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A330
A330
System Specification
Type-A Document
1.0 Scope
This document is made in the scope of the Systems Engineering Class at the Un iversity of Twente. It is a Type-A document describing the design of The Airbus A330/A340 Primary Flight Control System. The emphasis in our design is on the fault tolerance of the control of the plane, because this control system is mission critical.
3.0 Requirements
3.1 System Definition
This type-A document describes the specifications for the design of a flight control system for the Airbus A330/A340. In the Airbus A320, which was introduced in 1988, digital techniques were used for the primary flight controls. Although this aircraft can be flown using mechanical backup systems, under normal circumstances it adopts a complete fly-by-wire approach, where crew commands are transmitted to the control surfaces through computers rather than by mechanical linkages. In the mid-1990s Airbus introduced the A330/A340 family of aircraft. This also incorporates fly-by-wire techniques and makes extensive use of advanced computer systems. The A330 is a twin-engined aircraft, whereas the A340 has four engines. Due to the Fly-by-Wire concept, the user interface for the pilot is the same for all A3xx types, which saves a considerable amount of flight training hours. Although the A330 and A340 aircraft can be flown without the use of their electronic flight control system (EFCS), failure of this system would represent a considerable reduction in overall safety levels. The EFCS therefore requires a very high level of integrity and is designed and produced to the stringent standards appropriate for such a system. Because the aircraft relies heavily on its Figure 1 Flight Control Surfaces of an A340 computer system to operate its various control surfaces, it is imperative that the control system remains operational at all times. Fault detection is therefore not sufficient to provide safety and the system must also provide effective fault tolerance to allow the unit to continue safe operation, perhaps for several hours, in the presence of faults. In this case, we will concentrate on the architectural features to achieve a high level of fault tolerance, which is absolutely needed for this kind of mission-critical systems.
Sensor
position
Pilot
commands status
Interface
commands status
EFCS
control signals
Fault tolerance can be implemented by making the entire control system redundant. An example can be seen in figure 4, where there is a mechanical as well as an electronic link to the control surface. The actuators can be mechanical and hydraulic. This kind of redundancy has to be applied in every subsystem. Suggested is to use multiple pilots, interfaces, computers and (software) algorithms, sensors and actuators, preferably in an arrangement that is designed to provide a high degree of protection against a wide variety of system faults. Triple redundancy will suffice in most emergent cases and will be required for the flight control system.
Each flight control surface must be driven by multiple independent actuators, which are in turn controlled by different computers. This guarantees that failure of a single actuator or computer will not result in a loss of control of that surface. As movement of the control surfaces is achieved using hydraulic actuators, the hydraulic supply represents a key component within the control system. In common with other commercial aircraft, three separate hydraulic supplies should be used.
have to be used in high quantities. They must be very accurate and work independently, and stay robust in all weather conditions. They have to be protected against shocks, extreme pressures and temperatures, moisture etc. The interface has to show sensory measurements, flight status, but also feedback to recent pilot commands. The pilot should be able to request all kinds of information, like system status, air traffic status and weather status. Furthermore it has to show all kinds of calculations, e.g. errors, deviations and also warnings. It should be very reliable and should also be very ergonomically in use. For example primary controls and status displays have to be very clear (colored) in comparison with the rest. The pilots should be well trained and should be healthy, rest enough, fed enough, have high moral standards, peace with his relatives and never be drunk.
3.5 Logistics
3.5.1 Maintenance Requirements
For the maintenance of the system, the presence of spare parts and specialized personel at the airport is needed. A detection system in the plane has to provide information for the maintenance crew to check whether all jobs have been carried out. For fast and economic maintenance, all systems and parts must be modular and easily replaceable.