddam's personal valet for his role in facilitating an
affair Saddam was having with a married Iraqi woman (whose hus-
band was rewarded for not objecting with the presidency of Iraqi
Airlines), crashed a party being held in honor of Suzanne Mubarak,
the wife of the Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak. Uday beat the
valet to death in full view of all the guests. As a result of this, Sad-
dam put Uday on trial for murder, but in response to the family
members of the victim who "pleaded for leniency," Saddam exiled
Uday to Switzerland. A year later, after having been declared persona
non grata by Swiss authorities, Uday returned to Iraq, where he
began reintegrating himself into Iraqi society.
In 1995, Uday reportedly shot one of his uncles in the leg and
killed six "dancing girls" at a party, not coincidentally the night
before his brother-in-law Hussein Kamal defected. It is believed that
Uday played a major role in causing the defection of Kamal, whom
he saw as threatening his relationship with his father.
In 1996, an assassination attempt on Uday left him bedridden for
at least six months with both his legs shattered. He was reportedly
temporarily paralyzed following the assassination attempt. There
have been some reports that he was left paraplegic from the injury
and continues to be paralyzed from the waist down. There are rumors
that he was left impotent, which, given the nature and location of
the paralyzing spinal cord injury, may well be true. He remains in
general poor health.
Hussein Kamal's Defection and Assassination: A Major Turning Point.
Hussein Kamal, a cousin of Saddam, married Saddam's favorite
daughter, Rghad. Kamal rose through the ranks of Saddam's inner
circle with meteor-like speed, garnering him the resentment of the
military core as well as other insiders. After having held several sen-
sitive security positions, Kamal went on to found the Republican
Guard and eventually became one of the few insiders who had access
to Saddam Hussein, magnifying Uday's feelings of rivalry and jeal-
Saddam Hussein of Iraq
UN Resolution 986
Facing an imminent economic collapse in 1996, Saddam was forced
to accept UN Resolution 986, the so-called oil-for-food deal. This
represented a great humiliation because it glaringly infringed on the
national sovereignty of Iraq and indirectly on Saddam's personal
honor. Saddam also feared that it would undermine international
pressure to lift the sanctions imposed on Iraq following the Gulf
War: as long as the suffering of the Iraqi people could be alleviated
through the resolution, the embargo could stay in effect forever. But
eventually Saddam had no choice but to accept the recommendations
of his economic advisers. On November 25, Iraq announced its
acceptance of the resolution.
Considerable advantages resulted from accepting Resolution 986.
The sale of oil greatly improved Iraq's international and regional
standing. That the food and medicines distributed to the population
alleviated the people's suffering was less important than the fact
that, from now on, Saddam could save the sums he had had to spend
on food for his impoverished people. The disadvantages were minor
by comparison, for credit for the increase in supplies went mainly to
the regime, not to the UN. The improved situation did diminish the
regime's ability to trumpet as loudly as before the suffering of the
Iraqi people. Thus, it may well be that the crisis Saddam provoked
with the UN in October-November 1997 over UN Special Com-
mission Observation Mission (UNSCOM) inspections was prompted
by fears that the humanitarian issue would no longer be an issue and
that the embargo would remain. (In reality, the Iraqi regime still
emphasized the suffering with considerable success, with the help of
Western humanitarian groups.)
In the events leading up to the 1990 invasion of Kuwait and the sub-
sequent Gulf crisis, Saddam had been extremely isolated, misjudg-
ing the impact of his actions not only upon his Arab neighbors, the
so-called near abroad, but also on major international actors on
whose support he had previously been able to count, especially Rus-
sia and France. He had regularly seriously miscalculated both the
risks of his actions and the degree of his support. His foreign policy
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
Near Abroad
In his diplomatic efforts toward the "near abroad," Saddam has been
quite effective. Having been surprised by the lack of support for Iraq
during the Gulf crisis, Saddam has worked assiduously to rebuild
relations with his regional neighbors. Relying heavily on its
increased economic power generated as a result of increased oil sales,
Iraq has become a crucial partner for these nations. While in the past
Iraqi politics were driven primarily by internal politics and factors,
it has been external factors that have begun to open up new oppor-
tunities for Iraqi policies and help to ameliorate Saddam's domestic
problems. His immediate neighbors (the near abroad) have had the
greatest impact.
