Criminal Procedure Constitutional Rights of The Accused
Criminal Procedure Constitutional Rights of The Accused
Article III Bill of Rights of the Constitution Section 1. Right to due process Section 1. Right to equal protection of the laws Section 3. Right to inadmissibility of evidences obtained under Setion 2 Section 11. Right to a free access to the courts Section 11. Right to an adequate legal assistance Section 12(1). Right to be informed to remain silent Section12(1). Right to counsel Section12(1). Right to be informed of such rights Section 12(2). Right against torture Section 12(2). Right against secret detention Section 12(3). Right to inadmissibility of evidence against him obtained from any confession Section 13. Right to bail Section 14(1). Right to due process for a criminal offense Section 14(2). Right to be presumed innocent until presumed guilty Section 14(2). Right to be heard by himself and to be heard his counsel Section 14(2). Right to be informed of the cause and nature of the accusations against him
Section 14(2). Right to a speedy, impartial, and public trial Section 14(2). Right to confront the witnesses Section 14(2). Right to present evidence Section 16. Right to a speedy disposition of his case Section 17. Right against self-incrimination Section 19(1). Right against excessive fines Section 19(1). Right against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment Section 21. Right against double jeopardy Section 22. Right against ex-post facto laws
Under the doctrine of supremacy of the constitution, the constitution is the supreme law of the land, it is above all laws, and all laws must conform to it, otherwise it is inoperative, creates no right, no obligation, in short, no void. Right is something that is due to a person by just claim, legal guarantee, or moral principle.1 It gives protection the accused and serves as a barrier. The Constitutional Rights of the Accused are those rights of the accused which were provided by the Constitution, specifically provided under Article III Bill of Rights of 1987 Philippine Constitution. These rights are of paramount consideration, and are designed to protect the accused from any possible abusive acts of the government. It is intended against the State and in favor of the accused. ____________
Blacks Law Dictionary, page 4120, (8th edition 2004) Since the Constitution is the highest law of the land, as it provides the
rights of the accused, it fully guarantees them other than any statutes. It constrains the government to be negligent in promulgating judgments to avoid injustice and mistrial, and more importantly to prevent mistakes of judgment convicting innocent people, so that administration of justice will be more efficient. Constitutional Rights of the accused Article III, Bill of Rights, of the 1987 Constitution provides for the following rights: 1. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. (Sec. 16) 2. No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. (Sec. 14[1]) 3. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. 4. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature ad cause of the accusation against him, to have speedy, impartial, and
public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. (Sec. 14 [2]) 5. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. (Sec. 17) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (Sec. 12[1]) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (Sec. 12[2]) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. (Sec. 12[3]) 6. Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. (Sec. 19[1])
7. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. (Sec. 21) 8. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. (Sec. 11) Rights of the accused which may be waived and rights which may not be waived. A right which may be waived is the right of the accused to confrontation and cross-examination. A right which may not be waived is the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The reason or principle underlying the difference between rights which may be waived and rights which may not be waived is that those rights which may be waived are personal, while those rights which may not be waived involve public interest which may be affected. (2 Moran, Rules of Court, 1952 Edition, 748)
Procedural right. It is a right that derives from legal or administrative procedure; a right that helps in the protection or enforcement of a substantive right. Cf. substantive right. Blacks Law Dictionary 8 th Edition, 2004 Substantial right. It is an essential right that potentially affects the outcome of a lawsuit and is capable of legal enforcement and protection, as distinguished from a mere technical or procedural right. Blacks Law Dictionary 8th Edition, 2004
Substantive right. It is a right that can be protected or enforced by law; a right of substance rather than form. Cf. procedural right. Blacks Law Dictionary 8th Edition, 2004 1987 Constitution is the story of governmental power and
constitutional limits on it found in the Bill of Rights. The totality of governmental power is contained in three great powers: police power, power of eminent domain, and the power of taxation. These belong to the very existence of government and without them no government can exist. Therefore, inherent powers of the government which the constitution does not grant to the government, but only define and delimit them and allocate their exercise among various government agencies. The story of constitutional jurisprudence is the story of great minds striving to strike a balance between governmental power and personal freedom. Chief Justice Shaw stated that police power is the power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statues, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same. The police power has been used to justify public health, justify public safety, public morals. The almost awesome character of police power shown by the vastness of its reach comes out in greater relief when seen together with the presumption of constitutionality which its exercise enjoys. The judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is no clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation.
This vast power is, however, must be exercised within the limits set by the constitution. In the words of the leading case of U.S. v. Toribio, the legislative determination of what is a proper exercise of its police power is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts. The exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any person is subject to the judicial inquiry. And exercising such power must be measured with due process clause and the equal protection clause. Finally, it should be noted that the restrictions found in the Bill of Rights, as constitutional law, are directed against the state. They do not govern the relations between private persons. The word person includes not only the citizens but also aliens, private corporations without regard to any differences of race, color, or nationality. Article III, Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. Bill of Rights: Protection against abuse of power. Justice Malcolm elaborated: The right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution includes that right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the faculties to which he has endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the common welfare.
Malcolm likewise borrowed from Apolinario Mabini calling liberty freedom to do right and never wrong. . . ever guided by reason and the upright and honorable conscience of the individual. Protected property has been deemed to include vested rights, or a perfected homestead, or a final judgment. It includes the right to work and the right to earn a living. Ones employment, profession, trade, or calling is protected property. The constitutional protection of the right to life is not just a protection of the right to be alive or to the security of ones limb against physical harm. The right to life is also the right to a good life. The poor are the oppressed precisely because they are poor. In their regard therefore, property is as important as life and their liberty. Shylock was right: You take my life, when you do take the means whereby I live. Under the present provision, understood in the light of established jurisprudence on the position of property in the hierarchy of constitutional values, property stands a good chance of serving and enhancing the life and liberty of all. Due process as procedural fairness The legislature must provide due process in the enforcement of law. Thus, due process was understood to relate chiefly to the mode of procedure which government agencies must follow; it was understood as a guarantee of procedural fairness. Its essence was expressed by Daniel Webster as a law which hears before it condemns. Due process, however, is not always judicial process. This has always been recognized. Due process does not always include actor, reus, judex, regular allegations, opportunity to answer and a trial according to some settled course of judicial proceedings.
