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Table of Contents
CHAPTER I. Choosing A System Of Procedure.............................................................. 6 Band's Refuse Removal, Inc. v. Borough of Fair Lawn ................................................. 7 Kothe v. Smith ................................................................................................................ 9 CHAPTER II. The Rewards And Costs Of Litigation-Of Remedies And Related Matters ........................................................................................................................................... 11 Fuentes v. Shevin .......................................................................................................... 12 Connecticut v. Doehr .................................................................................................... 14 Carey v. Piphus ............................................................................................................. 16 Smith v. Western Electric Co........................................................................................ 18 Venegas v. Mitchell ...................................................................................................... 20 CHAPTER III. Describing And Defining The Dispute .................................................. 22 Gillispie v. Goodyear Service Stores ............................................................................ 23 United States v. Board of Harbor Commissioners........................................................ 24 McCormick v. Kopmann .............................................................................................. 25 Zuk v. Eastern Pennsylvania Psychiatric Institute of the Medical College of Pennsylvania ................................................................................................................. 27 Mitchell v. Archibald & Kendall, Inc. .......................................................................... 29 Ross v. A.H. Robins Company ..................................................................................... 31 Cash Energy, Inc. v. Weiner ......................................................................................... 32 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A........................................................................................ 34 Shepard Claims Service, Inc. v. William Darrah & Associates.................................... 35 David v. Crompton & Knowles Corp. .......................................................................... 37 Wigglesworth v. Teamsters Local Union No. 592 ....................................................... 39 David v. Crompton & Knowles Corp. .......................................................................... 41 Swartz v. Gold Dust Casino, Inc................................................................................... 43 CHAPTER IV. Establishing The Structure And Size Of The Dispute........................... 45 Southern Methodist University Association of Women Law Students v. Wynne and Jaffe............................................................................................................................... 46 Kedra v. City of Philadelphia........................................................................................ 47 Insolia v. Philip Morris, Inc. ......................................................................................... 49 Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc. v. Shepard Niles, Inc.................................................. 50 Clark v. Associates Commercial Corp.......................................................................... 52 State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire................................................................... 54 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission .................................................................................................................. 56 Hansberry v. Lee........................................................................................................... 58 In the Matter of Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. ................................................................. 60 CHAPTER V. Obtaining Information For Trial ............................................................. 62 Hickman v. Taylor ........................................................................................................ 63 In Re Convergent Technologies Securities Litigation .................................................. 65 Davis v. Ross ................................................................................................................ 66 Kozlowski v. Sears, Roebuch & Co.............................................................................. 68 Hickman v. Taylor ........................................................................................................ 70
Upjohn Co. v. United States ......................................................................................... 72 In Re Shell Oil Refinery ............................................................................................... 74 Cine Forty-Second Street Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. .................... 76 CHAPTER VI. Adjudication Before Trial: Summary Judgment ................................... 78 Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. ........................................................................................ 79 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett ................................................................................................ 81 Arnstein v. Porter .......................................................................................................... 83 Dyer v. MacDougall...................................................................................................... 85 CHAPTER VII. Judicial Supervision Of Pretrial And Promotion Of Settlement .......... 87 G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp. ............................................................ 88 Marek v. Chesny ........................................................................................................... 90 CHAPTER VIII. Trial..................................................................................................... 92 Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover ............................................................................... 93 Ross v. Bernhard........................................................................................................... 95 Curtis v. Loether ........................................................................................................... 97 Tull v. United States ..................................................................................................... 99 Teamsters Local No. 391 v. Terry .............................................................................. 101 Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg ............................................................................... 103 Galloway v. United States........................................................................................... 105 Lavender v. Kurn ........................................................................................................ 106 Guenther v. Armstrong Rubber Co............................................................................. 107 Ahern v. Scholz........................................................................................................... 108 Dimick v. Schiedt........................................................................................................ 109 Whitlock v. Jackson .................................................................................................... 110 People v. Hutchinson .................................................................................................. 111 CHAPTER IX. Choosing The Forum-Geographical Location..................................... 112 Pennoyer v. Neff ......................................................................................................... 113 Hess v. Pawloski ......................................................................................................... 114 International Shoe Co. v. Washington ........................................................................ 116 McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. ................................................................ 118 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson ............................................................. 119 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz................................................................................ 121 Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court ............................................................... 123 Pavlovich v. Superior Court........................................................................................ 125 Shaffer v. Heitner........................................................................................................ 127 Burnham v. Superior Court......................................................................................... 129 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall................................................... 131 Bates v. C & S Adjusters, Inc. .................................................................................... 133 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno ........................................................................................ 134 CHAPTER X. Choosing The Forum-State V. Federal Court....................................... 136 Mas v. Perry ................................................................................................................ 137 Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley...................................................................... 139 Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson ...................................................... 140 CHAPTER XI. Choosing The Law To Be Applied In Federal Court .......................... 141 Swift v. Tyson............................................................................................................. 142 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins ............................................................................................. 143
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York ........................................................................................ 145 Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc. ................................................. 146 Hanna v. Plumer.......................................................................................................... 148 Walker v. Armco Steel Corp....................................................................................... 150 Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc. .................................................................... 152 Mason v. American Emery Wheel Works .................................................................. 154 Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R. Co. ........................................................... 155 United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc. .......................................................................... 157 CHAPTER XII. Appeals............................................................................................... 158 Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Company ............................................................ 159 Digital Equipment Corporation v. Desktop Direct, Inc. ............................................. 160 Cardwell v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co............................................................. 161 Will v. United States ................................................................................................... 162 Curtiss-Wright Corporation v. General Electric Company......................................... 163 Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp...................................................... 164 Bose Corporation v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. ................................... 165 CHAPTER XIII. Preclusive Effects Of Judgments ...................................................... 167 Manego v. Orleans Board of Trade............................................................................. 168 Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie .............................................................. 170 Rinehart v. Locke........................................................................................................ 172 Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons ......................................... 173 Semtek Intl. Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. ............................................................... 175 Little v. Blue Goose Motor Coach Co. ....................................................................... 177 Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corporation............................................................... 178 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Sunnen ........................................................... 179 Halpern v. Schwartz.................................................................................................... 181 Benson and Ford, Inc. v. Wanda Petroleum Co.......................................................... 182 Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore.................................................................................... 183 United States v. Mendoza ........................................................................................... 184
Held. Yes. Judgment reversed and the matter is remanded to determine the validity of the contract. The trial judge overstepped the permissible bounds of judicial inquiry. Generally, it has been held that a trial judge may interrogate a witness, when it is not excessive. However, this power to call and examine witnesses is not unlimited. A judge's power must be balanced against the interests of a litigant. In the instant case, prejudicial error resulted from the trial court's production of a large number of witnesses and admission of their testimony. Prejudicial error also resulted from the creation of new issues by the court without notice. A trial judge's function is to serve litigants by determining their disputes and issues based upon the applicable rules of law. A judge may not initiate litigation or expand the case by adding new issues without giving the parties full and fair opportunity to meet those issues. As a result of the creation of new issues and denial of opportunity to investigate those issues the defendant was denied due process. Discussion. The court has adopted the classical view that a judge should have an inactive role in proceedings and should make decisions based on the rules of law.
Kothe v. Smith
Kothe v. Smith
Citation. 771 F.2d 667 (2nd Cir. 1985). Brief Fact Summary. Patricia Kothe (Plaintiff) brought suit for medical malpractice against four defendants, Dr. Smith, Dr. Andrew Kerr, Dr. Kerr's professional corporation, and Doctors Hospital (Defendants). Plaintiff discontinued actions against Dr. Kerr, Dr. Kerr's corporation and Doctors Hospital. Sanctions were imposed against Defendant, Dr. Smith, for settling the case during trial at an amount suggested by the judge prior to trial. Thus, Defendant appeals from a judgment of United States District Court of Southern District of New York, which directed him to pay $1,000 to Plaintiff's attorney, $1,000 to Plaintiff's medical witnesses, and $480 to the clerk of the court. Synopsis of Rule of Law. A trial judge may not abuse his sanction power in order to encourage settlement. Facts. Plaintiff brought suit for medical malpractice against four defendants, Dr. Smith, Dr. Andrew Kerr, Dr. Kerr's professional corporation, and Doctors Hospital, seeking $2 million in damages. Actions against Dr. Kerr, Dr. Kerr's professional corporation, and Doctors Hospital were discontinued. Three weeks prior to trial, the trial judge held a pretrial conference during which he directed parties to conduct settlement negotiations. The judge recommended settlement between $20,000 and $30,000 and warned the parties that if they settled for a comparable figure after trial had begun he would impose sanctions. Defendant offered $5,000, which was rejected. Plaintiff's attorney informed the judge that his client would settle for $20,000 but requested that the figure not be released to the Defendant. The only pretrial settlement that was released to the Defendant was $50,000. When the case settled for $20,000 after one day of trail, the district court penalized the Defendant alone. Defendant appeals. Issue. Whether a judge may impose sanctions against the dilatory party for failure to settle prior to trial? Held. No. Judgment vacated and remanded. The district court's imposition of sanctions was an abuse of the sanction power in Rule 16 (f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A trial judge must not use pressure tactics to compel settlement. Rule 16 was designed to encourage pretrial settlement discussion, not to impose negotiations on unwilling litigants. The coercion in this case was also troublesome, since the court imposed sanctions on the Defendant alone. The Defendant should not have been required to make an offer to settle because the court wanted him to. Defendant's attorney had every right to change his evaluation of the case after the trial had begun.
Kothe v. Smith
Discussion. The purpose of Rule 16 is to maximize the efficiency of the court system by urging attorneys and clients to cooperate with the court and to abandon practices that interfere with the management of cases. Imposing sanctions on parties for settling cases after the trial begins is contrary to the purpose behind the rules, which is to encourage the settlement of cases. This case is more troubling, as the judge imposed sanctions on the Defendant alone for settling during the trial.
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CHAPTER II. The Rewards And Costs Of Litigation-Of Remedies And Related Matters
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Fuentes v. Shevin
Fuentes v. Shevin
Citation. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). Brief Fact Summary. Two cases involving similar issues of due process considerations were joined. Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of prejudgment replevin statutes on the grounds that the denial of notice and a hearing was a violation of their right to due process. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Prejudgment replevin statutes, which deprive individuals of their property must comply with procedural due process. Facts. In the first case, Margarita Fuentes (Plaintiff), a resident of Florida, purchased a gas stove and service policy from Firestone Tire and Rubber Company (Defendant), under a conditional sales contract. A few months later, Plaintiff also purchased a stereophonic phonograph from the Defendant. Defendant retains title to the merchandise, while Plaintiff was entitled to possession of the items until she defaulted on her payments. With about $200 remaining to be paid, a dispute developed between the Plaintiff and the Defendant over the servicing of the stove. Plaintiff refused to make payments and the Defendant instituted an action in small claims court for repossession of the stove and stereo. When the Defendant filed that action, it also obtained a writ of replevin ordering a sheriff to seize the disputed goods. Plaintiff then filed suit in a federal district court challenging the constitutionality of the Florida prejudgment replevin procedures under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Appellants in the second case filed a similar action in federal district court in Pennsylvania challenging the constitutionality of that State's prejudgment replevin process. The Appellants in this case also had possessions seized under writs of replevin. In both cases, the district courts considered the Appellants' challenges to the constitutionality of the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes. The courts in both cases upheld the constitutionality of the statutes. Plaintiffs appeal. Issue. Do state replevin statutes that fail to provide property owners with notice and an opportunity to challenge the seizure of their property violate the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee that no state shall deprive any person of property without due process of law? Held. Yes. Judgment is vacated and remanded. One cannot deprive an individual of his or her property without prior notice and the opportunity for a pre-deprivation hearing. However, there are extraordinary situations that justify postponing notice and the opportunity for a hearing. Seizure of property without notice or a hearing is allowed in a few limited situations. First, the seizure must be necessary to secure an important governmental interest. Second, there
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Fuentes v. Shevin
must be a special need for very prompt action. Third, the person instituting the seizure must be a governmental official responsible for determining that it was necessary and justified in the particular instance. Here, the Florida and Pennsylvania prejudgment replevin statutes serve no important governmental interest. Neither statute limits the seizure of goods to special situations demanding prompt action. Lastly, no state official participates in the decision to seek the writ, reviews the basis for the claim for repossession, or evaluates the need for immediate seizure. Therefore, the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes do not provide extraordinary situations that justify denying the right to prior opportunity to be heard before property is taken from their possessor. Dissent. The decision depends on one's perception of the practical considerations involved. One should pay attention to the seller's interest, while also looking at those of the buyer. Here, the buyer's risk of harm is not as large as the majority concludes. Discussion. In order to have a due process violation, there must be state action and a deprivation of property. The court concludes that both of these requirements were not present, and therefore, both the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes were unconstitutional.
