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Garcia V Florido (Full Digest)
Garcia V Florido (Full Digest)
FLORIDO Garcia, wife and Francisco (on board the PU car) Inesin (owner of PU) Vayson (driver of PU) Mactan transic Co (bus) Tumala (driver of bus) PETITION: Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the CFI of Misamis Occidental, dismissing petitioners' action for damages against respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala "without prejudice to refiling the said civil action after conviction of the defendants in the criminal case filed by the Chief of Police of Sindangan Zamboanga del Norte", and denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration. On August 4, 1971, petitioners, Garcia, Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital, together with his wife, and Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of said hospital, hired and boarded a PU car with plate No. 241-8 G Ozamis 71 owned and operated by respondent, Marcelino Inesin, and driven by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a round-trip from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City, for the purpose of attending a conference of chiefs of government hospitals, hospital administrative officers, and bookkeepers of Regional Health Office No. 7 at Zamboanga City. At about 9:30 a.m., while the PU car was negotiating a slight curve on the national highway at kilometer 21 in Barrio Guisukan, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, said car collided with an oncoming passenger bus (No. 25) with plate No. 77-4 W Z.N. 71 owned and operated by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven by defendant, Pedro Tumala. As a result of the aforesaid collision, petitioners sustained various physical injuries which necessitated their medical treatment and hospitalization. Alleging that both drivers of the PU car and the passenger bus were at the time of the accident driving their respective vehicles at a fast clip, in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in gross violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car, Petitioners, German C. Garcia, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, filed on September 1, 1971 with respondent Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental an action for damages (Civil Case No. 2850) against the private respondents, owners and drivers, respectively, of the PU car and the passenger bus that figured in the collision, with prayer for preliminary attachment. On September 16, 1971, Inesin and Vayson (PU CAR) filed their answer and admitted the contract of carriage with petitioners but alleged, by way of defense, that the accident was due to the negligence and reckless imprudence of the bus driver, as when Ricardo Vayson, driver of the PU car, saw the oncoming passenger bus No. 25 coming from the opposite direction ascending the incline at an excessive speed, chasing another passenger bus, he had to stop the PU car in order to give way to the passenger bus, but, in spite of such precaution, the passenger bus bumped the PU car, thus causing the accident in question, and, therefore, said private respondents could not be held liable for the damages caused on petitioners. Respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, (BUS) filed a motion to dismiss on three (3) grounds, namely: 1) that the plaintiffs (petitioners) had no cause of action; 2) that the complaint carries with it a prayer for attachment but without the requisite verification, hence defective under the provision of Sec. 3, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court; and 3) that the defendants (respondents), Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and its driver, accused Pedro Tumala, had operated said passenger bus with maximum care and prudence. The principal argument advanced in said motion to dismiss was that the petitioners had no cause of action for on August 11, 1971, or 20 days before the filing of the present action for damages, respondent Pedro Tumala (BUS driver) was charged in Criminal Case No. 4960 of the Municipal Court of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, in a complaint filed by the Chief of Police for "double serious and less serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence", and that, with the filing of the aforesaid criminal case, no civil action could be filed subsequent thereto unless the criminal
case has been finally adjudicated, pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, and, therefore, the filing of the instant civil action is premature, because the liability of the employer is merely subsidiary and does not arise until after final judgment has been rendered finding the driver, Pedro Tumala guilty of negligence; that Art. 33 of the New Civil Code, is not applicable because Art. 33 applied only to the crimes of physical injuries or homicide, not to the negligent act or imprudence of the driver. petitioners filed an opposition to said motion to dismiss alleging that the aforesaid action for damages was instituted not to enforce the civil liability of the respondents under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code but for their civil liability on quasi-delicts pursuant to Articles 2176-2194, as the same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Revised Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code, and the party seeking recovery is free to choose which remedy to enforce . LC DISMISSED - lower court sustained the arguments of respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, and declared that whether or not "the action for damages is based on criminal negligence or civil negligence known as culpa aquiliana in the Civil Code or tort under American law" there "should be a showing that the offended party expressly waived the civil action or reserved his right to institute it separately" and that "the allegations of the complaint in culpa aquiliana must not be tainted by any assertion of violation of law or traffic rules or regulations" and because of the prayer in the complaint asking the Court to declare the defendants jointly and severally liable for moral, compensatory and exemplary damages, the Court is of the opinion that the action was not based on "culpa aquiliana or quasidelict." APPEAL DENIED
ISSUE: 1. WON the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint for damages on the ground that since no express reservation was made by the complainants, the civil aspect of the criminal case would have to be determined only after the termination of the criminal case 2. WON the lower court erred in saying that the action is not based on quasi-delict since the allegations of the complaint in culpa aquiliana must not be tainted by any assertion of violation of law or traffic rules or regulations and because of the prayer in the complaint asking the Court to declare the defendants jointly and severally liable for moral, compensatory and exemplary damages HELD: the decision and order appealed from are hereby reversed and set aside, and the court a quo is directed to proceed with the trial of the case. 1. Yes 2. Yes RATIO: There is no question that from a careful consideration of the allegations contained in the complaint in Civil Case No. 2850, the essential averments for a quasi-delictual action under Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code are present, namely: a) act or omission of the private respondents; b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the operation of the passenger bus No. 25 by respondent Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of the bus with the passenger car; c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by petitioners as a result of the collision; d) existence of direct causal connection between the damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of private respondents; and e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the parties. The circumstance that the complaint alleged that respondents violated traffic rules in that the driver drove the vehicle "at a fast clip in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car" does not detract from the nature and character of the action, as one based on culpa aquiliana.
The violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the failure of said driver to observe for the protection of the interests of others, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, which failure resulted in the injury on petitioners. Certainly excessive speed in violation of traffic rules is a clear indication of negligence. Since the same negligent act resulted in the filing of the criminal action by the Chief of Police with the Municipal Court (Criminal Case No. 4960) and the civil action by petitioners, it is inevitable that the averments on the drivers' negligence in both complaints would substantially be the same. It should be emphasized that the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from a crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under Arts. 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code. This distinction has been amply explained in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al. (73 Phil. 607, 620-621). It is true that under Sec. 2 in relation to Sec. 1 of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court which became effective on January 1, 1964, in the cases provided for by Articles 31, 33, 39 and 2177 of the Civil Code, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the civil action, may be instituted by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided said party has reserved his right to institute it separately, but it should be noted, however, that neither Section 1 nor Section 2 of Rule 111 fixes a time limit when such reservation shall be made . In Tactaquin v. Palileo, where the reservation was made after the tort-feasor had already pleaded guilty and after the private prosecutor had entered his appearance jointly with the prosecuting attorney in the course of the criminal proceedings, and the tort-feasor was convicted and sentenced to pay damages to the offended party by final judgment in said criminal case, We ruled that such reservation is legally ineffective because the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. We explained in Meneses vs. Luat that when the criminal action for physical injuries against the defendant did not proceed to trial as he pleaded guilty upon arraignment and the Court made no pronouncement on the matter or damages suffered by the injured party, the mere appearance of private counsel in representation of the offended party in said criminal case does not constitute such active intervention as could impart an intention to press a claim for damages in the same action, and, therefore, cannot bar a separate civil action for damages subsequently instituted on the same ground under Article 33 of the New Civil Code. In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioners never intervened in the criminal action instituted by the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has the said criminal action been terminated either by conviction or acquittal of said accused. It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil action for damages, petitioners have in effect abandoned their right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case, and have opted instead to recover them in the present civil case. As a result of this action of petitioners the civil liability of private respondents to the former has ceased to be involved in the criminal action. Undoubtedly an offended party loses his right to intervene in the prosecution of a criminal case, not only when he has waived the civil action or expressly reserved his right to institute, but also when he has actually instituted the civil action. For by either of such actions his interest in the criminal case has disappeared. As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, having always had its own foundation and individuality. Some legal writers are of the view that in accordance with Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-delict may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the latter . Hence, "the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to ... Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is
contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted ... and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso which is procedural, may also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation required in the proviso." But in whatever way We view the institution of the civil action for recovery of damages under quasi-delict by petitioners, whether as one that should be governed by the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules which require reservation by the injured party considering that by the institution of the civil action even before the commencement of the trial of the criminal case, petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene therein, or one where reservation to file the civil action need not be made, for the reason that the law itself (Article 33 of the Civil Code) already makes the reservation and the failure of the offended party to do so does not bar him from bringing the action, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, We find no legal justification for respondent court's order of dismissal.
Separate Opinions BARREDO, J., concurring: I believe that the only substantive legal provision involved in this case are Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code which read as follows: ART 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. ART 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. These provisions definitely create a civil liability distinct and different from the civil action arising from the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal Code . Since Civil Case No. 2850 is predicated on the above civil code articles and not on the civil liability imposed by the Revised Penal Code, I cannot see why a reservation had to be made in the criminal case. As to the specific mention of Article 2177 in Section 2 of the Rule 111, it is my considered view that the latter provision is inoperative, it being substantive in character and is not within the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate, and even if it were not substantive but adjective, it cannot stand because of its inconsistency with Article 2177, an enactment of the legislature superseding the Rules of 1940.