Substantial evidence means such reasonable evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. What is required is not actual hearing but a real opportunity to be heard. Thus, one who refuses to appear at a hearing is not thereby denied due process if a decision is reached without waiting for him. Substantive due process If all that the due process clause requires is proper procedure, then life, liberty, and property can be destroyed, provided, proper forms are observed. Hence, the clause must be understood to guarantee not just forms of procedure but also the very substance of life, liberty and property. The due process clause must be interpreted both as a procedural and as a substantive guarantee. It must be a guarantee against the exercise of arbitrary power even when the power is exercised according to proper forms and procedure. Shall the judiciary permit a government of men instead of a government of laws to be set up in the Philippine Islands? the courts will assist in retaining it as a government of laws, and not of men, and that no official, however high, is above the law, and that the courts are the forum which function is to safeguard individual liberty and to punish official transgressors. Equal protection The equal protection clause is a specific constitutional guarantee of the Equality of the Person. The equality it guarantees is legal equality or, as it usually put, the equality of all persons before the law. Under it, each individual is dealt with as an equal person in the law, which does not treat the person differently because of who he is or what he is or what he possesses. The goddess of Justice is portrayed with a blindfold, not because
she must be hindered in seeing where the right lies, but that she may not discriminate against suitors before her, dispensing instead an even handed justice to all. Equality in the criminal process One clear consequence of economic inequality is inequality in the field of criminal justice. In a criminal prosecution the accused finds himself face to face with the State and all its resources of wealth and power. Even the rich can feel intimidated by the resources that are at the disposal of the State. How much more helpless will a poor man feel when he finds himself ranged against the power of the State? It is for this reason that the law takes a special interest in the poor when brought before the bar of justice to answer for a crime. Article III, Section 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. This constitutional provision is the basis for the provision of Rule 3, Section 22, of the New Rules of Court allowing litigation in forma pauperis. Those protected include low-paid employees, domestic servants and laborers. They need not be persons so poor that they must be supported at public expense. It suffices that plaintiff is indigent and the difference between paupers and indigent persons is that the latter are persons who have no property or sources of income sufficient for their support aside from their own labor though self-supporting when able to work and in employment. Article III, Section. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families. The provision is of American provenance coming as it does principally from two American Supreme Court decisions: Escobedo v. Illinois and Miranda v. Arizona. Escobedo spoke of the rights of person in custodial investigations and specified custodial investigation as the time when the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements. Miranda for its part enumerated the rights that were available: (1) the person in custody must be informed at the outset in clear and unequivocal terms that he has a right to remain silent. (2) After being so informed, he must be told that anything he says can and will be used against him in court. (3) He must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during the interrogation. He does not have to ask for a lawyer. The investigators should tell him that he has the right to counsel at that point. (4) He should be warned that not only has he the right to consult with a
lawyer but also that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. (5) Even if the person consents to answer questions without the assistance of counsel, the moment he asks for a lawyer at any point in the investigation, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. (6) If the foregoing protections and warnings are not demonstrated during the trial to have been observed by the prosecution, no evidence obtained as a result of the interrogation can be used against him . People v. Duero said: Inasmuch as the prosecution in this case failed to prove that before Duerro made his alleged oral confession he was informed of his rights to remain silent and to have counsel and because there is no proof that he knowingly and intelligently waived those rights, his confession is inadmissible in evidence. Meanwhile, however, the process of clarifying the rights that are made available continue. Discussion of this provision will answer three questions: (1) When do the rights begin to be available? (2) What rights are made available? (3) When do the rights cease to be available? The rights under this section are available to any person under investigation for the commission of an offense. Investigation in this section was defined by the 1971 Constitutional Convention as investigation conducted by the police authorities which will include investigations conducted by the municipal police, the PC and the NBI and such other police agencies in our government. This includes conversation with a barangay captain that is part of an ongoing custodial investigation, Section 12(1) applies. Clearly, therefore, the rights enumerated are not available before government investigators become involved. Thus admissions made in an administrative investigation conducted by officials of the Philippine Airlines do not come under Section 12. It does not apply when the confession or
admission is made to a private individual. Neither does it apply to a person undergoing audit because an audit examiner is not a law enforcement officer. Nor does it apply to a verbal admission made to a radio announcer who was not part of the investigation. Even an admission made to a mayor who is approached not as a mayor but as confidante is not covered. Similarly an interview recorded on video and in the presence of newsmen is not covered. However, because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a medium for admitting ones guilt, and the recurrence of this phenomenon in several cases, the Court has warned that it is prudent that trial courts are reminded that extreme caution must be taken in further admitting similar confessions. The Court recognized the possibility of connivance with the police. Not for that matter does Section 12(1) apply to a situation where a person presents himself to the police and in the process makes his admissions. As the court said in People v. Taylaran: The applicability of the foregoing provision does not seem to contemplate cases like the present where no written confession is sought to be presented in evidence as a result of the formal custodial investigation. What was testified to was only what appellant told the police why he is (sic) surrendering to them. It is but natural for one who surrenders to the police to give reason or explanation for his act of surrendering. It can hardly be said that under such circumstance, the surrenderee is already under investigation, within the meaning of the constitutional provision. As the Solicitor General correctly observes on the circumstances of this case: If however, he voluntarily admits the killing and it was precisely because he surrendered to admit the killing (sic), the constitutional safeguards (sic) to be informed of the rights to silence and to counsel may not be invoked.
