Snyder V Cedar CT Case Banning PAS

Page 1
2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS 520, *
LEXSEE 2006 CONN. SUPER. LEXIS 520
Cited
As of: Feb 02, 2009
Daniel R. Snyder v. Deborah S. Cedar et al.
NNHCV010454296
SUPERIOR COURT OF CONNECTICUT, JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF NEW

HAVEN, AT NEW HAVEN
2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS 520
February 16, 2006, Decided

February 16, 2006, Filed
NOTICE: [*1] THIS DECISION IS UNREPORTED actually made by the daughter, not the mother. Even if
AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO FURTHER APPELLATE the statements were attributable to the mother, Conn.
REVIEW. COUNSEL IS CAUTIONED TO MAKE AN Gen. Stat. § 17a-101e(b) provided immunity for
INDEPENDENT DETERMINATION OF THE STATUS statements in child abuse reports filed under Conn. Gen.
OF THIS CASE. Stat. § 17a-103. The father showed a statement by the
mother to a family friend that the daughter did not visit
CASE SUMMARY: him anymore due to molestation was defamatory, but the
friend disbelieved the accusation and did not publish it,
so the father's damages were minimal. Finally, the IIED
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff father filed a claim was based on events that occurred more than three
complaint alleging defamation and intentional infliction years before the complaint and was barred by the SOL.
of emotional distress (IIED) against defendants, the
mother and the mother's husband. The mother and OUTCOME: The court found the father proved one
husband asserted special defenses, including that their count of common law slander and one count of slander
allegedly defamatory statements were privileged or were per se against the mother. It awarded a small amount as
statements of opinion. They also alleged a statute of damages for the common law slander and nominal
limitations (SOL) defense to the IIED claim under Conn. damages for the slander per se. The court denied punitive
Gen. Stat. § 52-577. damages or equitable relief. The court found for the
mother and husband on all of the father's other claims.
OVERVIEW: The father's complaint alleged the mother
and husband made specific defamatory statements to
third persons that labelled him a child molester. He also JUDGES: Patty Jenkins Pittman, Judge.
claimed they caused his daughter to fabricate allegations
against him regarding sexual contact, with the intent of OPINION BY: Patty Jenkins Pittman
causing him severe emotional distress. The court found
that many of the challenged statements were privileged OPINION
either by truth or were protected because they were made
in affidavits during court proceedings. Statements in MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
judicial proceedings were protected by an absolute
On April 28, 1997, the defendant Deborah Cedar
privilege. Moreover, statements in a police report were
received a call from a middle school social worker for
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her minor daughter Aviva, indicating that Aviva was in this lawsuit, he was the defendant in certain
troubled by some kind of physical contact between Aviva other lawsuits to which this opinion refers.
and the plaintiff. Daniel Snyder, her father. Cedar
No evidence was offered about the educational
assisted Aviva in making a report to the Branford Police
history of the defendant Deborah Cedar. 2 During the last
Department. Cedar filed paperwork in court for a
fifteen years, it appears that she has worked as a legal
restraining order against the plaintiff Later, upon inquiry
secretary or paralegal, a capacity in which she is now
from others who knew that Aviva was refusing all
employed.
contact with her father, Cedar repeated the general
allegation made by Aviva: that Daniel Snyder had
2 This opinion will refer to this defendant as
sexually molested Aviva.
"Cedar" throughout. Although she is a defendant
The plaintiff denies molesting Aviva. The plaintiff in this lawsuit, she was the plaintiff in certain
has filed this lawsuit as a defamation action against other lawsuits to which this opinion refers. She is
Cedar and Cedar's husband Edwin R. Vincent, Jr. The now known by her married name Deborah
plaintiff's complaint alleges that Cedar and Vincent each Vincent. She was known as Deborah Snyder
made specific defamatory statements to third persons to during her marriage to Daniel Snyder. After her
the effect that Snyder was a child molester. Snyder also divorce from the plaintiff Daniel Snyder, she
claims that [*2] Cedar directed Aviva to fabricate the resumed the use of her birth name Deborah
allegations against him, with the intention of causing him Cedar, and it is under that name that she was sued
to suffer severe emotional distress. in this case. Neither Cedar nor her counsel have
objected to the court referring to her as "Cedar."
The defendants do not deny making certain
statements about what Aviva said. They deny that any [*4] The defendant Edwin R. Vincent, Jr., has been
such statement was defamatory, they deny any conduct employed since 1990 as an officer with the New Haven
that amounts to intentional infliction of emotional Police Department.
distress, and they assert special defenses, including that
Aviva Vincent, 3 formerly Aviva Snyder, is the
of privilege, that they claim insulate them from any
daughter of Snyder and Cedar. Aviva is now 20 years old.
liability.
She has not had any relationship with Snyder since April
For reasons stated herein, the court finds for the 1997. Her estrangement from Snyder is so pronounced
plaintiff and against the defendant Cedar as to one that Aviva changed her last name to Vincent, surname of
specification of defamation contained in Count One and her stepfather. Aviva is not a party to this lawsuit.
in Count Two of the Fifth Amended Complaint, and finds
for the defendants on all other counts and specifications. 3 Although Aviva Vincent is no longer a minor,
so that ordinarily she should be given the
PARTIES
courtesy of reference by her surname, she was
The plaintiff Daniel R. Snyder 1 is 65 years old. He aged ten, eleven, and twelve during most of the
holds a Ph.D in psychology, awarded in 1972. For the events that gave rise to this lawsuit. For that
next twelve years, he was employed at Yale University in reason, this opinion will refer to her as "Aviva"
various capacities. After leaving Yale, Snyder spent his throughout.
time doing consulting work and attempting to develop a
THE COMPLAINT OF THE PLAINTIFF
number of small businesses in the field of intravenous
therapy systems, catheters, adult incontinence devices, Daniel Snyder has filed a complaint in three counts
and surgical tourism. Mostly these businesses foundered against Cedar and Vincent. The operative complaint is
because Snyder found [*3] himself in conflict with his the Fifth Amended Complaint (amending Count Three)
investors, his business partners, his customers, and even filed with leave of the court during trial, over the
his lawyers. Since 1990 by Snyder's own admission, his objection of the defendants.
chief occupation has been in the field of litigation--his
Count One [*5] : This count alleges that both Cedar
own--in order to attempt to straighten out his business
and Vincent made false and defamatory statements about
affairs. In the last fifteen years, the plaintiff has had no
Snyder that caused him to suffer actual injury.
steady source of income. He now relies for support on
his female companion and on a small monthly check Count Two: This count alleges that both Cedar and
from Social Security. Vincent made false and defamatory statements about
Snyder that constitute libel and slander per se, without
1 This decision will refer to the plaintiff as the need for proof of actual injury to Snyder.
"Snyder" throughout. Although he is the plaintiff
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Count Three: This count alleges that Cedar exercised The stipulation signed by the parties on June 8,
influence over the minor child Aviva such that Aviva 1994, was designed to permanently settle the issue of
made false charges of sex abuse against Snyder at custody and visitation. Stated in general terms, the
Cedar's suggestion and direction, constituting the tort of agreement was for joint legal custody, with the child's
intentional infliction of emotional distress. primary residence to be with Cedar. Snyder's visitation
was to be on Tuesday and Thursday afternoons from the
The Special Defenses: Cedar and Vincent allege by
time of school dismissal until 7:30 P.M. Also Aviva was
way of special defense that their statements were
to spend every other weekend, including overnights, at
privileged or that their statements were matters of
the home of her father, and was to spend substantial
opinion rather than statements of fact. Previously they
holiday and vacation time with him. The marriage of the
withdrew a special defense that alleged that the
parties was dissolved on June 10, 1994. Although the
statements were true. The court allowed them to amend
parties continued to have disputes about Aviva's
their special defenses, in response to the filing of the
upbringing, they largely complied with the custody and
Fifth Amended Complaint, to allege that the statute of
visitation schedule set forth in the 1994 agreement until
limitations bars any claim for intentional infliction of
the [*8] time of the events that gave rise to this lawsuit.
emotional distress that arose more than three years
before the commencement of this lawsuit. After the parties separated from one another in 1990,
Cedar met Edwin Vincent, Jr., and began keeping
THE LEGAL [*6] AND CUSTODIAL
company with him. Once Snyder and Cedar were
RELATIONSHIPS
divorced, Cedar and Vincent were married. Prior to
The plaintiff Daniel Snyder and the defendant marrying Cedar, Vincent had been married to Diane
Deborah Cedar were married on January 26, 1985. Their LaPaglia, with whom he had one daughter, Rachel
daughter Aviva was born on October 21, 1985. In July Vincent, who was about a year younger than Aviva.
1990, Cedar instituted an action for a family violence Though Rachel Vincent's custody was with Ms.
restraining order and an action for dissolution of LaPaglia, Rachel spent substantial amounts of visitation
marriage. time in the Cedar/Vincent household before 2000.
All aspects of the divorce 4 were hotly contested, Shortly after New Year's Day 1994, the plaintiff
most particularly the issue of the custody and visitation Daniel Snyder met Susan LaPointe, now known as Susan
of Aviva. Between the time litigation was first instituted Davis, with whom he quickly developed a romantic
by Cedar in July 1990 and the time the parties put in relationship. Beginning in 1994, Snyder and Davis saw
place the first of two stipulations regarding custody each other regularly, frequently spending weekends
almost three years later, each had hired and fired together. They have been living together since 1999.
numerous attorneys, each had filed numerous motions to
THE EMOTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN
find the other party in contempt for one thing or another,
THE PARTIES
and each had engaged in self-representation for a time.
