Professional Documents
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Human Intelligence Collector Operations
Human Intelligence Collector Operations
3 (FM 34-52)
HUMAN INTELLIGENCE
COLLECTOR OPERATIONS
September 2006
NOTE: All previous versions of this manual are obsolete. This document is identical in content
to the version dated 6 September 2006. All previous versions of this manual should be
destroyed in accordance with appropriate Army policies and regulations.
This publication is available at
PREFACE ............................................................................................................... vi
PART ONE HUMINT SUPPORT, PLANNING, AND MANAGEMENT
Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................1-1
Intelligence Battlefield Operating System .............................................................1-1
Intelligence Process ..............................................................................................1-1
Human Intelligence ...............................................................................................1-4
HUMINT Source....................................................................................................1-4
HUMINT Collection and Related Activities ...........................................................1-7
Traits of a HUMINT Collector..............................................................................1-10
Required Areas of Knowledge ............................................................................1-12
Capabilities and Limitations ................................................................................1-13
NOTE: All previous versions of this manual are obsolete. This document is identical in content to the version
dated 6 September 2006. All previous versions of this manual should be destroyed in accordance with
appropriate Army policies and regulations.
*This publication supersedes FM 34-52, 28 September 1992, and ST 2-22.7, Tactical Human Intelligence and
Counterintelligence Operations, April 2002.
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Collection Objectives.............................................................................................7-1
Research ...............................................................................................................7-1
Approach Phase....................................................................................................8-1
Direct Questions....................................................................................................9-1
Elicitation ...............................................................................................................9-5
Leads.....................................................................................................................9-5
Detecting Deceit....................................................................................................9-6
Report Types.......................................................................................................10-1
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Automation.......................................................................................................... 13-1
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
APPENDIX J REFERENCES......................................................................................................J-1
BIBLIOGRAPHY.................................................................................Bibliography-1
INDEX ............................................................................................................Index-1
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Preface
This manual provides doctrinal guidance, techniques, and procedures governing the
employment of human intelligence (HUMINT) collection and analytical assets in
support of the commander’s intelligence needs. It outlines⎯
• HUMINT operations.
• The HUMINT collector’s role within the intelligence operating system.
• The roles and responsibilities of the HUMINT collectors and the roles of those
providing the command, control, and technical support of HUMINT collection
operations.
This manual expands upon the information contained in FM 2-0. It
supersedes FM 34-52 and rescinds ST 2-22.7. It is consistent with doctrine
in FM 3-0, FM 5-0, FM 6-0, and JP 2-0. In accordance with the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005, the only interrogation approaches and techniques
that are authorized for use against any detainee, regardless of status or
characterization, are those authorized and listed in this Field Manual.
Some of the approaches and techniques authorized and listed in this Field
Manual also require additional specified approval before implementation.
This manual will be reviewed annually and may be amended or updated from time to
time to account for changes in doctrine, policy, or law, and to address lessons learned.
This manual provides the doctrinal guidance for HUMINT collectors and
commanders and staffs of the MI organizations responsible for planning and
executing HUMINT operations. This manual also serves as a reference for personnel
developing doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); materiel and force
structure; institutional and unit training; and standing operating procedures (SOPs),
for HUMINT operations at all army echelons. In accordance with TRADOC
Regulation 25-36, the doctrine in this field manual is not policy (in and of itself), but
is “…a body of thought on how Army forces operate….[It] provides an authoritative
guide for leaders and soldiers, while allowing freedom to adapt to circumstances.”
This manual applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National
Guard of the United States, and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise
stated. This manual also applies to DOD civilian employees and contractors with
responsibility to engage in HUMINT collection activities. It is also intended
for commanders and staffs of joint and combined commands, and Service Component
Commands (SCC). Although this is Army doctrine, adaptations will have to be made
by other Military Departments, based on each of their organizations and specific
doctrine.
Material in this manual applies to the full range of military operations. Principles
outlined also are valid under conditions involving use of electronic warfare (EW) or
nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons.
This manual is intended for use by military, civilian, and civilian contractor
HUMINT collectors, as well as commanders, staff officers, and military intelligence
(MI) personnel charged with the responsibility of the HUMINT collection effort.
HUMINT operations vary depending on the source of the information. It is essential
that all HUMINT collectors understand that, whereas operations and sources may
vi 6 September 2006
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
PART ONE
Chapter 1
Introduction
INTELLIGENCE PROCESS
1-2. Intelligence operations consist of the functions that constitute the
intelligence process: plan, prepare, collect, process, produce, and the
common tasks of analyze, disseminate, and assess that occur throughout
the intelligence process. Just as the activities of the operations process
overlap and recur as circumstances demand, so do the functions of the
intelligence process. Additionally, the analyze, disseminate, and assess tasks
Facilitates
Situational
Understanding
Relevant
COMMANDER
Information
(which includes
Intelligence)
Operations Process
Intelligence Process
PREPARE
ASSESS EXECUTE
is a
continuous
function PRODUCE
ANALYZE,
DISSEMINATE,
PLAN PROCESS
and ASSESS
are
PLAN continuous
functions
COLLECT
PREPARE
Commander’s
Intent
HUMAN INTELLIGENCE
1-4. HUMINT is the collection of information by a trained HUMINT collector
(military occupational specialties [MOSs] 97E, 351Y [formerly 351C], 351M
[formerly 351E], 35E, and 35F), from people and their associated documents
and media sources to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength,
dispositions, tactics, equipment, personnel, and capabilities. It uses human
sources as a tool and a variety of collection methods, both passively and
actively, to gather information to satisfy the commander’s intelligence
requirements and cross-cue other intelligence disciplines.
1-5. HUMINT tasks include but are not limited to—
• Conducting source operations.
• Liaising with host nation (HN) officials and allied counterparts.
• Eliciting information from select sources.
• Debriefing US and allied forces and civilian personnel including
refugees, displaced persons (DPs), third-country nationals, and local
inhabitants.
• Interrogating EPWs and other detainees.
• Initially exploiting documents, media, and materiel.
Note. In accordance with Army regulatory and policy guidance, a select set of intelligence
personnel may be trained and certified to conduct certain HUMINT tasks outside of those
which are standard for their primary MOS. Such selection and training will qualify these
personnel to conduct only those specific additional tasks, and will not constitute
qualifications as a HUMINT collector.
HUMINT SOURCE
1-6. A HUMINT source is a person from whom information can be obtained.
The source may either possess first- or second-hand knowledge normally
obtained through sight or hearing. Potential HUMINT sources include
threat, neutral, and friendly military and civilian personnel. Categories of
HUMINT sources include but are not limited to detainees, refugees, DPs,
local inhabitants, friendly forces, and members of foreign governmental and
non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
HUMINT COLLECTOR
1-7. For the purpose of this manual, a HUMINT collector is a person who is
specifically trained and certified for, tasked with, and engages in the
collection of information from individuals (HUMINT sources) for the purpose
of answering intelligence information requirements. HUMINT collectors
specifically include enlisted personnel in MOS 97E, Warrant Officers (WOs)
in MOS 351M (351E) and MOS 351Y (351C), commissioned officers in MOS
35E and MOS 35F, select other specially trained MOSs, and their Federal
civilian employee and civilian contractor counterparts. These specially
trained and certified individuals are the only personnel authorized to
conduct HUMINT collection operations, although CI agents also use
HUMINT collection techniques in the conduct of CI operations. HUMINT
Approach
1-10. During the approach phase, the HUMINT collector establishes the
conditions of control and rapport to gain the cooperation of the source and to
facilitate information collection. Chapter 8 discusses approach and
termination strategies in detail.
Questioning
1-11. During the questioning phase, the HUMINT collector uses an
interrogation, debriefing, or elicitation methodology to ask a source questions
systematically on relevant topics, collect information in response to the
intelligence tasking, and ascertain source veracity. Chapter 9 discusses
questioning techniques in detail. (See Appendix B for a source and reliability
matrix.)
HUMINT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
ROLE ROLE
• Determine • Detect
- Capabilities • Identify
- Order of Battle • Exploit
- Vulnerabilities • Neutralize
- Intentions
TARGET
TARGET • Adversary Intelligence
• Adversary Decisionmaking Activities
Architecture
INTENT INTENT
Shape Blue’s Degrade Red’s
Visualization Visualization
of Red of Blue
FUNCTIONS FUNCTIONS
• HUMINT Collection Activities • Collection
- Tactical Questioning - Contact Operations
- Screening - Tactical Source Operations
- Interrogation • Investigation
- Debriefing - Incidents
- Liaison - Anomalies
- Human Source Operations • Operation
- DOCEX - Agent Operations
- CEE Operations • Analysis
• Analysis - Link Diagrams
- Link Diagrams - Patterns
- Patterns
Termination
1-12. During the termination phase, the HUMINT collector completes a
questioning session and establishes the necessary conditions for future
collection from the same source by himself or another HUMINT collector.
(See Chapter 8.)
Reporting
1-13. During the reporting phase, the HUMINT collector writes, edits, and
submits written, and possibly oral, reports on information collected in the
course of a HUMINT collection effort. These reports will be reviewed, edited,
and analyzed as they are forwarded through the appropriate channels.
Chapter 10 discusses reporting in detail.
TACTICAL QUESTIONING
1-17. Tactical questioning is expedient initial questioning for information of
immediate tactical value. Tactical questioning is generally performed by
members of patrols, but can be done by any DOD personnel. (See ST 2-91.6.)
SCREENING
1-18. Screening is the process of identifying and assessing the areas of
knowledge, cooperation, and possible approach techniques for an individual
who has information of intelligence value. Indicators and discriminators used
in screening can range from general appearance, possessions, and attitude to
specific questions to assess areas of knowledge and degree of cooperation to
establish if an individual matches a predetermined source profile. Screening
is not in itself an intelligence collection technique but a timesaving measure
that identifies those individuals most likely to have information of value.
INTERROGATION
1-20. Interrogation is the systematic effort to procure information to answer
specific collection requirements by direct and indirect questioning techniques
of a person who is in the custody of the forces conducting the questioning.
Some examples of interrogation sources include EPWs and other detainees.
Interrogation sources range from totally cooperative to highly antagonistic.
Interrogations may be conducted at all echelons in all operational
environments. Detainee interrogation operations conducted at a Military
Police (MP) facility, coalition-operated facility, or other agency-operated
collection facility are more robust and require greater planning, but have
greater logistical support. Interrogations may only be conducted by personnel
trained and certified in the interrogation methodology, including personnel
in MOSs 97E, 351M (351E), or select others as may be approved by DOD
policy. Interrogations are always to be conducted in accordance with the Law
of War, regardless of the echelon or operational environment in which the
HUMINT collector is operating.
DEBRIEFING
1-21. Debriefing is the process of questioning cooperating human sources to
satisfy intelligence requirements, consistent with applicable law. The source
usually is not in custody and usually is willing to cooperate. Debriefing may
be conducted at all echelons and in all operational environments. The
primary categories of sources for debriefing are refugees, émigrés, DPs, and
local civilians; and friendly forces.
• Refugees, Émigrés, DPs, and Local Civilians Debriefing
Operations. Refugee, émigré, and DP debriefing operations are the
process of questioning cooperating refugees and émigrés to satisfy
intelligence requirements. The refugee may or may not be in custody,
and a refugee or émigré’s willingness to cooperate need not be
immediate or constant. Refugee debriefings are usually conducted at
refugee collection points or checkpoints and may be conducted in
coordination with civil affairs (CA) or MP operations. Local civilian
debriefing operations are the process of questioning cooperating local
civilians to satisfy intelligence requirements. As with refugees and
émigrés, the local civilians being debriefed may or may not be in
custody and the civilian’s willingness to cooperate may not be
immediate or constant. Debriefing operations must be conducted
consistent with applicable law and policy. Applicable law and policy
include US law; the law of war; relevant international law; relevant
directives including DOD Directive 3115.09, “DOD Intelligence
Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning”; DOD
Directive 2310.1E, “The Department of Defense Detainee Program”;
DOD instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOs.
• Friendly Force Debriefing Operations. Friendly force debriefing
operations are the systematic debriefing of US forces to answer
DOCEX OPERATIONS
1-24. DOCEX operations are the systematic extraction of information from
open, closed, published, and electronic source documents. These documents
may include documents or data inside electronic communications equipment,
including computers, telephones, Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs), and
Global Positioning System (GPS) terminals. This operation is not solely a
HUMINT function, but may be conducted by any intelligence personnel with
appropriate language support.
1-25. Many CEDs are associated with EPWs and other human sources.
Consequently, a HUMINT collector is often the first person to screen them.
HUMINT collectors will screen the documents associated with human
sources and will extract information of use to them in their immediate
collection operation. Any information discovered during this initial screening
that might cross-cue another collection effort will be forwarded to the
appropriate unit.
1-26. A captured document is usually something that the enemy has written
for his own use. For this reason, captured documents are usually truthful and
accurate. There are cases in which falsified documents have been permitted
to fall into enemy hands as a means of deception but these cases are not the
norm. Normal policy of not relying on single-source information should help
prevent deceptions of this type from being effective. Documents also do not
forget or misinterpret information although it must be remembered that
their authors may have. Usually, each document provides a portion of a
larger body of information. Each captured document, much like a single piece
of a puzzle, contributes to the whole. In addition to tactical intelligence,
technical data and political indicators that are important to strategic and
national level agencies can sometimes be extracted from captured documents.
Captured documents, while not affected by memory loss, are often time
sensitive; therefore, they are to be quickly screened for possible exploitation.
CEE OPERATIONS
1-27. CEE includes all types of foreign and non-foreign materiel found on a
detainee or on the battlefield that may have a military application or answer
a collection requirement. The capturing unit must––
• Recognize certain CEE as having immediate intelligence value, and
immediately forward such CEE to the unit’s S2. Such items include—
All electronic communications equipment with a memory card,
including computers, telephones, PDAs, and GPS terminals.
All video or photographic equipment.
• Recognize certain CEE as having technical intelligence (TECHINT)
value. Such items include––
New weapons.
All communications equipment not immediately exploitable for
HUMINT value.
Track vehicles.
Equipment manuals.
All CEE known or believed to be of TECHINT interest.
• Evacuate the equipment with the detainee.
• Confiscate, tag, and evacuate weapons and other equipment found on
the detainee the same as CEDs. (See Appendix D.)
• Secure and report the capture of TECHINT items to the unit’s S2 for
disposition instructions.
reflects fairness, strength, and efficiency, the source may prove more
cooperative and more receptive to questioning.
• Initiative. Achieving and maintaining the initiative are essential to a
successful questioning session just as the offensive is the key to success
in combat operations. The HUMINT collector must grasp the initiative
and maintain it throughout all questioning phases. This does not mean
he has to dominate the source physically; rather, it means that the
HUMINT collector knows his requirements and continues to direct the
collection toward those requirements.
• Cultural awareness in the various AOs will have different social and
regional considerations that affect communications and can affect the
conduct of operations. These may include social taboos, desired
behaviors, customs, and courtesies. The staff must include this
information in pre-deployment training at all levels to ensure that
personnel are properly equipped to interact with the local populace.
1-30. There are other areas of knowledge that help to develop more effective
questioning:
• Proficiency in the target language. The HUMINT collector can
normally use an interpreter (see Chapter 11) and machine translation
as they are developed to conduct questioning. Language proficiency is a
benefit to the HUMINT collector in a number of ways: He can save
time in questioning, be more aware of nuances in the language that
might verify or deny truthfulness, and better control and evaluate
interpreters.
• Understanding basic human behavior. A HUMINT collector can
best adapt himself to the source’s personality and control of the
source’s reactions when he understands basic behavioral factors, traits,
attitudes, drives, motivations, and inhibitions. He must not only
understand basic behavioral principles but also know how these
principles are manifested in the area and culture in which he is
operating.
• Neurolinguistics. Neurolinguistics is a behavioral communication
model and a set of procedures that improve communication skills. The
HUMINT collector should read and react to nonverbal
communications. He must be aware of the specific neurolinguistic clues
of the cultural framework in which he is operating.
CAPABILITIES
1-31. HUMINT collection capabilities include the ability to⎯
• Collect information and cross-cue from an almost endless variety of
potential sources including friendly forces, civilians, detainees, and
source-related documents.
• Focus on the collection of detailed information not available by other
means. This includes information on threat intentions and local
civilian and threat force attitudes and morale. It also includes building
interiors and facilities that cannot be collected on by other means due
to restrictive terrain.
• Corroborate or refute information collected from other R&S assets.
• Operate with minimal equipment and deploy in all operational
environments in support of offensive, defensive, stability and
reconstruction operations, or civil support operations. Based on solid
planning and preparation, HUMINT collection can provide timely
information if deployed forward in support of maneuver elements.
LIMITATIONS
1-32. HUMINT collection limitations include⎯
• Interpersonal abilities. HUMINT is dependent on the subjective
interpersonal capabilities of the individual rather than on the abilities
to operate collection equipment. HUMINT collection capability is based
on experience within a specific AO that can only be developed over
time.
• Identification of knowledgeable sources. There is often a multitude of
potential HUMINT sources. Information in response to specific
requirements can only be collected if sources are available and
identified that have that information.
• Limited numbers. There are never enough HUMINT collectors to meet
all requirements. Limited assets must be prioritized in support of units
and operations based on their criticality.
• Time limitations. HUMINT collection, particularly source operations,
takes time to develop. Collection requirements must be developed with
sufficient lead-time for collection.
• Language limitations. Although HUMINT collectors can normally use
an interpreter, a lack of language proficiency by the collector can
significantly slow collection efforts. Such language proficiency takes
time to develop.
• Misunderstanding of the HUMINT mission. HUMINT collectors are
frequently used incorrectly and assigned missions that belong to CA,
MP, interpreter or translators, CI, or other operational specialties.
• Commanders’ risk management. Maneuver commanders, in weighing
the risks associated with employing HUMINT collection teams (HCTs),
should seriously consider the potential loss of a wealth of information
such as enemy activities, locations of high-value personnel, and threats
to the force that they will incur if they restrict HCT collection
activities. J/G2Xs, operational management teams (OMTs), and HCT
leaders must educate maneuver commanders on the benefits of
providing security for HCTs and employing them in accordance with
their capabilities.
• Legal obligations. Applicable law and policy govern HUMINT
collection operations. Applicable law and policy include US law; the
law of war; relevant international law; relevant directives including
DOD Directive 3115.09, “DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee
Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning”; DOD Directive 2310.1E, “The
Department of Defense Detainee Program”; DOD instructions; and
military execute orders including FRAGOs. HUMINT operations may
be further restricted by Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) and
other agreements, execute orders and ROE, local laws, and an
operational umbrella concept. Such documents, however, cannot
permit interrogation actions that are illegal under applicable law.
• Connectivity and bandwidth requirements. With the exception of the
size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment (SALUTE) report, most
HUMINT reporting requires considerable bandwidth. Deployed
HUMINT teams must be able to travel to, and report from, all areas of
the battlefield. Digital communication equipment must be able to
provide reliable connectivity with teams’ reporting channels and
sufficient bandwidth for transmission of reports, including digital
imagery.
• Timely reporting and immediate access to sources. Except in tactical
situations when HUMINT collectors are in immediate support of
maneuver units, HUMINT collection and reporting takes time. In
stability and reconstruction operations, sources need to be assessed
and developed. Once they are developed, they need to be contacted
which often takes time and coordination. In offensive and defensive
operations, HUMINT collection at detainee holding areas sometimes
may still be timely enough to meet tactical and operational
requirements. See paragraphs 3-2 and 3-7 for more information on
offensive and defensive operations.
FM 2-22.3
Chapter 2
J /G 2
J /G 2 X ACE
S u p p o rte d
S2
O th e r
M ilita r y
G o v e rn m e n t
A s s e ts
A g e n c ie s
O p e r a tio n a l O p e ra tio n a l
M anagem ent M anagem ent
T e a m (G S ) T e a m (D S )
H U M IN T H U M IN T
C o lle c to r C o lle c to r
T e a m (s ) T e a m (s )
C/J/G/S2X
2-4. The C/J/G/S2X is a staff element subordinate to the C/J/G/S2, is the
primary advisor on HUMINT and CI, and is the focal point for all HUMINT
and CI activities within a joint task force (JTF) (J2X), an Army component
task force (G2X) or a brigade combat team (BCT) (S2X). The 2X can be
organic to the unit staff or can be attached or under operational control
(OPCON) to the staff from another organization such as the theater MI
brigade. The C/J/G/S2X is part of a coherent architecture that includes
organic HUMINT assets and HUMINT resources from national, theater, and
non-DOD HUMINT organizations.
2-5. The C/J2X is responsible for controlling Joint Force HUMINT assets,
coordinating all HUMINT and CI collection activities, and keeping the joint
force C/J/2 informed on all HUMINT and CI activities conducted in the joint
force area of responsibility (AOR). The C/J2X is also part of the review and
recommendation process concerned with the retention or release of detainees.
HUMINT reports maintained at the C/J2X are considered during the review
for release process. The C/J2X consists of the 2X Officer, a HOC, a
Counterintelligence Coordination Authority (CICA), a HUMINT Analysis
Cell (HAC), and a CI Analysis Cell (CIAC). At all echelons, the 2X should
also include an Operational Support Cell (OSC) staffed to operate 24 hours a
day. The authority and operational responsibilities of a C/J2X in combined or
joint contingency operations (CONOP) takes precedence over service-specific
CI and HUMINT technical control agencies. Specifically, the C/J/G/S2X⎯
• Accomplishes technical control and support, and deconfliction of all
HUMINT and CI assets through the Army component G2X, the
HUMINT and CI operations sections, or the OMTs.
• Participates in planning for deployment of HUMINT and CI assets in
support of operations.
• Coordinates, through the HOC and the CICA, all HUMINT and CI
activities to support intelligence collection and the intelligence aspects
of force protection for the deployed commander.
• Coordinates and deconflicts all HUMINT and CI operations within the
operational area.
• Coordinates with the senior US national intelligence representative for
specific operational approval when required by standing agreements.
• Is the release authority for HUMINT reporting at his echelon and only
releases reports to the all-source system after ensuring all technical
control measures for reporting have been met.
2-14. DOCEX teams are normally found at theater and national level
organizations. Lower echelon HCTs may also be designated to perform the
DOCEX mission based upon mission parameters and linguist availability.
However, if organic assets are used, there will be a mission tradeoff.
Dependent on the priority of exploitation and volume of documents, HCTs
assigned the DOCEX mission may be augmented by military, civilian, or
contractor personnel to accomplish their assigned mission. During
operations, the DOCEX team will normally screen documents, extract
information, and expedite the evacuation of documents to the Joint or
Theater Document Exploitation Facility.
Chapter 3
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
3-2. Offensive operations aim at destroying or defeating the enemy. Rapid
maneuver, constantly changing situations, and a vital need for intelligence
support at the point of contact influence HUMINT missions during offensive
operations. The guiding principle to the use of HUMINT in support of
offensive operations is to minimize the time between when friendly forces
encounter potential sources (detainees, refugees, and local civilians) and
when a HUMINT collector screens them.
3-3. During offensive operations, at echelons corps and below, HCTs
normally operate in the engaged maneuver brigades’ AOs and are further
deployed in support of maneuver battalions based on advice from the OMTs.
These collection assets may be in general support (GS) of the parent brigade
or in DS of the maneuver battalions, reconnaissance squadrons, and other
forward-deployed maneuver assets. The HCTs and their supporting control
structure are deployed in accordance with METT-TC based on three
principles:
• The relative importance of that subordinate element’s operations to the
overall parent unit’s scheme of maneuver and the overall ISR plan.
• The potential for that subordinate element to capture detainees, media
and materiel, or to encounter civilians on the battlefield.
• The criticality of information that could be obtained from those sources
to the success of the parent unit’s overall OPLANs.
3-4. HUMINT missions in support of offensive operations include screening
and interrogating EPWs and other detainees, questioning and debriefing
civilians in the supported unit’s AO, and conducting DOCEX, limited to
extracting information of immediate tactical value. EAC assets normally
support offensive operations through theater interrogation and debriefing
facility operations and mobile interrogation teams. These facilities are better
equipped to conduct in-depth interrogations and DOCEX, so it is imperative
that EPWs and other detainees who will be evacuated to theater facilities be
transported there as soon as possible.
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
3-7. Defensive operations defeat an enemy attack, buy time, economize
forces, hold the enemy in one area while attacking in another, or develop
conditions favorable for offensive operations. Forces conducting defensive
operations must be able to identify rapidly the enemy’s main effort and
rapidly assess the operational conditions to determine the timing of counter-
offensive or other operations. HUMINT support to defensive operations
centers on the ability to provide the forward-deployed maneuver commander
with information and intelligence of immediate tactical value. HUMINT
assets should be placed in the AO of the forward elements to minimize the
time between when friendly forces encounter potential sources (detainees,
refugees, local civilians) and when a HUMINT collector screens them.
HUMINT collectors are placed where the potential for HUMINT collection
and the criticality of the information are greatest.
3-8. In defensive operations, it may be necessary to divide the HUMINT
assets equally among the subordinate elements to provide area coverage
until the primary enemy threat is identified. The HUMINT C2 elements
(team leader, OMTs, and unit C2) must be prepared to task organize rapidly
and shift resources as the situation dictates, based on the changing situation
and higher headquarters FRAGO. HUMINT missions in defensive operations
normally include interrogation of detainees, refugee debriefings, and
assisting in friendly force patrol debriefings.
INITIAL PHASE
3-12. The initial phase of stability and reconstruction operations is used to
lay the foundation for future team operations. In general, the priority of
effort is focused inward on security. The HCT conducts initial and follow-up
screenings of locally employed personnel, to establish base data for
subsequent source operations. The supported unit S2, with the assistance of
the HUMINT team leader, establishes procedures to debrief reconnaissance
and surveillance assets operating in the supported unit AO, as well as
regular combat patrols or logistics convoys. The HCT lays the groundwork for
future collection efforts by establishing liaison with local authorities, as well
as developing plans and profiles for HUMINT collection. While establishing
the initial and subsequent rings, the HCT actively seeks to collect PIR
information, whether it pertains to the current ring or any other geographic
location.
CONTINUATION PHASE
3-13. Following the initial phase, the HCT’s focus shifts outward. While the
HCT continues performing HUMINT collection and analysis functions within
the base camp, it also expands its collection effort to outside the base camp to
answer the supported unit’s requirements. During the continuation phase,
the HCT conducts contact operations with local personnel who may be able to
LEVELS OF EMPLOYMENT
3-14. HCTs may be employed with varying degrees of contact with the local
population. As the degree of contact with the population increases, the
quantity and diversity of HUMINT collection increases. In many instances,
however, there is a risk to the HCT inherent with increased exposure to the
local population. The ability of the HCT members to fit in with the local
populace can become very important to their safety. Consequently, the
commander should consider exceptions to the ROE, as well as relaxed
grooming and uniform standards, to help HCT members blend in and provide
additional security. Commanders must consider the culture in which the
HCT members will be operating. In some cultures, bearded men are more
highly respected than clean-shaven men. Relaxing grooming standards for
HCTs in these situations will support the team’s ability to collect
information. The decision regarding what level to employ an HCT is METT-
TC dependent. The risk to the collection assets must be balanced with the
need to collect information and to protect the force as a whole. The
deployment and use of HUMINT collection assets may be limited by legal
restrictions, mission-specific orders, directions from higher headquarters,
and the overall threat level. The four basic levels of employment for the HCT
are discussed below. Figure 3-1 shows these levels as well as their collection
potential versus team security.
Base Camp
• Restricting the HCT to operations within the base camp minimizes the
risk to the team. This action, however, minimizes the collection
potential and maximizes the risk to the force as a whole. While
restricted to a base camp, the HCT can maintain an extremely limited
level of information collection by⎯
Interviewing walk-in sources and locally employed personnel.
Debriefing combat and ISR patrols.
Conducting limited local open-source information collection.
• This mode of deployment should be used only when dictated by
operational restrictions. These would be at the initial stages of stability
and reconstruction operations when the operational environment is
being assessed, or as a temporary expedient when the force protection
level exceeds the ability to provide reasonable protection for the
collectors. A supported unit commander is often tempted to keep the
HCT “inside the wire” when the force protection level or threat
HI
Soft
Independent
C
P
O
O
L
T Defensive
L
E Independent
E
N
C
T
T
I
I
A With
O ISR
L
N Assets
Base
Camp
LO
HI SECURITY TO THE TEAM LO
As an Independent Patrol
• Defensive. One of the key elements of the HCT success is the
opportunity to spot, assess, and develop relationships with potential
sources of information. Operating as independent patrols, without
being tied to ISR or combat assets, enables the HCTs maximum
interaction with the local population, thereby maximizing the pool of
potential sources of information. The HCT must be integrated into the
supported unit’s ISR plan and be provided with other command
elements as needed to support the collection mission. The team leader
will advise the supported unit on the specific capabilities and
requirements of the team to maximize mission success. This method
also increases the risk to the team. HCT members must carry the
necessary firepower for self-protection. They must also have adequate
communications equipment to call for help if needed. The team’s
posture, equipment, and appearance will be dictated by overall force
restrictions and posture. When operating as an independent patrol, the
HCT should not stand out from overall US forces operations. If US
forces are in battle-dress uniforms and operating out of military
vehicles, so should the HUMINT collectors.
• Soft. If the threat situation is such that soldiers are authorized to
wear civilian clothes when outside base areas, the HUMINT collectors
should also move among the civilian population in civilian clothes, so
that they do not stand out from others in the area.
EAC HUMINT
SUPPORT AGENCIES
3-24. HUMINT agencies from DOD, national level intelligence agencies, and
LEAs can support the battlefield commander. In a JTF, a national
intelligence support team (NIST) works with the J2X to coordinate national
level activities with JTF and component HUMINT and analytical assets.
Sometimes liaison officers (LNOs) are assigned directly to the C/J/2X to
facilitate collection activities.
• Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The DIA is a DOD combat
support (CS) agency and an important member of the United States
Intelligence Community. With more than 7,000 military and civilian
employees worldwide, DIA is a major producer and manager of foreign
military intelligence. DIA provides military intelligence to warfighters,
defense policymakers and force planners in DOD and the Intelligence
Community in support of US military planning and operations and
weapon systems acquisition.
Defense HUMINT (DH) Service. The DH Service, a branch of the
DIA, is the force provider for strategic HUMINT forces and
capabilities. During operations, elements from DH form a
partnership within the supported JTF headquarters J2X element for
the coordination and deconfliction of HUMINT source-related
collection activities. DH support to a joint force is outlined in the
classified DIAM 58-11 and DIAM 58-12.
• Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The CIA supports US national
security policy by providing accurate, evidence-based, comprehensive,
and timely foreign intelligence related to national security. The CIA
Chapter 4
COMBIN
COMBINEED C2/ACE
C2/ACE C2X
C2X//OMT MI CDR
CDR
MI CDR
CDR
JOIN
JOINT J2/
J2/ACE J2X/
J2X/OM
OMT
T
(AMIB or MI Battali
Battalion)
CORPS
CORPS/DIVI
DIVISION G2
G2//ACE G2
G2X/
X/OM
OMT
T MI CD
CDR/OMT
R/OMT
BRIG
BRIGAD
ADE
E S2 MI CD
CDR/OMT
R/OMT MI CD
CDR/OMT
R/OMT
PLAN
4-3. HUMINT planning defines collection objectives, when to collect it, and
which resources will be tasked to do the collection. Commanders with
HUMINT collection assets in their units receive collection tasking based on
requirements developed during ISR planning. The commander and staff, in
concert with their supporting OMTs, assess the requirements and task the
team or teams best capable of answering the requirement based on contact
placement and access.
4-4. Another aspect to consider carefully during the Plan phase of the
operational cycle is technical control. Technical control is ensuring adherence
to existing policies and regulations, providing information and guidance of a
technical nature, and supervising the MOS-specific TTP required in
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
PREPARE
4-5. During this phase, commanders and staff, including HUMINT
management sections, review HUMINT mission plans. This review is to
ensure all areas of the mission are considered and addressed in the plan and
included in rehearsals. Items to cover include but are not limited to⎯
• Route (primary and alternate).
• Communications.
• Security plan.
• Convoy procedures including actions on contact and rally points.
• Initial requirements to be covered.
• Mission duration.
4-6. The HUMINT collector then researches the topic area addressing the
requirement and prepares a questioning plan. The HCTs and OMTs must
coordinate all mission requirements. It is important that HUMINT elements
are included in all rehearsals conducted by their supported unit. These
rehearsals will enable HCTs to carry out essential coordination with other
units and ensure that they are included in and familiar with procedures such
as resupply, communications, casualty evacuation, fire support, and
fratricide avoidance. Rehearsals and briefbacks will allow the supported
command to see and correct problems with their support to the HUMINT
elements prior to deployment.
EXECUTE
4-7. Mission execution consists of the collection of information in accordance
with the integrated ISR plan. The requirements manager validates the
requirements based on command guidance. The G3 tasks the requirements to
the units and the individual asset managers (that is, OMT) to identify the
assets best capable to answer the requirement. When requirements are
levied against a specific HCT, the HCT leader decides which of his team’s
contacts can best answer the requirements. He then turns the requirement
into specific team tasks.
ASSESS
4-8. Assessment is the continuous monitoring––throughout planning,
preparation, and execution—of the current situation and progress of an
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
TECHNICAL CONTROL
4-10. Technical control refers to supervision of the TTP of HUMINT
collection. Technical control ensures adherence to existing policies or
regulations and provides technical guidance for HUMINT operations. The
elements that provide technical control also assist teams in translating
collection requirements into executable tasks. Commanders rely on the
expertise of intelligence personnel organic to their unit and within higher
echelons to plan, execute, and assess the HUMINT collection effort. The
OMTs, HATs, and the HOC of the C/J/G/S2X provide technical control.
They––
• Define and manage operational coverage and direction.
• Identify critical collection criteria such as indicators associated with
targeting.
• Prioritize collection missions in accordance with collection
requirements.
• Advise teams on collection techniques and procedures in accordance
with policy, regulations, and law.
• Register and deconflict sources.
• Conduct operational reviews.
• Advise commanders.
• Conduct operational coordination with staff elements and other
intelligence agencies.
• Manage ICF and incentive usage.
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
IF Gaining Unit
Establishes/
RELATIONSHIP Has May Be Can Impose
Receives Assigned Provides Maintains Has Priorities
IS: Command Task Further Com-
CSS Position or Liaison Communica- Established
Relation- Organized mand or Sup-
from: AO By: To: tions by:
ship with: by: port
with:
Relationship of:
As re- Attached;
Gaining Gaining Gaining Gaining quired by Unit to which OPCON;
Attached Gaining unit
unit unit unit unit gaining attached TACON; GS;
unit GSR; R; DS
Parent unit
and gaining
unit; gain- As re- As required by
OPCON;
Gaining ing unit Parent Gaining quired by gaining unit
OPCON Gaining unit TACON; GS;
unit may pass unit unit gaining and parent
COMMAND
GSR; R; DS
OPCON to unit unit
lower HQ.
Note 1
As re- As required by
Gaining Parent Gaining quired by gaining unit
TACON Parent unit Gaining unit GS; GSR; R; DS
unit unit unit gaining and parent
unit unit
As re-
Parent Gaining quired by As required by Not
Assigned Parent unit Parent unit Parent unit
unit unit parent parent unit Applicable
unit
Direct Sup-
Parent Supported Parent unit;
Support Parent unit Parent unit ported Supported unit Note 2
unit unit Supported unit
(DS) unit
Rein-
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General Reinforced
unit and Parent unit;
Support Parent unit and as Not
Parent unit Parent unit Parent unit as re- then
Reinforc- unit required by Applicable
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parent
unit
As re-
General
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Support Parent unit Parent unit Parent unit Parent unit
unit parent parent unit Applicable
(GS)
unit
NOTE 1. In NATO, the gaining unit may not task organize a multinational unit (see TACON).
NOTE 2. Commanders of units in DS may further assign support relationships between their subordinate units and elements
of the supported unit after coordination with the supported commander.
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_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
with the unit requirements manager to incorporate the HUMINT plan into
the overall unit ISR plan and works with the G3/S3 as necessary to help
develop OPORDs or FRAGOs to organic or attached ISR units. HUMINT
taskings will often include technical data that cannot be passed through
normal tasking channels. The HOC will pass that information directly to the
applicable HUMINT OMT or unit operations section.
4-29. The HOC and G2/S2X cannot provide operational taskings to a unit for
collection. Collection is a stated mission that the commander executes.
However, the technical control the HOC can provide as the HUMINT
manager affords the J2/G2X the ability to steer and direct collection assets
and operations. The MI commander and OMT determine specifically which
teams will collect on a given requirement and are responsible for the TTP
used. They report on the status and availability of their collection assets. On
the HCT level, the team chief determines which sources will be contacted and
the details of how the information will be collected from a given source. A
specific plan is developed for each source. This plan should—
• Identify the requirement.
• Identify the proposed source.
• Identify questions to be asked during the source meeting.
• Contain an outline of how the meeting should proceed.
• Identify which collector will conduct the source meeting.
4-30. At the HCT level, the senior team member reviews each plan to ensure
the proper planning for the collection mission. The plan is a minimum goal
for the collection. The collector must be fully aware of the overall collection
priorities and be prepared to take advantage of any additional leads.
DIRECT PRODUCTION
4-31. The G2 coordinates intelligence production to provide non-duplicative
all-source intelligence products to the commander, staff, and subordinate
forces. Some type of production occurs in the intelligence staff or separate
analysis element at every echelon from national to battalion level. The HCT
of the ACE at echelon’s division and higher will support the intelligence
production process through the analysis of HUMINT information and the
development of single-discipline HUMINT products.
DISSEMINATE INFORMATION
4-32. The 2X element at each level is normally the release authority for
HUMINT reporting and products, ensuring that reporting, products, and
data are disseminated to the lowest appropriate level. The G/S2X should
preplan criteria for the immediate release of combat information on high-
value targets, impending attacks, or other time-sensitive requirements. This
preplanning will ensure that commanders and other users quickly receive the
information in a format that supports situational understanding, strategic
responsiveness, and ISR and provides support to effects. Special effort is also
made to ensure that information obtained from detainees is passed back
down to the unit that detained them. This measure will support the efforts of
the commander as well as building trust in the intelligence process.
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
EVALUATE REPORTING
4-33. The HAT and the HOC provide the requirements manager and the
G2/S2 with expertise to support report evaluation. An important part of the
evaluation process is providing feedback to the collectors. Feedback is
important in HUMINT operations since the same source may be contacted
again for additional information. The collector needs feedback on the
accuracy, reliability, and appropriateness of the information reported. The
G/S2X team tracks reporting to determine how well the HUMINT collection
and production efforts are satisfying the PIRs. The G/S2X team supports the
RM team’s requirements to⎯
• Monitor and Maintain Synchronization. Through coordination
with the G2/S2, the G/S2X, and the HAT, the HOC knows when and
what critical pieces of information are missing from the commander's
estimate of the situation. The HOC uses the HUMINT portion of the
ISR plan to ensure synchronization with the overall operation and
scheme of maneuver. The other critical tool for the HOC is the decision
support template (DST). The HOC must have a complete copy of this
document, ensuring the HUMINT assets do not miss a collection
requirement.
• Correlate Reports to Requirements. The HOC tracks which
specific order or group of specific orders originates from which PIR to
ensure that the collected information was provided to the original
requester. This also allows the HOC to rapidly determine which asset
is available for retasking.
• Screen Reports. Each report received is screened for accuracy,
timeliness, and applicability to the original tasking or request. If the
HOC determines that it completely fulfills the tasking or request, the
HOC informs the G/S2X and G2/S2 so that the tasking or request can
be closed and the information provided to the original requesting unit.
• Provide Feedback to Collectors and Analysts. The HOC provides
feedback to all the HUMINT R&S assets. This is normally provided
through the C2 element of that unit. By doing so, the HOC quickly
reinforces if the reporting is answering the original order or request, or
the HOC can provide guidance if it is not. This feedback is essential.
The RM team may provide additional information on its collection or
analysis if the HOC tells the team exactly what is needed or has been
missed in the original report.
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Determine Constraints
4-41. This is a critical step in HUMINT mission analysis. HUMINT collection
operations are affected by applicable law and policy. Applicable law and
policy include US law; the law of war; relevant international law; relevant
directives including DOD Directive 3115.09, “DOD Intelligence
Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning”; DOD
Directive 2310.1E, “The Department of Defense Detainee Program”; DOD
instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOs. The degree of
restriction may depend on the type of operation being conducted. Constraints
are normally found in the scheme of maneuver, the concept of operations, and
coordinating instructions. Specific to intelligence interrogation operations, in
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
COLLECTION PRIORITY
4-45. During the MDMP, the MI commander advises his higher headquarters
on the most efficient use of the HUMINT collectors to meet collection
requirements. Depending on the particular higher echelon mission and the
capabilities of the specific personnel under his command, the supported S2
must decide whether to concentrate collection efforts on source, debriefing,
interrogation, tactical questioning, liaison, or DOCEX operations to answer
collection requirements. (See Chapter 5 for a description of these operations.)
The MI commander may be required by his operational tasking to support
any or all of these operations. He must decide how to task organize his assets
to meet these requirements. When faced with limited assets, prioritization of
collection is paramount.
4-46. A commander normally must prioritize HUMINT collections and
DOCEX. Although the decision is primarily dependent on which type of
source (human or document) is most likely to give the priority information,
other factors such as phase of operation, ROE, source availability, and
collection resource capabilities may influence his decision. At the tactical
level, both human sources and documents are screened and the senior
HUMINT soldier establishes the priorities. If documents and human sources
are determined to be equally likely of containing priority information, human
sources are normally exploited first due to—
• The ability of the HUMINT collector to get a human source to
elaborate and explain his information, which cannot be done with a
document.
• The rate at which people forget detailed information.
• The fact that an individual's resistance is easier to bypass immediately
after undergoing a significant traumatic experience (capture). Capture
thrusts them into an unfamiliar environment over which they have no
control and are vulnerable to various approach techniques. This initial
vulnerability passes quickly. An individual's established values begin
to assert themselves again within a day or two, and the individual's
willingness to cooperate might also decrease.