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Connecticut v. Doehr
Connecticut v. Doehr
Citation. 501 U.S. 1 (1991). Brief Fact Summary. In conjunction with a civil action for assault and battery against Brian K. Doehr (Respondent), John F. DiGiovanni (Petitioner), submitted an application for an attachment in the amount of $75,000 on Respondent's home in Meridan, Connecticut. Respondent challenged the constitutionality of the attachment statute, the General Statutes of Connecticut, Section 52-278(e) (1991), under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to resolve the conflict in authority between the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's ruling that the statute was unconstitutional and the District Court's decision to uphold the statute. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Prejudgment attachment without prior notice and an opportunity for a hearing violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Facts. Petitioner submitted an application to the Superior Court of Connecticut for an attachment in the amount of $75,000 on Respondent's home in Connecticut in connection with a civil action for assault and battery. The suit did not involve the Respondent's land nor did the Petitioner have any interest in Respondent's home or property. Connecticut's prejudgment attachment statute authorizes the attachment of real estate without prior notice or the opportunity for a prior hearing. The statute does not require the posting of a bond. Based upon Petitioner's affidavit that the Respondent willfully, wantonly and maliciously assaulted the Petitioner, the Superior Court of Connecticut judge found "probable cause to sustain the validity of the Petitioner's claim" and ordered attachment of the Respondent's home in the amount of $75,000. Only after the sheriff attached the property was the Respondent given notice of the attachment. Respondent filed suit against Petitioner in Federal District Court claiming that the statute was unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court upheld the statute. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the district court's decision. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari. Issue. Whether a state statute that authorizes prejudgment attachment of real estate without prior notice or the opportunity for a hearing, without extraordinary circumstances, and without the requirement that a person seeking attachment post a bond satisfies the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Held. No. The judgment is affirmed and remanded for further proceedings. Prejudgment attachment provisions that fail to provide prior notice or preattachment hearing without some showing of exigent circumstances violates the requirements of due process. In order to determine what process is due when the government seeks to deprive an individual of their property, the following three step analysis must be completed: 1) the private interests that will be affected; 2) the risk of erroneous deprivation;
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Connecticut v. Doehr
3) and the government's interests. Here, however, the inquiry is slightly different because prejudgment remedy statutes deal with disputes between private parties. Therefore, instead of considering the government's interests, principal attention must be given to the interest of the party seeking the remedy. In the instant case, homeowners' interests would be significantly affected by attachment even though there is no interference with possession of property because it could cloud title and interfere with borrowing on the property. Second, there is a substantial risk of erroneous deprivation since it is state practice to rely on conclusory affidavits and does not lend itself to documentary proof. Third, the interests of the Petitioner are too minimal, the only interest the Petitioner has in the Respondent's real estate is to ensure the availability of assets to satisfy the judgment if he prevailed on the merits of the claim. Petitioner's interest in attaching the property does not justify the burdening of the Respondent's ownership rights without a hearing to determine the likelihood of recovery. Due process also requires that the Petitioner post a bond in addition to requiring a hearing or showing of some exigency. A danger exists that property rights may be wrongfully deprived without the safeguards of a bond, even with a hearing or exigency requirement. Concurrence. The concurrence is in agreement with the decision of the court that the Connecticut attachment statute fails to satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the court's holding requiring the bond requirement is both unnecessary and not useful. The court should wait for more concrete cases, which present issues involving bonds to make such a decision. Agreement with the court that the Connecticut statute's validity should be determined by applying the test set forth in Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). It fails this test. Discussion. The factors used in the case to determine what process is due when the government seeks to deprive an individual of their property was set forth in Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The factors are as follows: 1) consideration of the private interest that will be affected by the prejudgment measure; 2) an examination of the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used; 3) the probable value of additional or alternative safeguards; and 4) the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Id. at 335. In Connecticut, the same test was used; however, the focus was different. In contrast to Mathews, the court emphasized that principal attention is to be paid to the interest of the party seeking the prejudgment remedy, with due regard for any ancillary interest the government may have in providing the procedure or in reducing its burden by not providing greater protections.
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Carey v. Piphus
Carey v. Piphus
Citation. 435 U.S. 247 (1978). Brief Fact Summary. The Supreme Court of the United States considered the elements and prerequisites for the recovery of damages of students who were suspended from public elementary and secondary schools without procedural due process. Synopsis of Rule of Law. In absence of any proof of actual injury only nominal damages may be recovered. Facts. Jariuss Piphus (Plaintiff) was caught smoking on school property by the school principal smoking. The principal thought that Plaintiff was smoking marijuana. The assistant principal imposed the usual twenty-day suspension for violation of the school rule against the use of drugs. The Plaintiff argued that he had not been smoking marijuana. A suspension notice was sent to the Plaintiff's mother. A few days later, a meeting was held to discuss the reasons for the suspension, but not to determine whether the Plaintiff had actually been smoking marijuana. Plaintiff and his mother filed suit against Defendants in Federal District Court under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 28 U.S.C. 1343, alleging that the Plaintiff had been suspended without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, along with actual and punitive damages in the amount of $3,000. Plaintiff was readmitted to school under a temporary restraining order. Plaintiff's case was consolidated with another case brought by Silas Brisco (Plaintiff), who was also suspended without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Brisco refused to remove a small earring from his ear when asked by the school principal. The school had a rule against the wearing of earrings by male students, because the principal believed that this practice denoted membership with street gangs. Brisco was suspended for twenty days. Brisco field suit and sought declaratory and injunctive relief, along with actual and punitive damages in the amount of $5,000. Brisco was also readmitted to school under a temporary restraining order. Piphus' and Brisco's cases were consolidated for trial and the district court held that both students had been suspended without procedural due process. However, the district court declined to award damages due to lack of proof. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case. It also held that the district court was wrong not to give declaratory and injunctive relief, and that the district court should have considered the pecuniary value of each day the students missed when they were suspended. However, the court said that the Plaintiffs would not be entitled to recover damages representing the value of the missed school time, if on remand, Defendants showed that there was just cause for the suspensions. Further, even if on remand the Plaintiffs' suspensions were
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Carey v. Piphus
justified, they would be entitled to recover substantial non-punitive damages because they had been denied procedural due process. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari. Issue. Whether a Plaintiff must prove actual injury by a deprivation of due process before he may recover substantial non-punitive damages? Held. Yes. The judgment is reversed and remanded. A plaintiff must prove actual injury by a deprivation of due process in order to recover compensatory damages. Neither the likelihood of such injury nor the difficulty of proving it is so great as to justify awarding compensatory damages without proof that such injury actually occurred. The plaintiff must convince the trier of fact that he actually suffered distress because of the denial of procedural due process itself. Denial of procedural due process should be actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury since the right to procedural due process is absolute. Discussion. The Supreme Court of the United States draws on the general law of tort remedies to determine a constitutional tort. The concept of tort remedies is that money damages should be sufficient to compensate the plaintiff for the harm caused by the defendant's actions. Punitive damages are not designed to compensate but to deter wrongful conduct. Nominal damages are usually a small sum given when legal injury is suffered, but when there was no substantial loss or injury to be compensated.
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Here, an employer owes a duty to their employees to provide a reasonably safe work place and to protect employees from avoidable peril. Plaintiff's petition adequately shows that the tobacco smoke of co-workers smoking in the work place is hazardous to the health of employees. The petition further demonstrates that Defendant knew the tobacco smoke was harmful to Plaintiff's health and Defendant has the authority, ability, and reasonable means to control smoking in the workplace. Thus, Defendant has breached his duty to provide a reasonably safe workplace. Exposure to smoke in the workplace causes irreparable harm. This is a harm for which money damages cannot adequately compensate a plaintiff. Plaintiffs should not be required to await the fruition of harm before he is entitled to seek an inadequate remedy. Therefore, the injunction is the appropriate remedy. Discussion. Permanent injunctions directly order defendants to either take action or to cease action. Monetary damages provide recovery for past harms, while injunctions prevent future harms from occurring. The purpose of an injunction is to provide a remedy when there is no available remedy at law. The effect of injunctions is that a defendant who violates an injunction may be liable for civil or criminal contempt.
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Venegas v. Mitchell
Venegas v. Mitchell
Citation. 495 U.S. 82 (1990). Brief Fact Summary. Prevailing petitioner, Venegas (Petitioner) was required to pay his attorney based on a contingency contract more than statutory award against respondent, Mitchell (Respondent). Petitioner appeals. Synopsis of Rule of Law. A statutory award of attorney's fees does not invalidate a plaintiff's ability to become bound by a private agreement, even if the private fee is larger than the statutory award. Facts. The current dispute arises out of an action under 42 U.S. C. 1983 brought by Petitioner alleging that police officers of Long Beach, California falsely arrested Petitioner and conspired to deny him a fair trial through the presentation of perjured testimony. The district court dismissed Petitioner's complaint as time barred by statute of limitations, which was subsequently reversed by the court of appeals. During this appeal, Petitioner retained Respondent as his attorney. Petitioner and Respondent signed a contingency contract for a fee of 40% of the gross amount of any recovery. The contract prohibited Petitioner from waiving Respondent's right to court-awarded attorney's fees. Petitioner obtained a judgment of $2.08 million. Respondent moved for attorney's fees and the District Court entered an order awarding Petitioner $117,000 in attorney's fees, of which $75,000 was attributable to work performed by Respondent. The award was calculated by multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours the respondent expended on the case, and then doubling this lodestar figure to reflect respondent's competent performance. Petitioner and Respondent had a disagreement about representation on appeal and Petitioner obtained different counsel for appeal. Respondent then asserted a $406,000 attorney's lien against the judgment proceeds, his half of the 40% fee. Petitioner objected because the fee was excessive and should be limited to the $75,000 found to be reasonable on the Motion for Attorney's Fees. The District Court refused to disallow or reduce the fee and the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision. Issue. Whether 42 U.S.C. 1988, which states that a court may award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party in a civil rights case, invalidates contingent-fee contracts that require prevailing civil rights plaintiff to pay his attorney more than the statutory award against the defendant? Held. No. Judgment affirmed. 42 U.S.C. 1988 does not restrict a plaintiff's right to become contractually and personally bound to pay an attorney, a percentage of the recovery even if such a fee is larger that the statutory fee the defendant must pay to the plaintiff. The purpose of 1988 is to enable civil rights plaintiffs to employ reasonably competent lawyers without costs to themselves if they prevail. However, nothing in the section regulates what
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Venegas v. Mitchell
plaintiffs may or may not promise to pay their attorneys if they lose or win. An attorney can collect both a statutory award of fees and fees that are derived from a private agreement. Petitioner also argued that the contingent fees in this case were unreasonable under federal and state law. However, the courts rejected this argument. Discussion. The fee award in this case was calculated by what is called the lodestar method, multiply the hours worked by the lawyer by the lawyer's hourly rate. The court may disallow hours that were spent on unsuccessful claims or inefficiently used.
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McCormick v. Kopmann
McCormick v. Kopmann
Citation. 23 Ill. App. 2d 189 (3rd Dis. 1959). Brief Fact Summary. Lewis McCormick (McCormick) was killed in auto accident with a truck operated by Kopmann (Defendant). McCormick's wife (Plaintiff) sued Kopmann and Huls (Defendants), the owners of the bar where McCormick had drunk beer before the accident. Two counts in Plaintiff's complaint were alternative pleadings. Defendants moved for a directed verdict, but the motion was denied. Kopmann appealed. Synopsis of Rule of Law. A complaint may contain inconsistent allegations, even though the proof of one negates any fault on the foundation of the other. Facts. McCormick was killed when a truck operated by Kopmann collided with his car. Plaintiff sued the operator of the car and the Huls, the owners of the bar where McCormick had beer before the accident. Count one of Plaintiff's complaint alleged that Kopmann, negligently drove his truck across the center-line and collided with McCormick's car. Count four, brought in the alternative to count one, under the Illinois Dram Shop Act alleged that the Huls, sold alcoholic beverages to McCormick, which rendered him intoxicated. As a result of the intoxication, he drove his car in such a manner as to cause a collision with Kopmann's truck. Kopmann moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the contradictions between count one and count four were fatal. The trial court denied his motion and the jury returned a verdict against Kopmann for $15,500 under count one and for the Huls under count four. Kopmann appealed. Issue. Whether inconsistent allegations can be pleaded simultaneously? Held. Yes. Judgment is affirmed. Plaintiff had the right to go to trial on both counts and to adduce all the proof she had under both counts. Plaintiff could not recover on both counts simultaneously, since the two counts are mutually exclusive. However, the Illinois Civil Practice Act states that claims may be made in the alternative regardless of consistency. In order to ensure that controversies may be settled and justice is accomplished, a Plaintiff may plead in the alternative. Nonetheless, alternative pleading is not permitted when the pleader knows which of the inconsistent statements are true and which are false. Here, there is nothing that indicates the Plaintiff know that the averments in either court were true. The key witness here to the accident is dead, therefore, pleading alternative sets of facts is often the only feasible way to determine what happened. Discussion. Rule 8(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a Plaintiff to plead alternative allegations. The pleader is also permitted to plead inconsistent versions of the
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McCormick v. Kopmann
facts. The purpose in allowing plaintiffs to plead in the alternative is to ensure that controversies may be settled and justice is accomplished.
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imposed when there is an abuse of discretion, which occurs if the court based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or erroneous assessment of the evidence. In the instant case, the appellant failed to prove that the films were being rented in the three years after the commencement of the action, and thus violated the three-year statute of limitations. Further, Appellant's legal arguments were not warranted by existing law, and therefore sanctions were within the discretion of the District Court. Furthermore, there was no error in the courts' type and amount of sanctions imposed by the District Court. However, it was error for the court to invoke without sanctions and without comment. The court must consider mitigating factors in imposing sanctions, most particularly, the sanctioned party's ability to pay. Other factors include history of behavior, willfulness of violation, frivolousness, and damage to the integrity of the legal system. Discussion. The court vacated and remanded the case because the District Court did not distinguish between the Section 1927 and Rule 11 sanctions. The court held that it was appropriate to impose Rule 11 sanctions against the Appellant on remand, because the court must provide an explanation for the severity of the sanctions.
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On the issue of whether dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) was procedurally proper, the court properly relied on Rule 12(b)(6) in disposing of the case since the Plaintiff sets forth a new theory of liability. The court is only required to accept well-pleaded facts as true without considering any new legal theory presented by Plaintiffs. Here, the Plaintiff's complaint was a narrative recital of the facts relevant to the issue of the Defendant's duty. The Defendants have no duty to the Plaintiffs. A possessor of land is subject to liability to business invitees only while they are on their land. Plaintiffs were not considered to be on Defendant's property, so Defendant was under no duty to the Plaintiffs. Here, the Plaintiffs were parked on a public thoroughfare, which was not part of Defendant's property. Dissent. The dissent is in agreement with the majority that the Defendant had no duty to protect against criminal acts of third persons on a public street. However, the facts of this particular case created a duty due to the increased risk. Discussion. There is a very liberal standard for sufficiency of plaintiff's claim. Courts typically will not dismiss the claim unless the court is certain that the plaintiff cannot prove the facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.
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pleading, it does not make sense that federal courts would require more stringent requirements.
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Furthermore, it is not necessary that conduct be excusable to qualify for relief under the good cause standard. Strong policy exists in favor of deciding cases on their merits and is outweighed by the slight delay experienced by the court. A default judgment deprives the client of his day in court and should not be used as a means to punish attorneys. Therefore, despite evidence of disarray on the part of the Defendant, the Defendant should not be deprived of his opportunity to present his defense at trial. Discussion. As a matter of law, a default judgment establishes that defendants are liable to plaintiff for each cause of action alleged in the complaint. Since the effect of a default judgment is so harsh, this court is opposed to denying the party of his day in court. Absent the intent to frustrate the judicial process or reckless disregard for the party's actions on the court system, the court will generally find good cause to set aside a default judgment.
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denial. However, information that is responsible within the defendant's control use of the non-positive denial based on lack of information and belief may be forbidden. Also, where information is matter of public record, the defendant may not deny for lack of information and belief.