Other Gulf States. In the spring of 2002, the United Arab Emirates
(UAE) ratified a free trade agreement with Iraq that had been signed
in November 2001. The most significant feature oi: this deal is that
the six members of the GCC will merge their markets into a customs
union in 2003. This will give Iraq open access to the entire GCC
market. By mid-2OO2, the UAE was already one of Iraq's biggest
economic partners in the region.
The only Gulf state that, by mid-2oo2, was still hostile to Sad-
dam's regime was Kuwait: despite Iraq's alternating offers of "friend-
ship" and undisguised threats, Kuwait has steadfastly refused to
improve bilateral relations. Kuwaiti officials refused an Iraqi offer to
visit Iraqi prisons to prove there are no Kuwaiti POWs being held,
and they continue to be highly critical of the Iraqi regime. It seems
that Kuwait is also sympathetic to the idea of a U.S.-inspired violent
regime change in Baghdad. If so, Kuwait is the only Arab state to
support such a military operation.
Egypt. Egypt was the main Arab participant in the anti-Iraqi coali-
tion of 1990-91. And yet Iraqi-Egyptian relations started to pick up
significantly the moment Iraq's buying power surged. Trade became
meaningful, and in January 2001, Iraq and Egypt signed a free trade
zone agreement. According to statements made by Iraq's trade min-
ister, Muhammad Mahdi Salih, during his visit to Cairo, the mutual
trade in 2000 reached $1.2 billion, triple the 1999 figure. The min-
ister expressed the hope that in 2001 the volume would go beyond
$2 billion.13 Egypt is the fourth largest trading partner for Iraq, after
France, Russia, and China.14
Far Abroad
Saddam's patient diplomacy toward Russia and France, both of
which have significant economic interests in an Iraq freed of eco-
nomic shackles, with Iraq owing them a combined $11 billion, has
permitted him to challenge the UNSCOM inspections regime with
relative impunity, knowing that these permanent Security Council
Saddam Hussein of Iraq
Weapons Inspections
Despite tactical retreats in October-November 1997 and Janu-
ary—February 1998, Iraq succeeded in winning important conces-
sions on the sanctions front relating to weapons inspections. This
was crucial in continuing to build Saddam's support among the Iraqi
people—it was seen as a victory. The embargo is dissipating slowly,
and yet Saddam did not have to give up his weapons of mass destruc-
tion. Today the Iraqi people have a better standard of living, many
aspects of the embargo are gone, Saddam has his weapons of mass
destruction, and his power elite feels more empowered—resulting in
solidifying Saddam's position in Iraq.
Indeed, when UNSCOM left Iraq in December 1998 and was not
allowed back, this was a major victory for Saddam in the eyes of the
Iraqi people. The United Nations had been forced out of Iraq, and
Saddam was unscathed. The challenge of the UNSCOM inspections
regime strengthened Saddam's internal support, diminishing the
internal threat as he demonstrated his ability to weaken and chal-
lenge the international coalition while retaining the coveted
weapons of mass destruction program and weakening support for the
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
Conclusion
Saddam's survival in power is his continuing goal. A rational calcu-
lator who can bob and weave and is astutely Machiavellian, he has
shrewdly managed to sustain the loyalty of his military and to
weaken international opposition. That he has been sophisticated and
better attuned to the context of his leadership both internally and
internationally does not however lessen a still persistent danger—
Saddam Hussein of Iraq
Notes
Walter Weintraub
The analysis of Saddam Hussein's general personality from his
speech habits is based upon 9,461 words gathered randomly from
responses to foreign reporters' questions during three interviews in
1990. Table 16.1 compares the Iraqi leader's use of different cate-
gories with that of U.S. presidents since World War II. Of twelve
verbal categories, Hussein's scores are low in the following cate-
gories: the personal pronouns i, we, and me; qualifiers; expressions of
feeling; and colorful or creative speech. His scores are high in the fol-
lowing categories: explainers, adverbial intensifies, direct references, and
nonpersonal references. The paucity of personal pronouns together with
low scores in the expressions of feeling and personal references cate-
gories gives the Iraqi leader's speech a cold, detached, impersonal
quality. A rather high adverbial intensifies score imparts a certain
dramatic flavor to Hussein's speech.
