Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Critical Race Theory1
Critical Race Theory1
1, 2007
REVIEW ARTICLE
JEANNE M. POWERS
gender in order to make democracy real’ (p. 10). While both books
specifically focus on the US context, the analysis and insights of these
authors are relevant for understanding and analysing race relations in other
contexts.
Education, writ broadly, is at the heart of critical race theory both in its
origins and some of its central issues of concern, a point implicitly
highlighted by Angela Harris’ introduction to Delgado and Stefancic’s
text. Harris writes of her experiences as a law school student at the
University of Chicago and as one of the small group of students of colour
in her law school class. The year before she entered law school, she was a
graduate student in the social sciences living in an activist student
community in which she and her colleagues protested apartheid, engaged
in readings and discussions of the ideas of Third World feminists, and
challenged the university administration to provide programmes and
resources targeted at students of colour. In her law school classes, the
‘lively discourse on racial-ethnic relations, both domestic and interna-
tional’ she had participated in over the prior year was completely absent
from the curriculum; instead ‘[t]here was only one Law, a law that in its
universal majesty applied to everyone without regard to race, colour,
gender, or creed’ (p. xviii).
Harris’ narrative poignantly illustrates how damaging ‘official knowl-
edge’ (Apple, 2000) can be to students of colour when their life
experiences and perspectives are erased from the curriculum.1 Yet Harris
also links her own story to a broader systemic issue, a move that is a key
feature of CRT analyses. While many areas of the law such as
immigration law, poverty law and criminal law have a profound impact
on communities of colour, in the mid-1980s when Harris was attending a
top-ranked law school ‘there was, seemingly, no language in which to
embark on a race-based, systematic critique of legal reasoning and legal
institutions themselves’ (p. xix). The impact of this silence is all the more
profound if we consider that graduates of the top law schools are well-
placed for careers that will allow them to have some measure of influence
over the legal system (i.e. in teaching positions at top-ranked law schools,
judgeships, and partnerships in the most prestigious law firms). At the
time, CRT was in its early stages of development. Two of the foundational
articles in the CRT movement had only recently been published (Freeman,
1978; Bell, 1980; see also Bell, 1976) and the events that propelled CRT
as a social movement within law schools were unfolding. In 1981, Derrick
Bell, one of the founding scholars of the movement, was denied tenure by
Harvard Law School, sparking a student boycott and the organisation of an
alternative course on race and the law (Crenshaw, Gotanda, Peller, and
Thomas, 1995). Cho and Westley (2000) argue that the anti-racist student
movements that began in the late 1960s and continued through the 1970s
and the 1980s were also an important factor propelling the development of
CRT (see also Matsuda, 1996).
In the late 1980s, a national conference on Critical Race Theory
was held. By the mid-1990s, an increasing number of articles written
by scholars associated with the CRT movement were appearing in
radar of the national media, the federal judiciary and the traditional
theaters of power’ (p. 37).
In Chapter 1, Guinier and Torres introduce two of the key ideas woven
throughout the text: political race and magical realism. The concept of
political race is encapsulated in the metaphor that provides the title of
the book—Guinier and Torres state simply and directly that ‘[r]ace, for us,
is like the miner’s canary’ (p. 11). More specifically, Guinier and
Torres argue that like the proverbial canary in the coalmine, which signals
through its death that the air is too toxic for miners to breathe,
the experiences of racially marginalised groups are an important indicators
of how fair and democratic American society is. Non-white communities
are among the first to suffer the consequences of injustice and
undemocratic social practices that will ultimately affect all citizens if
they are not altered. The idea of political race is Guinier and Torres’ effort
to provide a conceptual link between the fates of the canaries and the
miners, both of whom have a fundamental stake in the quality of the air in
the mine.
In the contemporary United States, race is both a matter of social
identity and institutionalised social structures. While for analytical
purposes we might separate these two dynamics, in practice—in our
daily lives—the social-psychological and institutional dimensions of race
are tightly linked. How people are treated in institutional settings is the
product of deeply rooted racialised (and gendered and classed) social
practices that shape how they view themselves and the world around them
and how they act in the world. Guinier and Torres’ conceptualisation of
political race is meant to highlight these complexities of race as a social
category. Yet Guinier and Torres also seek to move beyond analysis to
articulate a rationale for a political project, a democratic social movement
structured around the concept of political race. In Chapters 2 and 3,
Guinier and Torres provide an expanded discussion of their conceptualisa-
tion of and rationale for political race and examples of political race in
practice.