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party, which is not related to the action and therefore must have its own basis for federal jurisdiction. On the other hard, a compulsory counterclaim is any related claim arising of the same transaction or occurrence, and jurisdiction is ancillary to the claim. No independent basis for federal jurisdiction is required.
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determined whether Defendant's denial based on lack of information constituted an admission if the Defendant was in control or had knowledge of applicable facts.
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Plaintiff's allegations in the Amended Complaint arose from the same occurrence as set forth in the original complaint, in other words, Plaintiff's fall on the stairway. Whether or not Plaintiff's injuries were a result of negligence in the design or the installation or maintenance of the stairway does not change the fact that all claims in pleadings resulted from her fall. Notice of the commencement of the lawsuit need not be formal. If a person receives notice of the litigation that he may be liable to the plaintiff, he has received the notice required within the statutory period. Lack of diligence on the part of Plaintiff's counsel after receiving the information as to the true identity of the property owner is insufficient to prevent the Plaintiff from seeking leave to amend. Specific prejudice must be shown in order to prevent the Plaintiff from seeking amendment. Here, no such prejudice was shown. Discussion. There are two types of amendments prior to trial: as a matter of right or by permission. Each party may amend once either before the answer or responding pleading is served, in other words amendment as a matter of right. On the other hand, a party can amend by leave of the court or written consent of the opposing party. Typically, motions to amend pleadings are liberally granted except when prejudice to the other party may occur.
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Southern Methodist University Association of Women Law Students v. Wynne and Jaffe
Southern Methodist University Association of Women Law Students v. Wynne and Jaffe
Citation. 599 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1979). Brief Fact Summary. Southern Methodist University Association of Women Law Students (Association) and four female Lawyers A, B, C and D (Plaintiffs), who wished to remain anonymous, refused to disclose the identities of the four female attorneys that were allegedly discriminated against by the defendant law firms, Wynne and Jaffe (Defendants) when applying for summer law clerk and associate positions. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Only under special circumstances, where the issues involved are the subject of sensitive and a highly personal nature, will a court allow plaintiffs to use fictitious names. Facts. Plaintiffs brought a sex discrimination suit alleging that two defendant Dallas law firms discriminated against women in hiring summer law clerks and associates. Plaintiffs appeal from pretrial orders of the district court that required the Association to reveal the true identities of the four female lawyers. Issue. Whether special circumstances exist to allow plaintiffs to use fictitious names? Held. No. Judgment of the District Court is affirmed. Under Rule 10(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Title VII, individuals are required to state the names of all the parties to be included in the pleadings. However, in certain circumstances, courts have allowed plaintiffs to use fictitious names. Some of these special circumstances, which warrant plaintiffs to use fictitious names are issues involving birth control, abortion, homosexuality or the welfare rights of illegitimate children. All of these cases divulge intimate personal information. In the instant case, the four attorneys for the Plaintiffs did not reveal any intimate personal information or express a desire to participate in proscribed activities. Basic fairness states that individual party plaintiffs must bring suit against the defendants under their real names. Discussion. Rule 17(a) states that, "every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest." One of the purposes of this rule is to protect the interests of defendants.
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the parties. The district court held that it was easier to determine the prejudicial effect of joinder after discovery takes place and the case is ready to go to trial. The court stated that it was easier to determine the prejudicial effect of joinder after discovery takes place because at that time the degree of involvement of each of the Defendants will be clearer and prejudice will be easier to assess. Discussion. Some of the benefits of a single trial are that it is more convenient and less expensive and time-consuming for the parties and the court. Rule 20(a) allows for the joinder of multiple persons if they assert a right to relief that arises out of the same transaction or occurrence and if there is a common question of law or fact. Joinder of parties is more restrictive than joinder of claims. Joinder of parties is divided into permissive joinder (Rule 20) and mandatory joinder (Rule 19). On the other hand, Rule 18(a) allows a party to join as many claims as the party has against the opposing party. In terms of joinder of claims, the Federal Rules allow claims to be joined that are not even related. The theory behind this rule is that it will prevent the parties from bringing multiple lawsuits against one another.
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substantial risk of incurring double or inconsistent obligations. A determination under Rule 19(a) is necessary to the determination under Rule 19(b) that the case must be dismissed because joinder of the party is not possible and the party is indispensable to the resolution of the case. In the instant case, complete relief can be afforded to the Plaintiff and Defendant in the absence of Underwood. The district court erred in its holding that the possibility of a decision in the present action would be "persuasive precedent" in subsequent actions against Underwood, and would impair or impede Underwood's interests. Thus, Underwood is not an absent party whose joinder is compulsory. Furthermore, the continuation of the case in the absence of Underwood does not subject Defendant to double or inconstant liabilities. The possibility that the continuation of this case would have some effect on a subsequent litigation between Plaintiff and Underwood is speculative. Since Underwood is not a necessary party to the litigation, it is therefore unnecessary to determine whether Underwood is an indispensable party. Discussion. Initially, the district court retained subject matter jurisdiction by diversity, because Plaintiff is a citizen of Pennsylvania and the Defendant is a citizen of New York. However, Underwood is a Pennsylvania corporation, which would destroy diversity.
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the plaintiff's claim. Therefore, Defendants properly impleaded third party defendants. A third party complaint does not require the existence of a duty on the part of the third party defendant to the Plaintiff. Impleader is only proper if the third party defendant may be liable for some or all of the Plaintiff's claim against the third party plaintiff. The third party claim need not be on the same basis as the main claim and impleader is proper despite the fact that third party's liability is not established when the third party plaintiff's liability to the plaintiff is established. Therefore, in the instant case, the Defendants have stated a valid claim for indemnity against third party defendants. Inclusion of third party indemnity claims will not complicate the suit. This decision is typically within the discretion of the court. Here, the court finds that many of the issues are so closely related that resolution of Plaintiff's claims may collaterally estop defendants from relitigating these issues in separate proceedings and thus will not confuse the issues. Discussion. Impleader is the procedure by which a third party is brought into a lawsuit, through a defendant's third party action. This is also called third party practice. In this case, Defendant brought its employees, third party defendants into this lawsuit in order to be indemnified for any award that Plaintiff would obtain against Defendant. Since, employees and certain third parties were directly responsible for the damage done to the tractor during repossession they should bear the cost of any award of damages.
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concluded that interpleader was not available in the circumstances of this case. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to resolve the conflict of grounds for granting interpleader and to consider the administration of federal interpleader. Issue. Whether in the absence of a state law or contractual provision for direct action suits against the insurance company, the company is required to wait until persons asserting claims against its insured have reduced claims to judgment before seeking to invoke the benefits of federal interpleader? Whether federal jurisdiction was proper? Note: This issue was raised on the court's own motion. Held. No and Yes. The court held that the injunction to join all Defendants in the insurance company's litigation was improper, and it remanded the case to modify the injunction to be consistent with this decision. Further, the decision of United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on the jurisdictional question is reversed. The 1948 revisions removed the requirement that the insurance company wait until at least two claimants reduced their claims to judgments. Interpleader statutes were designed to remedy the difficulties: the race to obtain judgments and the potential unfairness to claimants. Therefore, Plaintiff properly invoked the interpleader jurisdiction. Even though Plaintiff properly invoked interpleader jurisdiction, it does not entitle Plaintiff to an order enjoining prosecution of suits against it outside the confines of the interpleader proceeding. An insurance company should not be allowed to determine that dozens of tort plaintiffs must be compelled to raise their claims in a single forum of the insurance company's choosing. Interpleader was never intended to be used as a means to solve all problems of multi-party litigation. Therefore, the interpleader statute did not authorize the injunction entered in the present case. The court found that federal jurisdiction was proper because the interpleader statue only requires minimal diversity, in other words diversity of citizenship between two or more claimants without regard to the fact that other rival claimants may be co-citizens. Discussion. In actions where a plaintiff may be exposed to multiple liability, the interpleader statute provides that persons who may have claims against the plaintiff be joined as defendants and required to interplead without first obtaining a judgment.
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Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Citation. 578 F.2d 1341 (10th Cir. 1978). Brief Fact Summary. American Mining Congress and Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corporation (Appellants), seek to review the order of the United States District Court of the District of New Mexico denying their motions to intervene as a matter of right or on a permissive basis. Synopsis of Rule of Law. A party seeking intervention must prove that they have an interest in the litigation, that their interest would be impaired if they were unable to intervene, and that the Defendants do not adequately represent their interests. Facts. The original action in which movants requested intervention was commenced by Plaintiff, Natural Resources Defense Counsel, Inc., (Plaintiff) seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of the Defendants, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the New Mexico Environmental Improvement Agency (NMEIA) (Defendants), prohibiting those agencies from issuing licenses for the operation of uranium mills in New Mexico without first writing environmental impact statements. Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (Act), Congress authorized the NRC, to issue licenses. Under Section 274(b) of the Act, the Defendant is authorized to enter into agreements with the states allowing the states to issue licenses. These agreements have been made with about twenty-five states including New Mexico. This action seeks to prevent the use of Section 274(b) in order to avoid the requirement of an impact statement. 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C) requires that a detailed environmental impact statement be prepared by the federal agencies in every recommendation or report affecting the quality of the environment. The complaint alleges that Defendant only prepares these statements if the states have not entered into agreement with Defendant. On the other hand, they do not prepare these statements where there is an agreement with a state such as New Mexico. The complaint further alleges that the granting of licenses to state agencies by the Defendant eliminates the need of the state agency to prepare environmental impact statements since it is not a federal agency. The relief sought by the Plaintiff is that the Defendant's involvement in the licensing procedure is sufficient to constitute major federal action. Plaintiffs also seek declaration that the New Mexico program is in conflict with the Act if an impact statement is not required with the granting of licenses. The motion of UNC to intervene was not opposed by the parties and was granted. On the date the complaint was filed, UNC was granted a license to operate a uranium mill in New Mexico and thus the complaint seeks to enjoin the issuance of the license. Motion to Intervene on behalf of Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corporation, Anaconda Company, Gulf Oil Corporation, Philips Petroleum Company and the American Mining Congress was denied on the grounds that the interests of the parties would be adequately represented by UNC. Issue. Whether the interests of the parties seeking to intervene were adequately represented by a fellow member of the industry?
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Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Held. No. Judgment reversed and the cause is remanded with instructions to the trial court to grant Appellants' Motion to Intervene. The interests of the movant in the subject matter are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the threat of loss of their interest and inability to participate is great enough to impair the ability to advance their interests. There are three requirements of Rule 24 that must be satisfied in order for the Appellants to obtain an intervention. The appellants must prove that the have sufficient interest in the litigation; that their inability to participate is great enough to impair their interests; and that the Defendant does not adequately represent their interests. Appellants have the requisite interest in the issuance and delivery of the license, which constitutes a genuine threat to the appellants. Another interest of Appellants is that one of the consequences of the litigation could be the requirement that an environmental impact standard should be prepared before granting a uranium license or the agreement between the Appellee and the Appellant could be terminated. Rule 24 does not require that that a movant in intervention have a direct interest in the outcome of the case. However, the interest must be a significant protectable interest. Appellants have also satisfied the impairment criteria of Rule 24 in that the considerations for requiring an impact statement are relatively the same in respect to the issuance of a uranium mining license. Rule 24 refers to impairment as a practical matter. The Defendants may not adequately represent the interests of the Appellants. While their interests appear to be small, there is no way to say that the Appellant's interests will not in some way differ from the Defendant and there is no requirement that the divergence of interest need to be great to satisfy the burden of the intervening party. Another reason for intervention is that there is some value in having the parties be bound by the result. After looking at the three requirements for intervention, it is clear that the Appellants have satisfied the three requirements and therefore should be allowed to intervene. Discussion. Intervention is a device for an outsider who has an interest in the litigation to join as a party voluntarily.
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Hansberry v. Lee
Hansberry v. Lee
Citation. 311 U.S. 32 (1940). Brief Fact Summary. Lee (Plaintiff) sought to enjoin the sale of land to Hansberry (Defendants) on the ground that the sale violated a racially restrictive covenant. Synopsis of Rule of Law. There must be adequate representation of the members of a class action in order for the judgment to be binding on the parties not adequately represented. Facts. Defendants, who were African Americans, bought and moved into a house in Chicago covered by a racially restrictive covenant. Owners of neighboring homes sued in an Illinois Circuit Court to void the sale of the home to the Defendants. Defendant argued that the covenant never became effective because it was not signed by 95% of the homeowners, as required by its terms. The trial court voided the sale to the Defendants and ordered them to move. It found that they were bound by a decision that the covenant was valid based on Burke v. Kleiman. When the judgment of a state court, based on the decision of another court, is challenged for want of due process, it is the duty of the Supreme Court of the United States to examine the course of procedure in both litigations to determine whether the litigant whose rights have been effected has been afforded notice and opportunity to be heard as required by due process. Issue. Whether a party can be bound by an earlier judgment of which they were not a party? Held. No. Judgment overturned. In general, one is not bound by a judgment in litigation in which he is not designated as a party. However, there is a recognized exception to this general rule. The judgment in a class or representative suit in which some members of the class are parties may bind members of the class or those represented who were not made parties to the action. A failure of due process occurs where it cannot be said that the procedure used insures the protection of the interests of the absent parties who are bound by the judgment. Here, since the parties have dual and potentially conflicting interest to the agreement in compelling and resisting performance, it is hard to say that any of them are of the same class. There was no designation of the Defendants in the suit as a class. When the Burke judgment was enforced, it did not purport to bind others. The Plaintiffs in the Burke case were not representing the petitioners in this case whose interests were in resisting performance. Therefore, the petitioners are not bound by the earlier judgment.
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Hansberry v. Lee
Discussion. In a class action suit, one or more members of a class of persons similarly situated may sue on behalf of other members of the class. These lawsuits are permitted where considerations of necessity and convenience justify action on behalf of a class of persons.
