Right To Travel
Right To Travel
IS A "RIGHT,"
NOT A GOVERNMENT
GRANTED PRIVILEGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CONSTITUTIONS
STATUTES
3 Angel Highways 3
11 American Jurisprudence. 1st., Constitutional Law, § 329, page 1123
CASE HISTORIES
1 Chitty Pr. 32
Barron v. Burnside 121 U.S. 186
Boone v. Clark, 214 S.W. 607
Buchanan v. Warley 245 U.S. 60, 74
Chicago Motor Coach v. Chicago, 169 N.E. 22
Cummins v. Jones, 155 P. 171
Deibel v. Kreiss, 50 N.E. 2d 1000 (1943)
Ferrante Equipment Co. v. Foley Machinery Co., N.J., 231 A.2d 208,
211, 49 N.J. 432
Gardner v. City of Brunswick, 28 S.E. 2d 135
Hadfield v. Lundin, 98 Wn. 657; 168 P. 516
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43
Hoke v. Henderson, 15 N.C. 15, 25 AM. Dec. 677
In re Hong Wah, 82 Fed. 623
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125
Ligare v. Chicago, 28 N.E. 934
McKevitt et al v. Golden Age Breweries, Inc., 126 P.2d 1077 (1942)
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 491 (1966)
Murdock v. Pennsylvania 319 U.S. 105
O'Conner v. City of Moscow, 69 Idaho 37
Packard v. Banton, 44 S.Ct. 257, 264 U.S. 140
Parish of Morehouse v. Brigham, 6 S. 257
Parish v. Thurston 87 Ind. 437 (1882)
People v. Nothaus, 147 Colo. 210
Robertson v. Department of Public Works, 180 Wash. 133 at 139
Rogers Construction Co. v. Hill, Or., 384 P.2d 219, 222, 235 Or. 352
Spann v. City of Dallas, 235 S.W. 513
State v. City of Spokane, 109 Wn. 360; 186 P. 864
State v. Johnson, 243 P. 1073
Thompson v. Smith (Chief of Police), 154 S.E. 579, 580
Weirich v. State, 140 Wis. 98
Wells v. Zenz, 236 P. 485
Western Turf Assn. v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359
Williams v. Fears, 343 U.S. 270, 274
LAW DICTIONARIES
2.1 The RIGHT to travel is a part of the liberty of which the Citizen
cannot be deprived without due process of the law under the 5th
Amendment. (Emphasis added). See: Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116,
125.
3.1 The term "public highway," in its broad popular sense, includes
toll roads--any road which the public have a RIGHT to use even
conditionally, though in a strict legal sense it is restricted to roads
which are wholly public. (Emphasis added). See: Weirich v. State, 140
Wis. 98.
4.1 Even the legislature has no power to deny to a Citizen the RIGHT
to travel upon the highway and transport his property in the ordinary
course of his business or pleasure, though this RIGHT might be
regulated in accordance with the public interest and convenience.
(Emphasis added). See: Chicago Motor Coach v. Chicago, 169 N.E. 22.
6.
PRIVILEGE OR RIGHT?
6.1 The use of the highway for the purpose of travel and
transportation is NOT a mere PRIVILEGE, but a COMMON AND
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT of which the public and individuals cannot
rightfully be deprived. (Emphasis added). See: Chicago Motor Coach v.
Chicago, supra; Ligare v. Chicago, 28 N.E. 934; Boone v. Clark, 214
S.W. 607; American Jurisprudence 1st Ed., Highways § 163.
6.3 The RIGHT of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and
to transport his property thereon, either by carriage or by automobile,
is not a mere privilege which a city may prohibit or permit at will, but
a COMMON RIGHT which he has under the RIGHT to life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness. (Emphasis added). See: Thompson v. Smith,
supra.
7.1 . . . [T]he streets and highways belong to the public, for the use
of the public in the ordinary and customary manner. See: Hadfield v.
Lundin, 98 Wn. 657; 168 P. 516.
7.2 All those who travel upon, and transport their property upon, the
public highways, using the ordinary conveyance of today, and doing so
in the usual and ordinary course of life and business. See: Hadfield,
supra; State v. City of Spokane, 109 Wn. 360; 186 P. 864.
7.3 The RIGHT of the Citizen to travel upon the highways and to
transport his property thereon, in the ordinary course of life and
business, differs radically and obviously from that of one who makes
the highways his place of business and uses it for private gain . . . .
(Emphasis added). See: State v. City of Spokane, supra.
