Dupuy v. McEwen, Cato Legal Briefs
Dupuy v. McEwen, Cato Legal Briefs
07-1075
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
___________
BELINDA DUPUY, et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
ERWIN MCEWEN, DIRECTOR, ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Respondent.
___________
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit
___________
BRIEF OF THE CATO INSTITUTE, THE
INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE, AND THE
GOLDWATER INSTITUTE AS AMICI CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
___________
ILYA SHAPIRO
CATO INSTITUTE
1000 Massachusetts
Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001
(202) 842-0200
Counsel for Amici Curiae
March 11, 2008 * Counsel of Record
QUESTION PRESENTED
When a State has only “mere suspicion” of child
abuse or neglect, does it deprive the parents and their
children of their rights under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment when it:
(a) secures safety plans either by direction or by
telling a parent that if they refuse to agree to a plan,
the State may take custody of the children and place
them in foster care; and
(b) provides no opportunity to contest the plans?
(i)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED ................................... i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................. v
INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE................. 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.............................. 2
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION... 4
I. FAMILY INTEGRITY IS A FUNDA-
MENTAL RIGHT THAT THE STATE
MAY NOT ABRIDGE THROUGH ITS
SAFETY PLAN PROCESS ........................... 4
A. Family Integrity Is A Fundamental
Right .......................................................... 4
B. Family Integrity May Not Be Abridged
Without Due Process................................. 6
C. The “Safety Plans” Do Not Satisfy Due
Process....................................................... 9
D. The “Safety Plans” Violate Due Process
By Vesting Unfettered Discretion In
State Officials............................................ 13
II. THE STATE’S “SAFETY PLANS” IMPOSE
AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITION
THAT IMPROPERLY INFRINGES ON
FAMILY INTEGRITY................................... 15
A. The Unconstitutional Conditions Doc-
trine Prohibits The Government From
Accomplishing Indirectly What It May
Not Lawfully Command Directly ............. 16
(iii)
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS – continued
Page
B. The “Safety Plans” Violate The Uncon-
stitutional Conditions Doctrine................ 19
CONCLUSION ..................................................... 21
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES Page
Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 235 (1819) ..................................... 13
Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518
U.S. 668 (1996) ........................................... 17
Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303 (11th
Cir. 2004) .................................................... 18
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986)..... 4, 5
Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114
(1889) .......................................................... 13
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976)............. 16
FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S.
215 (1990) ................................................... 14
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) ......... 14
Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972)................ 17
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) ........... 5
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) ... 8, 9
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)....... 6, 12
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110
(1989) .......................................................... 5
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494
(1977) .......................................................... 5, 7
Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) ......................... 18
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S.
825 (1987) ................................................... 16, 17
O’Connor v. Pierson, 426 F.3d 187 (2d Cir.
2005) ........................................................... 18
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593
(1972) ..................................................... 3, 16, 17
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944) .......................................................... 6, 7
R.S.W.W. v. City of Keego Harbor, 397 F.3d
427 (6th Cir. 2005) ..................................... 18
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – continued
Page
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst.
Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006) ................. 19
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)..... 8, 9
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969),
overruled on other grounds by Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) .................. 17
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) ....... 17
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394
U.S. 147 (1969) ........................................... 14
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,
316 U.S. 535 (1942) .................................... 5
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958)...... 16, 17
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) ........ 7
Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313
(1958) .......................................................... 14
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) 2, 6, 7, 10
United Pub. Workers of Am. (CIO) v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) ...................... 17
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112
(2001) .......................................................... 19
United States v. Oliveras, 905 F.2d 623 (2d
Cir. 1990) ................................................... 16, 18
United States v. Saunders, 973 F.2d 1354
(7th Cir. 1992) ............................................ 18
United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863 (9th
Cir. 2006) .................................................... 18
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) ...... 6
STATUTE
325 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/5 ............................ 3, 10, 12
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – continued
SCHOLARLY AUTHORITIES Page
Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Con-
ditions, State Power, and the Limits of
Consent, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1988).......... 16
INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE1
The Cato Institute, the Institute for Justice, and
the Goldwater Institute, as amici curiae, respectfully
request that this Court grant the petition for writ of
certiorari to review the decision and judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit.
The Cato Institute was established in 1977 as a
nonpartisan public policy research foundation
dedicated to advancing the principles of individual
liberty, free markets, and limited government. Cato’s
Center for Constitutional Studies was established in
1989 to help restore the principles of limited
constitutional government that are the foundation of
liberty. Toward those ends, the Cato Institute
publishes books and studies, conducts conferences
and forums, publishes the annual Cato Supreme
Court Review, and files amicus briefs with the
courts. The instant case is of central concern to Cato
because it raises vital questions about individual
rights and the rule of law.