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an appeal from the final judgment. The second condition requires that the ruling be described as an abuse of judicial discretion. In the instant case, the ruling of the district court will inflict irreparable harm. If the class had not been certified, the Defendants would be facing 300 suits and more may be filed. However, only a few more suits are likely to be filed, because the statute of limitations is expiring since the blood supply has been safe since 1985. The potential damages in 300 lawsuits are great. Class actions may also put the Defendant under pressure to settle the suit. This pressure to settle, however, must be balanced against the benefits of the class action. The discussion of the facts proves that the ruling will inflict irreparable harm. In terms of the second condition, the district court exceeded the bounds of allowable judicial discretion by devising an innovative plan for the litigation. Forcing Defendants to stake their companies on the outcome of a single jury trial when it is feasible to allow a final determination of their liability to emerge from multiple trials that involve different juries and different standards of liability is a great concern of the district court's ruling. Another concern is that the district court exceeded the bounds of permissible judicial discretion in that the court proposed to have the jury determine Defendants' negligence under a legal theory that does not exist. The final concern, in which the district court exceeded its authority, is that the judge's plan of action proposes to divide the trial of the issues that he has certified for class action from the other issues involved in the many potential and actual claims of the members of the class. An inconsistency would result between the juries. Therefore, the Petition for Writ of Mandamus is granted and the district judge is directed to decertify the Plaintiffs' claims. Dissent. The dissent argues that they would have denied the Defendants the Petition for Writ of Mandamus. The class action, if it continued, would resolve only the question of whether Defendants were negligent in distributing the blood solids. The law requires that the district court judge's plan be given the opportunity to succeed. Discussion. A writ of mandamus is a writ issued by a superior court to compel a lower court to perform duties correctly. There are two conditions for determining whether the granting of a writ of mandamus is appropriate: 1) whether the challenged ruling of the district court has inflicted irreparable harm, in other words, harm that cannot be rectified by an appeal from the final judgment; and 2) whether ruling is as an abuse of judicial discretion.
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Hickman v. Taylor
Hickman v. Taylor
Citation. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). Brief Fact Summary. In anticipation of litigation, the attorney for John M. Taylor, Fortenbaugh (Respondent), interviewed the survivors. Hickman (Petitioner) representing the deceased, brought an action and tried by means of discovery to obtain copies of statements from Respondent's attorneys, which were obtained from the survivors. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Materials prepared and information developed by a party or an attorney that is prepared in anticipation of trial is subject to discovery only if the discovering party can show substantial need and an inability to obtain the material by other means. Facts. Respondent sank the tugboat, while towing a car float across the Delaware River. Five of the nine crew members drowned. The tug owners and underwriters employed a law firm, of which Fortenbaugh is a member, to defend them against potential suits by representatives of deceased crew members and to sue the railroad for damages to the tug. Four of the survivors' testimony was recorded and shortly thereafter, Fortenbaugh privately interviewed the survivors and took statements from them in anticipation of litigation. Four of the claims of the deceased were settled, while the fifth claimant brought suit in federal court under the Jones Act, naming as Respondents, the two tug owners, individually and as partners, and the railroad. Petitioner filed interrogatories, the thirty-eighth of which requested the statements of survivors of the incident, and supplemental interrogatories requested any oral or written statement, records, reports or other memorandum that had been made concerning any matter relevant to the incident. The Respondents answered all interrogatories except number thirty-eight and the supplemental interrogatories on the ground that the requests were for privileged matter obtained in the preparation of the litigation. The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that the requested material was not privileged. Respondents refused to produce the material and the court adjudged them in contempt and ordered them to prison until they complied. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and held that the information was part of the work product of the lawyer and privileged from discovery. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari. Issue. Whether a party may inquire into oral and written statements of witnesses obtained by an adverse party's counsel in preparation of trial after the claim has arisen? Held. No. Judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. A party may not seek information, which is produced by the adversary party's attorney in preparation of litigation without a showing of necessity and the inability to gain access to the documents. Petitioner is attempting to secure the production of written statements and mental impressions contained in the attorney's files without the showing of necessity, and without any indication that the inability to obtain this information will
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Hickman v. Taylor
prejudice the preparation of their case. If such materials were open to opposing counsel, an attorney's trial strategy and his thoughts would not be his own. However, discovery may be allowed where relevant and nonprivileged facts remain hidden in an attorney's file, and are necessary to the preparation of one's case. Petitioner did not demonstrate any of these exceptions and thus the statements are protected as work product of Respondent's attorney. Concurrence. The primary effect of the production of the requested information would be on the legal profession. The purpose of discovery was not to enable a learned profession to perform its function without wits. It is demoralizing to the bar to require a lawyer to write out and deliver to his adversary statements that a witness told him. The practice advocated by the Petitioner would force the attorney to become a witness. Discussion. According to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in order to obtain information that would be covered by the work product doctrine, the moving party must show substantial need and the inability to obtain the information without undue hardship.
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Davis v. Ross
Davis v. Ross
Citation. 107 F.R.D. 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Brief Fact Summary. Gail Davis (Plaintiff) instituted this defamation action based on a letter written and disseminated by Diana Ross (Defendant). Plaintiff sought one million dollars in compensatory damages and one million dollars in punitive damages. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Information of Defendant's net worth may not be discovered until a verdict awarding punitive damages is made. Facts. In Plaintiff's defamation action against Defendant based on a letter written and disseminated by the Defendant, the complaint states the Plaintiff was employed as an executive assistant to Defendant. Defendant's letter to Plaintiff stated that Defendant had to layoff Plaintiff because either her work or personal habits were unacceptable. Plaintiff sued alleging that the letter contained false statements. The district court granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the text of the letter was not libelous, as it only expressed Defendant's dissatisfaction, rather than making a representation of Plaintiff's job performance. The court of appeals reversed and remanded stating that the letter may have a defamatory interpretation. The case is currently before the court to hear the parties' cross-motions to compel discovery. Issue. Whether parties cross motion to compel discovery should be granted? Held. Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Discovery should be denied, whereas Defendant's Motion should be granted. Plaintiff seeks discovery of information concerning Defendant's net worth and annual income, arguing that Defendant's wealth is relevant to an action for punitive damages. The Plaintiff's interests in proving the amount of the Defendant's wealth must be balanced against the Defendant's right to privacy and desire not reveal such information. However, Defendant should not be compelled to disclose private facts to anyone until it is found that Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages. Plaintiff's Motion to Compel discovery of information regarding Defendant's wealth is denied. Plaintiff's second discovery request is for documents reflecting bills by Defendant's law firm. Plaintiff argues that this information is discoverable because the Defendant stated that defense counsel was an important witness. Plaintiff is entitled as to the relationship between Defendant and defense counsel, however the amount of fees earned is not probative of a witness' bias. Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Discovery of Defendant's legal fees is denied. Plaintiff's last discovery request is to learn the names of other employees who have complained about the Defendant and the nature of their
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complaints. Plaintiff seeks discovery of this information to determine whether Defendant was a good or bad employer, and is not probative of whether Plaintiff's personal or work habits were satisfactory. The information sought by Plaintiff is irrelevant to any material issue and thus the motion is denied. Defendant seeks discovery of Plaintiff's treatment by a psychiatrist during the period that Plaintiff worked for Defendant. Defendant argues that the material is relevant and that the physician-patient privilege has been waived. When the mental or physical condition of the Plaintiff is at issue, the physician-patient privilege is waived. Defendant argues that Plaintiff put her mental condition at issue when she sued to recover for great mental pain and anguish and thus waived the physician-patient privilege. If the Plaintiff sues to recover for mental pain and anguish, she may not subsequently deny the Defendant the evidence she needs to argue that there was no damage. Thus, Defendant's Motion to Compel Discovery of Plaintiff's treatment by a psychiatrist is granted. Discussion. Evidence must be relevant to the case in order to be admissible in court. According to the Federal Laws of Evidence, relevant evidence means evidence that has the tendency of making the existence of a fact of the case more probable or less probable than without the evidence. For evidence to be discoverable Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that material need only be relevant to the subject matter of the action for good cause. Some information that is not directly important for the case could be relevant to the claims or defenses raised in the action. The rules do not place any restriction on what a party may do with the information obtained in the discovery process. Generally an inquiry into Defendant's financial status is not permitted, but it may be permitted in cases when punitive damages are sought.
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Discussion. Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the granting of protective orders, which protect parties against burdensome and oppressive discovery. The court can issue a protective order when the movant has acted in good faith to resolve the dispute. In deciding whether to grant a protection order, the court must balance the potential hardship to the party seeking discovery if the protective order is granted with the potential hardship to the party seeking the protective order if it is denied.
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Hickman v. Taylor
Hickman v. Taylor
Citation. 329 U.S. 495. Brief Fact Summary. The Petitioner, Hickman (Petitioner), representative of a deceased crewmember in a fatal tugboat accident, sought oral and written discovery collected by the Defendants attorney in anticipation of litigation. The Defendants in this matter were the tug boat operators. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Written and oral materials taken by a partys counsel in the course of preparation for litigation is not considered protected by the attorney-client privilege, but is considered the work product of the attorney. Absent necessity or justification, attorney work product is not discoverable. Facts. A tugboat sank while helping to tow a car float operated by the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad across the Delaware River in Philadelphia. Five of the nine crew members drowned. Three days later, the tugboat owners and underwriters hired a law firm in anticipation of litigation, of which Fortenbaugh was a member. A public hearing was held before the United States Steamboat Inspectors at which the 4 surviving crewmembers were examined. The testimony was recorded and made available to all interested parties. Shortly afterwards, Respondent, Fortenbaugh (Respondent), interviewed the surviving crewmembers and had them sign their statements. He also interviewed other people who were involved with or had knowledge of the accident and wrote memoranda of their conversations. Representatives of the five deceased crewmembers brought claims against the tugboat owners and four settled. The Petitioner brought suit in federal court naming as defendants the tugboat owners as joint and severally liable as well as the railroad. Petitioner filed 39 interrogatories directed to the tug owners. The 38th interrogatory asked for copies of any statements of crewmembers relating to the accident. Supplemental interrogatories asked for any written or oral statements, reports, records, or memoranda taken by Defendants. The tugboat owners answered all interrogatories except for number 38 and the supplemental interrogatories. They admitted that statements had been taken, but that they were privileged. The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that the requested matters were not privileged and ordered the production of information asked for in the 38th and supplemental interrogatories. Defendants and Respondent refused to comply and were held in contempt and ordered imprisoned until they did so. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts judgment stating the sought information was the attorneys work product. Issue. To what extent may a party inquire into oral and written statements of witnesses, or other information, secured by an adverse partys counsel in the course of preparation for possible litigation after a claim has arisen? Held. Absent a showing of necessity or justification, attorney work product is undiscoverable. Judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
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Hickman v. Taylor
Concurrence. United States Supreme Court Justice Jackson (J. Jackson) concurred that a trial is a battle of wits between counsel. A common law trial is and always should be an adversary proceeding. Discovery was hardly intended to enable a learned profession to perform its functions either without wits or on wits borrowed from the adversary. I can conceive of no practice more demoralizing to the Bar than to require a lawyer to write and deliver to his adversary an account of what witnesses have told him. Discussion. Where relevant and non-privileged facts remain hidden in an attorneys file and where production of those facts is essential to the preparation of ones case, discovery may properly be had. However, the burden is on the party who wishes to invade the veil of attorney work product to justify production through a subpoena or court order. The Petitioner in this case made no attempt to show necessity or justification that his case would all apart if adverse counsel did not give up his work product. Absent that showing, courts will not overarch the protections of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) with regard to the already liberal discovery rules.
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The Government fails to demonstrate a sufficient showing of necessity and unavailability by other means in order to justify the production of materials protected by the work product doctrine. No showing of necessity can overcome protection of work product, which is based on oral statement of witnesses. Here, the Government needed to prove a far stronger showing of necessity to overcome the work product doctrine. Discussion. The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their client. It therefore promotes broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.
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or specially employed in anticipation of trial, the court must look at whether exceptional circumstances exist to permit discovery. The Plaintiffs want Defendant's test results to avoid expense of conducting their own tests. Plaintiffs have failed to show exceptional circumstances, thus Plaintiffs request for discovery is denied. Discussion. Non-testifying experts are obtained by counsel when the lawyer needs the assistance of an expert in the preparation of trial. In other words, counsel is hiring someone to assist them in the development of the legal and factual theories for the case. Here, Plaintiff failed to show exceptional circumstances, which would permit the discovery of Defendant's experts.
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If a party makes a good faith effort to comply with an order, dismissing the complaint would deprive the party of a property interest without due process of law. Bad faith or gross negligence on the part of a party a default judgment can be imposed. Rule 37 states that negligent wrongs are fit for general deterrence and gross professional incompetence may be responsible for the interminable delays. In this case, Appellee caused this litigation to be frozen and the judge's order declining to adopt the magistrate's recommendation that proof of damages be barred is reversed. Discussion. Rule 26(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that an attorney's signature on discovery paper certifies that the papers are supported by good and existing law; proper purpose; and require or response is reasonable given the needs of the case. The rule authorizes the court to impose sanctions on the person signing the paper and the party on whose behalf the paper was submitted, if a paper is signed in violation of this rule.
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Discussion. Please note that this decision was subsequently overruled by Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). That decision held that the moving party has the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion, and that party must recognize those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of fact.
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(1970), should not be construed to mean that the burden is on the moving party to produce evidence showing the absence of genuine issue of material fact. Instead, the burden on the moving party may be discharged by showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. In the instant case, Respondent failed to show that there was an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. However, the court determined that the court of appeals is better situated to answer the question of whether Petitioner made an adequate showing of exposure to asbestos products. Dissent. The case required the Court to determine whether Respondent satisfied the initial burden of production in moving for summary judgment on the ground the Petitioner lacked evidence to establish and essential element of her claim. The Court has not clearly explained what is required of the moving party seeking summary judgment. Respondent did not meet its burden of production under Rule 56. Concurrence. Agree that the Court of Appeals was wrong to conclude that the moving Respondent must support his motion with evidence or affidavits showing the absence of a genuine dispute of fact. The movant must discharge the burden summary judgment places on it by demonstrating that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Agree that the case should be remanded for further proceedings. Discussion. This case overrules the decision in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., which held that the movant in summary judgment motions have the burden to demonstrate evidence of the absence of a material issue of fact.