It is now established that constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused orally admits having committed the crime. The accepted constitutional rule, moreover, following Escobedo and Miranda, is that the rule covers only situations when the person is already in custody, for which reason Escobedo ad referred to them as rights under custodial investigation. Significantly, however, the Court, in Galman v. Pamaran, departed from this rule. The Court sustained the contention of General Ver that the provision covered even persons not yet in custody but already under investigation. The Court said: The fact that the framers of our (1973) Constitution did not choose to use the term custodial by having it inserted between the words under and investigation, as in fact the sentence opens with the phrase any person goes to prove that they did not adopt in toto the entire fabric of the Miranda doctrine. The Text of the 1987 Constitution has preserved the phrase person under investigation without the word custodial. Moreover, the discussions on the floor of the 1986 Constitutional Commission manifest an intent, in the light of experiences during martial law, to expand he coverage of the right to situations when a person under investigation is not yet in custody. The discussion was triggered by the question of Commissioner Aquino whether the guarantee covered Responding both to custodial the investigation of and tactical Aquino, investigation. question Commissioner
Commissioner Colayco explained that, indeed, the intention was to extend the guarantee beyond mere strict custodial investigation of the Escobedo variety to the time immediately after the commission of any offense, whether the policeman or the person making the investigation had any
suspect under custody. Or, as Commissioner Aquino summed it up, the right should extend to the period of custodial interrogation, temporary detention and preliminary technical custody. Thus, if one puts the Galman case together with the 1986 deliberations, the conclusion that comes out is that the rights are available if a person is already in custody as a suspect, or if the person is the suspect, even if he is not yet deprived in any significant way of his liberty. Jurisprudence under the 1987 Constitution, however, has consistently held, following Escobedo, the stricter view, that the rights begin to be available only when the person is already in custody. As Justice Regalado emphasized in People v. Marra: Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. It is only after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate. In an obiter dictum and writing for a division in People v. Maqueda, Justice Davide, who, like Justice Regalado, was a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission adverted to the view in the Constitutional Commission that the rights are available even to one who is not yet in custody. There are, moreover, other investigatory situations where Section 12(1) does not apply. Subjection to paraffin test is one because it is not communicative action or testimonial compulsion. Similarly, one placed in a police line-up does not enjoy Section 12(1) rights, unless there is a move on the part of the investigators to elicit admissions or confessions. But a person
already under custodial investigation who is placed in a police line-up is entitled to Section 12 rights. Finally, however, it is important for the defense to remember that rights under Section 12 can be lost by neglect. Where the defense fails to raise objections to the admissibility of evidence immediately, as required by Rule 132, Section 36, the accused is deemed to have waived his right to object to admissibility. This is an indication that the fate of a person sometimes depends on the quality of counsel he or she can afford. Right of a person under investigation. Three rights are made available by Section 12(1): (1) the right to remain silent; (2) the right to counsel; (3) the right to be informed of such rights. Under the right against self-incrimination in Section 17, only an accused has the absolute right to remain silent. A person who is not an accused may assume the stance of silence only when asked an incrimination question. Under Section 12, however, a person under investigation has the right to refuse to answer any question. His silence, moreover, may not be used against him. The 1987 Constitution now specifies that the counsel made available to the person under investigation must be competent and independent and preferably of the accuseds own choice. Under the present provision, where a former judge showed up and said to the detainee: I am here because I have been summoned to assist you and I am going to assist you, the offer of assistance was found inadequate to meet the constitutional requirement. But if the accused never raises an objection to counsel given to him, he is deemed to have been properly counseled.
Moreover, the Court has eloquently said that even in times of emergency, and especially in times of emergency, the right to counsel must be respected. This was in the case of Diokno v. Enrile where, after repeatedly being refused permission to see Diokno, counsel filed a mandamus petition. Diokno was released on September, 1974, but the Supreme Court decision affirming his right to counsel was made only on December 19, 1981. The right to be informed of his rights which are guaranteed here is more than what is shown in television shows where the police routinely reads out the rights from a note card. As People v. Rojas put it: When the Constitution requires a person under investigation to be informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of a meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. As a rule, therefore, it would not be sufficient for a police officer just to repeat the person under investigation the provisions of the Constitution. He is not only duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which the latter is entitled; he must also explain their effects in practical terms. In other words, the right of a person under investigation to be informed implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective communication that results in understanding what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot then truly be said that the person has been informed of his rights. The criminal process includes the investigation prior to the filing of charges, the preliminary examination and investigation after charges are filed, and the period of trial. The Miranda rights or the Section 12(1) rights were conceived for the first of these three phases, that is, when the inquiry
is under the control of police officers. It is in this situation that the psychological if not physical atmosphere of custodial investigations, in the absence of proper safeguards, is inherently coercive. Outside of this situation, Section 12(1) no longer applies. But Sections 14 and 17 come into play instead. This was already adverted to during the deliberations of the 1971 Constitutional Convention when, upon inquiry by Delegate Sambolawan, Delegate R. Ortiz, who was sponsoring the provision, said that investigation here did not include judicial and quasi-judicial investigation such as those conducted by the fiscal of by the judge. Justice Narvasa was referring to the same matter when he said that Section 12(1) does not apply to persons under preliminary investigation or already charged in court for a crime and therefore already under the protection of the court: It seems quite evident that a defendant on trial or under preliminary investigation is not under custodial interrogation. His interrogation by the police, if any there had been would already have been ended at the time for the filing of the criminal case in court (or in the public prosecutors office). Hence, with respect to the defendant in a criminal case already pending in court (or the prosecutor office) there is no occasion to speak of his right while under custodial interrogation laid down by the second and subsequent sentences of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution [now Section 12(1)], for the obvious reason that he is no longer under custodial interrogation. But unquestionably, the accused in court (or undergoing preliminary investigation before the public prosecutor), in common with all persons, possesses the right against self-incrimination set out in the first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of he 1973 Constitution [now Section 17, Article III],