The Institute for Justice is a nonprofit, public
interest legal center established in 1991 and
committed to defending the essential foundations of a
free society and securing greater protection for
individual liberty. The Institute has a particular
interest in protecting the natural right of parents to
counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part, and
no person or entity other than amici made a monetary
contribution to the preparation or submission of the brief.
Counsel of record for all parties have been given timely notice of
the filing of this brief, and letters of consent have been filed with
the Clerk.
2
direct the upbringing and education of their children.
Among the issues the Institute has litigated in this
area are parental school choice and mandatory
community service as a condition of public high
school graduation. The Institute also filed an amicus
brief supporting parental rights in Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
The Goldwater Institute, established in 1988, is a
nonprofit, independent, nonpartisan, research and
educational organization dedicated to the study of
public policy. Through its research papers, editorials,
policy briefings and forums, the Institute advances
public policies founded upon the principles of limited
government, economic freedom and individual
responsibility. A core purpose of the Goldwater
Institute and its Center for Constitutional Litigation
is the preservation of constitutional liberties,
including family relationships.
their scope, and they may require one parent to leave the house
where the child is living, preventing a parent from being in the
presence of the child unless he or she is supervised by
designated parent or other “safety person” to be in the presence
of the child at all times, or even sending the child to live with
relatives. Pet. App. 54-73.
12
Thus, the State need not articulate any justification
to parents or to the judiciary in order to infringe on
family integrity through the “Safety Plan” process.
Consequently, these “Safety Plans” fail the second
factor of the Mathews test because they create an
enormous risk that the State will erroneously deprive
citizens of their fundamental rights after parents,
coerced by the State, “waive” those rights under the
threat of an even greater deprivation.
Third, in the absence of some articulable and
reasonable evidence of malfeasance, the State’s
undoubted interest in protecting children from abuse
or neglect cannot outweigh the parents’ fundamental
right to family integrity. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-
400. Indeed, as noted above, the State already has an
alternative procedure in place to remove children
from abusive homes on an emergency basis, and this
process requires the articulation of evidence and
subsequent judicial scrutiny. 325 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/5.
Therefore, there is no reasonable practical, legal, or
administrative hurdle preventing the State from
affording appropriate due process to parents.
In sum, the court below allowed the State to
intrude on a fundamental right protected by the Due
Process Clause without affording adequate – or any –
procedural protections. Instead, due process requires
the State (i) to articulate objectively reasonable
evidence of abuse or neglect to justify having
threatened parents with removal, and (ii) to satisfy
some periodic judicial scrutiny to guard against abuse
of the Safety Plan program.
13
D. The “Safety Plans” Violate Due Process
By Vesting Unfettered Discretion In
State Officials.
The “Safety Plans” also violate due process by
vesting unfettered and unreviewable discretion in the
hands of state officials to interfere with fundamental
familial rights. Through its “Safety Plans,” the State
empowers its officials to impose restrictions on
parents’ fundamental rights without (1) any apparent
check to govern the agent’s authority to impose the
mechanism in the first instance, or (2) any procedure
by which the agent’s decisions could be subjected to
judicial scrutiny after the fact.
The Constitution provides a bulwark against
arbitrary and unlawful government action. See Bank
of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 244
(1819) (an individual should be secure from “the
arbitrary exercise of the powers of government,
unrestrained by the established principles of private
rights and distributive justice”); Dent v. West
Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 124 (1889) (“The great
purpose of the [due process] requirement is to exclude
everything that is arbitrary and capricious in
legislation affecting the rights of the citizen.”). Due
process imposes limits on the discretion of
government officials to act, especially where
fundamental rights are at stake.
These limitations proceed on the assumption that
(i) an official who is accountable will act more
prudently, and (ii) a parent who has an appeal to a
body independent of the controversy has protection
against a government official’s passion, obstinacy,
irrational conduct, or incompetence. These principles
are widely applicable, and judicial review of
governmental action therefore is necessary in
circumstances ranging from denial of government
14
benefits to restraints on constitutionally-protected
speech. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266-69
(1970) (holding that when public assistance payments
are to be discontinued, due process requires a
pretermination evidentiary hearing). Thus,
“‘unbridled discretion in the hands of a government
official or agency’” is an “evil[] that will not be
tolerated.” FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S.
215, 225 (1990) (O’Connor, J.). An ordinance that
“‘makes the peaceful enjoyment of freedoms which
the Constitution guarantees contingent upon the
uncontrolled will of an official . . . is an
unconstitutional censorship or prior restraint upon
the enjoyment of those freedoms.’” Shuttlesworth v.