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Arnstein v. Porter
Arnstein v. Porter
Citation. 154 F.2d 464 (2nd Cir. 1946). Brief Fact Summary. Arnstein (Plaintiff) appealed summary judgment, which was granted to Cole Porter (Defendant). Plaintiff alleged that Defendant stole tunes for several popular songs that Defendant had written. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Summary judgment is improper when credibility of the parties is an issue. Facts. Plaintiff sued Defendant for copyright infringement, alleging that numerous songs of the Defendant were taken from a number of songs copyrighted by Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant had lived with Plaintiff, and had the opportunity to take this material from the Plaintiff. Defendant denied ever hearing or seeing any of Plaintiff's compositions. The trial court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment and Plaintiff appealed. Issue. Whether the lower court properly deprived the Plaintiff of a trial on his copyright infringement action? Held. No. Judgment is reversed. There are two separate elements essential to a copyright infringement action: 1) the Defendant must have copied the Plaintiff's work; and the copying of Plaintiff's work rose to the level of improper appropriation. There are similarities in the Plaintiff's and Defendant's compositions, but they do not compel the conclusion that Defendant copied Plaintiff's compositions. However, the similarities are enough to allow the case to go to the jury, and the jury may determine whether the similarities resulted from coincidence. Summary judgment then would have been proper if Defendant did not have access to Plaintiff's compositions. This also presents an issue of fact and even though part of Plaintiff's testimony does seem extreme, the Plaintiff's credibility should be determined by the jury. If the jury does not believe the Defendant's, the jury could infer that Defendant had access to Plaintiff's compositions. Thus, as the issue of credibility is involved, a genuine issue of material fact is presented. Plaintiff must not be deprived of the right to a trial by jury. Dissent. The majority relies on the trial to develop the facts of the case, however a trial cannot construct a case without some facts on which to start. The case is based on two premises: 1) belief that the jury has the ability to settle issues of plagiarism; 2) and a dislike of rules established by the Supreme Court of the United States as to summary
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Arnstein v. Porter
judgments. The dissent continues to defend summary judgment as an integral and useful part of the procedural system. Discussion. This case addresses the issue of what constitutes sufficient evidence to meet the party's burden of production. The court determines that issues of credibility constitute sufficient issues of fact for the case to proceed to the jury. This case is overruled by Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265 (2nd Cir. 1952), which held that summary judgment is appropriate in a defamation action when all the individuals alleged to have received the defamatory materials deny such receipt.
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Dyer v. MacDougall
Dyer v. MacDougall
Citation. 201 F.2d 265 (2nd Cir. 1952). Brief Fact Summary. Dyer (Plaintiff) appeals from a judgment dismissing two counts of Plaintiff's complaint for libel and slander. Synopsis of Rule of Law. In opposing a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party cannot rely on credibility evidence alone to ensure that the case goes to the jury. Facts. Plaintiff appeals from the granting of a Motion for Summary Judgment on the libel and slander counts in the complaint. The first count, which was not the subject of summary judgment, alleged that Albert E. MacDougall (Defendant) told the Plaintiff in front of a meeting of the Queensboro Corporation that Plaintiff was stabbing him in the back. The second count, which was also not the subject of the decision, alleged that Defendant wrote a letter to Plaintiff's wife stating that the Plaintiff made false representations to clients and presented bills for work not done. The first of the counts that is subject to summary judgment, alleges that Defendant said to a lawyer that a letter sent out by the Plaintiff to shareholder of Queensboro Corporation was a blackmailing letter. The final count alleged that Mrs. MacDougall, Defendant's wife who is also a Defendant, said to the Plaintiff's wife that the Plaintiff had written and sent out a blackmailing letter. Defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the second, third and fourth counts. Each of the Defendants denied the utterance of the slanders. Defendants filed an answer denying the defamatory utterances. The judge decided Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, and dismissed the third and fourth count on the ground that upon the trial, the Plaintiff would have no evidence to offer in support of the slanders except the testimony of witnesses. Issue. Whether there was any genuine issue of fact as to the utterance of the slanders? Held. No. Judgment affirmed. Summary judgment in a defamation action was granted in favor of Defendants due to the production of evidence that everyone whom the alleged defamation was published denied receiving such statements. Defendants had the burden of proving that there was no issue of fact, however at trial, the Plaintiff will have the burden of proving the utterances; and thus if Defendants succeeded in proving that the Plaintiff would not have enough evidence to go to the jury on the issue, the judgment granting the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment would be correct. If the case went to trial, the Plaintiff would have no witnesses by whom he could prove slander. Even though it may be possible that the party having the affirmative might succeed in convincing a jury of the truth of his allegations in spite of the fact that all the witnesses denied them, a verdict would still have to be directed against him.
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Dyer v. MacDougall
The likelihood that an examination in open court will provide the Plaintiff with information from four witnesses' admissions that he would not have obtained from the depositions that he refused is remote. Discussion. This case overrules Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2nd Cir. 1946), which held that when credibility of the parties is at issue, summary judgment is improper and a trial is indispensable.
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burden of requiring a corporate representative to attend a principal settlement conference was not out of proportion to the benefits to be gained. Further, no objection was made to the magistrate's order prior to the date of the pretrial conference. Appellant was left with only one course of action, he had to comply fully with the order. Thus, the district court did not exceed its authority and discretion to order a representative of Appellant to appear for pretrial settlements. Absent an abuse of discretion, there is no reason to disturb a district court's imposition of sanctions for failure of a party to comply with a pretrial order. Therefore, Appellant violated the district court's Order requiring it to have a corporate representative attend pretrial settlement negotiations and the court did not abuse its discretion by imposing sanctions on the Appellant for failure to do so. Dissent. The Dissent expressed concern that a district court judge's zeal to settle cases may ignore the value of other people's time. There are circumstances when an attorney can represent a party, and it is unnecessary to have a corporate representative. Rule 16 does not authorize a judge to require a represented party to attend a pretrial conference because the rule is clear that only unrepresented party litigants and attorneys may be required to appear. Many clients send their lawyer to negotiate in collective bargaining and merger talks, but is not less qualified to negotiate than a non-attorney representative. The majority decision compels persons who have committed no wrong to come to the court for the opportunity to receive a decision on the merits and then they are sanctioned for their actions. Discussion. The explosion of new settlement devices that has accompanied the Alternative Dispute Resolution movement has directed many courts to adopt other means of promoting settlement, other than such orders requiring settlement negotiations.
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Marek v. Chesny
Marek v. Chesny
Citation. 473 U.S. 1 (1985). Brief Fact Summary. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to determine resolve a dispute whether a prevailing plaintiff can recover attorney's fees incurred after the settlement offer. Synopsis of Rule of Law. A prevailing party may not recover attorney's fees incurred from the losing party subsequent to an offer of settlement. Facts. Alfred Chesney (Plaintiff) on his own behalf and as administrator of his son's estate, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state tort law against three police officers (Defendants) for killing his adult son. Defendants made a timely offer to settle for $100,000, but Plaintiff did not accept the offer. The case went to trial and Plaintiff was awarded $5,000 on the state law wrongful death claim, $52,000 for the 1983 violation and $3,000 in punitive damages. Plaintiff filed a Request for $171,692.47 in costs, including attorney's fees. This request for attorney's fees included costs incurred after the settlement offer. Defendant opposed the claim relying on Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which shifts the post-offer costs to the Plaintiff. Post-offer costs are all costs incurred subsequent to an offer of judgment when not exceeded by the recovery amount. The district court agreed with Defendants and declined to award Plaintiffs costs incurred after the settlement offer. Plaintiffs appealed and the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari. Issue. Whether attorney's fees incurred by a plaintiff subsequent to an offer of settlement must be paid by the defendant when the plaintiff receives a monetary judgment, which is less than the settlement offer? Held. No. Rule 68 provides that if a timely pretrial offer of settlement is not accepted and the judgment obtained by the offeree is less favorable than the settlement offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer. Defendant's offer of settlement was valid even though it lumped damages and costs together, because if not, a Defendant would be unlikely to make settlement offers. This holding does not frustrate Plaintiff's efforts to determine whether Defendants' offers are adequate. Plaintiff is aware of the amount of damages sought. Requiring itemization of damages separate from costs would not in any way require that the plaintiff know in advance whether the judgment at trial will exceed a defendant's offer. The term costs includes attorney's fees, and these fees are to be included for cost purposes under Rule 68. Under Section 1983, Congress expressly
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Marek v. Chesny
provided that costs, included attorney's fees are avoidable to the Plaintiff in such a suit and such fees are subject to the fee shifting provisions of Rule 68. Applying Rule 68 in the context of a Section 1983 action is consistent with the policies in Section 1988, which encourages plaintiffs to bring civil right suits, while Rule 68 encourages settlements. Dissent. The majority's reasoning is inconsistent with the history and structure of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The term costs should be interpreted narrowly in accordance with the definition in 28 U.S.C. 1920. It is not suggested in the limited history of the provision that costs include attorney's fees. The Rules provide that costs may automatically be taxed, which leads one to believe that costs are everyday charges, and that when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure's intent costs to encompass attorney's fee they do so explicitly. Also, the court can point to no authority suggesting that courts have even viewed the cost shifting provisions of Rule 68 as including attorney's fees. The dissent also argues that the words and phrases of the Federal Rules must be given consistent usage and the drafters of the Federal Rules intended Rule 68 to have a uniform application in all proceedings. The following concerns demonstrate that the term costs should not include attorney's fees. Furthermore, Section 1988 and Rule 68 do not fit smoothly together as argued by the majority. Congress has instructed that attorney's fees be governed by a reasonableness standard, but Rule 68 is not sensitive to these issues. Discussion. This case should be read against the rule that the prevailing party is not entitled to recover attorney's fees from the losing party.
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Defendant a trial by jury of all the issues in the antitrust controversy. After the jury rendered the verdict, the judge could have granted permanent injunctive relief. The right to a jury trial is a constitutional one and that discretion is very narrowly limited and must be exercised in such a way as to preserve the jury trial. Therefore, the right to a jury trial of legal issues cannot be lost through prior determination of equitable claims. Dissent. A litigant is entitled to a writ of mandamus to protect a clear constitutional or statutory relief to a jury trial. However, there was no such denial of a right here. When declaratory relief is sought, the right to a jury trial depends upon the basic context in which the issues are presented. The court's opinion does not hold that a court of equity may not determine legal rights. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit the trial of legal and equitable claims in the same proceeding, but expressly affirm the power of a trial judge to determine the order in which claims shall be heard. Discussion. The Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that the right of trial by jury shall be preserved and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States. There are two parts to the Amendment. The first provides the circumstances under which a litigant has a right to a jury trial and the other indicates what controls the court may impose upon a jury in a case, which the right is guaranteed.
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Ross v. Bernhard
Ross v. Bernhard
Citation. 396 U.S. 531 (1970). Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiffs brought this derivative action in federal court against the directors of Lehman Brother (Defendants). Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to a jury trial in stockholders' derivative actions in which the corporation would be entitled to a jury trial. Facts. Plaintiff's complaint contends that Lehman Brothers controlled the corporation through an illegally large representation on the corporation's board of directors. The corporation's board of directors was accused of converting corporate assets and of gross abuse of trust, bad faith and negligence. Both individual defendants, including Bernhard, and Lehman Brothers (Defendants) were accused of breaches of fiduciary duty. Plaintiffs requested that Defendants account for losses to the corporation and demanded a jury trial on the corporation's claims. On the Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' jury trial demand, the district court held that a shareholder's right to a jury trial was to be judged as if the corporation were itself the Plaintiff. The district court found that only the shareholder's initial claim had to be tried by a jury. The court of appeals reversed holding and held that no jury was available to try any part of it. Issue. Whether the Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to a jury trial in stockholders' derivative actions? Held. Yes. Judgment is reversed. Right to a jury trial extends to those issues in derivative actions when the corporation would be entitled to a jury trial. The Seventh Amendment preserves the right to a jury trial in all suits, which had a right to a jury trial at common law. The Seventh Amendment entitled the parties to a jury trial in actions for damages to a person or property, for libel and slander, for recovery of land, and for conversion of personal property. Common law, however, refused to permit stockholders to call corporate managers to account in actions at law. The Seventh Amendment question of the right to a jury trial depends on the nature of the issue to be tried rather than the character of the overall action. A derivative action has two aspects: the stockholders right to sue on behalf of the corporation, and the claim of the corporation against directors or third parties on which the company could demand a jury trial. The corporation is a necessary party to the action and is the real party in interest. Derivative suits have been described as true class actions. Therefore, the Seventh Amendment preserves the parties' right to a jury trial in a stockholder derivative suit when the corporations and those
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Ross v. Bernhard
against who a corporation pressed its legal claims have the same Seventh Amendment right. Dissent. The majority relies on an ill-defined combination of the Seventh Amendment and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Seventh Amendment does not extend the right to a jury trial, but preserves the right. There is no constitutional right to a jury trial even where there might have been one had the corporation brought the suit. Discussion. This case demonstrates that procedural innovation can give rise to a right to a jury trial in a case where it would not have been available at common law. The decision in this case cannot be explained by the Federal Rules or the Constitution. According to the Court, this decision can be explained by the overwhelming bias in favor of jury trials in civil actions.
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Curtis v. Loether
Curtis v. Loether
Citation. 415 U.S. 189 (1974). Brief Fact Summary. Curtis (Petitioner) brought a civil rights action under Section 812 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (Act) claiming that Loether and others who were white (Respondents) refused to rent an apartment to her because of her race. The district court held that a jury trial was not authorized and denied a jury trial. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed on the jury trial issue. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Seventh Amendment entitles either party to demand a jury trial in a civil rights action. Facts. Petitioner brought a civil action suit against Respondents for refusing to rent an apartment to Petitioner based on her race. Petitioner contends that Respondents' action constituted a violation of Section 804(a) of the Act. The complaint sought only injunctive relief and punitive damages. A claim for compensatory damages was later added. Respondents filed a demand for a jury trial, which the district court denied. The court of appeals reversed the decision based on the jury trial issue. Issue. Whether the Civil Rights Act of 1968 or the Seventh Amendment requires a jury trial upon demand of one of the parties in an action for damages and injunctive relief? Held. Yes. Judgment is affirmed. The Seventh Amendment entitles either party to demand a jury trial in an action for damages in federal court under the Civil Rights Act of 1968. The right to a jury trial applies to actions enforcing statutory rights. The Act "requires a jury trial upon demand, if the statute creates legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in courts of law." In the instant case, the damages action under Section 812 is an action to enforce legal rights within the meaning of the right to a jury trial. The damages action is basically an action in tort, which is a recognized action at common law. Further, the traditional relief sought is the traditional form offered in the court of law. When Congress provides for enforcement of statutory rights in an ordinary civil action in the district courts, a jury trial must be available if the action involves rights and remedies of the sort typically enforced by law. Petitioner's policy argument is that a jury trial may delay the disposition of damages actions, and that there is the possibility of jury prejudice. The court found these arguments to have merit. However, these considerations are insufficient to overcome the command for a jury trial in the Seventh Amendment. Therefore, the Defendants' demand for jury trial should be granted.
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Curtis v. Loether
Discussion. It is important to note that the Defendants were the proponents of the jury trial, while the Plaintiffs opposed it. The right to a jury trial extends beyond that which were previously available in common law forms of action. The court held that "[t]he Seventh Amendment applies to actions enforcing statutory rights, and requires a jury trial upon demand, if the statute creates legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for damages."