As for Aviva, she had been represented by two different The litigation over the custody of Aviva did not end
court-appointed attorneys, Helen Murphy and Michael with the stipulation and divorce in June 1994, nor with
Perzin, by the time of the second putatively permanent the conclusion of an agreement about certain post-
court order concerning custody on June 8, 1994. judgment financial matters on May 30, 1995. Although
the schedule of Tuesday and Thursday evenings and
4 The parties agreed that this court could take weekend and holiday visits at [*9] her father's home was
judicial notice of the dissolution of marriage file, one to which the parties largely adhered up to the Spring
Deborah Snyder v. Daniel Snyder, D.N. FA 90 of 1997, Snyder had become increasingly dissatisfied
302881, Judicial District of New Haven. with that schedule. According to Snyder, he began to feel
like a "chauffeur" during his visits, because of the need
[*7] As evidence of the intensity and energy that
to drive Aviva--then age 11--to riding lessons and to
went into the battle over Aviva's custody, the court in the
birthday parties and such. Snyder also continued to
dissolution matter reviewed and approved attorneys fees
believe that any defects he perceived in Aviva's
of $ 40,000 for Aviva's lawyers, upon a finding that this
personality were wholly the fault of Cedar's influence.
sum was fair and reasonable for the amount of work her
He determined to remedy this state of affairs by altering
attorneys had done through the summer of 1994. Many
the visitation schedule so that he could spend more time
more hours of attorney time and effort were to be
with Aviva. On August 6, 1996, Snyder had his attorney
expended thereafter on Aviva's behalf in 1996, 1997, and
file a motion to modify the custodial schedule to allow
1998.
Aviva to spend more overnights with Snyder.
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Without regard to the fact that Aviva had finally On April 28, 1997, the school social worker Diane
settled into a predictable and relatively peaceful custodial Palazza, now known as Diane Queen, called Cedar to tell
framework, Snyder decided to try to convince Aviva that her that Aviva was expressing distress over [*12] her
it was in her interests that she spend more time with him. relationship with her father. Cedar at first had no reason
Snyder did not recognize that spending more time with to suspect that Aviva was trying to articulate anything
him in no way appealed to Aviva. other than the continuing distress that Aviva felt over the
overbearing nature of her father. After meeting with
Snyder embarked on a virtual campaign to win over
Palazza, Cedar became more concerned about what it
Aviva to his way of thinking about a change in the
was that Aviva was trying to articulate. Later that same
custodial schedule. He made promises to Aviva and gave
day, Cedar took Aviva to the Branford Police station to
[*10] her unnecessary presents at a time when he could
have Aviva interviewed.
ill afford to do so. He made disparaging comments and
unwelcome jokes about Cedar in Aviva's presence. Aviva was first interviewed by a police officer
Snyder typed a memorandum to Michael Perzin, Aviva's outside the presence of Cedar. Aviva was then asked to
lawyer, about Snyder's preferred overnight schedule for record a statement in the presence of Cedar and two
Aviva, compelled Aviva to sign the memo as her own, members of the Branford police department. In her
and faxed it to the attorney. interview with the police, Aviva described, among other
things, the fact that her father used the bathroom when
Snyder's manipulative nature was not lost on Aviva.
she was showering, that he was able to see into her room
While telling her father that she wanted to spend more
when she was getting dressed, that he washed food and
time with him, Aviva was at the same time telling her
spills off the front of her body in a rough manner, that he
mother, and telling her lawyer, that she did not. 5
walked around the house in his underwear, and that on at
least one occasion when he was undressed he left a door
5 Michael Perzin, Aviva's attorney during the
open in a way that Aviva could see his body. All of this
1990s, testified in this trial. In the best
made Aviva uncomfortable.
professional manner, he declined to testify about
the confidential communications between himself Equally disturbing to Aviva were Snyder's rude
and his young client. The court's finding about comments to Aviva about Cedar and Snyder's use [*13]
Aviva's state of mind is an inference drawn from of petty bribery and guilt to make Aviva conform to his
the totality of the evidence and not from the wishes. Snyder used a number of manipulative
disclosure of any attorney-client confidence. techniques. He threatened to stop paying for her horse
riding activity. He used the promise of favors or gifts,
On April 10, 1997, when Snyder realized that he was
such as allowing her to attend karate or gymnastics, to
making no headway in his battle for [*11] Aviva's
try to convince Aviva to spend additional overnight visits
custody, he verbally attacked Aviva. During what should
at his house. He berated her to tell him the source of any
have been an ordinary, pleasant Thursday afternoon visit
statements she made that seemed to him to be
at his house, Snyder lit into Aviva about her deception,
oppositional. 6 He followed her in his car while she was
accusing her of lying to him, and accusing her of
in the neighborhood and waited near Cedar's home to try
manipulating him. As he turned away from Aviva to
to see Aviva, conduct that Aviva found to be intimidating
attend to a telephone call, Susan Davis, the romantic
and frightening.
companion of Snyder, took up where Snyder had left off,
accusing Aviva of being ungrateful for her father's
6 Presciently, Aviva made the following
largesse, and suggesting that Aviva capitulate to her
statement in the police interview: " . . . he says
father's wishes because of the financial sacrifices he had
things like, you know, 'why is this,' you know,
made on her behalf. Finishing his phone call, Snyder
'who did this,' 'why did you say that--give me the
returned to resume the "conversation" with Aviva, only
reason' and he will not go on unless I answer and
to see her, in tears, pick up her school backpack and
if I say nothing he makes sure I'm not lying and I
leave the house. Since that day, father and daughter have
have to lie sometimes because if I don't, it's
never spoken again.
almost like I get punished for telling the truth and
Snyder's view of this incident is that it was not my mother now has told him before it's almost as
indicative of his true relationship with Aviva and that the if I don't know the difference between a lie and
incident had nothing significant to do with any of the telling the truth because of my father."
events that followed.
[*14] On April 30, 1997, Cedar applied for a
AVIVA'S FIRST ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL family violence restraining order against Snyder in the
MOLESTATION AGAINST SNYDER Superior Court, requesting that Snyder be ordered to stay
Page 5
away from both Cedar and Aviva. In her affidavit in Snyder asserts that, beginning on that day, if not
support of the application, Cedar recounted statements before, Cedar began to coax Aviva into believing that
that Snyder had made to her in the past and asserted that Snyder was a child molester. As evidence of this, he
since April 10, 1997, Snyder had been driving up to points to the admissions of Cedar and Aviva that they
Cedar's house and had been following Cedar and Aviva spent time between April 10 and April 29, 1997, talking
in his car. Cedar stated that Aviva expressed fear that about Aviva's grievances against her father. Snyder
Snyder would try to kidnap Aviva. further points to the testimony of Diane Rotnem for the
proposition that Aviva succumbed to the "Parental
Cedar included the following statement in the
Alienation Syndrome" and the "Sex Abuse In Divorce"
affidavit: "[Diane] Pelazza discussed . . . her concern that
phenomenon, under the Svengali-like sway of Cedar.
she SUSPECTED, but had no evidence, that Aviva has
been sexually abused. Just a suspicion. Ms. Pelazzo did The court finds this theory unconvincing, to say the
indicate that there was, however, much inappropriate least. The evidence to support it in this case is not
behavior occurring." (Caps and alternate spellings in credible. To be sure, parents do sometimes hurl shocking
original.) and untrue allegations at one another in contested family
cases: one parent may even falsely accuse the other of
AVIVA'S LATER ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL
child sex abuse to gain the upper hand in litigation. In
ABUSE AGAINST SNYDER
this case, the court does not find that Cedar coached or
In the Spring of 1998, during her seventh grade year, directed Aviva on what to think or what to say to the
Aviva revealed to a school friend that Snyder had school social worker, to the [*17] police, to the lawyers,
touched Aviva's vagina. The friend urged Aviva to tell or to her father. Rather the court concludes that Aviva's
Cedar, and Aviva did so later that same evening. From statements were Aviva's own.
1998 to the present, Aviva has spoken to various
The question then presents itself: were Aviva's
therapists and medical providers [*15] about her
statements true? The court finds that Snyder did not
perception that her father molested her, although Aviva
sexually molest Aviva. While one could engage in
has disclaimed memory of most of the details. During
speculation about why Aviva made such accusations, and
her freshman year in college, Aviva told a gynecologist
why Aviva continues to claim that she has memories of
that she could not recall if she had been "penetrated,"
Snyder's inappropriate intimacies, the court declines to
although Aviva has testified under oath that she
do so. For purposes of this defamation case, the court
remembers one occasion in which her father put his
must determine from all of the evidence whether Snyder
finger in her vagina. Aviva denies the ability to recall if
did or did not molest Aviva. The court determines that he
there were any further instances of genital contact by
did not.
Snyder than the one instance of which she has a vague
memory. THE POST-JUDGMENT CUSTODY
PROCEEDINGS
The court finds that it was not until 1998 that Aviva
made a definite statement to Cedar that Snyder had On April 9, 1997, the day after Aviva missed an
molested her. Before that time, the subject of Aviva's after-school visit with Snyder, Cedar's attorney filed a
statements had been about how Snyder looked at her and Motion to Suspend Visitation, alleging that Snyder's
touched her in an inappropriate sexual way, without any conduct was having a detrimental impact on Aviva's
actual allegation that he had touched her genitals. emotional well-being. Nonetheless, Aviva went to visit
her father the next day, April 10, which was the day that
THE SOURCE OF THE ALLEGATIONS OF
Aviva left Snyder's house, never to return. On April 24,
SEXUAL ABUSE
1997, Cedar's attorney filed a Motion for Sole Custody.