The idea of political race is an effort to reframe race as a concept that
denotes both social location and political commitment. In proposing the
concept of political race, Guinier and Torres are trying to strike a delicate
balance. Their aim is to develop an analysis of inequalities that highlights
how the distribution of power and resources in the United States is
racialised yet also reaches beyond race. This analysis is a key first step
towards the broader goal of their project—the development of grassroots
political initiatives that are built around inclusive agendas that begin with
the issues and concerns of communities of colour, but that are also
expanded to address class, gender and other inequalities. Two points bear
further elaboration. First, Guinier and Torres want to account for both
institutionalised racial hierarchies and racial solidarity. That is, a key
component of their analysis of how race shapes people’s lives includes an
effort to understand the dynamics of historical and contemporary racial
oppression (Young, 1990). At the same time, Guinier and Torres also
recognise that communities of colour are important resources for their
members, not the least of which is that they provide what bell hooks
described as homeplace or a ‘safe place where black people could affirm
one another and by doing so heal many of the wounds inflicted by racist
domination’ (hooks, 1990, p. 42).
Second, in their argument for the utility of political race, Guinier and
Torres note a key point of convergence between conservative and some
progressive perspectives on race, their shared emphasis on colour
blindness. Here, Guinier and Torres’ explicitly anchor their analysis of
colour-blindness in the CRT critique of liberalism (Delgado and Stefancic,
2001), although some additional background is useful to better situate
their discussion. Contemporary colour-blindness emerged out of the post
World War II efforts at addressing racial inequality when two trends
converged: (i) social scientists critical of the hereditarian view of race
were starting to shape public debates about race; (ii) the widespread
revulsion over the horrors of Nazism delegitimised the most virulent
forms of scientific racism (Fredrickson, 1971; Pascoe, 1996; Horton,
2005). Liberal reformers advocated removing state-authorised racial
barriers in access to political, economic and cultural resources (e.g.
Myrdal, 1944). Brown v. Board of Education (1954) is widely considered
the paradigmatic example of this stream of social policy, which Horton
(2005) describes as post-war liberalism. However, as many critical race
theorists have pointed out, policies focused on removing racial barriers
(e.g. declaring segregation unconstitutional) are only partial solutions for
addressing racial inequality because they do not alter deeply entrenched
patterns of social stratification that were the product of explicitly racist
public policies.4
In the wake of the Civil Rights movement, as government policies based
on a more robust redistributive principle such as affirmative action were
articulated and implemented, a conservative challenge emerged. Since the
mid-1970s, conservatives have been increasingly successful at promoting
colour-blindness, which is best understood as a radical version of post war
liberalism: because formal or de jure discrimination has been abolished,
all uses of racial categories in public policy—including redistributive
policies meant to address the effects of past racism—are viewed as
illegitimate. As Guinier and Torres also point out, this worldview is
grounded in the assumptions of abstract individualism that emphasises
individual freedom and choice in a world of abstract rights.5 According to
Guinier and Torres, any consideration of the ways that race has functioned
as a social hierarchy where non-whites have been denied access to
political, economic, and cultural resources is outside the scope of the
colour-blind paradigm. Unanchored to a structural critique of racial
inequality, colour-blindness reduces race to skin tone (see also Haney-
Lopez, 2004).
Drawing from the work of Gotanda (1991) and other Critical Race
Theorists, Guinier and Torres argue that if race is viewed only as
phenotype and not as a ‘marker for social status, history, or power’ it is
possible to see any racial classification—including racial preferences—as
negative and stigmatising (p. 38). As Gotanda (1991) notes in his analysis
on race or class. That is, the dispute between K-Mart and its workers
was either a case of racial discrimination or a labour dispute. However, to
privilege race over class—or vice versa—risked alienating potential
allies. By asking if it was just for K-Mart to pay its workers in Greensboro
less than it paid workers at other distribution plants because the majority
of the Greensboro workers were black, the Pulpit Forum helped the union
to redefine the struggle in a way that linked issues of race, class
and the well-being of the wider community. When the Pulpit Forum
expanded their activities to include weekly civil disobedience in the
form of praying at the distribution plant, they were eventually joined by
white workers and other members of the community. The demonstrators
were eventually arrested for trespassing; K-Mart subsequently filed a
civil action against the protestors but only the black workers and
ministers were named in the lawsuit. Ultimately, the white workers held a
press conference asking why they were not named in the suit, thus
publicly asserting their common cause with the black workers and
disrupting the conventional narrative of the dispute as an instance of racial
discrimination.