7.4 . . . [F]or while a Citizen has the RIGHT to travel upon the public
highways and to transport his property thereon, that RIGHT does not
extend to the use of the highways, either in whole or in part, as a
place of business for private gain. For the latter purposes no person
has a vested right to use the highways of the state, but is a MERE
PRIVILEGE or license which the legislature may grant or withhold at its
discretion.... (Emphasis added). See: Hadfield, supra; State v.
Johnson, 243 P. 1073; Cummins v. Jones, 155 P. 171; Packard v.
Banton, 44 S.Ct. 257, 264 U.S. 140 and other cases too numerous to
mention.
9.1 It is not the amount of travel, the extent of the use of a highway
by the public that distinguishes it from a private way or road. It is the
RIGHT to so use or travel upon it, not its exercise. (Emphasis added).
See: Ind 455, 461.
10.1 The RIGHT of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and
to transport his property thereon, by horse-drawn carriage, wagon, or
automobile, is NOT a mere PRIVILEGE which may be permitted or
prohibited at will, but a COMMON RIGHT which he has under his right
to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Under this constitutional
guarantee one may, therefore, under normal conditions, travel at his
inclination along the public highways or in public places, and while
conducting himself in an orderly and decent manner, neither
interferring with, not disturbing another's RIGHTS, he will be
protected, not only in his person, but in his safe conduct. (Emphasis
added). See: 11 American Jurisprudence 1st., Constitutional Law, §
329, page 1123.
12. The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado discussed the issue in
the following way in 1961.
13.1 All men are by nature free and equal, and have certain
unalienable RIGHTS, among which are . . . ; acquiring, possessing,
and protecting property. . . . (Emphasis added).
14. The words of the Idaho Constitution are to all intents and
purposes identical with those of the North Carolina Constitution. The
Constitution of the State of North Carolina, Article I, § 1, states as
follows:
18. I demand all of my other rights, including the right to travel upon
the public highways and byways in the 50 united States of America.
23. Thus, there can be little doubt that, when this Sovereign Man
travels upon the streets or highways in the 50 united States of
America, he does so as a matter of RIGHT and not privilege. The
authority for such travel is described variously as a RIGHT, a COMMON
RIGHT, an ABSOLUTE RIGHT, an IN/UNALIENABLE RIGHT, and a RIGHT
protected by the Constitution of the United States for the United
States of America. Let us then examine the importance of these terms
to this Sovereign Man by defining their meaning.
24. It shows from these definitions that the States have an obligation
to acknowledge the RIGHT of this Sovereign Man to travel on the
streets or highways in the 50 united States of America. Further, the
States have the duty to refrain from interferring with this RIGHT and
to protect this RIGHT and to enforce the claim of this Sovereign Man to
it.
25. Now if this Sovereign Man has the absolute RIGHT to move about
on the streets or highways, does that RIGHT include the RIGHT to
travel in a vehicle upon the streets or highways? The Supreme Court of
the State of Texas has made comments that are an appropriate
response to this question.
26.1 To secure their property was one of the great ends for which
men entered into society. The RIGHT to acquire and own property, and
to deal with it and use it as the owner chooses, so long as the use
harms nobody, is a natural RIGHT. It does not owe its origin to
constitutions. It existed before them. It is a part of the Citizen's
natural liberty--an expression of his freedom, guaranteed as inviolate
by every American Bill of RIGHTS. (Emphasis added). See: Spann
supra.
27.
PROPERTY
28.1 The Federal Constitution and laws passed within its authority are
by the express terms of that instrument made the supreme law of the
land. The Fourteenth Amendment protects life, liberty, and property
from invasion by the States without due process of law.
28.2 Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns. It is
elementary that it includes the "RIGHT" to acquire, use and dispose of
it. (Emphasis added). See: Buchanan v. Warley 245 U.S. 60, 74.
29. These authorities point out that the RIGHT to own property
includes the RIGHT to use it. The reasonable use of an automobile is to
travel upon the streets or highways on which this Sovereign Man has
an absolute RIGHT to use for the purposes of travel. The definitions in
Title 49 Chapter 3 of the Idaho Code positively declare the RIGHT of
this Sovereign Man to travel in a vehicle upon the streets or highways
in Idaho.
30.
30.5 It seems obvious that the entire Motor Transportation Code and
the definition of motor vehicle are not intended to be applicable to all
motor vehicles but only to those having a connection with the
"transportation" of persons or property. (Emphasis added). See:
Rogers Construction Co. v. Hill, Or., 384 P.2d 219, 222, 235 Or. 352.
31. Now if this Sovereign Man has the RIGHT to use a vehicle on the
streets or highways in the 50 united States of America, to what extent
can the States regulate or diminish that RIGHT? There are some who
maintain that specific performance is required of every Sovereign Man
who uses a vehicle upon the streets or highways in the 50 united
States of America. Let us examine this contention in detail.
