The Search For Peace PDRC
The Search For Peace PDRC
Somali Programme
Haani salka ayeey ka unkantaa A milk container is built from the bottom up
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Peace Initiatives in Puntland 19912007
Researchers: Photographs: Map: Editor: Hassan Adan Mohamed, Amina Abdulkadir M. Nur Muctar Mohamed Hersi, Audio Visual Unit Adapted from Mark Bradbury, 2008, James Currey Dr Pat Johnson, Interpeace
This research study was made possible by the generous contributions of the interviewees, Working Group, peer reviewers, and colleagues at the Puntland Development Research Center, including Abdurahman A. Osman Shuke (Director), Ali Farah Ali (Research Coordinator), Mohamed Yassin Essa Ilkoasse (Finance Manager), and Muctar Mohamed Hersi (Director Audio-Visual Unit), in sharing their unique experiences as well as historical documentation.
Garowe, Puntland Phone: (+252 5) 84 4480 Thuraya: +88 216 4333 8170 [email protected] www.pdrc.somalia.org This report was produced by Interpeace and the Puntland Development Research Center and represents exclusively their own views. These views have not been adopted or in any way approved by the contributing donors and should not be relied upon as a statement of the contributing donors or their services. The contributing donors do not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this report, nor do they accept responsibility for any use made thereof. The study is a draft chapter in a forthcoming publication representing the findings of the peace mapping study.
CONTENTS
PREFACE AND METHODOLOGY FOR THE PEACE MAPPING STUDY ................................................... 5 OVERVIEW OF LOCAL PEACE PROCESSES IN PUNTLAND .................................................................. 8 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 8 Demography and historical background to Puntland .......................................................................... 8 The impact of the collapse of the Somali State on the northeast regions of Somalia ........................... 9 Simplified clan diagram for the Darood clan family ............................................................................ 11 Timeline of Events in Puntland (Northeast Somalia)........................................................................... 12 Civil war and the strengthening of the SSDF .................................................................................... 12 Transition in the northeast regions .................................................................................................... 19 The role of the traditional elders and local peace initiatives .............................................................. 22 Recovery and rebuilding: establishment of the Puntland State of Somalia......................................... 23 Puntland constitutional crisis, armed conflict, and the mediating peace mission, 2001-3 .................. 26 The Puntland Peace Agreement, 2003 ............................................................................................ 27 The Ramada Peace Agreement, 2005 ............................................................................................. 28 National level political dynamics and political transition, 2004 to present .......................................... 28 Analysis of the local peace initiatives in northeast regions/ Puntland ................................................ 29 Selection of the Case Studies........................................................................................................... 31 Timeline of major conflicts and peace initiatives in northeast regions of Somalia (Puntland), 1990 2007...................................................................................................... 32 Inventory of peace initiatives in northeast regions/ Puntland ............................................................. 33 CASE STUDY: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PUNTLAND STATE OF SOMALIA THE GAROWE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMUNITY CONFERENCE ......................................................... 34 Preparations for a Constitutional Community Conference, January-February 1998 ......................... 34 The consultative conference, 25 February-12 March 1998 ............................................................... 34 Assessment of the political context and the way forward .................................................................. 35 Representation and engagement of other regions ........................................................................... 36 Organisational preparation for the Constitutional conference ........................................................... 37 Garowe Constitutional Community Conference, 15 May-23 July 1998 ............................................. 38 Agenda and issues for discussion ....................................................................................... 40 Funding for the conference ................................................................................................ 43 The role of the international aid community ......................................................................... 44 Analysis of the process towards establishment of the Puntland State ............................................. 45 Actors ............................................................................................................................... 51 Participation and representation ......................................................................................... 52 Management, quality of mediation, critical junctures ........................................................... 52 Community ownership, funding, and legitimacy .................................................................. 53 Quality of the agreement and subsequent developments .................................................. 54 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 55 CASE STUDY: THE BURTINLE PEACE AGREEMENT .......................................................................... 56 Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 56 Background on environmental pressures on pastoral communities ............................................... 57 Conflict Trends ............................................................................................................................. 58
Unsettled Agreement ................................................................................................................... 60 The meditation process renegotiating peace .............................................................................. 62 The quality of the peace accord .................................................................................................... 63 Actors .......................................................................................................................................... 64 Dissemination, follow-up and impact ............................................................................................. 65 Comparison of Phase I and II of the Adadda conflict in 2007 ........................................................ 65 Analysis of the resolution of the conflict ......................................................................................... 66 Evolution of Harti Customary Law (Harti xeer) and Quality of the Peace Accord............................. 67 Findings and conclusions .............................................................................................................. 70 ANNEXES.............................................................................................................................................. 71 Annex 1: Glossary of Somali terms in peace and war .................................................................... 71 Annex 2: The Ramada Peace Agreement, 2005 ............................................................................ 76 Annex 3: Representatives at the Garowe Peace and Life Conference, December 1993................. 76 Annex 4: Representatives at the Garowe Constitutional conference, May-July 1998 .................... 77 List of Parliamentarians by region, 1998 ........................................................................................ 84 Annex 5: Details of Peace Agreements relating to the Adadda conflict, 1997-2007 ....................... 84 Annex 6: List of Interviewees ......................................................................................................... 90 BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................................... 92 PDRC Research Team ........................................................................................................................... 94
ACRONYMS
FSAU GTZ ICU LPI NGO SNDU SNM SPM SRC SSDF TFG UN UNDOS UNDP UNICEF UNITAF UNOPS UNOSOM I/II US USC USP WFP WSP International Food Security Assessment Unit (subsequently known as Food Security Analysis Unit) German Agency for Technical Assistance Islamic Courts Union Life and Peace Institute Non Governmental Organization Somali National Democratic Union Somali National Movement Somali Patriotic Movement Somali Revolutionary Council Somali Salvation Defence Force Transitional Federal Government United Nations United Nations Development Office for Somalia United Nations Development Program United Nations Childrens Fund United Nations Task Force United Nations Office for Project Services United Nations Operation in Somalia United States of America United Somali Congress United Somali Party World Food Programme War-torn Societies Project: subsequently known as International Peacebuilding Alliance (Interpeace)
The overall aim of the study was to enhance current approaches to and capacities for reconciliation and the consolidation of peace - both in the Somali region and in other contexts by studying and drawing lessons from local, regional and national peace initiatives in the Somali region since 1991. The specific objectives were to: Document key local, regional and national peace initiatives over the past 16 years in the Somali region (including those that may have failed to achieve the anticipated results); Identify key factors that influence successful peace initiatives and factors that may undermine the sustainability; Synthesise lessons learned from these reconciliation initiatives for the way forward; Study the relationship between peace initiatives and state building in the Somali region The study was designed with four phases, facilitated by Mark Bradbury in collaboration with the Interpeace Somali program team, with the field research undertaken by the three partner organisations. During the preparatory phase the three organisations established their research teams and compiled inventories of peace meetings in the Somali region. Following a workshop in April 2007, at which a research framework and a work plan for the study was agreed, the researchers conducted literature reviews, interviews and group discussions to develop a historical Overview of peace initiatives in their respective areas. This research was reviewed at a joint workshop, before undertaking a third phase of detailed research on case studies while the Audio Visual Units of the organisations prepared films (in Somali and English) to accompany the research and reach a wider audience. Additional support was provided by a number of colleagues2 and the CRD also undertook research on internationally sponsored national peace conferences in collaboration with Professor Ken Menkhaus. In the series of workshops that marked the transition between the project phases, the researchers received training in designing a research framework, analytical tools, interviewing techniques and comparative learning3. Information was gathered through individual interviews and group discussions with people who had been involved in or witnessed the events, many in the places and communities where the peace conferences took place. In line with Interpeaces Participatory Action Research (PAR) methodology, Working Groups of knowledgeable individuals were convened in each region to provide guidance and comment on the research. Many of the interviews were recorded on audio tape and film and now comprise a historic archive of material on Somali peace processes, together with written documentation on the meetings, including copies of signed peace agreements. Finally, the research reports were peer reviewed before being completed. This report forms part of the final series of five publications presenting the findings of the peace mapping study both as a record for those involved, and as a formal presentation of findings and recommendations to the national and regional authorities, the broader Somali community, and international policy makers. Together with the short documentary films that accompany the reports, it is hoped that these publications will provide a practical platform for the sharing of lessons learned on peace and reconciliation initiatives in the Somali region.
2 3
Mark Bradbury, Abdirahman Raghe, Pat Johnson, Janet Oeverland, Ulf Terlinden, Mohamed Hassan Ghani, Michael Walls, and Rita Glavitza. Resource people included Dr Justin Willis of the British Institute in Eastern Africa and Andy Carl of Conciliation Resources.
Foreword
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The Puntland Experience: A bottom-up approach to Peace and State Building Map 1 Somalia (showing Somaliland & Puntland)
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This oppression and alienation of leading Majeerteen figures was a significant factor in the formation of the first armed opposition to the military government of Siyad Barre in the aftermath of the Somali armys defeat in the Ogaden war with Ethiopia. A group of army officers led by Colonel Mohamed Sheikh Osman (a member of the Majeerteen clan) attempted a military coup in April 1978. Immediately after it was apparent that the coup had failed, a number of other officers, led by Lieutenant Colonel Abdulahi Yusuf Ahmed, fled to Kenya where the first Somali Salvation Front (SOSAF), later re-named the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), was secretly formed. The group subsequently moved to Ethiopia where the formation of the SSDF was officially launched and began an insurgency in the Somali regions bordering Ethiopia. The regime responded with a punitive scorched earth policy in Mudug region and further repression against the Mohamoud Suleiman sub-clan as a whole. According to WSP (2001), From independence in 1960 to the collapse of central government in early 1991, very little of the substantial foreign aid given to Somalia and the national development fund found its way to northeast Somalia. The crucial exceptions were the development in the 1970s of a tarmac road from Belet Weyn through Gaalkayo, the gateway to southern Somalia, to Garowe and in the late 1980s, another tarmac road from Garowe through the hinterland to Bosaaso Port and development of Bosaaso port itself, together with a fish processing plant.
The impact of the collapse of the Somali State on the northeast regions of Somalia
Following the overthrow of Siyad Barres regime in early 1991, the state collapsed and Somalia was plunged into civil war. In southern Somalia, hundreds of thousands of people died and government institutions and the economic infrastructure disintegrated, with public and private property looted, squatted and destroyed. The civil war caused social and political disintegration along clan lines and massive internal displacement, including the Darood clans exodus into the northeast as well as into southern regions of Somalia, as people were forced to flee the factional fighting and seek refuge in their ancestral territories. One of the primary legacies of the disintegration of the Somali State was a return to the dominance of clan-based structures throughout the country. In the absence of the state, local traditional mechanisms re-emerged as the basis of local governance to address social, security, administrative and political affairs, and to provide a crucial safety net. Thanks to its relatively homogeneous clan composition, the northeast regions were spared the fragmentation and violence that gripped much of the rest of Somalia after 1991, and remained a relatively coherent entity. The stabilization of the northeast regions was aided by a reversal of the brain drain to the south over the previous two decades. Many of the people who fled to the northeast regions in the early 1990s had professional backgrounds, including military officers and civilian technocrats in the administrations of the previous governments who earned the nickname Dowlad Ku Nool6 (government-dependents) (WSP, 2001). They brought a level of administrative expertise and experience to the northeast regions that had been largely absent. Their experience of government was one of the enabling factors in the evolution of local governance structures during the period of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) from 1993-5. A number of local administrative structures were re-established through clan-based power sharing arrangements following consultative community meetings, which were intended to provide the foundation for a modern democratic system of governance.
The record of these councils was mixed; some succeeded in establishing a level of law and order and others foundered on power struggles related to local clan and sub-clan dynamics or attempts to form new districts. In line with the Addis Agreement in 1993, which established the Transitional National Authority (TNA), UNOSOM only accepted districts established up to 31 December 1990 but in some areas, tensions between the sub-clans continued to simmer until UNOSOMs departure in 1995. The relative stability of the northeast meant that, unlike southern Somalia, most public infrastructure was spared from destruction. Police stations remained physically intact, often with a policeman protecting it from looting or squatting by displaced families who already occupied many other public premises. In the absence of salaries, the policemen supported themselves by using the police radios to provide an invaluable communication service to dispersed family members across Somalia and neighbouring countries. But there was widespread looting by gangs, who targeted former government offices and the Italian road construction companies in Garowe and Bosaaso, benefitting from the Somali communitys lack of a sense of common ownership of public property and institutions (which are therefore not protected from destruction or appropriation).. Another major impact of the war on the northeastern regions was a massive influx of displaced people of the Harti clan group from the south and the northwest regions (Somaliland). The population of urban centres doubled and, in the absence of local governance systems or municipal services, haphazard development emerged with little regard for public spaces. Many people headed for the port of Bosaaso, either for livelihood opportunities or to attempt the dangerous crossing to Yemen and onwards to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. Ferrying immigrants from Bosaaso and its coastal villages across the Gulf remains a lucrative business, despite the high risks and deaths en route. Despite the pressures of absorbing so many displaced persons, the region received very little external humanitarian assistance. This was primarily because international humanitarian resources were focussed on the disastrous famine in southern Somalia in which over a quarter of a million people are estimated to have died. Nevertheless, not a single starvation-related death was recorded in the northeast during 19911993, the height of the famine in the south (WSP, 2001).
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The diagram below is a partial and simplified lineage for the Darood clan family, one of the five main Somali clan-families. Many lineages are omitted while others are compressed or their relationships simplified.
Dulbahante
Majeerteen Warsangeli
Omar Mohamoud
Issa Mohamoud
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For the first ten years of the armed opposition (1978-1988), the SSDF had been effective in weakening the Barre regime. The Somali National Movement (SNM) was active from its base in Ethiopia from 1979, led by Sheikh Yusuf Madar, until he was replaced by Ahmed Mohamed Silanyo who was in turn replaced by Abdirahman Tuur in 1990. In 1989, the United Somali Congress (USC) was formed with Ismail Jimale Ossoble as its first chairman until his death in Italy in 1990. Ali Wardhigley led the USC branch in Mogadishu and was succeeded by Hussein Haji Bod and later General Aydiid. In April 1988, General Siyad Barre and Colonel Mengistu of Ethiopia met in Djibouti and signed a nonaggression agreement with commitments to restrain the armed political opposition movements operating in the others country. The SSDF and SNM chairmen, Dr. Hassan Ali Mirreh and Ahmed Mohamed Silanyo, met with Mengistu in May 1988, complaining of Ethiopian betrayal in reaching a secret agreement with Siyad Barre at their expense. Mengistu in turn accused them of failing themselves and letting down their allies because of infighting between and within the factions and offered to renounce the agreement if the factions united to form a joint armed opposition against the Barre regime. This was agreed by the SSDF, SNM and Ethiopia and a joint meeting was planned in Dire Dawa in 30 days time to finalise a strategy to depose the Barre regime8. However before the meeting took place, the SNM invaded Burao and Hargeysa in May 1988, resulting in heavy casualties and the devastation of both cities. The SNMs actions contributed to polarisation of the clans and the USC forming its own faction to focus on Hawiye-dominated regions in south-central Somalia. Meanwhile, in southern Somalia, the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) led by Colonel Omar Jess was conducting guerrilla operations in the Lower and Middle Juba regions Worried that this polarisation of clans, combined with a weakened Barre regime would lead to civil war and a political vacuum, the SSDF refrained from engaging in clan warfare and instead adopted a wait-and-see approach9. Chairman Dr. Hassan Ali Mirreh resigned at the end of his two year term in early 1989, replaced by Musa Islan Farah as acting chairman. In the meantime, an alliance was formed between General Aydiid (USC), Abdirahman Tuur (SNM) and Colonel Omar Jess (SPM) to intensify the guerrilla war in their respective areas. Critically, however, no single faction or leader was sufficiently dominant to take over as victor when the regime finally fell. In January 1991, the USC, encouraged by the local Hawiye uprising and boosted by public agitation by the Manifesto Group, entered the capital and drove out President Siyad Barre. Some analysts identify the controversial announcement by the Prime Minister of the first caretaker government, Omar Arteh, as a critical event, when he instructed the police, military and security forces to hand over government responsibilities to the liberation movements of the SNM in the North and the USC in the South - with no reference to the SSDF or the SPM10. This was seen by many as aggravating tensions between the clans. The USC forces, predominantly drawn from the Hawiye clan, exacted reprisals against members of the Darood clan-family for their clan affiliation with Barre. In the power vacuum that followed, the bloodshed escalated into all-out civil war. Members of the Darood living in the capital and neighbouring districts fled south to Kismayo, onwards to Kenya, or to the northeast regions of Somalia. The collapse of the central government also left a political and institutional vacuum at the local level. In the northeast regions, armed gangs of youth emerged, looting public property and harassing former
8 Interviews with senior Somali figures, Nairobi, August 2008 9 Some commentators note that the SSDF may have been weakened by the imprisonment of Abdulahi Yusuf in Ethiopia. 10 ibid
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government officials and innocent civilians. These gangs, known as Jirri after a blood-sucking bird that feeds off camels, further undermined the relative stability of the northeast regions. In order to combat the growing lawlessness and insecurity, and to defend their people from further attacks by USC forces, northeastern leaders including local politicians, elders, and former officers from the police and army agreed to reinforce the SSDF.
The Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and the struggle to control Gaalkayo, 1991
In 1977, the Siyad Barre regime had suffered a devastating defeat in the Ogaden war with Ethiopia. Founded the same year by a group of dissident politicians and senior military officers, the SSDF was the first major armed opposition movement to challenge Siyad Barres repressive regime and was welcomed by the Ethiopian revolutionary socialist regime headed by Colonel Mengistu. In time, Libya and Yemen also emerged as major sponsors of the SSDF. In the early days, the SSDF was an all-inclusive popular front with Mustapha Haji Noor (an Isaaq) as the chairman with three vice-chairmen: Haji Omar Sterlin and Shanddiinle (both Hawiye) and Colonel Abdulahi Yusuf (Darood). Both the Executive and Central Committees were well balanced regionally and clan-wise but serious internal power struggles and the establishment of other clan-based liberation movements soon reduced the SSDF to a principally Majeerteen organization. By the early 1980s, infighting and factionalism had plunged the SSDF into deep political crisis. In 1985, the new leader of the SSDF, Colonel Abdulahi Yusuf Ahmed, was detained by the Ethiopian government and the movements weapons and other assets were confiscated. The SSDF assumed a low profile to avoid being drawn into an inter-clan civil war. Most of the central committee members sought refuge abroad, while the fighters drifted back to Somalia, principally Mogadishu and the northeast region. In early 1991, following the seizure of Mogadishu by the Hawiye-dominated USC and massacres of Darood clan members, Majeerteen communities in northeastern Somalia especially Mudug region - feared further attacks by the Hawiye-based USC forces led by General Aydiid. Amongst the influx of people who fled from the south-central and northwest to their ancestral homeland in the northeast regions were a fair number who had experience in the civil service and professions, as well as many of the Majeerteen political leadership11. Both factors contributed to the idea of establishing an embryonic political organisation and revitalising the SSDF. A meeting was hastily convened in Gaalkayo on 14 February 1991 to re-launch the SSDF (WSP, 2001). A Central Committee of 76 members was formed, mainly from the Majeerteen clan with representatives from the Leylkase and Awrtable clans as well as the Marehan and Ogaden (all members of the Darood clan-family). General Mohamed Abshir, a senior and widely respected former national police commander in the 1960s, was appointed regional chairman for North Eastern Somalia. Musa Islan Farah remained the acting national Chairman and foreign affairs spokesman, leading the SSDF delegations to the Djibouti I and II reconciliation conferences in June and July 1991. Following these conferences, he deferred the national chairmanship to General Mohamed Abshir for the sake of unity of the SSDF and the people of North Eastern Somalia. However, some of those named in the Central Committee were not consulted or informed before their nomination while others were absent. Nevertheless the outcome partially overcame previous divisions
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among the SSDF membership, and created a united position on defence. The SSDF joined forces with the relatively small Mudug-based Somali National Democratic Union (SNDU) and militia from the Marehan clan in Galgaduud region against the USC forces. Two weeks later, on 28 February, USC militia attacked and took control of Gaalkayo, a strategic trading centre and crossroads between north and south Somalia, the coast and eastern Ethiopia. The action escalated the conflict between the Hawiye and the Darood clans - particularly between the Hawiye / Habar Gidir sub-clan of General Aydiid, and the Majeerteen clan, which reportedly lost over 550 people in the battle12. In May 1991, the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia was deposed by the rebel Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front. SSDF leaders, including Abdulahi Yusuf, were released from detention and returned home to the northeast regions. Yusuf was offered the role of second-in-command in the SSDF hierarchy, with the defence portfolio13, but he declined the offer, claiming instead his former position as chairman of the movement. In order to reconcile their differences, and join forces to re-take Gaalkayo, the SSDF Central Committee and other prominent members of the movement convened a meeting in Bosaaso. The rivalries between the different factions of the SSDF were temporarily resolved and a few weeks later, in June 1991, the SSDF militia resumed the battle for Gaalkayo, eventually retaking control in the late summer.
12 13 14 15 16
Interviews with elders and militia leaders in Gaalkayo, 2007 Decree issued by the SSDF Central Committee and traditional titled leaders of northeast regions on a state of emergency on 16 May 1992 Interviews with several senior Somali figures, August 2008 Similarly, in the south, remnants of the Barre regime joined forces with the armed wing of the USC. Interviews with several key Somali figures, August 2008
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The differences in approach were accentuated by the absence of key civilian politicians at critical periods (for example, General Mohamed Abshir was frequently preoccupied in Mogadishu and elsewhere supporting other Manifesto Group members or organising representation for the Northeast regions at national level peace conferences). Although Colonel Abdulahi Yusuf and his allies were active in the national peace talks, they also emphasised the military defence of the northeast regions. The unresolved leadership dispute and latent conflict between the two contenders and their respective supporters became a feature of successive national level reconciliation processes and hindered progress towards the establishment of an effective regional administration over the next seven years. Incremental headway was made through different phases17 and a series of political meetings and community gatherings, paving the way for public mobilisation at the grassroots level in the northeast regions. Despite its internal divisions, the SSDF played a critical role as the only major political and military faction in the area.
Goaanada Shirweynaha Garowe seminal conference, June 1991 and security challenges
In response to the rapidly evolving dynamics throughout the Somali region, the second inter-regional conference in the northeast regions was convened. Senior leaders of the SSDF arrived from the recently concluded Somali national conference in Djibouti (5-11 June, 1991), including Abdirizak Haji Hussein and Mohamud Yusuf Aden Muro. Representatives of the Marehan clan from Galgaduud region, who had joined forces with the SSDF in the battle against the USC for the liberation of Gaalkayo town, participated together with high level delegations from the regions of Bari, Nugaal and north Mudug, selected through consultations between the SSDF leadership and the senior elders (Dr. Z. Farah, 1998). The conference aimed to address four key issues: 1. the defence of the North-East and the protection of the lifeline road (Gaalkayo-Bosaaso) and Bosaaso port 2. resolution of the leadership of the SSDF and membership of its central committee; 3. the position of the Northeast regions towards the forthcoming Djibouti II conference due to take place the following month, July 199118 4. the position of the Northeast regions towards Somalilands declaration of independence in May 1991; Four days of intense deliberations resulted in a series of decisions. It was agreed, for the first time, that an inter-regional administration would be formed for the northeast regions to include local administrations at regional and district level. Jama Ali Jama was appointed as the coordinator with a full mandate to form a joint northeast administration, aided by a 16-point agreement on emergency powers to prevent opposition or obstructions. The key question of whether it would be independent or under the SSDF was resolved through a compromise in which there would be fifteen secretaries of state, five from the SSDF and ten from the regions, as a transitional model for the administration. The SSDF and Mudug and Nugaal regions made their nominations but selection of those from Bari region was more complicated (due to the multi-clan presence in Bari). Despite the emergency powers, Jama Ali Jama was unable to provide the necessary proposals and in November 1991 General Mohamed Abshir appointed Abdulahi Boqor Muuse (King Kong) to replace him as the coordinator to form a new northeast administration with a cabinet, which, however, failed to materialise. The decisions reached at the Djibouti I conference (at which the SSDF, USC, SPM, SNM, SDA and USF were all present) were reported to the meeting by Abdirizak Haji Hussein and the rest of his delegation,
17 Interview with Mohamed Abshir Waldo, Garowe, November 2007 18 Ali Mahdi was subsequently re-appointed as President at the Djibouti II conference in July 1991
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namely to condemn and bring to justice Siyad Barre for crimes committed against the nation; call for a ceasefire, peace and understanding amongst all Somalis; and convene the follow-up conference, Djibouti II, within thirty days. Abdirizak underlined the importance of participating in Djibouti II and preparing well for it. The Garowe conference responded to the declaration of independence by Somaliland with an acknowledgement of Somalilanders contribution in Somali political history, particularly the union of the North and the South in July 1960 to form the Somali Republic, and an appeal for them not to secede from the Republic. The stability of Bosaaso was given first priority in order to protect the port as the lifeline for the northeast regions, while agreement was reached to make Garowe the capital of the northeast regions. The conference was largely successful, although the divisions within the SSDF and differences in approach remained. However, over the next few months, security deteriorated and in late 1991 a senior UN international was murdered and a national doctor and an elder injured in an attack in Bosaaso, resulting in the suspension of foreign aid to the northeast regions for a year. Another effect of the breakdown of law and order was the illegal burning of thousands of trees, mainly from the acacia forest in the Sool plateau, for the highly profitable charcoal export trade through Elayo and Mareero (near Bosaaso), which was not only devastating the environment but also resulting in protection rackets and checkpoints on the main highway. Meanwhile, the SSDF faced three other potential challenges: to the west, the Somali National Movement (SNM), a liberation organization anchored in the Isaaq clan, was following up its declaration as an independent state by expanding its authority eastwards into Sool and Sanaag regions. Within the northeast, a militant Islamist faction known as al-Itihaad al-Islaami established training camps and settlements in several areas and persuaded General Mohamed Abshir who believed them to be free of corruption to hand over the management of Bosaaso port to them. There was also the continued threat of the USC militia attacks from the south.
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On 16 May, the SSDF Central Committee and traditional titled leaders of the clans of the northeast regions jointly issued an emergency decree to effectively dissolve the cabinet formed by King Kong and replace it with an emergency security committee led by Colonel Abdulahi Yusuf as commander of the SSDF militia. The emergency committee was empowered to manage the Bosaaso port revenue and seize properties and assets in order to counter the frequent attacks of the USC in north Mudug. Although the al-Itihaad forces were angered at losing management of the port, considering this to be the beginning of a campaign against them, the SSDF and the emergency committee did not see them as a major threat at this stage. The meetings decisions were pre-empted when al-Itihaad forces, led by Hassan Dahir Aweys seized the town of Garowe, Bosaaso port, and strategic locations along the main road. More than fifty traditional elders, politicians, and other prominent personalities attending a meeting in Garowe to mobilise resources for the emergency committee were taken hostage by al-Itihaad and held at Ligle, outside Garowe. The SSDF and clan militias responded immediately through mass popular mobilisation and heavy fighting ensued. By late June 1992, after fierce combat that left hundreds dead, the SSDF regained control. The Garowe hostages were released unharmed and the remaining al-Itihaad forces withdrew to Las-Qoray port in Sanaag region, west of Bosaaso (see also below). The conflict with al-Itihaad was ultimately resolved through a compromise that permitted the group to exist as an unarmed, religious/ social movement but obliged it to abandon political activity and expel all nonnative (i.e. non-Harti) members (including its Hawiye leader, Hassan Dahir Aweys, who was suspected of using al-Itihaad as a front to support General Aydiid) Many of its senior figures remained peaceably in the northeast, redirecting their energies toward business, preaching, teaching and the judiciary20.
Sool and eastern Sanaag regions, and the challenge of Somaliland, 1991-2
The initial peace agreements between the Isaaq and the Dhulbahante clans included the cessation of hostilities in Berbera in February 1991, the subsequent conference in Burao, April-May 1991, and a series of peace processes in Sanaag region21. These agreements ensured that political competition in Sool and Sanaag regions remained largely peaceful until 2003 but were nevertheless insufficient to provide full security and stability at local level. As in the northeast, the lawlessness and insecurity that followed the collapse of the state prompted the senior traditional and religious leaders and intellectuals in Sool region, led by Garaad Abdulqani Garaad Jama, to convene a meeting in Boame in June 1991 with the aim of establishing a local administration mandated to restore law and order in Dhulbahante clan areas. The primary outcome was to assert a position of Somali national unity for Sool region and the Dhulbahante community. A follow-up meeting, Boame II, was convened in 1992 with the substantial participation of members of the al-Itihaad al-Islaami, who had recently been defeated by the SSDF in the northeast regions. While the Dhulbahante elders invited peaceful participation by the al-Itihaad in the process of rebuilding in the region, ultimately many of the al-Itihaad followers moved to the strategically remote and inaccessible mountainous areas and coastal settlements in eastern Sanaag region (although others remained active in Sool region).
Violent conflict between the militia of the USC and the SSDF in Mudug, 1991-3
Between 1991 and the Addis Ababa Reconciliation Conference in March 1993, there were at least twelve major armed conflicts between the USC and the SSDF in Gaalkayo and Mudug. The second major conflict, in May 1991, reached the outskirts of Gaalkayo, after which a frontline was established 30 kms south of Gaalkayo at Dagaari and eastwards to the Indian Ocean. In 1992, the civil war was at its height and the SSDF and population of the northeast were attaching great importance to the defence of this southern border.
20 Interviews with several senior Somali figures, August 2008 21 See the Somaliland Peace Mapping study - Peace in Somaliland: An Indigenous Approach to State-building, APD/ Interpeace 2008
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signed, trade resumed between north and south Somalia and Gaalkayo town began to thrive. Although isolated incidents continued to occur, the two communities refrained from direct confrontation and instead problems were addressed through the traditional elders. Throughout this period, Abdulahi Yusuf focussed his attention on garnering the support of UNOSOM to form local district councils in north Mudug under his guidance. In exchange for Abdulahi Yusufs influence on Aydiid to attend the national reconciliation conference in Addis in March 1993, UNOSOM would approve the lists for the local councils in the northeast provided by Abdulahi Yusuf23. Despite public demonstrations against this approach when UNOSOM representatives arrived in Gaalkayo (during which Yusufs militia fired over the heads of the crowds to disperse them), the lists were approved and distributed to each town through the UNOSOM newspaper Maanta, quelling public challenges to Abdulahi Yusuf in the area24. One problematic after-effect of the Mudug Peace Agreement was the large number of militiamen who demobilised and returned to their communities. Many of them lacked livelihood skills and formed armed groups who set up roadblocks along the vital trade route between Gaalkayo and Bosaaso and joined protection rackets for the illegal burning of trees and the lucrative charcoal export trade (WSP, 2001).
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of north Mudug region. Members of other district councils, including that of Burtinle (in north Mudug), Laas Qoray, and Dhahar (Sanaag region) and elsewhere, had been selected by community leaders according to UNOSOM criteria agreed at the Addis conference. A series of consultative meetings were held in Bosaaso and Garowe in an effort to address the deteriorating lawlessness in the northeast regions and form regional administrations. Despite the opposition of General Mohamed Abshir, who wanted the congress postponed, an active minority, known as the group of four comprising influential figures allied to Abdulahi Yusuf General Abdulahi Saed Samatar, Mohamed Yusuf Gagaab, King Kong, and Ali Barre Idilibah persuaded the Isimo that the congress should go ahead. This was further reinforced when Aydiid contacted some of the Isimo to lend his support to Abdulahi Yusuf, raising hopes that progress towards establishment of a northeast administration would be matched by resolution of the fighting in south Somalia. Finally, by this stage the Isimo, many other influential figures, and the general public were increasingly impatient with the wrangling within the SSDF and wanted to see progress. The SSDF diaspora in Kenya were particularly vocal in their demand for the congress. It was agreed that the 5th SSDF Congress would be held in Gardo town aiming to restructure the SSDF Central Committee, elect a new chairman, and establish a credible and functional administration for the northeast regions, which would be empowered to re-establish law and order. This was the first, formal, all-inclusive SSDF congress since its last congress in Harar, Ethiopia in 1986. The deep division between General Abshir and Abdullahi Yusuf, as a result of differing opinions on the Mudug Peace Agreement, meant tension was high from the outset. The preparatory committee was headed by General Abdullahi Said Samatar, an ally of Abdulahi Yusuf, and the Congress foundered almost immediately over disagreements about the number, selection criteria, and representation of delegates, reflecting the struggle for chairmanship of the SSDF movement between Mohamed Abshir and Abdulahi Yusuf (as well as other potential candidates). A small group of participants strove to reconcile their differences but when almost three months passed without any agreement, on 22 August the seven Isimo present at the congress attempted to broker a compromise by appointing as chairman Abdirizak Haji Hussein, the well-known Somali nationalist and former Prime Minister of the civilian government of the 1960s. Although his arrival in Gardo was warmly welcomed by the public, his proposal for a one month conference to resolve the political crisis was accepted by Mohamed Abshir but rejected by Abdulahi Yusuf. Instead of unifying the SSDF, the congress had further exposed the sharp divisions within the movement and the SSDF divided into two factions, with neither able to claim control of the northeast regions, and Abdirizak returned to his home in the US. Following the failure of the Congress and the split in the SSDF, General Mohamed Abshirs faction nominated an ex-ambassador, Mohamed Omar Jama Dhigic-Dhigic, on 3 October 1994 as the head of a nonpolitical administration for northeast regions. He was tasked with the establishment of a North East Somalia State (NES), envisaged to be one of several states forming a future National Federation of Somalia. Detailed plans were put in place for institution building but foundered because of the unresolved divisions within the SSDF.
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An example of one of these peace initiatives was the Iid peace mission to eastern Ethiopia in late 1994 after fighting erupted between two sub-clans of the Majeerteen residing across the Ethiopian border in the eastern region of Wardheer, in an area known as Iid (the Sands). The conflict between the Reer Hersi subclan (of the Omar Mohamoud sub-clan of the Majeerteen clan) and the Reer Mohamoud sub-clan apparently arose over a killing dating back ten years and escalated with further revenge killings on either side, including that of a prominent businessman in Gaalkayo. The conflict between the two sub-clans impacted on the trade between Mudug and Wardheer regions, with the potential to expand further, both into northeastern Somalia and eastern Ethiopia. A group of respected Majeerteen clan elders, mostly from Bari and Nugaal regions and led by the late Islan Mohamed Islan Mussa, the paramount chief of Nugaal region, travelled to the Somali region of eastern Ethiopia to mediate. The mediation team was seen by both parties in conflict as neutral. It began by meeting the elders and intellectuals of the two sub-clans and, with their consent, convened a meeting at which the two communities presented their cases. The mediation team negotiated diya (compensation payment) and a settlement was reached between the two communities.
process, these initiatives helped to mobilise broad-based support amongst the communities in the northeast towards a level of stability and trust-building that fostered the aim of establishing a regional administration.