Snyder has alleged and has sought to prove that Before any action could be taken on either of these
Aviva's allegations of sexual abuse did not in fact motions, Cedar filed her application for a restraining
originate with Aviva. Snyder's theory is that Cedar, filled order on April 30, 1997.
with antipathy toward him and willing to use whatever
[*18] The court did not enter any ex parte orders on
weapons existed in her arsenal, decided to convince
Cedar's application. Rather, the court (Alander, J.) set the
Aviva that Aviva had been sexually abused by Snyder.
matter down for a hearing on May 14, 1997. Between the
Moreover, [*16] Snyder asserts that Cedar saw the
date of the application and the date of the hearing, the
argument between Snyder and Aviva of April 10, 1997,
Branford Police Department, the Connecticut
"as an opportunity to turn her child against Dr. Snyder
Department of Children and Families, and the Yale Sex
once and for all." Plaintiff's Post-Trial Brief, p. 2.
Abuse Clinic all undertook some kind of evaluation of
the claims made in the application, and all concluded that
Page 6
no further action was warranted. It is unclear whether might recommend that Cedar be granted sole custody of
any of these agencies conducted further interviews of Aviva.
Aviva or whether the determinations were made solely
Snyder described himself as hurt and desperate
on the basis of Aviva's previous statements to the police.
during this initial estrangement from Aviva. No doubt
On May 14, 1997, Snyder and Cedar attended court that was true. But rather than allowing Aviva to get the
with their lawyers. Along with Aviva's lawyer, they therapy she needed to work through her conflicted
agreed that Cedar would withdraw her restraining order feelings, and rather than allowing the lawyers and
application. They also agreed that there would be no forensic evaluator to set the case up for [*21] a
contact between Aviva and her father until the next court relatively prompt judicial determination about custody
date on June 11, 1997, at which point all pending and visitation, Snyder compounded the already troubled
motions would be reviewed. As part of the May 1997 family dynamics and complex dispute resolution process
agreement, the parties agreed that Aviva would enter by refusing to pay the privately-retained evaluator, 7 by
therapy at Clifford Beers Child Guidance Clinic. filing a formal lawyer-grievance against the guardian ad
litem who had been appointed for Aviva, by firing his
While a reasonable person could certainly have
own lawyer, and by filing a motion to "quash" the
questioned whether Aviva had [*19] been sexually
custody evaluation on the grounds that the psychiatrist
abused by Snyder, no one could seriously doubt that
performing the evaluation had conducted it in an
there was grave trouble in the relationship between father
unprofessional manner.
and daughter. Aviva had previously declined to go on a
visit with Snyder on April 8, and then had seen her father
7 The intensity of Snyder's distrust and vitriol
watching the house, which made Aviva fearful and angry.
toward Joseph D. Saccio, M.D., the specialist in
Aviva had run away from her father's home after the ugly
child psychiatry who was conducting the forensic
argument of April 10, had refused any contact with him
evaluation of the family for the custody litigation,
since, and had caused sufficient concern to her school
is particularly tragic. Snyder seems to have
social worker that the social worker had involved the
become obsessed with two issues regarding Dr.
child's mother. Snyder continued to deny that there was
Saccio: first, that the cost of the evaluation was
any difficulty in his relationship with Aviva. Rather, he
greater than had first been estimated, and second,
developed the theory that all of this was Cedar's fault.
that Saccio had not undertaken to reinstitute
Snyder decided to fight back. He adopted an aggressive
contact between Snyder and Aviva (although, of
litigation strategy and, as part of that, proceeded to resist
course, that was not at all Saccio's role). As to the
any idea that seemed to him to have Cedar's
first, Snyder clearly had the means to borrow the
endorsement, no matter how reasonable or benign.
cash necessary to pay Saccio for the crucial
First he had his attorney file an opposing Motion for completion of the evaluation, but Snyder stood on
Sole Custody on May 30, 1997. Next, he began to principle that he should not advance any more
withhold his cooperation in the dispute resolution money to see the report finished unless Cedar did
process. For example, when the Clifford Beers Clinic likewise. As to the second, Snyder became
decided to do its own investigation of the allegation of infuriated when he received a copy of a letter
sex abuse, through its child sex abuse [*20] treatment from Saccio to Atty. Michael Perzin, Aviva's
team (which would presumably have concluded, as had attorney in the custody case, detailing the need
others, that treating the child for intrafamilial sex abuse for an additional payment, due to the complexity
was the wrong focus for this family) Snyder refused to and volume of work involved in the evaluation.
abide by the agreement to cooperate with the Clifford Had Snyder read the letter, Exhibit 35, carefully,
Beers referral and demanded that Aviva be seen Snyder would have realized that Saccio was
elsewhere. When Cedar acceded to this wish and set considering "two additional interviews with
Aviva up with a different therapist, Snyder objected that Aviva with each of her parents," the very
the initial therapy plan for Aviva did not include inviting breakthrough for which Snyder had been hoping
Snyder himself into Aviva's sessions. After a court order all along. By the time Snyder was finally
on June 11, 1997, (entered by agreement) that a child compelled by the court to resume making
psychiatrist undertake a forensic evaluation of the family payments for Saccio's evaluation, months had
for the purpose of providing an opinion to the court of passed and Saccio completed the family
what custodial and visitation arrangement would best interviews without seeing father and daughter
meet Aviva's needs, Snyder stopped cooperating with the together.
forensic study when he got wind that the psychiatrist
[*22] When these and other aggressive and
destructive tactics on Snyder's part prolonged the
Page 7
resolution of the rift between Snyder and Aviva, Snyder's testified that in her expert opinion Aviva currently
only way of explaining his predicament to himself was displays all of the characteristics of a severe victim of
that a conspiracy was afoot. The chief architect of the "parental alienation syndrome." Rotnem explained that
campaign against him was Cedar, whom he perceived as this syndrome occurs when a parent known as the
having plotted all along to alienate Aviva from him. "obsessed alienator" undertakes actions designed to
influence a child to reject the "targeted parent" with the
For example, Snyder testified in this trial that prior
goal of creating a complete alienation of the child from
to April 1997, Cedar had habitually interfered with the
the targeted parent. One aspect of this syndrome that is
visitation schedule in an attempt to alienate him from
sometimes seen, according to Rotnem, is an allegation by
Aviva. But the court finds that the visitation schedule
one parent that the other parent has sexually abused the
was followed by both parents in the years from 1994 to
child, known by the handy acronym "SAID"
1997, with only occasional disputes between the parties
(presumably "Sexual Abuse In Divorce").
about adjusting the days and times of the schedule.
Snyder testified that Cedar suffered from severe Rotnem initially testified that "parental alienation
pathology and that only if Aviva were wrested away from syndrome" is well-recognized by mental health
Cedar would Aviva be able to truly express herself. But professionals and has been studied and written about
in the summer of 1997, only months after Aviva stopped most particularly by Dr. Richard [*25] A. Gardner who
visiting Snyder, Aviva would write her father a letter first described the syndrome. In Gardner's description of
from summer camp--a site away from whatever the syndrome, there are ten or eleven criteria which
immediate influence Snyder suspected Cedar of define the phenomenon. These criteria can be identified
exercising over Aviva--stating her feelings about the by an evaluator, presumably upon taking a history of the
situation and her wish for the end of [*23] the conflict. family and conducting clinical interviews of the various
family members. Rotnem testified that Aviva--the
More pertinent to this defamation case, Snyder
"victim"--exhibited all of the classic characteristics of an
believes that Cedar engaged in an ongoing assault on
"alienated child," notwithstanding that Rotnem had not
Snyder's reputation by broadcasting the rumor that he
interviewed anyone other than Snyder himself about the
was a child molester. But after the May 14, 1997,
situation nor even laid eyes on Aviva since 1992. 8
agreement to withdraw the restraining order application,
Cedar refrained from making any further statement on
8 When Rotnem was asked to specify the source
the topic of whether Snyder had or had not engaged in
of the information that formed the basis of her
inappropriate sexual behavior with Aviva to anyone
opinion that Aviva met each of the criteria for
involved in the custody case. In fact, it was not until after
parental alienation syndrome, Rotnem admitted
Aviva told Cedar in 1998 that Snyder had touched
that virtually all of the information on which she
Aviva's vagina that Cedar made any further statement on
based her opinion came to her not through any
that subject to any third party. Snyder remains convinced
clinical impressions to which she was privy but
that Cedar put words in Aviva's mouth concerning the
rather through Daniel Snyder's characterizations
allegations about Snyder's intimate viewing and touching
to Rotnem of the family's rocky course during the
of Aviva, and he has so alleged in this lawsuit. But this
intervening years since Rotnem last saw Aviva.
court finds that Cedar did not do so.
[*26] There is insufficient evidence that the
When Snyder found it impossible to schedule the
description offered by Rotnem of "parental alienation
trial of the custody and visitation case because of the
syndrome" has any scientific basis. There is no credible
roadblocks he himself had created to its resolution, he
evidence that this syndrome has been the subject of any
eventually dropped efforts to do so. On December 15,
scientific studies published with approval in peer-
1998, Snyder filed a withdrawal of his motion for sole
reviewed scientific literature. Rather, to the extent that
custody. Snyder continued to feel wronged by what he
there have been longitudinal studies of children of "high-
saw as Cedar's [*24] attempt to turn Aviva against him.
conflict" divorces in peer-reviewed literature, Rotnem
His focus on Cedar, rather than on his own relationship
admits that none of these studies uses the colorful,
with Aviva, was fueled by the enlistment of an unlikely
pejorative language such as "obsessed alienator" and
ally.
