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Black ICE Bioterrorism International Coordination Exercise After-Action Report
Black ICE Bioterrorism International Coordination Exercise After-Action Report
Bioterrorism
International Coordination Exercise
After-Action Report
The events regarding a bioterrorism attack contained in the Black ICE scenario are entirely
fictional and do not represent any organization or government’s opinion of the likelihood of any
particular bioterrorism attack scenario. The choice and source of disease agent, method of
attack, pattern of infection, and nations attacked were all chosen solely to assess international
organizations’ abilities to respond to bioterrorism. Exercise designers did not consult any type of
threat assessment in designing the scenario.
Black ICE organizers express sincere appreciation for the financial support of two prestigious
non-governmental institutions, the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and the Nuclear Threat
Initiative’s Global Health and Security Initiative.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In an unprecedented initiative to enhance international organizations' preparedness for and
response to bioterrorism, on September 7-8, 2006, the United States and Switzerland co-hosted
Black ICE (Bioterrorism International Coordination Exercise), a bioterrorism tabletop
exercise (TTX) in Montreux, Switzerland. With high-level officials leading delegations from 12
international organizations, Black ICE successfully catalyzed top-level dialogue between
organizations on vital bioterrorism-related cooperation, including: 1) international response
coordination authority; 2) the challenges of competing international health, investigative,
humanitarian, and security priorities; 3) sharing resources (financial, technical, logistical)
between and among organizations; and 4) the need to coordinate response and recovery with
national governments and regional entities. Black ICE increased participants’ awareness of the
international community’s response capabilities and constraints and identified key challenges to
a coordinated international response to a bioterrorism event. Particular areas of interest are
public communication, information sharing, operational readiness, and the impact of national
interests on organizational missions. Among critical issues emerging from the TTX, Black ICE
discussion and interaction indicated clear divergences between those working in the areas of
security and public health, highlighting the need for greater multi-sectoral international
engagement in combating bioterrorism.
In the Black ICE scenario six terrorists from South Asia self-infect with smallpox and, while
they are at their most contagious, travel by air to Central Asia. During their travel and upon
arrival, the terrorists infect as many people as possible with the disease. National response
capabilities are quickly overwhelmed and governments call upon international organizations for
assistance in areas such as disease diagnosis and interventions, public health and law
enforcement investigations, coordinating transportation policies, and managing displaced
populations. Ultimately 465 people in 17 countries in Europe, South Asia, Central Asia, and
North America are infected resulting in 108 deaths over six weeks.
Funded through a strategic public-private and international partnership, Black ICE's ground-
breaking breadth and level of participation fueled the process of building bridges between
organizations while simultaneously pointing out critical gaps in international counterterrorism
coordination and response planning for a bioterrorism attack. Participants endorsed plans to
further explore these issues and others in a series of two follow-on exercises that Interpol offered
to host.
U.S. and Swiss Black ICE hosting delegations were led by Ambassador Jacques Pitteloud, Head
of the Centre for International Security and Policy at the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign
Affairs, and Ambassador Henry A. Crumpton, U.S. Coordinator for Counterterrorism.
Several key recommendations emerged from the observations of Black ICE, including:
1. Although many international organizations are important repositories of expertise, their
on-the-ground response capacities have finite limitations. Consequently, nations should
strengthen their own capabilities in detecting and responding to a bioterrorism attack.
2. Nations should establish mechanisms for sharing medical countermeasures (e.g.,
vaccines, drugs, personal protective equipment) with other nations in a response to
bioterrorism. Further, nations should support international organizations’ efforts to
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develop and sustain an effective system for the apportionment of available medical
countermeasures.
3. International organizations should, with the support of member states, work to clarify the
coordinating authority of a response by international organizations to bioterrorism.
4. International organizations and individual nations should acknowledge and emphasize the
multi-sectoral nature of preparation for and response to bioterrorism.
5. International organizations should, within their mandates, thoughtfully evaluate their
bioterrorism response capabilities to pinpoint potential areas for creative collaboration
with other organizations.
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Black ICE After-Action Report
Black ice: A thin, transparent layer of ice on a roadway that gives the impression of being
merely water. It is extremely hazardous because it is difficult to detect and may appear to be
harmless.
Developed in close coordination between the Government of the United States, the Government
of Switzerland, and the 12 participating organizations, Black ICE goals reflected not only the
critical international needs in combating bioterrorism through collaboration, but also the needs
and aspirations of a diverse range of international entities, many of which are assessing their
roles in preventing or responding to bioterrorism, and their engagement with other global
partners.