The impact of the 1997 Cairo national Somali conference on the future of the northeast regions
Following the Sodere meeting, preparations were well underway in Bosaaso in late 1997 to host the national reconciliation conference when the process was unexpectedly shifted to Cairo, resulting in great dissatisfaction in the northeast (Herbert Herzog, 1998) and provoking accusations that Egypt, Yemen and other Arab countries were biased towards the Hawiye clan factions35. Suspicions were reinforced when the Cairo conference from 12 November-22 December 1997 resulted in an agreement that recognised Ali Mahdi and Hussein Aydiid (both leaders of Hawiye clan factions) as the sole representatives of the Somali people, in line with the power-sharing agreement between them. Furthermore, the Cairo agreement relocated the proposed National Reconciliation Conference from Bosaaso to Baidoa to be held in January 1998.
32 KAHA BARI (N. 350), 30 January 1998 33 Resolutions adopted by the National Salvation Council of Somalia in its second ordinary session from 24 June-10 July in Sodere, ,Ethiopia, and endorsed by IGAD 34 Decisions of the SSDF Leadership Meeting on 07-20 January 1997, Sodere , Ethiopia 35 KAHA BARI newspaper editorial (N. 351) 1997
For the general public in the northeast regions, the Cairo agreement was a huge blow and seen by many as a betrayal of hopes for the rebuilding of Somalia, as well as a way of minimising the influence of the northeast in Somali national affairs36. The relocation of the proposed national reconciliation conference from the relatively secure port of Bosaaso to Baidoa town, which was under military occupation by Aydiids forces, was seen as a humiliation for the That conference had [negative] political implication for northeast regions as well as impractical. (In the the northeastern people. The President, Ali Mahdi, and event, Aydiid refused to withdraw his forces the Prime Minister, Hussein Aydiid, appointed at the from Baidoa and the conference never took conference were both from the same Hawiye clan and place.) The SSDF delegation in Cairo called that was not acceptable. We instructed Abdulahi Yusuf the SSDF Central Committee in Bosaaso for and Aden Gabyow to walk out of the conference. The guidance and was instructed to withdraw and Sool and Sanaag regions were also unhappy with the return home. agreement signed at the conference Dr Yassin Farah, member of the SSDF Central Committee37. The refusal of two of the primary Darood clan leaders to acknowledge the Cairo agreement and their public withdrawal from it was welcomed by the majority of the Darood people. Mohamed Abshir, who endorsed the Cairo Agreement, was censored by his supporters and lost credibility, marking the beginning of the decline of his political influence in the northeast regions. The failure of the national reconciliation initiatives in Sodere and Cairo combined with popular desire in the northeast regions for an environment more conducive to peace and prosperity to provide the necessary impetus for political change (WSP, 1998; Bernhard Helander, 1998). It prompted prominent figures from the diaspora to intervene, urging the formation of a single, unified State of North East Regions.
Garowe Community Consultative and Constitutional Conferences and the birth of the Puntland State of Somalia, 1998
In early 1998, the failure of the national process, inherent threats from the USC in the south and the absence of effective administration in the northeast prompted a number of SSDF Central Committee meetings followed by a series of ad hoc consultative meetings between members of the SSDF central committee, local and diaspora intellectuals, and traditional and religious leaders in Bosaaso, Gardo and Garowe. Although there were differences on options and approaches at these meetings, almost all agreed on the need for a regional governance structure to address the political, economic, and social needs of the area. Eventually agreement was reached to convene a community consultative conference in Garowe in the February 1998, which decided to convene a northeast constitutional conference in May 1998. The selection of delegates was based on the demography of the Harti clan group, firstly by region and then by distribution down the main lineage to the sub-sub-clans. Instead of confining participation to the inhabitants of Northeastern Somalia, invitations were ultimately extended to all Harti clans (as well as the Marehan of Galgaduud region): a decision that would have significant consequences (see the case study below). Delegates began arriving in Garowe from early May 1998 for the opening of the constitutional conference on 15 May. Organisation of the Shir Beeleed (community conference), subsequently known as the Shir-Beeleedka Dastuuriga ah ee Garowe (Garowe Community Constitutional Conference), included the registration and accommodation of delegates, undertaken by a preparatory committee which organised the whole conference process and drafted the charter with the help of a group of international constitutional lawyers. Over 460 delegates representing the different sub-clans and social strata participated. A provisional Charter was adopted in July and a president and vice-president were elected, marking the establishment of
36 Interview with Dr. Yasin Farah, Bosaaso, November 2007 37 Interview with Dr. Yasin Farah, Bosaaso, November 2007
the Puntland State of Somalia. The cabinet was appointed in August 1998 and the parliament inaugurated the following month. The mandate of the nascent Puntland government was to address the priority concerns of the public, namely the reestablishment of public institutions; ensuring law and order; drafting a new constitution within the three years of its term of office; preparing socio-economic development plans; and playing a more effective role in the national peace and reconciliation process. The administration worked with prominent community elders and former police officers to establish the first units of the police and Daraawiish38 (paramilitary forces) and launched a campaign to clear the charcoal roadblocks39. Through their joint efforts simultaneous operations were carried out along the 680 km length of the road, removing over 60 illegal roadblocks. This had immediate benefits and over the next two years, the administration thrived, restoring peace, stability, and confidence to the region.
Puntland constitutional crisis, armed conflict, and the mediating peace mission, 2001-3
In June 2001, just weeks before the three year term of the first Puntland government was due to expire, a constitutional crisis erupted. The Puntland Charter agreed at the Garowe conference in 1998 defined the provisions for a transition to a democratic system of governance during the Puntland Regional Governments three year term. These included the drafting of a constitution, holding of a census and popular referendum to endorse the draft constitution, and preparation of the legal framework for political parties and elections. By mid-2001, none of these provisions had been fulfilled and the incumbent administration instead proposed extending its mandate for a further three years. However Article 34.2 of the Charter stipulated that if elections had not been held successfully by the end of the three-year transitional period, the Chairman of the Supreme Court would assume the presidency on an interim basis, pending the convening of a representative Community Constitutional Conference within 45 days. There was significant public opposition to the proposed extension of the mandate and pressure to adhere to the Charter. The outgoing administration called on the traditional titled elders to defuse the impasse, but rejected their recommendation to comply with the Charters provisions. The president of the Supreme Court was nevertheless sworn in at a meeting of the traditional titled elders in Garowe, over the objections of the outgoing president and his administration, and given responsibility to prepare the ground for a Constitutional Community Conference within the specified 45 days. The outgoing president, Abdulahi Yusuf, and his supporters regrouped in Gaalkayo and prepared for an assault on Garowe and Bosaaso. The president of the Supreme Court quickly convened the Constitutional Community Conference in Garowe but it was not fully representative since Abdulahi Yusuf and his supporters refused to participate. On 14 November 2001, the delegates at the conference elected Colonel Jama Ali Jama, a former official of the SSDF and a leading opponent of Abdulahi Yusuf, as president. He duly formed a government, but almost immediately Abdulahi Yusuf launched an attack and successfully captured Garowe, the Puntland capital. Jama Ali Jama withdrew with his cabinet to Bosaaso and Puntland was formally divided. Abdulahi Yusuf subsequently captured Bosaaso and Jama sought refuge in Djibouti, together with some of his cabinet members. Recognising the imminent threat to the stability and peace in Puntland, a group of influential figures from within Puntland and the diaspora initiated the Puntland Peace Mission comprising prominent intellectuals
38 Darwiish (derived from dervish) refers to members of armed religious fraternities, particularly the soldiers of Mullah Mohamed Abdulla Hassan, renowned for leading the struggle against the colonial powers in the early 19th century. The contemporary use of Daraawiish in Puntland refers to paramilitary forces. 39 Interviews with senior elders, 2007
and elders headed by Abdurahman Sheikh Nur, with funding support from Diakonia, an INGO based in Garowe. In the summer of 2001, the Puntland Peace Mission launched an intensive public awareness campaign to prevent further escalation of the conflict and avert civil war, in particular demanding that the two parties to the conflict confine any fighting to areas outside urban centres (which was effective). The mission also engaged in shuttle diplomacy between the two parties in Gaalkayo and Bosaaso, achieving a temporary suspension of hostilities. Despite these peace efforts, the first in a series of armed confrontations between the supporters of Jama Ali Jama and Abdulahi Yusuf took place at Al-Hamdullillah, midway between Gardo and Bosaaso in August 2002. Jama Ali Jamas militia suffered a heavy defeat and regrouped in Dhuudo, 100 km east of Gardo town under the leadership of General Mohamoud Mussa Hersi (Adde), a Somali from the diaspora in Canada. His forces suffered a further heavy defeat in Dhuudo in December 2002 and retreated to El-Afweyn in western Sanaag (Somaliland), where they re-grouped under the name Golaha Badbaadinta Puntland (Puntland Salvation Council). Several attempts to mediate the crisis ended in failure. Puntland remained tense and uncertain in the face of a serious threat of further violent confrontation between the two forces with the added potential risk of Sanaag region becoming a battleground. Insecurity on the main highway between Gaalkayo and Bosaaso resulted in reduced trade and economic hardship throughout Puntland.
Ararsame sub-clans of the Dhulbahante was sparked by disagreements between traders in qaad (a mild narcotic leaf), but its origins lay in disputes over grazing land and unresolved revenge killings. The conflict deteriorated with the killing and displacement of elders, women and children, razing of villages, and looting of camels and other livestock. Political interest groups in both Puntland and Somaliland appeared to be aggravating the situation. Several attempts by local elders, intellectuals and religious leaders failed to stop the bloodshed until General Mohamoud Hersi Mussa (Adde) stepped in. He engaged a number of other respected titled elders from the region in the process, including Garaad Suleyman from the Dhulbahante clan who was able to exert pressure on the two belligerent sub-clans. After extensive shuttle diplomacy between the two communities, a peace agreement was reached for a ceasefire and accommodation of the militia from both sides at Dharkeyn-Geenyo village.
The gradual maturing of Puntlands political institutions helped to better manage and contain conflict but did not eliminate it entirely. In early 2006, for example, the Puntland Minister of Planning and International Cooperation, Abdirahman Farole, lost a vote of confidence in the House of Representatives and was dismissed but, rather than accept the result, he mobilized militia from his clan to surround the parliament building. The police stormed the building, killing three and injuring several others of the militia in the operation. Although this rapid reaction resolved the immediate crisis, the way in which a senior figure in the administration had so easily resorted to force against the legislative body damaged the image of the Puntland administration and underscored the fragility of Puntlands peace and stability.
effectively with the help of traditional leaders and other influential figures, resulting in the election of a new Puntland president, General Adde in 2005. The main findings include the importance of administrative structures and systems of governance for managing and sustaining peace agreements The Overview reflects the complex interplay of the roles of traditional leaders, politicians, intellectuals and members of the diaspora, and of national and local level political agendas in the northeast regions and Puntland. After the collapse of the Somali state and the ensuing power vacuum, the traditional elders resumed responsibility for managing peace and security in the northeast regions and addressing local communitybased disputes, working in collaboration with other leading figures. Conflicts were resolved through interplay of the political elite together with the traditional leaders, intellectuals and members of the diaspora who all contributed to mediation of clashes, crises, and facilitation of the delivery of humanitarian assistance by international agencies. In most cases, the traditional conflict management structures and the modern system of governance worked in a complimentary way that provided for the application of law and order. Many of the peace initiatives aimed to build a structured system to tackle conflict through establishing administrative structures and systems of governance. This appears to reflect the recognition by the key stakeholders and communities that peace would only be sustained through effective governance capable of applying the rule of law. From 1991 onwards, efforts were being made to establish local and regional administrations and it is notable that, in the vast majority of cases, the local governance systems were established through a consultative approach that ensured a level of community ownership. The resolution of several peace initiatives dealing more directly with clan-based conflicts relied on the administrative structures for implementation and enforcement of peace agreements reached. Given the fluid political dynamics that underpinned the nascent local administrations in northeast regions/ Puntland, this rendered the peace agreements vulnerable to recurrence of conflict when agreements were not fully monitored or implemented. Nevertheless, the majority of the local clan-based peace initiatives were sustained with only minor breaches of the peace accords reached. In contrast, the political settlements have proved more challenging, with breaches that resulted in renewed violence (for example, after the constitutional crisis in 2001). During the period of political crisis from 2001-3, the political conflict over the administration and law and order mechanisms was associated with an increase in local conflicts, indicating the important role of governance systems in reinforcing conflict resolution and peace agreements at community level. This also reinforces the observation (above) that the sustained impetus towards establishing effective governance systems in the northeast regions/ Puntland was underpinned by recognition that effective governance is required to sustain peace and promote development. Throughout, from 1991 to the present, the impact of national level politics on dynamics within the northeast regions and Puntland is apparent. These reflect the interplay of the political elite and the traditional leaders as well as the relationship with Ethiopia as a regional partner with whom Abdulahi Yusuf, in particular, sustained a close relationship. Another feature is the continuing latent conflict over the disputed territories in Sool and eastern Sanaag regions between Somaliland and Puntland. Somalilands home-grown reconciliation and establishment of a
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functioning administration has been reflected in other constituencies in the Somali region. A number of the Dhulbahante elders who participated in the Boroma conference in Somaliland in 1993 were also active in the Garowe Constitutional conference in 1998, which led to the establishment of the Puntland state. While competing agendas of the political leadership at the national level were a strong feature of the state of permanent transition (WSP, 2001) from 1991-8, the successive failures of national peace talks - combined with a new emphasis on what became known as the building blocks approach to state rebuilding from 1995 - ultimately contributed to the impetus towards the community-based conference through which the Puntland State was finally established. Subsequently the national level agenda was a factor in resolution of the political crisis and violent conflict in 2003. However Puntlands vulnerability as a platform towards national level agendas may in part reflect the need to strengthen its vision for its existence as a semiautonomous state.
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Timeline of major conflicts and peace initiatives in northeast regions of Somalia (Puntland), 1990 2007
Transition Rebuilding Political crisis Political transition
Conflict-prone
Somali state collapses SSDF Congress in Gardo fails two factions Arta Somali National Conference Fighting between two Majeerteen sub-clans Charcoal roadblocks proliferate Fighting between sub-clans in Sanag region
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
The Manifesto Declaration Sodere Agreement and power sharing deal by SSDF leaders Charcoal roadblocks removed Garowe Constitutional Community Conference
Booame I 1991 Boame II 1992 (Sool region) Establishment of Bari, Nugal and Mudug regional administrations
Ramada Peace Agreement two Majeerteen subclans Puntland Peace Mission Dharkeen-geenyo Peace Agreement - two Dhulbahante sub-clans
Category/level
Local
Zonal
Regional
Local
Cross-border
Local
Local
Regional
Booame I
Booame II
Pacification
Case Study: The Establishment of the Puntland State of Somalia the Garowe Constitutional Community Conference
The long process towards the establishment of the Puntland State of Somalia had its origins in discussions at a conference in Garowe in June 1991 on the formation of a regional administration for the northeast regions and the Peace and Life conference of December 1993, which mobilised an alliance of Harti clans. The process was further reinforced by the outcome of the second National Reconciliation Conference of Addis Ababa in 1993 (Federico Battera, 1998). The series of meetings and the prevailing national and local dynamics during the subsequent seven years, notably the Sodere SSDF meeting in 1997, eventually culminated in the Shirweynaha Dasturka Woqooyi Bari (the Constitutional Community conference) in Garowe in 1998. This case study captures the key dynamics and challenges encountered during the course of the preparatory meeting, the Garowe consultative conference, and the Garowe Constitutional Community Conference itself and identifies the key ideas, principles and political positions that were addressed in the process.
the exception of the political and traditional leaders. They were joined on 8 March by political and traditional leaders from Sool and Sanaag regions, who arrived with pomp and ceremony - on garlanded horses44, accompanied by a fleet of cars to ask that they be included in the constitutional conference. The request was accepted and joint revision of the documents to include the two new regions was finalised between 10-12 March (see below). This now represented a broad cross-section of the communities of the Harti clan group and other Darood clans living in these regions. The final document included the contributions of a wide range of Isimo, leaders of political organisations in the respective regions (the SSDF, USP and SNDU), representatives of civic and womens groups, intellectuals, religious leaders, diaspora, media, and international agencies.
44 Horses are relatively rare and valuable resources in the northeast and their ceremonial use reflects prestige 45 Interview with Beldaje Ali Farah, Ugas Hassan Ugas Yasin, Bosaaso, November 2007 46 Interview with Beldaje Ali Farah, Bosaaso, November 2007
The conference went on to discuss technical issues relating to the establishment of the Puntland state with reports presented by the Technical Sub-committee of the preparatory committee on: the draft charter proposing the makeup of the government, its structures and institutions; levels of power sharing with the (future) federal state; the political role of the Isimo and of the political organizations of the SSDF, USP, and SNDU; socio-economic development and integration of the respective regions; and regulation of the economy and revenue generation.
47 Interview, Nairobi, August 2008 48 Speech of H.E. President Abdulahi Yusuf at the Opening of Parliament, Garowe, Puntland, 16 September 1998
Parallel mediations
During the consultative conference in Garowe, (and while Abdulahi Yusuf was seriously ill), several issues were resolved through the mediation of the Isimo and politicians in an effort to ensure the smooth-running of the subsequent Constitutional Conference.
One controversy related to the rival claims by Boqor Mahmoud Boqor Musse and his younger brother, Abdulahi Boqor Musse (King-Kong), for the title of Boqor of the Osman Mohamoud clan (Herzog, 1998). In private meetings, King Kong was eventually persuaded to give up his claim on the basis that, if the process included representation from the Harti clan group (not only the smaller Darood and Majeerteen clan representatives from the three northeast regions), he would be in a strong political position. Accordingly, he gave up his claims in favour of his older brother and lent his support to the strategy for inclusion of the Dhulbahante and Warsangeli as part of the wider Harti clan group. Subsequently the Isimo also addressed the long-standing dispute between the two Garaads of the Dhulbahante in Sool region, Garaad Abdi Qani and Garaad Salebaan, which was resolved sufficiently for their participation in the conference. However the lingering dispute between Suldan Said Suldan Abdisalan and his uncle, Ali Mahdi, over the title of Suldan of the Warsangeli required protracted arbitration by the council of Isimo and ultimately delayed the attendance of the delegation from Sanaag region at the constitutional conference.