"targeted parent," that Gardner uses in his many
THE ROLE OF DIANE ROTNEM published works. In fact, there appears to be an absence
of empirical research that reliably identifies a cause for
One of Snyder's witnesses was Diane Rotnem,
the behavior of a pre-adolescent child who decides to
Ph.D., a licensed clinical social worker who provided
reject contact with a parent. The prevailing opinion in the
psychotherapy to Aviva that began when Aviva was 4 1/2
field, as Rotnem herself admitted when pressed, is that
and ended in January 1992 when Aviva was 7. Rotnem
such empirical studies are unlikely ever to result in a
Page 8
reliable means of identifying such a "syndrome" or its 739 (1997). Rotnem's opinion that Cedar caused Aviva to
causes. Rotnem agrees that there are likely to be multiple suffer from "parental alienation syndrome" and thus
factors that contribute to the estrangement of a child caused Aviva to accuse her father of molesting her is not
from a parent, and that the motives and conduct of the competent evidence under State v. Porter, and as such it
parent with whom the child becomes aligned is only is inadmissable.
[*27] one of them.
Even if our rules of evidence and procedure
Indeed, as it became clear on re-cross examination, permitted the admissibility of Rotnem's opinion,
Rotnem appears to have only a vague familiarity with Rotnem's testimony is entitled to no weight whatsoever
how empirical studies in social or psychological fields for a reason more troubling than a mere lack of expert
are designed and for what types of variables such a study foundation. Rotnem appears to be so emotionally caught
must control in order to have any scientific validity, up in Snyder's narrative of this family's troubles that
much less the kind of validity that would result in its Rotnem's testimony is totally lacking in objectivity.
acceptance within the research or clinical community
The sad and surprising fact is that Rotnem has
referenced by that study.
allowed herself to be retained by her former patient's
Early in her testimony Rotnem stated her opinion to father in this lawsuit for money damages against her
a reasonable degree of scientific certainty within the former patient's mother without the knowledge or
profession of clinical social work that Aviva suffers from consent of her patient who is now an adult. Rotnem's
parental alienation syndrome. The purpose of such agreement to act as an expert witness for the father
testimony was evidently to convince the court that Cedar against the mother was evidently undertaken without any
was capable of, and actually succeeded in, causing Aviva attempt to secure consent or approval from Aviva. Even
to reject contact with Snyder, that is, that such rejection if this professionally dubious arrangement does not
was not due to any fault of Snyder and was not due to amount to [*30] a violation of the ethics rules that apply
Aviva acting on her own. In Rotnem's expert opinion, to social workers (there is no evidence that it is a
Cedar's manipulation of Aviva explained why Aviva violation), it certainly is sufficient to undermine the force
accused her father of molesting her, a charge that of Rotnem's testimony.
Rotnem did not believe was true, apparently based on her
Rotnem's credibility is further eroded by her
personal opinion that Snyder would not have done such a
evasiveness about the number and nature of contacts
thing. But Rotnem's answers to questions about her
between herself and Snyder in the years since her therapy
"scientific certainty" [*28] make clear that Rotnem's
with Aviva ceased. At first, Rotnem denied that she had
opinion, far from being held to any degree of certainty,
had any substantial communication with Snyder after
scientific or otherwise, is both subjective and fluid and is
1992. Then on cross examination Rotnem admitted that
based on no more than Rotnem's individual human
she had regular telephone and face-to-face "consultation
observations and conclusions having nothing to do with
sessions" with Snyder to provide him with emotional
her proffered expertise. While an experienced clinical
support when he was locked in post-dissolution litigation
social worker may be able to understand and interpret
struggles with Cedar over Aviva in 1997 and later. The
complex human behavior, it does not necessarily follow
correspondence and notes introduced as exhibits make it
that the social worker can offer her conclusions in court
clear that Rotnem and Snyder were frequently in touch in
under the guise of expert testimony when those views
the period after Aviva stopped visiting with Snyder.
lack any scientific foundation.
During the important phases of the post-dissolution
The court finds that "parental alienation syndrome" custody litigation in 1997 and 1998 when the events of
has no scientific validity at this time. There is no credible which Snyder complains were occurring, Rotnem
evidence that "parental alienation syndrome" as defined regularly provided Snyder with ideas about how to
or described by Rotnem, or that the "SAID" approach the child custody litigation in which he, Cedar,
phenomenon, has been recognized within any of the and Aviva were all involved.
mental health professions. Most importantly, in reference
Snyder was sometimes in [*31] touch with Rotnem
to our current case law, the diagnosis of parental
on a daily basis, sending her materials and soliciting her
alienation syndrome and the identification of the
comments. One of Snyder's purposes in regularly
perpetrator of such an affliction lacks any
sending to Rotnem copies of the letters and memos,
methodological underpinning. When the methodology
some of which are exhibits in this case, was to attempt to
underlying proferred evidence is sufficiently invalid to
enlist Rotnem to intercede on Snyder's behalf with the
render the evidence incapable of helping the fact finder
neutral custody evaluator, Dr. Saccio, with Aviva's
determine a fact [*29] in dispute, such evidence is
attorney Michael Perzin, and with the court-appointed
inadmissable. State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57, 89, 698 A.2d
guardian ad litem Marianne Charles. The contacts
Page 9
proposed by Snyder were not just that Rotnem respond to Snyder's intentions without comment in her notes and
professional inquiries from these individuals about continued to cooperate with Snyder and his litigation
Rotnem's prior involvement with Aviva, to the extent that team as though Snyder's covert behavior towards Aviva
the parties consented to the release of such information was completely benign. 9
and to the extent Rotnem's role as the child's therapist
permitted. Snyder also convinced Rotnem to initiate 9 By continuing to accept such a role and
discussions with these individuals to plead Snyder's continuing to offer emotional and litigation
cause. support to Snyder during the custody battle and
up to the present, Rotnem implicitly violated the
Indeed in one letter to Rotnem, Snyder proposes that
trust of her former patient. Whatever Aviva's role
Rotnem "convince Dr. Saccio to participate in a strategy
in the accusations made against Snyder--whether
designed to bring Deborah (Cedar) to the table . . ." The
Aviva was lying or was mistaken or was actively
strategy would be for Rotnem to convince Saccio to
misled by Cedar--Aviva is still a former patient of
falsely claim that Saccio's custody evaluation was about
Rotnem. In advising and counseling Snyder,
to result in a recommendation of sole custody to Snyder,
Rotnem was doing much more than "leaving the
as a way of persuading Cedar [*32] to capitulate and
door open" to assist a parent in addressing the
agree to joint custody. Rotnem denies having made such
needs of a troubled child. Rotnem abandoned her
an overture to Dr. Saccio; but neither did Rotnem repel
alliance to her patient and enlisted in the cause of
such requests from Snyder and advise him that such
her patient's father.
entreaties to her were inappropriate. Not only did
Rotnem continue to accept such correspondence from [*34] Regardless of any past association with the
Snyder, but she always took his phone calls and child, the long-standing, supportive bond between
responded to his requests for advice. Eventually Rotnem Snyder and Rotnem appears to have irreparably skewed
allowed herself to become fully involved behind the Rotnem's professional objectivity. She has become the
scenes of the custody litigation as a kind of shadow worst kind of "hired gun" expert witness. The evidence
attorney for Snyder. Rotnem has offered on behalf of Snyder on all topics in
this case is entirely unworthy of belief.
While Rotnem denies participating in Snyder's
scheme to manipulate Cedar through Dr. Saccio, it is THE LAW OF DEFAMATION
clear through Rotnem's own testimony and through
"Defamation is comprised of the torts of libel and
copies of her correspondence with Snyder that Rotnem
slander. Defamation is that which tends to injure
actually 1) strategized with Snyder about how to
reputation . . ." DeVito v. Schwartz, 66 Conn.App. 228,
influence the progress of the custody litigation, 2)
234, 784 A.2d 376 (2001), citing W. Prosser & W.
assisted Snyder in formulating meeting agendas with
Keeton, Torts, (5th Ed. 1984), p. 773. To find the
lawyers and other participants in the litigation, 3)
defendants liable for defamation, the court must find that
coordinated the scheduling of one or more meetings with
the defendants "published false statements that harmed
the lawyers involved in the litigation, and 4) led the
the [plaintiff] and that the defendants were not privileged
discussion in at least one such meeting in order to
to do so." Kelley v. Bonney, 221 Conn. 549, 563, 606
advocate Snyder's position about gaining custody of
A.2d 693 (1992).
Aviva.
Certain categories of defamation are deemed
Rotnem's allegiance to Snyder is so close as to be
actionable per se, that is, without evidence of actual
unsettling. [*33] In 1999, after the custody litigation
injury. They are ones in which the defamatory meaning
had died down, and there was no reason for any further
of the speech is apparent on the face of the statement.
contact between Rotnem and Snyder except to settle
Battista v. United Illuminating Co., 10 Conn.App. 486,
Rotnem's bill for services, Rotnem wrote a note to
491-92, 523 A.2d 1356, [*35] cert. denied, 204 Conn.
Snyder that included the following sentiments: "My heart
802, 525 A.2d 1352 (1987). An accusation that one has
breaks for you . . . Meanwhile, you're a good man Dan,
engaged in criminal behavior which involves moral
and you deserve to be happy and to find some peace in
turpitude constitutes defamation per se. Id., 493. An
your life." More recently when Rotnem met with Snyder
accusation that one has sexually molested one's child is
in 2005 to be recruited as a witness in this lawsuit,
therefore defamatory. The defendants do not contest that
Rotnem learned that Snyder had hired a private
a false accusation of child molestation is actionable per
investigator to gather personal information about Aviva,
se.
who is now in college. Rather than become disturbed or
alarmed by whatever Snyder's purpose toward Rotnem's The burden is on the defendants to specially plead
former patient was, Rotnem seems to have recorded and to prove matters in defense or in avoidance of the
Page 10
cause of action alleged in the complaint. The defendants false. Daley v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 249 Conn.
have pleaded the defense of privilege to the defamation 766, 795, 734 A.2d 112 (1999).
counts and have pleaded the statute of limitations as a
THE DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS OF CEDAR
defense to the intentional infliction of emotional distress
count. In Count One and Count Two of the Fifth Amended
Complaint, there are five sets of defamatory statements
The defendants initially filed a special defense of
allegedly made by Cedar and two sets allegedly [*38]
truth, but they withdrew that special defense without
made by Vincent. The allegations are listed below,
objection prior to trial. Under the common law, truth is
followed by the court's findings about each statement in
an affirmative defense to defamation. Cweklinsky v.
context, and by an analysis of the applicable law.
