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Undue Influence Lecture
Undue Influence Lecture
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UNDUE INFLUENCE IN EQUITY
INTRODUCTION
"Equity gives relief on the ground of undue influence where an agreement has
been obtained by certain kinds of improper pressure which were thought not
to amount to duress at common law because no element of violence to the
person was involved" (GH Treitel, The Law of Contract, p377).
A person who has been induced to enter into a transaction (eg, a gift, contract
or guarantee) by the undue influence of another (the wrongdoer) is entitled to
set that transaction aside as against the wrongdoer. The effect of undue
influence, like duress, is to make the contract voidable.
Such undue influence is either actual or presumed. In Barclays Bank v
O'Brien [1993] 4 All ER 417, the House of Lords adopted the following
classification of undue influence chosen by the Court of Appeal in BCCI v
Aboody [1989] 1 QB 923:
CLASS 1: ACTUAL UNDUE INFLUENCE
In these cases it is necessary for the claimant to prove affirmatively that the
wrongdoer exerted undue influence on the complainant to enter into the
particular transaction which is impugned. For example, see:
Williams v Bailey (1866) LR 1 HL 200.
Undue influence was described by Lindley LJ in Allcard v Skinner (1887) as
". some unfair and improper conduct, some coercion from outside, some
overreaching, some form of cheating and generally, though not always, some
personal advantage gained.
The House of Lords held in CIBC Mortgages v Pitt [1993] 4 All ER 433, that
there is no further requirement in cases of this kind that the transaction must
be shown to be to the manifest disadvantage of the party seeking to set it
aside (disapproving BCCI v Aboody (1989) on this point).
CLASS 2: PRESUMED UNDUE INFLUENCE
In these cases the complainant only has to show, in the first instance, that
there was a relationship of trust and confidence between the complainant and
the wrongdoer of such a nature that it is fair to presume that the wrongdoer
abused that relationship in procuring the complainant to enter the impugned
transaction.
In class 2 cases therefore, there is no need to produce evidence that actual
undue influence was exerted in relation to the particular transaction impugned:
once a confidential relationship has been proved, the burden then shifts to the
wrongdoer to prove that the complainant entered into the impugned
transaction freely, for example by showing that the complainant had
independent advice.
Note that it must also be shown that the transaction was manifestly
disadvantageous to the party alleged to be influenced (National Westminster
Bank v Morgan [1985] 1 All ER 821, below).
Such a confidential relationship can be established in two ways:
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CLASS 2A
Certain relationships as a matter of law raise the presumption that undue
influence has been exercised.
The relationships where undue influence is presumed have been held to be:
parent & child (Wright v Vanderplank (1855); solicitor & client (Wright v Carter
(1903)); doctor & patient (Mitchell v Homfray (1881)); trustee & beneficiary
(Ellis v Barker (1871)); and religious adviser & disciple (Roche v Sherrington
(1982)). For a case example see:
Allcard v Skinner (1887) 36 Ch D 145.
The relationship of husband and wife does not, as a matter of law, raise a
presumption of undue influence within class 2A (Midland Bank v Shepherd
(1988)). Nor does the rule apply between employer and employee (Matthew v
Bobbins (1980)).
CLASS 2B
If the complainant proves the existence of a relationship under which the
complainant generally reposed trust and confidence in the wrongdoer, the
existence of such relationship raises the presumption of undue influence.
In a class 2B case therefore, in the absence of evidence disproving undue
influence, the complainant will succeed in setting aside the impugned
transaction merely by proof that the complainant reposed trust and confidence
in the wrongdoer without having to prove that the wrongdoer exerted actual
undue influence or otherwise abused such trust and confidence in relation to
the particular transaction impugned.