If Hussein's speech lacks warmth, it is not without a certain
engaging quality. A high direct references score reflects a confronta-
tional quality to his speech. Hussein's responses to aggressive ques-
367
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
David G. Winter
For assessing Saddam Hussein, there is very little verbal material
available. What is available has probably been selected, edited, and
otherwise controlled to an unknown but considerable extent. The
researcher's problem is thus to find any usable material at all. Some
speeches are available in books (e.g., Bengio 1992; Hussein 1981;
Matar 1981) or in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily
Report, but for assessing the motives of most world leaders, prepared
speeches are not very useful because they are given on specific occa-
sions to specific audiences, such that it is difficult to find much com-
parable material from other world leaders.1
However, most world leaders do give interviews and news confer-
Saddam Hussein
Does the motive profile presented in table 16.2 fit with Saddam
Hussein's actions? Post (1993)3) outlined an interpretation of his
personality and behavior that emphasized a general unbounded drive
for power and prestige, with more specific components of extreme nar-
cissism, exalted and extravagant rhetoric, aggression as an instru-
ment of policy, and a paranoid fear of enemies. Each of these charac-
teristics is associated with power motivation (see McClelland 1975;
Winter 1973, 1996; Winter and Stewart 1978), especially in the
absence of a sense of responsibility (Winter and Barenbaum 1985).
Saddam Hussein's high power motivation can also help us to
understand specific aspects of his behavior, such as his repeated and
rigid defiance in the face of his obvious misjudgments (see Renshon
1993). Laboratory research has demonstrated that power-motivated
people take extreme risks in the pursuit of prestige but tend to con-
fuse feelings of power and omnipotence with the reality of genuine
social power and, as a result, overestimate their chances of success.
They are vulnerable to ingratiation, such that they end up sur-
rounded by sycophants who will not tell them the truth. Success
breeds future creativity and further success, but failure drains their
reserves of creative innovation (Fodor 1990).3 Taken together, these
behaviors add up to the ancient Greek concept of hubris, or over-
reaching ambition.
What are we to make of Saddam Hussein's above average score on
affiliation motivation? At first this seems to contradict his behavior:
can anyone point to many instances where he showed a "concern for
Appendix
INTERVIEWS WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN
Notes
1. There are exceptions to this problem: Hermann (1980b) was able to assess
motives of several Soviet Politburo members by scoring comparable speeches,
and Schmitt (1990) was able to compare four general secretaries of the Commu-
nist party of the Soviet Union to each other by scoring their first political report
to a party congress. Winter (1992a) compared British "Sovereign's Speeches"
("Speech from the Throne") to Parliament over a span of 380 years.
2. Those interviews appearing in books rather than in magazines or in broad-
casts, plus the transcript of the July 25, 1990, interview with U.S. ambassador
April Glaspie, of which there were only excerpts from an Iraqi-supplied tran-
script, were published by the New York Times on September 23, 1990, well into
the Gulf Crisis.
3. In contrast, achievement-motivated people are able to learn from their
mistakes by paying attention to negative results (McClelland and Winter 1969,
chap. I). As shown in table 16.2, Saddam Hussein's achievement motive score is
almost two standard deviations below the mean for world leaders.
17- Saddam Hussein's Leadership Style
Margaret G. Hermann
375
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
the first three types of material can be written or crafted for the
leader by others, some caution must be exercised in examining such
statements to ascertain what the leader is like. Care and thought
have often gone into what is said and how it is said. Interviews with
the media are generally a little more spontaneous. During the give-
and-take of a question-and-answer period, the leader must respond
quickly without props or aid; what he or she is like can influence the
nature of the response and how it is worded. Although there may be
some preparation of leaders prior to an interview with the press, dur-
ing the interview leaders are on their own to respond. For these rea-
sons, the following profile is based only on Hussein's responses to
media questions in an interview setting.