Mobil Chemical Co., 267 Conn. 210, 228-29, 837 A.2d
759 (2004). That is, at common law, although falsity was
P8.a. On April 30, 1997, Cedar filed an
an element of a cause of action for defamation, once a
Application for Relief from Abuse in the
statement was shown to be defamatory, falsity was
Superior Court that contained the
presumed. Restatement, Second, Torts §§ 581A [*36] ,
following false statements:
613(2) (1977); Prosser, Torts § 116 (4th Ed. 1971).
Although cases that involve public comment on public 1. My ex-husband stalked me and my
figures, such as New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 10 make daughter on April 8, 1997. He has a
clear that the burden of establishing falsity rests on the history dating back to 1991 of this
plaintiff when the "actual malice" standard applies, there behavior.
is no indication in these cases that the common-law rule
2. Diane Pelazza telephoned me . . .
has been altered for defamation by a private party of a
while [Aviva] was in her office, requested
non-public figure. Accordingly the falsity of the
I come right in to speak with her. [Aviva]
defamatory statements is presumed. 11
has been visiting her office frequently, 2,
3, times per week for some time, at least
10 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686
since December of 1996 . . .
(1964).
11 Though the defendants withdrew their special 3. In addition, her concern that she
defense of truth, the court nonetheless considered SUSPECTED, but had no evidence, that
in the alternative whether, had it been specially [Aviva] has been sexually abused.
pleaded, the defendants would have carried their
burden to prove that Snyder molested Aviva. The 4. He has threatened me repeatedly
court has determined that it has not been proved; over the years . . .
so that whether falsity is presumed or not, the 5. Dan [Snyder] has told me I am
court finds that the accusation is false. going to have a blood-bath.
The defendants have asserted the defense of 6. [Snyder's son by a prior marriage]
privilege: that some or all [*37] of the statements were is concerned about our safety as well
made in a context for which the law provides immunity because he has been victimized by his
from liability. The effect of an absolute privilege in a father as well and has warned us to be
defamation action is that damages cannot be recovered careful.
for a defamatory statement even if it is published falsely
and maliciously. Kelley v. Bonney, supra, 565. The law 7. . . . of a long history with Dan
recognizes an absolute privilege for communications [Snyder] of verbal threats, verbal [*39]
uttered or published in the course of judicial proceedings. abuse, the fact that he has taken off with
Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243, 245-46, 510 A.2d 1337 [Aviva] before, was arrested in 1990 for
(1986). Other statements may be covered by a violating a restraining order . . .
conditional privilege. Miles v. Perry, 11 Conn.App. 584,
529 A.2d 199 (1987).
The defendants have also asserted as a defense that Each of the above statements was in fact made by
Vincent's statements were not statements of fact but Cedar in the affidavit in support of her Application for
rather statements of opinion. In order for a statement to Restraining Order dated April 29, 1997, contained in the
be defamatory, it must be understood to convey an Superior Court file of which the court has taken judicial
objective fact, reasonably capable of being proved true or notice. The focus of the evidence in this case has been
the statement in paragraph 8.a.3 above, although the
other statements provide relevant context.
Page 11
As to # 1, above, Aviva missed a visit with Snyder commiserated with Cedar or Aviva, expressed concern
on April 8, 1997 (the visitation day immediately for their safety, and warned them to be careful of Snyder.
preceding the blow-up between Snyder and Aviva).
Regarding # 7, the court finds it to be true that
Either Cedar or Aviva had called Snyder to say that
Snyder was arrested, though it was in 1990 rather than in
Aviva was feeling ill and was staying home from school
1991, for violating a restraining order that Cedar had
and would not be coming to Snyder's house for the
obtained against him. In the face of a prohibition against
visitation as a result. Snyder drove over to Cedar's house
going to Cedar's place of work, Snyder went to her place
and attempted from his car to observe who might be at
of work. [*42] Even during this trial Snyder sought to
Cedar's house. He concluded that Aviva's grandmother
justify and minimize this incident apparently still not
was at the house, that Aviva must have been staying
appreciating the seriousness of violating a family
home to visit with the grandmother, that Aviva was not in
violence restraining order. Also, on occasion, Snyder
fact ill, and that Cedar must have lied to him about the
picked up Aviva for visits when he was not supposed to,
reason for Aviva's failure to attend the visitation with
and he sometimes failed to return Aviva at the agreed-
Snyder [*40] that day. The word "stalked" is likely the
upon time at the end of a scheduled visit. As previously
word or innuendo with which Snyder takes issue in this
noted, there were angry exchanges between Cedar and
statement.
Snyder--verbal threats, though not of bodily harm. Both
Stalking has both a legal meaning and an ordinary engaged in "verbal abuse" of the other.
non-legal one. Under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-181d,
Even if every statement in Cedar's Application and
stalking is characterized by a person wilfully and
Affidavit of April 30, 1997, were false and defamatory
repeatedly following or lying in wait for another and
however, the entire written affidavit is covered by the
intending to cause and actually causing the other to
absolute privilege for statements made during court
reasonably fear for her physical safety. In ordinary usage,
proceedings. Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243, 251-52, 510
to stalk means to pursue, to shadow, to skulk, to move
A.2d 1337 (1986). The Special Defense of privilege
stealthily, or, even more benignly, to travel on foot. On
applies and Cedar cannot be liable for any statement in
April 8, Snyder did in fact position himself outside of
the application and affidavit that was filed in court.
Cedar's house to do reconnaissance.
Regarding # 2 above, Aviva had been meeting 8.c. On or about April 29, 1997, Cedar made a false
regularly with Diane Pelazza for some months and it is report to the Branford Police Department that the (sic)
true that Pelazza called Cedar to arrange for an urgent Aviva had been sexually abused by Dr. Snyder.
meeting.
Cedar made no such report. Rather it was Aviva who
Regarding # 3 above, despite Pelazza's lack of made the report and [*43] whom the police interviewed.
memory of the exact substance of her conversation with Aviva made a series of statements, which were somewhat
Cedar, the court finds that Pelazza was indeed concerned vague and which were insufficient to support further
about whether there was more to Aviva's distress about investigation or action regarding sexual abuse at that
her father than Aviva was currently sharing. The court time. Cedar brought her daughter to the Branford Police
finds it more likely than not that Cedar's account of Department when Cedar became aware of Aviva's
Pelazza's statement--that Pelazza told Cedar that [*41] statements to Diane Palazza. But Cedar, who had no
Pelazza suspected but had no evidence that there may first-hand knowledge about whether Snyder had or had
have been sexual abuse--is accurately rendered by Cedar. not molested Aviva, did not make this report. Especially
reviewing the transcript of Aviva's recorded statement,
As for # 4 and 5 above, the court has no difficulty
Exhibit 9, and the entire police report of that evening, 12
believing that hyperbole was utilized by both parents
Exhibit 10, the court finds no defamatory statement by
throughout their entanglement with one another.
Cedar as alleged in this paragraph.
Although the court does not find that Snyder ever
intended to physically harm either Cedar or Aviva, he did
12 Detective Anthony Morro, who interviewed
make threats about how he would triumph in court and
Aviva for her recorded statement, and who then
the like, and more likely than not used a term such as
prepared a report of the incident, seems to have
"blood-bath" to explain his seriousness of purpose.
accurately assessed the family dynamics. "Aviva
Regarding # 6 above, Snyder admitted that he was feels that the touching (by) her father is sexually
estranged from his two grown sons for a period of time wrong, but . . . there were no incidents that could
during the 1990s. There was occasional cordial contact be documented in which a direct contact was
between these young men and their half-sister Aviva. The made to Aviva by her father in areas that were
court credits the evidence that one of Snyder's sons private," wrote Morro. He concluded his report
Page 12
by saying, "It appears, at this time, that Mr.

Snyder is possibly trying to get more control over
his daughter and that she (Aviva) is reluctant to
Diane LaPaglia was the former wife of Edwin
become a pawn in this relationship between him
Vincent, Jr. Vincent and LaPaglia were the parents of
and (Cedar)."
Rachel Vincent who was about a year younger than
[*44] Nonetheless, were the court to find to the Aviva. Rachel visited at the Vincent/Cedar home often.
contrary, the question of privilege again arises. Conn. LaPaglia was having great difficulty raising [*46]
Gen. Stat. § 17a-103 provides that any person who has Rachel. In 1999, Vincent and LaPaglia were engaged in
"reasonable cause to suspect or believe that any child discussions about whether it would be in everyone's best
under the age of eighteen is in danger of being abused, or interests to have Rachel move from LaPaglia's home to
has been abused . . . may cause a written or oral report to the Vincent/Cedar home.
be made to . . . a law enforcement agency." Conn. Gen.