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The second part focused on whether Congress, consistent with the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution, could authorize judges to assess civil penalties, thereby determining whether Petitioner had a constitutional right to a jury trial on that issue. In the United States, most actions that deal with civil penalties seek the amounts that are fixed by Congress. Because Congress fixes these amounts, there is no right to ask for a jury to do so. And since Congress, itself may fix the civil penalties, it may delegate that determination to trial judges.
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equitable issues are that of the injunctive relief sought by the Plaintiff to prevent Defendants from continuing to perform their illegal acts. The only remedy sought by the Plaintiff is compensatory damages for back pay and benefits. An award of money damages is a form of legal relief. Thus, the relief sought by the Plaintiff is legal in nature rather than equitable. Therefore, when examining both parts of the Seventh Amendment inquiry, the plaintiffs are entitled to a jury trial on all issues presented in this case. Dissent. The dissent disagreed with the analytic innovation of the court that identification of the trust action as a model for the duty of fair representation action is insufficient to decide the case. The court must adhere to the historical test in determining the right to a jury trial because it is required by the language of the Seventh Amendment. Concurrence. The Plaintiff seeks a remedy that is legal in nature. The Seventh Amendment entitles Plaintiffs to a jury trial on their duty of fair representation claims. However, Seventh Amendment claims should be determined on the basis of the relief sought. If the relief is legal in nature then the parties have a constitutional right to a trial by jury. By getting rid of the other prong of the Seventh Amendment inquiry, we save the courts from needless an intractable excursions into unfamiliar territory. The concurrence believed that the court made it unnecessarily difficult by exaggerating the importance of finding a precise common law similarity to the duty of fair representation. By stressing the importance of finding an exact similarity the court has diminished the utility of looking for any similarity. Discussion. The test used by the majority is enumerated in Tull v. Untied States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987). A right to a jury trial exists in actions involving legal issues. In order to determine whether a particular action will resolve legal rights, an examination of the nature of the issues involved and the remedy sought must be conducted. Here, the court determined that Plaintiffs were seeking monetary damages, which is legal relief, as opposed to equitable relief. Therefore, Plaintiffs were entitled to a jury trial.
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The question is whether the Seventh Amendment confers a right to a jury trial in the face of Congress' decision to allow a non-Article II tribunal to adjudicate the claims against them. Providing jury trials in fraudulent conveyance actions may impede swift resolution of bankruptcy proceedings and increase Chapter 11 reorganizations. However, these considerations are insufficient to overcome the right to a jury trial. The court here does not decide whether the current jury trial provision permits bankruptcy courts to conduct jury trials in fraudulent conveyance actions. The court however does determine that the Seventh Amendment entitles Petitioners to the jury trial they requested. Dissent. Respondent's action would have sounded in equity in England at common law. The majority's decision may threaten the efficacy of bankruptcy courts and the Seventh Amendment should not be used as a tool to reach this result. Concurrence. The concurrence disagrees with the majority. The federal government needs to be a party for a case to revolve around public rights. Discussion. The majority in this case states that it must give deference to Congress' judgment on constitutional issue, but denies the existence of evidence demonstrating that Congress had exercised any in the present case.
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Lavender v. Kurn
Lavender v. Kurn
Citation. 327 U.S. 645, 66 S.Ct. 740, 90 L.Ed. 916 (1946). Brief Fact Summary. Petitioner, the administrator of the estate of L.E. Haney (Haney), brought suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (Act) against the trustees of the St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company and the Illinois Central Railroad Company (Respondents). Under the act, recovery is permitted for personal injuries to an employee of a railroad engaged in interstate commerce. Synopsis of Rule of Law. An appellate court's function in reviewing a jury verdict is exhausted when an evidentiary basis for that jury's decision becomes apparent, it being immaterial that the court might draw a contrary inference or feel that another conclusion is more reasonable. Facts. Haney was a switch operator for a train company, who was found dead on train tracks. The Petitioner presented evidence that Haney was killed as a result of a mail hook hanging loosely down on the outside of a mail car. Under the theory advanced by the Petitioner, recovery would be allowed under the Act. Respondent's theory was that Haney was murdered, pointing to the fact that his empty wallet was found near his body. Under Respondent's theory, no recovery would be allowed under the Act. The jury returned a verdict for Petitioner. The Supreme Court of Missouri vacated the jury verdict. It found that there was insufficient evidence for the conclusion to find for Petitioner. Issue. Was there a sufficient evidentiary basis from which the jury could have sustained a verdict in favor of the Petitioner? Held. There was sufficient evidence of negligence on both the part of the St. Louis-San Francisco trustee and the Illinois Central trustee to justify the submission of the case to the jury and to require appellate courts to abide by the verdict rendered by the jury. There was evidence presented in which a jury could infer that the end of the mail hook struck Haney in the back of the head. This inference was not unreasonable because Haney fell forward toward the main track so that his head was five and one-half feet north of the rail. The inferences made were not so unreasonable, so as to remove the case from the jury. Discussion. In this case there was evidence tending to show both that it was impossible for the hook to strike Haney and that it might reasonably be inferred that Haney was murdered. Because there was a reasonable basis in the record for the jury's conclusion that the hook struck Haney, it would be an undue invasion of the jury's function for an appellate court to weigh the conflicting evidence and arrive at a conclusion opposite the one reached by the jury.
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Ahern v. Scholz
Ahern v. Scholz
Citation. 85 F.3d 774 (First Circuit, 1996). Brief Fact Summary. This case involves a breach of contract action between a band manager, Ahern (Plaintiff) and a successful musician from the band Boston, Scholz (Defendant). At issue is a series of agreements entered into between the two parties regarding Boston's first three albums. Synopsis of Rule of Law. An appellate court will reverse a denial of a motion for new trial because the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, only if the district court judge committed an abuse of discretion. So long as a reasonable basis existed for the jury's verdict, an appellate court will not disturb the district court's ruling on appeal. Facts. Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant for alleged failure to pay royalties due from one of the musician's albums, in violation of one of the agreements previously entered into between the parties. Defendant asserted various counterclaims against Plaintiff, including a breach of one of the previous agreements between the parties. Issue. At issue is whether the appellate court should reverse the decision of the district court denying Defendant's Motion for a New Trial. Held. The evidence presented in the record clearly establishes that the jury had a reasonable basis for concluding that Plaintiff did not substantially breach his agreement with Defendant. As a result, the appellate court found that the jury's verdict was not against the clear weight of the evidence and the district court did not abuse its discretion in its findings. Discussion. The position of the appellate court in reviewing the denial of a motion for a new trial should not be to assess the credibility of the witnesses and weight of their testimony. Rather, the function of the appellate court should be to isolate the factual basis for the trial court's ruling to determine whether a reasonable basis existed for that decision.
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Dimick v. Schiedt
Dimick v. Schiedt
Citation. 293 U.S. 474, 55 S.Ct. 296, 79 L.Ed. 603 (1935). Brief Fact Summary. Action brought by Peter Schiedt (Plaintiff) originally in the District Court for the District of Massachusetts to recover damages for personal injuries caused by the alleged negligent operation by David G. Dimick (Defendant) of a motor vehicle upon a highway in Massachusetts. Synopsis of Rule of Law. In the case of an excessive verdict, it is within the power of the trial court to grant Defendant's Motion for a New Trial unless Plaintiff remits the amount deemed to be excessive. However, the trial court is without the power to condition the allowance of Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial upon the refusal of Defendant to consent to an increase in the amount of damage. Facts. After trial in the district court, the jury returned a verdict in the amount of $500. Respondent moved for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict returned was contrary to the weight of the evidence presented at trial and that the damages awarded were insufficient. The district court ordered a new trial on the grounds that the damages awarded were insufficient. However, in its order, the district court allowed Petitioner the option of paying the increased sum of $1,500 in damages and foregoing a new trial. Petitioner agreed to this increase, but Respondent did not consent to this modification and appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed this decision. Issue. Whether the district court could increase, either absolutely or conditionally, an award amount fixed by the verdict of a jury. Whether a new trial should be granted based upon the increased award given by the court following the jury verdict. Held. The decision by the court of appeals reversing the district court is upheld. The action by the district court violated the Plaintiff's Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury when the district court modified the jury's award with the consent of the Defendant only. Dissent. The judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed because the district court has an implied authority to establish the upper and lower limits of any award. Discussion. The court makes a distinction between additur and remittitur. In remittitur, the trial judge offers a plaintiff who has received an excessive jury award the option of reducing the award or submitting to a new trial. Conversely, additur involves the situation in which a defendant is given the option of adding to the amount that the jury has awarded. In essence, the Supreme Court of the United States allows remittitur because the court is not substituting its judgment for that of the jury's. However, the Court will not allow additur because an increase by any court of a jury verdict would be allowing the court to perform both the functions of judge and jury.
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Whitlock v. Jackson
Whitlock v. Jackson
Citation. 754 F. Supp. 1394 (S.D. Ind. 1991). Brief Fact Summary. This is an action brought by Eileen Whitlock (Plaintiff) as the administratrix of the estate of her late brother, Richard Gaisor (Gaisor). Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants, in the course of their arrest of Gaisor inflicted serious injuries, which eventually led to his death. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The principle of waiver, which is found in Rule 49(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, cannot also be found in Rule 49(a). Facts. After trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff in the amount of $29,700.00, after finding the Defendants liable for battery. The Plaintiff now seeks an additur to that amount due to alleged inconsistencies in the jury's answers to special interrogatories. Issue. Did the Plaintiff's failure to object to the alleged inconsistencies in the jury's answers to special interrogatories constitute a waiver, thus preventing review? If no waiver occurred, are there in fact inconsistencies in the special interrogatories, which would require a new trial? Held. Plaintiff has not waived the right to challenge the alleged inconsistencies in the special interrogatories. The jury was given a special verdict form rather than a general verdict form and, as a result, Rule 49(a) applies. Rule 49(a) does not require a party to object to the inconsistencies in order to preserve his right to challenge the inconsistencies in a subsequent motion or on appeal. There are no inconsistencies in the special interrogatories that would require a new trial. There are legitimate reasons why the jury chose to award damages for battery and punitive damages, but not for constitutional violations. Since, the jury's rationale can be reconciled, the court will not conduct a further inquiry. Discussion. Although the Plaintiff did not waive the right to object to any inconsistencies in the special interrogatories, the Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial was denied. The basis for this decision resides in the fact that the jury's answers to the special interrogatories were consistent. As a result, the court would, if it chose to review the decision, be acting as the jury. This double role cannot be assumed by the court.
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People v. Hutchinson
People v. Hutchinson
Citation. 71 Cal.2d 342, 78 Cal.Rptr. 196, 455 P.2d 132 (1969). Brief Fact Summary. Hutchinson (Defendant) was convicted of possession of marijuana for sale. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court committed prejudicial error in refusing to consider a juror affidavit detailing misconduct on the part of the court's bailiff. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Jurors are competent witnesses to prove objective facts to impeach a verdict under Section 1150 of the Evidence Code. Facts. Within the affidavit, the juror certified that on multiple occasions, members of the jury felt rushed by the bailiff into reaching a verdict. The members of the jury were subject to both an angry tone and angry words from the bailiff concerning the length of time the jury was taking to deliberate. The juror also certified that, in his opinion, he agreed to a compromise verdict in order to prevent keeping the jury in deliberations overnight. Issue. Can members of a jury be allowed to impeach their own verdict? Held. The remarks that were made by the bailiff, combined with their tone and delivery constitute statements and conduct that are likely to have influenced the verdict improperly. As a result, the affidavit of the juror is admissible to prove the statements and conduct of the bailiff. Furthermore, the lower court's order denying the Motion for New Trial is vacated. Discussion. The scope of Section 1150 is quite limited. The only improper influences that may be proved under this section to impeach a verdict are those open to sight, hearing, and the other senses, and thus open to corroboration. In this case, because the bailiff's tone and delivery can be found to adhere to these limited categories, the juror affidavit is admissible.
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Pennoyer v. Neff
Pennoyer v. Neff
Citation. 95 U.S. (5 OTTO) 714, 24 L.Ed. 565 (1877). Brief Fact Summary. This case arises from the initial action taken by J.H. Mitchell (Plaintiff) against Pennoyer (Defendant) in Oregon, for the alleged nonpayment of legal fees. A default judgment was entered against Pennoyer, a nonresident of Oregon, after notice by publication. The second action is a suit by Pennoyer (Plaintiff) to recover possession of a tract of land, which Neff (Defendant) acquired under a sheriff's deed, made upon sale of property on execution issued upon a judgment recovered against Pennoyer in the prior action. Synopsis of Rule of Law. A court can enter a valid judgment in personam when jurisdiction has been obtained by personal service of process in the state, no matter how briefly the defendant was present within the state. Facts. After filing the initial suit, Mitchell submitted an affidavit that stated that Neff was a resident of the State of California. As a result of that affidavit, the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Oregon allowed Mitchell to serve notice to Neff by publication once a week for six weeks in a paper of general circulation in Multnomah County, Oregon. After publication, Mitchell's Judgment by Default was entered againt Neff. As a consequence, Pennoyer's land, which was located in Oregon, was sold to Neff at a sheriff's sale. Issue. Whether a state may properly exercise personal jurisdiction over an individual defendant, who is not present or available within the state to be personally served, if that individual defendant owns property within the boundaries of the forum state? Held. No. A state may properly exercise jurisdiction over the property within its borders. However, in this case, the property was foreclosed against in order to satisfy a personal judgment against a nonresident debtor. When the object of an action is to determine the rights of a nonresident debtor in a proceeding in personam, seizure of the property in question does not satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement of notice to the defendant. Discussion. The Supreme Court of the United States distinguishes in personam jurisdiction from in rem jurisdiction. A judgment is in personam when it makes a defendant personally liable. As such, the judgment is personal to the defendant. Alternatively, in rem jurisdiction focuses on property, and the mere physical presence of property within the state allows the court to adjudicate the rights that any individual holds in the property in question, no matter if those individuals are located within, or ever physically come to, the adjudicating state.