It is also worth noting another example of political race cited by Guinier
and Torres, the effort to create the Texas Ten Percent plan after the Fifth
Circuit court declared race-conscious admissions policies in higher
educational institutions unconstitutional in the 1996 Hopwood decision.10
In this case, members of the Mexican-American caucus in the Texas
legislature, activist organisations such as the NAACP and the Mexican
American Legal Defense Fund (MALDEF), and university professors11
worked together to craft a race-neutral admissions policy that was passed
by the Texas State Legislature in 1997. Under the Texas Ten Percent Plan,
the top ten percent of all high school students in the state would be
admitted to any university in the state, including the state’s flagship
universities (UT Austin and Texas A&M) regardless of their SAT scores.
Key support for the legislation—which was passed by a single vote—
came from rural legislators once they realised that the admissions system
then in place also disadvantaged whites from poor rural areas who were
also underrepresented at the flagship universities and that the proposed
plan would increase access for students from these areas as well. While the
policy that resulted was racially neutral on its face—and indeed had to be
because of Hopwood—Guinier and Torres view the process of creating the
Texas Ten Percent plan as an instance of political race and not progressive
colour-blind politics because ‘racial consciousness among people of color
was a crucial element in crafting a cross-racial coalition to make Texas’
educational system more just for Texans throughout the state’ (p. 74).
Many proponents of percentage-based admissions policies, including
Guinier and Torres, view the Texas Ten Percent Plan and other similar
plans that have been implemented in other states, such as California and
Florida, as pragmatic strategies to ensure that the most prestigious public
universities can maintain minority enrolment in the wake of successful
challenges to race-based affirmative action policies. However, some
analysts have raised important questions about whether or not percentage
program. However, now that the plan has been institutionalised, the term
may not be as relevant for the plan in its current manifestations,
particularly since in the wake of Grutter, the two flagship schools have
taken different courses of action (i.e., admissions policies at UT Austin are
race-conscious while admissions policies at Texas A&M remain race-
neutral).
Yet at the same time, the need for the kind of political project Guinier
and Torres’ propose is even more crucial in the wake of events such as
Hurricane Katrina’s devastation of New Orleans and the November 2005
riots among black and North African youths in France, which made race
and class divisions pointedly visible as few other recent events have
(Murray, 2006). At the same time, there were hopeful signs in the
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina that illustrate the power that a political
movement based on the principles of political race can have (see the
account in Davis and Fontenot, 2005). Newspapers across the country ran
story after story about how individual citizens who felt moved to make a
difference in strangers’ lives came to the aid of hurricane victims, in many
cases crossing boundaries of race and class. It is this energy that Guinier
and Torres wish to tap. The crucial pieces of the puzzle then, are to figure
out: (i) how these grassroots efforts can be mobilised in the absence of a
large-scale disaster; and (ii) how these largely individual efforts can be
channelled into a larger social movement. By providing a concept that can
be used to analyse and unify what are on the surface a disparate set of
political projects, Guinier and Torres take an important first step in this
challenging undertaking.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author would like to thank Michele Moses and the editors for their
insightful suggestions that helped improve this essay.
NOTES
1. In a chapter of The Alchemy of Race and Rights entitled ‘Crimes Without Passion’ Patricia
Williams (1991) evokes similar themes. Then a professor at an unnamed institution, where she
was the first black woman to teach in the law school, Williams describes how some of the
questions used in law school exams were framed in racist stereotypes and generalisations that
students were expected to accept—and reproduce uncritically in their answers—and the
resistance she experienced when she tried to raise this issue with her colleagues. See also the
account in Herrera (2002).
2. Wing and Smith’s article is published in the Winter 2006 issue of the UC Davis Law Review,
which highlights a series of papers from the Future of Critical Race Feminism symposium held at
UC Davis in April of 2005.