i.e., the right to refuse to answer a specific incriminatory question at the time it is put to him. Conceivably, however, even after the charges are filed, the police might still attempt to extract confessions or admissions from the accused outside of judicial supervision. In such situation, Section 12(1) would still apply. But outside of such situation, the applicable provisions are Section 14 and Section 17. It is for this reason that an extrajudicial confessions sworn to before a judge enjoys the mark of voluntariness. The 1987 Constitution now says: These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. The implication of this rule is that, in localities where there are no lawyers, the state must bring the individual to a place where there is one or bring counsel to the place where the person is held. And needless to say, the waiver must be in language which clearly manifests the desire to wave the right. The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, also treated separately as Section 17, has developed and has been interpreted so as to cover a wide range of forms of self-accusation. To prohibit coerced confessions, the 1987 Constitution added: secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. Secret detention places has special reference to safe-houses and, like solitary and incommunicado detention, were phenomena during the authoritarian regime of Mr. Marcos. Under the 1987 Bill of Rights, where self-incrimination is treated in Section 17 and custodial investigation and forced confessions in Section 12, the rule is reiterated in Section 12(3) thus: Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
It covers every form of evidence obtained in violation of Section 12 and Section 17, every form of confession tainted with involuntariness. It is a manifestation of the care with which the law wishes to insure the voluntariness of confessions. This care was already evident even under the 1935 Constitution. This care also appears in a number of recent cases where the Supreme Court has insisted that a plea of guilty should be accepted only after the trial court has taken pains to assure itself that the accused was well aware of the consequences and full import of his plea. Or, as one decision eloquently put it, Even if the confession of an accused is gospel truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given. The same would apply to a waiver of the rights to counsel not made in the presence of counsel. Moreover, although the word confession was used in the last sentence of Section 20 of the 1973 Bill of Rights, the protection covered not only confessions but also admissions. This is now explicit in the 1987 text. The difference between confession and admission is found in Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Admission is the act, declaration or omission of party as to a relevant fact (Rule 130, Section 26) whereas confession is the declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, (Rule 130, Section 33). Where the signature of an accused on a receipt for seized property or marijuana cigarettes where the accused wrote his name is not admissible. It should also be noted that the exclusionary rule found in Section 12 is not couched in the same language as the exclusionary rule in Section 3. Section 3 makes evidence illegally obtained inadmissible ofr any purpose in any proceeding. Section 12 says that confessions made in violation of the section and Section 17 shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. It
might be asked whether the text of Section 12 could be open to the narrowing process which the Miranda rule seems to have undergone in American jurisprudence. The text of Section 12 is general enough to allow a strict construction against government. Moreover, considering that involuntary testimonial evidence is a more serious affront to human dignity than illegally obtained real evidence, the absolute inadmissibility provided for in Section 3 should also be read into Section 12, and with greater reason, since involuntary confessions also affront the right of privacy protected by Section 2. The question of retroactivity of the application of this protection granted by the Constitution was settled in the first important Supreme Court decision on the new 1973 provision on custodial investigation, Magtoto v. Manguera. It established the rule that the new provision should only operate prospectively from the date of effectivity of the new Constitution January 17, 1973. The dissents of Justices Castro, Teehankee, and Fernando arguing for retroactivity of the rule are persuasive; but the issue is now regarded as closed and the Court now applies Magtoto where necessary as a matter of course. Section 12(4) says: The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families. Civil sanction in the form of damages is, strictly speaking, already covered by the Civil Code provision on actionable violations of constitutional rights. Penal sanctions are meant to be a deterrent against violations. And the compensation and rehabilitation provided for are social welfare measures. The way the provision is worded, however, it will need implementing legislation. And against the argument that the provision has no place in a Constitution, it was pointed out that these matters are intimately connected with the rights
guaranteed by the Constitution and should see articulation in the Bill of Rights itself which guarantees the inviolability of the rights. Article III, Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. Right to bail The right to bail, which is a corollary to the right to be presumed innocent is, like the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, another means of immediately obtaining liberty. It also enables the accused to prepare his defense. Bail is a mode short of confinement which would, with reasonable certainty, insure the attendance of the accused. If capital offenses or offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua are not made bailable, it is because frequently nothing short of confinement can insure the attendance of one who expects to receive such sentence. Where, however, the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive. So the Constitution commands. Because of the importance of the right to bail both for the accused and for the prosecution, certain duties are imposed upon the judge. Basco v. Rapatalo reiterates them thus: (1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended); (2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to
show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion (sections 7 and 8, supra); (3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary evidence of the prosecution; (4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond. (Section 19, supra). Otherwise, petition should be denied. Particularly in cases where the accused is charged with a capital offense, a hearing, mandatory in nature and which should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, is required with the participation of both the defense and a duly notified representative of the prosecution for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. The burden of proof is on the prosecution to show that the evidence meets the required quantum. The prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it want to introduce before the court. Likewise, the petitioner has the right to cross-examine the witnesses and present his own evidence in rebuttal. When, eventually, the court issues an order either granting or refusing bail, the same should contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution, followed by its conclusion as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. The quantum of evidence needed in order to deny an accused the right to bail is described by the text simply as strong evidence. This has been construed to mean proof evident or presumption great. Proof evident or evident proof in this connection means clear, strong evidence which leads a well-guarded dispassionate judgment to the conclusion that the offense has been committed as
charged, that accused is the guilty agent, and that he will probably be punished capitally if the law is administered. Presumption great exists when the circumstances testified to are such that the interference of guilt naturally to be drawn therefrom is strong, clear, and convincing to an unbiased judgment and excludes all reasonable doubt as to the guilt of accused, if on an examination of the entire record the presumption is great that accused is guilty of a capital offense, bail should be refused. If the prosecution does not present evidence, the court may ask the prosecution such questions as would ascertain the strength of the states evidence or judge the adequacy of the amount of bail. The factors which must be considered in determining bail are: ability to post bail, the nature of the offense, penalty imposed by law, character and reputation of the accused, health of the accused, strength of the evidence, probability of appearing for trial, prior forfeiture of bonds, whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested, authority to change the characterization of the offense but there is no power to reduce or change the crime charged in order to justify the grant of bail to the accused. It has been held that a court cannot require a strictly cash bond. It was established that since bail is constitutionally available to all persons, it must be available to one who is detained even before formal charges are filed. But of course, the person claiming the right must be under actual detention or custody of the law. One is under the custody of the law either when he has been arrested or has surrendered himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If granted bail, the accused does not necessarily have the right to leave the country. As a necessary consequence of the bail bond, which is intended to make a