Black ICE took place September 7-8, 2006, in Montreux, Switzerland. In addition to the time
participants spent engaged in the TTX itself, lunch and dinner events facilitated participants’
side-bar discussions and interorganizational networking. The participants’ interactions outside
of the structured exercise time strengthened informal communication by building both personal
and institutional relationships among international organizations, a key objective of the exercise.
Through both formal and informal means, Black ICE also promoted greater interorganizational
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Exercise Funding
Funding for Black ICE was a unique and successful international public-private partnership that
leveraged U.S. and Swiss Government resources several-fold through support from the Alfred P.
Sloan Foundation and the Nuclear Threat Initiative’s (NTI) Global Health and Security Initiative.
Exercise Planning
The development process of Black ICE itself illustrated the broadly collaborative and
international nature of the entire international bioterrorism initiative. Outreach to organizations
invited to participate in Black ICE began almost a year prior to the exercise and continued
throughout the exercise design. To strengthen international organization input into the TTX
design, U.S. and Swiss organizers convened a series of conference calls involving all of the
participating organizations. These calls were an important component of the inclusive nature of
the Black ICE design and allowed international organizations an opportunity to provide
thoughtful input into the development and direction of the exercise scenario.
Exercise Invitations
Through consultation with many entities both inside and outside of their respective governments,
U.S. and Swiss exercise planners created a list of international organizations invited to
participate in Black ICE. (More information on each of these organizations is found in the
“Participating Organizations” section below.) After much trans-Atlantic coordination, the head
of each organization (Secretary General or equivalent) received an invitation letter co-signed by
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Swiss Vice President and Chief of the Federal
Department of Foreign Affairs Micheline Calmy-Rey. Participating organizations responded to
this invitation enthusiastically and at senior levels.
Exercise Format
Senior leaders from international organizations participated in a tabletop exercise (TTX) that
employed realistic multimedia presentations including simulated news reports, an exercise
situation manual (SITMAN) that served as a reference manual through the exercise, and a
PowerPoint slide presentation. In convening exercise play, the exercise facilitator presented the
scenario events of the bioterrorist attack and led participants in the plenary discussion sessions,
creating an effective venue for candid interorganizational interaction and introspection.
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Black ICE provided a forum for exploring the roles, responsibilities, capabilities, and gaps of
international organizations in preparing for and responding to a bioterrorism event. To promote
open and candid discussion among participants, they were assured that Black ICE was not a test
of existing capabilities or knowledge, but rather an opportunity to explore areas for greater
synergy. Participants were encouraged to think creatively and collaboratively, sharing new
approaches and ideas outside of their organizations’ extant plans and capabilities. Black ICE
was designed for senior-level participants with decision-making authority who could call their
entire organization’s resources into action.
Participating Organizations
Black ICE brought together senior officials from 12 key international organizations, including
five organizations from the United Nations system and seven independent organizations,
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representing such critical response fields as public health, security, transportation, law
enforcement, and humanitarian response.
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SCENARIO OVERVIEW
The events in the Black ICE scenario are entirely fictional and do not represent any
organization or government’s opinion of the likelihood of any particular bioterrorism
attack scenario. The choice and source of disease agent, method of attack, pattern of
infection, and regions attacked were all chosen solely to assess international organizations’
abilities to respond to bioterrorism. Exercise designers did not consult any type of threat
assessment in designing the scenario.
Background
A terrorist organization, The Council of Eight, has
obtained the virus Variola major (smallpox) and
plans to attack on the annual Independence Day
celebration in a Central Asian nation on 31
August 2006. Six terrorists self-infect with
smallpox and travel by air from South Asia on 30
August. They intend to expose as many people as
possible during their air travel and as they
circulate extensively at the Independence Day
celebration.
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EMERGING THEMES
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activities of law enforcement or security organizations. The reverse is also sometimes true,
although security-oriented organizations in general expressed more willingness to explore
possible collaboration with unfamiliar organizations.
The Need to Efficiently Share Resources
Black ICE participants repeatedly returned to the issues surrounding the need to efficiently share
resources (financial, technical, and logistical)
between and among organizations. Many of the
organizations have significantly different
responsibilities and skills, but strikingly similar
requirements, especially in the area of logistics.
Although some organizations have relationships with
each other (particularly among the humanitarian
response organizations), sharing resources among
organizations seemed quite challenging, especially
between organizations on either side of the security-
humanitarian divide.