One concern of LaPaglia was her knowledge that
Stat. § 17a-101e(b) provides immunity to any person
Aviva did not have contact with her father. LaPaglia was
who, in good faith, makes a report pursuant to section
aware that there had been no such contact for some
17a-103. The statute is not limited to mandated reporters,
years. LaPaglia feared that this was the result of some
but is broad enough to cover one parent's report of
kind of parenting decision in the Cedar household, and
another parent. The court finds that Cedar acted in good
that if LaPaglia ceded custody of Rachel to Edwin
faith in facilitating Aviva's interview and report to the
Vincent, LaPaglia could expect to be shut out of Rachel's
Branford police. Even if Cedar herself had made the
life just as Snyder seemed to be shut out of Aviva's.
report instead of Aviva, the defense of privilege under
this statute has been proved. One day in December of 1999, LaPaglia called to
speak to Rachel, and Aviva answered the phone. What
P8.d. On or about April 8, 1997, Cedar LaPaglia said to Aviva on the phone caused Aviva to
made a false statement to the Branford become upset, a fact observed by Cedar. Cedar took the
Police Department that Dr. Snyder had phone from Aviva. LaPaglia identified herself to Cedar
stalked her and also falsely reported that and began to inquire about the custody and visitation
[minor child] called up her personal circumstances of Aviva. LaPaglia stated that she was
attorney to contact her father and advised concerned about why Aviva did not visit with Snyder. In
him of her not wanting to come over to response to the inquiry of LaPaglia about those
the [*45] house. circumstances, Cedar replied that there was no visitation
between father and daughter because Aviva said that
[*47] Snyder had molested her.
Aviva stated to the police on April 29 that she was On its face, the statement is objectively true: Aviva
afraid because she had seen her father outside of her did say that Snyder had molested her. Aviva revealed that
mother's house at a time when he had no business being to her mother in 1998. Nonetheless, as discussed below,
there. No credible evidence was offered at trial regarding the fact, as found by the court, that Snyder did not
the substance of any similar statement that may have sexually molest Aviva renders Cedar's publication of this
been made by Cedar to the police on April 8. statement to LaPaglia defamatory.
Accordingly the plaintiff has failed to prove that Cedar
made such a statement and that such a statement, if P8f. In or about December 1999, Cedar
made, was false or defamatory. stated to Susan L. Jacobs, Esq., Dr.
Snyder's attorney, that Dr. Snyder had
In fact, it is true that during the week of April 8,
molested his daughter.
Aviva communicated to her attorney, Michael Perzin,
that she did not wish to visit her father anymore.
Whether Aviva said that on April 8 or April 10 or
thereafter, no such statement can be the basis in this case Snyder had been ordered to pay child support to
for a claim of defamation by Cedar. Cedar during Aviva's minority. He had also been ordered
to pay over to Cedar an annual payment from an annuity
P8.e. In or about December 1999, known as TIAA. Snyder was sporadic in making the
Cedar stated to Diane Massaro LaPaglia former payments, necessitating Cedar to utilize the
that Dr. Snyder had not seen his daughter services of the state Child Support Enforcement Services
for a long time because Dr. Snyder had Unit in collecting these payments. Also each year Snyder
molested her. intentionally refused to make the TIAA payment,
Page 13
knowing that Cedar would first have to expend time and financial and visitation issues, Jacobs did not bring up
energy and attorney fees in taking him back to court the subject of Aviva. Rather, Jacobs stated that Cedar's
before he could be compelled to make the TIAA comment about Snyder as a child molester was voluntary
payment. and gratuitous, and was made after their argument to the
magistrate had been concluded. Weighing all the
By 1999, Cedar could no longer afford an attorney.
evidence, the court finds Cedar's version of the encounter
Instead, in September 1999, while using the services of
the more credible.
the Child [*48] Support Enforcement Unit to try to get
regular payments of her child support, Cedar attempted The court finds that Cedar was representing herself
to use the same court proceeding to collect the overdue in a court proceeding. As in all litigation, the parties,
payment of the TIAA annuity. whether pro se or represented by counsel, are encouraged
by the court to engage in negotiations or dialogue prior
In the summer of 1999, Snyder retained Susan
to the presentation of the case, in order to settle the
Jacobs as his new attorney. Jacobs was a close personal
dispute or at least to narrow the issues and agree on a
friend of Susan Davis, the woman with whom Snyder
manner of presentation. Jacobs, as opposing counsel, did
now resides. Snyder initially consulted with Jacobs to see
nothing inappropriate in broaching with Cedar all of the
what Jacobs could do to get his visitation restarted with
outstanding disputed issues between the parties; indeed it
Aviva. But when the child support enforcement division
was a propitious opportunity to do so.
cited him to appear (again) in September of 1999, and
when Cedar pro se tried to piggy-back the motion to But having initiated such a negotiation session at
collect the overdue TIAA payment in the same court, and having invited Cedar to justify the lack of
proceeding, Snyder directed Jacobs to represent him on contact between Snyder and Aviva, Snyder cannot use
those matters as well. By that time, Jacobs had been fully Cedar's response to his attorney's question [*51] as a
briefed by Snyder about the history of the disputes with further instance of defamation. The court finds that in
Cedar, including the disputes about Aviva's custody and this situation the Special Defense of privilege ought to
visitation; and Jacobs had thoroughly reviewed the court apply as a matter of sound public policy.
file, including the application and affidavit from April
The law recognizes an absolute privilege for
1997 that contained the accusation that Snyder had
statements made in the context of a court proceeding.
engaged in possible sexual misdeeds with Aviva.
"An attorney at law is absolutely privileged to publish
During a court proceeding at the family magistrate defamatory matter concerning another in
session in October of 1999, Cedar and Jacobs engaged communications preliminary to a proposed judicial
[*49] in a negotiation session in the hallway of the court proceeding, in the institution of, or during the course and
prior to entering the courtroom for the formal as part of, a judicial proceeding in which he participates
presentation to the child support magistrate of a Motion as counsel, if it has some relation to the proceeding." 3
to Dismiss that Jacobs had filed on the TIAA collection Restatement (Second) Torts § 586 (1977). There is no
issue. As part of an effort to negotiate not only the TIAA logical reason that the privilege should not cover the
issue, but the child support and visitation issue as well, statement of a pro se party to the same extent as it would
Jacobs stated to Cedar that the financial issues might be cover the statement of an attorney.
resolved more easily if Snyder's visitation with Aviva
To be sure, the absolute privilege can be lost "by
could be reinstituted. At first Cedar responded that the
unnecessary or unreasonable publication to one for
law considered child support and child visitation to be
whom the occasion is not privileged." Kelley v. Bonney,
unrelated to one another, a fact that Jacobs well knew.
221 Conn. 549, 575, 606 A.2d 693 (1992). That is not the
Jacobs pressed on with a query about why Cedar was
case here, where the publication was made only to
reluctant to try to negotiate a settlement on visitation.
Snyder's attorney and overheard by no one else.
Cedar replied that Aviva considered Snyder to be a child
molester, as a way of explaining why Aviva was While the judicial proceedings privilege applies
continuing to refuse all contact with her father. [*52] to statements made in pleadings or other
documents prepared in connection with a court
Jacobs testified in this trial that Cedar's statement
proceeding, see Petyan v. Ellis, supra, 251-52, it is not
that Snyder was a child molester was unqualified by any
essential that the statement be spoken in open court or
preface about Aviva holding such a view, and was
contained in a pleading, brief or affidavit. McManus v.
unsolicited by any question or other conversational
Sweeney, 78 Conn.App. 327, 335-36, 827 A.2d 708
invitation by Jacobs. Jacobs testified that, although she
(2003), citing Romero v. Prince, 85 N.M. 474, 477, 513
had been initially retained by Snyder to deal with the
P.2d 717 (1973). The policy underlying the absolute
[*50] visitation problem, and although she would have
privilege for statements made in the course of judicial
preferred to work toward a "global" settlement of both
Page 14
proceedings is that "in certain situations the public Massaro LaPaglia and in the presence of
interest in having people speak freely outweighs the risk Rachel Vincent that Dr. Snyder did
that individuals will occasionally abuse the privilege by horrible things to Dr. Snyder's daughter
making false and malicious statements." Petyan v. Ellis, and should be locked up.
supra, 246.
Here the statement was made in a negotiation
session between a pro se party and opposing counsel In December 1999, Vincent, his former wife Diane
prior to their matter being presented in court the same LaPaglia, and his minor daughter Rachel were
day. The court's finding that Cedar's statement is participating in a family therapy session. LaPaglia was
insulated by the privilege might be different if the court having difficulty raising Rachel and there was discussion
believed that Cedar had made the comment gratuitously, of Rachel going to live at the home of Vincent and
or if the parties were involved in a proceeding that did Cedar, where Aviva was residing. LaPaglia broached the
not involve an aspect of the ongoing family [*53] case, issue of Aviva's estrangement from Snyder. Vincent
or if Cedar had uttered the statement to Jacobs within the replied that Snyder was "a piece of crap and ought to be
hearing of others. But on the basis of the particular locked up. [*55] "
interchange between Cedar and Jacobs and the context in
The court finds that this was the only statement
which it occurred, the privilege applies in this case.
made by Vincent, and that it was made in the course of a
Courts encourage litigants involved in complicated therapy session related to the custodial and visitation
family cases to engage in comprehensive and, if arrangements with which Rachel might come in contact
necessary, lengthy negotiations in an attempt to settle all at the Vincent/Cedar home. The court does not credit the
outstanding disputes. It would chill the process of testimony of LaPaglia or of Rachel that Vincent said
negotiations in family cases to hold that a litigant is "[Snyder] did horrible things to Aviva" or that Vincent
liable for damages for presenting her perspective on the reiterated any statement about Snyder outside of the
family dynamics in private in response to a question therapy session, in the parking lot, or elsewhere.
from her ex-husband's lawyer. That is especially true
Having found that Vincent made the statement that
when the lawyer was well aware of the sex abuse claim
"[Snyder] is a piece of crap and ought to be locked up,"
before these negotiations ever began. The privilege
the question is whether the Special Defenses of privilege
should extend to pro se litigants as well as attorneys in
or opinion apply.
these circumstances, especially since the attorney is
likely to have superior legal knowledge and tactical skills Vincent argues that the statutory psychotherapist-
that may, intentionally or innocently, cause the patient privilege applies to insulate Vincent from liability
overmatched unrepresented litigant to utter a slander. for statements made in the therapy session, Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 52-146q or 146s. These statutes prevent the
The court holds that the negotiations immediately
therapist, or those under the supervision of the therapist,
preliminary to an in-court presentation constitute part of
from revealing confidential statements made during
the course of a judicial proceeding. The statement [*54]
therapy sessions. The statutes do not prevent the patients
of Cedar, in response to a question from Jacobs, was
or participants themselves from disclosing what was said
integrally related to the entire family dispute of which
in the sessions. In the context of group therapy, there
the child support and property division matters were a
[*56] is no statutory prohibition on one patient or
part. Cedar's statement to Jacobs is absolutely privileged.
participant revealing the statement of another patient or
THE DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS OF participant. See, e.g., Skakel v. Benedict, 1999 Conn.