person available any time he is needed by the court, a court may prevent a person admitted to bail from leaving the country. It has also been held that the right to bail may be waived even implicitly in an irrecoverable manner. Thus, it was held by the court that an accused waived his right when he agreed to remain in legal custody during the pendency of the trial of his criminal case. After conviction by the trial court, when presumption of innocence terminates, the constitutional right to bail should also terminate. Article III, Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. Due process in criminal cases The criminal due process clause of the Bill of Rights presupposes that the penal law being applied satisfies the substantive requirements of due process. As to procedural due process, it may be noted that, while the right to appeal is statutory, once it is granted by law, its suppression is a violation of due process. Public trial
The Court said, To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity. The Court added: Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Moreover, the effect of publicity on judges cannot be presumed especially since, unlike jurors, judges are trained professionals. Another aspect of due process, so frequently emphasized, is the right to be tried by an impartial judge. All suitors, we must say, are entitled to nothing short of the cold neutrality of an independent, wholly-free, disinterested and impartial tribunal. The principle is applicable to all types of cases. The rights under Section 14(2) guaranteed by the constitution are rights in all criminal prosecutions and prosecution starts only upon arraignment. The implication, therefore, is that the rights enumerated in Section 14(2), including the right to impartiality, are protected only during the trial. Finally, it may be asked whether a judge who inherits a case from another judge may decide a case fairly since he did not hear all the witnesses presented. The practical answer to the question must be in the affirmative. As the Court has said: The rule is rooted in practical considerations. Sometimes it is an impossibility for the judge who tried the case to be the same judicial officer to decide it. The judge who tired the case may die, resign or retire from the bench, before he could render judgment
thereon. We find no legal impediment to his successors continuing with the trial or rendering judgment on the basis of the evidence submitted if the trial has been terminated. It is sufficient that in such circumstances the judge, in deciding the case, must base it completely on the cold record before him, in the same manner as appellate courts when they review the evidence of the case raised to them on appeal. Presumption of innocence This principle has always been a part of criminal procedural law as guaranteed first by statutory law (General Orders No. 58) and now by the Constitution. Right to be heard The concept of the right to be heard, applied to criminal procedure, embodies in shorthand form a very fundamental and multifaceted right of the accused. In a very broad sense, it can be understood to mean the totality of the rights embodied in an adequate criminal procedural system. More precisely, however, it can be viewed as expressing both the qualities of the hearer and the manner of the hearing. The qualities demanded of the hearer are fairness and impartiality. Thhus, it is demanded that the judge may not play the ouble role of prosecutor and judge in one and the same case. He must maintain an attitude of neutrality in regard to the prosecution and the accused. Influence on the judge, even if unconscious, which prevents a calm and careful review of the evidence can nullify his decision. The more active role of the accused in expressing the right to be herd includes three specific rights: (1) the right to present evidence and to be present at the trial, (2) the right to be assisted by counsel, and (3) the right to compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf.
The right to present evidence includes the right to testify in ones favor and the right to be given time to call witnesses. If accused of two offenses, he is entitled to a trial of each case, and it is error for the court to consider in one case the evidence adduced against him in another. It also includes the right to present evidence even after a motion to dismiss, made before presentation of evidence for the defense, has been denied. The substantial rights of the accused should not be impaired because of his counsels anxiousness to have him promptly acquitted. Right to counsel The right to be heard can be a meaningless farce if it does not include the right to counsel. Justice Sutherlands well-known observations in Powell v. Alabama deserve to be quoted: Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he has a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. Thus, the familiarity of the ordinary layman with court procedures was compounded by the fact that he was made to face a government official whose specific function was to prosecute, and who was incomparably more familiar than the accused with the problems of procedure, the idiosyncrasies of juries, and last but not least, the personnel of the Court,: The guarantee
of the right to counsel serves to minimize that imbalance in the adversary system. In the words of Justice Black: It embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life, or liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by an experienced and learned counsel. In sum, the basic elements of the right to counsel as it is enforced now are the following: (1) The court is duty bound to inform the defendant that he has a right to an attorney before he is arraigned; (2) The court must ask him if he desires the service of counsel; (3) If he does, and is unable to get one, the court must assign counsel de oficio; (4) Or, if the accused wishes to procure private counsel, the court must give him time to obtain one. Where the appointed counsel could have acted in a double capacity, that is, if his actual interests were divided between the prosecution and the defense, his appointment constitutes reversible error; (5) Where duly authorized members of the bar are not available, the court may appoint resident of the province and of good repute for probity and ability. As Section 6 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court puts it, the judge has four pre-arraignment duties: (1) to inform the accused that he has the right to have his own counsel before being arraigned; (2) after giving such information, to ask accused whether he desires the aid of counsel; (3) if he so desires to procure the services of counsel, the court must grant him reasonable time to do so; and (4) if he so desires to have counsel but is unable to employ one, the court must assign counsel de oficio to defend him. It should be noted that under present jurisprudence the counsel de oficio must be a qualified lawyer. However, there are limits to the courts duty to furnish counsel de oficio. The duty of the court to appoint a counsel
de oficio when the accused has no counsel of choice and desires to employ the services of one is mandatory only at the time of arraignment ( Rule 116, Section 6, Revised Rules of Court). This is no longer so where the accused has proceeded with the arraignment and the trial with a counsel of his choice but when the time for the presentation of evidence for the defense has arrived, he appears by himself alone and the absence of his counsel was inexcusable. Moreover, unlike the right to counsel under Section 12(1), counsel need not be one who is the choice of the accused An examination of related provisions in the Constitution concerning the right to counsel, will show that the preference in the choice of counsel pertains more aptly and specifically to a person under investigation [Art. III, Section 14(2)], But, an accused who wishes to withdraw his appeal to the Supreme Court on the ground that he could not afford counsel should be given counsel de oficio instead. Like other personal rights, the right to counsel may be waived. In one case, where defendant, on being asked whether he could afford to employ a lawyer, replied in the affirmative but said that he had been unable to come to an agreement with any one as to the amount he should pay for the services and thereupon entered into trial conducting his own defense, he was deemed to have waived his right. This waiver of right is exemplified in People v. Sim Ben. The accused in this case was informed by the judge of his right to counsel and he was asked if he desired one. He answered that he did not. He was then asked if he agreed to have the information read to him even without counsel. He agreed. Thereupon, the information was read and translated for him. He pleaded guilty. He was then asked whether he realized that because of his plea of guilt the punishment provided by law would be imposed on him. He answered that he did. He was deemed to have validly waived his right.