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Hess v. Pawloski
Hess v. Pawloski
Citation. 274 U.S. 352, 47 S.Ct. 632, 71 L.Ed. 1091 (1927). Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiff sued Defendant, a resident of Pennsylvania, for injuries that occurred in a car accident in Massachusetts. A Massachusetts statute stated that driving through Massachusetts constitutes implied consent to have the state registrar accept service of process for non-residents, provided a copy of the summons was sent to the defendant. Defendant objected for lack of personal jurisdiction and eventually appealed a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. Synopsis of Rule of Law. States can require that motorists give implied consent to service of process on an agent within the state. Facts. Pawloski (Defendant) is a resident of Pennsylvania. In Massachusetts, Hess (Plaintiff) sued Defendant, alleging that Defendant negligently and wantonly drove on a public highway in Massachusetts. Under the Massachusetts statute, by driving on a Massachusetts highway, a nonresident-motorist designates the state registrar as her lawful attorney who may be served with process in relation to a cause of action arising out of the non-residents use of the highway, provided that notice of such service be sent to the Defendant. The service of process was made in compliance with the statute, but no personal service or attachment of property was made to Defendant. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the statute violated the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The motion to dismiss was denied by the lower court, who stated that statute was valid exercise of police power. There was a subsequent verdict for Plaintiff. D appealed. Issue. For purposes of claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents or collisions on state highways, does a state law that makes driving on state highways implied consent to the appointment of the registrar as one who may be served all lawful processes violate the due process clause of the 14th amendment? Held. No. Judgment affirmed. a. The general rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 714, 24 L.Ed. 565 (1877), is that process cannot run to one state where the person served is domiciled in another other state. Notice sent to the party outside the state is unavailing to give jurisdiction. b. The state has a public interest to protect all those who use its public highways. Since it has the power to regulate its highways, this power extends to nonresidents as well as residents. The relevant statute only confers specific jurisdiction over causes of action arising from use of the highways, and thus does not make hostile discrimination against nonresidents. Implied
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appointment is not substantially different from formal appointment so far as due process is concerned. Discussion. The Courts opinion shows that the states interest in protecting its residents against auto accidents between a resident and a non-resident occurring within the state necessitates the long-arm statute at issue.
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foreseeable that the defendant's business within the forum makes it amenable to suit within that forum. In addition, under the purposeful availment prong, the defendant's minimum contacts with the forum state must arise from non-accidental contact. In addition to the minimum contacts analysis, due process also requires that a reasonable effort be used to notify the defendant of a pending lawsuit so that it has an opportunity to appear and be heard.
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that situation from this case. In this case, Respondents used the automobile as it was meant to be used, and drove it out of the state. Discussion. This case highlights the fact that securing personal jurisdiction over any defendant will be difficult when there are no facts pointing to an effort by the Defendant to purposefully avail itself of the benefits of the laws of the forum state.
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Dissent. There is unfairness in any decision that forces a franchisee to defend an action in the forum state chosen by its franchisor. Furthermore, the only business that was contracted by the Defendant in Florida involved submission of royalty payments. Discussion. The dissent focuses on the fact that the Defendant in this action did not foresee suit being brought against him in Florida. Although Florida was not where any of the substantial business between the parties occurred, the franchise agreement does state that Florida law shall govern when construing the agreement. The majority used this detail to outweigh any inconvenience that Florida as a forum state would carry to the Defendant. The purposeful availment requirement ensures that a defendant will not be brought into a state court as a result of "random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts or from the unilateral activity of another party or a third person." Jurisdiction is proper when the defendant, himself, creates a substantial connection with the state. Since his activities within the state are protected by the forum's laws, then it is proper that he be subject to any litigation in that forum as well.
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Defendant, as noted by the court, was simply too severe to impose minimum contacts in this case. Furthermore, the court focused on the unique burdens that would otherwise be placed on a truly foreign corporation having to defend its actions in a foreign legal system.
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contacts that demonstrate that the defendant expressly aimed its tortious conduct at the forum state.
Facts. Plaintiff Matthew Pavlovich is currently a resident of Texas and the president of Media Driver, LLC, a technology consulting company in Texas. Plaintiff does not reside or work in California. He has never had a place of business, telephone listing, or bank account in California and has never owned property in California. Neither Plaintiff nor his company has solicited any business in California or has any business contacts in California. Plaintiff was the founder and project leader of the LiVid video project (LiVid), which operated a Web site located at "livid.on.openprojects.net." The site consisted of a single page with text and links to other websites. The site only provided information; it did not solicit or transact any business and permitted no interactive exchange of information between its operators and visitors. Consistent with these efforts, LiVid posted the source code of a program named DeCSS on its Web site as early as October 1999. The real party in interest, DVD Copy Control Association, Inc. was the manufacturer of DeCSS. DVD Copy is a nonprofit trade association organized under the laws of the State of Delaware with its principal place of business in California. At the time LiVid posted DeCSS, Plaintiff did not know that the organization manufacturing DeCSS was DVD Copy, or that DVD Copy had its principal place of business in California until after DVD Copy filed this action. In its complaint, DVD Copy alleged that Plaintiff misappropriated its trade secrets by posting the DeCSS program on the LiVid Web site. In response, Plaintiff filed a motion to quash service of process, contending that California lacked jurisdiction over his person. The trial court denied Plaintiffs motion, and this appeal followed. Issue. Whether a state court may exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident whose only connection to the state is an internet posting on the World Wide Web. Held. No. The California Supreme Court ruled that jurisdiction was improper. Courts have identified two ways to establish personal jurisdiction general or specific. When determining whether specific jurisdiction exists, courts consider
the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation. Merely asserting that a defendant knew or should have known that his intentional acts would cause harm in the forum state is not enough to establish jurisdiction. Instead, the plaintiff must also point to contacts that demonstrate that the defendant expressly aimed its tortious conduct at the forum.
Dissent. Baxter, J. dissented. His dissent focused on the fact that by intentionally posting an unlicensed decryption code of DVD Copys product on his website, Plaintiff was not merely aiming his conduct at specific persons or companies, but an entire industry. Thus,
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Judge Baxter felt, because Plaintiff knew that at least two of the industries companies were located in California, his tortuous conduct could be said to be aimed at the forum state.
Discussion. The court only looked to specific jurisdiction because DVD Copy failed to allege any general jurisdiction. In deciding specific jurisdiction lacking, the court relied on its holding that specific jurisdiction requires more than a finding that the harm caused by the defendant's intentional tort is primarily felt within the forum. Thus, by requiring evidence that the defendant expressly aimed its tortuous conduct at the forum, the court is implicitly holding that jurisdiction over a defendant must be both reasonable and foreseeable so that it does not violate substantial notions of justice and fair play.
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Shaffer v. Heitner
Shaffer v. Heitner
Citation. 433 U.S. 186, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2D 683 (1977). Brief Fact Summary. Heitner (Appellee), a nonresident of Delaware, was the owner of one share of stock in the Greyhound Corp., a business incorporation under the laws of Delaware, with its principal place of business in Phoenix, Arizona. On May 22, 1974, Appellee filed a shareholder's derivative suit in the Court of Chancery for New Castle County, Delaware, and named as defendants both Greyhound and twenty-eight present or former directors of either Greyhound Corp. or Greyhound Lines, Inc.(Greyhound), the subsidiary corporation. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Quasi in rem jurisdiction over a defendant cannot be exercised unless that defendant had such minimum contacts with the forum state that in personum jurisdiction could be exercised over him. Facts. Appellee alleged that the individual defendants had violated their duty to Greyhound by causing it and its subsidiary to engage in actions that resulted in the corporations being held liable for substantial damages in a private antitrust suit and for a large fine in a criminal contempt action. All of the activities in these suits took place in Oregon. Simultaneously with his complaint, Appellee filed a Motion for an Order of Sequestration of the Delaware property of the individual defendants, pursuant to Delaware state statute. The sequestration order was signed the day it was filed and, as a result, caused approximately 82,000 shares of Greyhound common stock to be seized. The court held that the stock was located in Delaware, so it was subject to seizure in Delaware. The twenty-one defendants affected by the seizure, filed a Motion to Quash Service of Process and to Vacate the Sequestration Order. They contended that the seizure was a violation of due process, there were not sufficient minimum contacts to sustain Delaware's jurisdiction under International Shoe, and the stocks were not capable of being seized in Delaware. The Court of Chancery denied these motions. The Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed this judgment. Issue. Whether a statute that allows a court of that state to take jurisdiction of a lawsuit by sequestering any property of the defendants that happens to be located within that forum state is constitutional? Held. No. All assertions of state court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the decision in International Shoe and its progeny. Appellants' stocks were not the subject of this litigation, nor were they the subject of an underlying cause of action. Therefore, Appellants' holdings in Greyhound do not provide sufficient contacts with Delaware to support the jurisdiction of that state's courts over them. Appellants' activities do not amount to "purposeful availment," because the Court found that they had nothing to do with Delaware. In addition, they had no reason to believe that they could be sued in Delaware. Appellants were not required to obtain stock in Greyhound in order to maintain their positions in the company, therefore, their holdings do not negate the requirement of minimum contacts with the state, before they can be sued in that state.
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Concurrence. Several concurring opinions were offered in this case. Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion and Justice Stevens wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment. J. Powell: The majority's opinion should not be understood to invalidate quasi in rem jurisdiction where real estate is involved. J. Stevens: The majority opinion should not extend to invalidate the acquisition of jurisdiction over people who receive adequate notice both of the particular controversy and the fact that their local activities might subject them to lawsuit within the forum. Dissent. Justice Brennan wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. J. Brennan: As a general rule, a state forum has jurisdiction to adjudicate a shareholder derivative action centering on the conduct and policies of the directors and officers of a corporation chartered in that state. Discussion. The court bases its findings on the argument that there is no necessary relationship between holding a position as a corporate fiduciary and owning stock or other interests in a corporation. The court states that if Delaware wanted to establish such a policy, it would have done so through the construction of a state statute to that effect.
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Concurrence. Justice White wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Brennan, with whom Justices Marshall, Blackmun and O'Connor joined, wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment (J. Brennan concurrence). Justice Stevens wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment. J. White: Jurisdiction over a non-resident by personal service in the forum state, alone, is so widely accepted that it cannot be invalidated at this time. J. Brennan: He agrees that jurisdiction can be granted through personal service upon a defendant while in the forum. Therefore, J. Brennan can concur in the judgment. However, J. Brennan does not believe that such a rule should remain forever unexamined due to its prior acceptance. J. Stevens: The historical evidence leads to the conclusion that this is a very easy case to decide. Personal jurisdiction based on physical presence in the forum state alone should be upheld. Discussion. This case shows that not all bases for the assertion of in personam jurisdiction must be treated alike and subjected to the "minimum contacts" analysis of International Shoe. The court firmly stands behind the notion that jurisdiction based upon physical presence alone, no matter how short the duration, has been, and will continue to be, a hallmark of the constitutional guarantee of due process.
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This action does not arise out of Defendants contact with the forum state. It must be therefore determined whether Defendants contacts were systematic and continuous. One trip by Defendants Chief Executive Officer is not sufficient in order to confer general personal jurisdiction. Contacts must be continuous and systematic under Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 72 S.Ct. 413, 96 L.Ed. 485 (1952). The checks that Defendant received that were drawn on a Texas bank were not appropriate for consideration. There is no evidence that Defendant requested they be drawn on a Texas bank . The bank on which a check is drawn is up to the discretion of the drawer. The purchasing of helicopters and training in Texas is not a sufficient contact to justify general in personam jurisdiction under Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923), which held that mere purchases are not sufficient contacts. If the purchase not related to the action, or if it cant be proved that it enhanced the nature of Defendants contacts with Texas, it is not sufficient under the test in Rosenberg. Dissent. J. Brennan: Purposeful availment of the benefits of the laws of the forum state is the test used to determine whether or not exercising jurisdiction offends notions of fair play and substantial justice. Because Defendant bought many items from Texas for many years, they did purposefully avail themselves of the benefits of Texas laws. Perkins and Rosenberg can be distinguished from this case. Although the litigation did not arise from Defendants specific contacts with the forum state, it was related to those contacts. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants pilot was negligent in flying and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the decedents deaths. The pilot was trained in Texas; therefore, the action is related to the contacts with the forum state. Discussion. In order to assert general jurisdiction, as opposed to specific jurisdiction over the defendant, the conduct need not be related but must be substantial. In this case, the majority holds that notwithstanding the fact that Defendant had some contact with the forum state, the contacts must be continuous and systematic, i.e., not just numerous.
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difference in substantive law between the two forums, when making its decision regarding forum non conveniens. Discussion. The court used the private vs. public balancing factor test established in Gulf Oil v. Gilbert. In Piper, the court noted that although, with regard to private interests, the evidence regarding design and manufacture of the plane was present in the United States, however in regard to the public interests, all of the witnesses concerning the maintenance of the aircraft, training of the pilot, investigation of the accident were located in Great Britain, all of the witnesses concerning damages were located in Scotland, the real parties in interest and the decedents were citizens of Scotland. Therefore, the public interests, i.e., the overwhelming majority of the connections were to Scotland, not the United States.
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Mas v. Perry
Mas v. Perry
Citation. 489 F.2d 1396 (5th Cir. 1974). Brief Fact Summary. Jean Paul Mas and Judy Mas (Appellees) were married at her home in Jackson, Mississippi. Mr. Mas was a citizen of France, and Ms. Mas was a citizen of the State of Mississippi. This action resulted from discovery by Plaintiffs that the home they rented in Baton Rouge, Louisiana contained two-way mirrors and that Oliver Perry (Appellant), a citizen of Louisville, had watched the couple through the mirrors during the first few months of marriage. A complaint seeking $100,000.00 was filed in district court in Louisiana. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Original jurisdiction is provided by the Constitution in the federal district courts for all actions that are between citizens of different states or citizens of a state and citizens of foreign states, and in which the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000. NOTE: The jurisdictional requirement has now been increased to $75,000. Facts. Before and shortly after the couple was married in Mississippi, they resided in Baton Rouge, Louisiana where they were graduate assistants at Louisiana State University. After their marriage they remained in Baton Rouge for approximately two years. The couple then moved to Park Ridge, Illinois. At the time of trial in this matter, the couple intended to return to Baton Rouge, while Mr. Mas concluded his studies for his Doctorate of Philosophy degree. After that, the couple was not sure where they would reside. At the trial, the jury returned a verdict for the Appellees and awarded $5000.00 to Mr. Mas and $15,000.00 to Ms. Mas. At the close of Appellees' case, Appellant had filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, which was subsequently denied by the district court. Issue. Was the district court correct in dismissing Appellant's Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction based upon diversity of citizenship? Held. Yes. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. Discussion. The power of the district court to entertain the claims of Appellees in this case stands on two separate legs of diversity jurisdiction: a claim by an alien against a state citizen (Mr. Mas vs. Appellant) and an action between citizens of different states (Ms. Mas v. Appellant). This final leg is satisfied because the court found that Ms. Mas is a domiciliary of the State of Mississippi. A person's domicile is the place of "his true, fixed, and permanent home and principal establishment, and to which he has the intention of returning whenever he is absent therefrom." Ms. Mas was only a student in Louisiana, and she lacked the requisite intention to remain there. Furthermore, she did not take any affirmative steps to effect a change in her domiciliary status. Therefore, since Ms. Mas was a domiciliary of Mississippi and the Appellant was a domiciliary of Louisiana, complete diversity existed. In addition to the court finding complete diversity, the court noted that although the Appellees only received $5,000.00 from the district court,
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diversity should not be defeated. The amount in controversy requirement is determined by the amount claimed by the plaintiff in good faith. As a result, federal jurisdiction is not lost because a judgment of less than the jurisdictional amount is awarded.