City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 151 (1969)
(citation omitted). Consequently, an official’s
“uncontrolled discretion” over “freedoms which the
Constitution guarantees” is unacceptable. Staub v.
City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 322 (1958).
An analogous burden exists here because the State
has vested unfettered discretion in its officials to
intrude on fundamental rights through the non-
statutory “Safety Plan” procedure. On a “‘mere
suspicion’” of abuse or neglect, Pet. App. 14-15 –
which can be based on nothing more than an
anonymous tip – State officials are empowered to
determine whether a family shows signs of any of
fifteen “safety factors” (including an undefined
“other” factor). Id. at 35-36 & n.1. State officials are
not required to meet any specific threshold of
evidence for any of the factors, Id. at 37, and there
are no apparent objective criteria governing the
assessments. Id. at 39-40. Further, it is unclear
whether there are any limits on the plans’ duration,
id. at 47-48, and, as noted above, no judicial recourse
has been afforded to parents. Id. at 49-50. The
15
“Safety Plan” regime thus is onerous and menacing.
Indeed, it is so intimidating that, out of the tens of
thousands of people who have been affected by the
plans, virtually every parent has “consented.” Id. at
44.
Consequently, the non-statutory “Safety Plan”
program violates due process and the rule of law by
placing absolute, unfettered, and unreviewable power
in the hands of State officials to infringe on
fundamental rights. Such unchecked power violates
fundamental tenets of due process, and cannot coexist
with a system of limited government and the rule of
law.
II. THE STATE’S “SAFETY PLANS” IMPOSE
AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITION
THAT IMPROPERLY INFRINGES ON
FAMILY INTEGRITY.
Contrary to the ruling below, the State’s “Safety
Plans” cannot be upheld on the theory that parents
have consented to the deprivation of their
fundamental familial rights. The unlawful character
of the Safety Plans invalidates any “consent” that the
State may have obtained. Because the government
may not directly interfere with fundamental rights
without first satisfying due process, it may not obtain
that result indirectly by threatening parents with an
unconstitutional deprivation of their rights unless
they agree to abide by a “Safety Plan.” Through its
“Safety Plans,” the State seeks to impose a condition
on private citizens that abridges family integrity even
though the State may have no lawful authority to do
so directly. Consequently, consent obtained by the
State does not insulate the “Safety Plan” system from
review under the Due Process Clause.
16
A. The Unconstitutional Conditions Doc-
trine Prohibits The Government From
Accomplishing Indirectly What It May
Not Lawfully Command Directly.
This Court has explained that states “may not seek
to achieve an unlawful end either directly or
indirectly.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 359 n.13
(1976); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)
(the State may not “produce a result which the State
could not command directly”). Applying that
principle, this Court has held that the Constitution
forbids the government from inducing private citizens
to waive or abate protected rights in circumstances
where the government could not lawfully do so
directly. See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n,
483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) (state committed a taking
where agency conditioned building permit on grant of
public easement); Elrod, 427 U.S. at 359-60 (public
employment may not be conditioned on support for
political party); Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 597
(government “may not deny a benefit to a person on a
basis that infringes his constitutionally protected
interests”).
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine restricts
the government from bargaining with its citizens so
as to ensure that sovereign power is not abused
improperly to coerce private individuals into waiving
fundamental liberties. United States v. Oliveras, 905
F.2d 623, 627 n.7 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (“[t]he
key proposition of the unconstitutional condition
doctrine is that the government may not do indirectly
what it cannot do directly.”); see also Richard A.
Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power,
and the Limits of Consent, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 15-25
(1988).