However,
in
another
case,
People
v.
Holgado,
The
following
interchange transpired in court: Court: Do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty? Accused: I have no lawyer and I will plead guilty. Whereupon he was arraigned. The Supreme Court ruled that the accused was denied the right to counsel. Waiver was not effective. As the Court said in another case, Whenever a protection given by the Constitution is waived by the person entitled to that protection, the presumption is always against the waiver. Consequently, the prosecution must prove with strongly convincing evidence to the satisfaction of this Court that indeed the accused willingly and voluntarily submitted his confession and knowingly and deliberately manifested that he was not interested in having a lawyer assist him during the taking of that confession. Finally, the rights enumerated in Section 14(2) are rights in all criminal prosecutions and criminal prosecutions according to the 1971 case of People v. Jose covers the period from arraignment to rendition of judgment. Hence, according to the same case, the right to counsel exists only during that period. It has been shown, however, that under the circumstances of Section 12(1) a right to counsel also exists before arraignment. Right to be informed The heart of the constitutional guarantee its purpose and its requirements was explained in U.S. v. Karelsen: The object of this written accusations was First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for prosecution against a further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be
had. In order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged. Thus, the cardinal requisite is that the accused be informed of facts that are imputed to him. To satisfy this requisite, the information must describe the act with sufficient particularity. If personal property is the subject of the offense, the descriptive terms used must be sufficient in their common and ordinary acceptation to show with certainty to the common understanding of intelligent men what the property was and to fully identify it. If the value of the property is material, it must be stated. If an offense has a qualifying circumstance, such as relationship in statutory rape, the relationship must be alleged. The right to assail the sufficiency of the information or the admission of evidence may be waived by the accused if he fails to object to its sufficiency during the trial and the deficiency is cured by competent evidence presented therein. What is essential therefore is that the accused be informed of the facts alleged against him; he need not be informed of the characterization of the crime, which is a conclusion of law. Hence, provided the facts are found in the body of the information, an incorrect caption is not a fatal defect. However, of the accused is charged with two informations containing two sets of facts, while the trial of the two cases may be joint, there should be two separate verdicts for the two informations. The facts in the two informations cannot be combined to allow a conviction for a complex crime consisting of the allegations in the two informations. To do so would violate his right to be informed of the accusation against him.
Speedy, impartial, and public trial As already seen, the right to impartial treatment is already an aspect of the guarantee of due process. It should be noted, however, that the right to an impartial trial is not a bar to a judges intervention in crossexamination. As the Court said: We have had occasion to hold that it is not only the right but oft-times the duty of a trial judge to examine witnesses when it appears necessary for the elucidation of the record. Under the system of legal procedure in vogue in this jurisdiction, where the trial court is judge of both the law and the facts, it is oft-times expedient or necessary in the due and faithful administration of justice for the presiding judge . . . to re-examine a witness in order that his judgment when rendered may rest upon a full and clear understanding of the facts. Speedy trial, for its part, is a two-edged sword. It can work against or to the advantage of the accused. Since the prosecution has the burden of proof, delay in the trial occasioning disappearance of witnesses and the dimming of memories can actually lessen the chances of conviction. Similarly, the accuseds own witnesses can disappear or suffer a similar dimming of memory. Speedy trial, as already stated, like fair trial, is necessarily relative. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to the defendant. It does not preclude the rights of public justice. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable delays. While it is the duty of the prosecution to see to it that criminal cases are tried without unfounded delays, the accused himself cannot sleep on said right but must see to it that his case be tried at any early date . . . He cannot agree to the repeated postponement of the trial of his case and then, when he finds the government absent or unable to go to trial on any of the dates of hearing, take advantage of said absence and ask for the dismissal
of his case. Much less may he be allowed to connive in the hiding of witnesses in order to delay trial. The constitutional privilege was never intended as furnishing a technical means for escaping trial. The right, moreover, may be waived. But waiver is not to be inferred from mere failure of the accused to urge the trial of the case. Such waiver or abandonment may be presumed only when the postponement of the trial has been sought and obtained by the accused himself or by his attorney. The presumption, in fact, is always against the waiver of constitutionally protected rights. In People v. Oplado, it was said that where one of two co-accused can be tried separately, the absence of the other does not justify delay of the trial of the accused who is present. The remedy an accused has for violation of his right to speedy trial is dismissal of the case and, if he is under detention, release by habeas corpus. Moreover, dismissal for violation of the right to speedy trial is equivalent to acquittal and is therefore a bar to subsequent prosecution for the same offense. Right of confrontation Closely connected with and equally essential as the right to be heard is the right to meet the witnesses face to face, or, as Rule 115, Section 1(f) of the (New) Rules of Court expresses it, to confront and cross-examine the witness against him at the trial. The right has a two-fold purpose: (1) primarily, to afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of the witness by cross-examination, and (2) secondarily, to allow the judge to observe the deportment of the witness. Agreements between prosecution and the defense to the effect that certain witnesses, if presented, would testify to certain facts can deprive the
defendant of the right to confrontation (besides preventing review of the evidence by the appellate court). The practice, however, of admitting such agreements has not been completely disallowed. A corollary of the right of confrontation is that testimony not subjected to cross-examination must be excluded from consideration. However, if cross-examination actually commenced, but, for lack of material time, was not completed, and the witness in the meantime died before crossexamination could be resumed, so much of the testimony as had already been covered by cross-examination is admissible. The Court said in Marinas v. Siochi: From Section 5 of Rule 112 it is clear that, unlike in the preliminary investigation proper, an accused is not entitled as a matter of right to be present during the preliminary examination nor to cross-examine the witnesses presented against him before his arrest, the purpose of said examination being merely to determine whether or not there is sufficient reason to issue a warrant of arrest. The provision commanding the determination of probable cause prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest, requires no notice to an accused. A preliminary examination is generally a proceeding ex parte in which the person charged has no right to participate or be present. Compulsory process Equally important as the right to counsel is the right to compulsory process for the attendance of witnesses. The accused, however, may not invoke this right on appeal if he made no effort during the trial to avail himself of it. Moreover, to establish the right to continuance by reason of the absence of witnesses the accused must show: (a) that the witnesses is really material; (b) that he is guilty of no neglect in previously obtaining
attendance of said witness; (c) that the witness will be available at the time desired; (d) that no similar evidence could be obtained.