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Swift v. Tyson
Citation. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 10 L.Ed. 865 (1842). Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiff sued in federal district court in New York to enforce a bill of exchange. The issue in the case became whether the federal court needed to apply New York common law or, whether, the court was free to fashion its own determination of the general principles of the law in this area. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Federal courts exercising jurisdiction predicated upon the ground of diversity of citizenship need not, in matters of general jurisprudence, apply the unwritten law of the state as declared by its highest court. The federal court is free to exercise an independent judgment as to what the common law of the state is, or should be. Facts. Defendant argued that the federal court was required to apply prior New York decisions to the present case. Defendant based his argument on the language behind the Rules of Decision Act. Issue. Are federal courts free, in diversity of citizenship cases, to ignore the common law of the state where the federal court sits? Held. Yes. Federal judges, sitting in diversity actions, are free to ignore the common law of the state where the federal court is located. Furthermore, those federal judges are able to determine exactly the parameters of the common law of that forum state. Discussion. The effect of this ruling is to allow nonresidents of the state where the federal court sits to discriminate against citizens of the forum state. As a result of the decision in this case, plaintiffs were effectively able to "forum shop" between state courts and federal district courts within the same state in order to determine which would be more favorable to their case. This case was overturned by Erie.
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erroneous and reinterpret the words "the laws" to include the decisions of local state courts. Discussion. The Court's decision in Erie effectively overturned the ruling in Swift. Note that Erie only says that the substantive state common law shall apply to diversity actions. However, federal rules and policies shall govern litigation for any procedural issue that arises. Therefore, in any given case, it is possible for a federal court, sitting with diversity jurisdiction, to apply both state and federal law.
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merely procedural and was not intended to be "bound up with the definition of the rights and obligations of the parties." The cases following the decision in Erie state that federal courts should conform to state rules even if it is only a procedural rule, when the application of state rules as opposed to federal rules would substantially alter the outcome of the litigation. However, the Court in Herron v. South Pacific Co., 283 U.S. 91 (1931), stated that the application of state rules may not "alter the essential character or function of the federal court." The Seventh Amendment protection of the right to a jury trial and the prescribed function of the jury is a fundamental right, which should not be governed by state law in federal court. The Court concluded that there was not a strong likelihood that a different result would occur in the application of state law, as opposed to federal law. Therefore, the state rule should not be applied over the federal rule in this case. Discussion. The decision of whether to try a case before a judge or before a jury is less outcome determinative than, as was the decision in Guaranty Trust Co., to completely bar a suit by an applicable statute of limitations. The decision of whether to try a case before a judge or before a jury is so little outcome-determinative that strong countervailing considerations such a federal policy should compel the district court to refuse to follow the applicable state rule. As a result, the court rejected the "outcome-determinative test" and created a "balance of interests test" in which the federal court weighs whether the state or federal judicial system has the greater interest in having its rule applied to the matter.
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Hanna v. Plumer
Hanna v. Plumer
Citation. 380 U.S. 460, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965). Brief Fact Summary. Hanna (Petitioner), a citizen of Ohio, filed a complaint in District Court for the District of Massachusetts, claiming damages in excess of $10,000 for injuries resulting from an auto accident in South Carolina, allegedly caused by the negligence of Louise Plumer Osgood (Osgood), a resident of Massachusetts. Osgood was deceased at the time of filing, so Osgood's executor (Respondent), was named as Defendant in the complaint. Synopsis of Rule of Law. In a diversity action, federal courts are to determine adequacy of service under Rule 4(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Facts. On February 8, 1963, service was made by leaving copies of the summons and complaint with Respondent's wife at his residence in compliance with Rule 4(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondent answered on February 28, 1963, alleging that an action could not be maintained because it was brought in violation of Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 197, Section 9. The district court granted Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. Issue. Whether, in a civil action when the jurisdiction of the district court is based upon diversity of citizenship between the parties, service of process shall be made in the manner prescribed by state law or that set forth in Rule 4(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure? Held. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the decision of the court of appeals. The Court stated that Rule 4(d)(1) was designed to govern service of process in diversity actions. In addition, Rule 4(d)(1) is in harmony with the Rules Enabling Act, since it is largely procedural in nature. The Rules Enabling Act is constitutional, and is the method by which service is to be conducted in federal court. Further, Rule 4(d)(1) applies to the matter before the court because it specifies the allowable method of service in a federal matter. As a result, the rule shall take precedence over any divergent state statute or rule, even if application of the rule will produce a different outcome than had the state rule been followed in the first instance. Concurrence. The majority has oversimplified the decision made in Erie. Justice Harlan stats that Erie is more than a forum-shopping deterrent, and notes that the focus should remain on the "outcome-determinative test." Discussion. The "outcome-determinative test" as established in Guaranty Trust Co., was not meant to serve as a talisman. Further, the court notes that any choice between state and federal law shall not be made by an application of an automatic, "litmus paper" test, but rather by reference to policies underlying the Erie decision. As the Court states, Erie's goals were the deterrence of forum-shopping and the avoidance of inequitable
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administration of the laws. In this case, if it had been governed by the state statute, the case would have ended before it began. Alternatively, since the Petitioner won, the litigation was allowed to proceed forward, with both parties having an opportunity to be heard.
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Enabling Act, and therefore within a constitutional grant of power such as the Necessary and Proper Clause. Hanna and Ragan are distinguishable from each other because in Hanna, Rule 4(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was in direct conflict with the Massachusetts law governing service of process. In Ragan, the state tolling provision was applied and not Rule 3. Rule 3 does not explicitly apply to the tolling of the state statute of limitations. Rule 3 governs the times at which limitations of federal rules begin to run, but does not establish the time at which a state statute of limitations begins to run. The Oklahoma law requiring a suit to commence by service of process is directly linked to the states policy of having the statute of limitations. The statute, therefore, is not in direct conflict with Rule 3. Thus, the Erie doctrine applies. Under the Erie doctrine, the state law must be applied because not applying the state law would allow out-of-state plaintiffs to avoid unfavorable statutes of limitations. Discussion. Under Hanna, a federal procedural rule must directly conflict with the state law dealing with the same issue in order for the federal rule to apply. In this situation, Rule 3 was interpreted not to address the statute of limitations, and thus did not fall into direct conflict with the Oklahoma state tolling provisions.
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J. Stevens: Justice Stevens disagreed on the need to vacate the court of appeal's decision and remand to the district court for it to apply the New York standard. He felt that the appellate court could do so without violating the Seventh Amendment. J. Scalia: The majority's decision contradicts the principle that the proper role of the trial and appellate courts in the federal system in reviewing the size of jury awards is a matter of federal law. Further, Justice Scalia notes that the majority commits the classic Erie mistake of regarding whatever changes the outcome of a case as substantive. Justice Scalia notes that "outcome-determination" was never meant to serve as a "talisman," a principle noted by the court in Hanna v. Plumer. Discussion. This case presents the situation in which a state statute may be both substantive and procedural in nature. In this case, under state law, the standard for granting a new trial was held to be substantive in nature. Alternatively, the requirement that the appellate court consider whether a new trial shall be ordered was found to be procedural in nature. As a result, a federal trial court, faced with such a factual situation, should determine whether a new trial should be ordered, applying the state standard, rather than an appellate court.
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Discussion. This decision is rooted in the fact that if federal law controls then it should be given uniform application through the country. This is essential to effectuate the purpose of federal statutes.
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Discussion. The Court notes that Rule 52(a), and its "clearly erroneous" standard, never actually forbids an independent examination of the entire record. In fact, the court in United States v. Gypsum Co. stated that a finding is "clearly erroneous" when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court after review of all the evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.
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case does not mean that the same transaction is not behind each. So, in the case before the court, it does not matter that one suit alleged a conspiracy with a racial animus and one alleged an antitrust theory. Further, it does not matter that the named defendants were not identical.
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ignoring the traditional rule of res judicata. Further, the concurrence noted that there was a need to discourage the "break-away" litigation that will, allegedly, occur as a result of the majority decision. Discussion. The court noted that they had addressed this same issue in Reed v. Allen. However, the court stated that the present case presented even more compelling reasons for applying res judicata than did Reed. In the present case, the respondents sought to be windfall beneficiaries of an appellate reversal procured by other independent parties who had no interest in the respondents' case. Further, the court noted that in the present case, it was clear that the respondents made a calculated decision to forgo the appellate process.
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Rinehart v. Locke
Rinehart v. Locke
Citation. 454 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1971). Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiff filed an original complaint alleging that an arrest made on November 24, 1964, deprived him of rights secured by the United States Constitution. Plaintiff was arrested after three private detectives (Defendants), observed Plaintiff at an intersection speaking with a man on a motorcycle. Their observations caused a false report to be made to county police that Plaintiff was falsely representing himself as a police officer. As a result of the report, four county police officers (Defendants), arrested Plaintiff for impersonating a government official and charged him with unlawful use of weapons and resisting arrest. Although Plaintiff was initially convicted, the conviction was later reversed on appeal for insufficient evidence. Synopsis of Rule of Law. An order of a district court, which dismisses a complaint for failure to state a claim, but which does not specify that the dismissal is without prejudice, is res judicata as to the then existing claim. Facts. The district court dismissed the 1969 complaint for failure to state a claim based on the absence of probable cause. Plaintiff filed a leave to file an amended complaint, but that motion was denied, without rationale, by the court. Plaintiff did not appeal and, on June 17, 1970, Plaintiff filed a second complaint that included an averment that the arrest was made without probable cause. Issue. Is Plaintiff barred from litigating a claim that is identical to a previously litigated claim, but now includes an averment that arrest was made without probable cause, under the doctrine of res judicata? Held. Plaintiff's claim that it was attempting to make in the first instance, but did not do so, is barred by the doctrine of res judicata because the original order did not contain a clause indicating that the action was dismissed without prejudice. As a result, Plaintiff is barred from relitigating the claim that the arrest was made without probable cause. Discussion. The rule forces individuals, such as the Plaintiff in this case, to persuade the district court to either include a specification that the dismissal is without prejudice or to permit an amendment. The outcome of the case, and the subsequent burden that is placed on individual plaintiffs, can be viewed as quite a strict conclusion to a situation in which the plaintiff's attorney merely failed to allege a lack of probable cause in the initial complaint. This is especially true in light of the fact that Plaintiff had filed a leave to plead that was denied without the court articulating a rationale. Normally, under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.
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The idea of comity between the federal and state court systems allows for policies such as the rule created in the instant case.
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The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not mean that states can give Federal court judgments the same effect they would give their own State court judgments, but must grant them the same effect the Federal court would. Thus Federal common law governs the claim-preclusive effect of a dismissal by a Federal court sitting in diversity.
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year. The Court found that collateral estoppel was not proper in this case, even though the contracts were identical. On this issue of the $4,881.35 royalties paid to his wife in 1937 pursuant to the 1928 contract, the facts, issues, and parties were identical to the earlier proceeding. However, legal principles have changed since the original decision. The Court found that there had been a significant change with the Clifford-Horst line of cases, which would have produced a different result in this case. Therefore, it found that collateral estoppel was not appropriate in this situation. Dissent. Justices Frankfurter and Jackson found that the judgment of the Tax Court was based on substantial evidence and was consistent with the law. Discussion. Subsequent modifications of the significant facts or a change or development in the controlling legal principles may make that determination obsolete, or erroneous, at least for future years. As a result, the "Subsequent Facts Doctrine" applies to prevent disparate treatment to taxpayers of the same tax class.
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Halpern v. Schwartz
Halpern v. Schwartz
Citation. 426 F.2d 102 (2nd Cir. 1970). Brief Fact Summary. Evelyn Halpern (Appellant) appeals from an order of the District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Judge John F. Dooling Jr., which affirmed the order of the referee in bankruptcy. The referee in bankruptcy denied on summary judgment Appellant's discharge because Schwartz's (Appellee) objections to her discharge were concluded by the prior judgment in which she was involuntarily adjudicated bankrupt. Synopsis of Rule of Law. A prior judgment will not foreclose reconsideration of the same issue if that issue was not necessary to the rendering of the prior judgment, and hence was incidental, collateral, or immaterial to that judgment. Facts. Appellee opposed Appellant's discharge from bankruptcy based upon one of the three charges. The Appellee moved for summary judgment denying Appellant a discharge on the ground that there was no defense to the charge, because the issue had previously been concluded in the bankruptcy adjudication and, thus, was res judicata. The referee granted summary judgment for the Appellee and the decision was affirmed on petition to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York for review. Issue. When the prior judgment rested on three independent, alternative grounds, is that judgment conclusive as to the facts that were necessarily found in order to establish only one separate ground? Held. No. When a prior judgment adjudicating one bankrupt rests on two or more independent alternative grounds, it is not conclusive as to the issues in trial of objections to discharge which issues were necessarily found in order to establish only one of those grounds. Since the finding of Appellant's actual intent to hinder and delay her creditors was found in connection with only one of the independent grounds, thus it cannot be given conclusive effect in this litigation. Discussion. The rationale for the court's ruling in this case was twofold. First, the decision on an issue not essential to the prior judgment may not have been afforded careful deliberation and analysis normally applied to essential issues, since a different disposition of the inessential issue would not effect the judgment. Second, the decision on an inessential issue in the prior judgment was not subject to a contested review on appeal. In this case, both of the two considerations were present. First, a finding of transfer while insolvent was sufficient without inquiry into Evelyn's intent. Finally, since there are alternative grounds, which could independently support the prior judgment, vigorous review of an asserted error as to one ground probably would not occur.
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