TASK ORGANIZATION
4-47. Because of the need to place HUMINT collectors in contact with the
local population and the need in many cases to integrate the HUMINT
collection process into other operations, the planning and analysis staff for
HUMINT missions is somewhat expanded from the norm. They should
include the C/J/G/S2X, SJA, S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, S6, other staff officers, as
necessary, Provost Marshal, MP, and US Army Criminal Investigation
Command, CA, unit HUMINT commanders, and senior HUMINT technicians
of the deploying unit. If the unit’s mission is to replace a currently deployed
HUMINT unit, a representative of that unit should be included.
4-48. The challenge to the MI commander is the proper training during
operations, task organization, placement, and coordination of movement of
HUMINT elements to meet collection requirements. The unit modified table
of organization and equipment (MTOE) organization, which is designed for
an MTW, may have to be modified to meet the specific requirements of
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
OPERATIONAL COORDINATION
4-56. HUMINT collection is not conducted in a vacuum. Coordination with
MI organizations and non-MI agencies, units, and staff organizations is often
critical to expedite and complete HUMINT collection operations. (See
Appendix C for predeployment planning.)
MI ORGANIZATIONS
4-57. Elements involved in HUMINT planning, execution, and analysis need
to maintain close coordination with their counterparts in the other
intelligence disciplines. Coordination includes but is not limited to the
disciplines shown below.
Imagery Intelligence:
• Support imagery analysis by using HUMINT sources to identify or
confirm the identification of items in imagery. This includes, for
example, using human sources to identify the functions of buildings
that have been tentatively identified through external imagery.
• Coordinate for current military or civilian imagery to use in the
questioning of sources.
• Cue requirements managers and others involved in imagery tasking on
locations or activities for imagery collection.
• Coordinate for IMINT information to verify information obtained
through HUMINT collection.
• Provide imagery for analysis (through still and video photography and
captured imagery).
• Coordinate for technical support as required when questioning
personnel on subjects related to imagery.
• Obtain imagery-related collection requirements that can be answered
by human sources.
Signals Intelligence:
• Support signals analysis by using HUMINT sources to identify or
confirm the information obtained through SIGINT collection.
• Coordinate for current SIGINT information to use in the questioning of
sources.
• Cue requirements managers and others involved in SIGINT tasking on
locations or activities (including communications types and
frequencies) for SIGINT collection.
• Coordinate for information to verify information obtained through
HUMINT collection.
• Provide SIGINT-related CEDs for SIGINT analysis.
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
Technical Intelligence:
• Support TECHINT analysis by using HUMINT sources and documents
to provide information concerning threat equipment and to support
TECHINT materiel analysis. This includes, for example, the
interrogation or debriefing of equipment operators of the translation of
operators manuals for a piece of equipment being investigated.
• Coordinate for current information on equipment capabilities to use in
the questioning of sources.
• Cue requirements managers and others involved in TECHINT tasking
on locations or activities for TECHINT collection. This includes
forwarding the identification and location of equipment of TECHINT
interest obtained during HUMINT collection operations.
• Coordinate for TECHINT information to verify information obtained
through HUMINT collection.
• Provide information from CEDs in support of TECHINT.
• Coordinate for technical support as required when questioning
personnel on subjects related to areas of TECHINT interest.
• Obtain TECHINT-related collection requirements that can be
answered by human sources.
Counterintelligence:
• Support CI analysis by using HUMINT sources to provide information
concerning adversary intelligence collection capabilities and
operations.
• Identify human and document sources that have information of CI
interest.
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Open-Source Intelligence:
• Support open-source intelligence (OSINT).
• Provide open source maps, charts, phone directories, business
directories, newspapers, video and audio media (including tapes and
compact discs) to the appropriate J/G/S2X and Intelligence Community
agencies and liaison officers.
OTHER ORGANIZATIONS
4-58. In addition to MI units, HUMINT collection organizations frequently
conduct coordination with other military organizations.
• Military Police Units: Close coordination between HUMINT
collectors and MPs is mutually beneficial. The MPs are responsible for
maneuver and mobility support, area security, internment and
resettlement, law and order, and police intelligence operations. Both
activities (HUMINT collection and MP operations) require close
contact with the local civilian, refugee, and detainee populations.
HUMINT collection at checkpoints and at EPW and other detainee
collection points must be coordinated with the MPs, who are normally
responsible for internment and resettlement operations. In return, the
HUMINT collectors, because of their screening and questioning of
these population groups, can help facilitate the MP’s population control
missions by providing information about the population’s activities and
intentions that may be of MP concern. At EPW/detainee collection
points, HUMINT collectors should arrange with the MP leadership to
be allowed to debrief MPs since MPs are in regular contact with the
detainees. This does not constitute tasking. Information collected in
this manner may provide valuable insight, which can aid the collector
in formulating approach strategies. MPs should be debriefed in such a
way so as not to interfere with their mission. Liaison with the MP
chain of command is vital to gain their support and assure them that
HUMINT collection will not interfere with MP operations. Joint patrols
containing MPs and HUMINT collectors can also be mutually
beneficial in many situations.
• Criminal Investigation Division (CID) and Provost Marshal
Office (PMO): The goals of HUMINT collection and those of the MPs
(particularly CID) are different. CID and PMO are concerned with
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
STAFF COORDINATION
4-59. Successful HUMINT collection operations require support from the
staff elements of the supported unit. These elements are collectively
responsible for the planning that results in HUMINT tasking. Below is a
partial list of the staff responsibilities that affect HUMINT collection:
• G1/S1 HUMINT-related responsibilities include but are not limited
to—
• Supervising the medical support furnished to EPW/detainees.
• Maintaining a list (by language and proficiency) of qualified
linguists within their command.
• Coordinating with the G4 or G5 for procurement and payment of
other interpreters and translators needed to perform intelligence
and non-intelligence duties.
• Ensuring the echelon's OPLAN contains complete provisions for
handling and evacuating detainees, refugees, DPs, and local civilians
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
as required. This plan must satisfy the interests of all other staff
officers and provide for—
− Ensuring humane treatment of all personnel.
− Promptly evacuating personnel from the combat zone.
− Integrating procedures for the evacuation, control, and
administration of personnel with other combat service (CS) and
CSS operations.
− Ensuring delivery of mail to EPWs and other detainees.
− Maintaining detainee (including EPW) statistics.
− Providing administration and control of detainee currency and
pay records, including coordinating with appropriate intelligence
authorities about investigating large sums of money.
• G2/S2 is responsible for developing intelligence in support of unit
operations. The G2/S2 at division and higher and in the interim BCT is
supported by a G/S2X and normally a HAT in the performance of his
HUMINT-related functions. His HUMINT-related responsibilities
include but are not limited to––
• Obtaining intelligence through intelligence reach to support
HUMINT collection.
• Incorporating HUMINT into the ISR plan.
• Developing the HUMINT annex to the OPORD and OPLAN.
• Coordinating to provide technical support for all HUMINT collection
operations.
• Ensuring deconfliction and synchronization for all HUMINT
collection assets within the unit’s AO. A particular effort must be
made to coordinate with all DOD military source operations (MSO),
and DOD and other government agencies (OGAs) that may be
operating in the AO; with the theater J2X, as part of deconfliction.
Failure to deconflict with DOD MSO and OGAs may result in
compromise of assets and interruption of collection operations and
potentially unintended casualties.
− Obtaining documents and materials of intelligence interest,
including visual and audio media and electronic equipment
(such as computers, phones, PDAs) taken from detainees, or
seized or loaned, in coordination with the Provost Marshal and
other elements.
− Recording, evaluating, and analyzing collected information and
providing feedback to HUMINT collectors.
− Ensuring adequate HUMINT collection and reporting nets and
systems are available.
− Coordinating with the G3 to ensure plans for HUMINT collection
operations are included in unit OPLANs.
− Coordinating with the G3 to ensure that HUMINT collectors are
included in unit training plans, rehearsals, and briefbacks.
− Drafting instructions for handling, evacuating, and exploiting
captured enemy personnel and CEDs. (They coordinate with the
G3 to ensure draft instructions are included in the command
standing operating procedures (SOPs), OPLANs, and OPORDs.)
− Projecting capture rates as well as refugee and DP rates.
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
ADDITIONAL SUPPORT
4-60. In addition to the major staff elements, a HUMINT collection element
requires support from several other elements in order to conduct operations.
These elements are discussed below.
• The US Army Criminal Investigation Command is the organization
with primary responsibility for investigating allegations of criminal
acts or reportable incidents committed by or against detainees.
• The SJA can provide legal support and advice on the interpretation
and application of applicable law and policy. Applicable law and policy
include US law; the law of war; relevant international law; relevant
directives including DOD Directive 3115.09, “DOD Intelligence
Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning”; DOD
Directive 2310.E, “The Department of Defense Detainee Program”;
DOD instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOS. The
SJA is also a channel for reporting known or suspected reportable
incidents of abuse or inhumane treatment.
• The Inspector General is a channel for reporting known or suspected
reportable incidents of abuse or inhumane treatment.
• The PMO is the channel for reporting criminal activity other than
reportable incidents, but also can be used for reporting known or
suspected reportable incidents.
• The Chaplain can also receive reports of reportable incidents.
• The G7 provides information on Information Operations and conducts
liaison with PSYOP, the Electronic Warfare Officer, the Military
Deception Officer, and Operations Security personnel.
FM 2-22.3
PART TWO
Chapter 5
HUMINT Collection
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
ONE-TIME CONTACT
5-7. The one-time contact is a source of information of value that was, and
will be, encountered only once. In all operational environments the HUMINT
collector will frequently encounter a source only once, particularly at lower
echelons. This may be a local civilian encountered during a patrol, a detainee
who is quickly questioned and then evacuated, or a refugee at a checkpoint.
5-8. In addition to the information obtained from a one-time contact, the
HUMINT collector must make a reasonable effort to obtain as much basic
data as possible about the one-time contact. Complete name, occupation,
address, and other basic data of this source are crucial for a thorough
analysis of the information provided. The one-time contact and the
information he provides cannot be assessed and evaluated independently;
however, the information provided by a one-time contact must be reported
and corroborated through other HUMINT sources and even other intelligence
disciplines.
5-9. Contact reports must be filed with the OMT and source registries
maintained in accordance with FM 34-5 (S//NF), AR 381-100 (S//NF), and
DIAM 58-11 (S//NF) in order to support analysis of information obtained. If a
one-time contact is encountered for a second time and again provides
information of value, then the contact may be thereafter treated as a
continuous contact.
5-10. A walk-in is a one-time contact who volunteers information of value to
US forces on his own initiative. The walk-in source may volunteer
information by approaching an HCT, other ISR elements, or US forces or
civilian personnel anywhere in the AO. Each unit must have in place a
program to identify, safeguard, and direct the walk-in to the appropriate
collection asset, to be screened and debriefed as required. For example, a
walk-in who wanted to report a crime would be directed to the PMO rather
than to a HUMINT collector.
5-11. The collection asset will screen the walk-in to determine the type of
information the source has and to determine and evaluate the reliability of
the individual. After identifying the type of information, the collector
determines if he has the jurisdiction to collect that information. If, for
example, the walk-in wishes to report a crime, the collector refers that
individual to the proper criminal investigative agency.
5-12. Systematic questioning, deception detection techniques, and cross
checking of information are used extensively in the evaluation process.
Concurrently, there are national level directives, DOD directives, and Army
regulations that direct specific actions to be taken with a walk-in. When
dealing with a walk-in source, HUMINT collectors must guard against
adversary intelligence collection. They must also protect legitimate sources of
information. The walk-in is thoroughly debriefed on all areas of information
relevant to collection requirements, and any information of value is reported.
5-13. On occasion, the HUMINT collector may determine that a one-time
contact has the potential to become a continuous contact or a formal contact.
This is referred to as a developmental lead. A developmental lead is an
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
CONTINUOUS CONTACTS
5-16. Continuous contacts are individuals who have been identified as
having more information than could be obtained through a one-time contact,
and have been met again by HUMINT collection personnel for the purpose of
collecting additional information. HUMINT collectors do not task continuous
contacts, but they can be sensitized in the same way as one-time contacts.
Continuous contacts provide their knowledge through informal debriefings
and elicitation.
5-17. All contacts who are seen more than once by HUMINT collectors must
be tracked by registering them in the Source Registry and reporting the
contacts to the OMT. As an example, a one-time contact who reported
information to a HCT contacts them again with follow-up information. That
person will now be registered as a continuous contact and tracked by the
OMT. This registration process helps to prevent the same information from
being collected by multiple collectors from the same contact without realizing
it. See AR 381-172 (S//NF) and FM 34-5 (S//NF) for further information on
source registration and for the required forms. Types of continuous contacts
are discussed below.
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
US Forces
5-22. US forces have many opportunities to interact with the local population
in the normal course of their duties in operations. This source perhaps is the
most under-utilized HUMINT collection resource. Some US forces, such as
combat and reconnaissance patrols, are routinely tasked and debriefed by the
appropriate level G2/S2. Others, such as medical teams or engineers who
have extensive contact with the local population, should also be debriefed.
5-23. Commanders and staff members who serve as liaison with the local
population and local government officials can be fruitful sources of
information. CA, PSYOP, MP, and other elements also have legitimate
reasons to conduct liaison with local authorities and should be debriefed as
appropriate. The friendly force debriefing effort can succeed only with
command emphasis.
5-24. HUMINT collection elements need to coordinate with local units to
identify those individuals who would be most profitable to debrief and to
further coordinate with them for time to conduct the debriefing. Although the
S2 and S3 can and should task their soldiers to conduct collection tasks
during the course of their normal duties, HUMINT collectors must ensure
that their friendly force debriefing effort does not interfere with the primary
mission accomplishment of the soldiers being debriefed. HCTs should ensure
that the necessary staff S2s and S3s are aware of the HUMINT collection
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
requirements and request that the staffs incorporate these into their
respective collection taskings. The results of debriefings by units should also
be disseminated to the HCTs for source development, collection targeting,
and analysis.
Official Liaison
5-25. Liaison with local military, government, or civilian agency officials
provides an opportunity to collect information required by the commander.
The HUMINT collector meets with these officials to conduct liaison,
coordinate certain operations, collect information, and obtain leads to
potential sources of information. Elicitation is the primary technique used
with liaison contacts, although in many cases there is a more formal
exchange of information. Information obtained by these elements through
liaison normally tends to reflect the official positions of their superiors and
may not be entirely accurate or complete.
Detainees
5-26. A detainee is any person captured or otherwise detained by an armed
force. An EPW is a detainee who meets the criteria of Articles 4 and 5 of the
GPW. (See Appendix A.) Detainees may be interrogated. They are frequently
excellent sources of information but in many instances the access of the
HUMINT collector to the detainees may be curtailed.
5-27. For example, when supporting a counterinsurgency, the supported
government may consider all captured insurgents to be criminals and not
allow US forces access to them. In these instances, US HUMINT collectors
should attempt to sit in during local questioning; they could submit questions
or, at a minimum, coordinate to receive the reports from local authority
questioning. US HUMINT collectors must remember that regardless of the
legal status of the detainees they must be treated in a manner consistent
with the Geneva Conventions. (See Appendix A.)
FORMAL CONTACT
5-28. Formal contacts are individuals who have agreed to meet and cooperate
with HUMINT collectors for the purpose of providing information. HUMINT
collectors who have met with a particular continuous contact three or more
times should consider assessing him for use as a formal contact. Formal
contacts meet repeatedly with HUMINT collectors, and their operation and
tasking must be carried out in accordance with AR 381-172 (S//NF),
DIAM 58-11 (S//NF), and DIAM 58-12 (S//NF).
5-29. Formal contacts are generally local nationals or third-country national
employees. Knowledge of their meeting with HUMINT collectors is restricted.
This can be accomplished by either disguising the fact that the HUMINT
collection personnel are indeed HUMINT personnel, or by concealing the
purpose of overt meetings with HUMINT personnel. HCTs take
extraordinary measures to protect their relationship with these contacts.
Depending on METT-TC factors, meetings with formal contacts may range
from overt meetings, which are conducted discreetly in order to protect the
DEBRIEFING OPERATIONS
5-30. Debriefing operations refer to the systematic questioning of individuals
not in the custody of the US, to procure information to answer collection
tasks by direct and indirect questioning techniques. The primary categories
of sources for debriefings are friendly forces and civilians including refugees,
DPs, and local inhabitants.
5-31. Debriefing operations are those operations directed towards collecting
information from a segment of the target population using primarily
debriefing techniques. These debriefing operations are separate from the
G2/S2 debriefing program to debrief personnel returning from missions.
Debriefing operations often include the debriefing of personnel who may not
usually be debriefed as part of their assigned duties.
5-32. Normally Army debriefing operations will be directly related to
collection tasks at the operational and tactical levels. Strategic debriefing of
high-level personnel in response to theater and national level requirements
is often under the purview of the DIA/DH. Army HUMINT collectors
frequently participate in this type of collection, which is under the control,
rules, regulations, and operational guidance of DH.
Biographic Intelligence
Economic Intelligence
Sociological Intelligence
Transportation and Telecommunications Intelligence
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
LIAISON OPERATIONS
5-46. Liaison is conducted to obtain information and assistance, to coordinate
or procure material, and to develop views necessary to understand
counterparts. Liaison contacts are normally members of the government,
military, law enforcement, or other member of the local or coalition
infrastructure. The basic tenet of liaison is quid pro quo. An exchange of
information, services, material, or other assistance is usually a part of the
transaction. The nature of this exchange varies widely depending upon the
culture, location, and personalities involved.
5-47. Because the nature of liaison tasks varies widely, the general goals of
the liaison operation and the objective of each liaison contact should be
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
INTERROGATION OPERATIONS
5-50. HUMINT interrogation is the systematic process of using approved
interrogation approaches to question a captured or detained person to obtain
reliable information to satisfy intelligence requirements, consistent with
applicable law and policy. Applicable law and policy include US law; the law
of war; relevant international law; relevant directives including DOD
Directive 3115.09, “DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings,
and Tactical Questioning”; DOD Directive 2310.1E, “The Department of
Defense Detainee Program”; DOD instructions; and military execute orders
including FRAGOs. Interrogation is to be conducted by personnel trained
and certified to use legal, approved methods of convincing EPWs/detainees to
give their cooperation. Interrogation sources are detainees, including EPWs.
5-51. Definitions of EPWs and rules for their treatment are contained in the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW).
The definition and rules for the treatment of civilians are contained in the
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
NON-DOD AGENCIES
5-55. Non-DOD agencies may on occasion request permission to conduct
interrogations in Army facilities. These requests must be approved by the
JTF commander or, if there is no JTF commander, the theater commander or
appropriate higher level official. The interrogation activity commander will
assign a trained and certified interrogator to escort non-DOD interrogators to
observe their interrogation operations. The non-DOD personnel will sign for
any detainee they want to question from the MPs, following the same
established procedures that DOD personnel must follow. In all instances,
interrogations or debriefings conducted by non-DOD agencies will be
observed by DOD personnel. In all instances, non-DOD agencies must
observe the same standards for the conduct of interrogation operations and
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
5-59. The standard MP security and internment functions are the only
involvement the MPs have in the interrogation process. MPs will not take
any actions to set conditions for interrogations (for example, “softening up” a
detainee). For purposes of interrogation, military working dogs will not be
used.
5-60. MPs may support interrogators as requested for detainee custody,
control, escort, and/or additional security (for example, for combative
detainees). When interrogators promise an incentive to a detainee, the
interrogators must coordinate with the MPs to ensure that the detainee
receives the incentive and is allowed to retain it. MPs may provide
incentives in support of interrogation operations under the following
conditions:
• Using incentives is coordinated with and approved by the MP facility
commander.
• Providing and withdrawing incentives does not affect the baseline
standards of humane treatment. This means that MPs can provide
incentives such as special food items. However, when the incentive is
withdrawn, the MPs still must provide the normal rations.
• Using incentives does not violate detainee custody and control or
facility security. This means that if a HUMINT collector requests MPs
to provide an incentive (for instance, specialty food) but the detainee
has been spitting on the guards, then MPs would not provide the
incentive because it might reinforce inappropriate behavior.
5-61. MPs exercise the overall responsibility for the safety of detainees, even
in those cases in which detainees are in the temporary custody of HUMINT
collectors or other agency personnel for the purpose of interrogation.
HUMINT collectors should arrange with the MP supervisor to debrief MP
guards. Guards who observe and interact with detainees can report the
detainees’ disposition, activities, mood, and other observable characteristics.
5-62. HUMINT collectors conduct interrogations for intelligence information.
They normally work within the confines of the detainee detention facility, but
have no involvement in the mission of the security of detainees. MPs follow a
strict protocol concerning access to detainees. Accompanied and
unaccompanied access to detainees must be coordinated and approved in
advance by the MP commander responsible for the detainees or that
commander’s designated representative.
5-63. When HUMINT collectors coordinate for a detainee interrogation in an
internment facility, the MPs escort the detainee to the interrogation site,
which is collocated with, or located within the internment facility. MPs verify
that the HUMINT collector is authorized access to the detainee. Depending
on security concerns, the HUMINT collector may request that the MP
remain, or he may request the MP depart until the detainee needs to be
returned to the living area. If the MP remains, his functions are to maintain
the security, accountability, and safety of the detainee and the safety of the
interrogator, interpreter, and others in the interrogation site. The MP will
perform no role in the interrogation. When conducting interrogations in a
holding area such as a detainee collection point (DCP), MPs may not be
available to provide security for interrogation operations. In that case, the
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
HUMINT collector will need to arrange for security from the unit that has
established the holding area.
5-64. If the MP departs the immediate area where the detainee is being
questioned (for example, asked to wait outside the interrogation room), the
HUMINT collector will assume custody and responsibility for the detainee by
signing for the detainee, noting the detainee’s physical condition.
5-65. SOPs should be written to comply with a requirement that
interrogation operations will always be under observation, whether
conducted in fixed sites, holding areas, or in the field. Physical setup and
logistical availability will dictate whether observation is conducted directly,
from a concealed location, or by video monitoring. HUMINT collectors should
never be alone with a detainee without being under observation.
5-66. Once a HUMINT collector has assumed custody of a detainee, he will
not turn the detainee over to anyone other than an MP. Specifically, he will
not allow another government agency to assume custody from him. The
HUMINT collector will instead return the detainee to the custody of the MP,
and the agency seeking custody of the detainee will then be required to do so
from the MP. Likewise, HUMINT collectors will not assume custody of a
detainee directly from another government agency, but will require them to
return the detainee directly to the custody of the MP.
“Prisoners of war do not belong to the power for which they have fought; they are all under the
safeguard of honor and generosity of the nation that has disarmed them.”
▬Napoleon, The Military Maxims of Napoleon
1927, ed. Burnod
• Maneuver and Mobility Support Operations • Screen and question detainees at TCPs and
• Area Security checkpoints
• Internment and Resettlement Operations • Question contacts, local civilians, refugees,
• Law and Order Operations
Operations and EPWs
• Police Intelligence Operations
Operations • Conduct liaison with military and civilian
•• Ensure detainee abuse is avoided and agencies
reported • Report information obtained
•• Ensure detainee abuse is avoided and
reported
• Support DOCEX
DETENTION FACILITY
MP Functions HUMINT Functions
5-69. The Geneva Conventions establish specific standards for humane care
and treatment of enemy personnel captured, retained, or detained by US
military forces and its allies. All persons who have knowledge of suspected or
alleged violations of the Geneva Conventions are obligated by regulation to
report such matters through command channels or to designated individuals,
such as the SJA or IG. For example, HUMINT collectors who are working
with others must ensure that no incidents of detainee abuse occur, whether
committed by a fellow HUMINT collector, an interpreter, HN or coalition
personnel, MP, representative of another government agency, or anyone else.
5-70. Failure to report a suspected or alleged violation of the law of war may
subject the service member to disciplinary actions. Violations of the Geneva
Conventions committed by US personnel may constitute violations of the
UCMJ. The commander is responsible for ensuring that the forces under his
command comply with the Geneva Conventions. If violations occur in the
conduct of warfare, the commander bears primary responsibility for
investigating and taking appropriate action with respect to the violators.
5-71. Every soldier has the duty to report serious incidents, whether
observed or suspected, in accordance with AR 190-40. Such incidents are
reported to the chain of command. If the chain of command itself is
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
implicated, the soldier can report the incident to the SJA, IG, chaplain, or
provost marshal.
5-72. There are reasons for reporting serious incidents beyond those related
to legal requirements. For instance, the publishing of enemy war crimes can
be used to influence public opinion against the enemy. Also, reporting war
crimes of other countries provides important information that may become
relevant, since we would not be able to transfer detainees to any power that
we could not rely on to treat them appropriately under the law of war,
including the Geneva Conventions.
5-73. Several articles of the GPW apply to HUMINT collectors and
interrogation operations. Excerpts from some of the most relevant articles of
the Geneva Conventions are listed below. Although the following excerpts are
specific to EPWs, service members must treat all detainees captured during
armed conflict consistent with the provisions of the GPW unless a
determination to the contrary is made. Moreover, US policy requires that US
forces apply the principles of the Geneva Conventions, during military
operations. (See Appendix A.)
• Article 5 - Should any doubt arise as to whether persons having
committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the
enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such
persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such
time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.
• Article 13 - PWs must at all times be treated humanely. Any unlawful
act or omission by the Detaining Power causing death or seriously
endangering the health of a PW in its custody is prohibited. Likewise,
PWs must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of
violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity.
• Article 14 - PWs are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their
persons and honor. Women shall be treated with all regard due to their
sex, and shall in all cases benefit by treatment as favorable as that
granted to men.
• Article 15 - The Power detaining PWs shall be bound to provide, free of
charge, for their maintenance and medical attention required by their
state of health.
• Article 17 - This article covers several requirements with direct impact
on interrogation.
• Every PW, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his
surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental,
personal or serial number, or failing this, equivalent information. If
he willfully infringes this rule, he may render himself liable to a
restriction of the privileges (emphasis added) accorded to his rank or
status.
• For example, this does not mean if a prisoner fails to give this
information he loses status as a prisoner, only special privileges. An
example might be an officer who fails to identify himself as such. An
officer cannot be compelled to work (Article 49). An officer who fails
to identify himself as such could lose this privilege.
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
5-78. Security internees are detainees who are not combatants but who pose
a security threat, may be under investigation, or who pose a threat to US
forces if released. HUMINT collectors are required to treat all detainees
humanely. EPWs are entitled to additional protections guaranteed by the
GPW that security internees may not be eligible for. For example, allowing a
security internee to communicate with a family member (a right that an
EPW has under the Geneva Conventions) could allow him to pass
information that would compromise a sensitive investigation and endanger
the lives of soldiers and civilians. HUMINT collectors should consult with
their SJA for clarification of detainees’ status and rights.
5-79. HUMINT collectors are employed below brigade level when the combat
situation requires limited tactical interrogation at battalion or lower.
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
Security
5-88. When dealing with detainees, the HUMINT collector faces two security
considerations: his own physical security and information security.
Particularly when operating in support of tactical operations, the HUMINT
collector is in close contact with enemy soldiers who could attempt to escape
and may attack the HUMINT collector in doing so. Detainees during a
stability and reconstruction operation are often people committed to a cause
who find themselves in desperate circumstances. Although the detainees are
normally under guard, the HUMINT collector must always be alert to any
physical threat posed by these individuals. He must also ensure that his own
actions do not provide the detainee with the means with which to harm the
collector or anyone else.
5-89. The HUMINT collector should also be aware that EPWs and other
detainees may attempt to elicit information. Since HUMINT collectors, by
virtue of their position, may possess a great deal of classified information,
they must be careful not to reveal it unwittingly in the process of questioning
a detainee.
Capture Rates
5-90. Anticipating not only overall capture rates but also capture rates
linked to specific operations is vital to the correct placement of HUMINT
collectors supporting interrogation operations. Defensive and stability and
reconstructions operations normally provide a small but steady flow of
detainees while successful offensive operations can overwhelm HCTs. To be
successful, HUMINT collection support to tactical operations must be
carefully planned and prioritized. Available HUMINT collection assets must
be balanced against the operations objective, enemy situation estimate, and
projected EPW capture rates. The unit S2 is responsible for projecting
capture rates.
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
Headquarters Element
5-104. The activity headquarters provides all command, administrative,
logistic, and maintenance support to the JIDC. It coordinates with—
• Higher headquarters for personnel, intelligence, and operational and
logistical support prior to and after deployment.
• Theater J2 for reporting procedures, operational situation updates,
theater and national level intelligence requirements, and collection
priorities.
• Provost marshal for location of theater detainee internment facilities
and for procedures to be followed by HUMINT collectors and MPs for
the processing, interrogating, and internment of EPWs.
• Commanders of theater medical support units and internment facility
for procedures to treat, and clear for questioning, wounded EPWs.
• Commanders of supporting CI and TECHINT assets to establish
support requirements and procedures.
• The servicing SJA.
• Magistrate for Article 78 issues.
• Commanders of Air Force, Marine, Navy, and national level
organizations to arrange administrative and logistic interoperability.
Operations Element
5-105. The operations element controls the daily activities within the JIDC.
The JIDC operations element—
• Ensures that work areas are available for all JIDC elements.
• Establishes and maintains JIDC functional files, logs, and journals.
• Makes detainee files available to detainee release boards to assist the
board members in their determinations.
• Establishes interrogation priorities.
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Analytical Element
5-106. The analytical element normally is directly subordinate to the
operations element. The JIDC analytical element ensures that collection
requirements are current and validated. It reviews reports to ensure that the
information reported is in response to validated collection requirements. In
addition, they ensure an up-to-date common operational picture (COP) by
maintaining digital mapping of the current tactical situation and with OB
updates to help HUMINT collectors maintain their situational awareness. At
locations where digital mapping is not possible, paper situation maps
(SITMAPs) are maintained. This element also––
• Obtains, updates, and maintains the database.
• Works with interrogators to provide collection focus for interrogations.
• Establishes and maintains OB workbooks and files including data
generated by intelligence information which has not been verified.
• Maintains digital or paper SITMAPs, as available, displaying enemy
and friendly situations.
• Catalogs, cross-references, and disseminates collection requirements to
JIDC collection elements.
• Reviews interrogation reports for inclusion into the database.
• Conducts situation briefings when required.
• Conducts intelligence reach with the J2 analytical cell and other
analytical elements, such as INSCOM Information Dominance Center,
for relevant information and analysis.
Editorial Element
5-107. The editorial element is normally directly subordinate to the
operations element. It reviews all outgoing reports for format, content, and
completeness.
DOCEX Element
5-108. At a minimum, the JIDC will contain a small DOCEX element to
translate, screen, and extract information from and report on information of
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
Screening Element
5-109. The JIDC normally has a separate screening element to receive and
screen all incoming detainees and their personal effects. The screening
element will review previous screening reports, which should have been sent
along with the detainees; recommend priorities for interrogation; identify
individuals of interest to other agencies; and may conduct limited
interrogations for PIR information. The exact size of the element will vary
based on detainee capture rates and detainee flow. Interrogation elements
should use their most experienced interrogators as screeners in order to
quickly and effectively select the detainees for interrogation who are most
likely to possess useful information.
Interrogation Element
5-110. The interrogation element assigns HUMINT collectors to specific
detainees, uses interrogation and other HUMINT collection methods to
obtain information in response to intelligence requirements, and produces
intelligence reports (IIRs and SALUTE reports) as well as source-related
operational reports. The interrogation element may also debrief returning US
POWs and other personnel as deemed relevant.
FM 2-22.3
PART THREE
Chapter 6
Screening
6-1. Available human sources and documents almost always exceed the
qualified HUMINT collection assets and resources that can be applied
against them. Screening facilitates the efficient application of these limited
assets and resources to maximize the collection of relevant information.
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
SCREENING OPERATIONS
6-7. Like all intelligence operations, human source screening operations are
focused on certain targets. Although the exact target population group will
depend on the requirements of the theater of operations, the target focus of
source screening operations is best described as the permanent and
transitory population in the AO. This definition includes local indigenous
populations, refugees, and travelers in the area, and detainees (including
EPWs). Specifically excluded from this definition are members of the HN
forces (military and paramilitary), members of allied forces, and members of
HN government agencies who are available to US forces through liaison
operations. Other personnel not indigenous to the AO (such as legitimate
NGOs, humanitarian organizations, UN personnel) are available to US forces
for voluntary debriefing and should be excluded from screening operations.
6-8. Screening operations may be conducted in a variety of situations and are
dependent on the operational situation and the population. Although every
source screening operation has the same basic purpose, each can be directed
against different segments of the population in different locations throughout
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
mission, PIR and IR, and supporting information (JUMPS). If time allows,
the HUMINT collector may collect additional information, such as the
source’s name, to start a formal source file to preclude duplication at higher
echelons. S2s and personnel other than HUMINT collectors should not
attempt an approach at this stage.
6-11. HUMINT collectors will only use approach techniques as time and
circumstance allow. The prime requirement is to identify the individuals
with information of immediate tactical value, to collect that information
expediently, and to evacuate the source. In this case, tactical questioning is
normally integrated seamlessly into the screening process. This initial
screening can also be used to identify individuals for immediate evacuation
to a higher echelon facility for detailed questioning. Any screening reports or
information reports generated at this level must accompany the EPWs or
detainees as they are evacuated. Typically, battlefield screening reports, such
as the screening sheet shown in Figure 6-1, will be done on paper in order to
allow multiple screeners to work simultaneously. If automation support is
available for each screener, an electronic version of the screening report is
used, or the “KB Easy” (Figure 10-2), which allows the screener to easily
put screening information into a DIA report format and transmit it
electronically. (See Chapter 10 for a KB-EZ worksheet.)
6-12. US forces capturing enemy forces or detaining civilians on the
battlefield search each individual for weapons, documents, or other material
of intelligence interest. Each individual receives a Capture Tag which records
basic biographic data such as name, rank, serial number, unit of assignment
(military), location of capture, and any special circumstances concerning the
capture. (See Appendices E and F.) Each document or item removed from the
captive is also “bagged and tagged” to identify from whom it was taken. This
initial step is vital, as properly processing captives and their equipment
greatly simplifies the screening process. All documents associated with the
source and any possessions taken from him must be evacuated with the
source, but not on his person. This is to ensure that the next echelon of
screeners and interrogators will have the ability to exploit these items for
intelligence value, or to support determination of approach strategies.
MP ISN NUMB
NUMBER: EV
EVAACUATION D
DAATE:
LNAME(E(P)
P)
P):: ___
____
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__
_______
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__
_______ C DAT
DATE: __
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A __
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P LNAME(E(M
M ): ___
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_______ P TIM
TIME:
E FN
FNAAME: __
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______ T PL
PLAACE: __
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R MNAME: ____
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______ U CAP
CAP UNIT: __
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S R
SVC/ID
SVC/ID NO
NO:: ___
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_______ CIRC
CIRCUM
UMST
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STAANCES: __
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O E
N DOB: __
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A LANG
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UAGES: __ ____
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______ D DOCUM
DOCUM
CUMENENTS: __
ENT ____
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M ARITA
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M = Mili
Milit
litary C = Civilian __
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***
*** ST ATUS:
P = Par
Para
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BRA
BRANCH: AF AR CG MC NY __ ____ PHYS
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N: SEX: M F
RANK: _____
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NDED: Y N ________ ____
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M
I FULL UNIT DS DSG:
G: __
___
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_ REM ARRKS:
KS: ____
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L ____
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I DUTY
DUTY PPSN: _______________ ___
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T E MEN
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ION:
N:
A JOB:
JOB: ____
______
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S EDUCA
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ION
N = __
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STATION: __________
______
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_______ S
Y INTE
INTELLIGENCE: AVG+ AVG AVG-
SKILLS
ILLS:: __
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___ M
E MENTAL STATE:__ ____
__
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EXPERIENC
EXPERIENCE NCE: ___________ ___
______ __
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JOB:
JOB: ____
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___ SCREE
CREENER:
ER: ____
______
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C D DATE:___
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__TTIME:___________
I ORG: ________ ___________
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A COOPER
COOPERA
OPERATION:
ION: 1(H
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V DUTIES:
DUTIES: __ ____
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KNOWLEDGE: A(High High)
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L BG
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ST:: Y N BGW CODE: DE:_____
I SKILLS
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______________ SOURCE
SOURCE CACATEGORY RY:: A B C D
N APP
APPROACH: _______
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_______
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SPEC
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REQUIREM
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ENT COD
CODES:
ES:_
______________________________
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I ____
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S
R
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_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Internment/Resettlement Operations
ACTIVITIES
The MPs assist MI screeners by identifying captives who may have answers that
support PIR and IR. Because MPs are in constant contact with captives, they see how
certain captives respond to orders and see the types of requests they make. The MPs
ensure that searches requested by MI personnel are conducted out of sight of other
captives and that guards conduct same-gender searches.
LOCATION
• The site is located where screeners can observe captives as they are segregated
and processed. It is shielded from the direct view of captives and is far enough
away that captives cannot overhear screeners’ conversations.
• The site has an operation, administrative, and interrogation area. The
interrogation area accommodates an interrogator, a captive, a guard, and an
interpreter as well as furniture. Lights are available for night operations.
• Procedures are implemented to verify that sick and wounded captives have
been treated and released by authorized medical personnel.
• Guards are available and procedures are implemented for escorting captives to
the interrogation site.
• Procedures are published to inform screeners who will be moved and when
they will be moved.
• Accountability procedures are implemented and required forms are available.
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
SCREENING PROCESS
6-24. At the internment facility, the screening process normally is distinct
from the questioning (interrogation or debriefing) process. Dependent on the
criticality of the information identified, the source may be questioned
immediately for relevant information but will more likely be identified for
future questioning. The screening is a more formal process in which the
screener attempts to obtain basic biographic data, areas of general
knowledge, source cooperation, and vulnerability to select approach
techniques in addition to identifying knowledge of critical intelligence tasks.
Once the screener has established the basics (source identification,
cooperation, and knowledge), he normally passes the source on to the
personnel that conduct the questioning. The screener will complete a
screening report that will be forwarded in accordance with unit SOPs (see
Chapter 10). If a detainee’s knowledge is of Joint Forces interest, a
knowledgeability brief (KB) should be written and submitted electronically.
(A short form KB worksheet is shown at Figure 10-2.) Complete guidance on
KBs is contained in DIAM 58-12 (S//NF).
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
6-25. If the source freely discusses information of PIR value, the screener
normally exploits the information fully and completes a SALUTE report. (See
Appendices H and I.) If the source’s knowledge of PIR information is
extensive and he is freely giving the information, the senior screener and the
OIC or noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) of the interrogation or
debriefing element are notified immediately. They decide if the screener
should continue questioning the source or if the source should be handed off
to another HUMINT collector. If source-associated documents contain PIR
information, the collector will exploit them as fully as possible and write a
SALUTE report. (See Appendix H.)
6-26. The source normally is assigned a standard screening code. The
screening code is an alphanumeric designation that reflects the level of
cooperation expected from the source and the level of knowledgeability the
source may possess. Table 6-1 shows the codes for assessing sources. Those
sources assigned to the same category are interrogated in any order deemed
appropriate by the interrogation or debriefing element.
Table 6-1. Source Screening Codes.
CO
CODE
DE COOP
OOPERERAATION LEVEEVEL L
1 Respo
sponds
nds to dire
direct ques
questions.
2 Responds
sponds hes
hesitant
tantly to quest
questiioning.
3 Does not re
resp
spond
ond to questioning
questioning..
6-27. Figure 6-3 shows the order in which detainees in the assessed
screening categories should be interrogated. Category 1-A sources normally
should be the first priority to be questioned. Category 1-B and 2-A would be
Priority II. Category 1-C, 2-B and 3-A would be next as Priority III sources,
with 2-C, and 3-B being in the fourth group to be interrogated. Category 3-C
sources are normally not questioned. This order ensures the highest
probability of obtaining the greatest amount of relevant information within
the available time. Screening codes may change with the echelon. The higher
the echelon, the more time is available to conduct an approach. Appendix B
discusses the reliability ratings of information obtained.
EXPECTED COOPERATION
2-A 2-B 2-C
Least
SCREENING METHODOLOGIES
6-28. Depending on the specific operation or echelon, screening may be a
separate operation or may be integrated into a specific collection mission. For
example, a HUMINT collector accompanying a patrol encounters a civilian
who may have information that is relevant to collection requirements. The
HUMINT collector screens the source (that is, asks some general questions to
determine the source’s level of cooperation and knowledge). Upon receiving a
positive response, the HUMINT collector may debrief the civilian on a
specific topic or question him on areas of PIR interest. He then reverts to the
screening role to determine other relevant knowledge. If the HUMINT
collector determines through screening that the source either has no relevant
information or cannot be persuaded to cooperate within an operationally
expedient timeframe, he is not debriefed as part of the screening process. In
detainee or refugee operations, a separate element will normally conduct all
screenings. They establish a prioritized list of sources who are then
systematically questioned on specific topics by other HUMINT collectors or
other technical specialists.
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
SCREENING REQUIREMENTS
6-29. In addition to potential sources, screening requires several components.
• Collection Requirements. Without a clear list of specific collection
requirements, screening becomes virtually impossible. The concept
behind screening is to rapidly identify source knowledgeability as it
relates to requirements. Screeners should obtain a copy of the
supported element's collection requirements and become familiar with
the intelligence indicators listed therein. Screeners must use their
experience and imagination to devise ways to identify EPWs and
detainees who might possess information pertinent to these indicators.
Vague requirements (such as “What is the threat doing?”) do not
provide the focus necessary to make a source selection. The HUMINT
collection element must break these SIRs into indicators if the
supported intelligence officer has not already done this. The indicators
must take into account the type of sources anticipated. For example, a
refugee probably will not know if the threat intends to defend a
particular ridgeline. However, he might know whether or not there are
threat forces on the ridge, if an improvised explosive device (IED) is
being employed on a route, if they are digging in, or if engineer type
equipment is in the area.
• Selection Criteria. After reviewing the collection requirements, the
HUMINT collection element will develop preliminary criteria to
identify the source type that will most likely have the required
information. The source type may include gender, appearance, military
rank, age, or occupation. Some of these criteria are determined by
visual observation, thereby saving time in not having to question
everyone. Other criteria such as occupation or place of residence may
require brief questions.
• Trained Screeners. Screening is possibly the most difficult HUMINT
skill. A HUMINT collector must use his experience, questioning skill,
cultural knowledge, and knowledge of human nature to decide in a
matter of minutes or possibly seconds whether limited HUMINT
collection assets and valuable time should be spent talking to an
individual based on the way he looks and the answers to a few
questions. A wrong decision will mean wasted assets and valuable
information missed.