CONTRACT?
34. Several types of contracts exist but all must contain the essential
features listed. Contracts can be classified under three principal
categories:
34.1 Express
34.2 Implied
34.3 Quasi
35. Quasi contracts, while being called contracts are not really
contracts, will not be considered in this discussion of contracts but will
be considered in a separation section later.
38.1 The full significance of the clause law of the land is said by
Ruffin, C. J. to be that statutes that would deprive a Citizen of the
RIGHTS of person or property without a regular trial according to the
course and usage of the common law would not be the law of the land.
(Emphasis added). See: Bouvier's Law Dictionary quoting Hoke v.
Henderson, 15 N.C. 15, 25 AM Dec 677.
40. Thus, even if this Sovereign Man wanted to do so, he could not
give up his RIGHT to travel on the streets or highways in the 50 united
States of America or exchange it for the privilege of having a driver's
license. Thus, in exchange for the supposed obligation of this
Sovereign Man, the State has given nothing. Thus, there is no
consideration.
45. If the State cannot prevent this Sovereign Man from traveling on
the streets or highways in 50 united States of America, they do not
have any discretion in the matter and do not have the choice of
whether to obligate themselves or not. Thus, the obligation of the
State cannot be to grant this Sovereign Man the privilege of traveling
on the streets or highways in the 50 united States of America. The
obligation of the State cannot be to refrain from prohibiting this
Sovereign Man from traveling on the streets or highways in the 50
united states of America since the State did not have the RIGHT to do
this at first.
46. It is the contention of this Sovereign Man that the only obligation
that this Sovereign Man incurs when using a vehicle upon the streets
or highways in the united states of America is the Common Law
obligation to refrain from any act that causes another person to lose
life, liberty, or property. In complying with this obligation, this
Sovereign Man does comply with many statutes in the union of States'
Statutes since they are, for the most part, only common sense rules
by which this Sovereign Man avoids doing damage to others.
50. The application form contains the signature of the applicant and
the signature of the person taking the oath of the applicant. The
reverse side of the application contains the results of a vision test and
rudimentary physical examination with the results of a driving test.
These results are signed by the examiner and not by the applicant.
54. The applicant places his signature upon this form that is then
copied by some photographic process. Other material is added
including a photograph, signature of the Director of the Department of
Motor Vehicles/Law Enforcement and the driver's license is made of
this composite.
56. But the idea that the driver's license is a contract with the State is
pervasive. It is a belief that is strongly held even by people in high
places. So let us examine the driver's license as if it were a contract
and see if it can withstand scrutiny. Not every offer made by one party
and accepted by the other creates a valid contract. The outward form
of a contract, either oral or written may exist, and yet the
circumstances may be such that no contract was in reality created.
Some circumstances that will cause an apparently valid contract to be
void are:
57.
57.2 Fraud.
57.3 Duress.
57.4 Alteration.
58.1 It has been shown, still, that traveling is a "RIGHT" and not a
privilege. Thus, a mutual mistake has been made, and the "contract" is
void. See: Deibel v. Kreiss, 50 N.E. 2d 1000 (1943).
59. But the legislative bodies of the States who passed the statutes
contained in the union of States' Statutes are knowledgeable people,
many of whom are lawyers, and they undoubtedly knew at the time
the law was passed that traveling was a RIGHT and not a privilege. If
this were the case, then the mistake would be unilateral. A unilateral
mistake known to the other party is sufficient grounds to void a
contract.
60.
FRAUD
60.1 Fraud may consist in conduct, and may exist where there are no
positive representations, Silence where honesty requires speech, may
sometimes constitute fraud. The rule that a man may be silent and
safe is by no means a universal one. Where one contracting party
knows that the other is bargaining for one thing, he has no RIGHT by
silence to deceive him and suffer him to take an altogether different
thing, from that for which he bargains. (Emphasis added). See: Parish
v. Thurston 87 Ind. 437 (1882).
61. If the driver's license is a contract, a case can be made for the
contention that it was an agreement obtained by the State by fraud.
65. This Sovereign Man did rely upon the representations of the
legislature that traveling was a privilege when he obtained his driver's
license, else he would not have obtained one.
66. This Sovereign Man did suffer damage as a result of his acting
upon the representation of the legislature at least to the extent of the
license fee.
DURESS
68.1 A party must consent to a contract of his own free will; free
consent is an essential element of an agreement. Consequently, if he is
coerced into signing a contract by fear induced by a threat to cause
personal injury to himself or to some close relative, the contract will
not be a real agreement and it will be voidable at his option. The
threat of personal injury must be a threat to inflict immediate bodily
injury or to institute a criminal prosecution against the person
threatened or some close relative.