The relation of banker and customer will not normally give rise to a
presumption of undue influence, but it can do so in exceptional cases if the
customer has placed himself entirely in the hands of the bank and has not
been given any opportunity to seek independent advice. See:
Lloyd's Bank v Bundy [1974] 3 All ER 757
National Westminster Bank v Morgan [1985] 1 All ER 821
MANIFEST DISADVANTAGE
With both of the above presumptions (class 2A and 2B), the transaction must
be to the 'manifest disadvantage' of the party claiming undue influence. See:
National Westminster Bank v Morgan [1985] 1 All ER 821
BCCI v Aboody [1989] 1 QB 923
Barclays Bank v Coleman (2000) The Times, January 5.
UNDUE INFLUENCE AND THIRD PARTIES
Undue influence is now regularly invoked by wife-sureties where their
relationship with the bank-creditor is manipulated when the debtor-husband
acts as intermediary. For example, a husband persuading his wife to
guarantee his company's overdraft with a bank, using the matrimonial home,
of which she is joint owner, as security for the debt. In such situations the
creditor may be 'tainted' by the undue influence of the intermediary. If a bank
entrusts certain duties to a debtor-husband who, as intermediary, is capable
of exerting some influence over his wife, the position is as follows:
1. If the transaction is one which is (a) on its face not to the financial advantage
of the party seeking to set it aside, and (b) if there is a substantial risk of its
having been obtained by undue influence, then the third party will have
constructive notice of undue influence giving the right to set aside the
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transaction. The creditor must take reasonable steps to ensure that the wife's
consent was properly obtained. See:
Barclays Bank v O'Brien [1993] 4 All ER 417.
2. However, if the transaction is not of this kind, but is on its face capable of
benefiting the party who seeks to set it aside, the third party will not have
constructive notice of any undue influence which may in fact have existed.
See:
CIBC Mortgages v Pitt [1993] 4 All ER 433.
REBUTTING THE PRESUMPTION
The presumption of undue influence is rebutted if the party benefiting from the
transaction shows that it was "the free exercise of independent will, even if no
external advice was given or even though it was not taken (Inche Noriah v
Shaik Allie bin Omar [1928] All ER 189). However, the most usual way of
rebutting the presumption is to show that the other party had independent
advice before entering into the transaction. Case examples include:
Re Craig [1970] 2 All ER 390
Re Brocklehurst [1978] 1 All ER 767.
Where a bank seeks to enforce its security against a wife who claims to have
been induced by her husband's undue influence or misrepresentation to
charge the matrimonial home by way of security, the principles which apply in
determining whether the bank is able to rely on the fact that the wife received
legal advice before entering into the charge to rebut the presumption of undue
influence and imputed or constructive notice thereof and whether the bank
ought to have been put on inquiry to ascertain whether the wife was subject to
her husband's undue influence, were given by the Court of Appeal in:
Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No 2) [1998] 4 All ER 705.
REMEDIES
The remedy in cases of undue influence is rescission. Damages are not
available, but see below.
RESCISSION
Where rescission is ordered, the whole transaction will be set aside. See:
TSB Bank v Camfield [1995] 1 All ER 951
Dunbar Bank v Nadeem [1998] 3 All ER 876.
Bars to rescission:
(i) IMPOSSIBILITY OF RESTITUTION
However, the fact that restitutio in integrum is impossible will not be a bar to
rescission:
O'Sullivan v Management Agency & Music Ltd [1985] 3 All ER 351
Cheese v Thomas [1994] 1 All ER 35
Mahoney v Purnell [1996] 3 All ER 61.
(ii) DELAY
Delay defeats equity. For example, see:
Allcard v Skinner (1887) 36 Ch D 145.
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SEVERANCE
It may be possible for the court to sever from an instrument affected by undue
influence the objectionable parts leaving the part uncontaminated by undue
influence enforceable. See:
Barclays Bank v Caplan and Another (1997) The Times, December 12.
DAMAGES
Damages are not available for undue influence, but if a bank has broken a
duty of care to a wife-surety damages may be available in negligence under
Hedley Byrne v Heller (1964).