• Language Capability and Cultural Awareness. Screening involves
more than asking a series of questions. The HUMINT collector must be
able to evaluate the answers, the specific language used, and other
clues such as body language to determine the value of an individual to
the collection effort. This requires a mature and experienced screener.
If the HUMINT collector does not possess the target language, he and
his interpreter must be able to work together quickly with mutual
trust and confidence.
• Area Conducive to Screening Operations. Effective screening
operations must allow the HUMINT collector to speak to the source
where the source is not exposed to outside influences or dangers that
may inhibit his responses. For that reason, sources should never be
screened within the sight or hearing of other potential sources.
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
6-34. The screeners will also examine all documents and possessions found
on the source (if any) and all documents pertaining to the source (if any). At
a minimum, a detainee should have a properly filled out capture tag,
which will indicate to the screener where the detainee was captured,
by which unit, and under what circumstance. (See para 6-12 and
Appendix D.) Documents such as personal letters, orders, rosters, signal
operating instructions (SOIs) and map sections can provide information that
identify the source, his organization, mission, and other personal background
information (family, knowledge, experience, education). They may in
themselves provide information, may identify a source for questioning, and
may provide information helpful in assessing a source’s susceptibility to an
approach.
6-35. Documents pertaining to the source, beginning at the point of capture
throughout the evacuation process, such as previous screening and
intelligence reports and administrative documents (such as source personnel
records prepared by the MPs) help the screener by providing information
concerning the source’s physical status, emotional status, level of knowledge,
level of experience, and other background data. Making timely use of reports
from lower echelons can be difficult for the screener, especially when dealing
with large numbers of potential sources.
SOURCE ASSESSMENT
6-36. Screeners use standard reporting formats to identify the results of
their screening (see Chapter 10). The determination must be made as to
whether the source is of any intelligence value to the HUMINT collector. The
HUMINT collector will basically place the source within one of four
categories.
• Of Immediate Intelligence Interest. This category includes personnel
who are assessed, based upon the screening process, who possess
information in response to requirements. They are interrogated or
debriefed (dependent on their status) to retrieve relevant information.
This questioning may be conducted by the same person conducting the
screening or by another HUMINT collector.
• Of Interest to Other Agencies. In most cases, the HUMINT collector
will be provided with collection requirements by other agencies or
disciplines such as TECHINT or CI. In this case the HUMINT collector
will question the source on these requirements and report the
information appropriately. However, in some instances, particularly in
the case of CI, the HUMINT collector may be given a list of topics or a
profile of personnel who are of interest to CI. The HUMINT collector
will notify the local CI representative when a person matching the “CI
profile” is identified. After the HUMINT collector has extracted any
relevant intelligence information, he will “pass” the individual off to
the CI agents. In many cases, particularly with individuals of
TECHINT or other specialized interest, the HUMINT collector will be
asked to conduct the questioning with the technical support of the
individual from the interested agency. This is coordinated through the
HUMINT collector’s OMT and the chain of command.
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Chapter 7
COLLECTION OBJECTIVES
7-2. Each HUMINT collection mission is conducted for a definite purpose.
The HUMINT collector must keep this purpose firmly in mind as he proceeds
to obtain usable information to satisfy the requirements, and thus
contributes to the success of the unit's mission. The HUMINT collector must
use the objective as a basis for planning and conducting questioning. The
HUMINT collector should not concentrate on the objective to the extent he
overlooks or fails to recognize and exploit other valuable information
extracted from the source. For example, during HUMINT collection, the
HUMINT collector learns of the presence of a heretofore unknown, highly
destructive weapon. Although this information may not be in line with his
specific objective, the HUMINT collector must develop this important lead to
obtain all possible information concerning this weapon.
RESEARCH
7-3. The key to good HUMINT collection is preparation on the part of the
collector. The HUMINT collector must understand the environment and
particularly its human component, the mission of the supported unit, that
unit’s intelligence requirements, his source, and the cultural environment.
The ultimate success of a questioning session is often decided before the
HUMINT collector even meets the source.
GENERAL RESEARCH
7-4. Due to the quickly changing world circumstances, it is impossible to
conduct all the specific research required immediately prior to questioning a
source. General research should be completed before entering an AO and
continues until operation completion. Areas of research include but are not
limited to––
• OPLANs and OPORDs. The HUMINT collector must be familiar with
the unit OPLAN and that of its higher headquarters. By thoroughly
understanding the unit OPLAN and OPORD, the HUMINT collector
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3 5
• Legal guides, SOFAs, operations and execute orders, ROE, and other
legal and administrative requirements. The HUMINT collector must
be thoroughly familiar with all documents that may set the legal
parameters for his collection operations. These are available through
the chain of command and from the SJA office. He must know how
these requirements apply and to what type of sources each is applied.
• Collection requirements. The HUMINT collector needs not only to
know but also to understand the requirements that he will be
attempting to answer. These requirements can include CCIRs (PIRs
and IRs), essential elements of friendly information (EEFIs),
Intelligence Priorities for Strategic Planning (IPSP), specific requests
from national level consumers such as HUMINT collection
requirements (HCRs), SDRs, or even vocal orders given by the local
commander. These all will determine the objective of the questioning
plan.
• Databases. Intelligence databases can give the HUMINT collector
detailed information about the source's unit, its organization, and its
capabilities. They also have information on personalities. The
HUMINT collector will use information obtained from databases to
control the source and assess his answers for truthfulness. They will
also give the HUMINT collector ideas of other areas to research. For
example, if the threat is primarily a lightly armed insurgent force,
studying similar organizations will provide the HUMINT collector with
valuable insights into the possible methods of operation of the current
target organization.
• SITMAP and COP. The current situation, both friendly and enemy, is
vital for the movement of the HCT and for its collection operations. It
reflects enemy unit identification, disposition, and boundaries; major
roads or trails for movement of personnel, equipment, weapons; and
locations of artillery, minefields, roadblocks, entrenchments, obstacles,
staging areas, NBC contaminated areas, and ground surveillance
devices. All of this information can be used in source questioning as
control questions or in otherwise determining source veracity. The
HUMINT collector will be able to identify indicators and predict what
should be PIRs and IRs.
• INTSUM. The INTSUM provides a summary of the intelligence
situation covering a specific period as dictated by the commander. It is
already analyzed intelligence.
• Intelligence estimate. The intelligence estimate is derived from the
intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). It is based on all
available intelligence and considers everything of operational
significance. It will help point out gaps in the intelligence database. It
is from these gaps that requirements are derived. It will provide
information on the mission, AO, weather, terrain, enemy situation,
enemy capabilities, and conclusions. It will cover all of the standard
OB topics.
• Weapons and equipment guides. Weapons and equipment guides can
assist the HUMINT collector in becoming familiar with the type of
equipment employed in the AO. Guides are available in hardcopy and
softcopy.
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3 5
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
SOURCE-SPECIFIC RESEARCH
7-8. Source-specific research is done immediately prior to questioning the
source. The HUMINT collector may have to respond spontaneously in the
case of a walk-in source in tactical operations, or if the HUMINT collector
has advanced warning as in the case of a planned meeting with a source, a
long-term debriefing, or an invitational source. Areas of research include but
are not limited to––
• Screening Reports, KBs, Other Reports: Reports about the source not
only can provide specific information about the type of information the
source can provide to answer specific collection requirements but also
can give the HUMINT collector extensive background information
about the source. This background information can give clues to
information the source might possess and to possible approach
techniques. Information contained in screening reports and KBs may
provide insight into––
• Geographic Area: This area may show information about the source’s
ethnic background, political affiliation, religion, and customs.
Information can be obtained from databases, locally registered vital
statistics, and residence registries.
• Languages: Determining the languages and dialects spoken, written,
and understood by a source can provide valuable insights into that
source’s geographic and ethnic or tribal background, education, and
social status. This determination of languages and dialects can be
facilitated by the use of “flash cards” specific to the battlefield.
• Other Reports: This can include other reports collected from this
source at other echelons or reports from other sources from the same
unit or location as the source. It can also include reports or
documents published by the ACE at your request.
_______________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3 5
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
• SMEs: There will be occasions when the HUMINT collector will talk to
sources about subjects of which the HUMINT collector has no
knowledge. In that case, the HUMINT collector will want to talk to
personnel who are SMEs. Depending on the depth of knowledge that
the source is expected to have and the time available to prepare, the
HUMINT collector may arrange for a technical expert to support the
questioning (see Chapter 9).
• Technical Manuals: There are various weapon and equipment
identification guides available in hardcopy, softcopy, and off the
Internet that can assist the HUMINT collector in identifying any
equipment mentioned by the source.
• Source Physical and Mental Condition: HUMINT collectors should
observe the source prior to questioning if possible and also talk to
anyone available who has relevant information concerning the source.
MP guards can be an especially valuable source of information based
on source observation and should be debriefed periodically. This can
prevent surprises at the onset of the questioning session and can help
the HUMINT collector assess the source’s physical and mental
condition as well as provide insights to possible approaches.
• Databases: Collectors should review source information and reports
contained in the various databases available to them. The CHATS
system, BAT database, and other databases can provide collectors with
source information and previous reporting.
_______________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3 5
OBJECTIVE
7-10. The HUMINT collector will first determine the objective of his
questioning. The objective is the set of collection requirements that the
HUMINT collector will attempt to satisfy during the questioning session. A
number of circumstances including the intelligence requirements, the time
available, and the source will set the objective. Determining the objective
consists of three parts:
• Identify the intelligence requirements. The primary objective of any
questioning session is to answer or confirm PIR or other collection
requirements.
• Identify the subject: The HUMINT collector will want to consider the
source; for example, who he is, what he may know. The HUMINT
collector will also want to consider the legal and other restrictions
based on the type of source (contact source, EPW, refugee, strategic).
For a military source (EPW) this includes rank, position specialty, and
unit of assignment. For a civilian source it includes job, placement and
access, associations, area of residence, and employment.
• Identify the intelligence requirements that the source may be able to
answer. The HUMINT collector cannot normally waste time “fishing”
for information. He must determine based on screening, what
collection requirements the source can answer. The HUMINT collector
compares the information that he gathered through his general and
source-specific research and compares it to his list of collection
requirements. He compares that list to the identity of the source and
refines the list including all requirements that the source can be
expected to be able to answer. The HUMINT collector will approach
those areas first while staying aware of leads into other collection
topics.
LOCATION
7-11. In most cases, the location for the questioning will be determined by
operational requirements. However, the HUMINT collector should ensure
some basic requirements are met:
• Each questioning session should be conducted outside the hearing and
view of third parties. Even in the case of a source meeting in a public
place, the HUMINT collector should choose a location where they
cannot be overheard and where their meeting will not arouse
suspicion.
• The location should be in a place that has reasonable security for the
HUMINT collector and the source. In contact operations, the risk
cannot always be eliminated but the acceptable risk levels should be
based on the expected intelligence gain. In combat operations, most
questioning (interrogation, debriefing of civilians on the battlefield)
will take place in forward combat areas, but it cannot be done if it
increases the risk to the source. Safe evacuation of the sources has
priority over questioning.
• The location should provide ready access to the chosen method of
recording and reporting the information.
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
TIME
7-13. Time to conduct questioning should be estimated based on the source,
the type of information that the HUMINT collector expects to get, and the
complexity of that information. Other considerations include expected
evacuation times for sources in tactical situations, the number of other
sources that need to be spoken to; and in contact operations, the estimated
time that the HUMINT collector can meet with the source without increasing
the risk.
7-14. The HUMINT collector must also consider the physical conditions of
the source and himself. After extended operations, there may be a limit on
how long either the HUMINT collector or source can concentrate on a given
subject. Even if the HUMINT collector has an unlimited time period (such as
at a joint interrogation and debriefing facility), he must break his
questioning down into topical sessions to maximize effectiveness. Time is
only an estimate and should be modified based on the circumstances. It may
be extended, for example, if the source has a greater than expected amount of
information, or critical information in unforeseen areas. The time may be
curtailed if the HUMINT collector has met his requirements, the source does
not possess the expected information, or a more valuable source is identified.
_______________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3 5
• The HUMINT collector himself. What abilities does he have that can
be brought into play? What weaknesses does he have that may
interfere with the HUMINT collection? Are there social or ethnic
barriers to communication? Can his personality adapt to the
personality of the source?
7-16. If the HUMINT collector has a screening sheet or KB, he can use it to
help select his approaches. After reviewing the information, the HUMINT
collector will analyze the information for indicators of psychological and/or
physical weakness that would make a source susceptible to a specific
approach. The HUMINT collector also needs to consider his particular
strengths and weaknesses in conducting specific approaches. He must
consider what immediate incentives he may possibly need and ensure that
they are available. Also, if incentives had been previously offered or
promised, the collector needs to know if they were in fact provided. If the
HUMINT collector has previously questioned the source, he must evaluate
the approaches he used and decide if they need to be modified or if additional
approach techniques will be needed (see Chapter 8.)
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3 5
military unit, many of the OB factors will not fit the collection plan. A helpful
memory aid, in this case, is mission, identification, location, and organization
(MILO). MILO gives a short, easily remembered structure for questioning
nonmilitary or strategic topics. The MILO factors can be questioned in any
order, but often the most logical sequence of MILO questioning is
identification, organization, location, and mission. Many of the nine OB
factors can also fit into the MILO format.
FINAL PREPARATIONS
7-25. After the source-specific questioning plan is developed, the HUMINT
collector takes some final preparatory steps.
• Review plan. The HUMINT collector should always go over his
collection plan with his supervisor. This review can be written or oral.
In addition to the obvious requirements to keep the chain of command
informed, this review helps identify any weaknesses in the plan and is
a means to effect required coordination and support.
• Collect questioning support materials. The HUMINT collector will
want to collect the various references and other guides that he will use
to support his questioning. These materials may include source
documents, maps, aerial photographs, imagery, OB data, extra lights,
extra tables, drawing templates, graph paper, questioning guides,
technical reference manuals, city plans and handbooks, and recording
devices.
• Conduct required coordination. The HUMINT collector coordinates any
support requirements including analytical, technical, or interpreter
support, questioning location, ICFs, recording equipment, security, and
transportation.
• Organize. The HUMINT collector organizes his materials in a logical
manner that will complement his topical sequence. By being organized,
the HUMINT collector will not waste time trying to locate the correct
manual or guide. Additionally, the HUMINT collector will present a
professional appearance to his source.
• Reconnoiter the questioning location. If the questioning location is to
be somewhere other than the HUMINT collector's normal AO, such as
a public restaurant, the HUMINT collector should conduct an
unobtrusive reconnaissance of the site. If at all possible, this should be
at the same time and day of the week as the planned meeting. This
allows the HUMINT collector to assess the possible security problems
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
of the location, judge the traffic flow, and identify any other items that
might affect the questioning. He can also judge where within the
meeting site he can set up for maximum security and psychological
advantage. He must be careful that in doing so he does not set up
patterns of operation that will increase rather than decrease security
problems.
• Set up questioning site. If the HUMINT collector has control over the
site where the collection is being conducted, the last step in preparing
is the actual setup of the questioning site. The HUMINT collector will
want to decide on the placement of the furniture and lighting and
where everyone will be seated and decide where he will place his
technical support materials.
• Question guards. If the person to be questioned is a detainee, the
HUMINT collector should arrange to question MP guards who have
been in contact with the detainee to ascertain source behavior,
attitude, and other useful information that guards may be able to
provide.
• Check with medical personnel. If the detainee was injured or ill,
ensure that he was treated by medical authorities and released for
questioning.
7-26. The supervisor reviews each plan for legal considerations, appropriate
goals in accordance with the collection objectives of the supported unit, and
makes any changes he thinks are necessary. The supervisor ensures that
contract interrogators are utilized in accordance with the scope of their
contract and current policy. (See Appendix K.) After the plan is approved, the
collection operation is executed. Prior to execution, the supervisor ensures
mission brief back, rehearsal, and pre-combat inspections are conducted.
Chapter 8
NOTE: The word “source” will be used in this chapter to mean any person who is
the objective of the HUMINT collector’s approach, and is applicable in any
collection situation unless otherwise noted in the text. This use of the term
“source” is consistent with US Army Intelligence Center HUMINT collector
training.
APPROACH PHASE
8-4. During the approach phase, the HUMINT collector establishes the
conditions of control and rapport to facilitate information collection. The
approach begins with initial contact between the source and the HUMINT
collector. Extreme care is required since the success of the collection effort
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
DEVELOPING RAPPORT
8-9. The basis of rapport is source confidence in the HUMINT collector,
which leads to a willingness to cooperate. Rapport does not necessarily mean
a friendly relationship, although that may be the case. It means an
establishment of a relationship in which the HUMINT collector presents a
realistic persona designed to evoke cooperation from the source. The source
responds with relevant, truthful information. Rapport is established during
the approach and must be maintained throughout the questioning of the
source. If the HUMINT collector has established good rapport initially and
then abandons the effort, the source would rightfully begin to question the
HUMINT collector’s sincerity and may cease answering questions.
BUILDING RAPPORT
8-10. Building rapport is an integral part of the approach phase. The
establishment of rapport begins when the HUMINT collector first encounters
the source. Depending on the situation, the HUMINT collector may introduce
himself to the source. In debriefing and liaison operations, this will normally
be the collector’s true name and affiliation. In elicitation, the requirement
and type of introduction depends on the operation. In interrogation
operations, the HUMINT collector normally will not introduce himself unless
he is laying the groundwork for an approach. If he does introduce himself,
normally he will adopt a duty position and rank supportive of the approach
strategy selected during the planning and preparation phase. The HUMINT
collector must select a rank and duty position that is believable based on the
HUMINT collector’s age, appearance, and experience. A HUMINT collector
may, according to international law, use ruses of war to build rapport with
interrogation sources, and this may include posing or “passing himself off” as
someone other than a military interrogator. However, the collector must not
pose as—
• A doctor, medic, or any other type of medical personnel.
• Any member of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
or its affiliates. Such a ruse is a violation of US treaty obligations.
• A chaplain or clergyman.
• A journalist.
• A member of the US Congress.
8-11. The HUMINT collector should seek advice from his SJA concerning
representing himself as holding any other sensitive position.
8-12. A good source assessment is the basis for the approach and vital to the
success of the collection effort. The HUMINT collector continually assesses
the source to see if the approaches—and later the questioning techniques—
chosen in the planning and preparation phase will indeed work. Approaches
chosen in planning and preparation are tentative and based on the limited
information available from documents, guards, and personal observation.
This may lead the HUMINT collector to select approaches that may be totally
incorrect for obtaining this source's willing cooperation. Thus, careful
assessment of the source is critical to avoid wasting valuable time in the
approach phase. Whether the HUMINT collector is using reasoned argument
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
RAPPORT POSTURE
8-13. Unless there is rationale for acting otherwise, the HUMINT collector
will begin his interaction with the source in a businesslike manner. He will
be neither hostile nor overly friendly. Based on the tentative approaches
developed during planning and preparation and the verbal and physical clues
from the source, the HUMINT collector will modify this posture to facilitate
collection.
8-14. Based on planning and preparation, the HUMINT collector may decide
to adopt a stern posture. He presents himself as a person in a superior
position to the interrogation source and demands proper deference and
obedience by the interrogation source. In the case of an EPW this is
manifested by having the source remain at attention and address the
HUMINT collector as “Sir.” This can be effective in dealing with lower
ranking military personnel or members of oppressed ethnic, tribal, or
religious groups who are conditioned to respond to authority or civilians in
lower economic or social positions who are used to responding to directions
from various bureaucrats and civilian superiors. This posture can have
negative results since many persons in the positions mentioned above have
developed mechanisms for dealing with superiors that mostly involve giving
minimal information and agreeing with whatever the authority figure says.
8-15. In most cases, either initially or after the interrogation source has
begun answering questions, the HUMINT collector will adopt a more relaxed
or even sympathetic posture. The HUMINT collector addresses the
interrogation source in a friendly fashion, striving to put him at ease.
Regardless of the posture selected by the HUMINT collector, he must stay
detached emotionally while maintaining the appearance of total involvement
and stay within his adopted persona. The HUMINT collector must control his
temper at all times. He must not show distaste, disgust, or unease at
anything the source says unless that reaction is a planned part of the
approach strategy. He should not show surprise at anything that the
interrogation source says since it might undermine source confidence in the
HUMINT collector and their relationship.
8-16. The HUMINT collector must support his verbal approaches with
appropriate body language. Just as the HUMINT collector is observing the
source to identify non-verbal clues that support or contradict the verbal
message, the HUMINT collector is being scrutinized by the source to identify
the same clues. The techniques used in an approach are a totality of effort,
not just verbal conversation between the HUMINT collector and the source.
Body language is in many instances culturally dependent. Standing at a
given distance from an individual may be perceived as comforting in some
societies and hostile in others. The HUMINT collector must adapt his body
language to the culture in which he is working rather than expect the source
to adapt to his.
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
APPROACH TECHNIQUES
8-17. The approaches listed are not guaranteed solutions for every situation.
Some individual approaches that may be suitable for one operating
environment, such as when conducting HUMINT contact operations, may be
ineffective in another, such as interrogation. Some will be successful with
one source and ineffective with another. In any case, everything the
HUMINT collector says and does must be in compliance with the applicable
law and policy under which the HUMINT collector is operating. Applicable
law and policy include US law; the law of war; relevant international law;
relevant directives including DOD Directive 3115.09, “DOD Intelligence
Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning”; DOD
Directive 2310.1E, “The Department of Defense Detainee Program”; DOD
instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOs.
8-18. There are 18 approach techniques that can be employed on any
detainee regardless of status or characterization, including EPWs.
Additionally, there is one restricted interrogation technique called separation
(see Appendix M). Separation cannot be employed on EPWs. With the
exception of the direct approach, which may be effective by itself, approach
techniques are used in combination with other approaches and techniques.
Transitions from one approach to another must be smooth, logical, and
convincing.
DIRECT APPROACH
8-19. (Interrogation and Other MSO) Almost all HUMINT collection begins
with the direct approach. The exception to this is during elicitation
operations that by their very nature are indirect. In using the direct
approach, the HUMINT collector asks direct questions (see Chapter 9). The
initial questions may be administrative or nonpertinent but the HUMINT
collector quickly begins asking pertinent questions. The HUMINT collector
will continue to use direct questions as long as the source is answering the
questions in a truthful manner. When the source refuses to answer, avoids
answering, or falsely answers a pertinent question, the HUMINT collector
will begin an alternate approach strategy. The fact that the source is
answering questions does not preclude the HUMINT collector from providing
an incentive to reward the source and continue his cooperation as long as
that incentive does not slow down the collection. For example, a HUMINT
collector might offer the source coffee or cigarettes to reward his cooperation.
See Chapter 9 for the use of Repeat and Control questions in detecting
deception.
8-20. Statistics from interrogation operations in World War II show that the
direct approach was effective 90 percent of the time. In Vietnam and in
Operations URGENT FURY (Grenada, 1983), JUST CAUSE (Panama, 1989),
and DESERT STORM (Kuwait and Iraq, 1991), the direct approach was 95
percent effective. The effectiveness of the direct approach in Operations
ENDURING FREEDOM (Afghanistan, 2001-2002) and IRAQI FREEDOM
(Iraq, 2003) are still being studied; however, unofficial studies indicate that
in these operations, the direct approach has been dramatically less
successful. The direct approach is frequently employed at lower echelons
when the tactical situation precludes selecting other techniques, and where
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
INCENTIVE APPROACH
8-21. (Interrogation and Other MSO) The incentive approach is trading
something that the source wants for information. The thing that you give up
may be a material reward, an emotional reward, or the removal of a real or
perceived negative stimulus. The exchange of the incentive may be blatant or
subtle. On one extreme, the exchange may be a formal cash payment for
information during some contact operations while on the other extreme it
may be as subtle as offering the source a cigarette. Even when the direct
approach is successful, the HUMINT collector may use incentives to enhance
rapport and to reward the source for cooperation and truthfulness. The
HUMINT collector must be extremely careful in selecting the options offered
to a detainee source. He cannot deny the detainee anything that he is
entitled to by law.
8-22. The HUMINT collector also should not offer anything that is not in his
power to give. Although this might be expedient in the short term, in the long
run it will eliminate source cooperation. When asked to provide something
beyond his authority, the HUMINT collector can agree to help, check into, or
otherwise support the request without committing himself to its successful
accomplishment. HUMINT collectors must be cautious in the use of
incentives for the following reasons:
• There is an inherent suspicion of the truthfulness of “bought”
information. Sources may manufacture information in order to receive
or maintain an incentive. Sources may also “hold back” information in
the hopes of trading it at a later date for greater incentives. They may
also hold back information if the incentive is not immediately available
or guaranteed.
• The incentive must be believable and attainable. The incentive must be
within the capability of the HUMINT collector’s assumed persona to
achieve. For example, if the detainee was captured after killing a US
soldier, an incentive of release would not be realistic or believable.
Likewise, if the interrogator is presenting himself as being a “harmless
clerk” at the detention center, it would be unrealistic to expect a
detainee to believe that a clerk could arrange to have the detainee’s
girlfriend brought to visit him. Such a visit might be possible, but the
interrogator’s assumed persona would not seemingly provide him with
the authority to make it happen.
• The HUMINT collector must provide any promised incentive. A simple
promise of an incentive may be sufficient to obtain immediate
cooperation. If, however, the HUMINT collector does not follow
through on providing the incentive, he will lose credibility and rapport
with his source. This may end the cooperation of not only that source
but also possibly any potential source who has contact with that
source.
• The HUMINT collector may not state or even imply that the basic
human rights guaranteed by applicable national and international
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
EMOTIONAL APPROACHES
8-23. (Interrogation and Other MSO) Emotional approaches are centered on
how the source views himself and his interrelationships with others. Through
source observation and initial questioning, the HUMINT collector can often
identify dominant emotions that motivate the EPW/detainee. The motivating
emotion may be greed, love, hate, revenge, or others. The emotion may be
directed inward (feelings of pride or helplessness) or outward (love of family).
The HUMINT collector employs verbal and emotional ruses in applying
pressure to the source’s dominant emotions. He then links the satisfaction of
these emotions to the source’s cooperation. Often, the presentation of like
experiences and presenting the source with an opportunity to express his
emotions is sufficient to result in cooperation. However, sometimes the
source must be presented with a specific action or tangible manifestation of
support.
8-24. Although the emotion is the key factor, an emotional approach is
normally worthless without an attached incentive. The incentive must meet
the criteria listed above for the incentive approach to ensure that the
incentive is believable and attainable. For example, this technique can be
used on the EPW/detainee who has a great love for his unit and fellow
soldiers. Simply having the source express this emotion is not enough. After
the source expresses this emotion, the HUMINT collector can take advantage
of this by telling the EPW/detainee that by providing pertinent information,
he may shorten the war or battle in progress and save many of his comrades'
lives, but his refusal to talk may cause their deaths. This gives the source the
alternatives of facing the status quo or expressing love of comrades through
cooperating with the HUMINT collector.
8-25. Religion is an especially difficult topic to use in any emotional
approach. An approach using religion may encourage the source to be further
motivated by love, remorse, futility, or even pride to cooperate with the
interrogator. On the other hand, an approach using religion may also
encourage the source to end any rapport and cooperation with the
interrogator. Although it is acceptable to use religion in all interrogation
approaches, even to express doubts about a religion, an interrogator is not
permitted to denigrate a religion’s symbols (for example, a Koran, prayer rug,
icon, or religious statue) or violate a religion’s tenets, except where
appropriate for health, safety, and security reasons. Supervisors should
carefully consider the experience level of their subordinates before permitting
the use of religion in any interrogation approach.
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
the outlet for the fear. Supervisors should consider the experience level of
their subordinates before approving their use of this approach.
8-36. If there is a justifiable fear, the HUMINT collector should present it
and present a plan to mitigate it if the source cooperates (combination of
emotional and incentive approaches). For example, an EPW source says that
he will not cooperate because if he does his fellow prisoners will kill him or, if
a contact source says that if people find out he is cooperating, his family will
suffer. In these cases, the HUMINT collector can point out that the source
has already placed himself at risk and he or his family may suffer whether he
cooperates or not (justified fear). But if he cooperates, the HUMINT collector
will do his best to ensure that either no one will find out or that he will be
protected (incentive).
8-37. If there is no justified fear, the HUMINT collector can make use of non
specific fears. “You know what can happen to you here?” A fear-up approach
is normally presented in a level, unemotional tone of voice. For example, “We
have heard many allegations of atrocities committed in your area and anyone
that was involved will be severely punished” (non-specific fear). “If you
cooperate with me and answer all of my questions truthfully, I can make sure
you are not falsely accused” (incentive). The source should demonstrate some
indication of fear, whether verbal or non-verbal, prior to using this approach.
If a fear is pre-existing, the approach will work and is legal. If there is no
indication of fear, another approach should be considered.
8-38. It is often very effective to use the detainee’s own imagination against
him. The detainee can often visualize exactly what he is afraid of better than
the HUMINT collector can express it.
8-39. The “fear-up” approach is frequently used in conjunction with the
emotional love or hate approaches. For example, the HUMINT collector has
already established that a detainee source has a strong love of family but is
now separated from them. He may state, “I wonder how your family is
getting along without you?” (fear of the unknown). He then promises to allow
the detainee more than the minimum two letters a month required by the
GPW.
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
HUMINT collector must describe concrete actions that he will take in order
to remove the source’s fear.
8-41. Frequently the object of the fear is too traumatic for the source to face
directly. While calming the source, the HUMINT collector may initially ask
nonpertinent questions and avoid the subject that has caused the source's
fear. This develops rapport and establishes communication. The HUMINT
collector must remember that his goal is collecting information, not concern
with the psychological well being of the source. He will be concerned with the
latter only insofar as it helps him obtain the former. This approach technique
may backfire if allowed to go too far. After convincing the source he has
nothing to fear, the source may cease to be afraid and may feel secure enough
to resist the HUMINT collector's pertinent question.
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
Emotional-Futility
8-49. (Interrogation and Other MSO) The emotional-futility approach is
generally used in an interrogation setting, but may also be used for other
MSO, if indicated by the source’s state of mind. In the emotional-futility
approach, the HUMINT collector convinces the source that resistance to
questioning is futile. This engenders a feeling of hopelessness and
helplessness on the part of the source. Again as with the other emotional
approaches, the HUMINT collector gives the source a “way out” of the
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
helpless situation. For example “it is hopeless for your forces to continue
fighting because they can no longer get supplies, but you can help end the
war and their suffering.” When employing this technique, the HUMINT
collector must have factual information. The HUMINT collector presents
these facts in a persuasive, logical manner. He should be aware of and able to
exploit the source's psychological and moral weaknesses, as well as
weaknesses inherent in his society.
8-50. The futility approach is effective when the HUMINT collector can play
on doubts that already exist in the source's mind. Factual or seemingly
factual information must be presented in a persuasive, logical manner, and
in a matter-of-fact tone of voice. Making the situation appear hopeless allows
the source to rationalize his actions, especially if that action is cooperating
with the HUMINT collector. When employing this technique, the HUMINT
collector must not only have factual information but also be aware of and
exploit the source's psychological, moral, and sociological weaknesses.
Another way of using the futility approach is to blow things out of proportion.
If the source's unit was low on, or had exhausted, all food supplies, he can be
easily led to believe all of his forces had run out of food. If the source is
verging on cooperating, it may aid the collection effort if he is told all the
other sources have cooperated.
8-51. The futility approach must be orchestrated with other approach
techniques (for example, love of comrades). A source who may want to help
save his comrades' lives may be convinced the battlefield situation is hopeless
and they will die without his assistance. The futility approach is used to
paint a bleak picture for the prisoner, but it is not normally effective in and
of itself in gaining the source's cooperation.
Other Approaches
8-52. There are numerous other approaches but most require considerable
time and resources. Most are more appropriate for use with sources who are
detainees, but some, such as change of scenery, may have application for
elicitation or MSO.
8-53. We Know All. (Interrogation) In the “we know all” approach
technique, the HUMINT collector subtly convinces the source that his
questioning of the source is perfunctory because any information that the
source has is already known. This approach may be employed in conjunction
with the "file and dossier" technique or by itself. If used alone, the HUMINT
collector must first become thoroughly familiar with available data
concerning the source and the current situation. To begin the collection
effort, the HUMINT collector asks questions based on this known data.
8-54. When the source hesitates, refuses to answer, or provides an incorrect
or incomplete reply, the HUMINT collector provides the detailed answer
himself. The HUMINT collector may even complete a source's answer, as if
he is bored and just “going through the motions.” When the source begins to
give accurate and complete information, the HUMINT collector interjects
pertinent questions. Questions to which answers are already known are also
asked periodically to test the source's truthfulness and to maintain the
deception that the information is already known. There are some inherent
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
problems with the use of the "we know all" approach. The HUMINT collector
is required to prepare everything in detail, which is time consuming. He
must commit much of the information to memory, as working from notes may
show the limits of the information actually known. It is also only usable
when sufficient prior information exists to convince the source that “we know
all.”
8-55. File and Dossier. (Interrogation) The file and dossier approach is a
variation of the “we know all” approach. The HUMINT collector prepares a
dossier containing all available information concerning the source or his
organization. The information is carefully arranged within a file to give the
illusion that it contains more data than actually there. The file may be
padded with extra paper if necessary. Index tabs with titles such as
education, employment, criminal record, military service, and others are
particularly effective. It is also effective if the HUMINT collector is reviewing
the dossier when the source enters the room and the source is able to read his
name on the dossier and sees the numerous topics and supposed extent of the
files.
8-56. The HUMINT collector proceeds as in the “we know all” approach. He
refers to the particular labeled segment of the dossier before, during, or after
asking a question. In the early stages of questioning, the HUMINT collector
asks questions to which he has the answer. He may answer along with the
source, complete the information for the source, or even show the source
where the information is entered in the dossier. He never lets the source
physically handle the dossier. As the source becomes convinced that all the
information that he knows is contained within the dossier, the HUMINT
collector proceeds to topics on which he has no or little information. In doing
so, he still refers to the appropriate section of the dossier and may even nod
his head knowingly or tell the source that the information the source is
providing still matches what is in the dossier.
8-57. This technique has several limitations and drawbacks. The preparation
time in developing the dossier is extensive. The success of this technique is
largely dependent on the naiveté of the source, volume of data on the subject,
and skill of the HUMINT collector in convincing the source that the dossier is
more complete than it actually is. There is also the risk that a less naïve
source will refuse to cooperate, claiming that, if the collector already knows
everything, there is no need for him to talk. Also with this technique, the
HUMINT collector is limited in the method he may use to record new
information. If the HUMINT collector writes down information, it destroys
the illusion that all the information has already been obtained. The
HUMINT collector is normally limited to using electronic recording devices or
his memory. The HUMINT collector can also arrange ahead of time for
another interrogator or analyst to take notes for him, undetected by the
source. This could be especially effective in a situation where a separate
monitoring area (for oversight) is used by the analyst.
8-58. Establish Your Identity. (Interrogation) In using this approach, the
HUMINT collector insists the detained source has been correctly identified as
an infamous individual wanted by higher authorities on serious charges, and
he is not the person he purports to be. In an effort to clear himself of this
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
such as, "You planned this operation for a long time, didn't you? Was it your
idea?" The HUMINT collector must be patient when using this technique. It
may appear the technique is not succeeding, but usually will when given a
reasonable chance.
8-63. Change of Scenery. (Interrogation and Other MSO) The change-of
scenery approach may be used in any type of MSO to remove the source from
an intimidating atmosphere such as an “interrogation” room type of setting
and to place him in a setting where he feels more comfortable speaking.
Bringing a source into a formal setting to conduct an interrogation or
debriefing has psychological implications. On the positive side, it places the
HUMINT collector in a superior position since he is operating on his “home
turf” and has set the conditions for the meeting. It allows the HUMINT
collector control over the immediate environment including the positioning of
the participants, to establish the desired atmosphere for the approach.
8-64. However, there are potential negative factors in the conduct of
questioning in an “Interrogation Room” environment. The source may be
intimidated and more guarded; he may consider the formal setting in terms
of an adversarial relationship; and he may limit his answers as a mode of
self-protection. In some circumstances, the HUMINT collector may be able to
invite the source to a different setting for coffee and pleasant conversation.
When removed from the formal environment, the source may experience a
feeling of leaving the interrogation behind. The perceived reduced pressure
may lower his guard and allow him to attach less significance to conversation
that occurs outside the formal setting, even though pertinent information is
still being discussed. During the conversation in this more relaxed
environment, the HUMINT collector steers the conversation to the topic of
interest. Through this somewhat indirect method, he attempts to elicit the
desired information. The source may never realize he is still being
questioned.
8-65. Mutt and Jeff. (Interrogation) The goal of this technique is to make
the source identify with one of the interrogators and thereby establish
rapport and cooperation. This technique involves a psychological ploy that
takes advantage of the natural uncertainty and guilt that a source has as a
result of being detained and questioned. Use of this technique requires two
experienced HUMINT collectors who are convincing actors. The two
HUMINT collectors will display opposing personalities and attitudes toward
the source. For example, the first HUMINT collector is very formal and
displays an unsympathetic attitude toward the source. He may, for instance,
be very strict and order the source to follow all military courtesies during
questioning. Although he conveys an unfeeling attitude, the HUMINT
collector is careful not to threaten or coerce the source. Conveying a threat of
violence is a violation of the UCMJ.
8-66. At the point when the interrogator senses the source is vulnerable, the
second HUMINT collector appears (having received his cue by a signal,
hidden from the source, or by listening and observing out of view of the
source), and scolds the first HUMINT collector for his uncaring behavior and
orders him from the room. The second HUMINT collector then apologizes to
soothe the source, perhaps offering him a beverage and a cigarette. He
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
explains that the actions of the first HUMINT collector were largely the
result of an inferior intellect and lack of sensitivity. The inference is that the
second HUMINT collector and the source share a high degree of intelligence
and sensitivity.
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
Selecting an Approach
8-72. There often is insufficient information available to determine an
approach other than the direct approach. In this case where the source
answers questions but will not discuss pertinent issues, the HUMINT
collector may ask direct but nonpertinent questions to obtain sufficient
information to develop an approach strategy. This technique is also useful in
debriefing to establish rapport. Nonpertinent questions may include––
• Asking about immediate past events. This includes asking an EPW
about the circumstances of his capture or asking a refugee about the
circumstances concerning his arrival at the refugee point or
checkpoint. By doing this, the HUMINT collector can gain insight into
the source’s current state of mind and, more importantly, he can
ascertain his possible approach techniques.
• Asking background questions. This includes asking about the source's
family, work, friends, likes, and dislikes. These types of questions can
develop rapport and provide clues as to the source’s areas of knowledge
or reveal possibilities for incentives or emotional approaches.
• Considering what are culturally and socially acceptable topics of
discussion. For example, asking an Arab male about his wife could be
considered extremely rude, whereas not asking an American the same
question might be seen as insensitive.
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
source the initial stage could last from a few minutes to numerous seemingly
accidental meetings over a period of weeks or months. The HUMINT collector
will gradually shift the conversation to topics of collection interest but will be
prepared to return to more unthreatening topics based on negative reactions
on the part of the subject. Once a topic of interest has been introduced, the
HUMINT collector keeps the conversation going by asking for clarification
(for example, “I agree, however, what did you mean by….?”) or expressing a
hypothetical situation.
8-89. There are two basic elicitation approaches: mild flattery and
provocation.
• Mild Flattery: Most people like talking about their interests and like
talking to those who are knowledgeable and interested in the same
topics. People also like to speak to someone who values their opinion on
shared interests. The HUMINT collector takes advantage of this. The
HUMINT collector leads the conversation into areas that he wishes to
collect but does it in such a way that it appears to the source that the
source is leading the conversation. Above all in elicitation, the
HUMINT collector plays the role of the rapt, attentive, and inquisitive
listener.
• Provocation: This is a more dangerous approach and, if used too early
in an operation, can alienate the source. Once the HUMINT collector
has established shared interests with the source, he can selectively
challenge some of the source’s statements, encouraging the source to
provide more information in support of his view. The HUMINT
collector can also insert bits of actual information into the conversation
to cause the source to confirm and expound on the topic. Care must be
taken so as not to give away more information than is gained.
TERMINATION PHASE
8-90. When it is necessary or prudent, the HUMINT collector will terminate
the questioning of a particular source. Whatever the reason for terminating,
the HUMINT collector must remember there is a possibility that someone
may want to question the source at a later date. There are many reasons why
a HUMINT collector may want or need to terminate questioning:
• The source remains uncooperative during the approach phase.
• The collection objective cannot be met in one questioning session.
• The HUMINT collector fails to maintain rapport and loses control of
the questioning.
• The collection objectives have been satisfied.
• The HUMINT collector or the source becomes physically or mentally
unable to continue.
• Information possessed by the source is of such value that his
immediate evacuation to the next echelon is required.
• The HUMINT collector's presence is required elsewhere.
8-91. There are many ways to conduct a termination, but the following points
must be conveyed to the source:
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Chapter 9
Questioning
9-1. Questioning is one of the five phases of HUMINT collection. Developing
and using good questioning techniques enable the HUMINT collector to
obtain accurate and pertinent information and to extract the maximum
amount of information in the minimum amount of time. The HUMINT
collector must know when to use different types of questions.
DIRECT QUESTIONS
9-4. Direct questions are basic questions normally beginning with an
interrogative (who, what, where, when, how, or why) and requiring a
narrative answer. They are brief, precise, and simply worded to avoid
confusion. The HUMINT collector must consider the probable response of the
source to a particular question or line of questioning and should not, if at all
possible, ask direct questions likely to evoke a refusal to answer or to
antagonize the source.
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Initial Questions
9-6. The HUMINT collector begins his questioning with the first topic in his
collection plan and asks all the basic questions necessary to cover the topic.
The answers to the basic questions will determine the requirements for
follow-up questioning. The initial questions are directed toward obtaining the
basic information on the topic. In other words, they are the “who, what,
where, when, how, and why” of each topic.
Follow-up Questions
9-7. Follow-up questions are used to expand on and complete the information
obtained from the initial questions. Often even if the initial question is a
well-constructed direct question, it will elicit only a partial answer. For
example, when asked, “Who is going to attack?” The source might say, “My
unit.” Follow-up questions are used to determine precisely what the source
means by “my unit” and what other units may also attack. The answer to
follow-up questions may lead to more follow-ups until the source’s knowledge
on a given topic is exhausted. At a minimum, upon receiving a positive
answer to an initial question, the HUMINT collector needs to ask “Who
(what, where, when, why, how) else?” For example, if the HUMINT collector
asks the source, “Who, in the local government is collaborating with the
insurgents?” and is told a name in response, he will ask follow-up questions
to determine all the required information about this individual and then will
ask, “Who else, in the local government is collaborating with the insurgents?”