VINCENT Super. LEXIS 3070, Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial
District of Fairfield at Bridgeport, CV 98 357386, Nov.
P8g. In or about December 1999, 10, 1999 (LoisLaw 1999 Ct.Sup. 14727) (Stodolink, J.)
defendant Vincent stated to a (25 Conn. L. Rptr. 667). The special defense of privilege
psychotherapist, whose name, based upon does not apply.
information and belief is Harlie Kesten,
Vincent asserts that the statement is one of opinion,
that Dr. Snyder did horrible things to Dr.
rather than a statement of fact, such that it cannot form
Snyder's daughter and should be locked
the basis of a defamation claim. To prevail on a
up.
common-law defamation claim, a plaintiff must prove
P8h. In or about December 1999, that the defendant published a false statement. Torosyan
defendant Vincent reiterated, outside the v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 234
presence of Harlie Kesten, to Diana Conn. 1, 27, 662 A.2d 89 (1995). To be actionable, the
Page 15
statement in question must convey an objective fact, as emotions they vent will not become part of public
generally a defendant cannot be held liable for discourse outside of the session. Even though there is no
expressing a mere opinion. Daley v. Aetna Life & statutory privilege against one participant in a therapy
Casualty Co., 249 Conn. 766, 795, 734 A.2d 112 (1999) session disclosing the statements of another, there is
(citations omitted). certainly a privacy interest which the law ought to
recognize, so that participants in group or family therapy,
The Restatement, Second, Torts, § 566, recognizes
or proper third parties invited in to individual therapy
that a statement of opinion can nonetheless be actionable
sessions, can feel safe in speaking. Vincent's statement
if the statement implies the allegation [*57] of an
about Snyder was prompted by the topic then being
undisclosed defamatory fact as the basis for the opinion.
discussed in the session: what were the relative benefits
The application of the fact/opinion analysis is a difficult
of Rachel living in the Vincent/Cedar home, and were
one. See, e.g., Kimber v. Bancroft, 2004 Conn. Super.
there any impediments or disadvantages to her living
LEXIS 1645, Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial
there? What was the policy in that home about access of
District of New Haven, CV 01 0455708, June 25, 2004
the child to a visiting parent? Vincent responded,
(LoisLaw 2004 Ct.Sup. 9615) (Corradino, J.). The
coarsely and somewhat cryptically, with his opinion on
coarseness of modern conversation and the increasing
Aviva's relationship with Snyder. The response was
acceptance of hyperbole in social discourse have made
limited in scope, made on a proper occasion, and made
the proper application of the concept even harder. See,
only to the persons attending the therapy session and not
Prosser & Keeton, 5th Ed. § 111, p. 776. ("A certain
beyond. The fact that it contained an insult to Snyder
amount of vulgar name-calling is tolerated, on the theory
does not indicate that it was made in bad faith. The fact
that it will necessarily be understood to amount to
that Vincent did not elaborate on his opinion of [*60]
nothing more.")
Snyder tends to indicate that Vincent was attempting to
"He is a big piece of crap" is clearly an expression of exercise good faith and his better judgment in limiting
opinion that is not actionable, as it implies no specific the statement as he did.
undisclosed facts. However, what is one to make of
Given all the circumstances, the court finds that
Vincent--a police officer--stating "he ought to be locked
Vincent has carried his burden of proving that a
up"? In speaking such words to a brother officer, say, it
conditional privilege should attach to the statement he
might be that the words would be understood to convey
made in the therapy session he attended with Rachel,
specific undisclosed facts that amounted to an accusation
Rachel's mother, and Rachel's therapist.
that Snyder had committed a crime. In the context of a
discussion among family members, where Vincent's THE INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF
status as a police officer is tangential or [*58] irrelevant, EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CLAIM
there is no reasonable likelihood that such a statement
In order for the plaintiff to prevail on this claim, he
would be understood to be anything other than hyperbole
must establish four elements: (1) that the actor intended
or exaggeration. Considering the entire context in which
to inflict emotional distress or knew or should have
the statement was made, the court finds that Vincent has
known that emotional distress was the likely result of his
carried the burden of proving that the statement made
conduct; (2) that the conduct was extreme and
was understood as a mere expression of opinion and not
outrageous; (3) that the defendant's conduct was the
a statement that expressed or implied a false fact.
cause of the plaintiff's distress; and (4) that the emotional
Vincent has also carried the burden of proving that a distress sustained by the plaintiff was severe. Appleton v.
qualified or conditional privilege covers the statement he Board of Education, 254 Conn. 205, 210, 757 A.2d 1059
made in his daughter's family therapy session. There are (2000). The court finds that neither Cedar nor Vincent
five elements to be met in establishing a conditional engaged in any conduct the intent of which was to inflict
privilege: (1) an interest to be upheld, (2) a statement emotional distress on Snyder.
limited in its scope to this purpose, (3) good faith, (4) a
Snyder has attempted to plead and prove that the
proper occasion, and (5) a publication in a proper manner
allegations that he sexually molested Aviva were [*61]
to proper parties only. Miles v. Perry, 11 Conn.App. 584,
part of a scheme devised by Cedar to alienate Snyder
595, 529 A.2d 199 (1987). No conditional privilege
from his daughter, that as part of that scheme Cedar
exists where the defamatory remarks are activated by
concocted the allegation that Snyder abused Aviva,
malice, improper motive, or lack of good faith in making
convinced Aviva to make the accusation public, and then
the statement. See Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City
that Cedar maliciously spread this rumor with the intent
Crystal Co., 142 Conn. 605, 615, 116 A.2d 440 (1955).
of doing as much harm as possible to Snyder. The court
Participants in therapy sessions have an [*59] does not find this to be the case.
expectation that the confidences they disclose and the
Page 16
The claim that Cedar engaged in conduct intending father. The fact that Cedar stated her honest belief that
to create a rift between Aviva and Snyder is particularly Aviva's statements were true, while opening Cedar to a
unsupported. The actual break between father and defamation claim, is not sufficient to constitute the
daughter began as a result of Snyder's and Aviva's own "extreme and outrageous conduct" element of this tort.
prickly personalities and was fueled by the hostility that
Snyder also seeks to extend his claim of intentional
was created in the ongoing family litigation--for which
infliction of emotional distress to Vincent under the
Snyder is just as responsible as Cedar. It came to a head
general purview of paragraph 7 of the complaint: that
on April 10, 1997, two weeks before the allegations of
"the campaign [to inflict emotional distress on Snyder]
sexual abuse surfaced, and it came to a head without any
has been joined [*64] by Vincent, and constitutes a
involvement by Cedar. After that, it was Aviva--who is
continuous course of conduct which, on information and
not a defendant in this case--who raised the issue that
belief, is ongoing." Aside from uttering the one insulting
Snyder had molested her. Although Cedar assisted Aviva
comment about Snyder to his ex-wife in December 1999,
in reporting this to the police and to those involved in the
there is no credible evidence that Vincent has engaged in
family litigation, the court finds that Cedar neither
any conduct disparaging to Snyder. Vincent has not
conspired with Aviva to make such an allegation nor
engaged in any conduct that was intended to inflict
encouraged [*62] or directed Aviva to make such an
emotional distress upon Snyder, nor has Vincent engaged
allegation.
in any conduct that could remotely be considered
By May 14, 1997, all of the individuals and entities extreme and outrageous. The court finds that Snyder's
to whom the allegation was initially reported had proof on Count Three fails as to Vincent.
determined that Aviva's vague statements did not amount
As for the third and fourth elements of the tort of
to proof of sexual abuse. For all practical purposes, that
intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court will
was the end of any statement Cedar made on this topic to
address them below in the sections on injury and
anyone except Diane LaPaglia and Susan Jacobs, as
damages.