3. See Harris (1993) for an analysis of how white privilege has been institutionalised within United
States law.
4. For an analysis of how white race privilege has been a core feature of American social policy in
the 20th century, see Lipsitz (1998). See also Katznelson (2005) for a detailed historical analysis
of how mid-century public policies such as Social Security and the G.I. Bill were created and
administered in ways that facilitated the creation of the white middle class and thus significantly
widened the racial gap in education, employment and wealth between blacks and whites in the
United States. For analyses of race in the British context, see The Commission on Multiethnic
Britain (2000) and the BBC’s May 2002 report Race U.K. (available online at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/1993597.stm).
5. For a discussion of traditional liberalism versus contemporary liberalism, see Moses (2001). For
a historical account of the relationship between race and different strands of liberalism and how
these have played out in the US political context, see Horton (2005).
6. For a historical account of how Celts, Jews, Armenians and Slavs were racialised as white in the
United States, see Jacobsen (1998). Jacobsen perceptively notes that while white ethnic groups
experienced racial discrimination in the early part of the 20th century, which complicates simple
black-white readings of racial discrimination, it is also a mistake to project this discrimination
into the present ‘as though whiteness and the category ‘‘Caucasian’’ had had no purchase at all
upon the nation’s political life’ (Jacobsen, 1998, p. 276).
7. For a detailed analysis of the relationship between families’ wealth, standards of living and
general life chances and the racial gap in wealth in the contemporary United States, see Shapiro
(2004). Shapiro argues that wealth rather than income is a more important indicator of families’
economic standing. If white families and black families at the same level of income are
compared, white families’ net worth and net financial assets, or liquid assets, are far greater than
black families’. Shapiro argues that these contemporary patterns are not simply a function of
families’ differing propensities to save but instead are rooted in the process whereby
‘transformative assets’ or inherited wealth is passed down through generations. Two key forms
of transformative assets are: (1) cash in the form of a gift that allows a family to place a down
payment on a home; and (2) university tuition payments.
8. While only briefly addressed by the authors in a footnote, there are also some important parallels
between Guinier and Torres’ conceptualisation of power-with and Freire’s (1990) discussion of
praxis.
9. K-Mart is a discount department store based in the United States. While the K-Mart Company
operated stores in Asia, Australia, Canada, Europe and Mexico, the company had sold or
discontinued its overseas operations by 2000 largely due to financial problems.
10. In the case of Hopwood v. Texas, plaintiff Cheryl Hopwood and three other white applicants to
the University of Texas Law School challenged the school’s admissions process on the
grounds that black and Mexican American applicants with lower grade point averages and LSAT
scores were admitted over her and her co-plaintiffs in a separate admissions process. The
district court upheld the use of race in the law schools admissions process as a way to address the
effects of past discrimination while declaring the separate review of minority candidates
unconstitutional. The plaintiffs appealed against the decision to Fifth Circuit Court, which ruled
that race-based affirmative action plans were unconstitutional. The Supreme Court denied to
grant certiorari in 1996. (In the US, certiorari is the writ that a court of appeal issues to a lower
court in order to review its judgment for legal error, where no appeal is available as a matter of
right. Since, in most cases, appeal cannot be made to the US Supreme Court, a party who wants
that court to review a decision of a federal or state court files a ‘petition for a writ of certiorari’ in
the Supreme Court. If the court grants the petition, the case is scheduled for briefing and
argument.) Hopwood was overruled by the Supreme Court’s decision in Grutter v. Bollinger
(2003).
11. Gerald Torres was one of the co-authors of the Texas Ten Percent Plan.
12. MALDEF et al. (2005) point out that these patterns are not necessarily an outcome of the greater
selectivity at UT Austin and Texas A&M compared to other state schools. For example,
California’s racial demographics are roughly similar to Texas, and the top UC campuses UCLA
and UC Berkeley are both more selective than their Texas counterparts and also more diverse.
13. While this phrasing is awkward, I use the term ‘racialised as non-whites’ to highlight how whites
are also racialised.
14. Harris (2003) critiques Guinier and Torres’ analysis of the Texan Ten Percent Plan as an instance
of political race, arguing instead that Bell’s (1980) interest convergence thesis is a better
explanation of why the Texas Ten Percent Plan was passed.
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