This will continue until the source’s knowledge in this area is exhausted.
Nonpertinent Questions
9-8. Nonpertinent questions are questions that do not pertain to the
collection objectives. They are used to conceal the collection objectives or to
strengthen rapport with the source. They are essential when the collector is
using the elicitation technique. Nonpertinent questions may be used to gain
time for the HUMINT collector to formulate pertinent questions and may
also be used to break the source's concentration, particularly, if the HUMINT
collector suspects the source is lying. It is hard for a source to be a convincing
liar if his concentration is frequently interrupted.
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
Repeat Questions
9-9. Repeat questions ask the source for the same information obtained in
response to earlier questions. They are a method to confirm accuracy of
important details such as place names, dates, and component parts of
technical equipment and to test truthfulness. Repeat questions should not be
exact repetitions of an earlier question. The HUMINT collector must
rephrase or otherwise disguise the previous question. The repeat question
also needs to be separated in time from the original question so that the
source cannot easily remember what he said. Repeat questions may also be
used to develop a topic the source had refused to talk about earlier.
Control Questions
9-10. Control questions are developed from recently confirmed information
from other sources that is not likely to have changed. They are used to check
the truthfulness of the source's responses and should be mixed in with other
questions throughout the questioning. If a source fails to answer a control
question as expected, it may be an indicator that he is lying. However, there
are other possible explanations. The source—
• Could have misunderstood the question.
• Could be making up information in order to please the questioner
and/or receive a promised incentive.
• Could have answered the question truthfully to the best of his ability,
but his information could be wrong or outdated.
• May be correct and the information that the control question was
based on is no longer true.
9-11. It is the responsibility of the HUMINT collector to determine, through
follow-up questions, which of the possibilities is the case. The HUMINT
collector should also consult with the HAT for assistance in verifying the
source reporting through all-source analysis.
Prepared Questions
9-12. Prepared questions are questions developed by the HUMINT collector,
normally in writing, prior to the questioning. Prepared questions are used
primarily when dealing with information of a technical nature or specific
topic, which requires the HUMINT collector to formulate precise and detailed
questions beforehand. The HUMINT collector may have to research
analytical or technical material or contact SMEs to assist him in preparing
questions. HUMINT collectors must not allow the use of prepared questions
or any limitations to their education or training to restrict the scope and
flexibility of their questioning. In many instances, the HUMINT collector
should have an analyst or technical expert “sit in” on the questioning as well.
9-13. The HUMINT collector must be able to use the different types of
questions effectively. Active listening and maximum eye-to-eye contact with
the source will provide excellent indicators for when to use follow-up, repeat,
control, and nonpertinent questions. The HUMINT collector must use direct
and follow-up questions to fully exploit subjects pertinent to his interrogation
objectives. He should periodically include control, repeat, and nonpertinent
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Leading Questions
9-15. Leading questions are questions that are constructed so as to require a
yes or no answer rather than a narrative response. They generally begin with
a form of the verb “to be” (such as “is,” “was,” “were,” “will,” “are”). For
example, “Is the mayor working with the insurgents?” Leading questions
should generally be avoided for the following reasons:
• They make it easier for the source to lie since the source only provides
minimal information.
• It takes longer to acquire information.
• A source, particularly one that is frightened or trying to get an
incentive, will tend to answer in the way that he thinks the HUMINT
collector wants him to answer.
9-16. Although normally avoided during questioning, an experienced
HUMINT collector may use leading questions when the technical nature of
the subject matter or the specific information needed leaves no alternatives.
Leading questions can be used to—
• Verify specific facts.
• Pinpoint map locations.
• Confirm information obtained during map tracking.
• Transition from one topic area to another.
Negative Questions
9-17. Negative questions are questions that contain a negative word in the
question itself such as, "Didn’t you go to the pick-up point?” If the source
says “yes,” the HUMINT collector is faced with the question of whether he
means “yes, I went to the pick-up point” or “yes, I didn’t go to the pick-up
point.” When the source answers, the HUMINT collector cannot be sure
what the answer means; therefore, he must ask additional questions. This
can be particularly confusing when working with an interpreter. Other
cultures may interpret a negative question in a way other than what the
HUMINT collector meant. Negative questions should never be used during
questioning unless they are being used deliberately during the approach to
make the source appear to contradict himself. In other instances, the
insertion of negative words within the question makes them impossibly open-
ended. For example, “Who didn’t attend the meeting?”
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
Compound Questions
9-18. Compound questions consist of two questions asked at the same time;
for example, "Before you were captured today, were you traveling north or
south?" Or “Where were you going after work and who were you to meet
there?” They are easily misunderstood and may confuse the source or force
him to give an ambiguous answer. Compound questions allow the source to
evade a part of the question or to give an incomplete answer.
Vague Questions
9-19. Vague questions do not have enough information for the source to
understand exactly what the HUMINT collector is asking. They may be
incomplete, general, or otherwise nonspecific and create doubt in the source's
mind. Vague questions confuse the source, waste time, and are easily evaded.
They result in answers that may confuse or mislead the HUMINT collector
and require further follow-up questions.
ELICITATION
9-20. Elicitation is the gaining of information through direct interaction with
a human source where the source is not aware of the specific purpose for the
conversation. Elicitation is a sophisticated technique used when conventional
questioning techniques cannot be used effectively. Of all the collection
methods, this one is the least obvious. However, it is important to note that
elicitation is a planned, systematic process that requires careful preparation.
Elicitation is always applied with a specific objective in mind and normally
directed toward a specific source.
LEADS
9-20. A lead is a statement made by a source spontaneously or in response to
questioning that leads the questioner to believe that the source has
information on a topic other than the one currently under discussion.
Documents captured with or on the source may also be exploited as sources of
leads. Leads are referred to as either “hot” or “cold.”
HOT LEADS
9-21. A hot lead is a statement made by a source either spontaneously or in
response to questioning that indicates he has information that could answer
intelligence requirements on a topic other than the one currently under
discussion. The lead could also be on a topic that although not listed as a
requirement is, based on the HUMINT collector’s experience, of critical
importance. Information on WMD and information on US personnel being
held by threat forces are normally considered hot leads even if not listed as
requirements. The HUMINT collector will normally question the source
immediately on a hot lead, unless he is already asking questions on another
topic. In this case, he completes questioning and reports the information on
the priority topic, as appropriate, and then immediately questions on the hot
lead. As soon as the HUMINT collector is sure he has obtained and recorded
all the details known to the source, he reports the hot lead information by the
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
COLD LEADS
9-22. A cold lead is a statement made by a source either spontaneously or in
response to questioning that indicates he has information on a topic of
interest other than the one currently under discussion but that would not
answer PIRs. The HUMINT collector makes note of the cold lead and exploits
it after the planned questioning objectives have been satisfied or at the
appropriate time during the questioning sequence.
DETECTING DECEIT
9-23. HUMINT information often has the capability to be more accurate and
reliable than other disciplines. SIGINT information, for example, is not
always able to return to the original source of the information to determine
the reliability of the information, and interpretation of IMINT information
may be uncertain. However, while HUMINT can be reviewed for reliability,
determining the reliability of human sources is a continuous process
accomplished by carefully assessing not only the sources of information but
also assessing the information itself.
9-24. Detection of deception is not a simple process, and it normally takes
years of experience before a HUMINT collector can readily identify deliberate
deceit. Inconsistencies in the source’s actions or words do not necessarily
indicate a lie, just as consistency is not necessarily a guarantee of the truth.
However, a pattern of inconsistencies or unexplainable inconsistencies
normally indicate deceit.
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
RECORDING TECHNIQUES
9-29. Accuracy and completeness are vital principles to reporting. However,
it is usually not possible to completely record all information in a questioning
session. Recording techniques may involve memory, handwritten or typed
notes, tape recordings, and video recordings. Each has its advantage and
corresponding disadvantage.
• Memory: Relying on one’s memory has certain advantages. It does not
require any equipment or extra time, and is the least intrusive method
of recording information. It allows maximum interaction with the
source and projects sincerity. An individual can train himself to
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
claimed to have received it, to the source’s known activities, may provide
indications of truthfulness or deception on the part of the source.
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
which they are planned to occur. The HUMINT collector will normally
establish various CPRs throughout the questioning of the source.
9-40. For certain sources such as friendly forces, tasked sources, or other
instances where the starting and ending points of the mission being
questioned are easily established, the first point of reference is normally
where that source began the mission. For other sources such as detainees,
line crossers, informers, and refugees, it is often more difficult to establish a
“starting point.” In these instances the HUMINT collector uses a sequential
approach to the map tracking. He establishes a point of reference that is a
logical end point for the subject being discussed. This may be, for example,
the point of capture for a detainee, the point where a line crosser entered the
friendly force area, or where a refugee left the area of intelligence interest.
Second and subsequent points of reference are established during
questioning when the source mentions a disposition, activity, or location of
interest that can be located on the map. The HUMINT collector locates the
reference point on the map through direct questioning and terrain
association. He uses leading questions as necessary to establish an exact
location. He then establishes the route of travel.
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
ILLITERATES
9-46. HUMINT collectors should never make the mistake of equating
illiteracy with a lack of intelligence or an inability to provide meaningful
information. In fact, many illiterates have developed extremely good
memories to compensate for their inability to rely on the written word. An
illiterate’s frame of reference does not include street signs, mile markers, and
calendars. It also will probably not include conventional time and distance
measurements. The HUMINT collector must compensate for these
differences. Map tracking, for example, must normally be accomplished by
terrain association. If the source cannot tell time, time of day can be
determined by the position of the sun.
Chapter 10
Reporting
10-1. Reporting is the final and in many cases the most vital phase in
HUMINT collection. If the collected information is not reported accurately, in
a timely manner, in the proper format, and to the correct recipient, it cannot
become part of the all-source intelligence product or tip in time to affect
operational decisions. Information that would support targeting must be
reported by the fastest means possible.
REPORTING PRINCIPLES
10-2. The HUMINT collector must be able, in a written report, to convey to
the user the information obtained from a source. Therefore, the following
principles of good report writing are to be followed:
• Accuracy. Accurately reflect the information obtained from the source.
Reporter comments and conclusions must be clearly identified as such.
• Brevity. Report all relevant information; however, the report should be
brief, to the point, and avoid unnecessary words.
• Clarity. Use simple sentences and understandable language. Proper
grammar and punctuation are a must. Another team member, if
possible, should read the reports to ensure clarity.
• Coherence. Present the information in a logical pattern based on
standard reporting formats.
• Completeness. Report all information collected. The collector should
not filter information since all information is of interest to an analyst.
Report negative responses to pertinent topics to prevent a
misunderstanding or duplication of effort in subsequent questioning
based on SDRs.
• Timeliness. Report information as soon as operationally feasible. Most
collection requirements contain a LTIOV as part of the requirement.
While written reports are preferable, critical or time-sensitive
information is passed by the most expedient means available.
• Releasability. Include only releasable information in reports that are to
be shared with multinational units. When possible, reports to be
shared with multinational units should be kept to the appropriate
classification to ensure the widest dissemination of the reported
information.
REPORT TYPES
10-3. There are two major categories for reporting information: operational
reports and source administrative reports. Figure 10-1 shows the HUMINT
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
reporting channels. Refer to DIAM 58-11 (S//NF) and DIAM 58-12 (S//NF) for
specific guidance in using these reports.
OPERATIONAL REPORTS
10-4. Operational reports is a broad category that encompasses all reports
that do not contain information collected in response to intelligence
requirements or the reporting of the technical, and usually sensitive, aspects
of HUMINT collection. It includes but is not limited to all administrative and
logistical reports. Unit SOPs and directives from higher headquarters
establish operational reporting requirements, formats, and procedures.
Operational reporting––
• Tells the commander where and when assets are conducting missions.
• Describes unit mission capability.
• Responds to administrative and logistical requirements.
• Describes support requirements.
• Includes but is not limited to unit status reports, mission planning
reports, mission status reports, and equipment status.
• Reports ICF usage at any echelon where the use of ICFs is authorized.
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
SALUTE Reports
10-10. The SALUTE report is a standard Army format used to report
information of immediate interest by individuals at any echelon. (See
Appendix H for a SALUTE report format.) The SALUTE report is the
primary means used to report combat information to units that could be
affected by that information. After review by the team leader, SALUTE
reports are sent simultaneously to the supported unit S2, to the OMT in
control of the HCT, and to the intelligence staff officer of any other tactical
unit that may be affected by the information contained in the SALUTE
report.
10-11. The OMT reviews the report and forwards it to the supporting HAT
and supporting J/G/S2X for inclusion in the analysis picture. The supported
S2 will––
• Review the information.
• Incorporate it into his unit intelligence products, as applicable.
• Forward the information to his higher echelon intelligence staff officer.
• Ensure that all affected units are notified.
10-12. Units must develop SOPs for the passing of information and
intelligence to multinational units. Report writers and editors must ensure
that reports that are to be shared with multinational units contain only
releasable information. This will enable reports to have the widest
dissemination. Arrangements are made through the C/J2X/LNO for
distribution. When possible, reports to be shared with multinational units
should be kept to the appropriate classification to ensure the widest
dissemination of the reported information.
Contact Reports
10-14. Collectors use contact reports to inform their technical chain (from
OMT through J/G/S2X) of all relevant information concerning specific
meetings with HUMINT sources. Information typically includes the
circumstances of the contact (purpose, locations, time), the operational
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Other Reports
10-15. HUMINT collectors also use a number of other reports to administer
source contacts and to report information. Copies of the following reports
should be maintained in the detainee’s permanent file for future reference.
HUMINT collectors will review these reports when planning additional
collection activities; release committees or tribunals can use the reports to
help evaluate if a detainee can be released or not. These reports include––
• Screening Reports. Screening reports are used to report BSDs,
knowledge areas and levels, cooperation, vulnerabilities to approaches,
and other relevant source information between HUMINT collectors. It
is normally filled out either electronically or manually by the initial
HUMINT collector to speak to a source. The screening report is
normally forwarded electronically to higher echelon HUMINT
collection organizations and other MI organizations that might have
interest in the source. Higher echelon organizations may add
information to the screening sheet extracted through subsequent
screenings. Available digital screening reports contained in the
HUMINT collector’s mission support software (for example, BAT or
CI/HUMINT Automated Management System [CHAMS]) should be
used whenever possible to ensure rapid transfer of data. If screening
reports have to be handwritten, the information collected should
conform to theater requirements and local SOPs.
• Knowledgeability Briefs. The KB is used to inform the Intelligence
Community of a source’s full identity, past history, and areas of
knowledge, as well as to set a suspense date for the submission of
intelligence requirements. It is normally only used at the strategic and
operational echelons. When completed, a KB will be classified at least
Confidential in accordance with the DIA Classification Guide to protect
the identity of the source. The use of KBs and the formats are covered
in DIAM 58-11 (S//NF). See Figure 10-2 for an example of a short
form KB that can be used for screening at all echelons, and can also
be prepared and published like the full KB. This allows the entire
intelligence community to see who is either in custody or to whom US
intelligence has access so that SDRs can be issued to help focus the
intelligence collection effort.
• Notice of Intelligence Potential (NIP). A NIP is used to inform the US
Intelligence Community of the availability of a source of potential
interest and to notify them of what agency has responsibility for
questioning that source and where to forward questions and requests
for information from that agency. The use of NIPs and the formats
are covered in DIAM 58-11 (S//NF).
• Lead Development Report (LDR). The LDR is used to inform the
HUMINT chain of ongoing operations directed toward a specific source.
It notifies them as to what element spotted the potential source, the
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
REPORTING ARCHITECTURE
10-16. There are three basic reporting channels (see Figure 10-1):
• The operational reporting chain consists of primarily the C2 elements
for the HUMINT collection element. It includes the OMTs, unit
commanders, and unit S3 and operation sections.
• The technical chain includes the OMTs, HOC, and the C/J/G/S2X, and
in certain circumstances, the unit G2/S2s.
• The intelligence reporting chain includes the OMTs, HATS,
C/J/G/S2Xs, and unit G2/S2s.
10-17. Many elements serve multiple and overlapping functions within the
reporting architecture. Each element must be aware of its function within the
architecture to ensure that information is disseminated expeditiously to the
right place in the right format. This architecture should be established and
published prior to implementation in order to avoid confusion.
OPERATIONAL REPORTING
10-18. Operational reporting is sent via the organic communications
architecture (see Chapter 13). Operational reports are normally sent per unit
SOP or based on direction from higher headquarters. HCTs normally send all
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
operational reports through their OMT to the command element of the unit to
which they are assigned. If an HCT is attached, it will normally send its
operational reports to the unit to which it is attached with courtesy copies to
their assigned unit as required. If there is an administrative or logistics
relationship established with the supported unit, HCTs that are in DS send
the principal copy of all related administrative and logistic reports to the
supported unit with a courtesy copy to their parent unit. If the HCT is
operating in GS, a courtesy copy of operational reports should be forwarded to
all affected unit commanders in the supported AO.
TECHNICAL REPORTING
10-19. Technical reporting includes the forwarding of source information and
technical parameters of collection operations from lower to higher and the
passing of tasking specifics, source information, technical control measures,
and other information from higher to lower. Technical reporting is conducted
through the technical chain that extends from the HCT through the OMT and
Operations Section (if one exists) to the C/J/G/S2X.
INTELLIGENCE REPORTING
10-20. The key to intelligence reporting is to balance the need for accurate
reporting with the need to inform affected units as quickly as possible. The
J/G/S2 and MI commander are key to ensuring the right balance.
J/G2
Supported
J/G2X ACE
S2
Other
Military
Government
Assets
Agencies
Operational Operational
Management Management
Team (GS) Team (DS)
GS CO DS CO
HUMINT HUMINT
Collector Collector
Team(s) Team(s)
Legend:
Operational
O perational
perati onal Reporting
Technical Reporting
Intelligence Reporting
NOTE: In addition to the standard HUMINT reporting channels, GS teams will simultaneously
send SALUTE reports to any units in their AOR that may be affected by the reported information.
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
KB-EZ
KB-EZ WORKSHEET
1. PERSONAL
PERSONAL DATA:
1A. Name:
Name:
1C.
1C. Source Number (MPs):
(MPs):
1G.
1G. Birth City:
City:
1H.
1H. Birth Country:
Country:
1I.
1 I. Birth Date:
Date:
2C.
2C. Name of Institution:
2F:
2F: Completion Status/Degree Type:
3C.
3C. City Location of Place of Employment:
Employment:
3D.
3D. Country of Place of Employment:
Employment:
3F.
3F. Security Clearance:
Clearance:
4D.
4D. Rank of Equivalent:
Equivalent:
4F.
4F. City Location of Unit/Group:
Unit/Group:
4H.
4H. Military/Group Duty Position/Title:
Position/Title:
4I.
4I. Security Clearance:
Clearance:
6
6.. NAME OF SCREENER:
Spoken
Entries
Ent ries for “Location” may need to include a village or even neighborhood.
neighborhood.
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
PREPARATION:
PREPARATION:
Coordinate
Coordinate with MP for access to the detainee.
Prepare
Prepare for exploitation topics:
O
Obtain
btain appropriate map sheet(s)
Obtain
Obtain references
R
Review
eview previous reports, detainee correspondence
Research
R esearch collection topics
Prepare questions
questions
Prepare
Prepare interrogation site (furnishings, lighting, climate, security, monitoring).
Ask
Ask Guard Questions.
Review
Review Detainee Documentation:
ID Card
Capture
C apture Tag
Documents
D ocuments captured with the detainee
Post-Inte
Post-Interrogation
Pos t-Interrogation
rrogation Report
Report
Effectiveness
Ef fectiveness of Approaches:
Approaches:
Attitude
Attitude and Behavior of Detaine
Detaine
e
e::
Summary
Sum mary of Topics Expl
Expl
oi
oited:
ted:
Expected
Expected Reports Production iin
nRResponse
esponse to Requirements:
esponse Requirements:
T
Termination:
ermination:
R
Reason:
eason:
Approach
Approa ch Reinforced:
Reinforced:
IIncentive
ncentive Promised:
Promised:
D
Delivered:
elivered:
R
Recommendation
ecommendation for Further Interrogation and Rationale:
R
Recommended
ecommended Approach(es):
T
Topics
opics for Further Exploitation (Leads):
D
Disposition
isposition of Source:_______________________________________________________________
Additional
Additional Comments:_______________________________________________________________
FM 2-22.3
Chapter 11
ADVANTAGES
11-2. Interpreters are frequently a necessary aid to HUMINT collection.
There are certain advantages to using an interpreter. The most obvious is
that without an interpreter, a HUMINT collector without the proper
language or necessary proficiency in that language is severely limited.
Furthermore, if properly trained, briefed, and assessed, the interpreter can
be a valuable assistant to the HUMINT collector. The interpreter––
• Probably has a greater knowledge of the local culture and language
usage than could be developed by the HUMINT collector.
• Can identify language and culturally based clues that can help the
HUMINT collector confirm or refute the veracity of the source’s
statements.
• Can interpret not only the literal meaning of a statement but also the
intent and emotion of a sentence.
DISADVANTAGES
11-3. There are, however, several significant disadvantages to using
interpreters. Disadvantages may include—
• A significant increase in time to conduct the collection. Since the
interpreter must repeat each phrase, the time for a given questioning
session or meeting is normally at least doubled.
• Since there is now a third person in the communications loop, the
potential for confusion or misunderstanding increases significantly.
This is especially true when the interpreter is deficient in his command
of either language.
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
CAUTIONS
11-4. Be careful of comments made in the presence of your interpreter.
Although you plan comprehensively with your interpreter, you should only
share information with your interpreter on a need-to-know basis. Obviously
the exchange of information concerning the “what, where, when, with whom,
and how” of each meeting must be discussed with your interpreter, but
sometimes the “real why” is none of his business! You may be meeting with a
source or contact because the commander believes this individual has lied.
The real purpose (the why) of the meeting is to pose control questions and to
determine whether the source or contact lied in the past or whether there
was simply a miscommunication.
11-5. Be careful of sensitive or personal conversations when the interpreter
is present. This applies to conversations en route to or from meetings,
conversations over lunch or dinner in the operational area, and conversations
in the team area. It is easy to get used to the presence of the interpreter and
to overlook his presence. An interpreter is a necessary tool but we must
remember that most are only very lightly screened for the sensitive access
they have. If your interpreter turned out to be working for the other side,
what information beyond “the necessary” could he provide?
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
BASIC METHOD
11-7. The basic method of interaction is used when––
• The interpreter and HUMINT collectors have not worked together
extensively.
• The interpreter has language skills but no interpreter training or
experience.
• The interpreter’s skill in English or the target language is suspect.
• The HUMINT collector has limited experience using an interpreter.
• The interpreter’s capabilities, loyalty, or cultural knowledge are not
known or suspect.
11-8. Using the basic method, the interpreter is used solely as an
interpretation device. When initial contact is made, the interpreter instructs
the source to maintain eye contact with the HUMINT collector. The
interpreter is briefed on the general course of the collection but usually is not
advised of the specific purpose or collection goals. While the interpreter will
be instructed to reflect the attitude, behavior, and tone of voice of both the
collector and the source, he is told to not interpose comments or personal
opinions at all in the conversation.
11-9. The questioning phase is conducted in the same way it would be if no
interpreter were used with the obvious increase in time due to the
interpretation. The interpreter uses the same person and tense as the
HUMINT collector or source and neither adds nor subtracts anything from
the dialogue. He does his best to fade into the background. When reports are
written, the interpreter will only be asked questions based on the actual
translation of the dialogue.
ADVANCED METHOD
11-10. The advanced method of interaction requires additional training on
the part of the HUMINT collector and the interpreter, extensive experience
working together, and a rapport between the HUMINT collector and the
interpreter. The HUMINT collector must trust both the capabilities and the
judgment of the interpreter. At this level of interaction, the interpreter
becomes a more active participant in the HUMINT activities. The HUMINT
collector remains in charge and makes it clear to the interpreter that he (the
HUMINT collector) is responsible for the substance and direction of the
questioning. The interpreter is normally briefed as to the specific goals of the
collection.
11-11. The interpreter becomes a more active participant in the approach
and termination phases to the point of even making planned comments to the
source supportive of the HUMINT collector’s approach. For example, if the
HUMINT collector is using an incentive approach, the interpreter in an aside
to the source can tell him that the HUMINT collector always keeps his
promises. This type of technique should only be used if both planned and
rehearsed.
11-12. During the questioning phase, the interpreter supports the collector
by not only translating the word of the source but also cueing the collector
when there are language or culturally based nuances to what the source is
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
saying that might add credence or doubt as to the veracity of the statements.
For example, the interpreter could point out that although the source claims
to be a factory worker, his language use indicates that the source has a
university education. In another example, the interpreter could indicate that
the dialect or pronunciation that the source is using does not match the area
that he claims to be from. During report writing, the interpreter supports the
HUMINT collector by not only answering questions on the literal
interpretation but also adds, when appropriate, comments on the significance
of both what was said and how it was said.
SOURCES OF INTERPRETERS
11-13. There are almost never sufficient interpreters to meet all unit mission
requirements. Interpreters in support of HUMINT collection require a
security clearance and knowledge of the operational situation. While any
qualified interpreter can be used to support HUMINT collection, the
HUMINT collectors maximize the collection potential if the interpreter has
received specific training. The number of interpreters needed to support a
HUMINT collection mission is METT-TC driven based primarily on the
number of HUMINT collectors, the dispersion of the HUMINT collectors in
the AO, and the number of sources. Normally one interpreter for every two
non-language qualified HUMINT collectors is sufficient; however, in
situations where a large number of high-value sources must be questioned in
a limited time, a ratio of 1 to 1 may be required. Interpreters are obtained
from within the military and from the US and local civilian populations or
other English-speaking countries.
MILITARY
11-14. There are many soldiers, including non-US citizens, who have native
language abilities due to their upbringing. Their parent unit may identify
these language abilities, or these soldiers may volunteer their abilities when
a contingency arises. The ARNG, USAR, other US military services, and even
coalition militaries, have language-trained and certified personnel in
Military Intelligence MOSs, such as 98G or 09L, who may be called upon to
serve as interpreters for the HUMINT collection effort.
CIVILIAN
11-15. Civilian corporations may be contracted by the military to provide
interpreters for an operation. These interpreters are divided into three
categories:
• CAT I Linguists - Locally hired personnel with an understanding of the
English language. These personnel undergo a limited screening and
are hired in-theater. They do not possess a security clearance and are
used for unclassified work. During most operations, CAT I linguists are
required to be re-screened on a scheduled basis. CAT I linguists should
not be used for HUMINT collection operations.
• CAT II Linguists - US citizens who have native command of the target
language and near-native command of the English language. These
personnel undergo a screening process, which includes a national
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
INTERPRETATION TECHNIQUES
11-16. During the planning and preparation phase, the HUMINT collector, in
collaboration with the interpreter, selects a method of interpretation. There
are two methods:
• Alternate Interpretation. The interpreter listens to the entire phrase,
sentence, or paragraph. The interpreter then translates it during
natural pauses in speech.
• Simultaneous Interpretation. The interpreter listens to the source and
translates what he says, just a phrase or a few words behind. The
HUMINT collector should select the simultaneous method only if all
the following criteria are met:
• The sentence structure of the target language is parallel to English.
• The interpreter can understand and speak English as well as the
target language with ease.
• The interpreter has special vocabulary skills for the topics to be
covered.
• The interpreter can easily imitate the HUMINT collector’s tone of
voice and attitude for the approaches and questioning technique
selected.
• Neither the collector nor the interpreter tends to get confused when
using the simultaneous method of interpretation.
11-17. If any of the above-mentioned criteria in the simultaneous method
cannot be met, the HUMINT collector should use the alternate method. The
alternate method should also be used when a high degree of precision is
required.
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
• The interpreter should inform the HUMINT collector if there are any
inconsistencies in the language used by the source. The HUMINT
collector will use this information in his assessment of the source.
• The interpreter needs to assist with the preparation of reports and
administrative documents relevant to the source and meeting.
11-19. Once the HUMINT collector has chosen a method of interpretation, he
must brief the interpreter. This briefing must cover—
• The current situation.
• Background information on the source (if available).
• The administrative particulars of the meeting such as where it will be
held, the room setup, how long it will last.
• The specific positioning of the interpreter, collector, and source.
• The general or (if advanced method of interaction is being used) the
specific collection objectives.
• The selected approach and possible alternate approaches that the
HUMINT collector plans on using. If time allows, the collector and
interpreter should rehearse the approaches.
• Any special topic or technical language that is anticipated. If time
allows, the interpreter should research any anticipated technical
vocabulary with which he is unfamiliar.
11-20. Throughout the briefing, the HUMINT collector fully and clearly
answers questions the interpreter may have. This helps ensure the
interpreter completely understands his role in the HUMINT collection
process. With a more advanced interaction plan, the HUMINT collector and
the interpreter should “wargame” their plan and rehearse their actions as
necessary.
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
The HUMINT collector should also review these files before using an
unfamiliar interpreter.
FM 2-22.3
PART FOUR
Chapter 12
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
and factors so that analysts can detect patterns and establish threat
intentions.
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
SOURCE ANALYSIS
12-11. Source analysis involves the actions taken to determine if information
from a single human source is internally consistent based on factors such as
placement and access of source, prior information from the source, and
existing holdings. Source analysis is used to determine if the information
from a source is complete, truthful, and responsive to collection
requirements. Preliminarily source analysis is the responsibility of the
individual HUMINT collector.
12-12. The HUMINT collector evaluates all source statements within the
context of the information known about the source and the current situation
to determine both the veracity and the validity of source statements. That is
not to say that the HUMINT collector ignores any information that does not
fit into expected pattern; rather that he treats that information with
skepticism and uses appropriate questioning methodology to validate the
statements (see Chapter 9). Source analysis is supported by the HCT leader,
the OMTs, and the HOC. Each echelon reviews the intelligence and
operational reports, identifies inconsistencies, evaluates veracity, and recom
mends additional lines of questioning as appropriate.
12-13. Analysts can assign an alphanumeric designator to collected
information based on an analyst’s determination of the reliability of the
source and the probable accuracy of the information reported. A letter from A
to F is assigned reflecting the level of reliability, with A representing the
highest degree of reliability. The letter designation is then coupled with a
number from 1 to 6. The number 1 represents confirmed intelligence and the
numbers 2 through 6 represent increasing degrees of uncertainty as to the
veracity of the information. A complete explanation if this rating system is
contained in Appendix B. [NOTE: This system of labeling the reliability of
sources and their reported information should not be confused with the
alphanumeric rating scheme for source-screening operations as described in
Chapter 6.]
________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Matrices
12-18. Construction of a matrix is the easiest and simplest way to show the
relationships between a number of similar or dissimilar associated items.
The items can be anything that is important to a collection effort such as
people, places, organizations, automobile license plates, weapons, telephone
numbers, or locations. In analysis, matrices are often used to identify “who
knows whom,” or “who has been where or done what” in a clear concise
manner. There are two types of matrices used in human analysis: the
association matrix, used to determine existence of relationships between
individual human beings, and the activities matrix, used to determine
connectivity between individuals and any organization, event, address,
activity, or any other non-personal entity. The graphics involved in
constructing the two types of matrices differ slightly, but the principles are
identical.
12-19. The association matrix (Figure 12-2) shows connections between key
individuals involved in any event or activity. It shows associations within a
group or associated activity. Normally, this type of matrix is constructed in
the form of an equilateral triangle having the same number of rows and
columns. Personalities must be listed in exactly the same order along both
the rows and columns to ensure that all possible associations are correctly
depicted. An alternate method is to list the names along the diagonal side of
the matrix. This type of matrix does not show the nature, degree, or duration
of a relationship, only that a relationship exists. The purpose of the matrix is
to show the analyst who knows whom and who are suspected to know whom.
In the event that a person of interest dies, a diamond is drawn next to his or
her name on the matrix.
12-20. The analyst uses a dot or closed (filled-in) circle to depict a strong or
known association. A known association is determined by direct contact
between one or more persons. Direct contact is determined by several factors.
Direct associations include––
• Face-to-face meetings.
• Telephonic conversations in which the analyst is sure who was
conversing with whom.
• Members of a cell or other group who are involved in the same
operations.
________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8 9
10 11 12 13 14
15 16 17 18 19
27 MAY 93 29 MAY
MAY 93 19 JUN 93 22 JUN 93 24 JUN 93
Timing device Recon
Reco n of Holland First batch of Salem and Alvarez FBI arrest Siddig,
tested and Lincoln tunnels ANFO mixed attempt to buy guns Sallah, Alvarez,
Kallafalla, and 5
Sundanese
Sund anese
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Albert
Bernard
Michael
Victor
William
Ludwig
Herbert
George
Clarence
Julia
Francis
Figure 12-2. Example of an Association Matrix.
A lb e rt
B e rn a rd
M ic h a e l
V ic to r
W illia m
L u d w ig
H e rb e rt
G e o rg e
C la re n c e
J u lia
F ra n c is
Swiss bank
Terrace Club
Rome Bomb
Mons
Rome
Red Fighters
Blue Flat
Paris
Libya
Frankfurt bomb
I.S.C.V.
Frankfurt
12-25. The link analysis diagram (Figure 12-4) shows the connections
between people, groups, or activities. The difference between matrices and
link analysis is roughly the same as the difference between a mileage chart
and a road map. The mileage chart (matrix) shows the connections between
cities using numbers to represent travel distances. The map (link analysis
diagram) uses symbols that represent cities, locations, and roads to show how
two or more locations are linked to each other.
Assn MAR 91
Khalla- Hampton
Zaid Saleh
? Shalabi Falla El
$ El
Alvarez Siddigg
Siddi Salem
Ayyad Hassan
Abou-
Abou-
Halima Planned UN/FBI/Tunnel
$ Bombing – In Custody
German Salameh
Bank
Elgabr Shaik
WTC
Bomb Owny Rahman
FBI
? 4 Bomb Attacks in
Nossair Egypt 1990
Kahane
Assassination
Karam Unk
Yusef $
Hezbollah
Tvl to Iraq Iran Mrs.
Fall 1992 $ Rahman Farag Unk
Egypt
JONES JONES
JON ES
• Persons known by more than one name (alias or AKA) are shown as
overlapping circles with names in each circle (as shown below) or
both names are simply listed in the same circle. If the alias is
suspected, a dotted line is used to depict the intersection. If the alias
is confirmed, the intersection is shown with a solid line.
BROWN
BROWN GREEN BROWN GREEN
MOSQUE
CARTER CARTER
R R
RTE RTE
CA S CA S
NE =
=
NE =
=
JO JO
JONES JONES
C
CCNY
CNY ’88 – ‘91
‘91
3 = CARTER
CARTE
CARTER
R JONES
JONES
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
A B C
12-28. The analyst can easily determine from the diagram that Alpha knows
Bravo, Bravo knows Charlie and Delta. Bravo is suspected of knowing Echo
and Charlie knows Delta, Bravo, and Echo. Although the same information
could be shown on a matrix, it is easier to understand when depicted on a
link analysis diagram. As situations or investigations become more complex,
the ease in understanding a link analysis diagram becomes more apparent.
In almost all cases, the available information is first depicted and analyzed
on both types of matrices, which are then used to construct a link analysis
diagram for further analysis.
12-29. Link analysis diagrams can show organizations, membership within
the organization, action teams or cells, or participants in an event. Since each
individual depicted on a link analysis diagram can be shown only once, and
some individuals may belong to more than one organization or take part in
more than one event, squares or rectangles representing non-personal
entities may have to overlap. The following illustration demonstrates that
Ralph and Fred are both members of the "Red Fighters," and that Fred also
is a member of the "Students for Peace." Further, since Ralph and Fred are
shown in the same “box,” it is a given that they are mutually associated.
Red Fighters
Fred Ralph
Ralph
S.F.P.
Bombing
Terrorist
Supporting
Training Ahmed
Government
Camp
Terrorist Group
12-30. There is more to overlapping organizations than is immediately
obvious. At first glance, the overlap indicates only that an individual may
belong to more than one organization or has taken part in multiple activities.
Further study and analysis would reveal connections between organizations,
connections between events, or connections between organizations and
events, either directly or through persons. The above diagram reveals a more
________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
SMITH JONES
BROWN
CELL
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
12-35. In the second case, where Smith is associated with the entity, but not
the persons who are members of entity, the situation is shown as depicted
here:
SMITH JONES
BROWN
CELL
SMITH
JONES SMITH
________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
12-37. Use the association matrix and show all confirmed and suspected
personal associations.
D H
E A C B I
F J
G
• After all personal associations have been shown on the link analysis
diagram, the analyst uses the activities matrix to determine which
activities, organizations, or other non-personal entities need to be
depicted by appropriate rectangles. Having done so, the lines of
connectivity between persons within the rectangles may be removed
to prevent clutter. (It is assumed that participants in the same
activity or members of the same cell are acquainted.)
D H
E A C B I
F J
G
CELL 1 CELL 2
12-38. As shown in Figure 12-4, the link analysis diagram depicts the
membership, organization, activities, and connections of the group that,
under the leadership of Sheik Omar Abdul Rahman, carried out the bombing
of the World Trade Center in New York City and planned other bombing
attacks. Together with the time event chart (Figure 12-1), one can gain a
basic understanding of the group and its activities, and develop working
hypotheses for additional collection and analysis efforts.
12-39. After completion of the matrices and the link analysis diagram, the
analyst makes recommendations about the group’s structure, and areas can
be identified for further collection. Collection assets are employed to verify
suspected connections, ID key personalities, and substantiate or refute the
conclusions and assessments drawn from the link analysis that has been
done. The link analysis diagram and thorough analysis of the information it
contains can reveal a great deal about an organization. It can identify the
group’s leadership, its strong and weak points, and operational patterns. The
analyst can use these to predict future activities.
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Coordinates Register
12-41. The coordinates register, or incident map, is one type of pattern
analysis tool (Figure 12-5). It illustrates cumulative events that have
occurred within the AO and focuses on the “where” of an event. The analyst
may use multiple coordinates registers that focus on a different subject or
blend subjects. Normally, the coordinates register includes additional
information such as notes or graphics. The analyst should use the
coordinates register in conjunction with the pattern analysis plot sheet.
Town of Macomb
________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
B – Miscellaneous
Miscellaneous
L – Raid
Raid
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
OB Factors
12-43. A final analytical tool is OB. The OB does not predict enemy
intentions or probable COAs but is a means of cataloging intelligence data
that qualifies and quantifies certain aspects of threat units. The analyst uses
nine factors shown in Table 12-1 to focus the analysis. These help the analyst
determine threat capabilities, vulnerabilities, and COAs. Although the
situation may dictate that one or more of the factors are given a higher
priority, generally speaking, they are all of equal importance. The OB
framework, while initially developed to support force-on-force offensive and
defensive operations, is easily adapted to support stability and reconstruction
operations and to depict “unconventional” forces or even civilian
organizations.
Table 12-1. Order of Battle Factors.
Factor Component
Composition • Unit identification
• Organization
Disposition • Geographical Location
• Tactical Deployment
• Movements
Strength • Personnel
• Weapons and Equipment
• Types of Units
Tactics • Tactical Doctrine
• Special Operations
Training • Individual
• Unit
• Specialized
Logistics • Systems
• Status
• Funding
Combat Effectiveness • Combat Experience
• Morale
• Tactics
• Logistics
Electronic Technical Data/Emitter Nomenclature • Emitter Type
• Mode of Emission
• Frequency Range
• Location Accuracy for Direction Finding
• Associated Use (Units or Weapons)
Miscellaneous • Personalities/Leadership
• Unit History
• Uniforms and Insignia
• Code Names and Numbers
12-44. The OB is based on the premise that there are certain constants to
any group activity. All groups whether they are conventional military forces,
insurgent groups, or civilian organizations must have an organizational
structure (composition). This structure may not be easily discernable but it
will exist. Likewise, any organization has a location or locations in which it
operates, personnel and equipment numbers, a system for training, getting
supplies, judging efficiency and effectiveness of its operations, communi-
________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
cating, and taking care of other intangibles such as morale. The OB gives the
analyst a framework to organize information. The analyst adapts the topic
headings to match the particular environment.
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
Source Source
3 4
Source
Source 1
2
0001
0001 Police Village 1 X
FM 2-22.3
Chapter 13
AUTOMATION
FM 2-22.3 ________________________________________________________________________________
BIOMETRICS
13-4. Biometrics is the study of measurable biological characteristics. In
HUMINT collection, biometric devices, usually computer based, enable the
HUMINT collector to use biological data to support the collection and
analysis effort. Biometrics can also be used in non-HUMINT efforts to
collect and maintain evidence for criminal prosecution. The two major types
of biometric data that are useful to the HUMINT collector are identification
data and data that indicate source truthfulness. Identification devices use
biological information such as fingerprints, voiceprints, facial scans, and
retinal scans to match an individual to a source database. They can verify
the identity of a specific individual from the target population during
screening.
13-5. HCTs may be equipped with portable equipment for collecting,
storing, analyzing, forwarding, and retrieving biometric information. The
BAT is able to identify personnel by using identifying characteristics of
their irises, fingerprints, or facial photograph. The structured query
language (SQL) server-based database links identifying characteristics
with all previous reports related to the person. Once a person’s identifying
characteristics are entered into the database, if that person is again
detained and scanned, the system has a probability of identifying them that
approaches 100 percent. This ability is especially useful for determining if
a source is providing the same information to multiple collectors; thereby
avoiding false confirmation of information. HUMINT collectors primarily
use BAT during screening operations at all echelons; from checkpoint
screening, to screening at a DCP, to screening at a JIDC. MPs use the
Detainee Reporting System (DRS) during in-processing at internment
facilities. The DRS records data for detainee processing and tracking and is
intended to interact with the BAT system to avoid duplication of effort.
13-6. The hardware that makes up the system, which is given to MI teams,
consists of a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) semi-hardened laptop
computer running an operating system with a graphical user interface. It
has a camera and an iris scanner, each of which is portable and can be used
independent of the computer to collect and temporarily store information.
The system also includes a fingerprint scanner that conforms to FBI
requirements for admissible evidence. The fingerprint scanner must be
attached to the computer during use.