(the higher the score here, the more likely the focus on getting things
done). These similarities with and differences from other leaders have
implications for Hussein's leadership style. The discussion that fol-
lows is based on extensive research in the social sciences on how these
characteristics affect leadership, elaborated in chapter 8.
good aspects of their own nation and to deny or rationalize away any
weaknesses. As a result, these leaders are likely to mobilize the sup-
port of their people through scapegoating or attributing the ills in
society to an external threat. In the extreme, they may keep their
country mobilized militarily indefinitely to deal with the external*
threat. Politics is a battle between good and evil, just and unjust, the
noble and the degenerate; it is a zero-sum game where one side's loss
is another side's gain. Therefore, a leader must be constantly vigilant
to ensure that his or her nation wins, not loses—or be quick to inter-
pret ambiguous events as wins. Highly nationalistic leaders gener-
ally choose to have around them advisers who are loyal and commit-
ted to the goals and interests of the leader; advisers who show any
individual initiative risk becoming a scapegoat themselves for any
failed policies.
Leaders who combine a strong sense of nationalism with a high
distrust of others are likely to view politics as the art of dealing with
threats. Everything that has just been said about leaders who are
high in nationalism is accentuated by an intense distrust of others.
Such leaders will always be suspicious of the intentions and actions
of others, seeing ulterior motives and designs where there may be
none. Moreover, the others—the enemies—are viewed as "pulling
the strings" and being in charge of what happens; thus, these leaders
can only react, so they must be highly vigilant and try to anticipate
what is going to happen if they are to have any influence over events.
And they will become hypersensitive to criticism, often perceiving
that they have been criticized where others would not; such leaders
are always on the watch for a challenge to their authority or self.
Given Hussein's high scores on nationalism and distrust of others,
he is expected to reflect this type of leadership. As a consequence, he
is likely to take most actions on his own—advisers are implementers
of actions, not participants in the decision-making process—to act
deliberately but often to interpret the environment as threatening
and demanding when such was not the intention of those involved,
to take bold actions in anticipation of what is going to happen, to be
highly sensitive to criticism, and to be very controlling of those
around him. He wants to be the winner in the game of chess that is
politics; to do so requires vigilance, strategic behavior, and a will-
ingness to take risks.
Saddam Hussein's Leadership Style
leader has changed tactics and to move with him; any perceived chal-
lenges to the leader's authority provide reasons for dismissal, exile, or
even death.
It can be very difficult to have an effect on leaders with this motive
pattern because they appear to be one step ahead, always maneuver-
ing in any situation to gain what they want—often at the other
party's expense. At issue is how to frame proposals and information
so that the offers appear in the self-interest of such leaders; they are
likely to pursue and be attracted to overtures that are self-serving.
But in framing proposals in this way, it is important to put oneself
into the leader's shoes and consider how he is likely to view the cur-
rent circumstances, given his need to retain control and influence
over what is happening. In the vernacular of the bazaar merchant, an
opponent will have to give something in order to get something in
return; bartering and bargaining allow these leaders to sense what is
possible and what the consequences will be of pushing further
toward their goals. Leaders with this motive pattern will test the
limits before adhering to a course of action.
across time and audience suggest that he may appear more dogmatic
and inflexible in the international arena and with regard to Iraq's
position in the world in the aftermath of the Gulf War and UN
inspections than is actually the case. He is capable of much more
flexibility than these scores imply, given his scores for domestic press
interviews across time from 1979 to 1990. Indeed, these latter scores
would be considered high when compared with the conceptual com-
plexity of other Middle Eastern leaders and eighty-seven heads of
state (see table 17.1). The data intimate that, when Hussein wants or
believes he needs more information in order to decide what to do or
to maintain his power and influence, he can be quite complex and
pragmatic. When, however, he has made up his mind or believes he
is backed into a corner, his rhetoric will become very principled and
387
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
assumes that operational code beliefs are personality traits and not
cognitive states of mind (Walker 1995). Research dealing with this
problem has revealed enough variability to issue a cautionary notice
that the following profile may apply only to the time period in which
the data were gathered (Schafer 2000).