Trial in absentia The 1987 Constitution, as also the 1973 Constitution, now provides for allowable trial in absentia. Article III, Section 14(2), has this added sentence: However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of he accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. The evident purpose of this change is to prevent unnecessary delays of the trial. The rights of the accused are amply protected because trial in absentia can be had only if three conditions concur: (1) accused has been arraigned; (2) notice of the trial was duly served to him and properly returned; (3) his failure to appear is unjustified. The Court has ruled that the presence of the accused at arraignment is an absolute requisite for any trial to proceed, the reason being that it is at arraignment that the accused is informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him and it is then that the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person. It has also been ruled that the new provision allowing trial in absentia does not lend itself to a latitudinarian construction that would preclude forfeiture of bail for one who jumps bail. Moreover, there is a statutory rule which requires the presence of the accused at promulgation of judgment. Trial in absentia can also take place when the accused voluntarily waives his right to be present. There are, however, restrictive conditions for allowing waiver. The right may be waived provided that after arraignment he may be compelled to appear for the purpose of identification by the witnesses of the prosecution, or provided he unqualifiedly admits in open court after his arraignment that he is the person named as the defendant in
the case on trial. Reason for requiring the presence of the accused despite his waiver, is, if allowed to be absent in all the stages of the proceeding without giving the Peoples witnesses the opportunity to identify him in court, he may in his defense and, therefore, is entitled to acquittal. Thus, for an accused to be excused from attending trial, it is not enough that he vaguely agrees to be excused from attending trial, it is not enough that he vaguely agrees to be identified by witnesses in his absence. He must unqualifiedly admit that every time a witness mentions a name by which he is known, the witness is to be understood as referring to him. Article III, Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. Speedy disposition of cases It is a truism that justice delayed can mean justice denied. It should be noted that the provision guaranties the right generally to a speedy disposition of their cases. It covers therefore the periods before, during, and after trial. In this respect it gives broader protection than Section 14(2) which guarantees merely the right to a speedy trial. It is also broader than the protection given by Article VIII, Section 15, which covers merely the period after the submission of a case. Moreover, the present provision applies to civil, criminal, and administrative cases. As the Court has put it, the constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. The concept of speedy disposition of cases, like speedy trial, is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept. It is consistent with reasonable delay.
Lastly, as in the case of violation of the right to a speedy trial, the remedy for violation of the right to a speedy disposition of a case is dismissal obtained through mandamus. Article III, Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Self-incrimination The 1987 Constitution separated the provision from the rules on custodial investigation. But Section 12(3) places violations of the selfincrimination clause under the exclusionary rule. The justification for the guarantee was stated by the Court thus: It was established on the grounds of public policy and humanity: Of policy, because, if the party were required to testify, it would place the witness under the strongest temptation to commit perjury; and of humanity, because it would prevent the extorting of confessions by duress. Another decision said: The main purpose of the provision . . . is to prohibit compulsory oral examination of prisoners before the trial, or upon trial, for the purpose of extorting unwilling confessions or declarations implicating them in the commission of a crime. Although the guarantee has proscribed an inquisitorial system of investigation, it does not prohibit every form of preliminary investigation. Preliminary investigation is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime so as to enable the fiscal his complaint or information. To violate the right, it is not necessary that a categorical admission of a specific offense be sought. Chief Justice Marshall explained that usually a crime or a criminal act may contain two or more elements and that a question would have a tendency to incriminate, even if it tends to elicit only
one of said elements. The right thus includes a right to refuse to testify to a fact which would be a necessary link in a chain of evidence to prove the commission of a crime by a witness. It was held early in Philippine jurisprudence that what is prohibited by the constitutional guarantee is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the witness, not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be material. Thus, substance emitting from the body of the defendant was received as evidence in a prosecution for acts of lasciviousness. Subjection to ultra-violet examination is allowed. So is paraffin test. Morphine forced out of the mouth of the accused was received. An order by the judge for the witness to put on a pair of pants for size was allowed. The taking of an accused persons picture does not incriminate him. And since, according to the Court, the kernel of the privilege was the prohibition of testimonial compulsion. This harsh rule, so contrary to the humane purpose of the law, was justified by justice Malcolm by the statement that No rule is intended to be so rigid as to embarrass the administration of justice in its endeavour to ascertain the truth. The Court added: Fully conscious that we are resolving a most extreme case . . . which on first impression is a shock to ones sensibilities, we must nevertheless enforce the constitutional provision . . . undeterred by merely sentimental influences. The only proviso imposed was that torture or force should be avoided. The rule on the permissibility of requiring a witness to write in order to furnish a sample of his handwriting was settled in Beltran v. Samson. It was held that, since witnesses in a preliminary investigation are protected by the prohibition, they may not be compelled to take a dictation in order to compare their handwriting with that found in a supposedly falsified document. In support of this ruling, the Court said:
. . . writing is something more than moving the body, or the hand, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of the intelligence and attention . . . We say that, for the purpose of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document. And one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is require to furnish evidence against himself. And we say that the present case is more serious . . . because here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means of the act of writing, evidence which does not exist. Beltran, however, was distinguished from Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan where the accused where asked to affix their signatures on the envelopes of the letters which constituted the corpus delicti in a mail pilferage case. The Court said: To be sure, the use of specimen handwriting in Beltran is different form and the use of petitioners signature in this case. In that case, the purpose was to show that the specimen handwriting matched the handwriting in the document alleged to have been falsified and thereby show that the accused was the author of the crime (falsification) while in this case the purpose for securing the signature of petitioner on the envelopes was merely to authenticate the envelops as the one seized from him and his coaccused. When a person, however, voluntarily answers an incriminating
question, he is deemed to have waived his right. Moreover, after the accused pleaded guilty, for the purpose of ascertaining the proper penalty to be imposed or for any other legal purposes, the court may properly ask such questions as are necessary to that end. By this plea of guilty, he is deemed to have waived his right to the extend, at least of not allowing him subsequently to claim error by reason of such questions or answers thereto.