49 Conversation with Abdirahman Osman Abdulle (Shuke), PDRC director, Garowe, November 2007
Participants
The preparatory committee engaged in a painstaking process to validate the legitimacy of the lists of delegates according to the rules established by the consultative Conference. The allocations had been agreed as follows: Bari (97), Nugaal (56), north Mudug (56), Sool region and Buhoodle district (96), Sanaag (56), western Galgaduud (42, although these delegates did not attend) and diaspora (30) from the relevant regions, to be selected by their communities according to their own agreed procedures, and with each of them to having voting rights at the conference (Abraham, 2002: see annex for the distribution of quotas for diaspora delegates). The contest for seats began at the district level, with lists passed to regional governors and validated by the Isimo. On occasion the Isimo were confronted with two or more lists of delegates from the same districts or regions and considerable time was devoted to addressing the disputes. While the mediation by the Isimo during the preparations for the conference had succeeded in resolving several internal disputes amongst senior clan representatives, the lingering dispute between Suldan Said Suldan Abdisalan and his uncle, Ali Mahdi, over the title of Suldan of the Warsangeli required protracted arbitration until finally, on 22 June 1998, over a month after the conference had begun, Suldan Said was recognised as the legitimate titled leader and the delegation from Sanaag were able to join the conference. The validation of delegates was further complicated by continuing dissension over the participation of representatives from the Dhulbahante and Warsangeli clans from Sool and Sanaag regions. General Mohamed Abshirs alliance within the SSDF saw that the inclusion of these delegates tilted the balance of voting power strongly in favour of Abdulahi Yusufs alliance (since he had supported their inclusion). Another concern was about the tensions that would be generated with Somaliland, since these regions lie within the borders it claims. Implicit admonitions were made by a number of international diplomats and donors against the inclusion of Sool and Sanaag regions in the process. According to Ugas Hassan, The donors were prepared to support the conference with financial contribution, provided that Sool and Sanaag were excluded. This position was overruled by the determination of the people50. Under pressure from Abdulahi Yusufs supporters, King Kong (who had renounced his claim to the title of boqor to contest as a political leader for the Harti clan group), and the Sool and Sanag representatives themselves, Sool and Sanaag regions were included and subsequently played a decisive role in the establishment of Puntland State. Ultimately, the competing demands over representation were resolved by increasing the delegates for Bari (which generally supported General Mohamed Abshir) and Sool and Sanaag regions, adding a further 91 seats to the total number of delegates (from 421 to 51251), and the official lists were agreed by the preparatory committee.
50 Transcript of interview with Ugas Hassan Ugas 51 Note that the total number of participants at the conference fluctuated as different times during the process
Sixteen private villas were used to accommodate delegates and the host region of Nugaal provided 400 armed police and militia to ensure the security of the conference under the overall protection of the Isimo52 .
Preliminary speeches focussed on the analysis of the Somali situation; the relevance of the establishment of Puntland State; the security context in the regions; environmental protection (related to charcoal production); and the objectives and the expectations from the conference. The chairing committee presented the documents drafted by the preparatory committee, including a draft agenda and charter and received suggestions from the delegates on: procedures for conducting the conference, including the time allocated to speakers; discussion of the Charter and its endorsement; the capital of Puntland State; procedures for campaigning and for electing the Parliament, Head of State and Deputy; and the future role of the political organizations and of the traditional elders in the politics of the would be Puntland State.
The Garowe community accepted the need to extend their hospitality and lines of credit to the delegates. Garowe did not have good water and there were not adequate hotels and restaurants. Some of the delegates had to sleep in the open. Everyone was tolerant for the sake of the conference Dr Yasin Farah53
The Charter
During the adjournment of the conference for three days, delegates were able to read the draft charter in preparation for a full debate on relevant articles. The resumption of the conference heralded lively discussion, with the secretariat interacting with the steering committee and delegates, providing information, summarizing delegates speeches, and attending to the procedural aspects of the conference and providing copies of the agenda and conference procedures to the regional delegates54. The procedure for election of the Head of State and Deputy generated heated debate over the voting method (secret ballot or hand raising); the determination of the total number of voting delegates and voting quorums; and the denomination of the Head of State (as Chief Minister or President). Some delegates favoured establishing an Electoral Committee to preside over the elections and numerous other views were expressed. There were complaints that insufficient time was allowed for speeches and insufficient copies of the Charter and other documents were available. Eventually, the Chairing Committee proposed the nomination of a Charter Technical Committee of five members, one from each region, to study the controversial articles of the draft Charter, make the necessary revisions, and propose a version that could be agreed upon. The Technical Committee was appointed as follows: Chair Dr. Abdi-Asis Nur Hersi (north Mudug); Hassan Abshir Farah (Nugaal); Dr. Abdurahman Abdi Madobe (Bari); Ahmed Abdi Haabsade (Sool); a representative from Sanag, when available (since the Sanaag delegation was still awaiting validation). The delegates forwarded their suggestions to the Technical Committee, who withdrew to consolidate the different views presented and compile a revised draft of the Charter. When the conference reconvened on 21 June 1998, for the first time (after more than a month of discussion) the Chairman was able to produce the definitive list of official delegates to the Constitutional Conference (with the exception of the Sanaag delegation)55. Non-delegates were asked to leave the hall, including the delegates from Sanaag region who had yet to present a unified list. The remaining delegates gave their
52 Interview with the governor of Nugaal, Dahir Ali Isse, by Kaha Bari, 5 June 1998 53 Interview with Dr. Yasin Farah, Bosaaso, November 2007 54 Verbatim report on conference proceedings, Abdullahi Arahman Ahmed Ayrow UNDP Bosaaso, 26 July 1998 55 Ibid
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formal endorsement to the agenda and procedures for the conference. They also received copies of the revised draft Charter, following the amendments made to it by the charter review committee on the basis of almost 300 proposals from the delegates.
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the Charter was approved by 359 of the 402 delegates present with 31 voting against and 12 abstentions59. The conference then adjourned for a short break to enable the Isimo to discuss the two contentious articles, while the delegates celebrated Somali National Independence Day on 1 July, reconvening on 4 July. Two days later they welcomed an Italian government delegation led by the Italian ambassador for Somalia, Francesco Sciortino, who brought messages of political support for the Constitutional Conference. The conference delegates had high expectations of a statement from the Isimo on how to resolve the differences relating to the two outstanding articles, on the selection of the capital and allocation of parliamentary seats. With visible disappointment, the chair, Islan Mohamed, informed them that the Isimo had been unable to reach a compromise solution and the decision would have to be made instead by the delegates. Extensive discussion ensued. After input by half of the hundred delegates who had registered to speak on the issue, the chairman observed that since no new insights were forthcoming, the issue would be put to a vote. The vote was held on 8 July with delegates raising their hands, region by region, with 257 voting for Garowe and 36 for Bosaaso with 6 abstentions. Only 299 delegates were present for the vote: many of the absentees had campaigned for Bosaaso and, lacking sufficient votes to win, they absented themselves rather than endorse Garowe as the capital.
59 Verbatim report on the Constitutional Community Conference, UNDP, 1998 60 Minority groups include the Arab Saalah, Madhiban, Tumaal, and Bantu
number of delegates in some districts but were unable to share these among themselves.61 An overwhelming majority of the delegates approved the proposed distribution of parliamentary seats and the chairman enjoined the delegates to present their nominations for parliamentary representatives within 45 days.
Presidential election
The scene was set for appointment of the electoral committee and the election of the president and vice president. The electoral committee members, who were selected on the basis of neutrality and were not conference delegates, were: Musse Islan Farah (north Mudug), Sheikh Ali Nur (Nugaal), Abdi Hakim Said Musse (Bari), Hassan Awad Guled (Sool) and Osman Ashur Abdulle (Sanaag). The conference was adjourned for several days to allow for campaigning by the presidential and vice presidential candidates, who were: Abdulahi Yusuf Ahmed, Mohamed Jama Magan, and Warsame Abdi Shirwa for president; and Mohamed Abdi Hashi, Yasin Ali Tamad, Mohamed Abdi Haabsade, and Ahmed Mohamed Gonle for vice president. The electoral committee established that the quorum would be two-thirds of the delegates and voting would proceed by a show of hands. Abdulahi Yusuf was elected president with more than 80% of the votes (377 out of 392 delegates present), with Mohamed Abdi Hashi elected as his vice president by 237 votes. They duly took the oath of office and were empowered for the three year transitional period.
61 62 63 64
Interview with Beldaje Ali Farah, Bosaaso, November Interview with Hassan Abshir KAHA BARI (N.365) Ugo Mattei, Cardozo Law Bulletin - Patterns of African Constitution in the Making, 27 November 1998 Interview with Mohamed Abdulkadir Barre (Accountant of the Financial Committee
own expenses during the planned fifteen day conference65. The women from the regions, and particularly Nugaal, made a tremendous contribution in providing accommodation and addressing numerous logistical issues66. When the Constitutional Conference extended far beyond the scheduled fifteen days, the elders, delegates, and general public of Garowe and beyond showed considerable resilience in sustaining the process and meeting the additional costs. The financial costs of the conference were only settled after the establishment of the first executive cabinet of the Puntland State. According to the accountant of the financial committee, The debt incurred by the conference with the public amounted to US $300.000. The Ministry of Finance of the first Puntland Government paid US $ 200,000 and the rest was written off.67
International support for the process was therefore limited to technical expertise to prepare for the conferences, to document the proceedings, and to assist with formulation of the Charter. One of the technical experts, Ugo Mattei, reported that the only help provided has been a small group of .scholars under the coverage of the United Nations Development Office for Somalia. Such experts met with the preparatory Committee in Garowe in the month of April and a document has been produced to serve as a base for the Constitutional Conference74 These scholars were Brendan OLeary, constitutional expert on government at the London School of Economics; Herbert Herzog, Swiss consultant; John Murray, professor on Comparative Sharia and Secular Law and former US State legislator; Ugo Mattei, Italian constitutional lecturer at Italian and US universities; and Marco Guadagni, Italian Professor of Education at Trieste University, who all provided invaluable expertise in assisting with the drafting and editing of the Charter of Puntland State. Abdiqawi Yusuf and Zakariye Farah were not present at the charter drafting sessions in Garowe but made valuable written contributions,. Other Somali resource persons in drafting the charter included Dr. Hassan Ali Mirreh, Dr. Mohamed Hassen Barre, Abdirahman Farole, and Adam Jama Biihi. Although the UN Political Office gave minimal attention to the process, UN Development Office for Somalia (UNDOS) provided technical support to minute the conference proceedings; the US appeared to be altogether oblivious of the process; and the Arab League and the African Union were suspicious that it was a prelude to further disintegration of the country.
Elders meet in Burtinle with PDRC researchers to prepare the ground for the reconciliation process
Businessmen and elders engage in serious discussions over the costs of the berkedo (water reservoirs) to be destroyed as part of the peace accord
Community elders and officials oversee the destruction of the berkedo (water reservoirs) as agreed as part of the reconciliation process
Collecting camels for compensation payment as part of the reconciliation process (above and below)
On the southern border of the northeast regions, there was no expectation that the community of south Mudug, inhabited predominantly by clans of the Hawiye, would join the process. Despite the relative success of the Mudug Peace Agreement of 1993 between the communities of north and south Mudug, little progress had been made since then to consolidate the peace and move towards a joint administration. A number of factors contributed to the subsequent and, for many, unexpected - inclusion of Sool and Sanaag regions (and the district of Buhoodle) in the formation of the state of Puntland. Having been invited to observe progress at the consultative conference, on Abdulahi Yusufs initiative, the Dhulbahante and Warsangeli clan representatives indicated their intention to stay on and join the process. Critically, their inclusion shifted the balance of power away from the alliance of Mohamed Abshir towards the alliance of Abdulahi Yusuf, who had brought them into the process. The high proportion (45%) of delegates from Sool and Sanaag at the Constitutional Conference overwhelmed the political ambitions of Mohamed Abshirs camp to the advantage of Abdulahi Yusuf and his supporters. The inclusion of the Dhulbahante and Warsengeli enabled an extension of territory to encompass the wider Harti clan group, beyond the Majeerteen clan and allied Darood clans, comprising a third of the entire Somali region. It also reinforced the links with the Harti clan group presence in Kismayo and Juba, a strategic resource-rich location in southern Somalia. The broader alliance of the Harti clan group both recognises and reinforces the investment of Puntland in the political future of southern Somalia and at the same time had the potential to undermine Somalilands secession from Somalia since Sool and Sanaag regions and the district of Buhoodle all lie within the former colonial borders claimed by Somaliland. Although many in the northeast regions opposed Somalilands secession, instead favouring a united Somali state, they also opposed the extension of the envisaged process from the northeast regions to the Harti clan group. The original organisers of the conference were vocal in arguing against the inclusion of Sool and Sanaag regions in the process and recognised the potential for political and administrative confusion in the territories disputed with Somaliland. They also anticipated that the international donor community would withdraw its pledge of support for the conference and subsequent support for the regional administration, which proved to be a valid concern as the international aid community demonstrated its reluctance to endorse the engagement of Sool and Sanaag regions in the process75. From the perspective of the representatives of the Dhulbahante and Warsangeli clans at the conference, joining Puntland State fulfilled several purposes. One of the stated motivations was that Sool and Sanaag regions were not benefiting from the aid assistance provided by the international aid community to Somaliland on their behalf76. The alliance with Puntland provided a means to: exercise leverage on the Somaliland government to increase resources to their area; oppose Somalilands secessionist claim; consolidate the Harti clan group position in Kismayo and Juba; and benefit from influencing the balance of power in both Puntland and Somaliland. At the Garowe conference, Sool and Sanaag regions fielded 213 out of the 469 delegates, gained 26 of the 66 parliamentary seats and three of the nine cabinet posts. In addition, by unwritten agreement, the Puntland vice president is Dhulbahante and the parliamentary speaker is Warsengeli. It had originally been envisaged that the Marehan, another Darood clan who inhabit neighbouring territory in Galgaduud region, would also be engaged in the process of establishing Puntland State as overall clan security was the highest priority in the civil war situation. The organisers of the consultative conference had had high expectations of their participation77 and a variety of reasons were given for their withdrawal. One issue related to the involvement of Marehan militia in fighting with Harti groups in Kismayo.
75 Interview with senior diplomat, Nairobi, 30 November 2007 76 A meeting of representatives of the Harti clan and Meheri sub-clan of the Arab Saalah clan in Kenya on 28 March 1996, in the presence of members of the SSDF and USP, made a formal complaint to the international donors about the lack of aid to Sool and Sanaag regions after the collapse of the state. 77 Interview with Suldan Said Mohamed Garasse, Garowe, and with Dr. Yasin Farah, Bosaaso, November 2007
0
We sent envoys to them but they would not participate in the conference because of the situation developing in Lower Juba. There was heated debate on whether to wait until the issue was settled: it was decided to go ahead with the conference interview with Dr Yasin Farah78. Ugas Hassan also noted there was also dissension within the Marehan clan the Galgaduud or Abudwaq Marehan community couldnt agree among themselves on participation in the conference although some welcomed it79 Another issue related to the absence of representation by a sufficient number of credible and respected traditional elders able to shoulder the responsibility of such a serious commitment80. Finally, the question of their participation may have been influenced by unresolved grievances: Nevertheless, the seats allocated to the Marehan clan remained open to them throughout the Constitutional Conference. We invited and hosted them several times but the lingering grudge of the Marehan clan of Siyad Barre against the role of the SSDF in dethroning the Barre regime might not have healed well interview with Suldan Said81.
Although the establishment of Puntland State was based on power sharing between the clans, this was not made explicit in the Charter (or the subsequent Puntland constitution). The incompatibility of the clan-based system with democratic systems of governance presents significant challenges, in terms of the appropriate engagement of qualified people for government positions on the basis of merit; issues of accountability; and broader public participation, including that of women and minority groups. Nevertheless, the clan-based power sharing of the Puntland State did provide a formula for stability in the short-term and the basis for a transition towards democracy.
Actors
The power struggle between the wings associated with the two SSDF leaders, General Mohamed Abshir and Colonel Abdulahi Yusuf, remained a theme throughout the preparations for the conference and the meeting itself. Although the SSDF reunification conference in Sodere in early 1997 resolved the leadership dispute between Mohamed Abshir and Abdulahi Yusuf and unified the organisation, recurrent tensions testified to the continuing power struggle between the two leaders. Mohamed Abshir was absent from the country for eight months and missed the beginning of the consultative conference. In his absence, Abdulahi Yusuf authorised mechanisms for funding both the conference and the conflict in Kismayo. Mohamed Abshir disputed the decree, which was also unpopular with members of the business sector, and the Isimo was forced to intervene to endorse the measures. The clash between the two figures continued after the conclusion of the Garowe conference, which had recommended that there would not be political organisations in the three year transitional mandate of the government, during which time a new constitution allowing political parties was to be written. Abdulahi Yusuf was skilful in building alliances and neutralising key opponents, for example, by bringing dissatisfied representatives of the Dhulbahante and Warsangeli into the process and gaining support from the Islan, chair of the conference, in exchange for Yusufs support for Garowe as the capital. He appeared to have access to the necessary funds from the diaspora to support these alliances and had also gained in popularity for his stand at the Cairo conference in contrast with Mohamed Abshirs loss of credibility in supporting its controversial outcome.