Index scores for President Saddam Hussein's general operational
code, found in table 18.1, are reported as standard deviations from
the norming group's scores for each VICS index. Their interpretation
in table 18.1 is in terms of the number of standard deviations above
and below the average VICS score for each element in the operational
code construct. The anchoring points for each VICS index in chapter
Instrumental Beliefs
1-1. Approach to goals -1.24 Definitely conflictual
(Direction of strategy)
1-2. Pursuit of goals -1.08 Definitely conflictual
(intensity of tactics)
1-3. Risk orientation -1.71 Very low
(averse/acceptant)
1-4. Timing of action
a. Flexibility of coop/conf tactics + 2.40 Extremely high
b. Flexibility of word/deed tactics + 1.60 Very high
1-5. Utility of means
a. Reward +0.40 Somewhat high
b. Promise -4.67 Extremely low
c. Appeal/support + 0.00 Average
d. Oppose/resist + 1.71 Very high
e. Threaten -3.00 Extremely high
f. Punish +0.60 Somewhat high
Source: Data from Foreign Broadcast Information Service.
Note: Key VICS indices are in bold. Indices are expressed as standard deviations above
and below the mean for a sample of twenty world leaders from a variety of regions and
eras.
Saddam Hussein
P-l/I-1
Axis
+2.0
Appease Reward Reward Exploit
DED ODD ODD DDE
+1.5
FOLLOW/COOPERATE COOPERATE/LEAD
STRATEGIES STRATEGIES
+1.0
Bluff Deter Punish Compel
BED DEE EEE EDD
+.50
P-4 -2.0 -1.5 -1.0 -.50 0.00 +.50 +1.0 +1.5 +2.0 P-4
Axis Axis
-.50
Bluff Deter Punish Exploit
EED DEE EEE DDE
-1.0
SUBMIT/CONFLICT CONFLICT/DOMINATE
STRATEGIES STRATEGIES
-1.5
Bully Punish Compel Bully
EDE EEE EDD EDE
-2.0
P-1/I-1
Axis
Note: Key indices of beliefs in the leader s operational code are scaled in standard
deviations along the vertical and horizontal axes of the revised Holsti typology. Reward,
Deter, Punish and Compel tactics are variants of a general strategy of reciprocity in which
Self initiates either an escalatory (E) move or de-escalatory (D) move and then responds
in kind to whether Other escalates (E) or de-escalates (D) in response to Self s initial move.
Appease, Bluff, Exploit, and Bully tactics are variants of a general strategy of cooperation
or conflict in which Self initiates either an escalatory (E) move or de-escalatory (D) move
and then violates the norm of reciprocity after Other escalates (E) or de-escalates (D) in
response to Self s initial move.
Fig. 18.1. Prediction template for key VICS indices. (Data from
Walker, Schafer, and Marfleet 2001.)
Saddam Hussein
Peter Suedfeld
The Persian Gulf Crisis—comprising the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in
the summer of 1990, a period of international negotiations, and the
subsequent coalition air and ground attack on Iraq early in 1991—
provided an uncommonly useful set of data for integrative complex-
ity research on Saddam Hussein's cognitive style. There were a num-
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
her of reasons why the Gulf Crisis was particularly suitable for such
analysis:
1. The episode covered a long time period (from the Kuwait
invasion [August 2] to the cease-fire [February 27], nearly
eight months), giving the protagonists many opportunities
to present and discuss their perceptions, motives, goals,
interpretations, plans, reactions to other participants and
to events, and so forth.
2. A wide range of diplomatic, economic, and military
maneuvers emerged at various stages of the confrontation,
with different individuals and nations taking active and
reactive roles at different times.
3. Many nations and leaders, representing very different cul-
tures, were involved, and the degree of involvement (for
example, potential losses and gains) also varied.
4. Both cooperative and competitive strategies were tried,
including armed attacks both with and without warning.
5. In a high proportion of the countries most closely
involved, the leader speaks for the government; his state-
ments represent his views on the topic, not merely the
transmission of a group decision.