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
13-7. Biometric devices such as voice stress analyzer and polygraph support
the determination of the truthfulness of a source. The polygraph is of
limited usefulness in general HUMINT collection due to the level of
expertise needed to operate it and the lack of general availability of the
device to the field. As devices are developed that can remotely collect and
report information to the HUMINT collector on subtle changes in the
source’s respiration, heartbeat, perspiration, and eye movement that can be
indicators of deceit, they can be used to support HUMINT collection.
FM 2-22.3 ________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
SEARCH ENGINES
13-14. Search engines provide access to previously collected or known
information facilitating the development of comprehensive analytical and
intelligence products and avoiding unnecessary collection tasking
redundancy. A tool set for data visualization, search, and discovery is
required, which is embedded with several software programs for
manipulating data from multiple databases. The types of modules in
visualization packages should include search engines and knowledge
discovery (semantic clustering) for unformatted data, applications for
extracting and organizing formatted data, and data labeling. The package
should also include a model building tool to enable users to make their
archives more efficient with respect to search, retrieval, and compatibility
to other applications as well as archiving and maintenance tools to support
what will eventually become a large data warehouse. Search engines
should be⎯
• Multilingual and able to query multiple classified and unclassified
databases.
• Capable of developing, querying, and manipulating stored
information.
FM 2-22.3 ________________________________________________________________________________
• Identify timely intelligence gaps and the leads to fill those gaps.
• Ensure immediate analytical feedback on collector reports to—
• Post questions directly to a web page to enable all HCTs to answer
or be cued to the specific request.
• Identify or request clarification on questionable data for quality
control.
• Fuse HUMINT information and all-source information as required.
• Focus collection teams supporting maneuver commanders’
requirements more effectively.
• Immediately extract information for crisis reaction.
13-17. If HCTs use web portals to submit reports directly to theater level,
they must also send the reports through their OMT for submission to the
2X. Failure to do so may deny the 2X the ability to deconflict and cross-
reference reports. HUMINT collectors must ensure that they follow the
theater-specific methodology for access to the theater web portal.
DATABASES
13-18. Without databases, information is difficult or impossible to retrieve
quickly, especially under adverse conditions. Databases allow access to
data in a distributed environment and support many complex HUMINT
functions and requirements, including—
• Mission deconfliction.
• RM.
• RFIs.
• HUMINT analysis.
• Summary, report, and assessment preparation.
• Threat and friendly situation tracking.
• Targeting.
13-19. Databases interact with other tools to support predictive analysis,
prepare graphic analytical products, and provide situational understanding
down to the HCT. These databases⎯
• Support time event charts, association matrices, link analysis, and
other analysis tools.
• Require a designated systems administrator at each. To ensure a
high degree of integrity, discrepancies must be verified for accuracy.
• Allow operators, managers, and analysts to—
• Compartment (protect) source-sensitive operational database
segments, files, records, and fields.
• Create, update, and maintain databases from locally generated
information.
• Import complete or partial databases from larger or peer databases.
• Export complete or partial databases to peer or larger databases.
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
AUTOMATION SYSTEMS
13-21. The HUMINT collection automation systems are normally shared
systems used by both the HUMINT and CI communities. They must have
connectivity with lateral units as well as higher and subordinate elements.
FM 2-22.3 ________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
COMMUNICATIONS
13-27. Successful HUMINT operations must be supported by multi-echelon
technical control and a communications system that provides internal team
communications, links HCTs to OMTs, and links OMTs to higher
headquarters, analytical elements, and theater and national agencies.
COMMUNICATION ARCHITECTURE
13-28. The HUMINT collection architecture requires operation on several
communications and processing nets. These nets provide the framework
needed to coordinate the tasking, reporting, C2, and service support of
HUMINT collection units spread across the width and depth of the
battlefield. Under most operational scenarios, HCTs are not stationary.
They are constantly moving throughout their supported command’s AO and
are able to communicate on the move. They cannot rely on fixed
communications nodes for support. Communications redundancy ensures
the loss of any one system does not severely disrupt HUMINT operations.
HCTs and OMTs normally operate at the collateral security level to ensure
the timely dissemination of combat information and targeting data to
organizations operating outside MI channels. The C/J/G/S2X normally
requires access to Top Secret (SCI) communications capabilities to maintain
coordination with national level agencies.
13-29. The HUMINT collection assets use three basic communications nets:
the operations and intelligence (O/I) net, a command net, and a HUMINT-
specific technical net. Dependent on their mission and battlefield location,
the HCTs may also need to monitor the fire support element (FSE),
aviation, or air defense artillery (ADA) communications nets.
• The O/I net links the collectors and producers of intelligence to the
consumers of the intelligence information. It is used to pass
information of immediate value to the affected unit and to analytical
elements at the supported unit.
• The command nets exist at every echelon of command. They link the
superior headquarters with its subordinate elements. Normally a
unit will operate on two command nets; the one that links that unit
to its higher headquarters and the one that links that unit to its
subordinate elements. HUMINT elements will also use their unit’s
command net to coordinate logistic and administrative support.
• The technical nets link the control team to all of their subordinate
collection teams and to the centers or organizations that provide the
databases and technical guidance necessary for single-discipline
collection and analysis. For example, the technical net would connect
HCTs through their control teams to the S2X and higher echelon
HUMINT analysis organizations.
FM 2-22.3 ________________________________________________________________________________
Appendix A
Geneva Conventions
The articles in this section are extracted from the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949.
ARTICLE 1
The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present
Convention in all circumstances.
ARTICLE 2
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace time, the present Convention
shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between
two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of
them.
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a
High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention, the Powers
who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall
furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and
applies the provisions thereof.
ARTICLE 3
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of
the High Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum,
the following provisions:
1. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who
have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or
any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse
distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar
criteria. To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in
any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel
treatment and torture;
(c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment;
(d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment
pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may
offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavor to bring into force, by means of special
agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the
conflict.
ARTICLE 4
A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging to one of the
following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy:
1. Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of militias or
volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.
2. Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of
organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or
outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or
volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfill the following
conditions:
(d) That of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.
4. Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof, such as
civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members
of labor units or of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that they
have received authorization from the armed forces which they accompany, who shall provide
them for that purpose with an identity card similar to the annexed model.
5. Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices, of the merchant marine and
the crews of civil aircraft of the Parties to the conflict, who do not benefit by more favorable
treatment under any other provisions of international law.
B. The following shall likewise be treated as prisoners of war under the present Convention:
1. Persons belonging, or having belonged, to the armed forces of the occupied country, if the
occupying Power considers it necessary by reason of such allegiance to intern them, even
though it has originally liberated them while hostilities were going on outside the territory it
occupies, in particular where such persons have made an unsuccessful attempt to rejoin the
armed forces to which they belong and which are engaged in combat, or where they fail to
comply with a summons made to them with a view to internment.
2. The persons belonging to one of the categories enumerated in the present Article, who have
been received by neutral or non-belligerent Powers on their territory and whom these Powers
are required to intern under international law, without prejudice to any more favorable
treatment which these Powers may choose to give and with the exception of Articles 8, 10, 15,
30, fifth paragraph, 58-67, 92, 126 and, where diplomatic relations exist between the Parties
to the conflict and the neutral or non-belligerent Power concerned, those Articles concerning
the Protecting Power. Where such diplomatic relations exist, the Parties to a conflict on whom
these persons depend shall be allowed to perform towards them the functions of a Protecting
Power as provided in the present Convention, without prejudice to the functions which these
Parties normally exercise in conformity with diplomatic and consular usage and treaties.
C. This Article shall in no way affect the status of medical personnel and chaplains as provided
for in Article 33 of the present Convention.
ARTICLE 5
The present Convention shall apply to the persons referred to in Article 4 from the time they fall
into the power of the enemy and until their final release and repatriation.
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and having
fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such
persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has
been determined by a competent tribunal.
ARTICLE 6
In addition to the agreements expressly provided for in Articles 10, 23, 28, 33, 60, 65, 66, 67, 72,
73, 75, 109, 110, 118, 119, 122 and 132, the High Contracting Parties may conclude other special
agreements for all matters concerning which they may deem it suitable to make separate
provision. No special agreement shall adversely affect the situation of prisoners of war, as
defined by the present Convention, nor restrict the rights which it confers upon them.
Prisoners of war shall continue to have the benefit of such agreements as long as the Convention
is applicable to them, except where express provisions to the contrary are contained in the
aforesaid or in subsequent agreements, or where more favorable measures have been taken with
regard to them by one or other of the Parties to the conflict.
ARTICLE 7
Prisoners of war may in no circumstances renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured to
them by the present Convention, and by the special agreements referred to in the foregoing
Article, if such there be.
ARTICLE 8
The present Convention shall be applied with the cooperation and under the scrutiny of the
Protecting Powers whose duty it is to safeguard the interests of the Parties to the conflict. For
this purpose, the Protecting Powers may appoint, apart from their diplomatic or consular staff,
delegates from amongst their own nationals or the nationals of other neutral Powers. The said
delegates shall be subject to the approval of the Power with which they are to carry out their
duties.
The Parties to the conflict shall facilitate to the greatest extent possible the task of the
representatives or delegates of the Protecting Powers.
The representatives or delegates of the Protecting Powers shall not in any case exceed their
mission under the present Convention. They shall, in particular, take account of the imperative
necessities of security of the State wherein they carry out their duties.
ARTICLE 9
The provisions of the present Convention constitute no obstacle to the humanitarian activities
which the International Committee of the Red Cross or any other impartial humanitarian
organization may, subject to the consent of the Parties to the conflict concerned, undertake for
the protection of prisoners of war and for their relief.
ARTICLE 10
The High Contracting Parties may at any time agree to entrust to an organization which offers
all guarantees of impartiality and efficacy the duties incumbent on the Protecting Powers by
virtue of the present Convention.
When prisoners of war do not benefit or cease to benefit, no matter for what reason, by the
activities of a Protecting Power or of an organization provided for in the first paragraph above,
the Detaining Power shall request a neutral State, or such an organization, to undertake the
functions performed under the present Convention by a Protecting Power designated by the
Parties to a conflict.
If protection cannot be arranged accordingly, the Detaining Power shall request or shall accept,
subject to the provisions of this Article, the offer of the services of a humanitarian organization,
such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, to assume the humanitarian functions
performed by Protecting Powers under the present Convention.
Any neutral Power or any organization invited by the Power concerned or offering itself for these
purposes, shall be required to act with a sense of responsibility towards the Party to the conflict
on which persons protected by the present Convention depend, and shall be required to furnish
sufficient assurances that it is in a position to undertake the appropriate functions and to
discharge them impartially.
No derogation from the preceding provisions shall be made by special agreements between
Powers one of which is restricted, even temporarily, in its freedom to negotiate with the other
Power or its allies by reason of military events, more particularly where the whole, or a
substantial part, of the territory of the said Power is occupied.
Whenever in the present Convention mention is made of a Protecting Power, such mention
applies to substitute organizations in the sense of the present Article.
ARTICLE 11
In cases where they deem it advisable in the interest of protected persons, particularly in cases of
disagreement between the Parties to the conflict as to the application or interpretation of the
provisions of the present Convention, the Protecting Powers shall lend their good offices with a
view to settling the disagreement.
For this purpose, each propose to the Parties of the Protecting Powers may, either at the
invitation of one Party or on its own initiative, to the conflict a meeting of their representatives,
and in particular of the authorities responsible for prisoners of war, possibly on neutral territory
suitably chosen. The Parties to the conflict shall be bound to give effect to the proposals made to
them for this purpose. The Protecting Powers may, if necessary, propose for approval by the
Parties to the conflict a person belonging to a neutral Power, or delegated by the International
Committee of the Red Cross, who shall be invited to take part in such a meeting.
Prisoners of war are in the hands of the enemy Power, but not of the individuals or military units
who have captured them. Irrespective of the individual responsibilities that may exist, the
Detaining Power is responsible for the treatment given them.
Prisoners of war may only be transferred by the Detaining Power to a Power which is a party to
the Convention and after the Detaining Power has satisfied itself of the willingness and ability of
such transferee Power to apply the Convention. When prisoners of war are transferred under
such circumstances, responsibility for the application of the Convention rests on the Power
accepting them while they are in its custody.
Nevertheless if that Power fails to carry out the provisions of the Convention in any important
respect, the Power by whom the prisoners of war were transferred shall, upon being notified by
the PROTECTING Power, take effective measures to correct the situation or shall request the
return of the prisoners of war. Such requests must be complied with.
ARTICLE 13
Prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated. Any unlawful act or omission by the
Detaining Power causing death or seriously endangering the health of a prisoner of war in its
custody is prohibited, and will be regarded as a serious breach of the present Convention. In
particular, no prisoner of war may be subjected to physical mutilation or to medical or scientific
experiments of any kind which are not justified by the medical, dental or hospital treatment of
the prisoner concerned and carried out in his interest.
Likewise, prisoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of violence or
intimidation and against insults and public curiosity.
ARTICLE 14
Prisoners of war are entitled in all circumstances to respect for their persons and their honor.
Women shall be treated with all the regard due to their sex and shall in all cases benefit by
treatment as favorable as that granted to men. Prisoners of war shall retain the full civil
capacity which they enjoyed at the time of their capture. The Detaining Power may not restrict
the exercise, either within or without its own territory, of the rights such capacity confers except
in so far as the captivity requires.
ARTICLE 15
The Power detaining prisoners of war shall be bound to provide free of charge for their
maintenance and for the medical attention required by their state of health.
ARTICLE 16
Taking into consideration the provisions of the present Convention relating to rank and sex, and
subject to any privileged treatment which may be accorded to them by reason of their state of
health, age or professional qualifications, all prisoners of war shall be treated alike by the
Detaining Power, without any adverse distinction based on race, nationality, religious belief or
political opinions, or any other distinction founded on similar criteria.
ARTICLE 17
Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his surname, first
names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or serial number, or failing this,
equivalent information. If he willfully infringes this rule, he may render himself liable to a
restriction of the privileges accorded to his rank or status.
Each Party to a conflict is required to furnish the persons under its jurisdiction who are liable to
become prisoners of war, with an identity card showing the owner's surname, first names, rank,
army, regimental, personal or serial number or equivalent information, and date of birth. The
identity card may, furthermore, bear the signature or the fingerprints, or both, of the owner, and
may bear, as well, any other information the Party to the conflict may wish to add concerning
persons belonging to its armed forces. As far as possible the card shall measure 6.5 x 10 cm. and
shall be issued in duplicate. The identity card shall be shown by the prisoner of war upon
demand, but may in no case be taken away from him.
No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of
war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to
answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous
treatment of any kind.
Prisoners of war who, owing to their physical or mental condition, are unable to state their
identity, shall be handed over to the medical service. The identity of such prisoners shall be
established by all possible means, subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraph.
The questioning of prisoners of war shall be carried out in a language which they understand.
ARTICLE 18
All effects and articles of personal use, except arms, horses, military equipment and military
documents shall remain in the possession of prisoners of war, likewise their metal helmets and
gas masks and like articles issued for personal protection. Effects and articles used for their
clothing or feeding shall likewise remain in their possession, even if such effects and articles
belong to their regulation military equipment.
At no time should prisoners of war be without identity documents. The Detaining Power shall
supply such documents to prisoners of war who possess none.
Badges of rank and nationality, decorations and articles having above all a personal or
sentimental value may not be taken from prisoners of war.
Sums of money carried by prisoners of war may not be taken away from them except by order of
an officer, and after the amount and particulars of the owner have been recorded in a special
register and an itemized receipt has been given, legibly inscribed with the name, rank and unit
of the person issuing the said receipt. Sums in the currency of the Detaining Power, or which are
changed into such currency at the prisoner's request, shall be placed to the credit of the
prisoner's account as provided in Article 64.
The Detaining Power may withdraw articles of value from prisoners of war only for reasons of
security; when such articles are withdrawn, the procedure laid down for sums of money
impounded shall apply.
Such objects, likewise the sums taken away in any currency other than that of the Detaining
Power and the conversion of which has not been asked for by the owners, shall be kept in the
custody of the Detaining Power and shall be returned in their initial shape to prisoners of war at
the end of their captivity.
ARTICLE 19
Prisoners of war shall be evacuated, as soon as possible after their capture, to camps situated in
an area far enough from the combat zone for them to be out of danger.
Only those prisoners of war who, owing to wounds or sickness, would run greater risks by being
evacuated than by remaining where they are, may be temporarily kept back in a danger zone.
Prisoners of war shall not be unnecessarily exposed to danger while awaiting evacuation from a
fighting zone.
ARTICLE 20
The evacuation of prisoners of war shall always be effected humanely and in conditions similar
to those for the forces of the Detaining Power in their changes of station.
The Detaining Power shall supply prisoners of war who are being evacuated with sufficient food
and potable water, and with the necessary clothing and medical attention. The Detaining Power
shall take all suitable precautions to ensure their safety during evacuation, and shall establish
as soon as possible a list of the prisoners of war who are evacuated.
If prisoners of war must, during evacuation, pass through transit camps, their stay in such
camps shall be as brief as possible.
ARTICLE 21
The Detaining Power may subject prisoners of war to internment. It may impose on them the
obligation of not leaving, beyond certain limits, the camp where they are interned, or if the said
camp is fenced in, of not going outside its perimeter. Subject to the provisions of the present
Convention relative to penal and disciplinary sanctions, prisoners of war may not be held in close
confinement except where necessary to safeguard their health and then only during the
continuation of the circumstances which make such confinement necessary.
Prisoners of war may be partially or wholly released on parole or promise, in so far as is allowed
by the laws of the Power on which they depend. Such measures shall be taken particularly in
cases where this may contribute to the improvement of their state of health. No prisoner of war
shall be compelled to accept liberty on parole or promise.
Upon the outbreak of hostilities, each Party to the conflict shall notify the adverse Party of the
laws and regulations allowing or forbidding its own nationals to accept liberty on parole or
promise. Prisoners of war who are paroled or who have given their promise in conformity with
the laws and regulations so notified, are bound on their personal honor scrupulously to fulfil,
both towards the Power on which they depend and towards the Power which has captured them,
the engagements of their paroles or promises. In such cases, the Power on which they depend is
bound neither to require nor to accept from them any service incompatible with the parole or
promise given.
ARTICLE 22
Prisoners of war may be interned only in premises located on land and affording every guarantee
of hygiene and healthfulness. Except in particular cases which are justified by the interest of the
prisoners themselves, they shall not be interned in penitentiaries.
Prisoners of war interned in unhealthy areas, or where the climate is injurious for them, shall be
removed as soon as possible to a more favorable climate.
The Detaining Power shall assemble prisoners of war in camps or camp compounds according to
their nationality, language and customs, provided that such prisoners shall not be separated
from prisoners of war belonging to the armed forces with which they were serving at the time of
their capture, except with their consent.
ARTICLE 23
No prisoner of war may at any time be sent to or detained in areas where he may be exposed to
the fire of the combat zone, nor may his presence be used to render certain points or areas
immune from military operations.
Prisoners of war shall have shelters against air bombardment and other hazards of war, to the
same extent as the local civilian population. With the exception of those engaged in the
protection of their quarters against the aforesaid hazards, they may enter such shelters as soon
as possible after the giving of the alarm. Any other protective measure taken in favor of the
population shall also apply to them.
Detaining Powers shall give the Powers concerned, through the intermediary of the Protecting
Powers, all useful information regarding the geographical location of prisoner of war camps.
Whenever military considerations permit, prisoner of war camps shall be indicated in the
daytime by the letters PW or PG, placed so as to be clearly visible from the air. The Powers
concerned may, however, agree upon any other system of marking. Only prisoner of war camps
shall be marked as such.
ARTICLE 24
Transit or screening camps of a permanent kind shall be fitted out under conditions similar to
those described in the present Section, and the prisoners therein shall have the same treatment
as in other camps.
ARTICLE 25
Prisoners of war shall be quartered under conditions as favorable as those for the forces of the
Detaining Power who are billeted in the same area. The said conditions shall make allowance for
the habits and customs of the prisoners and shall in no case be prejudicial to their health.
The foregoing provisions shall apply in particular to the dormitories of prisoners of war as
regards both total surface and minimum cubic space, and the general installations, bedding and
blankets.
The premises provided for the use of prisoners of war individually or collectively, shall be
entirely protected from dampness and adequately heated and lighted, in particular between dusk
and lights out. All precautions must be taken against the danger of fire.
In any camps in which women prisoners of war, as well as men, are accommodated, separate
dormitories shall be provided for them.
ARTICLE 26
The basic daily food rations shall be sufficient in quantity, quality and variety to keep prisoners
of war in good health and to prevent loss of weight or the development of nutritional deficiencies.
Account shall also be taken of the habitual diet of the prisoners.
The Detaining Power shall supply prisoners of war who work with such additional rations as are
necessary for the labor on which they are employed.
Sufficient drinking water shall be supplied to prisoners of war. The use of tobacco shall be
permitted.
Prisoners of war shall, as far as possible, be associated with the preparation of their meals; they
may be employed for that purpose in the kitchens. Furthermore, they shall be given the means of
preparing, themselves, the additional food in their possession.
ARTICLE 27
Clothing, underwear and footwear shall be supplied to prisoners of war in sufficient quantities
by the Detaining Power, which shall make allowance for the climate of the region where the
prisoners are detained. Uniforms of enemy armed forces captured by the Detaining Power
should, if suitable for the climate, be made available to clothe prisoners of war.
The regular replacement and repair of the above articles shall be assured by the Detaining
Power. In addition, prisoners of war who work shall receive appropriate clothing, wherever the
nature of the work demands.
ARTICLE 28
Canteens shall be installed in all camps, where prisoners of war may procure foodstuffs, soap
and tobacco and ordinary articles in daily use. The tariff shall never be in excess of local market
prices. The profits made by camp canteens shall be used for the benefit of the prisoners; a special
fund shall be created for this purpose. The prisoners' representative shall have the right to
collaborate in the management of the canteen and of this fund.
When a camp is closed down, the credit balance of the special fund shall be handed to an
international welfare organization, to be employed for the benefit of prisoners of war of the same
nationality as those who have contributed to the fund. In case of a general repatriation, such
profits shall be kept by the Detaining Power, subject to any agreement to the contrary between
the Powers concerned
ARTICLE 29
The Detaining Power shall be bound to take all sanitary measures necessary to ensure the
cleanliness and healthfulness of camps and to prevent epidemics.
Prisoners of war shall have for their use, day and night, conveniences which conform to the rules
of hygiene and are maintained in a constant state of cleanliness. In any camps in which women
prisoners of war are accommodated, separate conveniences shall be provided for them.
Also, apart from the baths and showers with which the camps shall be furnished, prisoners of
war shall be provided with sufficient water and soap for their personal toilet and for washing
their personal laundry; the necessary installations, facilities and time shall be granted them for
that purpose.
ARTICLE 30
Every camp shall have an adequate infirmary where prisoners of war may have the attention
they require, as well as appropriate diet. Isolation wards shall, if necessary, be set aside for cases
of contagious or mental disease.
Prisoners of war suffering from serious disease, or whose condition necessitates special
treatment, a surgical operation or hospital care, must be admitted to any military or civilian
medical unit where such treatment can be given, even if their repatriation is contemplated in the
near future. Special facilities shall be afforded for the care to be given to the disabled, in
particular to the blind, and for their rehabilitation, pending repatriation.
Prisoners of war shall have the attention, preferably, of medical personnel of the Power on which
they depend and, if possible, of their nationality.
Prisoners of war may not be prevented from presenting themselves to the medical authorities for
examination. The detaining authorities shall, upon request, issue to every prisoner who has
undergone treatment, an official certificate indicating the nature of his illness or injury, and the
duration and kind of treatment received. A duplicate of this certificate shall be forwarded to the
Central Prisoners of War Agency.
The costs of treatment, including those of any apparatus necessary for the maintenance of
prisoners of war in good health, particularly dentures and other artificial appliances, and
spectacles, shall be borne by the Detaining Power.
ARTICLE 31
Medical inspections of prisoners of war shall be held at least once a month. They shall include
the checking and the recording of the weight of each prisoner of war. Their purpose shall be, in
particular, to supervise the general state of health, nutrition and cleanliness of prisoners and to
detect contagious diseases, especially tuberculosis, malaria and venereal disease. For this
purpose the most efficient methods available shall be employed, e.g. periodic mass miniature
radiography for the early detection of tuberculosis.
ARTICLE 32
Prisoners of war who, though not attached to the medical service of their armed forces, are
physicians, surgeons, dentists, nurses or medical orderlies, may be required by the Detaining
Power to exercise their medical functions in the interests of prisoners of war dependent on the
same Power. In that case they shall continue to be prisoners of war, but shall receive the same
treatment as corresponding medical personnel retained by the Detaining Power. They shall be
exempted from any other work under Article 49.
ARTICLE 33
Members of the medical personnel and chaplains while retained by the Detaining Power with a
view to assisting prisoners of war, shall not be considered as prisoners of war. They shall,
however, receive as a minimum the benefits and protection of the present Convention, and shall
also be granted all facilities necessary to provide for the medical care of, and religious
ministration to, prisoners of war.
They shall continue to exercise their medical and spiritual functions for the benefit of prisoners
of war, preferably those belonging to the armed forces upon which they depend, within the scope
of the military laws and regulations of the Detaining Power and under the control of its
competent services, in accordance with their professional etiquette. They shall also benefit by the
following facilities in the exercise of their medical or spiritual functions:
(a) They shall be authorized to visit periodically prisoners of war situated in working
detachments or in hospitals outside the camp. For this purpose, the Detaining Power shall
place at their disposal the necessary means of transport.
(b) The senior medical officer in each camp shall be responsible to the camp military
authorities for everything connected with the activities of retained medical personnel. For
this purpose, Parties to the conflict shall agree at the outbreak of hostilities on the subject of
the corresponding ranks of the medical personnel, including that of societies mentioned in
Article 26 of the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949. This senior medical officer, as well
as chaplains, shall have the right to deal with the competent authorities of the camp on all
questions relating to their duties. Such authorities shall afford them all necessary facilities
for correspondence relating to these questions.
(c) Although they shall be subject to the internal discipline of the camp in which they are
retained, such personnel may not be compelled to carry out any work other than that
concerned with their medical or religious duties.
During hostilities, the Parties to the conflict shall agree concerning the possible relief of retained
personnel and shall settle the procedure to be followed.
None of the preceding provisions shall relieve the Detaining Power of its obligations with regard
to prisoners of war from the medical or spiritual point of view.
ARTICLE 34
Prisoners of war shall enjoy complete latitude in the exercise of their religious duties, including
attendance at the service of their faith, on condition that they comply with the disciplinary
routine prescribed by the military authorities.
ARTICLE 35
Chaplains who fall into the hands of the enemy Power and who remain or are retained with a
view to assisting prisoners of war, shall be allowed to minister to them and to exercise freely
their ministry amongst prisoners of war of the same religion, in accordance with their religious
conscience. They shall be allocated among the various camps and labor detachments containing
prisoners of war belonging to the same forces, speaking the same language or practicing the
same religion. They shall enjoy the necessary facilities, including the means of transport
provided for in Article 33, for visiting the prisoners of war outside their camp. They shall be free
to correspond, subject to censorship, on matters concerning their religious duties with the
ecclesiastical authorities in the country of detention and with international religious
organizations. Letters and cards which they may send for this purpose shall be in addition to the
quota provided for in Article 71.
ARTICLE 36
Prisoners of war who are ministers of religion, without having officiated as chaplains to their
own forces, shall be at liberty, whatever their denomination, to minister freely to the members of
their community. For this purpose, they shall receive the same treatment as the chaplains
retained by the Detaining Power. They shall not be obliged to do any other work.
ARTICLE 37
When prisoners of war have not the assistance of a retained chaplain or of a prisoner of war
minister of their faith, a minister belonging to the prisoners' or a similar denomination, or in his
absence a qualified layman, if such a course is feasible from a confessional point of view, shall be
appointed, at the request of the prisoners concerned, to fill this office. This appointment, subject
to the approval of the Detaining Power, shall take place with the agreement of the community of
prisoners concerned and, wherever necessary, with the approval of the local religious authorities
of the same faith. The person thus appointed shall comply with all regulations established by the
Detaining Power in the interests of discipline and military security.
ARTICLE 38
While respecting the individual preferences of every prisoner, the Detaining Power shall
encourage the practice of intellectual, educational, and recreational pursuits, sports and games
amongst prisoners, and shall take the measures necessary to ensure the exercise thereof by
providing them with adequate premises and necessary equipment.
Prisoners shall have opportunities for taking physical exercise, including sports and games, and
for being out of doors. Sufficient open spaces shall be provided for this purpose in all camps.
CHAPTER VI DISCIPLINE
ARTICLE 39
Every prisoner of war camp shall be put under the immediate authority of a responsible
commissioned officer belonging to the regular armed forces of the Detaining Power. Such officer
shall have in his possession a copy of the present Convention; he shall ensure that its provisions
are known to the camp staff and the guard and shall be responsible, under the direction of his
government, for its application.
Prisoners of war, with the exception of officers, must salute and show to all officers of the
Detaining Power the external marks of respect provided for by the regulations applying in their
own forces.
Officer prisoners of war are bound to salute only officers of a higher rank of the Detaining Power;
they must, however, salute the camp commander regardless of his rank.
ARTICLE 40
The wearing of badges of rank and nationality, as well as of decorations, shall be permitted.
ARTICLE 41
In every camp the text of the present Convention and its Annexes and the contents of any special
agreement provided for in Article 6, shall be posted, in the prisoners' own language, at places
where all may read them. Copies shall be supplied, on request, to the prisoners who cannot have
access to the copy which has been posted.
Regulations, orders, notices and publications of every kind relating to the conduct of prisoners of
war shall be issued to them in a language which they understand. Such regulations, orders and
publications shall be posted in the manner described above and copies shall be handed to the
prisoners' representative. Every order and command addressed to prisoners of war individually
must likewise be given in a language which they understand.
ARTICLE 42
The use of weapons against prisoners of war, especially against those who are escaping or
attempting to escape, shall constitute an extreme measure, which shall always be preceded by
warnings appropriate to the circumstances.
Upon the outbreak of hostilities, the Parties to the conflict shall communicate to one another the
titles and ranks of all the persons mentioned in Article 4 of the present Convention, in order to
ensure equality of treatment between prisoners of equivalent rank. Titles and ranks which are
subsequently created shall form the subject of similar communications.
The Detaining Power shall recognize promotions in rank which have been accorded to prisoners
of war and which have been duly notified by the Power on which these prisoners depend.
ARTICLE 44
Officers and prisoners of equivalent status shall be treated with the regard due to their rank and
age.
In order to ensure service in officers' camps, other ranks of the same armed forces who, as far as
possible, speak the same language, shall be assigned in sufficient numbers, account being taken
of the rank of officers and prisoners of equivalent status. Such orderlies shall not be required to
perform any other work.
Supervision of the mess by the officers themselves shall be facilitated in every way.
ARTICLE 45
Prisoners of war other than officers and prisoners of equivalent status shall be treated with the
regard due to their rank and age.
Supervision of the mess by the prisoners themselves shall be facilitated in every way.
ARTICLE 46
The Detaining Power, when deciding upon the transfer of prisoners of war, shall take into
account the interests of the prisoners themselves, more especially so as not to increase the
difficulty of their repatriation.
The transfer of prisoners of war shall always be effected humanely and in conditions not less
favorable than those under which the forces of the Detaining Power are transferred. Account
shall always be taken of the climatic conditions to which the prisoners of war are accustomed
and the conditions of transfer shall in no case be prejudicial to their health.
The Detaining Power shall supply prisoners of war during transfer with sufficient food and
drinking water to keep them in good health, likewise with the necessary clothing, shelter and
medical attention. The Detaining Power shall take adequate precautions especially in case of
transport by sea or by air, to ensure their safety during transfer, and shall draw up a complete
list of all transferred prisoners before their departure.
ARTICLE 47
Sick or wounded prisoners of war shall not be transferred as long as their recovery may be
endangered by the journey, unless their safety imperatively demands it.
If the combat zone draws closer to a camp, the prisoners of war in the said camp shall not be
transferred unless their transfer can be carried out in adequate conditions of safety, or if they
are exposed to greater risks by remaining on the spot than by being transferred.
ARTICLE 48
In the event of transfer, prisoners of war shall be officially advised of their departure and of their
new postal address. Such notifications shall be given in time for them to pack their luggage and
inform their next of kin.
They shall be allowed to take with them their personal effects, and the correspondence and
parcels which have arrived for them. The weight of such baggage may be limited, if the
conditions of transfer so require, to what each prisoner can reasonably carry, which shall in no
case be more than twenty-five kilograms per head.
Mail and parcels addressed to their former camp shall be forwarded to them without delay. The
camp commander shall take, in agreement with the prisoners' representative, any measures
needed to ensure the transport of the prisoners' community property and of the luggage they are
unable to take with them in consequence of restrictions imposed by virtue of the second
paragraph of this Article.
The Detaining Power may utilize the labor of prisoners of war who are physically fit, taking into
account their age, sex, rank and physical aptitude, and with a view particularly to maintaining
them in a good state of physical and mental health.
Non-commissioned officers who are prisoners of war shall only be required to do supervisory
work. Those not so required may ask for other suitable work which shall, so far as possible, be
found for them.
If officers or persons of equivalent status ask for suitable work, it shall be found for them, so far
as possible, but they may in no circumstances be compelled to work.
ARTICLE 50
Besides work connected with camp administration, installation or maintenance, prisoners of war
may be compelled to do only such work as is included in the following classes:
(a) Agriculture;
(b) Industries connected with the production or the extraction of raw materials, and
manufacturing industries, with the exception of metallurgical, machinery and chemical
industries; public works and building operations which have no military character or purpose;
(c) Transport and handling of stores which are not military in character or purpose;
Should the above provisions be infringed, prisoners of war shall be allowed to exercise their right
of complaint, in conformity with Article 78.
ARTICLE 51
The Detaining Power, in utilizing the labor of prisoners of war, shall ensure that in areas in
which prisoners are employed, the national legislation concerning the protection of labor, and,
more particularly, the regulations for the safety of workers, are duly applied.
Prisoners of war shall receive training and be provided with the means of protection suitable to
the work they will have to do and similar to those accorded to the nationals of the Detaining
Power. Subject to the provisions of Article 52, prisoners may be submitted to the normal risks
run by these civilian workers.
ARTICLE 52
No prisoner of war shall be assigned to labor which would be looked upon as humiliating for a
member of the Detaining Power's own forces.
ARTICLE 53
The duration of the daily labor of prisoners of war, including the time of the journey to and fro,
shall not be excessive, and must in no case exceed that permitted for civilian workers in the
district, who are nationals of the Detaining Power and employed on the same work.
Prisoners of war must be allowed, in the middle of the day's work, a rest of not less than one
hour. This rest will be the same as that to which workers of the Detaining Power are entitled, if
the latter is of longer duration. They shall be allowed in addition a rest of twenty-four
consecutive hours every week, preferably on Sunday or the day of rest in their country of origin.
Furthermore, every prisoner who has worked for one year shall be granted a rest of eight
consecutive days, during which his working pay shall be paid him.
If methods of labor such as piecework are employed, the length of the working period shall not be
rendered excessive thereby.
ARTICLE 54
The working pay due to prisoners of war shall be fixed in accordance with the provisions of
Article 62 of the present Convention.
Prisoners of war who sustain accidents in connection with work, or who contract a disease in the
course, or in consequence of their work, shall receive all the care their condition may require.
The Detaining Power shall furthermore deliver to such prisoners of war a medical certificate
enabling them to submit their claims to the Power on which they depend, and shall send a
duplicate to the Central Prisoners of War Agency provided for in Article 123.
ARTICLE 55
The fitness of prisoners of war for work shall be periodically verified by medical examinations at
least once a month. The examinations shall have particular regard to the nature of the work
which prisoners of war are required to do.
If any prisoner of war considers himself incapable of working, he shall be permitted to appear
before the medical authorities of his camp. Physicians or surgeons may recommend that the
prisoners who are, in their opinion, unfit for work, be exempted therefrom.
ARTICLE 56
The organization and administration of labor detachments shall be similar to those of prisoner of
war camps.
Every labor detachment shall remain under the control of and administratively part of a prisoner
of war camp. The military authorities and the commander of the said camp shall be responsible,
under the direction of their government, for the observance of the provisions of the present
Convention in labor detachments.
The camp commander shall keep an up-to-date record of the labor detachments dependent on his
camp, and shall communicate it to the delegates of the Protecting Power, of the International
Committee of the Red Cross, or of other agencies giving relief to prisoners of war, who may visit
the camp.
ARTICLE 57
The treatment of prisoners of war who work for private persons, even if the latter are responsible
for guarding and protecting them, shall not be inferior to that which is provided for by the
present Convention. The Detaining Power, the military authorities and the commander of the
camp to which such prisoners belong shall be entirely responsible for the maintenance, care,
treatment, and payment of the working pay of such prisoners of war.
Such prisoners of war shall have the right to remain in communication with the prisoners'
representatives in the camps on which they depend.
ARTICLE 58
Upon the outbreak of hostilities, and pending an arrangement on this matter with the Protecting
Power, the Detaining Power may determine the maximum amount of money in cash or in any
similar form that prisoners may have in their possession. Any amount in excess, which was
properly in their possession and which has been taken or withheld from them, shall be placed to
their account, together with any monies deposited by them, and shall not be converted into any
other currency without their consent.
If prisoners of war are permitted to purchase services or commodities outside the camp against
payment in cash, such payments shall be made by the prisoner himself or by the camp
administration who will charge them to the accounts of the prisoners concerned. The Detaining
Power will establish the necessary rules in this respect.
ARTICLE 59
Cash which was taken from prisoners of war, in accordance with Article 18, at the time of their
capture, and which is in the currency of the Detaining Power, shall be placed to their separate
accounts, in accordance with the provisions of Article 64 of the present Section.
The amounts, in the currency of the Detaining Power, due to the conversion of sums in other
currencies that are taken from the prisoners of war at the same time, shall also be credited to
their separate accounts.
ARTICLE 60
The Detaining Power shall grant all prisoners of war a monthly advance of pay, the amount of
which shall be fixed by conversion, into the currency of the said Power, of the following amounts:
Category II: Sergeants and other non-commissioned officers, or prisoners of equivalent rank:
twelve Swiss francs.
Category III: Warrant officers and commissioned officers below the rank of major or prisoners
of equivalent rank: fifty Swiss francs.
Category IV: Majors, lieutenant colonels, colonels or prisoners of equivalent rank: sixty Swiss
francs.
However, the Parties to the conflict concerned may by special agreement modify the amount of
advances of pay due to prisoners of the preceding categories.
Furthermore, if the amounts indicated in the first paragraph above would be unduly high
compared with the pay of the Detaining Power's armed forces or would, for any reason, seriously
embarrass the Detaining Power, then, pending the conclusion of a special agreement with the
Power on which the prisoners depend to vary the amounts indicated above, the Detaining Power:
(a) Shall continue to credit the accounts of the prisoners with the amounts indicated in the
first paragraph above;
(b) May temporarily limit the amount made available from these advances of pay to prisoners
of war for their own use, to sums which are reasonable, but which, for Category I, shall never
be inferior to the amount that the Detaining Power gives to the members of its own armed
forces.
The reasons for any limitations will be given without delay to the Protecting Power.
ARTICLE 61
The Detaining Power shall accept for distribution as supplementary pay to prisoners of war sums
which the Power on which the prisoners depend may forward to them, on condition that the
sums to be paid shall be the same for each prisoner of the same category, shall be payable to all
prisoners of that category depending on that Power, and shall be placed in their separate
accounts, at the earliest opportunity, in accordance with the provisions of Article 64. Such
supplementary pay shall not relieve the Detaining Power of any obligation under this
Convention.
ARTICLE 62
Prisoners of war shall be paid a fair working rate of pay by the detaining authorities direct. The
rate shall be fixed by the said authorities, but shall at no time be less than one-fourth of one
Swiss franc for a full working day. The Detaining Power shall inform prisoners of war, as well as
the Power on which they depend, through the intermediary of the Protecting Power, of the rate of
daily working pay that it has fixed.
Working pay shall likewise be paid by the detaining authorities to prisoners of war permanently
detailed to duties or to a skilled or semi-skilled occupation in connection with the administration,
installation or maintenance of camps, and to the prisoners who are required to carry out
spiritual or medical duties on behalf of their comrades.
The working pay of the prisoners' representative, of his advisers, if any, and of his assistants,
shall be paid out of the fund maintained by canteen profits. The scale of this working pay shall
be fixed by the prisoners' representative and approved by the camp commander. If there is no
such fund, the detaining authorities shall pay these prisoners a fair working rate of pay.
ARTICLE 63
Every prisoner of war shall have at his disposal the credit balance of his account as provided for
in the following Article, within the limits fixed by the Detaining Power, which shall make such
payments as are requested. Subject to financial or monetary restrictions which the Detaining
Power regards as essential, prisoners of war may also have payments made abroad. In this case
payments addressed by prisoners of war to dependants shall be given priority.
In any event, and subject to the consent of the Power on which they depend, prisoners may have
payments made in their own country, as follows: the Detaining Power shall send to the aforesaid
Power through the Protecting Power a notification giving all the necessary particulars
concerning the prisoners of war, the beneficiaries of the payments, and the amount of the sums
to be paid, expressed in the Detaining Power's currency. The said notification shall be signed by
the prisoners and countersigned by the camp commander. The Detaining Power shall debit the
prisoners' account by a corresponding amount; the sums thus debited shall be placed by it to the
credit of the Power on which the prisoners depend.
To apply the foregoing provisions, the Detaining Power may usefully consult the Model
Regulations in Annex V of the present Convention.
ARTICLE 64
The Detaining Power shall hold an account for each prisoner of war, showing at least the
following:
1. The amounts due to the prisoner or received by him as advances of pay, as working pay or
derived from any other source; the sums in the currency of the Detaining Power which were
taken from him; the sums taken from him and converted at his request into the currency of
the said Power.
2. The payments made to the prisoner in cash, or in any other similar form; the payments
made on his behalf and at his request; the sums transferred under Article 63, third
paragraph.
ARTICLE 65
Every item entered in the account of a prisoner of war shall be countersigned or initialed by him,
or by the prisoners' representative acting on his behalf.