69. Since it was essential to this Sovereign Man in pursuing his
occupation of common RIGHT to use a vehicle upon the streets or
highways in the 50 united States of America, and since the States
threaten to and do prosecute people in criminal actions for not
possessing a driver's license, regardless of their status, this Sovereign
Man did obtain a driver's license under duress. If then the driver's
license is a contract, the contract is unenforceable and invalid because
of this duress.
73. In the following cases the agreement is invalid, unless the same
or some note or memorandum of it, be in writing and subscribed by
the party charged, or by his agent. Evidence, therefore, of the
agreement cannot be received without the writing or secondary
evidence of its contents:
73.2 . . . . . . .
74. Since the term of the driver's license contract is so many years
and the contract is not written, the Statute of Frauds does apply and
the contract is unenforceable.
75. The discussion up to this point has been concerned with bilateral
contracts in which each party promises something to the other party.
Is it possible that the driver's license is a unilateral contract? A
unilateral contract is described as:
76. Since the act expected by the State is obedience to the statutes of
the union of States' Statutes, what promise has the State offered in
exchange for this act? The only promise that the State could make this
Sovereign Man is the promise to allow him to travel on the streets or
highways in the 50 united States of America. Since this Sovereign Man
already can do that as a matter of RIGHT, the State can promise him
nothing. Thus there is no consideration and a unilateral contract
cannot exist.
77. Having shown that no contract exists between this Sovereign Man
and the State, let us examine the proposition that a quasi-contract
exists between this Sovereign Man and the State.
78.
QUASI-CONTRACT
79.1 That the defendant has received a benefit from the plaintiff.
80. Thus, if it is contended that this Sovereign Man must obey the
statutes in the union of States' Statutes because of a quasi-contract, it
must be shown that this Sovereign Man has received a benefit from
the State. But traveling on the streets or highways in the State is not a
benefit received from the State. It was a RIGHT that attached to this
Sovereign Man at the moment of his birth and cannot be removed by
the State. In this respect, no benefit has been received from the State,
and thus a quasi-contractual obligation cannot exist with respect to
this Sovereign Man.
81. It may be claimed that the statutes are made pursuant to the
police powers of the State and that every person in the State is
obligated to obey them.
82. The police power is a grant of authority from the people to their
governmental agents for the protection of the health, the safety, the
comfort and the welfare of the public. In its nature it is broad and
comprehensive. It is a necessary and salutary power, since without it,
society would be at the mercy of individual interest and there would
exist neither public order nor security. While this is true it is only a
power. It is not a "RIGHT?"
83.1 To secure their property was one of the great ends for which
men entered into society. The RIGHT to acquire and own property, and
to deal with it and use it as the owner chooses, so long as the use
harms nobody, is a natural RIGHT. It does not owe its origin to
constitutions. It existed before them. It is a part of the Citizen's
natural liberty--an expression of his freedom, guaranteed as inviolate
by every American Bill of RIGHTS.
87. If further proof is needed to show that this Sovereign Man need
not be licensed to travel on the streets or highways in the 50 united
States of America, it is provided in the following decisions:
87.2 A state may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a RIGHT
granted by the Federal Constitution. (Emphasis added). (However,
rights are not granted by any piece of paper, only privileges). See:
Murdock v. Pennsylvania 319 U.S. 105.
88. Since a fee is charged for a driver's license and since traveling on
the streets or highways in the 50 united States of America is a RIGHT
guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, and by the LAW OF NATURE, it
is not constitutional for the State to require this Sovereign Man to be
licensed to travel.
89. Even the application for a Driver's License form recognizes the
RIGHT of some people to travel without a license. The union of States'
Statutes recognizes categories of peoples who are not required to be
licensed in the State. Why is it then that the first demand made by the
law enforcement personnel when making a traffic stop is: "Let's see
your driver's license, registration, and proof of insurance," and not
always politely, when the first question should be; "What is your status
and are you required to have a driver's license?"
94.
97. It is a person in the eyes of the law, but it lacks character, morals,
conscience and a soul. It's every activity must be directed and
supervised by the State. Under the definition of Due Process of Law,
Bouvier's Law Dictionary states in part:
98. The statutes in the union of States are designed to direct the
activities of the class of persons of which a corporation is a member.
Corporations are absolutely bound by these statutes. It is imperative
that a conscienceless entity not be allowed to roam the streets or
highways in the 50 united States of America and jeopardize the
Sovereign Man. It is for this purpose that the statutes of the 50 united
States of America were enacted and not for the control of a Free and
Natural Sovereign Man.
CONCLUSION