17
This doctrine has been applied to protect a wide
variety of property and other rights. For instance, in
a long series of First Amendment decisions, this
Court has recognized that “constitutional violations
may arise from the deterrent, or ‘chilling,’ effect of
governmental [efforts] that fall short of a direct
prohibition against the exercise of First Amendment
rights.” Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972). The
government thus violates the First Amendment when
it conditions the receipt of benefits on an individual’s
agreement to a restriction on his or her speech, belief,
religious, or association rights. See, e.g., Bd. of
County Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674-75
(1996) (termination of government contractors);
Elrod, 427 U.S. at 359-60 (conditioning public
employment on supporting political party); Sinder-
mann, 408 U.S. at 597-98 (denial of tenure); United
Pub. Workers of Am. (CIO) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75,
100 (1947) (denial of public employment).3
Moreover, in Nollan, this Court held that a state
agency violated the Takings Clause when it
conditioned the award of a building permit on the
property owner’s grant of an easement to the
government. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831. Because an
uncompensated taking would have occurred had the
government directly required the property owner to
grant the easement, the government could not secure
that same result indirectly. Id. These principles are
likewise applicable to other rights protected by the
Constitution. For example, public employees do not
waive their Fourth Amendment rights merely by
who was released on his own recognizance before trial did not
validly consent to random drug testing, even though it was an
express condition of his pre-trial release. United States v. Scott,
450 F.3d 863, 866-68 (9th Cir. 2006). The Eleventh Circuit has
found that a city may not compel individuals to submit to
searches in order to participate in protests, despite the city’s
claim that the searches were “voluntary” because the protesters
were required to submit to searches only if they chose to
participate in the protest. Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303,
1324 (11th Cir. 2004). See also O’Connor v. Pierson, 426 F.3d
187, 201 (2d Cir. 2005) (school board may have violated
teacher’s privacy interests when demanding release of those
records as a condition to returning to work); R.S.W.W. v. City of
Keego Harbor, 397 F.3d 427, 434-36 (6th Cir. 2005) (city violated
due process when conditioning liquor license on restrictions
which city had no authority to demand, noting that the
Unconstitutional Conditions doctrine “should equally apply to
prohibit the government from conditioning benefits on a citizen’s
agreement to surrender due process rights”).
19
F.2d 1354, 1363 n.1 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting conflict
among circuits).
Thus, a government may demand the waiver of
important rights in exchange for the receipt of
benefits only if it could abridge those rights directly.
For instance, in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic &
Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006), this Court
affirmed the constitutionality of the Solomon
Amendment only after determining that Congress
could directly require campus access for military
recruiters under the Constitution. Id. at 57-58. In
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 n.4
(2001), this Court held that conditioning parole on
assent to future searches did not violate Due Process,
and thus did not reflect an unconstitutional
condition, even though the government admitted that
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine set “a
limitation on what a probationer may validly consent
to in a probation order.” Id. at 118 n.4.
B. The “Safety Plans” Violate The Uncon-
stitutional Conditions Doctrine.
These principles apply equally to an individual’s
fundamental right of family integrity. As such, the
State may not bargain with individuals to give up
their rights to avoid the imposition of an
unconstitutional deprivation.
To allow the State to infringe on family integrity
through the imposition of “Safety Plans” in
circumstances where the State could not lawfully
interfere directly undermines the due process
protections applicable to family rights. If a govern-
ment could circumvent constitutional limitations
simply by indirectly coercing private citizens into
“waiving” their rights, then the fundamental rights
protected by the Constitution would be no stronger
20
than the will of a private citizen to defy the state’s
threats with regard to the fate of his or her children.
Indeed, under the ruling below, the story of King
Solomon would need to be rewritten so that the
mother who agreed to give up her infant to avoid the
awful consequence offered by King Solomon should be
held to her “choice” because she consented and thus
was no worse off from being offered that “choice.”
Pet. App. 16. The uncon-stitutional conditions
doctrine, however, protects private citizens from
facing this Hobson’s choice by establishing limits on
the state’s ability to coerce its citizens.
According to the court below, this case involves a
simple negotiation between the government and
private citizens: through its “Safety Plan” procedure,
the State offers not to remove children from their
parents immediately or permanently in exchange for
the parents’ consent to the State’s intrusion into their
family integrity. Pet. App. 14. But the Safety Plans
do not require the State to justify the statutory or due
process standards for removing children from abusive
homes. Nor do the Safety Plans provide any
procedural due process protections (or any judicial
scrutiny at all) after the deprivation has occurred.
Id. at 50.
If the State may not directly infringe on a protected
right, it may not accomplish the same result
indirectly simply by threatening to remove those
liberties. The State of Illinois may not constitution-
ally impose limitations on family integrity absent due
process. It thus may not impose “Safety Plans” that
seek the waiver of those rights unless, at a minimum,
it satisfies due process by (1) obtaining sufficient good
cause to warrant the invasion of a fundamental right,
and (2) providing a procedural avenue for verifying
and challenging the plans. Yet the “Safety Plans”
21
neither require the State to ascertain sufficient
evidence to intrude on family integrity prior to
making demands of parents, nor provide for any
procedural protections whatsoever.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and those stated in the
petition, the petition for writ of certiorari should be
granted.
Respectfully submitted,
ILYA SHAPIRO
CATO INSTITUTE
1000 Massachusetts
Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001
(202) 842-0200
Counsel for Amici Curiae
March 11, 2008 * Counsel of Record