Prisoners of war shall at all times be afforded reasonable facilities for consulting and obtaining
copies of their accounts, which may likewise be inspected by the representatives of the Protecting
Powers at the time of visits to the camp.
When prisoners of war are transferred from one camp to another, their personal accounts will
follow them. In case of transfer from one Detaining Power to another, the monies which are their
property and are not in the currency of the Detaining Power will follow them. They shall be given
certificates for any other monies standing to the credit of their accounts.
The Parties to the conflict concerned may agree to notify to each other at specific intervals
through the Protecting Power, the amount of the accounts of the prisoners of war.
ARTICLE 66
On the termination of captivity, through the release of a prisoner of war or his repatriation, the
Detaining Power shall give him a statement, signed by an authorized officer of that Power,
showing the credit balance then due to him. The Detaining Power shall also send through the
Protecting Power to the government upon which the prisoner of war depends, lists giving all
appropriate particulars of all prisoners of war whose captivity has been terminated by
repatriation, release, escape, death or any other means, and showing the amount of their credit
balances. Such lists shall be certified on each sheet by an authorized representative of the
Detaining Power.
Any of the above provisions of this Article may be varied by mutual agreement between any two
Parties to the conflict.
The Power on which the prisoner of war depends shall be responsible for settling with him any
credit balance due to him from the Detaining Power on the termination of his captivity.
ARTICLE 67
Advances of pay, issued to prisoners of war in conformity with Article 60, shall be considered as
made on behalf of the Power on which they depend. Such advances of pay, as well as all
payments made by the said Power under Article 63, third paragraph, and Article 68, shall form
the subject of arrangements between the Powers concerned, at the close of hostilities.
ARTICLE 68
Any claim by a prisoner of war for compensation in respect of any injury or other disability
arising out of work shall be referred to the Power on which he depends, through the Protecting
Power. In accordance with Article 54, the Detaining Power will, in all cases, provide the prisoner
of war concerned with a statement showing the nature of the injury or disability, the
circumstances in which it arose and particulars of medical or hospital treatment given for it.
This statement will be signed by a responsible officer of the Detaining Power and the medical
particulars certified by a medical officer.
Any claim by a prisoner of war for compensation in respect of personal effects, monies or
valuables impounded by the Detaining Power under Article 18 and not forthcoming on his
repatriation, or in respect of loss alleged to be due to the fault of the Detaining Power or any of
its servants, shall likewise be referred to the Power on which he depends. Nevertheless, any such
personal effects required for use by the prisoners of war whilst in captivity shall be replaced at
the expense of the Detaining Power. The Detaining Power will, in all cases, provide the prisoner
of war with a statement, signed by a responsible officer, showing all available information
regarding the reasons why such effects, monies or valuables have not been restored to him. A
copy of this statement will be forwarded to the Power on which he depends through the Central
Prisoners of War Agency provided for in Article 123.
ARTICLE 69
Immediately upon prisoners of war falling into its power, the Detaining Power shall inform them
and the Powers on which they depend, through the Protecting Power, of the measures taken to
carry out the provisions of the present Section. They shall likewise inform the parties concerned
of any subsequent modifications of such measures.
ARTICLE 70
Immediately upon capture, or not more than one week after arrival at a camp, even if it is a
transit camp, likewise in case of sickness or transfer to hospital or another camp, every prisoner
of war shall be enabled to write direct to his family, on the one hand, and to the Central
Prisoners of War Agency provided for in Article 123, on the other hand, a card similar, if
possible, to the model annexed to the present Convention, informing his relatives of his capture,
address and state of health. The said cards shall be forwarded as rapidly as possible and may not
be delayed in any manner.
ARTICLE 71
Prisoners of war shall be allowed to send and receive letters and cards. If the Detaining Power
deems it necessary to limit the number of letters and cards sent by each prisoner of war, the said
number shall not be less than two letters and four cards monthly, exclusive of the capture cards
provided for in Article 70, and conforming as closely as possible to the models annexed to the
present Convention. Further limitations may be imposed only if the Protecting Power is satisfied
that it would be in the interests of the prisoners of war concerned to do so owing to difficulties of
translation caused by the Detaining Power's inability to find sufficient qualified linguists to
carry out the necessary censorship. If limitations must be placed on the correspondence
addressed to prisoners of war, they may be ordered only by the Power on which the prisoners
depend, possibly at the request of the Detaining Power. Such letters and cards must be conveyed
by the most rapid method at the disposal of the Detaining Power; they may not be delayed or
retained for disciplinary reasons.
Prisoners of war who have been without news for a long period, or who are unable to receive
news from their next of kin or to give them news by the ordinary postal route, as well as those
who are at a great distance from their homes, shall be permitted to send telegrams, the fees
being charged against the prisoners of war's accounts with the Detaining Power or paid in the
currency at their disposal. They shall likewise benefit by this measure in cases of urgency.
As a general rule, the correspondence of prisoners of war shall be written in their native
language. The Parties to the conflict may allow correspondence in other languages.
Sacks containing prisoner of war mail must be securely sealed and labeled so as clearly to
indicate their contents, and must be addressed to offices of destination.
ARTICLE 72
Prisoners of war shall be allowed to receive by post or by any other means individual parcels or
collective shipments containing, in particular, foodstuffs, clothing, medical supplies and articles
of a religious, educational or recreational character which may meet their needs, including books,
devotional articles, scientific equipment, examination papers, musical instruments, sports outfits
and materials allowing prisoners of war to pursue their studies or their cultural activities.
Such shipments shall in no way free the Detaining Power from the obligations imposed upon it
by virtue of the present Convention.
The only limits which may be placed on these shipments shall be those proposed by the
Protecting Power in the interest of the prisoners themselves, or by the International Committee
of the Red Cross or any other organization giving assistance to the prisoners, in respect of their
own shipments only, on account of exceptional strain on transport or communications.
The conditions for the sending of individual parcels and collective relief shall, if necessary, be the
subject of special agreements between the Powers concerned, which may in no case delay the
receipt by the prisoners of relief supplies. Books may not be included in parcels of clothing and
foodstuffs. Medical supplies shall, as a rule, be sent in collective parcels.
ARTICLE 73
In the absence of special agreements between the Powers concerned on the conditions for the
receipt and distribution of collective relief shipments, the rules and regulations concerning
collective shipments, which are annexed to the present Convention, shall be applied.
The special agreements referred to above shall in no case restrict the right of prisoners'
representatives to take possession of collective relief shipments intended for prisoners of war, to
proceed to their distribution or to dispose of them in the interest of the prisoners.
Nor shall such agreements restrict the right of representatives of the Protecting Power, the
International Committee of the Red Cross or any other organization giving assistance to
prisoners of war and responsible for the forwarding of collective shipments, to supervise their
distribution to the recipients.
ARTICLE 74
All relief shipments for prisoners of war shall be exempt from import, customs and other dues.
If relief shipments intended for prisoners of war cannot be sent through the post office by reason
of weight or for any other cause, the cost of transportation shall be borne by the Detaining Power
in all the territories under its control. The other Powers party to the Convention shall bear the
cost of transport in their respective territories.
In the absence of special agreements between the Parties concerned, the costs connected with
transport of such shipments, other than costs covered by the above exemption, shall be charged
to the senders.
The High Contracting Parties shall endeavor to reduce, so far as possible, the rates charged for
telegrams sent by prisoners of war, or addressed to them.
ARTICLE 75
Should military operations prevent the Powers concerned from fulfilling their obligation to
assure the transport of the shipments referred to in Articles 70, 71, 72 and 77, the Protecting
Powers concerned, the International Committee of the Red Cross or any other organization duly
approved by the Parties to the conflict may undertake to ensure the conveyance of such
shipments by suitable means (railway wagons, motor vehicles, vessels or aircraft, etc.). For this
purpose, the High Contracting Parties shall endeavor to supply them with such transport and to
allow its circulation, especially by granting the necessary safe-conducts.
(a) Correspondence, lists and reports exchanged between the Central Information Agency
referred to in Article 123 and the National Bureau referred to in Article 122;
(b) Correspondence and reports relating to prisoners of war which the Protecting Powers, the
International Committee of the Red Cross or any other body assisting the prisoners, exchange
either with their own delegates or with the Parties to the conflict.
These provisions in no way detract from the right of any Party to the conflict to arrange other
means of transport, if it should so prefer, nor preclude the granting of safe-conducts, under
mutually agreed conditions, to such means of transport.
In the absence of special agreements, the costs occasioned by the use of such means of transport
shall be borne proportionally by the Parties to the conflict whose nationals are benefited thereby.
ARTICLE 76
The examination of consignments intended for prisoners of war shall not be carried out under
conditions that will expose the goods contained in them to deterioration; except in the case of
written or printed matter, it shall be done in the presence of the addressee, or of a fellow-
prisoner duly delegated by him. The delivery to prisoners of individual or collective consignments
shall not be delayed under the pretext of difficulties of censorship.
Any prohibition of correspondence ordered by Parties to the conflict, either for military or
political reasons, shall be only temporary and its duration shall be as short as possible.
ARTICLE 77
The Detaining Powers shall provide all facilities for the transmission, through the Protecting
Power or the Central Prisoners of War Agency provided for in Article 123, of instruments, papers
or documents intended for prisoners of war or dispatched by them, especially powers of attorney
and wills.
In all cases they shall facilitate the preparation and execution of such documents on behalf of
prisoners of war; in particular, they shall allow them to consult a lawyer and shall take what
measures are necessary for the authentication of their signatures.
Prisoners of war shall have the right to make known to the military authorities in whose power
they are, their requests regarding the conditions of captivity to which they are subjected.
They shall also have the unrestricted right to apply to the representatives of the Protecting
Powers either through their prisoners' representative or, if they consider it necessary, direct, in
order to draw their attention to any points on which they may have complaints to make
regarding their conditions of captivity.
These requests and complaints shall not be limited nor considered to be a part of the
correspondence quota referred to in Article 71. They must be transmitted immediately. Even if
they are recognized to be unfounded, they may not give rise to any punishment.
Prisoners' representatives may send periodic reports on the situation in the camps and the needs
of the prisoners of war to the representatives of the Protecting Powers.
ARTICLE 79
In all places where there are prisoners of war, except in those where there are officers, the
prisoners shall freely elect by secret ballot, every six months, and also in case of vacancies,
prisoners' representatives entrusted with representing them before the military authorities, the
Protecting Powers, the International Committee of the Red Cross and any other organization
which may assist them. These prisoners' representatives shall be eligible for re-election.
In camps for officers and persons of equivalent status or in mixed camps, the senior officer
among the prisoners of war shall be recognized as the camp prisoners' representative. In camps
for officers, he shall be assisted by one or more advisers chosen by the officers; in mixed camps,
his assistants shall be chosen from among the prisoners of war who are not officers and shall be
elected by them.
Officer prisoners of war of the same nationality shall be stationed in labor camps for prisoners of
war, for the purpose of carrying out the camp administration duties for which the prisoners of
war are responsible. These officers may be elected as prisoners' representatives under the first
paragraph of this Article. In such a case the assistants to the prisoners' representatives shall be
chosen from among those prisoners of war who are not officers.
Every representative elected must be approved by the Detaining Power before he has the right to
commence his duties. Where the Detaining Power refuses to approve a prisoner of war elected by
his fellow prisoners of war, it must inform the Protecting Power of the reason for such refusal.
In all cases the prisoners' representative must have the same nationality, language and customs
as the prisoners of war whom he represents. Thus, prisoners of war distributed in different
sections of a camp, according to their nationality, language or customs, shall have for each
section their own prisoners' representative, in accordance with the foregoing paragraphs.
ARTICLE 80
Prisoners' representatives shall further the physical, spiritual and intellectual well being of
prisoners of war.
In particular, where the prisoners decide to organize amongst themselves a system of mutual
assistance, this organization will be within the province of the prisoners' representative, in
addition to the special duties entrusted to him by other provisions of the present Convention.
Prisoners' representatives shall not be held responsible, simply by reason of their duties, for any
offences committed by prisoners of war.
ARTICLE 81
Prisoners' representatives shall not be required to perform any other work, if the
accomplishment of their duties is thereby made more difficult.
Prisoners' representatives may appoint from amongst the prisoners such assistants as they may
require. All material facilities shall be granted them, particularly a certain freedom of movement
necessary for the accomplishment of their duties (inspection of labor detachments, receipt of
supplies, etc.).
Prisoners' representatives shall be permitted to visit premises where prisoners of war are
detained, and every prisoner of war shall have the right to consult freely his prisoners'
representative.
All facilities shall likewise be accorded to the prisoners' representatives for communication by
post and telegraph with the detaining authorities, the Protecting Powers, the International
Committee of the Red Cross and their delegates, the Mixed Medical Commissions and with the
bodies which give assistance to prisoners of war. Prisoners' representatives of labor detachments
shall enjoy the same facilities for communication with the prisoners' representatives of the
principal camp. Such communications shall not be restricted, nor considered as forming a part of
the quota mentioned in Article 71.
Prisoners' representatives who are transferred shall be allowed a reasonable time to acquaint
their successors with current affairs.
In case of dismissal, the reasons therefor shall be communicated to the Protecting Power.
I. GENERAL PROVISIONS
ARTICLE 82
A prisoner of war shall be subject to the laws, regulations and orders in force in the armed forces
of the Detaining Power; the Detaining Power shall be justified in taking judicial or disciplinary
measures in respect of any offence committed by a prisoner of war against such laws, regulations
or orders. However, no proceedings or punishments contrary to the provisions of this Chapter
shall be allowed.
If any law, regulation or order of the Detaining Power shall declare acts committed by a prisoner
of war to be punishable, whereas the same acts would not be punishable if committed by a
member of the forces of the Detaining Power, such acts shall entail disciplinary punishments
only.
ARTICLE 83
ARTICLE 84
A prisoner of war shall be tried only by a military court, unless the existing laws of the Detaining
Power expressly permit the civil courts to try a member of the armed forces of the Detaining
Power in respect of the particular offence alleged to have been committed by the prisoner of war.
In no circumstances whatever shall a prisoner of war be tried by a court of any kind which does
not offer the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality as generally recognized, and,
in particular, the procedure of which does not afford the accused the rights and means of defense
provided for in Article 105.
ARTICLE 85
Prisoners of war prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining Power for acts committed prior to
capture shall retain, even if convicted, the benefits of the present Convention.
ARTICLE 86
No prisoner of war may be punished more than once for the same act, or on the same charge.
ARTICLE 87
Prisoners of war may not be sentenced by the military authorities and courts of the Detaining
Power to any penalties except those provided for in respect of members of the armed forces of the
said Power who have committed the same acts.
When fixing the penalty, the courts or authorities of the Detaining Power shall take into
consideration, to the widest extent possible, the fact that the accused, not being a national of the
Detaining Power, is not bound to it by any duty of allegiance, and that he is in its power as the
result of circumstances independent of his own will. The said courts or authorities shall be at
liberty to reduce the penalty provided for the violation of which the prisoner of war is accused,
and shall therefore not be bound to apply the minimum penalty prescribed.
No prisoner of war may be deprived of his rank by the Detaining Power, or prevented from
wearing his badges.
ARTICLE 88
Officers, non-commissioned officers and men who are prisoners of war undergoing a disciplinary
or judicial punishment, shall not be subjected to more severe treatment than that applied in
respect of the same punishment to members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power of
equivalent rank.
A woman prisoner of war shall not be awarded or sentenced to a punishment more severe, or
treated whilst undergoing punishment more severely, than a woman member of the armed forces
of the Detaining Power dealt with for a similar offence.
In no case may a woman prisoner of war be awarded or sentenced to a punishment more severe,
or treated whilst undergoing punishment more severely, than a male member of the armed
forces of the Detaining Power dealt with for a similar offence.
Prisoners of war who have served disciplinary or judicial sentences may not be treated
differently from other prisoners of war.
ARTICLE 89
1. A fine which shall not exceed 50 per cent of the advances of pay and working pay which the
prisoner of war would otherwise receive under the provisions of Articles 60 and 62 during a
period of not more than thirty days.
2. Discontinuance of privileges granted over and above the treatment provided for by the
present Convention.
4. Confinement.
ARTICLE 90
The duration of any single punishment shall in no case exceed thirty days. Any period of
confinement awaiting the hearing of a disciplinary offence or the award of disciplinary
punishment shall be deducted from an award pronounced against a prisoner of war.
The maximum of thirty days provided above may not be exceeded, even if the prisoner of war is
answerable for several acts at the same time when he is awarded punishment, whether such acts
are related or not.
The period between the pronouncing of an award of disciplinary punishment and its execution
shall not exceed one month.
When a prisoner of war is awarded a further disciplinary punishment, a period of at least three
days shall elapse between the execution of any two of the punishments, if the duration of one of
these is ten days or more.
ARTICLE 91
1. He has joined the armed forces of the Power on which he depends, or those of an allied
Power;
2. He has left the territory under the control of the Detaining Power, or of an ally of the said
Power;
3. He has joined a ship flying the flag of the Power on which he depends, or of an allied Power,
in the territorial waters of the Detaining Power, the said ship not being under the control of
the last-named Power.
Prisoners of war who have made good their escape in the sense of this Article and who are
recaptured, shall not be liable to any punishment in respect of their previous escape.
ARTICLE 92
A prisoner of war who attempts to escape and is recaptured before having made good his escape
in the sense of Article 91 shall be liable only to a disciplinary punishment in respect of this act,
even if it is a repeated offence.
A prisoner of war who is recaptured shall be handed over without delay to the competent
military authority.
ARTICLE 93
Escape or attempt to escape, even if it is a repeated offence, shall not be deemed an aggravating
circumstance if the prisoner of war is subjected to trial by judicial proceedings in respect of an
offence committed during his escape or attempt to escape.
In conformity with the principle stated in Article 83, offences committed by prisoners of war with
the sole intention of facilitating their escape and which do not entail any violence against life or
limb, such as offences against public property, theft without intention of self-enrichment, the
drawing up or use of false papers, the wearing of civilian clothing, shall occasion disciplinary
punishment only.
Prisoners of war who aid or abet an escape or an attempt to escape shall be liable on this count to
disciplinary punishment only.
ARTICLE 94
If an escaped prisoner of war is recaptured, the Power on which he depends shall be notified
thereof in the manner defined in Article 122, provided notification of his escape has been made.
ARTICLE 95
A prisoner of war accused of an offence against discipline shall not be kept in confinement
pending the hearing unless a member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power would be so
kept if he were accused of a similar offence, or if it is essential in the interests of camp order and
discipline.
Any period spent by a prisoner of war in confinement awaiting the disposal of an offence against
discipline shall be reduced to an absolute minimum and shall not exceed fourteen days.
The provisions of Articles 97 and 98 of this Chapter shall apply to prisoners of war who are in
confinement awaiting the disposal of offences against discipline.
ARTICLE 96
Without prejudice to the competence of courts and superior military authorities, disciplinary
punishment may be ordered only by an officer having disciplinary powers in his capacity as camp
commander, or by a responsible officer who replaces him or to whom he has delegated his
disciplinary powers.
Before any disciplinary award is pronounced, the accused shall be given precise information
regarding the offences of which he is accused, and given an opportunity of explaining his conduct
and of defending himself. He shall be permitted, in particular, to call witnesses and to have
recourse, if necessary, to the services of a qualified interpreter. The decision shall be announced
to the accused prisoner of war and to the prisoners' representative.
A record of disciplinary punishments shall be maintained by the camp commander and shall be
open to inspection by representatives of the Protecting Power.
ARTICLE 97
Prisoners of war shall not in any case be transferred to penitentiary establishments (prisons,
penitentiaries, convict prisons, etc.) to undergo disciplinary punishment therein.
All premises in which disciplinary punishments are undergone shall conform to the sanitary
requirements set forth in Article 25. A prisoner of war undergoing punishment shall be enabled
to keep himself in a state of cleanliness, in conformity with Article 29.
Officers and persons of equivalent status shall not be lodged in the same quarters as non-
commissioned officers or men.
ARTICLE 98
A prisoner of war awarded disciplinary punishment may not be deprived of the prerogatives
attached to his rank.
Prisoners of war awarded disciplinary punishment shall be allowed to exercise and to stay in the
open air at least two hours daily.
They shall be allowed, on their request, to be present at the daily medical inspections. They shall
receive the attention which their state of health requires and, if necessary, shall be removed to
the camp infirmary or to a hospital.
They shall have permission to read and write, likewise to send and receive letters. Parcels and
remittances of money, however, may be withheld from them until the completion of the
punishment; they shall meanwhile be entrusted to the prisoners' representative, who will hand
over to the infirmary the perishable goods contained in such parcels.
ARTICLE 99
No prisoner of war may be tried or sentenced for an act which is not forbidden by the law of the
Detaining Power or by international law, in force at the time the said act was committed.
No moral or physical coercion may be exerted on a prisoner of war in order to induce him to
admit himself guilty of the act of which he is accused.
No prisoner of war may be convicted without having had an opportunity to present his defense
and the assistance of a qualified advocate or counsel.
ARTICLE 100
Prisoners of war and the Protecting Powers shall be informed as soon as possible of the offences
which are punishable by the death sentence under the laws of the Detaining Power.
Other offences shall not thereafter be made punishable by the death penalty without the
concurrence of the Power upon which the prisoners of war depend.
The death sentence cannot be pronounced on a prisoner of war unless the attention of the court
has, in accordance with Article 87, second paragraph, been particularly called to the fact that
since the accused is not a national of the Detaining Power, he is not bound to it by any duty of
allegiance, and that he is in its power as the result of circumstances independent of his own will.
ARTICLE 101
If the death penalty is pronounced on a prisoner of war, the sentence shall not be executed before
the expiration of a period of at least six months from the date when the Protecting Power
receives, at an indicated address, the detailed communication provided for in Article 107.
ARTICLE 102
A prisoner of war can be validly sentenced only if the sentence has been pronounced by the same
courts according to the same procedure as in the case of members of the armed forces of the
Detaining Power, and if, furthermore, the provisions of the present Chapter have been observed.
ARTICLE 103
Any period spent by a prisoner of war in confinement awaiting trial shall be deducted from any
sentence of imprisonment passed upon him and taken into account in fixing any penalty.
The provisions of Articles 97 and 98 of this Chapter shall apply to a prisoner of war whilst in
confinement awaiting trial.
ARTICLE 104
In any case in which the Detaining Power has decided to institute judicial proceedings against a
prisoner of war, it shall notify the Protecting Power as soon as possible and at least three weeks
before the opening of the trial. This period of three weeks shall run as from the day on which
such notification reaches the Protecting Power at the address previously indicated by the latter
to the Detaining Power.
1. Surname and first names of the prisoner of war, his rank, his army, regimental, personal or
serial number, his date of birth, and his profession or trade, if any;
4 . Designation of the court which will try the case, likewise the date and place fixed for the
opening of the trial.
The same communication shall be made by the Detaining Power to the prisoners' representative.
If no evidence is submitted, at the opening of a trial, that the notification referred to above was
received by the Protecting Power, by the prisoner of war and by the prisoners' representative
concerned, at least three weeks before the opening of the trial, then the latter cannot take place
and must be adjourned.
ARTICLE 105
The prisoner of war shall be entitled to assistance by one of his prisoner comrades, to defense by
a qualified advocate or counsel of his own choice, to the calling of witnesses and, if he deems
necessary, to the services of a competent interpreter. He shall be advised of these rights by the
Detaining Power in due time before the trial.
Failing a choice by the prisoner of war, the Protecting Power shall find him an advocate or
counsel, and shall have at least one week at its disposal for the purpose. The Detaining Power
shall deliver to the said Power, on request, a list of persons qualified to present the defense.
Failing a choice of an advocate or counsel by the prisoner of war or the Protecting Power, the
Detaining Power shall appoint a competent advocate or counsel to conduct the defense.
The advocate or counsel conducting the defense on behalf of the prisoner of war shall have at his
disposal a period of two weeks at least before the opening of the trial, as well as the necessary
facilities to prepare the defense of the accused. He may, in particular, freely visit the accused and
interview him in private. He may also confer with any witnesses for the defense, including
prisoners of war. He shall have the benefit of these facilities until the term of appeal or petition
has expired.
Particulars of the charge or charges on which the prisoner of war is to be arraigned, as well as
the documents which are generally communicated to the accused by virtue of the laws in force in
the armed forces of the Detaining Power, shall be communicated to the accused prisoner of war
in a language which he understands, and in good time before the opening of the trial. The same
communication in the same circumstances shall be made to the advocate or counsel conducting
the defense on behalf of the prisoner of war.
The representatives of the Protecting Power shall be entitled to attend the trial of the case,
unless, exceptionally, this is held in camera in the interest of State security. In such a case the
Detaining Power shall advise the Protecting Power accordingly.
ARTICLE 106
Every prisoner of war shall have, in the same manner as the members of the armed forces of the
Detaining Power, the right of appeal or petition from any sentence pronounced upon him, with a
view to the quashing or revising of the sentence or the reopening of the trial. He shall be fully
informed of his right to appeal or petition and of the time limit within which he may do so.
ARTICLE 107
Any judgment and sentence pronounced upon a prisoner of war shall be immediately reported to
the Protecting Power in the form of a summary communication, which shall also indicate
whether he has the right of appeal with a view to the quashing of the sentence or the reopening
of the trial. This communication shall likewise be sent to the prisoners' representative concerned.
It shall also be sent to the accused prisoner of war in a language he understands, if the sentence
was not pronounced in his presence. The Detaining Power shall also immediately communicate
to the Protecting Power the decision of the prisoner of war to use or to waive his right of appeal.
3. Notification, where applicable, of the establishment where the sentence will be served.
The communications provided for in the foregoing subparagraphs shall be sent to the Protecting
Power at the address previously made known to the Detaining Power.
ARTICLE 108
Sentences pronounced on prisoners of war after a conviction has become duly enforceable, shall
be served in the same establishments and under the same conditions as in the case of members
of the armed forces of the Detaining Power. These conditions shall in all cases conform to the
requirements of health and humanity.
A woman prisoner of war on whom such a sentence has been pronounced shall be confined in
separate quarters and shall be under the supervision of women.
In any case, prisoners of war sentenced to a penalty depriving them of their liberty shall retain
the benefit of the provisions of Articles 78 and 126 of the present Convention. Furthermore, they
shall be entitled to receive and dispatch correspondence, to receive at least one relief parcel
monthly, to take regular exercise in the open air, to have the medical care required by their state
of health, and the spiritual assistance they may desire. Penalties to which they may be subjected
shall be in accordance with the provisions of Article 87, third paragraph.
Subject to the provisions of the third paragraph of this Article, Parties to the conflict are bound
to send back to their own country, regardless of number or rank, seriously wounded and
seriously sick prisoners of war, after having cared for them until they are fit to travel, in
accordance with the first paragraph of the following Article.
Throughout the duration of hostilities, Parties to the conflict shall endeavor, with the
cooperation of the neutral Powers concerned, to make arrangements for the accommodation in
neutral countries of the sick and wounded prisoners of war referred to in the second paragraph of
the following Article. They may, in addition, conclude agreements with a view to the direct
repatriation or internment in a neutral country of able-bodied prisoners of war who have
undergone a long period of captivity.
No sick or injured prisoner of war who is eligible for repatriation under the first paragraph of
this Article, may be repatriated against his will during hostilities.
ARTICLE 110
1. Incurably wounded and sick whose mental or physical fitness seems to have been gravely
diminished.
2. Wounded and sick who, according to medical opinion, are not likely to recover within one
year, whose condition requires treatment and whose mental or physical fitness seems to have
been gravely diminished.
3. Wounded and sick who have recovered, but whose mental or physical fitness seems to have
been gravely and permanently diminished.
1. Wounded and sick whose recovery may be expected within one year of the date of the
wound or the beginning of the illness, if treatment in a neutral country might increase the
prospects of a more certain and speedy recovery.
2. Prisoners of war whose mental or physical health, according to medical opinion, is seriously
threatened by continued captivity, but whose accommodation in a neutral country might
remove such a threat.
The conditions which prisoners of war accommodated in a neutral country must fulfil in order to
permit their repatriation shall be fixed, as shall likewise their status, by agreement between the
Powers concerned. In general, prisoners of war who have been accommodated in a neutral
country, and who belong to the following categories, should be repatriated:
1. Those whose state of health has deteriorated so as to fulfil the conditions laid down for
direct repatriation;
2. Those whose mental or physical powers remain, even after treatment, considerably
impaired.
If no special agreements are concluded between the Parties to the conflict concerned, to
determine the cases of disablement or sickness entailing direct repatriation or accommodation in
a neutral country, such cases shall be settled in accordance with the principles laid down in the
Model Agreement concerning direct repatriation and accommodation in neutral countries of
wounded and sick prisoners of war and in the Regulations concerning Mixed Medical
Commissions annexed to the present Convention.
ARTICLE 111
The Detaining Power, the Power on which the prisoners of war depend, and a neutral Power
agreed upon by these two Powers, shall endeavor to conclude agreements which will enable
prisoners of war to be interned in the territory of the said neutral Power until the close of
hostilities.
ARTICLE 112
Upon the outbreak of hostilities, Mixed Medical Commissions shall be appointed to examine sick
and wounded prisoners of war, and to make all appropriate decisions regarding them. The
appointment, duties and functioning of these Commissions shall be in conformity with the
provisions of the Regulations annexed to the present Convention.
However, prisoners of war who, in the opinion of the medical authorities of the Detaining Power,
are manifestly seriously injured or seriously sick, may be repatriated without having to be
examined by a Mixed Medical Commission.
ARTICLE 113
Besides those who are designated by the medical authorities of the Detaining Power, wounded or
sick prisoners of war belonging to the categories listed below shall be entitled to present
themselves for examination by the Mixed Medical Commissions provided for in the foregoing
Article:
1. Wounded and sick proposed by a physician or surgeon who is of the same nationality, or a
national of a Party to the conflict allied with the Power on which the said prisoners depend,
and who exercises his functions in the camp.
3. Wounded and sick proposed by the Power on which they depend, or by an organization duly
recognized by the said Power and giving assistance to the prisoners.
Prisoners of war who do not belong to one of the three foregoing categories may nevertheless
present themselves for examination by Mixed Medical Commissions, but shall be examined only
after those belonging to the said categories.
The physician or surgeon of the same nationality as the prisoners who present themselves for
examination by the Mixed Medical Commission, likewise the prisoners' representative of the said
prisoners, shall have permission to be present at the examination.
ARTICLE 114
Prisoners of war who meet with accidents shall, unless the injury is self-inflicted, have the
benefit of the provisions of this Convention as regards repatriation or accommodation in a
neutral country.
ARTICLE 115
No prisoner of war on whom a disciplinary punishment has been imposed and who is eligible for
repatriation or for accommodation in a neutral country, may be kept back on the plea that he has
not undergone his punishment.
Prisoners of war detained in connection with a judicial prosecution or conviction and who are
designated for repatriation or accommodation in a neutral country, may benefit by such
measures before the end of the proceedings or the completion of the punishment, if the Detaining
Power consents.
Parties to the conflict shall communicate to each other the names of those who will be detained
until the end of the proceedings or the completion of the punishment.
ARTICLE 116
The costs of repatriating prisoners of war or of transporting them to a neutral country shall be
borne, from the frontiers of the Detaining Power, by the Power on which the said prisoners
depend.
ARTICLE 117
Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active
hostilities.
In the absence of stipulations to the above effect in any agreement concluded between the Parties
to the conflict with a view to the cessation of hostilities, or failing any such agreement, each of
the Detaining Powers shall itself establish and execute without delay a plan of repatriation in
conformity with the principle laid down in the foregoing paragraph.
In either case, the measures adopted shall be brought to the knowledge of the prisoners of war.
The costs of repatriation of prisoners of war shall in all cases be equitably apportioned between
the Detaining Power and the Power on which the prisoners depend. This apportionment shall be
carried out on the following basis:
(a) If the two Powers are contiguous, the Power on which the prisoners of war depend shall
bear the costs of repatriation from the frontiers of the Detaining Power.
(b) If the two Powers are not contiguous, the Detaining Power shall bear the costs of transport
of prisoners of war over its own territory as far as its frontier or its port of embarkation
nearest to the territory of the Power on which the prisoners of war depend. The Parties
concerned shall agree between themselves as to the equitable apportionment of the remaining
costs of the repatriation. The conclusion of this agreement shall in no circumstances justify
any delay in the repatriation of the prisoners of war.
ARTICLE 119
On repatriation, any articles of value impounded from prisoners of war under Article 18, and any
foreign currency which has not been converted into the currency of the Detaining Power, shall be
restored to them. Articles of value and foreign currency which, for any reason whatever, are not
restored to prisoners of war on repatriation, shall be dispatched to the Information Bureau set
up under Article 122.
Prisoners of war shall be allowed to take with them their personal effects, and any
correspondence and parcels which have arrived for them. The weight of such baggage may be
limited, if the conditions of repatriation so require, to what each prisoner can reasonably carry.
Each prisoner shall in all cases be authorized to carry at least twenty-five kilograms.
The other personal effects of the repatriated prisoner shall be left in the charge of the Detaining
Power which shall have them forwarded to him as soon as it has concluded an agreement to this
effect, regulating the conditions of transport and the payment of the costs involved, with the
Power on which the prisoner depends.
Prisoners of war against whom criminal proceedings for an indictable offence are pending may be
detained until the end of such proceedings, and, if necessary, until the completion of the
punishment. The same shall apply to prisoners of war already convicted for an indictable offence.
Parties to the conflict shall communicate to each other the names of any prisoners of war who
are detained until the end of the proceedings or until punishment has been completed.
By agreement between the Parties to the conflict, commissions shall be established for the
purpose of searching for dispersed prisoners of war and of assuring their repatriation with the
least possible delay.
ARTICLE 120
Wills of prisoners of war shall be drawn up so as to satisfy the conditions of validity required by
the legislation of their country of origin, which will take steps to inform the Detaining Power of
its requirements in this respect. At the request of the prisoner of war and, in all cases, after
death, the will shall be transmitted without delay to the Protecting Power; a certified copy shall
be sent to the Central Agency.
Death certificates in the form annexed to the present Convention, or lists certified by a
responsible officer, of all persons who die as prisoners of war shall be forwarded as rapidly as
possible to the Prisoner of War Information Bureau established in accordance with Article 122.
The death certificates or certified lists shall show particulars of identity as set out in the third
paragraph of Article 17, and also the date and place of death, the cause of death, the date and
place of burial and all particulars necessary to identify the graves.
The burial or cremation of a prisoner of war shall be preceded by a medical examination of the
body with a view to confirming death and enabling a report to be made and, where necessary,
establishing identity.
The detaining authorities shall ensure that prisoners of war who have died in captivity are
honorably buried, if possible according to the rites of the religion to which they belonged, and
that their graves are respected, suitably maintained and marked so as to be found at any time.
Wherever possible, deceased prisoners of war who depended on the same Power shall be interred
in the same place.
Deceased prisoners of war shall be buried in individual graves unless unavoidable circumstances
require the use of collective graves. Bodies may be cremated only for imperative reasons of
hygiene, on account of the religion of the deceased or in accordance with his express wish to this
effect. In case of cremation, the fact shall be stated and the reasons given in the death certificate
of the deceased.
In order that graves may always be found, all particulars of burials and graves shall be recorded
with a Graves Registration Service established by the Detaining Power. Lists of graves and
particulars of the prisoners of war interred in cemeteries and elsewhere shall be transmitted to
the Power on which such prisoners of war depended. Responsibility for the care of these graves
and for records of any subsequent moves of the bodies shall rest on the Power controlling the
territory, if a Party to the present Convention. These provisions shall also apply to the ashes,
which shall be kept by the Graves Registration Service until proper disposal thereof in
accordance with the wishes of the home country.
ARTICLE 121
Every death or serious injury of a prisoner of war caused or suspected to have been caused by a
sentry, another prisoner of war, or any other person, as well as any death the cause of which is
unknown, shall be immediately followed by an official enquiry by the Detaining Power.
A communication on this subject shall be sent immediately to the Protecting Power. Statements
shall be taken from witnesses, especially from those who are prisoners of war, and a report
including such statements shall be forwarded to the Protecting Power.
If the enquiry indicates the guilt of one or more persons, the Detaining Power shall take all
measures for the prosecution of the person or persons responsible.
ARTICLE 122
Upon the outbreak of a conflict and in all cases of occupation, each of the Parties to the conflict
shall institute an official Information Bureau for prisoners of war who are in its power. Neutral
or non-belligerent Powers who may have received within their territory persons belonging to one
of the categories referred to in Article 4, shall take the same action with respect to such persons.
The Power concerned shall ensure that the Prisoners of War Information Bureau is provided
with the necessary accommodation, equipment and staff to ensure its efficient working. It shall
be at liberty to employ prisoners of war in such a Bureau under the conditions laid down in the
Section of the present Convention dealing with work by prisoners of war.
Within the shortest possible period, each of the Parties to the conflict shall give its Bureau the
information referred to in the fourth, fifth and sixth paragraphs of this Article regarding any
enemy person belonging to one of the categories referred to in Article 4, who has fallen into its
power. Neutral or non-belligerent Powers shall take the same action with regard to persons
belonging to such categories whom they have received within their territory.
The Bureau shall immediately forward such information by the most rapid means to the Powers
concerned, through the intermediary of the Protecting Powers and likewise of the Central
Agency provided for in Article 123.
This information shall make it possible quickly to advise the next of kin concerned. Subject to the
provisions of Article 17, the information shall include, in so far as available to the Information
Bureau, in respect of each prisoner of war, his surname, first names, rank, army, regimental,
personal or serial number, place and full date of birth, indication of the Power on which he
depends, first name of the father and maiden name of the mother, name and address of the
person to be informed and the address to which correspondence for the prisoner may be sent.
The Information Bureau shall receive from the various departments concerned information
regarding transfers, releases, repatriations, escapes, admissions to hospital, and deaths, and
shall transmit such information in the manner described in the third paragraph above.
Likewise, information regarding the state of health of prisoners of war who are seriously ill or
seriously wounded shall be supplied regularly, every week if possible.
The Information Bureau shall also be responsible for replying to all inquiries sent to it
concerning prisoners of war, including those who have died in captivity; it will make any
inquiries necessary to obtain the information which is asked for if this is not in its possession.
All written communications made by the Bureau shall be authenticated by a signature or a seal.
The Information Bureau shall furthermore be charged with collecting all personal valuables,
including sums in currencies other than that of the Detaining Power and documents of
importance to the next of kin, left by prisoners of war who have been repatriated or released, or
who have escaped or died, and shall forward the said valuables to the Powers concerned. Such
articles shall be sent by the Bureau in sealed packets which shall be accompanied by statements
giving clear and full particulars of the identity of the person to whom the articles belonged, and
by a complete list of the contents of the parcel. Other personal effects of such prisoners of war
shall be transmitted under arrangements agreed upon between the Parties to the conflict
concerned.
ARTICLE 123
A Central Prisoners of War Information Agency shall be created in a neutral country. The
International Committee of the Red Cross shall, if it deems necessary, propose to the Powers
concerned the organization of such an Agency.
The function of the Agency shall be to collect all the information it may obtain through official or
private channels respecting prisoners of war, and to transmit it as rapidly as possible to the
country of origin of the prisoners of war or to the Power on which they depend. It shall receive
from the Parties to the conflict all facilities for effecting such transmissions.
The High Contracting Parties, and in particular those whose nationals benefit by the services of
the Central Agency, are requested to give the said Agency the financial aid it may require.
The foregoing provisions shall in no way be interpreted as restricting the humanitarian activities
of the International Committee of the Red Cross, or of the relief Societies provided for in Article
125.
ARTICLE 124
The national Information Bureau and the Central Information Agency shall enjoy free postage
for mail, likewise all the exemptions provided for in Article 74, and further, so far as possible,
exemption from telegraphic charges or, at least, greatly reduced rates.
ARTICLE 125
Subject to the measures which the Detaining Powers may consider essential to ensure their
security or to meet any other reasonable need, the representatives of religious organizations,
relief societies, or any other organization assisting prisoners of war, shall receive from the said
Powers, for themselves and their duly accredited agents, all necessary facilities for visiting the
prisoners, distributing relief supplies and material, from any source, intended for religious,
educational or recreative purposes, and for assisting them in organizing their leisure time within
the camps. Such societies or organizations may be constituted in the territory of the Detaining
Power or in any other country, or they may have an international character.
The Detaining Power may limit the number of societies and organizations whose delegates are
allowed to carry out their activities in its territory and under its supervision, on condition,
however, that such limitation shall not hinder the effective operation of adequate relief to all
prisoners of war.
The special position of the International Committee of the Red Cross in this field shall be
recognized and respected at all times.
As soon as relief supplies or material intended for the above-mentioned purposes are handed
over to prisoners of war, or very shortly afterwards, receipts for each consignment, signed by the
prisoners' representative, shall be forwarded to the relief society or organization making the
shipment. At the same time, receipts for these consignments shall be supplied by the
administrative authorities responsible for guarding the prisoners.
ARTICLE 126
Representatives or delegates of the Protecting Powers shall have permission to go to all places
where prisoners of war may be, particularly to places of internment, imprisonment and labor,
and shall have access to all premises occupied by prisoners of war; they shall also be allowed to
go to the places of departure, passage and arrival of prisoners who are being transferred. They
shall be able to interview the prisoners, and in particular the prisoners' representatives, without
witnesses, either personally or through an interpreter.
Representatives and delegates of the Protecting Powers shall have full liberty to select the places
they wish to visit. The duration and frequency of these visits shall not be restricted. Visits may
not be prohibited except for reasons of imperative military necessity, and then only as an
exceptional and temporary measure.
The Detaining Power and the Power on which the said prisoners of war depend may agree, if
necessary, that compatriots of these prisoners of war be permitted to participate in the visits.
The delegates of the International Committee of the Red Cross shall enjoy the same
prerogatives. The appointment of such delegates shall be submitted to the approval of the Power
detaining the prisoners of war to be visited.
ARTICLE 127
The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of peace as in time of war, to disseminate the
text of the present Convention as widely as possible in their respective countries, and, in
particular, to include the study thereof in their programs of military and, if possible, civil
instruction, so that the principles thereof may become known to all their armed forces and to the
entire population.
Any military or other authorities, who in time of war assume responsibilities in respect of
prisoners of war, must possess the text of the Convention and be specially instructed as to its
provisions.