78 79 80 81
Interview with Dr. Yasin Farah, Bosaaso, November 2007 Interview transcript, Ugas Hassan Ugas Interview with Beldaje Ali Farah, Bosaaso, November 2007 Interview with Suldan Said Mohamed, Garowe, November 2007
1
The crucial role played by the Isimo (in collaboration with other influential figures) in mediating numerous disputes at different levels demonstrated the regard in which they are held in Puntland as well as highlighting some of the challenges implicit in making the transition from the traditional xeer system of conflict resolution to democratic systems of governance. A number of professionals and intellectuals showed immense commitment to the resolution of the process and their dedication was a factor in its ultimate success. This was coupled with the valuable technical expertise provided by the small group of international resource people.
During the consultative conference that prepared the way for the Constitutional conference, Islan Mohamed and his fellow Isimo worked with other influential figures (including politicians) to mediate competing claims to lineage titles within the Dhulbahante and the Osman Mohamoud clans of the Harti clan group. However the lineage dispute within the Warsangeli clan was not resolved until a month after the Constitutional conference began, delaying the participation of the delegates from Sanaag region. At critical junctures during the Constitutional conference itself, Islan Mohamed, as chair of the conference, adjourned the sessions in order to find solutions outside of the main hall with the assistance of ad hoc technical committees formed for specific purposes. For example, the multiple comments of delegates on the draft Charter were addressed by a five-member technical committee, who presented an amended draft for further discussion by the plenary. The two outstanding issues of contentions (selection of the capital and allocation of parliamentary seats) were left for the Isimo to develop a proposal to present to the plenary, reflecting the confidence in which they were held by the delegates to reach a workable compromise. The chair, Islan Mohamed, was clearly disappointed when they failed to reach agreement amongst themselves. Instead, the selection of the capital was put to a vote and the contentious issue of allocation of parliamentary seats was referred to a fifteen-member technical committee and ultimately resolved by the host community (and that of the chair, Islan Mohamed) giving up a parliamentary seat to Bari region. In line with the overall process of power sharing on a clan basis, the committees, including ad hoc technical committees, were selected on a regional basis (clan). Throughout, the group of ten wise men provided added value in fostering constructive dialogue. They had been brought together to represent the interest of the whole community (rather than the interests of individual communities) and, where necessary, they provided a counter balance to the dynamics within the political elite. This tactical approach by the chairing committee proved immensely valuable in helping to resolve a number of issues through discussions behind the scenes. The strategies adopted by the chairing committee were not welcomed by all the participants. At different stages, two key figures, Abdulahi Boqor Musse King-Kong and Mohamed Abshir, objected to the way the conference was being conducted, indicating their suspicions that the chairing committee was favouring Abdulahi Yusufs camp. Their dissatisfaction was taken as reflecting the shift in the political balance towards the other main contender for leadership, Abdulahi Yusuf. In response, the chairing committee threatened to resign, a drastic measure that would have left the process in disarray. This was sufficient to contain the crisis and the meeting proceeded.
stalemate of the political process. All of these factors are likely to have contributed to the commitment of the general public to the long process that culminated in the Garowe Constitutional conference. The determination of both the conference organisers and the public to succeed with the process may well have been enhanced by the absence of international funding. Earlier indications from donors of financial support were not forthcoming when the political implications of the process became clear, namely that representatives of Sool and Sanaag regions were participating. The measures put in place by the SSDF prior to the conference to raise the necessary funds generated controversy within the SSDF leadership and were disputed by members of the business sector, who bore the brunt of the increased taxation. However they proved successful in covering approximately two thirds of the costs, with the balance written off and absorbed, primarily by the host community, the Isse Mohamoud clan of Nugaal region, who in line with custom also provided security, livestock, and accommodation for delegates.
Conclusion
The Garowe Constitutional Community Conference was fundamentally a community-driven process, founded on the inter-related needs to go beyond the paralysing stalemate produced by the power struggle within the SSDF leadership, ensure common security, and to reach an effective agreement for the shared management of the economic resources of the northeast regions from Bosaaso port to the trading centre of Gaalkayo. Attempts in southern parts of Somalia to form clan-based systems of governance have yet to bear fruit (after the first attempt, by the Digil-Mirifle clan in Bay and Bakool regions, was overthrown by Aydiids militia forces in 1995). One of the factors in the successful formation of Puntland State may be the dominance of the northeast regions through the 1990s by a single military political faction, the SSDF, and the consequent relative security and stability of the area after the collapse of the State. A second related factor is the strong tradition of respect for the authority of the titled traditional elders, which originates from and is fostered by the relative homogeneity and common lineage of the communities in the northeast regions. This enabled the traditional leaders to manage community-based disputes (and maintain relative security) as well as support mediation of the long-standing power struggles within the SSDF sufficiently to sustain it as a single faction. And, third, the communities in the northeast regions are perceived to share a sense of common identity, which was reinforced by the impact of the civil war and by the dominance of other communities in the national level reconciliation processes. All of these factors appear to have contributed to sustaining the long evolution of the process that culminated, after a further ten months of dedicated preparation, in the Garowe Constitutional Community Conference and the establishment of the Puntland State. While this was a substantial achievement that brought considerable benefits to the area, to date the political system of Puntland State has not been fully democratized. In order to avoid the stalemate of permanent transition, the next steps in the democratisation process will have to be fully grasped.
Introduction
In early 2007, violent conflict arose between two communities in the strategic pastoral zone of Adadda, which has abundant rich pastures but few water sources. The dispute related primarily to the use of grazing resources, with one community opposing any further development of permanent water catchments (berkedo) and the other community pressing for expansion to the north of new settlements through building berkedo.
The Search for Peace
Resolution of conflicts between the pastoral communities in Adadda area is complicated by the crossborder nature of this remote territory, which straddles: the regions of Sool, Nugaal, and Mudug as well as the unmarked border with Zone 5 of Ethiopia; the territories disputed between Puntland and Somaliland; and clan boundaries. The communities in the area are primarily from the Omar Mohamoud sub-clan of the Majeerteen and the Bah Ararsame sub-clan of the Dhulbahante, both from the Harti clan group of the Darood clan family and with fluid clan boundaries between them and frequent inter-marriage, which cements social relationships between the two communities. The Adadda area has also been host to several clan-based political factions since the outbreak of the civil war. The Majeerteen-dominated Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) political group was the primary force in the region after its re-constitution in 1991, with the Warsangeli-Dhulbahante political faction of the United Somali Party (USP) and the Awrtable-Leylkase faction of the Somali National Defence Union (SNDU) also present. The drive towards settling political competition through the establishment of a regional authority overshadowed local level clan conflicts through the 1990s and beyond. The Adadda conflict provides insights on the impact of these political transformations in the region and the ability of the pastoralist communities to contain, manage, and mitigate local resource-based conflicts. While the cross-border nature of this strategic pastoral area has contributed to the failure of previous reconciliation efforts, another factor has been the lack of clarity about roles and responsibilities for follow-up and the absence of a strong administration to ensure adherence to the agreements reached. Furthermore, successive failed initiatives have increased distrust and animosity between the two communities.
82 See Overview for a detailed background on the political, social, and economic situation in the northeast regions of Somalia during the past 18 years.
The role of berkedo in the cycle of increasing structural vulnerability to drought in Northern Somalia (Johnson 000, FSAU)
Deregulation of economy
Breakdown of adaptive pastoral socio-economic systems: Increased settlement Reduced rotational grazing Reduced protection of grazing areas Increased use of berkedo in dry season grazing areas Increased commercial livestock trade
Conflict Trends
Competition over pastoral resources is often exacerbated in the hot dry season of the jiilaal from January to April, when pasture as well as water becomes scarce, presenting a threat to the livelihood and security of the pastoral family and community. Typically during the jiilaal, previous injuries, taunts, unrequited blooddebts, and other differences are all contributory factors which are readily touched off when men are hungry and weary and least disposed to temporize (Lewis, 1960). This is reflected in the historical pattern of previous violent conflicts in the strategic pastoral area of Adadda, which erupted during the jiilaal season in 1985, 1997, and in 2001.
Each outbreak of violence was followed by a peace settlement but the recurrent nature of the conflict illustrates both the challenges and the absence of effective mechanisms for implementation of the terms of agreements, which, in the absence of viable government authority in the area, has rested with the elders. During the settlement of the conflict in 1985, ministers from the Somali government were present83 but the Siyaad Barre regime was already in serious decline. In the later rounds of conflict in 1997 and 2001, political dynamics within the northeast regions (subsequently Puntland) took precedence over clan conflict and mediation. The definition of conflict by Morton Deutsch (in Walker, 2005) aptly describes the origins of the conflict in Adadda as arising when incompatible activities occur [where] one party is interfering, disrupting, obstructing, or in some other way making another partys actions less effective. This definition encompasses not only competition over sparse resources but also the divergent interests and needs of both groups. As indicated above, the administrative institutions that could prevent or manage the conflict were weak or absent. Furthermore, clan conflict is notionally outside the governments jurisdiction and the Puntland government lacks the financial resources, manpower, and absolute support of the Harti community and clans to enforce the agreements of the clan elders, leaving space for the reoccurrence of conflicts. The confrontation between the Bah Ararsame and Omar Mohamoud communities in 1997 arose over the construction of berkedo (concrete water reservoirs) in Tukaale, a rich grazing area between Qoriley and Magaaley settlements, which are the primary settlements of these two sub-clans84 and also their main militia bases. Armed forces gathered at Kuraad, a water reservoir near Tukaale and a mediation meeting was called, hosted by the Bah Ararsame traditional elders in Qoriley from 13-15 May 1997 with SSDF leaders and members of the Burtinle district council among the participants85. The mediation committee recommended that no further berkedo be constructed in the area and that the Nugaal regional authority should be responsible for implementation of the accord (see Annex 5 for details of the accord). The agreement aimed to placate the immediate conflict but its resolutions were unrealistic since, as observers noted, in 1997 there was no formal administrationto oversee the process even with the presence of the SSDF 86 and the Nugaal regional authority did not have the means to monitor or regulate disputes in the Adadda area. Furthermore, attention during this period was focussed predominantly on the dynamics related to the formation of an overall regional authority for the northeast regions, culminating in the Garowe Constitutional Community Conference and the establishment of the Puntland State in 1998. As a consequence, there was inadequate follow-up and little effective implementation of the peace agreement. When conflict recurred in Adadda in 2001, regional level dynamics again took precedence with attention focussed on the Puntland constitutional crisis. On this occasion, the conflict was settled internally through mediation between the clan elders, intellectuals and the Isimo (traditional titled elders) from the two communities with little input from the Puntland administration. The most recent violent conflict erupted when the Bah Ararsame objected to members of the Omar Mohamoud sub-clan again digging a new berked at Tukaale (where both communities had agreed in 1997 that this was prohibited) and asserted that the Omar Mohamoud were disregarding clan boundaries. Initial efforts by local traditional and religious leaders to contain the violence were supported by officials from the TFG and the Ethiopian government (given the cross-border nature of the incidents) and, despite the limited authority of the Puntland government across the Ethiopian border in Adadda, it responded by sending 65 soldiers (later increased to 120). They were accompanied by Puntland government officials from Laas
83 Research validation workshop, 8-9 December 2007 84 Interview with Jama, Garowe, 2007 85 Interview, Mohamed Ismail, PDRC Garowe, 2007 86 Interview, Jama, Garowe, 2007
Aanood and Burtinle, who were from the same sub-clans as the two communities in conflict. On arrival in Adadda, the Puntland soldiers camped between the militia of the two communities to enforce a cessation of hostilities87.
Unsettled Agreement
With the cessation of hostilities in place, on 10 March 2007 a self-appointed mediation committee comprising titled traditional leaders (Isimo), elders, religious leaders and members of the Puntland administration, began mediations based on the 1997 peace deal. The representatives of the Puntland government included the Minister of Finance, Mohamed Ali Yusuf (an Omar Mohamoud) and the Minister of Interior, Ahmed Abdi Habsade (a Bah Ararsame), who worked in collaboration with traditional elders from several clans from Puntland. The Minister of Justice and Religious Affairs, Abdirizak Said Geesood, selected 13 members from the parties in conflict to form the mediating committee88, in contrast with traditional practice in which members of the feuding parties are not part of the committee. While some contested the high level of involvement by the Puntland government, some saw this positively and even essential to reaching an agreement. Others recognised the limitations on the jurisdiction of the Puntland government but commended its efforts to address the conflict and noted that a lack of response from the government would have aroused considerable public dissent89. Another factor was the pressure from the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) on the Puntland government to take action, since it had a vested interest in the rapid resolution of the conflict in this cross-border area90. During this period, the TFG, supported by Ethiopian troops, had entered Mogadishu and ousted the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), whose members dispersed. Puntland troops had been deployed to Gaalkayo to defend against infiltration by ICU militia into the Puntland region, as well as west into Ethiopia, and the Puntland government was under considerable pressure from the TFG to secure its borders. Yet another factor was that the conflict was taking place in the territories disputed between Puntland and Somaliland, providing further impetus for rapid engagement by the Puntland government to assert its dominance in the area. The diagram below illustrates the overlapping interests of the different government bodies in the conflict area:
Ethiopia
TFG
Somaliland
Puntland
87 88 89 90
Interview with Jama, Garowe, 2007 Interviews with Jama, 2007 and Daad, 2008 Interviews with Jama, 2007 and Daad, 2008 Validation Workshop, 8-9 December, 2007
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The mediating committee rapidly reached an agreement, which, unusually, included destruction of berkedo in the grazing areas as well as specifying customary blood compensation payments (diya) for the deceased. According to the customary law practised in Puntland, xeer Somali, and sharia provisions, the diya for the death of a man is 100 camels and for the death of a woman is 50 camels but in the case of Adadda, the mediating committee specified diya of 120 camels and added a number of young women to be given in marriage (godobtir) to the aggrieved party, the Bah Ararsame.
However, critically, the agreement proposed by the mediating committee failed to address the core issue of pastoral rights in the disputed area and the Bah Ararsame appealed against it, referring to the terms of the agreement reached in 1997, which banned the building of berkedo in common grazing lands. Their appeal to the mediation committee stated that, while they accepted the elders ruling on compensation for the dead and wounded, they contested the balance of the agreement, stating that the Omar Mohamoud had dug 25 berkedo, all in Dhulbahante (Bah Ararsame) territory, while they themselves had only built 4 berkedo (see Annex 5 for the agreement and the Bah Ararsames appeal against it). In response, the mediating committee attempted to appease the Bah Ararsame, who had also suffered more casualties, by increasing the level of restitution for the destruction of one of the largest berked, owned by Ina Habsade, the brother of the Puntland Minister of Interior at that time, Ahmed Abdi Habsade. The mediating committee also established a buffer zone of 25 kms between the two parties, a common traditional practice to reduce the risk of conflict between pastoralists since conflicts occur when, owing to scarce pasture, adversary groups are constrained to graze together or close to each other, thereby offering an opportunity for settling old scores To avoid this from happening, adversary pastoralists usually maintain a good distance from each other when grazing, keeping an informal buffer zone that often remains unused (PDRC, 2003). However in this instance, the demarcation of the buffer zone by the mediating committee had the effect of reducing the size of the Bah Ararsames territory and instead of calming tensions, it aggravated the threat to the Bah Ararsame of the perceived disregard of territorial boundaries by the Omar Mohamoud. The provisions in the agreement for destruction of the berkedo in the grazing area and financial reparation did not address these concerns of the Bah Ararsame community. Two months later, in late March 2007, the conflict resumed, triggered by a clash between two young men from the two communities at a water point, in which the man from the Bah Ararsame clan was killed.
1
Subsequent fighting between militia of the two communities resulted in a further five deaths amongst the Bah Ararsame adding to the three men killed in the earlier clashes and scores of wounded, including amongst the Omar Mohamoud. Tensions were high and began to affect neighbouring areas in Sool and Nugaal regions and beyond. Appeals were made through radios, mosques and public gatherings for immediate intervention to end the fighting. The renewed clashes drew the attention of the titled traditional elders from Nugaal and Sool, namely Islan Issa Islan Mohamed, Suldan Said Garasse, Garaad Abdulahi Soofe and Garaad Abshir Salah, and women from a number of different clans. The women mobilised for peace by encouraging the parties in conflict to engage in constructive dialogue, the media to cover the mediation process, and the Puntland government to provide funding support.
On 29 April the mediating committee and the Isimo arranged a meeting of the thirty four elders representing the two sub-clans, at which they presented their allegations and arguments. After an exhaustive examination of information from all sides, the Isimo asked the technical committee to provide a fair and impartial judgement on the case. The following day, the mediating committee convened a plenary session of the conference at which the chair described the process of their deliberations and finally presented a draft resolution for consideration by the two delegations. After further discussion (see below), the Burtinle Peace Agreement was endorsed by both delegations and the Isimo. Traditionally, the guilty party comes to the table ready to submit to the terms of the aggrieved party91. In this case, the Omar Mohamoud were deemed the guilty party for killing Bah Ararsame men and at the signing of the agreement, an Omar Mohamoud elder professed waxaan samaynay lama arag lakin waxaa kadanbaysiinaynaa lama maqal, meaning we [the Omar Mohamoud] have done something never seen before, and what we are about to do is unheard of92 and, in a gesture of reconciliation, the Omar Mohamoud elders presented the weapons captured during the conflict at the ceremonial occasion of the signing of the Burtinle Peace Agreement on 8 May 2007 in the Burtinle Secondary school.