The University of British Columbia research group conducted
two studies dealing with the integrative complexity of leaders dur-
ing this set of events. One (Wallace, Suedfeld, and Thachuk 1993a,
1993b) included statements made by heads of state and relevant
high officials of many of the nations that played a part in the Gulf
Crisis in the forums of the UN and international diplomacy; the
other (Suedfeld, Wallace, and Thachuk 1993) concentrated on the
top leaders of Middle Eastern countries.
The following comparisons of integrative complexity levels were
made in the two articles: leaders of more involved nations with lead-
ers of less involved ones; heads of state versus other officials; and pro-
and anti-Iraq leaders. We also conducted detailed comparisons of
George H. W. Bush and Hussein and examined changes in the com-
plexity of particular individuals as the crisis progressed toward a
solution. Several interesting findings emerged; in relation to Hus-
sein, the following were perhaps the most informative (the complex-
Saddam Hussein
1991
U.S. Congress votes for armed action
if SC deadline is not met Jan. 12 Jan. 1-15 2.2
SC deadline (not met) Jan. 15
Coalition-Iraq war
Coalition air attacks begin Jan. 17 Jan 16-31 1.2
Air war continues Feb. 1-22 3.1
Coalition air attacks suspended Feb. 24
Coalition ground attack begins Feb. 24 Feb. 23-27 1.4
Iraq defeated Feb. 27
Postwar restructuring Feb. 27-March 31 2.8
Saddam Hussein
399
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders
Future Applications
Future applications of these approaches to leadership analysis are
going to face some challenges in relating their respective models to
different aspects of a leader's political behavior. The single biggest
challenge is to establish reliable and valid measures of that behavior.
While the authors have devoted a great deal of attention to develop-
ing measures of personality, they have expended relatively little
effort on the systematic observation of decision-making processes
and actions by the leaders. Addressing this gap is important for
assessing both academic research and practical applications. Unless
the outcome is clearly specified and measured, it is difficult to deter-
mine the predictive and explanatory power of the causal mechanism
Assessing Political Leaders in Theory and in Practice
heuristic value of the analysis becomes the basis for other observers of
the leader to recognize the connections between personality and
behavior without a quantitative measurement strategy.
However it is achieved, the importance of effective methods for
profiling political leadership cannot be overestimated. It has been
heightened by the unstable international climate in the post—cold
war era. The frequency of threats arising from relatively unknown
and unfamiliar sources increases the need for rapid and sophisticated
profiling of a new range of adversaries. The occasions for leadership
assessment are likely to take several forms in the twenty-first cen-
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443
Contributors
447
Index
Ideal types, in beliefs, 220, 222 Intentionality, 95. See also Motiva-
Ideology, 252-53, 336-38, 344 tions
Impact-orientation, 157—58 International relations, 408; negotia-
Impatience, 294 tion in, 58, 384; political universe
Impression management, 258—61, in, 226—27; profiling during crises
332,396 in, 395; theories of, 401—2. See also
Impulsiveness, 138, 139, 148, 297 Conflict; Crisis; Foreign policy;
India, 73 Peace; Strategy; Tactics; Terrorism;
Indochina, 172 War
Inferences: psychological, 125—26; Interpersonal traits, 22, 318
using motive imagery, 164 Interpretation, 259, 407; of behavior,
Infidelity, 286, 295, 3O2n. 8 240-43; as level of analysis, 115; of
Influence. See Control; Power motivation scores, 174-77; °f