ARTICLE 128
The High Contracting Parties shall communicate to one another through the Swiss Federal
Council and, during hostilities, through the Protecting Powers, the official translations of the
present Convention, as well as the laws and regulations which they may adopt to ensure the
application thereof.
ARTICLE 129
The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective
penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches of
the present Convention defined in the following Article.
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have
committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such
persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in
accordance with the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another
High Contracting Party concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima
facie case.
Each High Contracting Party shall take measures necessary for the suppression of all acts
contrary to the provisions of the present Convention other than the grave breaches defined in the
following Article.
In all circumstances, the accused persons shall benefit by safeguards of proper trial and defense,
which shall not be less favorable than those provided by Article 105 and those following of the
present Convention.
ARTICLE 130
Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of the
following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the Convention: willful
killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, willfully causing great
suffering or serious injury to body or health, compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of
the hostile Power, or willfully depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular trial
prescribed in this Convention.
ARTICLE 131
No High Contracting Party shall be allowed to absolve itself or any other High Contracting Party
of any liability incurred by itself or by another High Contracting Party in respect of breaches
referred to in the preceding Article.
ARTICLE 132
At the request of a Party to the conflict, an enquiry shall be instituted, in a manner to be decided
between the interested Parties, concerning any alleged violation of the Convention.
If agreement has not been reached concerning the procedure for the enquiry, the Parties should
agree on the choice of an umpire who will decide upon the procedure to be followed.
Once the violation has been established, the Parties to the conflict shall put an end to it and
shall repress it with the least possible delay.
ARTICLE 133
The present Convention is established in English and in French. Both texts are equally
authentic. The Swiss Federal Council shall arrange for official translations of the Convention to
be made in the Russian and Spanish languages.
ARTICLE 134
The present Convention replaces the Convention of 27 July 1929, in relations between the High
Contracting Parties.
ARTICLE 135
In the relations between the Powers which are bound by The Hague Convention respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land, whether that of July 29, 1899, or that of October 18, 1907,
and which are parties to the present Convention, this last Convention shall be complementary to
Chapter II of the Regulations annexed to the above-mentioned Conventions of The Hague.
ARTICLE 136
The present Convention, which bears the date of this day, is open to signature until February 12,
1950, in the name of the Powers represented at the Conference which opened at Geneva on April
21, 1949; furthermore, by Powers not represented at that Conference, but which are parties to
the Convention of July 27, 1929.
ARTICLE 137
The present Convention shall be ratified as soon as possible and the ratifications shall be
deposited at Berne.
A record shall be drawn up of the deposit of each instrument of ratification and certified copies of
this record shall be transmitted by the Swiss Federal Council to all the Powers in whose name
the Convention has been signed, or whose accession has been notified.
ARTICLE 138
The present Convention shall come into force six months after not less than two instruments of
ratification have been deposited.
Thereafter, it shall come into force for each High Contracting Party six months after the deposit
of the instrument of ratification.
ARTICLE 139
From the date of its coming into force, it shall be open to any Power in whose name the present
Convention has not been signed, to accede to this Convention.
ARTICLE 140
Accessions shall be notified in writing to the Swiss Federal Council, and shall take effect six
months after the date on which they are received.
The Swiss Federal Council shall communicate the accessions to all the Powers in whose name
the Convention has been signed, or whose accession has been notified.
ARTICLE 141
The situations provided for in Articles 2 and 3 shall give immediate effect to ratifications
deposited and accessions notified by the Parties to the conflict before or after the beginning of
hostilities or occupation. The Swiss Federal Council shall communicate by the quickest method
any ratifications or accessions received from Parties to the conflict.
ARTICLE 142
Each of the High Contracting Parties shall be at liberty to denounce the present Convention.
The denunciation shall be notified in writing to the Swiss Federal Council, which shall transmit
it to the Governments of all the High Contracting Parties.
The denunciation shall take effect one year after the notification thereof has been made to the
Swiss Federal Council. However, a denunciation of which notification has been made at a time
when the denouncing Power is involved in a conflict shall not take effect until peace has been
concluded, and until after operations connected with the release and repatriation of the persons
protected by the present Convention have been terminated.
The denunciation shall have effect only in respect of the denouncing Power. It shall in no way
impair the obligations which the Parties to the conflict shall remain bound to fulfill by virtue of
the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized
peoples, from the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience.
ARTICLE 143
The Swiss Federal Council shall register the present Convention with the Secretariat of the
United Nations. The Swiss Federal Council shall also inform the Secretariat of the United
Nations of all ratifications, accessions and denunciations received by it with respect to the
present Convention.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, having deposited their respective full powers, have
signed the present Convention.
DONE at Geneva this twelfth day of August 1949, in the English and French languages. The
original shall be deposited in the Archives of the Swiss Confederation. The Swiss Federal Council
shall transmit certified copies thereof to each of the signatory and acceding States.
The following excerpted articles from the Geneva Conventions contain requirements concerning
the treatment of civilians during time of war. Violations of these articles can constitute war
crimes and should be treated as such.
PART I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 1
The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present
Convention in all circumstances.
Article 2
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the present Convention
shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between
two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of
them.
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a
High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention, the Powers
who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall
furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and
applies the provisions thereof.
Article 3
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of
the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum,
the following provisions:
1. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have
laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any
other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction
founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place
whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and
torture;
(c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;
(d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment
pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may
offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special
agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the
conflict.
Article 4
Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given moment and in any manner
whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the
conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.
Nationals of a State which is not bound by the Convention are not protected by it.
Nationals of a neutral State who find themselves in the territory of a belligerent State, and
nationals of a co-belligerent State, shall not be regarded as protected persons while the State of
which they are nationals has normal diplomatic representation in the State in whose hands they
are.
The provisions of Part II are, however, wider in application, as defined in Article 13.
Persons protected by the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949, or by the Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea of August 12, 1949, or by the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949, shall not be considered as protected persons within the
meaning of the present Convention.
Article 5
Where, in the territory of a Party to the conflict, the latter is satisfied that an individual
protected person is definitely suspected of or engaged in activities hostile to the security of the
State, such individual person shall not be entitled to claim such rights and privileges under the
present Convention as would, if exercised in the favour of such individual person, be prejudicial
to the security of such State.
In each case, such persons shall nevertheless be treated with humanity, and in case of trial, shall
not be deprived of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed by the present Convention. They
shall also be granted the full rights and privileges of a protected person under the present
Convention at the earliest date consistent with the security of the State or Occupying Power, as
the case may be.
Article 25
All persons in the territory of a Party to the conflict, or in a territory occupied by it, shall be
enabled to give news of a strictly personal nature to members of their families, wherever they
may be, and to receive news from them. This correspondence shall be forwarded speedily and
without undue delay.
If the Parties to the conflict deem it necessary to restrict family correspondence, such restrictions
shall be confined to the compulsory use of standard forms containing twenty-five freely chosen
words, and to the limitation of the number of these forms dispatched to one each month.
PART III
SECTION I
Article 27
Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour,
their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs.
They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of
violence or threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity.
Women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against
rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.
Without prejudice to the provisions relating to their state of health, age and sex, all protected
persons shall be treated with the same consideration by the Party to the conflict in whose power
they are, without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, religion or political
opinion.
However, the Parties to the conflict may take such measures of control and security in regard to
protected persons as may be necessary as a result of the war.
Article 28
The presence of a protected person may not be used to render certain points or areas immune
from military operations.
Article 29
The Party to the conflict in whose hands protected persons may be is responsible for the
treatment accorded to them by its agents, irrespective of any individual responsibility which may
be incurred.
Article 30
Protected persons shall have every facility for making application to the Protecting Powers, the
International Committee of the Red Cross, the National Red Cross (Red Crescent, Red Lion and
Sun) Society of the country where they may be, as well as to any organization that might assist
them.
These several organizations shall be granted all facilities for that purpose by the authorities,
within the bounds set by military or security considerations.
Apart from the visits of the delegates of the Protecting Powers and of the International
Committee of the Red Cross, provided for by Article 143, the Detaining or Occupying Powers
shall facilitate as much as possible visits to protected persons by the representatives of other
organizations whose object is to give spiritual aid or material relief to such persons.
Article 31
Article 32
The High Contracting Parties specifically agree that each of them is prohibited from taking any
measure of such a character as to cause the physical suffering or extermination of protected
persons in their hands. This prohibition applies not only to murder, torture, corporal
punishment, mutilation and medical or scientific experiments not necessitated by the medical
treatment of a protected person but also to any other measures of brutality whether applied by
civilian or military agents.
Article 33
No protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally committed.
Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited.
Pillage is prohibited.
Article 34
SECTION II
Article 41
Should the Power in whose hands protected persons may be consider the measures of control
mentioned in the present Convention to be inadequate, it may not have recourse to any other
measure of control more severe than that of assigned residence or internment, in accordance
with the provisions of Articles 42 and 43.
In applying the provisions of Article 39, second paragraph, to the cases of persons required to
leave their usual places of residences by virtue of a decision placing them in assigned residence
elsewhere, the Detaining Power shall be guided as closely as possible by the standards of welfare
set forth in Part III, Section IV of this Convention.
Article 42
The internment or placing in assigned residence of protected persons may be ordered only if the
security of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary.
If any person, acting through the representatives of the Protecting Power, voluntarily demands
internment, and if his situation renders this step necessary, he shall be interned by the Power in
whose hands he may be.
Article 43
Any protected person who has been interned or placed in assigned residence shall be entitled to
have such action reconsidered as soon as possible by an appropriate court or administrative
board designated by the Detaining Power for that purpose. If the internment or placing in
assigned residence is maintained, the court or administrative board shall periodically, and at
least twice yearly, give consideration to his or her case, with a view to the favourable amendment
of the initial decision, if circumstances permit.
Unless the protected persons concerned object, the Detaining Power shall, as rapidly as possible,
give the Protecting Power the names of any protected persons who have been interned or
subjected to assigned residence, or who have been released from internment or assigned
residence. The decisions of the courts or boards mentioned in the first paragraph of the present
Article shall also, subject to the same conditions, be notified as rapidly as possible to the
Protecting Power.
Article 44
In applying the measures of control mentioned in the present Convention, the Detaining Power
shall not treat as enemy aliens exclusively on the basis of their nationality de jure of an enemy
State, refugees who do not, in fact, enjoy the protection of any government.
Appendix B
SOURCE RELIABILITY
B-1. Reliability ratings range from “Reliable” (A) to “Unreliable” (E) as shown
in Table B-1. In every instance the rating is based on previous reporting
from that source. If there has been no previous reporting, the source must be
rated as “F”. [NOTE: An “F” rating does not necessarily mean that the
source cannot be trusted, but that there is no reporting history and therefore
no basis for making a determination.]
Table B-1. Evaluation of Source Reliability.
INFORMATION CONTENT
B-2. The highest degree of confidence in reported information is given to that
which has been confirmed by outside sources, “1”. Table B-2 shows evalua
tion of information content. The degree of confidence decreases if the
information is not confirmed, and/or does not seem to make sense. The
lowest evaluated rating of “5” means that the information is considered to be
false. [NOTE: A rating of “6” does not necessarily mean false information,
but is generally used to indicate that no determination can be made since the
information is completely new.]
Appendix C
Pre-Deployment Planning
HUMINT leaders must anticipate, identify, consider, and evaluate all
potential threats. They must take advantage of enhanced information flow
through hierarchical and nonhierarchical networks (computer,
communications, and personnel). HCTs should––
• Review available databases on assigned contingency AOIs; review
existing IPB products, conduct IPB on these AOIs; and develop
appropriate IPB products. Information on databases created for
specific contingencies can be gotten from the J2X.
• Continually monitor and update their OPLANs to reflect the evolving
situation.
• Be aware of higher headquarters SOPs and DIA manuals for specific
ISR management guidance.
• Prepare and practice an intelligence “surge” on likely contingency
crises.
• Prepare and practice coordination from pre-deployment through
redeployment with personnel from HUMINT, IMINT, MASINT,
SIGINT, CA, PSYOP, SOF units, MP, and Engineers.
• Plan for requirements to support 24-hour operations: automation,
communications capacity, and personnel necessary to provide
continuous intelligence information collection and RM, processing, and
reporting.
• Plan and coordinate for linguistic support.
• Forward all RFIs to higher headquarters in accordance with SOPs.
• Prepare and practice coordination with units they will support during
pre-deployment exercises. Liaison must be conducted with
commanders, S2s, administrative support personnel, logistical support
personnel, communications personnel, and others. Obtain supported
unit’s briefing slide formats.
• Obtain copies of the supported unit’s SOPs and ensure all team
members are aware of the procedures governing HUMINT interface.
• Ensure that team data processing equipment is compatible with the
supported unit’s network structure and that appropriate interfaces are
available.
• Exercise unit deployment SOPs, load plans, and packing lists.
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Appendix D
PURPOSE
D-2. This guide is for battalion and brigade S2s. It explains standard
procedures on what the S2 should do when his unit—
• Captures an enemy soldier or other detainee.
• Encounters a civilian on the battlefield.
• Finds or captures an enemy document.
• Discovers an unusual enemy weapon or other unusual piece of
equipment during tactical operations.
PERSONNEL HANDLING
D-3. The GPW defines persons entitled to treatment as prisoners of war upon
capture, in Article 4 (see Appendix A, Section I).
D-4. The GC defines the civilian population (exclusive of those civilian
persons listed in GPW, Article 4) who benefit to varying degrees from the
provisions of the Geneva Conventions. (See Appendix A, Sections II and III.)
D-5. Persons in each of these categories have distinct rights, duties, and
restrictions. Persons who are not members of the Armed Forces, as defined in
Article 4, GPW, who bear arms or engage in other conduct hostile to the
enemy thereby deprive themselves of many of the privileges attaching to the
members of the civilian population. The capturing unit treats all combatants
and noncombatants who are suspected of being part of the threat force as
EPWs or retained personnel until their status can be determined. This
determination normally occurs at the detainee collection point or at a higher
echelon. Noncombatants are handled, questioned, detained, evacuated, and
released in accordance with theater policy. In all cases, detainees are treated
humanely.
D-8. The capturing unit’s first job is to disarm, search, and maintain positive
control over all detainees. The detainees are disarmed and searched for
concealed weapons and for equipment and documents of particular
intelligence value immediately upon capture, unless the number of detainees
captured, enemy action, or other circumstances make such a search
impracticable. Until each detainee is searched, the responsible forces must be
alert to prevent the use of concealed weapons or destruction of documents or
equipment.
D-9. The capturing unit gathers all loose CEDs and CEE in the area.
Identification documents and protective military equipment such as helmets
or NBC gear stay with the detainee unless otherwise directed by the
battalion S2.
• Equipment. Items of personal or individual equipment that are new or
appear to be of a type not previously observed may be of intelligence
value and should be processed and reported in accordance with the
unit’s SOP, specific evacuation instructions in Annex B (Intelligence) of
the OPORD, and theater policy. Equipment for personal protection
such as protective masks or protective clothing may not be taken
unless replaced with equivalent equipment.
• Documents. A CED is any piece of recorded information that has been
in the hands of the enemy. CEDs include but are not limited to maps,
sketches, photographs, orders, tactical and technical manuals and
instructions, code books, log books, maintenance records, shipping and
packing slips and lists, war and field diaries, personal diaries, pay
books, newspapers, service records, postal savings books, payrolls,
postcards and letters, and any written, printed, engraved, or
photographic matter that may contain information relative to the
enemy and to weather and terrain data. A capturing unit is normally
not able to accurately determine the potential intelligence value of any
documents found on the detainee. It is therefore normally expedient to
remove all documents, with the exception of the detainee’s primary
identification document. These documents are sealed in a waterproof
container and tagged with part C of the capture tag. If capture tags are
not available, the document bag must be marked at a minimum to
identify the detainee to whom the documents belong (see Appendix I).
• Personal effects. Except as provided in Step 1, detainees should be
permitted to retain all of their personal effects including money;
valuables; protective equipment, such as helmets, protective masks,
and like items; effects and articles used for clothing or eating, except
knives and forks; identification cards or tags; badges of grade and
nationality; and articles having a personal or sentimental value. When
items of equipment issued for the personal protection of detainees are
taken from them, they must be replaced with equivalent items serving
the same purpose. Although money and other valuables may be taken
from detainees as a security measure, they must then be receipted for
and a record thereof maintained in a special register. These
administrative steps normally are not practical to accomplish prior to
arrival of the detainee at an EPW camp.
STEP 2. SILENCE
D-10. Detainees are kept silent so that they cannot plan deception or
encourage each other to resist. Keeping the detainees silent also prevents
them from relieving the stress and shock of capture by talking with others. If
the shock of capture is preserved, HUMINT collectors can take advantage of
it in an approach. The capturing unit instructs or signals the detainees to be
silent. If that does not work, the detainee is gagged. Guards give orders to
detainees, but do not converse with them or give them any comfort items.
STEP 3. SAFEGUARD
D-11. All detainees are promptly evacuated out of the “danger” zone. Their
presence may not be used to render points or areas immune to attack, nor
should they be retained for participation in psychological warfare or other
activities. The capturing forces must protect detainees from reprisals.
Detainees will not be denied food, potable water, or appropriate clothing and
shelter. Necessary medical attention will not be delayed. Those detainees
held in an area should be provided protective facilities and equipment and
should be oriented as to procedures to be followed in case of chemical,
biological, and radiological agent attack.
STEP 4. SEGREGATE
D-12. The capturing unit separates officers from enlisted, senior from junior,
male from female, and civilian from military within their capabilities to both
guard and safeguard the detainees. (Physical segregation at this point is not
always possible.) Deserters and people of different nationalities and
ideologies should be further segregated. The capturing unit prepares a
capture tag and puts one on each detainee (see Figure D-1). Tagging
procedures are discussed in paragraph D-16.
D-16. When the detainees have been searched and segregated, the capturing
unit prepares a capture tag and puts one on each detainee. It is very
important that the capturing unit fill out the Capture Tag as accurately and
completely as possible. HUMINT collectors will use the information from
the tag when preparing to interrogate detainees. The “capturing unit” and
“location of capture” information will be used to provide direct feedback to
the capturing unit when information of immediate tactical value is obtained.
Each EPW tag has a different serial number used for the purpose of
accountability and cannot be reproduced. The EPW tag is perforated into
three parts: Part A is attached to the detainee, Part B is retained by the
capturing unit, and Part C is attached to the detainee’s property (see Figure
D-1).
DOCUMENT HANDLING
D-20. The S2 extracts the combat information and uses the SALUTE format
as a template to organize the information.
MEDICAL CARE
D-23. Medical equipment and supplies to permit the administering of
emergency first aid should be available at each EPW collecting point and
EPW holding area. A qualified medical retained person, if available, may
administer first aid to other detainees. All detainees suspected of having
communicable diseases are isolated for examination by a medical officer.
Wounded detainees may be questioned by intelligence personnel once the
detainees are cleared by competent medical authority for questioning.
D-24. For evacuation purposes, detainees may be classified as walking
wounded or sick, or as non-walking wounded or sick. Walking wounded
detainees are evacuated through MP EPW evacuation channels. Non-walking
wounded are delivered to the nearest medical aid station and evacuated
through medical channels.
FM 2-22.3
Appendix E
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
PRISONER-OF-WAR STATUS
E-7. Captured personnel (CPERS) can be divided into two categories:
Captured personnel who are PWs and other detainees.
E-8. Prisoner-of-war status is conferred on captured personnel who fall
within the categories listed in Article 4 of GC3, which is reproduced in
Annex A, or, if ratified by the nations concerned, those who meet the
expanded definition of a PW as stated in Protocol I of the 1977 Protocols.
E-9. Other detainees are personnel being held by NATO forces until their
status can be determined and their further disposition can be decided.
E-10. Furthermore, when NATO forces are engaged in Peacetime Support
Operations (PSOs), the operational plan should contain specific instructions
as to which individuals will have PW status. Directions for handling other
detainees, including those suspected of crimes against humanity and war
crimes, are also to be included in the operational plan or in the Standing
Operating Procedures used in the operation.
PERSONNEL
E-11. Conditions allowing, the following procedures should be followed by the
capturing unit:
a. CPERS should be disarmed immediately, and all documents and
effects of military or investigative interest except for necessary clothing,
identity documents and protective equipment (Geneva Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GC3), Article 18) should be removed.
CPERS should then be tagged in accordance with the procedures outlined at
Annex B. A Common Capture Report should also be completed and forwarded
in accordance with the procedure set out in Annex C. It is important that the
documents, equipment, maps, etc., taken from a CPERS accompany him to
the next receiving unit. Valuable information may be lost by not having these
items available during processing and interrogation.
b. Within the confines of the tactical situation, CPERS are to be
segregated according to rank, grade, service, sex and nationality or ethnic
group/warring faction to minimize the opportunity to prepare counter-
interrogation measures. Furthermore, deserters, civilians and political
indoctrination personnel will be individually segregated from other CPERS.
Such segregation shall be undertaken in a manner which does not violate
GC3, Article 16.
c. Talking or fraternization between CPERS is to be prevented in order
not to prejudice future intelligence collection operations. CPERS will be
allowed no opportunity to exchange information between themselves, to
exchange identities or to dispose of articles of intelligence interest.
d. Interrogation operations must not be compromised by contact between
CPERS and personnel not concerned with interrogation duties.
e. CPERS will also be prevented from observing sensitive and critical
activities, equipment and procedures involving NATO, national or allied
forces.
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
DOCUMENTS
E-12. Captured documents (CDOC) considered of intelligence interest will be
handled by the capturing unit in the following manner:
a. The capturing unit will conduct a preliminary screening to obtain
information of immediate technical or tactical value.
b. An intelligence report (INTREP) identifying the CDOC and its
disposition as well as giving information considered to be of immediate
tactical value will be prepared and submitted by the capturing unit. (See
STANAG 2022.)
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
c. The capturing unit will tag or otherwise mark the CDOC as follows:
- National identifying letters of capturing unit a s prescribed in
STANAG 1059.
- Designation of capturing unit including service.
- Serial number of the CDOC. This will consist of a number allocated
sequentially by the capturing unit.
- DTG of capture.
- Location of capture (geographic coordinates or UTM grid reference
including grid zone designation and 100,000-meter square
identification).
- Captured from Unit (enemy or warring faction) (including national
identifying letters in accordance with STANAG 1059).
- Summary of circumstances under which the CDOC was obtained.
Interrogation serial number of any associated CPERS, if appropriate
or known.
- CED associated with a captured person should be marked with part
C of the Standardized EPW Capture and Personal Equipment Tag.
d. CED to be used as evidence in legal proceedings against CPERS
suspected of crimes against humanity and war crimes will be kept under
guard or in a secure area separate from other CED.
EQUIPMENT
E-13. Captured Equipment (CE) and Associated Technical Documents
(ATDs) considered of intelligence interest will be handled by the capturing
unit in the following manner:
a. A Capture Report as set out in Annex C of the OPORD will be
prepared by the capturing unit upon the discovery or capture of CE or ATD
believed to be of intelligence interest. The reporting channels are from the
capturing unit through the chain of command to the first TECHINT element.
b. The capturing unit will conduct a preliminary screening to obtain
information of immediate technical or tactical value. A Preliminary Technical
Report (PRETECHREP) as set out in Annex D of the OPORD will be
prepared and submitted through established intelligence channels.
c. Intelligence Reports (INTREP) may, as circumstances dictate, be
submitted in advance but not in lieu of the Capture Report and
PRETECHREP. (See STANAG 2022.)
d. CE and ATD will be tagged or marked by the capturing unit as follows:
- National identifying letters of capturing unit as prescribed in
STANAG 1059.
- Designation of capturing unit including service.
- DTG of capture.
- Location of capture (geographic coordinates or UTM grid reference
including grid zone designation and 100,000-meter square
identification).
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
FM 2-22.3
Appendix F
1. Every captured person selected for interrogation will be given an Interrogation Serial
Number. This number shall be allocated by the Interrogation Unit conducting the first
interrogation of the captured person.
2. The number should not be confused with the Prisoner of War Internment Serial Number
(ISN), which is to be used for administrative purposes only.
3. The purpose of the Interrogation Serial Number is to identify the source of information to
ensure its proper evaluation, processing, and follow-up action. It will also identify the nationality
and location of the interrogation unit.
a. 2 letters to indicate the Nationality of the captured person (see para 6).
b. 2 letters to indicate the Service of the captured person (see para 7).
c. 1 letter to indicate the Arm of Service of the captured person (see para 8).
d. 4 numbers to indicate the Interrogation Sequence Number of the captured person (see
para 9).
g. 4 letters to indicate the Nationality and Service of the Interrogation Unit (see para 10).
5. Each group shall be separated by a dash. The final number shall therefore appear as in the
following examples:
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
San Marino – Army prisoner – One star or above – 431st captured person interrogated –
captured 7 Jul – interrogated by UK Army – team 19
6. The two letters used for indicating the Nationality of the captured person will be in
accordance with established NATO Country codes in STANAG 1059.
7. The following list of letters is to be used to indicate the Service of the captured person:
8. The following list of letters is to be used to indicate the Arm of Service of the captured person:
9. The sequence number of the interrogated captured personnel shall be of four digits allocated
in numerical order of interrogation by the team first interrogating the captured person.
a. Country codes, as laid down in STANAG 1059, are to be used for indication of the
Nationality of the Interrogation Team.
b. The following lists of letters are to be used for indicating the Service of the Interrogation
Team:
c. NATO teams will use the following abbreviations: (These will be determined as
command changes are implemented and STANAG 1059 is revised).
SC EUROPE RC SOUTH
RC NORTH JHQ SOUTHWEST
JHQ NORTH JHQ SOUTH
JHQ NORTHEAST JHQ SOUTH CENTER
JHQ CENTER JHQ SOUTHEAST
CC AIR NORTH CC AIR SOUTH
CC NAV NORTH CC NAV SOUTH
SC ATLANTIC RC EAST
RC WEST STRIK FLTLANT
RC SOUTHEAST SUB ACLANT
11. Nations will allocate 4-digit serial numbers to their interrogation teams. NATO Commands
will issue similar numbers to subordinate national interrogation teams under their command.
FM 2-22.3
Appendix G
This appendix offers a quick reference for the trained HUMINT collector. It is not meant to be
all-inclusive, nor instructive in proper questioning technique, but lays out frequently used
requirements grouped logically by OB factor. Proper formation of questions is covered in detail
in Chapter 9.
Missions: Mission questioning consists of three areas: Time of Capture Mission, Future
Mission, and Past Mission. Missions are questioned in that order, to ensure that the information
is collected in the order of importance to a supported commander. Logical follow-up questioning
may lead the collector into any of the OB factors at any time during questioning in order to
provide complete information.
Offensive Missions:
When will the enemy attack?
Where will they attack?
What is the main objective of the attack?
What units will participate in the attack?
What tactics will be employed?
What artillery, air, and other units will support the attack?
Defensive Missions:
Where will the enemy establish lines of defense?
What units have been assigned to the defensive lines?
What obstacles have been emplaced (mines, trenches, wire, etc.)?
What artillery support is there for the defensive operation?
Retrograde Operations:
What units will take part in the retreat?
What are the current positions of the retreating units?
When will they start to retreat?
What routes will be used?
What is the planned destination of the retreating units?
What units will cover the retreat?
Composition:
What is the command and control element of (the target unit)?
What types of units are directly subordinate to (the target unit)?
What is the designation of (each of the subordinate units)?
How many units of that type are directly subordinate to (target unit)?
What units are attached? When? Why? What unit(s) are they detached from?
What units are detached? When? Why? What unit(s) are they attached to now?
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Dispositions:
Disposition questioning is ideally done with the aid of a map.
In the case of artillery, describe the placement and orientation of the guns,
Tactics:
Offensive: What offensive tactics are being employed by (unit)?
What other units are involved?
When did (unit) begin employing these tactics?
What are the major objectives?
Defensive: What defensive tactics are being employed by (unit)?
What other units are involved?
When did (unit) begin employing these tactics?
Special Operations: What special operations tactics are being employed by (unit)?
What are the designations of the units employing special operations tactics? When did
(unit) begin employing special operations tactics?
Where/Why are these tactics being employed?
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
Training:
Individual Training: What individual training is being conducted by (unit)?
Who is being trained?
How effective is the training?
Where is the training conducted?
What are the training standards?
Unit Training: What unit training is being conducted by (unit)?
Who is being trained?
How effective is the training?
Where is the training conducted?
What are the training standards?
Specialized Training: What specialized training is being conducted by (unit)?
Who is being trained?
How effective is the training?
Where is the training conducted?
What are the training standards?
What specialized equipment is used in the conduct of the training?
Combat Effectiveness:
Losses:
Personnel: What personnel losses have been incurred by (unit)?
When? Where? How?
What were the duty positions/ranks of the lost personnel?
Equipment: What equipment losses have been sustained by (unit)?
What type of equipment was lost?
When? Where? How many?
How were they lost?
Replacements (Personnel):
Received: What replacements have been received by (unit)?
What replacements are available to (unit)?
How many?
From where were the replacements received?
Available: What personnel replacements are available to (unit)?
From where are replacements available?
How many? What ranks?
How long would it take for replacements to arrive once requested?
Replacements (Equipment):
Received: What equipment replacements have been received by (unit)?
How many?
From where were the replacements received?
How does the quality of the replacement equipment compare to that of the original
equipment?
What is the level of confidence in the replacement equipment, compared to the original?
Available: What equipment replacements are available to (unit)?
From where are replacements available?
How long would it take to receive replacement equipment once requested?
How many of each type of equipment are available?
Reinforcements:
Received: What reinforcements have been received by (unit)?
What type was the reinforcing unit?
What is the designation of the reinforcing unit?
What equipment did the reinforcing unit bring?
To which unit was the reinforcing unit further assigned?
Why did (receiving unit) receive reinforcements?
How long will the reinforcing unit be assigned as reinforcement to (unit)?
Available: What reinforcements are available to (unit)?
From where (parent unit/location) are reinforcements available?
What types of units are available to reinforce (unit)?
How long would it take for reinforcements to arrive, once requested?
Morale:
Describe the morale of the members of (unit).
How long has the morale been…?
What is the unit leadership doing to (maintain/improve) the morale?
What effect has (high/low) morale had on the behavior or performance of the unit
members?
Logistics:
Weapons: What is the condition of the (specific weapons) in (the unit)?
Why are (the weapons) in that condition?
What is being done to improve the condition of (the weapons)?
How often is maintenance performed? By whom?
Who inspects weapons? How often?
Is there an increased emphasis on maintenance? If so, why?
What is done to prevent/alleviate a shortage while weapons are being maintained?
What spare parts are there for weapons in (unit)?
What shortages of spare parts are there?
What problems are there with spare parts (quality, fit, delays, etc)?
Ammunition: What types of ammunition are available for the (weapon/weapon system)
in the (unit)?
What problems are being experienced with ammunition for (weapon or weapon system)
in (unit)? Why? Since when?
What is being done to correct the problem(s)?
What shortages of ammunition for (weapon or weapon system) are there in (unit)?
What is being done to correct the shortage?
When was the last issue of ammunition for the (weapon or weapon system) in the (unit)?
How much was issued?
When is the next issue of ammunition planned?
(For insurgents/irregulars - Where is funding obtained for ammunition/explosive
purchases?
Where are ammunition/explosives obtained?
How are ammunition/explosives transported/delivered?
Vehicles: What is the condition of the (specific vehicle) in (the unit)?
Why are (the vehicles) in that condition?
What is being done to improve the condition of (the vehicles)?
How often is maintenance performed? By whom?
Who inspects vehicles? How often?
Miscellaneous:
Personalities: Question for name, rank, unit, duty position, and unit of key leaders.
Collect identifying characteristics such as age, height, weight, build, hair and eye color,
writing hand, facial hair and teeth.
Report contact information such as work and home addresses, telephone numbers, fax
number, and email address.
Complete biographical IIR format is in DIAM 58-12 (S//NF).
Code Names: What is the code name of (each unit)?
What code names are being used for specific operations?
Passwords: What is the current challenge/password for (unit)?
When did it go into effect?
When will it change?
What will the next challenge/password be?
What other (informal, “run in”) passwords are in use?
Obstacles:
Enemy: What obstacles have the enemy forces emplaced?
Where, when, what type of obstacles?
What safe lanes are there through or around the obstacles?
(If mine fields, collect type, pattern, quantity, and method of emplacement of mines.)
How are the obstacles being covered (artillery, ambush, etc.)?
Why have the obstacles been emplaced where they are (denial of terrain, canalization
into a fire sack, etc.)?
Friendly: What friendly obstacles have enemy forces encountered?
Where? When?
Have those obstacles been breached or otherwise neutralized?
What effect have the friendly obstacles had on enemy maneuver?
PSYOP:
Enemy: What PSYOP are being conducted by (unit)?
What is the text of the messages?
Who is the target audience?
Where are the PSYOP materials prepared?
Where and how are they delivered? What is the hoped-for effect?
Friendly: What PSYOP have members of (unit) encountered? Where? When?
What form of PSYOP was encountered?
What effect have the PSYOP had on the officers/NCOs/enlisted of (unit)?
What is the leadership of (unit) doing to counter the effects of friendly PSYOP?
FM 2-22.3
Appendix H
SALUTE Reporting
H-1. The SALUTE report format requires brief entries which require the
collector to break information down into basic elements: who, what, where,
when, why, and how. This allows for efficient reporting via electronic or
hardcopy medium. It also allows the analyst to quickly scan multiple reports
to find specific information.
TO: Usually the address of the supported S2/G2 (according to unit SOP)
2. (A)ctivity/What: This line is the focal point of the report and relates to the PIR or
important non-PIR information being reported. It should be a concise bullet
statement.
4. (U)nit/Who: This entry identifies who is performing the activity described in the
“Activity/What” entry. Include the complete designation of a military unit,
identification of a civilian or insurgent group, or the full name of an individual, as
appropriate.
5. (T)ime/When: For a future event, this is when the activity will initiate. Past
events are usually not the subject of SALUTE reports, but if a past event is to be
reported, the Time/When entry will generally reflect when the event ended. Ongoing
events are reported as such. Reports of composition of forces, morale, and Electronic
Technical Data and other non-event topics are reported as ongoing. When reporting
on a disposition, the “Time/When” entry is generally the last time the source was at
the disposition.
7. Remarks: Use this entry to report the source of the information, whether a person,
a CED, open-source media, or other source. Include the date of information and the
PIR that the reported information addresses. Map data for coordinates given in the
“Location/Where” entry are included, stating map series name, sheet number, scale
and edition. If there are enclosures to the SALUTE report, such as sketches, they are
annotated here.
Figure H-1. Example of a Written SALUTE Report.
Appendix I
DEFINITIONS
I-2. A document, as defined by AJP 2.5, is any piece of recorded information,
regardless of form. Documents include printed material such as books,
newspapers, pamphlets, OPORDs, and identity cards as well as handwritten
materials such as letters, diaries, and notes. Documents also include
electronically recorded media such as computer files, tape recordings, and
video recordings and the electronic equipment which contains documents or
other vitally important intelligence. Examples include hard drives, operating
systems, and personal electronic devices, including phones, PDAs, and GPS
devices. A CED may be needed by several collection or exploitation activities
at the same time, requiring copies to be made. Collectors must have ready
access to copying equipment. Documents often must be evacuated through
two different channels for proper exploitation, which also makes copying
necessary. Such documents and equipment require special handling to
assure that they are returned to their owners.
I-3. DOCEX is the systematic extraction of information from threat
documents for the purpose of producing intelligence or answering IRs. A
threat document has been in the possession of the threat, written by the
threat, or is directly related to a future threat situation. DOCEX can occur in
conjunction with HUMINT collection activities or as a separate activity.
I-4. A CED is any document that was in the possession of an enemy force
that subsequently comes into the hands of a friendly force, regardless of the
origin of that document. There are three types of CEDs.
• Official - documents of government or military origin.
• Identity - personal items such as identification (ID) cards or books,
passports, driver licenses.
• Personal - documents of a private nature such as diaries, letters, and
photographs.
I-5. Open-source documents are documents that are available to the general
public including but not limited to newspapers, books, videotapes, public
records, and documents available on the Internet or other publicly available
electronic media.
FM 2.22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
OPEN-SOURCE INFORMATION
I-7. Open-source information is publicly available information appearing in
print or electronic form. Open-source information may be transmitted via
radio, television, newspapers, commercial databases, electronic mail
networks, or other electronic media like CD-ROMs. Whatever form they take,
open sources are not—
• Classified at their origin.
• Subject to proprietary constraints.
• The product of sensitive contacts with US or foreign persons.
I-8. In all operations, open-source collection can be a valuable addition to the
overall intelligence collection and each intelligence discipline’s efforts. Open-
source information supplements the HUMINT collection effort, and all types
of open sources must be considered for exploitation.
I-9. Open sources are evaluated and categorized as friendly, neutral, or
hostile. Certain high-value, open-source information sources may be
identified for continuous monitoring. Other open-source information sources
may be identified to screen for the presence or lack of specific indicators. In
addition, the information obtained from open sources is extremely helpful for
the HCT members to be current with the latest developments in the AO,
which enables them to establish rapport and effectively converse with their
sources. Open-source documents are exploited in the same manner as CEDs.
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
FM 2.22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
capturing unit does not have the time nor the manpower to mark each
document due to ongoing combat operations should the capturing unit fill out
one capture tag for a group of documents. In this case, the capturing unit
should place the documents in a weatherproof container (box or plastic bag).
The capturing unit should fill out two copies of the DD Form 2745, placing
one copy inside the container and attaching one to the outside of the
container. If these forms are not available, the capturing unit records the
required data on any piece of paper. Figure I-1 shows an example of a field
expedient tag. At a minimum, the capturing unit should record the
information as follows:
• Time the document was captured as a DTG.
• Place document was captured, including an 8-digit coordinate, and
description of the location. This should be as detailed as time allows.
For example, if a terrorist safe house was searched, documents might
be “bagged and tagged” based on what room of the house they were in,
what file cabinet, what desk, and so forth.
• Identity of the capturing unit.
• Identity of the source from whom the document was taken, if
applicable.
• Summary of the circumstances under which the document was found.
I-15.Document evacuation procedures are listed in Annex B (Intelligence) to
the OPORD. If the capturing unit does not contain a supporting HCT, it
forwards any CEDs found on the battlefield directly to its S2. The S2 extracts
PIR information as practicable, ensures that the documents are properly
tagged, and ensures speedy evacuation to the next higher echelon through
intelligence channels. Normally, a capturing unit will use any available
vehicle, and in particular empty returning supply vehicles, to evacuate
documents. Documents captured on or in association with detainees,
including EPWs, should be tagged and removed from the detainee. They are
evacuated with (but not on) the detainees to an MP escort unit or an EPW
holding facility.
I-16.When large numbers of documents are captured in a single location, it is
often more expedient for the capturing unit to request a DOCEX team or
HCT from the supporting MI unit be sent to the documents rather than
attempting to evacuate all the documents. This reduces the burden on the
capturing unit, facilitates the rapid extraction of information, and enables
the priority evacuation of documents of importance to higher echelons. This
method should only be used if the capturing unit can adequately secure the
documents until the arrival of the DOCEX team and if the battlefield
situation and MI resources permit the dispatch of a team. The capturing unit
should include in its request the following:
• The identification of the capturing unit.
• Its location and the location of the documents.
US
NATIONALITY OF CAPTURING FORCE:_____________________________
_______________________________________________________________
151310ZAUG2004
DATE/TIME CAPTURED:__________________________________________
BH56321785, Smalltown, IZ
PLACE CAPTURED______________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
1 x PSYOP document
DESCRIPTION OF WEAPON/DOCUMENT:___________________________
th
produced by US 16 PSYOP Bn
______________________________________________________________
FM 2.22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Accountability
I-19.The capturing unit and each higher echelon take steps to ensure that
they maintain CED accountability during document evacuation. To establish
accountability, the responsible element inventories all incoming CEDs.
Anyone who captures, evacuates, processes, or handles CEDs must maintain
accountability. All CEDs should have completed captured document tags. An
incoming batch of documents should include a captured document
transmittal. Figure I-2 shows this format. The exact format for a document
transmittal is a matter of local SOP, but it should contain the information
listed below:
• The identity of the element to which the CEDs are to be evacuated.
• The identity of the unit forwarding the CEDs.
• The identification number of the document transmittal.
• Whether or not CEDs in the package have been screened and the
screening category. (If not screened, NA is circled.) Document
handlers should package documents that have been screened
separately, by category.
• A list of the document serial numbers of the CEDs in the package.
TO:__________________________ DTG:_____________________________
FROM:_______________________
FROM:____ ___________________ TRANSMITTAL NO:_________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
Inventory
I-22.The receiving element conducts an initial inventory of incoming CEDs
by comparing the CED to the captured document tag and accompanying
transmittal documents. This comparison identifies—
• Transmittals that list missing CEDs.
• Document tags not attached to CEDs.
• CEDs not attached to document tags.
• CEDs not listed on the accompanying transmittal documents.
UNIT:________________________________________________________
UNIT:_______________________________________________________
UNIT:________________________________________________________
FILE
FI
FILLE
E RECEIVED DOCUMENT INCOMING FORWARDING RECEIVED DTG AND PLACE
NUMBER DTG SERIAL # TRANSMITTAL# UNIT BY OF CAPTURE
1501 150830AUG99 0102368 1T08 1/82d Abn Div SSG KIM 150500AUG99/EK030949
1502 150930AUG99 0110443 2T11 2/82d Abn Div SSG KIM 150620AUG99/EK045860
1503 150930AUG99 1039964 2T11 2/82d Abn Div SSG KIM 150725AUG99/EK058383
1504 150930AUG99 1192583 2T11 2/82d Abn Div SSG KIM 150725AUG99/EK058383
CAPTURING
CAPTURING SCREENING DESCRIPTION DESTINATION/
REMARKS
UNIT CATEGORY OF DOCUMENT TRANSMITTAL #
Co A, 1/504th, 1 Bde, 82d A Letter of promotion, KP, 1Pg JDEC, 15T01 SALUTE written
Co B, 2/504th, 2 Bde, 82d A Letter describing attack, RU, 3 Pg JDEC, 15T01 SALUTE written
Co B, 2/504th, 2 Bde, 82d B List of call signs, RU, 1Pg JDEC, 15T03 None
Co B, 2/504th, 2 Bde, 82d C Personal letter, KP, 2 Pg JDEC 15T02 Translation end
Trace Actions
I-23.The receiving unit initiates trace actions on all missing CEDs, missing
captured document tags, and all information missing from the captured
document tags. They initiate trace actions by contacting elements from which
the documents were received. The receiving unit can complete this corrective
action swiftly if that unit's captured document log was filled out completely.