91 Interview with Nur & Farah, November 2007 92 Statement by Abdiqorah during signing of the Burtinle Peace agreement 93 Interview with Nur and Farah, Garowe, November 2007
Finally, the agreement states that any violation of its terms causing injury or death is subject to an immediate fine before the case is examined, indicating the seriousness of the commitment to establishing and sustaining peace in the area. Some members of the Omar Mohamoud community contested these recommendations and one of the mediators reported aggression towards them during their stay in Adadda, with one of their vehicles damaged by gunfire. However, ultimately the support and cooperation of the community elders overcame pockets of resistance to the agreement94, reflecting their role as consolidators and upholders of traditional agreements95.
Actors
As described above, the second phase was led by the Isimo from the affected area and neighbouring regions (Sool and Nugaal, later joined by Isimo from Mudug), who were trusted as third party mediators by all the stakeholders. Because of the lack of trust by one party in its role and potential conflicts of interest, the Puntland government reduced its involvement to play a support role (in contrast with the first phase). The Isimo selected respected figures as the technical mediating committee and, together with the mediating committee, identified thirty four elders representing the two sub-clans to participate in the peace talks. A group of forty women activists known as Nabadeynta played a key role in community mobilisation for peace, drawing in a wide range of stakeholders to support resolution of the conflict, as described below. The local media was also engaged early on, increasing the transparency of the process by identifying the actors and their roles, which enabled members of the different communities to identify potential spoilers and integrate them into the process. The media also amplified the efforts of the Nabadeynta women to pressure all the parties and the government to make peace.
Phase I
Mediation Process Minister of Justice Chairmanship Mediating committee Agreement Included the parties in conflict Land issue not addressed Contested
Phase II
Senior Isim (Islan Issa Islan Mohamed) Third party mediators Land issue addressed Agreement addressed group interests and needs Omar Mohamoud acceded to needs of Bah Ararsame Follow-up committee established
Puntland-wide including 40 region women from the five regions of Puntland engaged in shuttle diplomacy and peace mobilisation at all levels of community Puntland government monitored and facilitated progress; shared responsibility for implementation of agreement.
Government involvement
Evolution of Harti Customary Law (Harti xeer) and Quality of the Peace Accord
During the research on the Burtinle Peace Agreement, the notion of Harti xeer (customary law) emerged as a separate system to the wider Somali xeer and Darood xeer, which exist already for the Darood people regardless of their geographical location. Although Harti xeer is already in place historically amongst the Harti communities in the Kismayo and Juba area99, it had not previously been conceptualised in Puntland. One member of the mediating committee, an elder and prominent businessman, Abdisaeed Ali Suuryan, said that the broad participation in the process towards the Burtinle peace agreement established Harti xeer as a reality. Although the differences between Darood xeer and Harti xeer are unclear, the issue generated extensive discussion amongst those who had been part of the Burtinle peace process, which was seen as setting a precedent and establishing a mechanism to manage conflict amongst the Harti communities in Puntland. One Isim can represent all Isimo. Therefore theoretically Islan Issa Islan Mohamed represented the Isimo who were not present, including the absent Warsangeli Isimo and it can be argued that xeer Harti was established even though the entire Harti were not present according to some members of the mediating committee100. Although Harti xeer is conceived with regard to its application for Harti pastoralist communities (Danish Refugee Council, 2007), in principle it could evolve to address issues of concern for the Harti communities in urban as well as rural areas101. The mediators and stakeholders with vested interests in the success of the Burtinle Peace Agreement encouraged the modernization of xeer, notably by setting a fixed timeframe for the payment of diya, thus putting pressure on the guilty party to comply with the payment. This is an important development and recognises that the unfinished business of peace agreements (typically a failure to complete payment of diya) is a common cause of renewed bouts of revenge killings and/ or recurring conflicts in pastoral communities. If members of the injured party loses patience with the time taken to pay diya or feel they are not being given due respect, they may retaliate by killing some members of the offending party and the conflict may resume. The use of specific timeframes for completion of diya payments in the Burtinle peace agreement was drawn on soon afterwards when violent clashes occurred between Dhulbahante sub-clans in Buhoodle, on the border of Ethiopia, in June 2007. This was, in fact, a case in which the prolonged delay in completing diya payments triggered recurrence of a conflict. Some members of the Adadda/ Burtinle mediating committee also arbitrated the dispute in Buhoodle and there were similarities in the negotiated terms to resolve the Buhoodle conflict with that of the Burtinle peace agreement. Firstly, the terms specified the timeframe for completion of the payment of the diya. Secondly, because of the background to the conflict, the accord also stipulated a similarly imposing diya to that of the Burtinle agreement, of over 1000 live camels by one sub-clan to the other. As indicated above, the collection of live camels (as opposed to mobilising funds, for example through the diaspora) presents significant challenges for the offending party and is seen as indicating the seriousness of the offence. In the Buhoodle case, after further negotiations the recipients conceded to a request by the offending party for cash payment in lieu of 300 of the 1000 camels (as had happened in the Burtinle case) and the payment was completed satisfactorily. A subsequent example of the use of specified timeframes in peace agreements for the completion of diya payments is the Mahas II peace agreement between Hawadle and Murosade clans (Hiran region, April 2008). An example of the threat posed by unfinished business to a peace accord is the prolonged delay in payment of diya for birmageydo in the peace agreement between Saad and Saleman clans (Mudug and Galgaduud regions, February 2007.)
99 Validation workshop, 8-9 December 2007 100 Validation workshop, 8-9 December 2007 101 Validation workshop, 8-9 December 2007
Item
Camel per head Dallada Berked Addada Berked Burial expenses Condolence Injured compensation Contributions from NGOs Puntland government including logistics and destruction of berkedo Donations from business and Harti community
Quantity
1070 1 1 9 8 13 n/a n/a
Total US$
149,800 8,000 7,000 2,250 8,000 19,500 n/a n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
(Source: Danish Refugee Council report on Aggare Conflict Resolution, 2007) A number of NGOs provided logistical and technical support for the process, as detailed below. Organization Danish Refugee Council (DRC), international NGO with office in Bosaaso Puntland Development Research Center (PDRC), local NGO based in Garowe
Type of Assistance
Supply to those mediating the conflict of water, food, blankets, transport and communication (as access to telecommunications is difficult in the remote areas of the conflict zone) Technical support and consultations with the mayor of Burtinle and elders; facilities for convening of elders; financial and logistical support for women lobbyists, the mediating committee, and elders; production of a documentary film on the second phase of the peace talks.
WAWA, Bosaaso-based Mobilisation of women peace activists, in partnership with the Puntland womens network of womens Ministry of Women Development and Family Affairs. organisations from all regions of Puntland Rahan, local NGO based in Laas Financial and logistical support for meetings between the two clans. Aanood The contributions of the NGOs and civic groups supplemented the efforts of the elders and Puntland government in ensuring that logistical and technical support were available in a timely manner to support the peace process. Although it may be argued that responsibility for this provision lies with the Puntland government, this is not feasible at the current stage of development of the administration. In terms of ownership of the process, despite the financial support by the Puntland government in terms of compensation payments for destruction of berkedo, considerable sacrifices were required from the offending community in gathering a substantial number of camels to cover the diya. The completion of the payment within a reasonable consensual timeframe is a good indicator of ownership of the process and commitment to the peace accord. The involvement of a range of stakeholders, including not only the traditional and religious leaders but also women, youth, the media, and the local and Puntland administrations enhanced local ownership and increased pressure towards an agreement to resolve the conflict.
Considering the high financial costs involved in resolution of conflicts, one proposal made by those consulted was to establish conflict monitoring systems during the conflict-prone season of the jiilaal from December to April. For example, semi-permanent bases could be supported at the district level in order to police areas where conflicts over pastoral resources are likely to arise.
0
Annexes
Annex 1 Glossary of Somali terms in peace and war
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. Aafti: no mans land/ buffer zone Aaqil: (see Caaqil below) Aarsi: revenge/reprisal Adable: black soil Afjar: conclude/bring to an end Afduub: taking hostage, kidnapping, abduction, taking prisoner 2. a terrorizing act against someone Aqabal keen: acceptance of an idea Ardaa: families/ clans share of blood compensation (mag) Arrin keen: one who initiates an idea Baad: ransom, extortion, to obtain property from another by intimidation 2. food (usually referring to fodder for livestock) Baadisooc: buffer zone or separating your own livestock from others mixed with it Baanis (Baaniso): boastful/ rhetoric Baaqnabadeed: call for peace Bariidin: morning greetings Baraago dumin: destroying water reservoirs, demolishing water reservoirs Barakac: displacement Beel: clan/community Beero gubid: setting on fire for farms, burning agricultural fields Berked sumayn: poisoning water reservoirs, contaminating water reservoirs Bililiqo: looting, plundering, robbery, prowling 2. raiding Birmagaydo: preserve the vulnerable from harm, spared from the spear Boob: looting, prowling, raiding, pillaging Boog: moral wound Booga dhayid: healing or treating the wounds, recovering Caaqil (Aaqil): chief Caasikaayn: rebel hide out Cadaawad: hostility Ceel-dumin: destroying water catchments or wells, pulling down water holes Ciidan kala qaadis: pulling [fighting] forces apart Ciribtir: genocide, ethnic cleansing Col: enemy Colaad: enmity Colaad hurin: perpetuating conflict, upholding disputes, organizing hostility, encouraging warring sides to fight Daaqsin: grazing land Daacad: Honest Dabdemis: put off tension or put out fire Dagaal: War Dakharo: injuries Damaanadqaad: guarantee, assurance, promise, pledge, certification Dan: interest/ need Dayday: extorters, freelance militiamen Debecsanaan: flexibility, easygoing, relaxed Dedaal Nabadeed: peace initiative
Annexes
1
44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93.
Deegaan: environment/ settlement Deganaan: stability Dhac: robbery Dhaymo: ointment Dhexdhexaadin: mediating Dhul-gubid: set areas on fire, destroy with fire, the act of burning a piece of land Dhir-jarid: tree cutting, deforestation Dib u dejin: resettlement, relocation 2. immigration, movement, journey Dib u heshiisiisn: reconciliation Dil: kill Diya: blood compensation (mag) Diyo bixin: blood compensation, payment for a persons life Dood: argument/debate Dooy: sun soil Duco: blessing Dulqaadasho: tolerance/ patience Dulxaadis: overview Duudsi: dismiss, forgive and forget (forced to give up ones inheritance or right to compensation) Ergo: delegation/ envoy Ergo Nabadeed: peace delegates/ peace envoy Fadhi: session Faq: private discussion or whispering Faraxumayn: the act of molesting, misconduct against someone Furitaan: opening Gaadiid: transport Gaadmo: off guard, surprise attack, unexpected action against someone, quick raid against unaware person Gablan iyo wiil laaan: childless, having no baby, without sons Gadood: strike, mutiny, revolt, to become furious Gacansarrayn: having upper hand, being victorious, winning the battle/ game Galad: favour Gammaan: horses and donkeys Ganaax: penalty, fine, sentence, consequence, punishment Gar cadaawe: strict adjudication Gar Sokeeye: flexible adjudication Garsoorid: jury verdict, judiciary system, judgment of a case by a court or group of people Gar: hearing/ verdict Garaad: senior elder (similar to Ugaas or Suldaan) Garawshiiyo: concession Garnaqsi: defend; to justify or vindicate Gardhigasho: bringing case to the mediators Gar-diiddo: unwilling to accept any ruling Garyigil: willing to accept any rules Garqaadasho: acceptance of a verdict Gawaari dhicid: car hijack, car seizure, car robbery Gebogebo: wrap up/ conclusion Gashi: grudge Geed: traditional venue under a tree Geedyare: mini conference Geel dhicid: camel looting, robbery of camels Geesi: warrior
94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141.
Gembis: dismissal Goaan: decision Goaan qaadasho: decision taking, determination, taking an action/measure Gobanimo: freedom/ boldness Godob reeb: exchange of women for strengthening peace Godob: guilt Godobtir: special price for women being jealous Godobxir: to console the victim by giving something (bride, money, livestock) Goisu taag: raising a sheet as a white flag in surrender (wave the flag) Gogol: peace venue Gole fadhiisin: make somebody sit before the traditional court or Geed Gole: jury Gorgorton: bargaining; negotiation Guddi: committee Guddida Qabanqaabada: preparatory committee Gumaad: up-rooting, massacre, butchery, mass murder, mass destruction Gunaanad: conclusion Gurmad: cavalry/ reinforcement Gurgurshe Qowrac: killing burden animal as a punishment or in war Guurti: elders meeting to address an issue, especially pertaining to governance or general wellbeing Guuxay: appreciate (sound deep in the throat to indicate appreciation or disapproval) Habaar: curse Haladayg: no concession/dare saying Hanjabaad: threatening, intimidating, hostile/ frightening Hantiboob: property looting, robbery, taking by force Hanti celis: property restitution, restoration of property Hayin, Biyo Ma daadshe: humble person/ obedient Heshiis: agreement Heshiis buuxa: agreement accepted by all sides, having the means to implement the peace deal in place Heshiisiin: conciliation/ taking role of reconciliation Hibasho, Hiirtaanyo: reminisce about bad event Hiif: reprimand Hub-dhigis: disarm Hubka-dhig horta Adigu-dhig: disarm after the other disarms Irmaan Qowrac: kill lactating animal as punishment or in a war Is afagaranwaa: disagreement Is afgarasho: understanding Isbaaro: road block Isasaamixid: forgiveness, trustfulness, cooperation Isa soo horfariisin: direct talk, convene sides at roundtable for negotiation Isgacan-qaadis: shaking hands with each other Isgacansaarid: shaking hands with each other 2. fit for fighting Is qancin: convince one another Ishkin: camels, cows, horses and donkeys Is mariwaa: deadlock, impasse, stalemate, gridlock, standstill Is nabad gelin: give peace to each other Isu soo dhoweyn: to narrow differences, enable parties to resolve their problems, convince contesting sides into negotiation Isu tanaasul: compromise; give and take
Annexes
142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192.
Jajuub: pressure, decide without agreement or consensus Jidgooyo: ambush, waylay, lie in wait 2. surprise attack Jifo: family lineage Jiri: extorters, freelance militiamen Joogid: presence Kala bogsi: forgiveness Kala fogaansho: widening differences, complicating procedures to make peace Kala Kac: standoff Khaarajin: unlawful killing, organized murdering, assassination Kicin dadweyne: public agitation/ campaigning Kufsi: rape, a sexual attack Kulan: meeting Laabxaadhasho: try to make somebody forgive you or talk openly without reserve Labadibleyn: restrain ones hands Maato-lays: innocent killings Madal: venue, forum Madaxfurasho: ransom, extortion Majo-xaabin: back stabbing, setback, undermining, destabilizing Mag: blood compensation Magdhow: compensation, paying back the cost of damage done, refund for losses Maqnaansho: absent Maraado: punishment for individuals who will not abide by peace agreement Mudo-Diyo: fixed time to pay blood compensation Marti: guests Martigelin: hosting Milil: secretion from an infection Mooraduug: deprivation, dispossession, denial of properties Mooryaan: extorters, freelance militiamen (same as Jiri, Dayday) Muddeyn: give fixed time Muddo: period Murtiyen: rationalize/ summarise Mashxarad: jubilee, ululation Nabad raadis: peace searching Nabad: peace Nabadgelin: give peace Nabadiid: peace rejecter/ anti-peace Nabadoon: peacemaker/ peace seeker Nabad sugid: securing peace Nabadeyn: peace making Odayaal: elders Qaadhaan: material and/ or financial contribution Qaan-sheegad: claim for compensation Qaan: liability Qabanqaabo: preparation Qaybgal: participation Qax: flee, run away, dislocation Qolo: clan X Qoonsad: sceptical, take offense from a comment Qoordhiibasho: giving the mandate to the mediation committee Qorituur: draw lots Raas: sub-sub-clan
193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238.
