Himagan v People

237 SCRA 538 (Nov. 18, 1997) Facts: Ishmael Himagan a policeman assigned in medical company of the Philippine National Police Regional Headquarters at Camp Catitigan, Davao City, was implicated in the killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and the attempted murder of Bernabe Machitar. After the information for murder and attempted murder were filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Davao City, On September 16, 1992, the trial court issued an Order suspending petitioner until the termination of the case on the basis of Section 47, R.A. 6975, otherwise known as Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990, which states : Sec. 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Crimunal Case. Upon the filling of a complaint or Information sufficient in form and sustance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies Where the penalty impose by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated.Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accoused. On October 11, 1993, Himagan filed a motion to lift the order of suspension,relying on Section 42 of P.D. 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days, but on December 14, 1993 respondent judge denied the motion and motion for reconsideration was also denied. Higaman appealed to the Supreme Court for a petition for certiorari and mandamus to set aside the orders of the respondent Judge and assailed the suspension averring that Sec 42 of PD807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days.He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to theCivil Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of law.

Issue: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by theConstitution.

Rulling: No, The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Thus, the equal protection clause does not absolutely forbid classifications, such as the one which exists in the instant case. If the classification is based on real and substantial differences; is germane to the purpose of the law; applies to all members of the same class; and applies to current as well as future conditions,the classification may not be impugned as violating the Constitution's equal protection guarantee. If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Section 47 ofR.A. 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman's constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. -Ivan Bright F. Villanueva-

Marquez v Desierto
359 SCRA 772 (July 27, 2001) FACTS: Sometime in May 1998,Lourdes T. Marquez a Branch Manager of Union Bank of the Philippines,Julia Vargas Branch, recieved an Order from the Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto to produce several bank documents for purposes of inspection in camera relative to a case pending with the Ombudsman entitled, Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) v. Amado Lagdameo, et. al. On May 26, 1998 the FFIB panel met the petitioner and aggreed to an in camera inspection on June 3, 1998. However on June 4, 1998 pettioner wrote that she needs more time to comply with the order, the inspection was reset again and on June 16, 1998 the Ombudsman issued an order directing the petitioner to produce the bank documents and if not complied, petitioner will facing contempt under Sec 3(b) and Se. 36of R.A. 6779. On July 10, 1998 petitioner filed for declaratory relief, prohibition and injuction with the RTC of Makati against Ombudsman but RTC denied the petition and motion of reconsideration was also denied. The petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether of not Marquez complying with the order of the Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection will not violate R.A. 1405 and allowed as an exception. Rulling: Marquez should not comply with the order of the Ombudsman because the order of the Ombudsman to produce for in camera inspection the subject accounts with the Union Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, is based on a pending investigation at the Office of the Ombudsman against Amado Lagdameo, et. al. for violation of R. A. No. 3019, Sec. 3 (e) and (g) relative to the Joint Venture Agreement between the Public Estates Authority and AMARI. An examination of the secrecy of bank deposits law (R. A. No. 1405) would reveal the following exceptions: 1. Where the depositor consents in writing; 2. Impeachment case; 3. By court order in bribery or dereliction of duty cases against public officials; 4. Deposit is subject of litigation; 5. Sec. 8, R. A. No. 3019, in cases of unexplained wealth as held in the case of PNB vs. Gancayco The court ruled that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case. In Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,it held that Section 2 of the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits, as amended, declares bank deposits to be absolutely confidential except: (1) In an examination made in the course of a special or general examination of a bank that is specifically authorized by the Monetary Board after being satisfied that there is reasonable ground to believe that a bank fraud or serious irregularity has been or is being

committed and that it is necessary to look into the deposit to establish such fraud or irregularity, (2) In an examination made by an independent auditor hired by the bank to conduct its regular audit provided that the examination is for audit purposes only and the results thereof shall be for the exclusive use of the bank, (3 Upon written permission of the depositor, (4) In cases of impeachment, (5) Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or (6) In cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation There is yet no pending litigation before any court of competent authority. What is existing is an investigation by the office of the Ombudsman. Clearly, there was no pending case in court which would warrant the opening of the bank account for inspection. Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that "[e]very person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as actionable torts several acts for meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also holds a public officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private communications. The Revised Penal Code makes a crime of the violation of secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act, and the Intellectual Property Code. -Ivan Bright F. Villanueva-

Misola v Panga
181 SCRA 630 (January 30, 1990) FACTS: Petittioner was known as a member of the N.P.A., after receiving an information from unidentified informant, Police raided the under ground house and found an illegal firearm where petitioner was charged by the prosecutors of illegal possession of firearms under Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 1866 which penalizes illegal possession of firearms and ammunition commited in futherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion, insurection, or subvertion. Which inflicts higher penalty up to sentence if death. ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 1. Of P.D. No. 1866 is unconstitutional for being violative of Art. III Sec 22 of the 1987 Constitution . RULLING: Sec 1 of P.D. 1866 is not contrary to the 1987 Constitution, where a law or statute is People v Ferer, defined a bill of attainder as a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial trial. On the instant case, where petitioner was tried in court. Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial. The last element, the total lack of court intervention in the finding of guilt and the determination of the actual penalty to be imposed, is the most essential to be considered as a bill of attainder the P.D. 1866, paragraph 1. P.D. No. 1866 does not posses the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to inflict punishment without a judicial trial. Nowhere in the measure is there a finding of guilt and an imposition of a corresponding punishment. What the decree does is to define the offense and provide for the penalty that may be imposed, specifying the qualifying circumstances that would aggravate the offense. There is no encroachment on the power of the court to determine after due hearing whether the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the offense of illegal possesion of firearms has been commited and that the qualifying circumstance attached to it has been established also beyond reasonable doubt as the Constitution and judial precedents require.

Govt of the USA v Purganan

ISSUE: Whether or not an extridite can be granted of bail RULLING: No, extradite cannot be granted of bail, because Art III, Sec 13. States that All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Execessive bail shall not be required.
Respondent Mark B. Jimenez was correct that this constitutional provision secures the right to bail of all persons, including those sought to be extradited.Supposedly, the only exceptions are the ones charged with offences punishable with reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong. On the other hand, there is no provision in the Philippine Constitution granting the right to bail to a person who is the subject of an extradition request and arrest warrant. As suggested by the use of the word conviction, the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not ne subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue. The rule, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty to curve grave abuse of discreation and tyranny, as well as the power to promulgate rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights. Futhermore, the right to due process is broad enough to include the grant of basic fairness to extradites. Indeed, the right to due process extents to the life, liberty or property of every person. It is dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every situation calling for its application.kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after a potential extraditee has been arrested or placed under custody of the law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in the exradition cases therein.