If necessary, the trace action continues to other elements that have handled
the document. If a captured document tag is unavailable from elements that
have previously handled the CED, the document examiner fills out a
FM 2.22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Document Logs
I-24.The captured document log is a record of what an element knows about
a CED. After trace actions are initiated for any missing documents, the CEDs
are entered in the REMARKS section of the captured document log. This log
must contain the following:
• Name of capturing unit.
• File number (a sequential number to identify the order of entry).
• DTG the CED was received at this element.
• Document serial number of the captured document tag.
• Identification number of the transmittal document accompanying the
CED.
• Complete designation of the unit that forwarded the CED.
• Name and rank of individual that received the CED.
• DTG and place of capture (as listed on the captured document tag).
• Identity of the capturing units (as listed on the captured document
tag).
• Document category (after screening).
• Description of the CED. (At a minimum, the description includes the
original language; number of pages; type of document such as a map,
letter, or photograph; and the enemy's identification number for the
CED, if available.)
• Destination and identification number of the outgoing transmittal.
• Remarks to include any other information that can assist the unit in
identifying the CED including processing codes. These are set up by
local SOPs to denote all actions taken with the document while at the
element, including intelligence reports, translations, reproductions, or
return of the CED to the source from whom it was taken.
DOCUMENT SCREENING
I-25.Document screening is the rapid but systematic evaluation of documents
to determine which documents contain priority information. Selected priority
documents will be exploited immediately for PIR information and evacuated
expeditiously (often electronically) to a DOCEX facility. Document screening
can be done manually (requiring a linguist who is well versed in the current
collection requirements) or through the use of scanning devices with key
word identification capability. Document processing does not require the
complete translation of a document but requires sufficient translation to
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
DOCUMENT CATEGORIES
I-27.Documents are divided into categories to prioritize their evacuation and
the extraction of information from them for intelligence purposes. Document
categories are discussed below.
Category A
I-28.Category A documents are those that require priority evacuation and/or
special handling because of their special intelligence value. They contain
SALUTE reportable information. Category A documents also include those
that are of interest to another command, collecting agency, or other agency
(for example, TECHINT, Air Force, Navy, PSYOP, Cryptography).
I-29. What determines if a document is a Category A document changes
according to the operational environment and will be set forth in each
DOCEX element's SOP and in Annex B (Intelligence) of the unit’s OPORD.
Documents that are evidence in legal proceedings against captured personnel
suspected of crimes against humanity and war crimes will be handled as
Category A documents. All Category A documents are handled as SECRET.
Standard Category A documents include but are not limited to—
• Unmarked maps.
• Maps and charts containing any operational graphics, which are sent
to the G2/S2. From G2/S2, they would be evacuated to the all-source
analysis center.
• Air Force related documents, which should go to the nearest Air Force
headquarters.
• Navy related documents, which should be sent to the nearest Navy
headquarters.
• TECHINT-related documents, which are evacuated to the nearest
TECHINT unit.
• Cryptographic and communications-related documents, which are
evacuated to the nearest SIGINT analysis unit.
FM 2.22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Category B
I-30.Category B documents contain information of intelligence interest to the
supported command. The lowest echelon possible exploits the documents and
evacuates them through intelligence channels. Category B documents are
handled as SECRET.
Category C
I-31.Category C documents and items contain no information of intelligence
interest but still require special administrative accountability (for example,
currency, works of art, narcotics). Currency is accounted for on DA Form
4137 (Evidence/Property Custody Document).
Category D
I-32.Category D documents contain no information of intelligence value.
Only the theater or higher document repository can categorize documents as
Category D.
GROUP DOCUMENTS
I-33.CEDs are first grouped according to their assigned screening category.
Personnel must be careful when sorting CEDs to ensure no CED is separated
from its associated documents. These large groupings can be broken down
into smaller groups. Each of these smaller groupings consists of CEDs that
were—
• Captured by the same unit.
• Captured in the same place.
• Captured on the same day at the same time.
• Received at the DOCEX element at the same time.
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
FM 2.22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
DOCUMENT RECOVERY
I-42.At a minimum, the JDEF manning includes teams trained in extracting
and downloading information from electronic media such as computer hard
drives. These individuals work in conjunction with TECHINT personnel
responsible for the evaluation of captured computer hardware and software.
These teams are prepared to deploy forward as necessary to accomplish their
mission.
DOCUMENT TRANSLATION
I-43.Translations are not intelligence information reports. They are,
however, often a precondition for DOCEX. Once translated, intelligence
information can be extracted and reported on an IIR, SALUTE, or similar
report. A translation should accompany the original foreign language
document; a copy of the translation should accompany any copies of the
original foreign language document and, as required, the intelligence reports.
A translation report should contain the following information:
• Where the report will be sent.
• Which element prepared the report.
• DTG of the document translation.
• Report number as designated by local SOPs.
• Document number taken from the captured document tag.
• Document description including type of document, number of pages,
physical construction of document, and enemy identification number, if
applicable.
• Original captured document language.
• DTG document was received at element preparing the report.
• DTG document was captured.
• Place document was captured.
• Identity of capturing unit.
• Circumstances under which document was captured.
• Name of translator.
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
TYPES OF TRANSLATION
I-44.There are three types of translations:
• Full—one in which the entire document is translated. This is both time
and manpower intensive, especially for lengthy or highly technical
documents. Normally only a DOCEX facility at theater or national
level will do full translations, and then only when the value of the
information, technical complexity, or political sensitivity of the
document requires a full translation. Even when dealing with Category
A documents, it may not be necessary to translate the entire document
to gain the relevant information it contains.
• Extract—one in which only a portion of the document is translated. For
instance, a TECHINT analyst may decide that only a few paragraphs
in the middle of a 600-page helicopter maintenance manual merit
translation, and that a full translation is not necessary. The analyst
would request only what he needed.
• Summary—one in which a translator begins by reading the entire
document. He then summarizes the main points of information instead
of rendering a full or extract translation. A summary translation is
normally written, but may be presented orally, particularly at the
tactical level. Summary translations may be done as part of the
document screening process. A summary translation requires a
translator have more analytical abilities. The translator must balance
the need for complete exploitation of the document against time
available in combat operations. Translators working in languages of
which they have a limited working knowledge may also use a summary
translation. For instance, a Russian linguist may not be able to
accurately deliver a full translation of a Bulgarian language document.
However, he can probably render a usable summary of its content.
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
I-46.Document translators will usually need to have a clearance in order to
conduct document translation. An exception is that open-source document
translation does not require a security clearance unless the information
collected from the open-source documents is linked to specific US collection
FM 2.22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
SOURCES OF TRANSLATORS
I-47.There are various sources that a commander can use to obtain the
linguists necessary to support DOCEX operations.
• RC and AC MI linguists. Dependent on their mission requirements,
any MI soldiers with the required language qualification may be used
as document translators. The advantage of using MI soldiers is that
they have the appropriate security clearance and have a firm grasp of
collection requirements. The DOCEX operation will usually require MI
officers to manage the administrative portions.
• Other linguists. Non-MI Army linguists include numerous soldiers who
have proficiency in a foreign language, regardless of MOS. US civilians
can be contracted to provide translator support as can local nationals.
Local national hires will provide the bulk of the translator support.
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
REPORTING
I-49.Information collected from documents is normally reported in a
SALUTE report or an IIR. Reporting through other reporting formats is
discouraged. Intelligence reports are normally forwarded electronically or as
otherwise directed by SOPs and operational instructions. Normally an
electronic or hardcopy file of each report is maintained at the unit of origin;
one electronic or hardcopy is submitted through intelligence reporting
channels; and one is forwarded with evacuated documents to the next unit to
receive the document to prevent redundant reporting. In the event that the
document itself cannot be evacuated in a timely manner, a verified copy of a
translation report can be forwarded separately from the original document to
an exploitation agency.
FM 2.22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
SOURCE-ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTS
I-51.Documents captured on or in association with a human source play an
important role in the HUMINT collection process. These documents may
contain reportable information the same as with any other CED. The
information is immediately extracted from the documents and forwarded in
the appropriate intelligence report. In addition to reportable information,
documents (in particular personal documents) may provide valuable insight
into the attitude and motivation of the source and can be effectively used by
the HUMINT collector in the approach process (see Chapter 8). Guidelines
for the disposition of the detainee's documents and valuables are set by
international agreements and discussed in more detail in AR 190-8 and
FM 19-4.
I-52.The capturing unit removes all documents, with the exception of the
source's primary identification document, from an EPW or other detainee to
prevent their destruction. These are placed in a waterproof container
(usually a plastic bag) and Part C of the capture tag is placed in the bag.
Documents from each source should be placed in a separate bag. These
documents are turned over to the first MP EPW handling unit in the chain of
command. The MPs will inventory all documents and prepare a handreceipt
and provide a copy to the EPW or detainee.
I-53.To ensure proper handling and expeditious disposition of these
documents, the first HUMINT collection element to see the detainee should
review the documents as part of the source screening process. If an official
document is confiscated and evacuated through MI channels, the HUMINT
collector must obtain a receipt for that document from the MPs. If possible,
the HUMINT collection unit copies any documents that contain information
of intelligence interest and forwards the copies through MI channels. With
the exception of an identification document, documents are normally kept
separate from the detainee until the detainee arrives at a permanent
confinement facility, at which time documents are returned to them per AR
190-8.
I-54.Three possible actions may be taken with documents captured with a
source. The documents may be confiscated, impounded, or returned to the
source.
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
Confiscated
I-55.Documents confiscated from a source are taken away with no intention
of returning them. Official documents, except identification documents, are
confiscated and appropriately evacuated. The intelligence value of the
document should be weighed against the document's support in the HUMINT
collection of the source. The HUMINT collector must comply with the
accounting procedures established for CEDs by the MPs in accordance with
AR 190-8.
Impounded
I-56.Some CEDs will contain information that must be exploited at higher
echelons. These documents may be impounded by the HUMINT collector and
evacuated through intelligence channels. The HUMINT collector must issue
a receipt to the source for any personal documents that he impounds. He
must comply with the accounting procedures established for CEDs
impounded by the MPs in accordance with AR 190-8. When a CED is
impounded, it is taken with the intent of eventual return. Personal
documents with military information will be impounded if the military value
is greater than the sentimental value. An example of a personal document
whose military value might outweigh the sentimental value could be a
personal photograph that includes military installations or equipment.
I-57.When a CED is impounded, it must be receipted. The receipt will
include an itemized list of all the items taken from the prisoner, and the
name, rank, and unit of the person issuing the receipt. Items of high value
may be impounded for security reasons. For instance, an EPW or detainee
apprehended with an unusually large amount of money would have the
money impounded and receipted. The MPs will establish and maintain a DA
Form 4237-R (Detainee Personnel Record) for impounded items. The register
will identity the owner of the impounded items and provide a detailed
description of the items impounded. A receipt will be given to anyone who
has items impounded. Also, the OIC or authorized representative will
complete and sign DA Form 1132-R (Prisoner's Personal Property List –
Personal Deposit Fund). A copy will be provided the source. See AR 190-8 for
procedures on handling personal effects.
Returned
I-58.Returned CEDs are usually personal in nature. They are taken only to
be inspected for information of interest and are given back to the source.
Personal documents belonging to a source will be returned to the source after
examination in accordance with the GPW. These documents are CEDs whose
sentimental value outweighs their military value and may be returned to the
source. Copies of these documents may be made and forwarded if deemed
necessary. Except for an identification document (which is always returned
to the source), documents are evacuated with the source, rather than on the
source, until the source reaches a permanent confinement facility at EAC.
FM 2-22.3
Appendix J
References
The following references are provided to assist HUMINT collectors, commanders, and
trainers in obtaining regulatory guidance for HUMINT collection operations. These and
other references are in the bibliography.
1. AR 350-1. Army Training and Education. 9 April 2003.
12. AR 381-12. Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the US Army (SAEDA).
15 January 1993.
16. AR 381-47. (U) US Army Offensive Counterespionage Activities (S). 30 July 1990.
17. AR 381-100. (U) Army Human Intelligence Collection Program (S). 15 May 1988.
18. AR 381-102. (U) US Army Cover Support Program (S). 10 January 1991.
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
20. AR 381-172. Counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations and Low-Level Source
Operations. 30 December 1994.
22. AR 614-200. Military Intelligence Civilian Excepted Career Program. 30 September 2004.
23. DA Pam 381-15. Foreign Military Intelligence Collection Activities Program. 1 June 1988.
24. Executive Order 12333. United States Intelligence Activities. 4 December 1981.
25. DOD Directive 2310.1. DOD Program for Enemy Prisoners of War (EPOW) and Detainees
(Short Title: DOD Enemy POW Detainee Program). 18 August 1994.
26. DOD Directive 3115.09. DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and
27. DOD Directive 5100.77. DOD Law of War Program. 9 December 1998.
29. DOD Instruction 3020.41. Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the U.S. Armed
Forces. 3 October 2005.
30. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I) Memorandum, Guidance for the
Conduct and Oversight of Defense Human Intelligence (HUMINT) (U). 14 December 2004.
32. DOD Regulation 5240.0-R. Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence
33. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Public Law No. 109-163, Title XIV.
Further information and links to many of the above publications can be found at:
http://www.dami.army.pentagon.mil/offices/dami-cd/
ARTEPS, MTPs, and other intelligence training products are available at the Reimer
Digital Library http://www.adtdl.army.mil.
Appendix K
Contract Interrogators
INTRODUCTION
K-1. Contractors are used increasingly to augment existing capabilities and
bridge gaps in the deployed force structure. With the increased use of
contractors comes the need to identify the doctrine and procedures affecting
their employment. Leaders and those working with contractors must
understand that contractors are civilians authorized to accompany the force
in the field and should be provided with an ID card as proof of their
authorization. In accordance with GPW Article 4, contractors are to be
accorded POW status if captured.
KEY TERMS
K-2. Contract Interrogator. A contract interrogator is a contractor who is
specifically trained and DOD certified for, tasked with, and engages in the
collection of information from individuals (HUMINT sources) for the
purpose of answering intelligence information requirements. Their
operations must be conducted in accordance with all applicable law and
policy. Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of war; relevant
international law; relevant directives including DOD Directive 3115.09,
“DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical
Questioning”; DOD Directive 2310.1E, “The Department of Defense
Detainee Program”; DOD instructions; and military execute orders
including FRAGOs. Contract interrogators will operate only in fixed
facilities and not in tactical operations. See DOD Instruction 3020.41 for
additional information.
K-3. External Support Contractor. Contract interrogators fall into the
category of External Support Contractor. They work under contracts
awarded by contracting officers serving under the command and
procurement authority of supporting headquarters outside the theater.
Their support augments the commander's organic capability.
K-4. Contracting Officer Representative (COR). A COR is the
contracting officer’s designated representative who assists in the technical
monitoring and administration of a contract. Typically, a COR is
responsible for assisting the contracting officer in contractor-employee day-
to-day management of issues that may affect contractor or unit
requirements.
K-5. Statement of Work (SOW) or Performance Work Statement:
• Contractor roles and functional requirements, as well as security
issues and the relationship to the military chain of command, must be
accurately and adequately defined in the SOW. The SOW should
include a description of the essential service and require the contractor
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
CIVILIAN STATUS
K-6. A contract employee cannot be made to engage in any activity
inconsistent with his civilian status such as serving as a crew member on a
weapon system. Interrogations are presumptively consistent with civilian
contractor status, but other tasks should be vetted with the command’s
legal advisor to ensure they are legally permissible.
COMMAND CONSIDERATIONS
K-7. Theaters in which large-scale operations are conducted are very likely
to employ contract interrogators, due to limited numbers of Army HUMINT
collectors available. The presence of contractors in the AO adds an
additional dimension to the commander’s planning process. Force protection
is a critical issue. Even in "permissive" environments such as in the case of
humanitarian operations, contractors may be placed in danger. The
commander must protect his contractors since they have limited capacity to
protect themselves.
K-8. The commander has no command authority over contractor personnel.
Their relationship with the Government is governed by the terms and
conditions of their contract. In short, the commander must "manage"
contractor personnel through the contracting process. He has no authority
to command or discipline them unless it is a declared war, at which time
contractors may fall under the provisions of the UCMJ. This distinction
between command and management does not prohibit the commander from
directing contractors to carry out essential activities, such as activities
related to security and safety, consistent with the terms of their contracts.
K-9. The terms and conditions of any contract must be constructed so as to
include provisions requiring contractor personnel to abide by all guidance
and obey all instructions and general orders applicable to US Armed Forces
and DOD civilians including those issued by the Theater Commander. The
contractor can be required to "take reasonable steps" to ensure his
personnel comply with the above and to ensure "the good conduct" of his
employees. Furthermore, the contractor can be required to promptly
resolve, to the satisfaction of the COR, all contractor employee performance
and conduct problems identified by the COR. The COR can direct the
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
TRAINING REQUIREMENTS
K-16. All contractor interrogators must successfully complete a training
program approved by the United States Army Intelligence Center and Fort
Huachuca, or the Defense HUMINT Management Office, which will serve
as validation to perform MI interrogations (see DODD 3115.09). The
organization Commander or Director initiating the contract must certify
that the training has been completed. The training program will ensure
that contract interrogators are trained and certified on—
• The most current TTP of interrogation as promulgated by DOD.
• The applicable law and policy related to the treatment of detainees.
Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of war; relevant
international law; relevant directives including DOD Directive
3115.09, “DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and
Tactical Questioning”; DOD Directive 2310.1E, “The Department of
Defense Detainee Program”; DOD instructions; and military execute
orders including FRAGOs.
K-17. Contract interrogators must also receive training on the supported
unit’s mission and Interrogation Counter-Resistance Policy pertinent to the
AOR they are supporting. This training will be conducted in-theater by the
gaining unit.
EQUIPMENT
K-18. Contractors must be issued personal protection gear appropriate for
the threat environment. This may include ballistic helmet, personal body
armor, NBC protective gear, and in certain circumstances a personal
weapon. Contract interrogators must have access to automation equipment
to support their mission of intelligence collection and reporting.
UTILIZATION
K-19. Only trained and certified contractors working under the supervision
of MI personnel are authorized to conduct interrogations. Contract
interrogators may conduct interrogations with an interpreter in the room;
however, an OIC or NCO will monitor the interrogation by personal
presence or by means of live video camera feed.
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
WORK LOCATIONS
K-21. The commander may position contract interrogators in fixed
detention facilities anywhere in the theater, in accordance with the terms
and conditions of their contract.
ATTIRE
K-22. Contractors accompanying the force should be visibly distinct from
soldiers so as not to jeopardize their status. The JTF or combatant
commander may direct contract personnel to wear civilian clothing or a
uniform that says “civilian.” Specific items of military attire required for
safety or security may also be worn, such as chemical defense equipment,
cold weather equipment, or mission specific safety equipment.
FIRE ARMS
K-23. A contractor authorized to accompany the force in the field is not
entitled to be issued a firearm. However, a contract employee may be armed
only if all of following conditions are met:
• The theater commander grants his approval.
• The employee's corporate policy allows it.
• The employee agrees.
K-24. If all three conditions are met, then the employee must pass proper
military side-arm training and will be issued a military specification
weapon and ammunition (generally, a 9-millimeter pistol) for personal
protection. The contractor must also comply with all applicable DOD,
service, and local command policies on weapons.
RECOMMENDED READING
8 October 1996.
Appendix L
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
FM 2-22.3
Appendix M
GENERAL
M-2. This appendix provides doctrinal guidance for the use of separation as
an interrogation technique. Separation involves removing the detainee from
other detainees and their environment, while still complying with the basic
standards of humane treatment and prohibitions against torture or cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, as defined in the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 and addressed in GPW Article 3 (Common Article III).
Separation is to be distinguished from segregation, which refers to removing
a detainee from other detainees and their environment for legitimate
purposes unrelated to interrogation, such as when necessary for the
movement, health, safety and/or security of the detainee, or the detention
facility or its personnel. This appendix—
• Will be reviewed annually and may be amended or updated from time
to time to account for changes in doctrine, policy, or law, and to address
lessons learned.
• Is not a stand-alone doctrinal product and must be used in conjunction
with the main portion of this manual.
COCOM Commander
USD(I)
Approves overall use of
Provides oversight of OSD Policy interrogation approach techniques
in theater.
GO/FO
Interrogation Supervisor
Interrogator
Reviews interrogation plan for necessity and
Develops interrogation plan based on screening
appropriateness of requested use of separation.
and assessment of source’s intelligence value
Ensures that proper safeguards and support
and level of cooperation.
are stipulated.
RESPONSIBILITIES
M-10. Commanders of interrogation or detention facilities and forces
employing the approved separation technique are responsible for compliance
with applicable law and policy. Commanders must understand that
separation poses a higher risk to the detainee than do standard techniques,
and so require strenuous oversight to avoid misapplication and potential
abuse.
M-11. The interrogation chain of command must coordinate the interrogation
plan with the detention operations commander. Close coordination must
occur between intelligence personnel and personnel responsible for detainee
operations, including MP, security forces, Master at Arms, and other
individuals providing security for detainees (hereafter referred to as guards).
Guards do not conduct intelligence interrogations and, in accordance with
DOD Directive 3115.09, will not set the conditions for interrogations. Guards
may support interrogators as requested for detainee custody, control, escort,
and/or additional security (for example, for combative detainees), in
accordance with paragraphs 5-57 through 5-66 and FM 3-19.40, JP 3-63, and
the approved interrogation plan.
M-12. The detention operations commander (in conjunction with the MI
commander) may convene a multidiscipline custody and control oversight
team including, but not limited to, MP, MI, BSC (if available), and legal
representatives. The team can advise and provide measures to ensure
effective custody and control in compliance with applicable law and policy.
M-13. Commanders must consider the following when employing separation:
• Is separation directed against the appropriate individual and is it
necessary for collecting important intelligence?
• Does separation complement the overall interrogation strategy and
interrogation approach technique or techniques?
• Is the application of separation with the specific detainee at issue
consistent with humane treatment and in accordance with applicable
law and policy?
M-14. Planning for the use of separation requires coordination with staff
elements that provide support to interrogation operations. Staff elements
that support interrogation facilities and forces employing separation will
comply with paragraphs 4-59 and 4-60 and all controls and safeguards
identified in paragraphs M-17 through M-26.
FM 2-22.3 REQUIREMENTS
M-17. Separation must be employed in accordance with the standards in this
manual. These standards include the following:
• Prohibitions against abusive and unlawful actions (see para 5-75) and
against the employment of military working dogs in the conduct of
interrogation (see paras 5-59 and 8-2).
• Requirement for non-DOD agencies to observe the same standards for
the conduct of interrogation operations and treatment of detainees
when in DOD facilities (see para 5-55).
• Prohibition on guards conducting intelligence interrogations or taking
any actions to set the conditions for interrogations. Humane treatment,
evacuation, custody and control (reception, processing, administration,
internment, and safety) of detainees; force protection; and the
operation of the internment facility are discussed in paragraphs 5-57
through 5-66. (FM 3-19 .40 and JP 3-63 also thoroughly discuss
detainee operations.)
• Assignment of ISNs to all detainees in DOD control, whether or not
interrogation has commenced, as soon as possible; normally within 14
days of capture. (See AR 190-8 and Secretary of Defense Memorandum
dated 20 September 2005, "(S//NF) Policy on Assigning Detainee
Internment Serial Numbers (ISN)(U)."
• Access to detainees by the ICRC.
control measures, and safeguards associated with the use of separation. Any
interrogation technique that appears to be cruel, inhuman, or degrading as
defined in US law; or impermissibly coercive, or is not listed in this manual,
is prohibited and should be reported immediately to the chain of command or
other appropriate channels for resolution. Orders given to treat detainees
inhumanely are unlawful. Every interrogator must know how to respond to
orders that the individual interrogator perceives to be unlawful
(see paras 5-80 through 5-82).
M-19. If the order is a lawful order, it should be obeyed. Failure to obey a
lawful order is an offense under the UCMJ.
COMMAND POLICY AND OPERATION ORDERS
M-20. The provisions of this appendix must be written into COCOM policy
and/or OPORDs when using the restricted interrogation technique of
separation.
MEDICAL
M-21. Commanders are responsible to ensure that detainees undergoing
separation during interrogation receive adequate health care as described in
greater detail in paragraph 5-91.
TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION
M-22. Only those DOD interrogators who have been trained and certified by
the United States Army Intelligence Center (USAIC), or other Defense
HUMINT Management Office (DHMO) designated agency, in accordance
with guidance established by USD(I) to use separation, are authorized to
employ this technique. The training must meet certification standards
established by the Defense HUMINT Manager in coordination with
applicable DOD components. Properly trained and certified contract
interrogators are authorized to initiate interrogation plans that request the
use separation, and, once the plan is approved, to employ the technique in
accordance with the provisions of this appendix and Appendix K. Contract
interrogators will always be utilized under the supervision and control of US
government or military personnel (see para K-19 and K- 20). Non-DOD
personnel conducting interrogations in DOD facilities must be certified by
their agency and separately gain approval (through their agency's chain of
command) for the additional technique described in this appendix. They must
present this written certification and agency approval to the COCOM before
use is permitted (see para 5-55).
PLANNING
M-23. Planning for the use of separation must include—
• An interrogation plan that addresses safeguards, limits of duration,
interval between applications, termination criteria, and presence of
qualified medical personnel for emergencies (see Figure M-2).
• A provision for detainees to be checked periodically in accordance with
command health care directives, guidance, and SOPs applicable to all
detainees.
• A legal review.
TECHNICAL CONTROL
M-25. Requests for approval of separation will be forwarded (for information
purposes only) via secure means through intelligence technical channels at
the same time as they are sent through command channels. Intelligence
technical channels are those used for forwarding of source information and
technical parameters of collection operations from lower to higher and
passing tasking specifics, source information, technical control measures, and
other sensitive information from higher to lower. The technical chain extends
from the HCT through the OMT and Operations Section (if one exists) to the
C/J/G/S2X.
M-29. Safeguards:
• Duration: Self-explanatory.
• Physical Separation: Limited to 30 days of initial duration.
• Field Expedient Separation: Limited to 12 hours of initial
duration at the initial interrogation site. This limit on duration does
not include the time that goggles or blindfolds and earmuffs are used
on detainees for security purposes during transit and evacuation.
• Oversight Considerations for Field Expedient Separation:
The intended use of field expedient means of separation must be
specified on the interrogation plan that is submitted to the GO/FO
for approval.
Detainees must be protected from self-injury when field expedient
means of separation are used. The effect of the application of field
expedient separation means on the detainee must be monitored to
detect any possible health concerns.
M-30. The following safeguards apply to both Physical Separation and Field
Expedient Separation.
• Break: Additional periods of separation will not be applied without the
approving GO/FO's determination of the length of a break between
iterations.
• Extension:
Physical Separation Method: Extensions of this technique past 30
days must be reviewed by the servicing SJA and approved by the
original approving GO/FO or his replacement in that position.
Field Expedient Method: Extensions past 12 hours of initial
duration at the initial interrogation site must be reviewed by the
servicing SJA and approved by the original approving/replacement
GO/FO.
Medical: Detainees will be checked periodically in accordance with
command health care directives, guidance, and SOPs applicable to
all detainees.
Custody and Control: The interrogation chain of command must
coordinate the interrogation plan with the Detention Operations
Commander. The Detention Operations Commander (in conjunction
with the MI commander) may convene a multidiscipline custody and
control oversight team including, but not limited to, MP, MI, BSC (if
available), and legal representatives. The team can advise and
provide measures to ensure effective custody and control in
compliance with the requirements of applicable law and policy.
• Oversight Considerations:
Use of hoods (sacks) over the head, or of duct tape or adhesive tape
over the eyes, as a separation method is prohibited.
If separation has been approved, and the interrogator subsequently
determines that there may be a problem, the interrogator should
seek further guidance through the chain of command before applying
the technique.
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
Glossary
The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions, and other selected terms.
Where Army and joint definitions are different, (Army) follows the term. Terms for which
FM 2-22.3 is the proponent manual (the authority) are marked with an asterisk (*) and followed
by the number of the paragraph (¶) or page where they are defined. For other terms, refer to the
manual listed. JP 1-02, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms and FM 1-02 Operational
Terms and Graphics are posted on the Joint Electronic Library, which is available online and on
CD ROM.
• Use this URL to access JP 1-02 online:
http://atiam.train.army.mil/soldierPortal/atia/adlsc/view/public/11444-1/FM/1
02/TOC.HTM
http://atiam.train.army.mil/soldierPortal/atia/adlsc/view/public/11444-1/FM/1
02/TOC.HTM
• /jel/service_pubs/101_5_1.pdf
• Follow this path to access JP 1-02 on the Joint Electronic Library CD-ROM:
• Follow this path to access FM 1-02 on the Joint Electronic Library CD-ROM:
FM 101-5-1.
*2X The *2X Staff conducts mission and RM for all HUMINT and CI
entities located within the designated AOIR. It coordinates,
deconflicts, and synchronizes all HUMINT and CI activities in the
designated AOIR. (“*2X” indicates 2X functions at all levels.)
AC Active Component
ACCO Army Central Control Office
ACE analysis and control element
ACT Analysis Control Team
ADA Air Defense Artillery
ADP automated data processing
ADCON administrative control
aka also known as
AMHS Automated Message Handling System
AMID allied military intelligence battalion
AO area of operations
AOI area of interest
AOIR area of intelligence responsibility
AOR area of responsibility
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
approx approximately
ARNG Army Reserve National Guard
ASAS All-Source Analysis System
ASCC Army Service Component Command
ASD(C3I) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence)
ASI additional skill identifier
assn assassination
ATD associated technical document
BAT Biometric Automated Toolset
BCT brigade combat team
BDA battle damage assessment
BOS Battlefield Operating System
BSC Behavioral Science Consultant
BSD basic source data
C2 command and control
CA civil affairs
CAT category
CCIR commander’s critical information requirement
CCNY City College of New York
CDOC captured document
CDR commander
CGS common ground station
CE captured equipment (STANAG term)
CED captured enemy document
CEE captured enemy equipment
CENTCOM US Central Command
CFSO Counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations
CHAMS CI/HUMINT Automated Management System
CHATS CI/HUMINT Automated Tool Set
CI counterintelligence
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CICA Counterintelligence Coordination Authority
CIAC Counterintelligence Analysis Cell
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
EW electronic warfare
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEO forced entry operations
FFIR friendly force information requirement
FHA foreign humanitarian assistance
FISS Foreign Intelligence Security Service
Five S’s search, seize, segregate, safeguard, and silence
FORSCOM US Army Forces Command
FRAGO fragmentary order
Gb gigabyte
GC Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War
GPS Global Positioning System
GPW Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
GRCS Guardrail Common Sensor
GRIFN Guardrail Information Node
GS general support
GSR general support-reinforcing
GUI graphic user interface
GWS Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field
HAC HUMINT analysis cell
HAT HUMINT analysis team
HCR HUMINT collection requirement
HCT HUMINT collection team
HET human exploitation team
HN host nation
HOC HUMINT operations cell
HSOC Homeland Security Operations Center
HQ headquarters
HQDA Headquarters, Department of the Army
security detainee Those detainees who are not combatants, but who may be under
investigation or pose a threat to US forces if released.
SE southeast
SECDEF Secretary of Defense
SERE survival, evasion, resistance, and escape
S.F.P. Students for Peace
SIGINT signals intelligence
SII statement of intelligence interest
SIO senior intelligence officer
SIPRNET Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
SIR specific information requirement
SITMAP situation map
SJA Staff Judge Advocate
SME subject matter expert
SOF Special Operations Forces
SOFA Status of Forces Agreement
SOI signal operating instruction
SOP standing operating procedure
SOW statement of work
Source (DOD) 1. A person, thing, or activity from which information is obtained.
2. In clandestine activities, a person (agent), normally a foreign
national, in the employ of an intelligence activity for intelligence
purposes. 3. In interrogation activities, any person who furnishes
information, either with or without the knowledge that the
information is being used for intelligence purposes. In this
context, a controlled source is in the employment or under the
control of the intelligence activity and knows that the information
is to be used for intelligence purposes. An uncontrolled source is a
voluntary contributor of information and may or may not know
that the information is to be used for intelligence purposes. See
also agent; collection agency. (JP 1-02)
SQL structured query language
SSC small-scale contingency
Stability and Reconstruction
Operations Those operations that sustain and exploit security and control
over areas, populations, and resources. They employ military
capabilities to reconstruct or establish services and support
civilian agencies. Stability and reconstruction operations involve
both coercive and cooperative actions.
STANAG Standardization Agreement
Bibliography
The bibliography lists field manuals by new number followed by old number,
as indicated.
DOCUMENTS NEEDED
These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication.
JP 0-2. Unified Action Armed Forces. 10 July 2001.
JP 2-0. Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations. 9 March 2000.
JP 2-01.2. (U) Joint Doctrine and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for
Counterintelligence Support to Operations (S//NF). 13 June 2006.
JP 3-0. Doctrine for Joint Operations. 10 September 2001.
JP 3-63. Joint Doctrine for Detainee Operations. September 2005.
JP 4-0. Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations. 6 April 2000.
AR 40-25. Nutrition Standards and Education. 15 June 2001.
AR 715-9. Contractors Accompanying the Force. 29 October 1999.
DA Pam 715-16. Contractor Deployment Guide. 27 February 1998.
FM 1. The Army. 14 June 2005.
FM 1-02. Operational Terms and Graphics. 21 September 2004.
FM 2-0. Intelligence. 17 May 2004.
FM 3-0. Operations. 14 June 2001.
FM 3-100.21. Contractors on the Battlefield. 3 January 2003.
FM 5-0. Army Planning and Orders Production. 20 January 2005.
FM 6-0. Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces. 11 August 2003.
FM 27-10. Law of Land Warfare. July 1956.
FM 34-5. (U) Human Intelligence and Related Counterintelligence Operations (S//NF).
29 July 1994.
FM 34-130. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. 8 July 1994.
FM 63-11. Logistics Support Element Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. 8 October
1996.
FM 71-100. Division Operations. 28 August 1996.
FM 100-15. Corps Operations. 13 September 1989.
FM 101-5. Staff Organization and Operations. 31 May 1997.
AMC Pam 715-18. AMC Contracts and Contractors Supporting Military Operations.
June 2000.
READINGS RECOMMENDED
These sources contain relevant supplemental information.
ARMY PUBLICATIONS
Most Army doctrinal publications are available online:
http://155.217.58.58/atdls.htm
AR 190-8. Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other
Detainees. 1 October 1997.
AR 190-40. Serious Incident Report. 15 July 2005.
AR 195-5. Criminal Investigation Evidence Procedures. 28 August 1982.
AR 380-5. Department of the Army Information Security Program. September 2000.
AR 380-10. Technology Transfer, Disclosure of Information, and Contacts with
Foreign Representatives. 15 February 2001.
AR 380-15. (C) Safeguarding Classified NATO Information. 1 March 1984.
AR 380-28. Department of the Army Special Security System. 12 December 1991.
AR 380-40. Policy for Controlling and Safeguarding Communications Security
(COMSEC) Material. 22 October 1990.
AR 380-49. Industrial Security. 15 April 1982.
AR 380-53. Telecommunications Security Monitoring. 29 April 1998.
AR 380-67. Personnel Security Program. 9 September 1988.
AR 381-1. Security Controls on Dissemination of Intelligence Information.
12 February 1990.
AR 381-10. US Army Intelligence Activities. 1 July 1984.
AR 381-12. Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the US Army (SAEDA).
15 January 1993.
AR 381-14. Technical Counterintelligence (TCI). 30 September 2002.
AR 381-20. (U) US Army Counterintelligence Activities (S). 26 September 1986.
AR 381-45. Investigative Records Repository. 25 August 1989.
AR 381-47. (U) US Army Offensive Counterespionage Activities (S). 30 July 1990.
AR 381-100. (U) Army Human Intelligence Collection Program (S//NF). 15 May
1988.
AR 381-102. (U) US Army Cover Support Program (S). 10 January 1991.
AR 381-143. Military Intelligence Nonstandard Material Polices and Procedures.
1 December 1986.
AR 381-172. (U) Counterintelligence Force Protection Operations (CFSO) and Low
Level Source Operations (LLSO) (S//NF). 30 December 1994.
AR 385-10. The Army Safety Program. 23 May 1988.
AR 614-115. Military Intelligence Excepted Career Program. 12 April 2004.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
JP 2-01. Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations. November 1996.
AR 350-1. Army Training and Education. 9 April 2003.
DIAM 58-11. (U) DOD HUMINT Policies and Procedures (S//NF). August 1993.
DIAM 58-12. (U) DOD HUMINT Management Systems (S//NF). June 1997.
FM 2-22.3
Index
Entries are by paragraph number
_________________________________________________________________________________ Index
Counterintelligence
E Hot leads, 9-21
Agency.
Debriefing, 1-21
Exploit dispositions, 9-43
3-21
5-30
F 3-19
Operational Considerations,
Field Interrogations Operations,
Environment, 3-20
5-34
5-95
Phases, 1-8
Detainee, 5-26
Five S’s, D-7
Allocation to maneuver
Geneva Convention
Forced Entry Operations. See
units, 5-96
categories, 6-14
also HUMINT operations. HUMINT Collector, 1-7
Interrogation Operations,
Formal Contacts, 5-28
HUMINT Command and Control,
1-20
4-9
Document
G Continuous Contacts, 5-16
Accountability, I-19
G2X, 2-4
Formal Contact, 5-28
I-51
Categories of detainees,
2-3 through 2-14
Categories, I-27
6-15
HUMINT Collection and Related
Exploitation (DOCEX)
Excerpts, Appendix A
Activities, 1-14
Evacuation, I-12
Collection Team.
4-44
Handling, I-14
As an Independent Patrol,
HUMINT Operations, 1-23
Screening, I-25
3-14
Assessing, 4-8
Tag, I-14
Integrated with other
Executing, 4-7
operations, 3-14
Translation, I-43
Planning, 4-3
Transmittal, I-34
Preparing, 4-5
FM 2-22.3_______________________________________________________________________________
HUMINT Organization,
Advantages, 11-2
M
Figure 2-1
Briefing, 11-18
Machine translation, 13-8
HUMINT Requirements
Cautions, 11-4
Maneuver unit support, 4-9
Analysis, 4-18
HUMINT Requirements
11-24
Management, 4-16
Matrices, 12-18
Disadvantages, 11-3
Evaluating, 11-28
Intelligence (MASINT), 4-57
Placement, 11-21
5-46
Selection, 12-45
Techniques, 11-16
Military Intelligence
Civilian, 11-15
Evaluating, 11-28
5-56, Figure 6-2
I
Military, 11-14
Internment/resettlement
INTSUM, 7-4
operations, 6-14,
4-28
Mutt and Jeff, 8-65
INSCOM, 3-22
Updating, 4-34
J2X, 2-4
10-6
10-15
battlefield, 12-3
Joint Interrogation and
O
Debriefing Center (JIDC),
5-102
Figure 1-1
5-99
One-Time Contact, 5-7
Of wounded detainees,
Knowledgeability Brief, 10-15
assessment, 12-8
5-91
5-74
Leads, 9-20
force, 5-73
Appendix F
Liaison Operations, 1-22, 5-46
Operations Orders, 4-53
Field, 5-96
Limitations, 1-32
Orders
Joint, 5-100
operations, 1-21
Organizational Chart, 9-28,
11-29, 11-30
_________________________________________________________________________________ Index
12-14
Plan, 1-2
Channels, 10-3, 10-16,
Figure 10-1
Situation Map (SITMAP), 7-4
Evaluation, 4-33
Sociological Intelligence, 5-45
7-1
Principles, 10-2
SOF. See Special operation
forces.
Polygraph, 13-7
Report types, 10-3
1-29
Source, 1-6
6-23, E-8
Research, 7-3
Administrative reports, 10-5
Pre-deployment planning,
Appendix C
Source-specific, 7-8, 7-25
Analysis, 12-11
Prepare, 1-2
Reserve component integration,
Assessment, 6-36
Process, 1-2
Restricted Interrogation
Map reading skills, 9-38
Techniques, 8-71
Profiles, 12-51
Produce, 1-2
Geneva Conventions,
Stability and reconstruction
Appendix B
S operations, 3-9
Psychological Operations
S2 Guide for Handling
Staff coordination, 4-59
S2X, 2-4
5-43
Questioning, 1-11
Format, Appendix H
7-4
Illiterates, 9-46
Science and technical
Support Operations, 3-15
Plan, 7-18
intelligence, 5-45
Support Relationships
Principles, 9-2
Screening, 1-18, 6-1
(HUMINT), 4-13
Appendix G
Community, 6-38
General Support, Table 4-2
Questions, 9-2
Local employees, 6-37
4-27, 4-60
Direct, 9-4
Methodologies, 6-9
T
Follow Up, 9-7
MP support, 6-14, Figure
6-2
Tactical Debriefing Operations,
Non-pertinent, 9-8
5-35
Prepared, 9-12
Observations, 6-30
Repeat, 9-9
Operations, 1-19, 6-7, 6-8
To avoid, 9-14
Prisoner of war and refugee,
6-9 , 6-13
Task Organization, 4-47
R Reports, 10-15
Taskings and Requests, 4-28
Requirements, 6-7
Technical expert support, 9-30
(TECHINT), 4-57
techniques, 9-29
Separation, M-1
6-42
References, Appendix J
Signals Intelligence, 4-57
Support, 7-17
Termination, 1-12
1-21, 5-31
FM 2-22.3_______________________________________________________________________________
Phase, 8-84
Trusted Workstation (TWS),
Warning Order, 4-37
Report, 10-15
13-3
Figure 12-1
Umbrella concept, 7-4
Web-based reporting, 13-15
Translators, I-47
Urban Operations, 3-16
Transportation and
telecommunication
V
intelligence, 5-45
Video Recording, 9-29
I have approved FM 2-22.3 in accordance with DOD Directive 3115.09, DOD Intelligence
Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning.
STEPHEN A. CAMBONE
Under Secretary of Defense
for Intelligence
0516001
DISTRIBUTION:
Regular Army, Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve: To be distributed in accordance with
the initial distribution number (IDN) 111130, requirements for FM 2-22.3.
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PIN: 082535-000