Rafiso: 20% advance of blood compensation given to the victim Reer: clan Samirsiin: help someone to accept the situation with patience, to be tolerant Samotalis: somebody who works for the sake of goodness Shafshafo: minor compensation for a wounded person Shir weyne: conference Shir: meeting Shirguddoon: chairing committee Shirqool: conspiracy, plot, machination, set-up Soo hoyasho: giving in, surrendering, yielding, giving way Sooryo: food for guests Suldaan: higher in rank than chief (aaqil) Sulux: traditional mechanism of settling disputes, peace making, reconciliation, way of resolving a social dispute through mediation Sumal & Sabeen: ram and lamb paid as apology Tabasho: resentment Tashi: consultation Tol: clans binding together, kinship Tolweyne: the extended clan Toogasho: shooting, shelling, gunfire, assassination, murdering, execution Turxaan bexin: trouble shooting/ problem solving Tusaalayn: examples Ugaas: senior elder rank (similar to suldaan) Uurkutaalo: anxiety U kala dab-qaadid: peace shuttling, mediation mission, or coordinating diplomatic message between two parties Wabar: senior elder rank (similar to suldaan) Wada hadal: dialogue Wadatashi: consultation Waran sib/ Waranjiifis: lay down weapons Weerar: attack Weer-xidhasho: trouble shooting, expressing grief or calling for revenge Xaal marin: redress for losses for wrong doings Xaal: apology in kind Xabad joojin: ceasefire Xadgudub: transgression Xalay-dhalay: forgive and forget, to cancel grievances (literally: to have given birth the previous evening no newborn can hold or have caused grievances) Xaq: rights/ entitlement Xasuuq: genocide, mass execution, bloodbath, slaughter, annihilation Xeerbeegti: jury Xeer: customary law Xeerhoosaad: by-laws (internal regulations) Xidhitaan: closing Xidid: in-laws Xigaal: close relatives Xoolo-kala-dhicid: property looting, robbery, taking by force Xul: select (verb), best selection, selected people Xulasho: selection
Annexes
Annex 3 Representatives at the Garowe Peace and Life Conference, December 1993
Senior Isimo and representatives of political organizations at the conference included: Boqoro Mohamud Boqor Musse, Ugaas Yaasin Abdirahman, BeeldajeHaji Abdulahi Mohamed Ismail,Beeldaje Ali Farah Mohamud (Bari region); Islaan Mohamed Islaan Musse, Suldaan Said Mohamed Garase (Nugaal region); Islaan Abdulle Islaan Farah, Garaad Mohamed Elmi Shirwa (Mudug region); Garaad Saleebaan Garaad Mohamed, Garaad Ismail Duale (Sool region); Suldaan Abdisaaln SuldaanMohamed, Ugaas Mohamed Said (Sanaag region). Observers included: Gen. Mohamed Abshir (SSDF- Chairman), Abdulahi Boqor Musse (SSDF), Awad Ahmed Ashre (USP ViceChairman), Salah Mohamed Salah (USP). UN representatives included: UN Under-Secretary-General for political affairs Mr. James Jonah and acting UNOSOM-II Zone Director for the North-East Regions Mr. Modem Lawson
MUDUG REGION 1. Md. Abdulahi Yusuf Ahmed 2. Eng. Ali Mohamoud Ahmed 3. Abdi Warsame Ali 4. Abdullahi Hersi Ali 5. Abdulkadir Mohamed Gulled 6. Abdiwali Mohamed hersi 7. Hassan Mohamed Hassan 8. Abdullahi Mohamed Farah 9. Mohamed Ali Basbas 10.Abdirisak Mohamed Omar 11.Mohamed Farah Warsame 12.Abdirashid Mohamoud Yusuf 13.Abdulkadir Haji Hussein 14.Hassan Farah Elmi 15.Abbas Jama Botan 16.Gelle Jama Farah 17.Sh.Mohamoud Abdullahi Siklan 18.Ahmed Mohamed Yusuf 19.Dr. Abdullahi Hersi Ahmed 20.Mohamed Ali Yusuf 21.Ismail Haji Warsame (replaced Mohamed Abshir Waldo) 22.Aden Jama Bihi (replaced Ahmed Mohamed Loyan) 23.Abdirisak Sh. Osman 24.Ahmed Mohamed Igaal 25.Mohamed Jibril Musa 26.Abdul Warsame koshin 27.Warsame Abdi Shirwa 28.Mohamed Kalif Mohamoud 29.Abdiasis Nor Hersi 30.Osman Yusuf Harare 31.Mohamed Abdi Daar 32.Mohamed Omar Salah 33.Oways Abdullahi Jama 34.Mohamoud Yasin Mursal 35.Ahmed Ali Aden 36.Ahmed Mohamed Ahmed 37.Ali Ismail Abdigir 38.Abdullahi Kalif Hashi 39.Abdullahi Ahmed 40.Mohamed Abdi Egal 41.Jama Hassan Ali
42.Hassan Mohamed Kalaf 43.Abdisaid Ali Suryan 44.Mohamed Abdi Kulmiye 45.Abdirahman Haji Salad 46.Mohamed Jama Salal 47.Ahmed Aden Warsame 48.Said Jama Hassan 49.Dahir Mohamed Hassan 50.Mohamed Aden Farah 51.Shakib Nor Dirie 52.Dirie Hersi Farah 53.Ali Mohamed Ahmed 54.Mohamed Ali isahak 55.Mohamed Ahmed Elmi 56.Abdirashid Mohamed Hassan 57.Asha Gelle Dirie 58.Anab Hassan Jama 59.Sahra Mohamed Hussein 60.Mohamed Aden Dhagaweyne 61.Ibrahim Elmi Gab (replaced A/maan Mohamoud Ismail) 62.Yusuf Ali Hersi 63.Abdirahman Salad Dirshe 64.Abdi Awad Said NUGAAL REGION: 1. Mohamed Abshir Muse 2. hassan Abshir Farah 3. Abdirahman Mohamed Mohamoud Farole 4. Mohamoud Osman Ali (Aydid) 5. Abdiasis Gureye Karshe 6. Ali Abdulle Farah 7. Mohamoud Sh. Hamud 8. Abdi Ahmed Abdulle 9. Abdullahi Mohamed Haji Elmi 10.Kalif Hassan Duale 11.Ali Yusuf Ali Hoosh 12.Jama H. Samatar 13.Abdinasir Haji Mohamed 14.Jama Ali Liban 15.Abdirahman Dirie Mohamed 16.Abdulkadir Osman Isse 17.Abdullahi Osman Waays 18.Osman Gamure Farah
Annexes
19.Dahir Ali Isse 20.kasim Mohamed Abdi 21.Jama Salad Mohamoud 22.Abdulkadir Hassan Egag 23.Abdiwali Hersi Nor 24.Yusuf Jama Dagal 25.Ali Mohamed Hassan 26.Hersi Bulhan Farah 27.Abdullahi Muse Aw-ali 28.Bashir Yusuf Aw-Nor 29.Abdiasis Jama Warsame 30.Abdulkadir Karshe Addur 31.Aden Jama Qodob 32.Warsame Abdulahi Diriye 33.Nor Aden Elmi 34.Kalif Aw-Ali Aw-Ahmed 35.Dahir Mohamed Garase 36.Abdullahi Hashi Warsame 37.Ali Mohamoud Warsame 38.Omar Ali Said 39.Osman Awad Ali 40.Ahmed Mohamed Ei 41.Abdikayr Yusuf Gulled 42.Abdirisak Abdi Dad 43.Hussien Gulled Hanaf 44.Abdinasir Mohamed Farah 45.Muhiyadin Mohamed hashi 46.Mohamoud Aynab Abdi 47.Said Mohamed yey 48.Abdirisak Abdullahi irday 49.Duran Heri Isse 50.Abdiwahid Ahmed Abdi 51.Abdullahi Haji Ismail 52.Hassan Mohamed Aden 53.Abdihakin Hassan Abdi 54.Abdihakin Ismail Aw-Osman 55.Abdiwahid Ahmed Jawo 56.Daar Musse Samatar 57.Yusuf Mumin Mohamed (Bidde) from Bari 58.Ahmed Abdilahi Samatar 59.Halimo Ali biyod 60.Halimo Abdi Warsame 61.Madino Jama Gesod 62.Jaylani Farah Mohamoud 63.Jama Aydid Warsame 64.Abdulkadir Jama Adoyo 65.Hassan Yusuf Karshe
BARI REGION 1. Farah Hayir (replaced A/hi Boqor Muse) 2. Abdirashid Ali Musse 3. Abdirahman Said Mohamoud 4. Abdirisak Said Aden 5. Abdullahi Said Samatar 6. Abshir M. Isse 7. Ali Aden Hassan 8. Ali Ahmed Ali (Gamute) 9. Ahmed Mohamed Abdi 10.Mursal Yusuf Mohamoud 11.Omar Sadik Shiek Osman 12.Omar yusuf Mohamed 13.Dahir Farah Yusuf 14.Gani Barre Muse 15.Jama Abdi Barre 16.Mohamed Abdirahman Sugulle 17.Mohamed Farah Yare 18.Mohamed Salah Mohamoud 19.Mohamed Yusuf Ahmed 20.Mohamoud Jama Afbalar 21.Mohamoud Yusuf Weyrah 22.Mohamoud Aynab Mohamoud 23.Muse haji Said 24.Ahmed Shiek Mohamed (replaced Osman Hussein Ali) 25.Said Abdullahi Deni 26.Mohamed Hassan Haji (replaced Said Mohamed Rage) 27.Said Sheik Mohamed 28.Yasin Farah Artan 29.Yusuf Jibril Arris 30.Yusuf Maalin Ibrahim 31.Ardo Said Mohamoud 32.Mohamed Ismail Mohamed 33.Mohamed Hassan Musse (replaced Abshir Musse Said) 34.Bashir Abdi Garas 35.Abdi Ahmed Abdulle 36.Eng. Aydarus Osman Kenadid 37.Said Ismail Mohamoud (replaced Mohamoud Hayir Isse) 38.Mohamed Haji Said 39.Eng. Mohamoud Mohamed Hussien Malfa 40.Mohamoud Hirad Hersi 41.Hassan Gure Hassan 42.Abukar Mohamed Ali 43.Botan Barre Samatar 44.Omar Nor Osman
45.Jama Shire Samatar 46.Maryan Nor Ali Jama 47.Mohamed Said Hito 48.Musse Ali Jama 49.Said Abdullahi Salah 50.Abdulkadir Muse Yusuf 51.Ali Haji Ismail 52.Farah Beldaje Abdullahi 53.Hersi Ismail Mohamed 54.Yusuf Hassan Abdirahman 55.Omar Mohamed Musse 56.Mohamed Elmi Musse 57.Gen. Osman Mohamed Samatar 58.Mohamoud Mohamed Idiris (replaced Ibrahim Omar Muse) 59.Liban Osman Salah (replaced Barkad Ali Salah) 60.Said Abdullahi Yusuf 61.Said mohamed Mohamoud 62.Mohamed Ahmed Kullan 63. Mire Amalle Hussein 64.Abdi Mohamoud Samatar 65.Mohamed Osman Hassan (replaced Ahmed M. Elmi) 66.Ahmed Mohamed Geyre 67.Ahmed Mohamed Warsame 68.hmed Mohamoud Mohamed 69.Ahmed Hassan Nor 70.Bashir Mohamed Hussien 71.Abdirahman Shiek Musse 72.Abdi Ahmed Geldon 73.Abdi Said Hirad 74.Abdullahi Muse Yusuf 75.Jama Mohamed Osman 76.Abdullahi Bile Nor 77.Ali Mohamed Ali 78.Ali Moahmed Mohamoud 79.Ali Sahar Gulled 80.Isse Ismail Mohamed (replaced Said Jama Abdullahi) Officer 81.Osman Mohamed Balli 82.Omar Salah Mohamed 83.Farah Mohamed Fukyare 84.Abdirahman Ali Madobe 85.Jawahir Muse 86.Kalif Mohamed Farah 87.Mohamed Asayr Barre 88.Mohamed Said Osman 89.Mohamed Siad osman
90.Mohamed Yusuf Salah 91.Mohamoud Abdi Awad 92.Mohamoud Abdi Jama 93.Muse Hassan Isse 94.Said Dahir Muse 95.Bashir Dirie Ali (replaced Siad Gulled Sanyere) 96.Said Ibrahim Arrale 97.Said Ismail Gonyaade 98.Siad Mohamed Muse 99.Said Mohamed Mohamoud 100. Salad Mohamed Ali 101. Said Hassan Ibrahim 102. Said Salah Ismail 103. Sh. Naleye Aden Yusuf 104. Yusuf Mohamed Ali 105. Fatuma Hor-ujel 106. Salado Ismail Mirod 107. hufan Artan 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. Hawo Isse Dhere Maryan Mohamud Gudud Halimo Farah Mohamed Mohamed Hared Farah Mursal Mohamoud Nor Safiyo Ahmed kayr.
SOOL REGION 1. Mohamed Abdi Hashi 2. Abdirahman Haji Ismail 3. Hassan Dahir Mohamed 4. Yusuf Botan Dakar 5. Hussein Mohamed Dahir 6. Sulub Ali Gas 7. Nadif Ali Hassan 8. Dahir Haji Kalif 9. Dahir Mohamed Omar 10.Rashid Sh. Ali Aden 11.Nor Abdi Dimone 12.Mohamoud Dhanto Ahmed 13.Mohamed Ismail Hassan 14.Abdullahi Ahmed Dabagoye 15.Harir Gas Guutaale 16.Mohamed Awale Elmi 17.Abdikani Maalin Farah 18.Mohamed Hassan Daar 19.Salah Aden Ali 20.Ali Mohamoud Mohamed 21.Mohamud Warsame Yusuf 22.Ibrahim Mohamud Gurre 23.Hassan Mohamoud Abdiwahid
Annexes
24.Abdullahi Jama Hersi 25.Mohamud Yusuf Mohamed 26.Saleban Bulale Aden 27.Ali Ahmed Ali 28.Abdi Jama Ahmed 29.Hussein Yasin H. Dirie 30.Mohamed Abdi Ayanle 31.Ahmed Yusuf Awale 32.Ibrahim Muse Jama 33.Jama Hassan Karshe 34.Yusuf Abdi Farah 35.Elmi Yusuf Aden 36.Awil Saleban H. Ahmed 37.Axmed Ibrahim Warsame 38.Abdi Haji Ahmed 39.Muse Yusuf Warsame 40.Kurushof Mohamed Mohamoud 41.Mohamed Duale Ali 42.Aden Aw-Muse Isse 43.Mohamoud Guhad Hassan 44.Warsame Serar Hussein 45.Ahmed Haji Mohamoud 46.Ahmed Hassan Bile 47.Dahir Farah Jama 48.Aden Abdi Ahmed 49.Ibrahim Hussein Farah 50.Ali Haji Mohamoud 51.Abdirisak Barud Tarabi 52.Hussein Bullale Ahmed 53.Ali Mohamed Farah 54.Ali Roble Ismail 55.Mohamed Warsame Gongome 56.Mohamed Hirsi Hussein 57.Abdiwahid Abdullahi Jama 58.Ibrahim Mohamoud Mire 59.Ahmed Abdi Hussein 60.Hussein Hashi Hassan 61.Abdirashid Abbase Sh. Ahmed 62.Salah Sulleban Ali 63.Abdi Sheik Mohamoud 64.Hassan Dahir Af-kura 65.Duale Jama Dalmar 66.Isse Hassan Abdi 67.Yusuf Gure Ateye 68.Hussein Ismail Gulled 69.Mohamoud Fardale Golongol 70.Abdirahman Mohamed Ali 71.Ibrahim Yusuf Ali
72.Abdi Dahir Gas 73.Yasin Ali Abdulle 74.Abdi Muse Deni 75.Salad Ismail Mohamed 76.Sadik Abshir Garad 77.Abdi Yusuf H. Ismail 78.Abdi Ali Duale 79.Abdikarin Hassan Salah 80.Abdisalan Haji Mohamoud 81.Ahmed Abdi Mohamoud (Haabsade) 82.Mohamoud Haji Hassan Arab 83.Mohamed Sh. Bashir Abokor 84.Asad Warsame Nor 85.Ahmed Ali Dira 86.Abdi Mohamed Hashi 87.Abdiasis Sh. Abdullahi Hashi 88.Ahmed Hassan Ali 89.Abdullahi Hussein Ahmed 90.Abdi Ali Mohamoud 91.Mohamed Mire Ali 92.Mohamoud Karshe Hoosh 93.Mohamed H. Ali Sheal 94.Mohamoud H. Omar Amey 95.Mohamoud Sofe Hassan 96.Saleban Yusuf Dhigane 97.H. Ahmed Aden Had 98.Ismail Mohamed Ali 99.Abdi Jibril Dagaweyne 100. Abdi Barkad Tahbib 101. Mohamed Yusuf Abdi 102. Abdullahi Mohamed H. Aden 103. Bashir Jama Beydan 104. Sahra Issa Farah 105. Saqa Sofe Muse 106. Run Olujog Awad SANAAG REGION 1. Abdirahman Jama Abdulle 2. Mohamed Ali Gulled 3. Mohamed Osman Hassan 4. Abdullahi Mohamed Gurrey 5. Mohamed Ali Jama 6. Ahmed Mohamed Muse 7. Mohamed Said Jamus 8. Omar Liban Arab 9. Ahmed Salah Mohamed 10.Farah Ali Muse 11.Ismail Mohamed Gutale 12.Salah Jama Farah
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13.Dahir Saleban Duale 14.Mohamed Said Abdi 15.Sh. Bihi Sh. Abdirahman 16.Abdullahi Ahmed Bulgas 17.Abdalle Mohamoud Nahar 18.Awad Ahmed Ashare 19.Ismail Abdi Hassan 20.Abdirisak Haji Hirad 21.Ali Osman Abdi 22.Bashir Hassan Ali 23.Ahmed Ali Jibril 24.Abdi Abdalle Jama 25.Mohamed Ahmed Osman 26.Hassan Aware Arrale 27.Ahmed Osman Ahmed 28.Salah Mohamed Salah 29.Mohamed Yusuf Aware 30.Muse Farah Aden 31.Abdirahman Mohamoud Ali-beyr 32.Abdi Salah Farah 33.Jama Hersii Farah 34.Jama Arab Anshur 35.Ahmed Hassan Mohamed 36.Muse Botan 37.Mohamoud Ali Elmi 38.Abdiasis Mohamoud Jama 39.Ahmed Abdi Isse 40.Abdulkadir Mohamoud Farah 41.Said Ali Hassan 42.Ali Abdi Abdille 43.Abdille Aden Abdi 44.Warsame Mohamed Gair 45.Ahmed Farah Ali 46.Ahmed Ali Shire 47.Mohamoud Muse Aden 48.Abdirisak Ali Ayan 49.Mohamoud Hassan Mohamoud 50.Mohamed Hassan Omar 51.Mohamoud Haji Dirir 52.Mohamed Abdi Awl 53.Abdullahi Farah Abdi 54.Ali Omar Ahmed 55.Omar Mohamoud Erbad 56.Mohamed Jibril Yusuf 57.Osman Abdi Shabele 58.Ali Jama Farah 59.Mohamed Abdi Adde 60.Ali Kilwe 61.Abdullahi Duale Ali
62.Ahmed Gure Aden 63.Mursal Ahmed H. Gelle 64.Ali Mohamed Ali 65.Abdirahman Mohamed Said 66.Mohamoud Waberi Issa 67.Mohamed Said Mohamed 68.Abdi Ali Farah 69.Ali Abdi Ali 70.Said Aden Abdi 71.Bashir Hersi Aden. 72.Abdullahi Ali Hassan 73.Mohamoud Mohamed Kullan 74.Hassan Farah Mohamoud 75.Ibrahim Ali Shabin 76.Mohamed Jama Mohamoud 77.Aden Ahmed Ibrahim 78.Said Salad Warsame 79.Abdullahi Gurhan Gedi 80.Ahmed Osman Aden 81.Mohamed Ali Abdi 82.Abdullahi Farah Odey 83.Ahmed Haji Ali 84.Mohamed Muse Ali 85.Mohamed Ali Shirwa 86.Abdikarin Anshur Abdalla 87.Ismail Suldan Mohamoud 88.Hodan Ismail Mohamed 89.Jokha Gelle Foley 90.Hayad Ali Farah 91.Ali Haji Noh 92.Saleban Awad Noh 93.Mohamed Omar Abdirahman 94.Mohamed Hirsi Geel-laye 95.Mohamed Omar Hashi-hash 96.Aw-Omar Hassan Naleye 97.Abdirahman Ali Said 98.Abdirizak Ahmed Warsame 99.Deka Jama Olujok 100. Nasir Mohamed Shire 101. Abdirahman Abdullahi Ali 102. Faysal Ega Hassan 103. Mohamud Ali Aden 104. Jama Ahmed Hassan 105. Mohamed Ismail Shabba 106. Mohamed Hamud Abdi DIASPORA MEMBERS 1. Mohamoud Abdullahi Shirwa (Canada) 2. Mohamed Abdirashid (Canada)
Annexes
1
3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.