The Need to Coordinate with National Governments and Regional Entities
Participants noted that the effectiveness of international organizations is highly dependent upon
the cooperation and capabilities of countries involved and that national policies can conflict with
the best advice from international organizations on issues such as vaccination strategies, border
control measures, and investigative practices, among others. In addition, some organizations’
mandates require that they only engage in a response when nations request their assistance. If
nations delay these requests, international organizations’ ability to help may be compromised or
even eliminated.
THE RESPONSE
Participating organizations were unanimous in their accolades for Black ICE, repeatedly seeking
out U.S. and Swiss officials to express interest in next steps and solicit input and possible
engagement on a range of bioterrorism-related initiatives. Senior officials across the
organizations praised the networking and relationship-building opportunities that Black ICE
offered and sought out opportunities for follow-on exercises. Stimulated by the dynamic
interaction and interorganizational engagement, Interpol announced plans to convene two
bioterrorism-specific follow-on exercises in 2007 and 2008 while other participating
organizations expressed a keen interest in scheduling future events to discuss improving areas for
coordination identified during Black ICE.
As both U.S. and Swiss officials noted, and as a number of participants indicated in Black ICE
feedback forms, achieving such a collection of top-level international officials at this event for
this particular purpose was in itself a significant and positive outcome, boding well for future
engagement. Participants praised, in particular, the consistent and open U.S. and Swiss initiative
to ensure that all organizations had a voice not just in the exercise itself, but in virtually every
step of its design and implementation. Several organizations underscored the need for all invited
international organizations to participate in exercises such as Black ICE and encouraged the
U.S. and Switzerland to continue such partnership, engagement, and outreach.
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KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
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organizations will require the support and political will of national governments to make
such effective stockpiles and allocation systems a reality.
3. International organizations should, with the support of national governments and other
institutions, work to clarify the coordination mechanisms and/or coordinating authority
of a response by international organizations to bioterrorism. The international
organizations that participate in Black ICE possess a tremendous catalogue of resources
necessary to a bioterrorism response. However, the Black ICE event demonstrated that no
coordination mechanisms or central bioterrorism response coordinating body exist and that,
without coordination, a bioterrorism response by international organizations would likely be
inefficient and, in a worst case scenario, chaotic and ineffective. International organizations,
however, will not be able to develop such effective coordination mechanisms and/or a
coordinating authority without the clear support of national governments and other
institutions. Black ICE pointed out critical gaps or redundancies in implementing a
coordinated international response. The great challenge, though, is to develop an effective
solution which helps coordinate international organizations’ and national governments’
efforts to mount an effective and complementary response. Additionally, this work will be
need to achieve balance and synergy among the many competing needs in bioterrorism
response (i.e., public health, humanitarian, law enforcement investigation, security, disaster
relief, intelligence), while acknowledging the wide variety of capabilities and mandates in the
international organizations.
4. International organizations and individual nations should acknowledge and emphasize
the multi-sectoral nature of preparation for and response to bioterrorism. An effective
bioterrorism response, whether by international organizations or national governments,
requires input, skill, and guidance from a broad range of sectors that includes law
enforcement, public health, military, intelligence, agriculture, foreign affairs, development
assistance, environment, transportation, and science sectors. Some of these sectors, however,
do not traditionally work together, are not always aware of others’ roles and responsibilities,
and are sometimes wary of association with one another. Black ICE facilitated some
exchange of information among key international organizations, but it was only a beginning.
International organizations must proactively foster multi-sectoral awareness and coordination
both within and among organizations in their work to prepare for and respond to a
bioterrorism attack. Likewise, national governments should cultivate this same multi-
sectoral coordination among domestic agencies as well as internationally.
5. International organizations should thoughtfully evaluate their bioterrorism response
capabilities and systems to pinpoint potential areas for creative collaboration with other
organizations. Black ICE brought together a vast array of international organizations with a
tremendous range of responsibilities. No matter how diverse the mandates, however, many
organizations needs in common – often in the area of logistics. Organizations can leverage
their bioterrorism response capabilities by creatively evaluating their resources and planning
together in advance of a bioterrorism attack to avoid redundancies and overlaps.
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CONCLUSION
Officials from most organizations found the exercise valuable in increasing their understanding
of the sometimes complementary organizational roles and of the potential for overlaps and
confusion. Participants praised the networking and
relationship-building opportunities that Black ICE
offered. Overall, participants found the exercise
experience valuable, and expressed their eagerness to
participate in follow-on exercises. Some organizations
have plans to improve coordination gaps identified during
Black ICE. As several participants noted, inspiring the
senior leadership of these diverse international
organizations to participate in Black ICE was, in itself, a
major achievement and a significant contribution to
enhancing global cooperation to combat bioterrorism.
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