found above. The statements to LaPaglia and to Jacobs
were Cedar's responses to inquiries made by persons The defendants have presented a statute of
whom Cedar legitimately believed ought to have a direct limitations defense: that any conduct of Cedar or Vincent
and, as far as Cedar knew, truthful answer. Although that occurred more than three years before the service of
Snyder urges the court to find that Cedar was engaged in process in this action is time-barred. Conn. Gen. Stat. §
some kind of campaign to besmirch Snyder's good name, 52-577. This action was commenced in July 2001, so that
there is simply no credible evidence of this. Nor is there any conduct of Cedar or Vincent before July 1998 is
sufficient credible evidence to persuade the court that insulated from liability by the statute of limitations. Even
Cedar undertook any of the alleged conduct with the if the court were to believe that Cedar engaged in
intent to alienate Aviva from Snyder. conduct [*65] designed to alienate child from father, that
conduct was fully completed by April 10, 1997, and in
To be sure, there is no love lost between Cedar and
the few months thereafter, when Aviva dug in her heels
Snyder. Cedar has certainly wished Snyder ill from time
and decided that she no longer wished to have anything
to time; she has even wished him dead. But like most
to do with Snyder. There is certainly no credible
litigants in family cases, she has not acted on these
evidence that Cedar engaged in any conduct after July of
emotions in any overt way. She has not turned Aviva
1998 that contributed to any further alienation of father
against Snyder and has not engaged [*63] in any
and daughter. By November 1997, Snyder himself had
"campaign" to brand Snyder a child molester. Her
determined that he did not wish to have further contact
repetition of Aviva's statements to a few select
with Aviva if the primary custody of Aviva continued to
individuals was without malice. Cedar did not intend to
be with Cedar. Whatever "damage" was done, it was
inflict emotional distress upon Snyder. Snyder has failed
done before July 1998, so that the statute of limitations
to prove the first element of the tort of intentional
bars Snyder's claim for intentional infliction of emotional
infliction of emotional distress.
distress. Also, Snyder's claim that there was a
As for the second element--the conduct was extreme "continuing course of conduct" by Cedar or Vincent after
and outrageous--that element would certainly be satisfied July 1998 is unsupported by the evidence. The special
if the court believed that Cedar had made up these defense has been proved, and Snyder's claim is time-
allegations and had somehow convinced Aviva to parrot barred.
them. Branding an innocent person as a child molester is
SNYDER'S INJURIES
extreme and outrageous. But as previously stated, the
court does not find that Cedar conspired with Aviva or Snyder claims that the primary injury from which he
directed or encouraged Aviva to tell this tale about her suffers is the alienation that has taken place from his
Page 17
daughter and the pain that flows from such alienation. 13 The evidence is that Diane LaPaglia is the only
The court finds that no such injury was proximately person to whom Cedar published, in a non-privileged
caused by any of the conduct alleged [*66] against context, the accusation that Snyder had molested Aviva.
Cedar or Vincent in this lawsuit. Diane LaPaglia was not sure at first whether to believe it,
but satisfied herself within weeks thereafter that it was
13 Neither party has raised or briefed the issue untrue. That being so, there is evidence to support an
of the effect, if any, of Conn. Gen. Stat. Sec. 52- injury to Snyder's reputation with LaPaglia for that brief
572b. period of time in which LaPaglia harbored doubts about
whether the accusation might be true. As for the
Snyder also claims that his reputation has been
publication to Susan Jacobs, even if that publication had
injured by the publication of the falsehood that he
occurred in a non-privileged context, it created no injury
sexually molested Aviva. This claim is more complicated
to Snyder. Jacobs, after all, had already reviewed the
than it first appears. The first problem is the source from
contents of the restraining order application of April
which any injury to reputation may have flowed. The
1997, in which the claim was made that there was a
original publication of the allegation was by Aviva to the
suspicion of sexual contact between Snyder and Aviva.
police. The next publication was Cedar's court filing to
Jacobs already knew of the two-year-long estrangement
which the absolute privilege attaches. Though those two
of father and daughter. Jacobs had already been fully
avenues, neither of which can be used to assess damages
briefed by Snyder about the [*69] ongoing disputes with
against Cedar, all of the people in the family litigation
Cedar and the ongoing rift with Aviva. Jacobs did not
learned of the original accusation of sexual misconduct.
believe that Snyder was a child molester, either before or
If the greater community acquired knowledge that
after the statement by Cedar in October 1999. Snyder
Snyder was a child molester such that Snyder's
suffered no actual injury to his reputation as a result of
reputation was damaged, the burden is upon Snyder to
Cedar's statement to Jacobs.
prove that such knowledge came by way of a non-
privileged publication uttered by Cedar or [*67] The evidence is that Vincent published his opinion
Vincent. With only one exception, Snyder has failed to about Snyder in the presence of LaPaglia, Rachel, and
prove this. Rachel's therapist. Even if Vincent's publication had been
a statement of fact rather than of opinion, there was no
That one exception is the knowledge that Diane
actual injury to Snyder from this statement. LaPaglia
LaPaglia acquired from Cedar in the December 1999
testified inconsistently about her reaction to Vincent's
phone call. The court finds that until that phone call
statement; but the better evidence allows the court to
LaPaglia was unaware of any such charge. LaPaglia was
infer that by the time of the therapy session in December
alarmed by the news, and did not at first know whether
1999, LaPaglia no longer believed that Snyder had
to give it any credence. Within weeks, she repeated
molested Aviva and did not give any credence to
Cedar's statement to Snyder, whom she knew slightly.
Vincent's statement. There is insufficient credible
After speaking with Snyder, LaPaglia became convinced
evidence that Rachel Vincent, who was 12 at the time,
that the accusation was not true.
understood Vincent's statement or attached any negative
There is no credible evidence that anyone in significance to it. 14 There is no evidence that Harlie
Snyder's community knew that he had been accused of Kesten, the therapist, understood the statement or knew
being a child molester. Even certain of the witnesses who the name of the person referred to or even heard the
testified in this trial as to Snyder's upstanding character statement when it was made. There was no actual injury
did not seem to know that the subject matter of this trial [*70] to Snyder's reputation as a result of Vincent's
was an accusation that Snyder had molested Aviva. If statement.
Snyder's character witnesses are to be believed, Snyder
has enjoyed a good reputation in the community 14 Rachel Vincent's demeanor on the witness
consistently during all of the last twenty years or more. stand reflected such extreme animosity toward
None of the witnesses to Snyder's good character offered Cedar and Vincent that it affected the credibility
any evidence that Snyder's reputation ever suffered in of her testimony. The court does not believe that
any way, and they certainly offered no support for the she had any recollection of the events about
proposition that his [*68] reputation was injured by which she testified, so that the court gives no
anything having to do with Aviva or with statements weight to her testimony.
about sexual conduct with Aviva. There is simply no
Snyder has also offered evidence that he was
credible evidence that Snyder's reputation had been
overwhelmed by feelings of depression, sadness, fear,
damaged by any statements or conduct of Cedar or
and desperation from the time the allegations surfaced in
Vincent.
April 1997 up to the present day. He claims that these
Page 18
feelings are the result of the defamation of Cedar and

Vincent and of their attempt to inflict emotional distress 15 This is unlike any such damage analysis were
upon him. The court credits Snyder's testimony that he the court to determine that Cedar's statement to
was fearful of arrest between the time of Aviva's police Susan Jacobs was unprivileged. Susan Jacobs
report on April 29, until May 14, 1997, the day on which never believed that the statement was true, so that
all parties acknowledged that the agencies involved in any damages assessed would be nominal.
investigating the charges determined them to be
[*73] Snyder has proved common-law slander
unfounded.
under Count One and slander per se under Count Two
Thereafter the evidence suggests that Snyder [*71] against Deborah Cedar, as a result of Cedar's statement to
became consumed not so much with clearing his name LaPaglia. In assessing damages, the court finds that
but rather with winning the battle for Aviva. The distress Daniel Snyder is entitled to $ 200, assessed against
he felt was mostly attributable to his inability to convince Deborah Cedar, as full and fair compensation, as to
anyone that Cedar was a seriously disturbed unfit mother Count One; and for nominal damages of $ 1.00 as to
and that he was the better custodial parent for Aviva. Count Two. Snyder has failed to prove malice and
While he felt a sense of failure over the breakdown in his accordingly no punitive damages are awarded against
relationship with Aviva, that was not a breakdown for Vincent or Cedar on any of the counts. The court awards
which Cedar bears responsibility. no equitable relief.
Cedar points out that Snyder never sought treatment The court finds the issues for Edwin Vincent, Jr., and
for the distress he was feeling, and so the distress could against Daniel Snyder under Counts One, Two, and
not have been severe, certainly not severe enough to Three. The court finds the issues for Deborah Cedar and
qualify under the standards of the intentional infliction of against Daniel Snyder under Count Three.
emotional distress tort. However it is not necessary for
Patty Jenkins Pittman, Judge
one to completely decompensate emotionally or for one
to seek psychiatric treatment in order to prove that one's
emotional distress is severe.
The distress Snyder may have been feeling did not
come from Snyder's knowledge that Cedar had made
statements to LaPaglia or to Jacobs about him, nor from
Snyder's belief that Cedar had convinced Aviva to lie
about him. From the totality of the evidence, it is clear
that the most pervasive emotion felt by Snyder during the
relevant time periods [*72] was not emotional distress or
embarrassment or depression caused by Cedar's or
Vincent's alleged statements or alleged actions. Rather
Snyder was overwhelmed by a quest for vengeance,
toward Aviva for aligning herself with Cedar, toward
Cedar for "winning" Aviva, and toward Vincent for
associating with Cedar and Aviva.
SNYDER'S DAMAGES
Although there is no credible evidence that Snyder
suffered any actual injury to his reputation in the
community, it is true that Diane LaPaglia, for a short
period of time after her December 1999 phone
conversation with Cedar, was left with the impression
that Snyder molested Aviva. 15 Within the same month
after first hearing this claim, LaPaglia no longer believed
it to be true. In fact after the phone conversation with
Cedar and close in time to the therapy session with
Vincent, LaPaglia had satisfied herself that the
accusation was false, so much so that she sent Snyder a
Christmas card along with a picture of herself and her
children.

Snyder V Cedar CT Case Banning PAS

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2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS 520, *

LEXSEE 2006 CONN. SUPER. LEXIS 520

Daniel R. Snyder v. Deborah S. Cedar et al.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CONNECTICUT, JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF NEW

2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS 520

February 16, 2006, Decided

by saying, "It appears, at this time, that Mr.

feelings are the result of the defamation of Cedar and

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