Abdulkadir Farah Nor (Holland) Saynab Jama Nor (Masar) Yasin Abdi Samatar (UAE) Abdirashid Ismail Habibo (Kenya) Mohamed Aden Abdillahi (Pakistan) Dr. Yusuf Haji Said (Sweden) Mohamed Farah (Denmark)
10.Hussein Abshir Farah (Australia) 11.Abdirahman Mohamed Hassan (Kenya) 12.Nor Abdi Hashi (UK) 13.Kalif Isse Yusuf (UAE) 14.Abdirashid Ahmed Egag (Sweden) 15.Asha Jama Hirsi (UAE)
Diaspora representation for 30 delegates with voting rights was assigned as follows: USA 3, Canada 4, UK 2, Holland 2, Italy 1, Scandinavia 2, Kenya 3, Uganda 1, Tanzania 1, Ethiopia 1, Zambia 1, Saudi Arabia 2, UAE 2, Egypt 1, Kuwait-Qatar 1, Yemen 1, Australia-New Zealand 2 (Dr. Kinfe Abraham, 2002) The following Traditional Elders signed the outcome of the Garowe consultative Conference: North Mudug Region 1. Islan Bashiir Islan Abdulle 2. Garad Mohamed Elmi Shirwa 3. Suldan Mohamud Elmi Alas 4. Ali Ugas Mohamed 5. Suldan Abdulkadir Omar Shabele Nugaal Region 1. Islan Mohamed Islan Muse 2. Suldan Said M. Garase. 3. Suldan Abdulahi Haji Nur 4. Ugas Omar Ghele Mohamed Bari Region 1 Abdulahi Boqr Muse Representative 2. Beldaje Yasin Ali 3. Beldaje Ali Farah 4. Beldaje Ahmed Beldaje Mohamed 5. 6. 7. 8. Suldaan Said Irbad Ismail Beldaje Abdulahi Hassan Ugaas Yasin Beldaje Ali Bin Jael
Sool, southern Togdheer and eastern Sanaag 1. Garad Abdikani Garakad Jama 2. Garakad Salebakan Garad Mohamed 3. Garad Abdilahi Garad Sofe 4. Sultan Said Osman Ali 5. Garad Abshir Salah Mohamed 6. Ugas Abdilahi Isse Nur Delegates from eastern Sanaag Region 1. Ismail Sultan Mohamud Ali Shire 2. Islan Husein Abdisalan Diif 3. Abdilahi Gurhan Gedi
Chairman Co-chairman
Titled Elder
Secretary Assistant
Nugaal Nugaal
3. Mr. Ali Ahmed Mohamed 4. Mrs.Asha Gelle Diriye 5. Mr. Mohamed Farah Yare 6. Mr. Ahmed Hassan Nur 7. Mr. Abdurahman Sheikh Ismail 8. Mr. Mohamud Sofe Hassan 9. ------------------------------10. ------------------------------
The Technical Committee was selected by region as follows: Mudug Region: 1. Mohamed Jibril 2. Shakib Farah 3. Abdulahi Nur Abdulle Nugaal Region: 4. Ali Haji Abdulle 5. Dahir Ali Isse 6. Abdirashid Abdi Bari Region: 7. Ali Sahar Guled 8. Said Mohamed Musse 9. Said Salah Mohamed Sool Region: 10. Harir Gas 11. Mohamed Sheikh 12. Yusuf Gure Ateye Sanaag Region: 13. Omar Mohamed Irbad 14. Faysal Ige Hassan 15. Abdurahman Jama Abdalle
Ten wise men (a traditional elder and an intellectual from each region) to guide the process 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Garad Mohamed Elmi Mr. Ibrahim Elmi Suldan Said Mohamed Eng. Abdirizak Abdi Ugas Abdulahi Isse Mudug Mudug Nugaal Nugaal Sool 6. Dr. Hassan Ismail 7. Garad Abdulahi Ali Id 8. Deeq Ol-Ujoog 9. Abdulahi Boqor Musse 10.Osman Mohamed Samatar Sool Sanag Sanag Bari Bari
Annexes
Annex 5
1997 Agreement
(Translated from the original Somali) The mediating committee proposed the following: - Immediate dismantling of forces at Kuraad - Management of resources ( in this case water ) through xeer, or customary law - Formation of berkedo in common grazing areas are prohibited - For environmental reasons, deforestation is prohibited
Use of movable plastic reservoirs will substitute construction of [permanent] berkedo Nugaal authorities will monitor and regulate the building of new berkedo in Tukaale as well as other nearby common grazing land; Nugaal authorities are also responsible for reimbursement for destruction of berkedo; Community elders shall administer the implementation of the mediating committees recommendations;
First phase of the 2007 agreement The following terms were agreed upon: - Payment of one-hundred and twenty camels for each of the deceased persons from the Bah Ararsame; 50,000,000 Somali Shillings (So.sh) for funeral costs; $1000 for the family of deceased; and one godobtir girl per deceased; - The wounded are to be examined in Garowefour from the Bah Ararsame and five from the Omar Mohamoud; - Destruction of three berkedo in Adadda and one in Daladka; - Construction of new waterpoints is prohibited in the geographical zone between the Bah Ararsame and Omar Mohamoud. That includes the villages of Qoriley, Magacley, Maygaagle, Carris and Gumbur; - Those who defy the aforementioned agreements will be held accountable; they will be fined 50,000,000 So.sh and one year imprisonment; - Building of impermanent settlements are prohibited; violators will be fined 10,000,000 So.sh and imprisoned for six months; - Puntland government will reimburse the owners of the berkedo a sum of twenty-six thousand dollars ($26,000); ten-thousand dollars ($10,000) for Ina Habsades berked, six thousand dollars ($6000) for the berked in Daladka, and ten thousand dollars ($10,000) for two other berkedo Following the appeal of the Bah Ararsame the mediating committee revised the above agreement by adding the following: - Increasing the value of Ina Habsades berked to twenty thousand dollars ($20,000); - A buffer zone of 25Km between the two communities is demarcated; this draws back the berked of Ina Habsade 7Km
Annexes
The Bah Ararsame Committee Aw-Daahir Haji Hassan Abdille Abdirahman Mohamed Ali Mohamed Abdi Haabsade Yusuf Haji Mohamud Ali Abdirahman Saleeban Mursal Abdulahi Hasssan Ali Jama Yacqub Osman Mohamud Gurre Ali
Haji Mahad Haji Yusuf aw-Abdi Ali Abdi Galayr Abdi Aden Ali Ali Mohamed Kaarshe Ahmed Mohamed (Dheganalow) Ibrahim Bulhan Mohamed Mohamed Abdulqadir Ileeye Mohamed Ahmed Dheere Mohamud Ahmed Ibyan
(translated from the original Somali) To: Bah Ararsame Community To: Omar Mohamud Community Cc: Islan Bashir, Islan Bashir, Islan Abdulle, Islan Farah Cc: Elders of Puntland Subject: Committee verdict Verdict is made on the basis of careful analysis and evaluation of the issues related to the pastoral areas and the disputes over water, such as digging Berkedo which creates environmental degradation. All the concerns and complaints of both communities were listened to. It is also based on the related references and previously reached agreements about the area such as the May 15th 1997 agreement which forbids digging any Berkedo or cutting the trees of the areas. 1. 2. 3. Berkedo at Daladka and the berked owned by Abdimalik Haji Hussein at Adadda shall be demolished. The two berkedo of Hassan Abdi Haabsade family shall remain in place, provided that new berkedo shall not be established beyond this point southwards within the grazing area. The terrain between the existing villages is designated as grazing zone for the livestock: therefore it is prohibited to construct new berkedo, develop new townships or establish temporary makeshifts camps that could lead to further erosion and damage to the environment. At the location of God-Dhurwaa and Kal-belebo, there shall not be any further extension by establishing new berkedo. In the event that any new berkedo are constructed, both the new and the old shall be demolished. Any party that violates the above four articles shall be liable to a fine of Somali Shilling 100 million and one year imprisonment. The above resolutions shall be overseen by a committee composed of the two communities. The committee can seek assistance from the regional authorities of Sool and Nugaal. The owners of the berkedo that are to be demolished as agreed here shall receive: a. Daladka $8.000 b. Adadda $7.000 c. Compensation to be paid in cash by Puntland administration through the Isimo Representatives from Puntland administration, the mediating committees and elders from both communities shall execute the demolition of the above mentioned berkedo. Regarding the deceased men: a. For each of the 8 men killed during the latest fighting, the committee has ruled: A diya of 120 camels An additional US $1000 as exoneration (plea for forgiveness). Funeral expenses of Somali Shilling 5 million b. The committee has also ruled a diya payment for a man as: 110 camels as diya Funeral expenses of Somali Shilling 5 million The diya payment shall be completed as follows: a. 467 heads [live camels], which corresponds to the Fiffi shall be paid within 2 months. b. 603 heads [live camels], which is the Mag-Dheer shall be paid within 6 months. The cash compensations of funeral expenses, exoneration and the weapons shall be handed over on the date of signature of this agreement and are: funeral expenses totalling Somali Shillings 45 million, and exoneration $8.000, and 6 guns. Regarding the injuries, the Isimo ruled that each wounded member of both communities shall receive US $1.500 as medication/healing compensation to be brought to the venue of this conference. Cc: Garaad Jama Garaad Ali Garaad Jama Cc: Puntland Minister of Justice & Religious Affairs Cc: President of Puntland Cc: Puntland Minister of Interior Cc: All officials of Nugaal, Sool and Mudug regions
4.
5. 6. 7.
8. 9.
10.
11.
12.
Annexes
13. 14.
The Isimo shall be the sole reference body for any changes that may be done to this agreement. After signature of this agreement, either of the reconciled sub-clans that initiates actions that causes death or injury shall be fined Somali Shilling 200 million before the case is examined.
(translated from the original Somali) Decisions by the elders chairing the Burtinle conference To: To: To: Cc: Ba Ahararsame committee Omar Mohamoud communities Puntland government Communities in Sool, Eyn, Mudug and Nugaal
Subject: Elders Decisions - Having seen the decisions by the committee mediating the Bahar arsame and Omar Mohamoud communities and submission of both sides - Having seen the good will of the two sides by accepting the decisions - Considering how important it is to bring a lasting peace between the related communities and how imperative it is to protect the environment from deforestation and erosion. We have decided that: 1. The verdict reached by the mediation committee be duly implemented 2. The Puntland government settles all expenses charged regarding the water reservoir and water catchments to be demolished 3. The land be shared among all with no one not able to claim it particularly as their own 4. To proactively prevent anything that may cause problems or reignite previous conflict 5. Intellectuals from both communities communicate the signed peace agreement to their communities in the conflict area 6. Relocation of the forces should happen as soon as possible 7. The elders of Puntland and the mediation committee jointly monitor the implementation of the agreement Conclusion: We compliment all the intellectuals who participated in the creation of peace and harmony among the communities. Islan Iise Islan Mohamed Islan Bashir Islan Abdulle Garad Abdullahi Garad Sofe Ugas Abdullahi Iise Garad Abshir Salah Garad Mahamoud Osman Mashqare Garad Saleban Burale Ugas Farah Mahamoud Ali The mediation committee 1. Dahir Mohamed Farah-Sanwaylod (chairman) 2. Aqil Mohamoud Haji Omar (vice-chairman) 3. Nabadon Kaliif Aw Ali 4. Nabadon Abdulahi Jama Areef 5. Nabadon Abdiasiis Jama Warsame 6. Abas Ali Dhere 7. Mohomed Abshir Nur 8. Ali Yusuf Ali Hoosh
Annexes
9. Amiir Jama Mohamed Mire 10.Yusuf Jama Alas 11.Dalmar Haji Mohamoud 12.Haji Ahmed Adan Haad 13.Bihi Hirsi Farah 14.Ibrahim Abade Burale 15.Awil Ismail 16.Ahmed Barre Siad Muse (secretary) The witnessing Elders 1. Ugaas Hassan Ugaas Yaasiin 2. Ugaas Abdullaahi Ugaas Soofe 3. Garaad Abdullahi Ali Ciid 4. Garaad Abdisalam Hassan 5. Suldan Said Mohamed Garaase 6. Suldan Abdisalan Suldan Mohamed 7. Suldan Bashir Muuse Keente 8. Ugaas Faradh Haji Mohamud 9. Ugaas Omar Geelle Mohamed 10.Suldan Ali Ismail
3. Mohamud Abdi Haabsade 4. Yusuf Haji Mohamud Ali 5. Abdirahman Saleeban Mursal 6. Abdullahi Hassan Ali 7. Jama Yacqub Osman 8. Mohamud Guure Ali 9. Haji Mahad Haji Yusuf aw-Abdi 10.Ali Abdi Galayr 11.Abdi Aden Ali 12.Ali Mohamed Kaarshe 13.Ahmed Mohamed [Dheganalow] 14.Ibrahim Bulhan Mohamed 15.Mohamed Abdulqadir Ileeye 16.Mohamed Ahmed Dheere 17.Mohamud Ahmed Ibyan Omar Mohamud Committee 1. Abdullahi Hasan Baalee 2. Nuur Mohamed Ahmed Sandheere 3. Abdirashid Ahmed Jama 4. Abdullahi Kooreeye Elmi 5. Abdi Budeeye Hassan 6. Jama Omar Dhagad 7. Mohamed Hassan Samatar 8. Abdul Dalmar Ali 9. Jama Bihi Nuur 10.Isse Haji Jama 11.Mohamud Abdi Daahir 12.Muuse Haaji Jama 13.Mohamud Khalif Hersi 14.Osman Ahmed Omar 15.Mohamud Isse Ahmed 16.Bashir Mohamud Dalmar 17.Ahmed Osman Warsame
Representatives of the authorities 1. Abdirizaq Yasin Abdille Geessod Puntland Minister of Justice and Religious Affairs 2. Abdirahman Jama Boorre [Mayor of Laas Aanood ] 3. Hussein Guuled Hanaf [Mayor of Burtinle] 4. Bedel Khalaf Jaama [representative of Federal Government of Ethiopia, Bookh District]
Bah Ararsame Committee 1. Aw-Daahir Haji Hassan Abdille 2. Abdirahman Mohamed Ali
0
11.Mrs. Salado Ismail Mirood 12.Mrs. Maryan-noor Ali Jama 13.Mohamed H Barre (Shimbiralaye) 14.Abdulahi Arahman Ahmed (Ayrow) 15.Ahmed Abbas Ahmed 16.Abdigafar Haji Mohamed Abdulle 17.Abdisalaan Ali Farah Biligsay 18.Walid Musa, EC political affairs 19.Mohamed Abdulkadir Barre (accountant, financial committee) Unnamed interviewees Community and clan leaders, October 2007 Elders and militia leaders in Gaalkayo, November 2007 Senior diplomat, Nairobi, 30 November 2007 Senior elders, November 2007 Several senior Somali figures, August 2008 Interviewees for research on the Burtinle Peace Agreement 1. Abdisaeed Ali Suuryan 2. Abdulrahman Aden Jama Interview with Mayor of Las Anood at PDRC, unpublished film; interviewers Abdinasir and A. Nur, Garowe, November 2007 3. Abdurahman Abdulle Osman Shuke, PDRC director, Garowe, November 2007 4. Ahmed Saeed Musse (Barre) 5. Ahmed Sheik Jama 6. Aisha Gelle Diryire Interview with Minister of Women Development and Family Affairs at MOWDAFA, unpublished film; interviewers Abdinasir and Amina Nur, Garowe, November 2007 7. Bashir Abdiaziz Omar (Lilen), unpublished filmed interview; interviewer Muctar Hersi, PDRC Garowe, November 2007 8. Daarhir Mohamed Sanwaaylood 9. Hawa Isse Mohamud, WAWA womens group, Bosaaso, November 2007 10. Hussein Gelle Hanaf 11. Ladan Abdifarah 12. Mohamed Ali Daad, Interview of member of diaspora, interviewer Amina Nur, San Diego, 1 January 2008 13. Mohamed Abshir Nur and D. M. Farah, Interview with Chairman of BPA Mediating Committee at PDRC, unpublished film; interviewers A. Nur and Abdinassir, Garowe, November 2007 14. Salado Ismail Meiraood 15. Weris Ali Warsame and L. Abdifarah, Interview with Sool Women at PDRC, interviewers A. Nur and A. M. Abdulkadir, Garowe, November 2007
Annexes
1
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