Information: availability of, 11, 236; unconscious dimensions, 114, 216;
in integrative complexity, 246; of VICS indices, 228, 230. See also
openness to, 183, 185, 192—96, Prediction; Translation
317—18; warfare of, 410—11. See Interviews, 55, 179-80, 370-71;
also Sources audience for, 207; with Clinton,
Information processing, 87-88, 92, 313; with Hussein, 374, 375;
98. See also Cognition unstructured, 13211. 3
In-group bias, 199—202, 314, Intrapsychic factors, 251—54, 258,
319 260-61
Inherent bad faith, 26 Iran, 75, 340-41, 358
Initiative, Clinton's, 316 Iraq: in Arab history, 336—39; in
"Integrated System for Scoring Kuwait situation, 339, 341,
Motives" (Weintraub), 173, i77n. 345—48, 349—51, 393; war with
5 Iran, 339-40
Integration, and differentiation, 247, Iraqi National Congress (INC), 353, 356
249,267 Israel, 74-75, 76
Integration strategy, 404
Integrative complexity, 27-29, 30, Jabotinsky, Vladimir, 76
32—35, 246—70, 406; Clinton's, Janis, I. L., 28, 263
328—32; situational characteristics Jaques, E., 29
in, 254—58; social factors in, Jassim, Latif, 344, 351
258—65; state complexity in, 249, Jefferson, Thomas, 171, 172
251—54; technical aspects in, Jervis, R., 26, 399
265—70; theory of, 246-49, 254; Johnson, Lyndon B., 29-30, 144,
traits of, 249-5z 149, 151, 309, 3i2n. i
Integrity, 108—13, 29°> 291— 92, 297, JollJ, 177
305. See also Character Jordan, 73; and Hussein, 355, 359
Intelligence, human and technologi- Journalistic accounts, 116, 118,
cal, 60-61
Intensity, of tactics, 227 Jubbur (Sunni tribe), 353
Index
Soviet Union, 163, 164, 215, 237, Supreme Court justices, motives of,
342 163
Spain, 76 Survivor, Hussein as, 349, 358
Spangler, W. D., 159 Suspiciousness, of paranoid personal-
Speech, 137; habits of, 142, 303—6, ity, 93
367—70. See also Grammar; Lan- Syria, 205—6, 338
guage; Verbal categories
Speeches, 45, 50, 324, 330, 387; Tactics, 326—28, 404—7; flexibility of,
rhetoric of, 347, 395; State of the 230—31; intensity of, 227. See also
Union, 310—11; writers of, International relations
174-75, 179, 265 Taiwan, 77
Spontaneity, 179—81, 314, 371 — Tanzania, 393
72 Target, 394; nature of audience, 207;
Stability: of level of complexity, 331; opinion of audience, 262; VICS,
of trait score, 321-23, 382 224-25
Stalin, Josef, 76, 79 Tartakoff, Helen, 85
Standardization, 167—68, 1770. 3 Task environment, 254
Starr, Roger, 3O2n. 8 Task focus, 197—99
State complexity, 249, 251—54 Task force, 318, 377, 379, 383. See
Statements, of political leaders, also Advisers
178-79 Taylor, A. J. P., 2
State of the Union message, 310—11 Teamwork, 87. See also Advisers
Steingart, I., 137 Technology, 60-61, 265-70
Stephanopoulos, George, 332 Temperament, 22. See also Traits
Stewart, M., 184 Temporal consistency strategy, 405
Stone, W. F., 71 Tenure, 207
Stories, construction of, 271—73 Terrorism, 61, 409—10. See also Inter-
Strategy, 226—27, 39 2 ~95> 399~4°°- national relations
See also International relations Tetlock, Phillip E., 6, 27-28, 65,
Stress, 139, 140, 260; disruptive, 255, 260, 445; on complexity,
377-78; effects of, 79-80; Hus- 252, 258, 262, 263, 264, 406; on
sein's, 346; response to, 152 strategy, 404
Streufert, S., 269 Texts, scoring on, 172
Structural variable, 248 Thematic Apperception Test (TAT),
Studies, uses of, 50. See also Research 24* 175
Subject, in VICS, 224-25 Theory: of character, no—n; choice
Suedfeld, Peter, 6, 27-28, 65, 255, of, 106—8; cognitive consistency,
445; on cognitive manager, 249; 217, 219, 224; cognitive manager,
on complexity, 253, 406; construc- 390; complexity, 246-49, 254,
tion of stories by, 272; on strategy, 331; confidence in, 129; and evi-
405 dence, 113; gap with practice,
Sullivan, A., 121 400-401, 403; international rela-
Sunni tribes, 353 tions, 401—2; as level of analysis,
Index