Besides, it is the courts which determine whether or not a question is in fact incriminating. But an invariable answer of I do not remember is equivalent to refusal to answer and does not constitute waiver. The privilege against self-incrimination can be rendered meaningless if the silence of a witness may be used against him. Hence, the rule has been established that refusal of an accused to be a witness or of a witness to answer should in no manner be used against them. This rule, however, does not prohibit an unfavourable interference from failure of one party to produce evidence that is in his control. Documents and records It will be recalled that Philippine jurisprudence prior to Stonehill v. Diokno had linked the inadmissibility of illegally obtained evidence with the self-incrimination clause. Jurisprudence on the subject was founded on Boyd v. United States which had declared that a compulsory production of the private books and papers of the owner . . . is compelling him to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Both Stonehill and Article III, Section 3(1), have since divorced the exclusionary rule in the search and seizure clause from self-incrimination. Nevertheless, the rule established in Boyd still remains that the self-incrimination clause covers documentary evidence. It should also be noted that, unlike the search and seizure clause, which protects both natural persons and corporations, the privilege against self-incrimination is a personal one, applying only to natural individuals. Moreover, a corporate officer may not prevent the production of corporate papers on the ground that they may incriminate him personally, for in such situation it would not be a case of the officer incriminating himself but the corporation incriminating him.
Article III, Section 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. (2) The employment against or of physical, prisoner penal psychological, or facilities or degrading use of subhuman
punishment substandard
any
inadequate
conditions shall be dealt with by law. Cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment; excessive fines In Legarda v. Valdez, it was clearly established that the phrase cruel and unusual embodied an inseparable pair: To be prohibited by this provision the punishment must not only be unusual but it must also be cruel. There is no reason why unusual punishments which were not cruel should have been prohibited. Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the Constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life. Thus to be cruel and unusual or excessive within the meaning of the Constitution, the penalty must be flagrantly disproportionate to the offense no matter under what circumstances the offense may be committed; but to be clearly excessive under Article 5 of the Penal Code, it need only be disproportionate to the circumstances of the offense and of the offender. In the former, the punishment imposed by the Legislature has exceeded the limits of its discretionary power, and the Court steps in to apply the constitutional brake; in the Latter, the Legislature has acted within the limits of its power, but an unforeseen situation occurs which calls for clemency and
the court can merely recommend clemency because in the constitutional scheme it has power only to apply the law. Abolition of death penalty It was made clear that there was no intention to pass judgment on capital punishment as cruel and unusual. The matter should be left to legislative discretion. Thus, when lethal injection was challenged as a cruel and unusual punishment disallowed by the Constitution, the Court easily dismissed the contention appealing to well-settled jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment. Punishment is so if it involves torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the Constitution. Unconstitutional punishment implies something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life. Article III, Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. Double jeopardy Justice Moran, writing in 1941, could said: Being thus a mere recognition of the maxim of the common law, and adoptment from the Constitution of the United States, the principle of double jeopardy followed in this jurisdiction the same no narrower or wider line of development as in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. It will also be seen that the role which the Rules of Court has played in the development of the doctrine on double jeopardy has made it very difficult to determine what aspect of the development belongs to constitutional double jeopardy and what to statutory double jeopardy.
When jeopardy attaches Under present law, to raise the defense of double or second jeopardy three requisites must be shown: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first. These three requisites provide a convenient division for the discussion of the subject. The Court enumerated the requisites for the attachment of jeopardy: (a) upon a good indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, and (d) after plea. Rule 117, Section 7 of the New Rules of Court, says that there must be a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction. Under such rule, it has been uniformly held that if the charge is fatally defective in form, jeopardy does not attach. Thus, too, when the substance of the information does not allege sufficient facts to constitute an offense, jeopardy does not attach. Under these and similarly defective informations, the accused can never be convicted and, hence, he cannot be said to have been in jeopardy of conviction. When the court that takes cognizance of the case without jurisdiction, either because the crime charged is outside the ambit of the courts powers or because the crime was committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of t he court, all proceedings in such court are void and the accused cannot be convicted. Hence, again, jeopardy does not attach. Conviction by a court that is without jurisdiction is a nullity and, at most, has the effect of a preliminary investigation. In a preliminary
investigation, however, the accused is not placed in jeopardy because it has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe the accused guilty thereof. However, the Supreme Court ruled that in the case of People v. Balisacan, where the accused pleaded guilty and was allowed to present evidence in mitigation, his evidence amounted to a withdrawal of his plea of guilty and, since no new plea was entered, there was no jeopardy which the acquittal could terminate. Termination of jeopardy Once jeopardy has attached, may double jeopardy be raised as a defense even before the termination of the first jeopardy? Justice Roberto Concepcion, in Yap v. Lutero, wrote: Our bill of Rights deals with two kinds of double jeopardy. The first sentence of clause 20, Section 1, Article III of the [1935] Constitution ordains that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The second sentence of said clause provides that if an act is punishable by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. Thus, the first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, whereas the second contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. Under the first sentence, one may be twice put in jeopardy of punishment of the same act. Provided that he is charged with different offenses, or the offense charged in one case is not included in, or does not include, the crime charged in the other case. The second sentence applies, even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the other violation of a statute. If the two charges are based on one and the same act, conviction or acquittal
under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other. Article III, Section 22. No ex-post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted. Ex post facto laws An ex post facto law has been defined as one: (a) Which makes an action done before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; or (b) Which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; or (c) Which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; (d) Which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant; (e) Assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful; (f) Deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. Bill of attainder
A bill of attainder, according to Cummings v. Missouri, is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial. If the punishment be less than death, the act is termed a bill of pains and penalties. It is thus a general safeguard against legislative exercise of the judicial function, or more simply trial by legislature.
BIBLIOGRAPHY The 1987 Philippine Constitution: Commentary, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, 2003 Edition Remedial Law Volume I, Justice Herrera, 2001 Edition Revised Penal Code Annotated, J.B.L. Reyes, 2008 Edition