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HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

State of Ohio PLAINTIFF -vsDEFENDANT : : : : : CASE NO.: JUDGE: DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR DISCLOSURE OF EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE

Defendant

, through counsel, respectfully moves this Court

to order the prosecution to disclose to the defense all evidence of an exculpatory nature, regardless of whether counsel for the State or any other law enforcement officials personally believe that such evidence in fact is exculpatory. This motion is made pursuant to Ohio R. Crim. P. 16(B)(1)(f), and the relevant case law, including Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The reasons in support of this motion are more fully set out in the accompanying memorandum. MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution is violated when the State fails to reveal any information it actually or constructively possesses and which information is favorable to the Defendant and material to the issue of guilt or punishment or in any way discrediting the States case. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); McMullen v. Maxwell, 3 Ohio St. 2d 160, 209 N.E.2d 449 (1965). See also Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967); Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967); Ohio R. Crim. P. 16(B)(1)(f). Upon request, the State must disclose to the defense all such information. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). See also Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942); Giles, 386 U.S. 66. Moreover, the Courts supervisory power to safeguard the proper administration of justice reinforces due process and compulsory process requirements

of disclosure.

United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563 (2nd Cir.

1961); United States v. Miller, 411 F.2d 825 (2nd Cir. 1969); United States v. Leja, 568 F.2d 493 (6th Cir. 1977). It is essential that the prosecution disclose information as it is obtained or to allow inspection of such information. In Brady, the court stated: A prosecution that withholds evidence on demand of an accused which, if made available, would tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty helps shape a trial that bears heavily on the defendant. That casts the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a proceeding that does not comport with standards of justice. 373 U.S. at 87-99 Any information or evidence which the prosecution has knowledge of or access to, and which might be exculpatory in nature, must be disclosed to the defense in a timely manner. The same is true of any evidence which tends to mitigate the penalty or extenuate the circumstances of the crime. Although the Brady rule is often phrased in terms of information known to the prosecution, the prosecutions knowledge for this purpose clearly extends beyond the personal knowledge of the prosecutor representing the State at trial. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), suggests, for example, that the prosecutor is responsible for information known to his co-workers. The court in Giglio noted: To the extent this places a burden on the large prosecution offices, procedures and regulations can be established to carry that burden and to insure communications of all relevant information on each case to every lawyer who deals with it. 405 U.S. at 154. Moreover, many cases have held that information known to law enforcement personnel is within the knowledge of the prosecutor. In Barbee v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842, 846 (4th Cir.

1964), the court expressed its views that the police are also part of the prosecution, and that the taint on the trial is no less if they, rather than the States attorney, were guilty of nondisclosure. Ignorance of the existence of police information will not justify the States failure to produce that information, for purposes of finding a Brady violation; Brady is aimed at ensuring that the accused receives a fair trial. United States ex rel. Smith v. Fairman, 769 F.2d 386 (7th Cir. 1985). It is also important to note that the State has a continuing duty to disclose all exculpatory evidence, including scientific test results. State v. Kassow, 28 Ohio St. 2d 141, 277 N.E.2d 435 (1971), vacated on other grounds, sub nom. Kassow v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 939 (1972); see also United States v. Kelly, 420 F.2d 26 (2nd Cir. 1969). Disclosure of the requested information must be timed to enable effective preparation for trial. United States v. Polisi, 416 F.2d 573, 578 (2nd Cir. 1969); United States v. Kaplan, 554 F.2d 577, 580 (3rd Cir. 1977). In United States v. Baxter, 492 F.2d 150, 173-174 (9th Cir. 1973), it was stated that: Disclosure by the government must be made at such a time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in preparation and presentation of its case, even if satisfaction of this criterion requires pretrial disclosure. See, e.g. United States v. Elmore, 423 F.2d 775, 779 (4th Cir. 1970); United States v. Deutsch, 373 F.Supp. 289, 290-291 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See also Gorham v. Wainwright, 588 F.2d 178, 180 (5th Cir. 1979); Grant v. Alldredge, 498 F.2d 376, 381, n.5 (2nd Cir. 1974); Clay v. Black, 479 F.2d 319, 320 (6th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); Hamric v. Bailey, 386 F.2d 390, 393 (4th Cir. 1967); Ashley v. Texas, 319 F.2d 80, 85 (5th Cir. 1963); United States v. Germain, 411 F. Supp. 719 (S.D. Ohio 1975); Coleman v. Maxwell, 273 F.Supp. 275 (S.D. Ohio 1967). Disclosure must be made in sufficient time to allow defense counsel the ability to mold the information into a cohesive defense. To be effective, trial counsel must be aware of all important

evidence well before trial. Important strategy decisions that must be made prior to trial can only be made intelligently with an awareness of all the facts. An effective opening statement can only be made if counsel is cognizant of all important evidence that supports his client's innocence. Late disclosure of exculpatory evidence may well force defense counsel to adopt new trial strategies during trial that are inconsistent with counsel's opening statements. Such a shift in strategy may leave the jury confused or even remove credibility as to the Accused's position regarding what punishment is appropriate. If counsel receives discoverable evidence in the middle of trial, defense counsel will be compelled by their constitutionally generated duty to be effective, to request lengthy continuances for the purpose of investigating the new facts and developing them into a theory of defense. Counsel may be forced to move for a mistrial on the basis that the evidence so changes the defense perspective toward the case that voir dire and opening statements, the defense theory of the case, the defense case-in-chief, defense cross-examinations, and defense arguments would have been so completely different that counsels performance up to the point of disclosure has been rendered ineffective by the failure to disclose the evidence. See Bagley v. Lumpkin, 798 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1986), on remand sub nom. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985); Blake v. Kemp, 758 F.2d 523, 532 (11th Cir. 1985). Where information is not produced until trial, reversal will be granted where an appellant has been denied the opportunity to use the disclosed material effectively. United States v. Johnston, 784 F.2d 416, 425 (1st Cir. 1986). In his Demand for Discovery, Defendant made specific requests for information. The defense is entitled to this evidence under Ohio R. Crim. P. 16, Brady, and other caselaw. Specifically, the defense is entitled to any and all pertinent information concerning any and all witnesses' credibility, Schneider v. Estelle, 552 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1979); inconsistent statements,

prior unfounded accusations, and prior convictions of any and all witnesses, United States v. Canaday, 466 F.2d 1191 (9th Cir. 1972); promises of consideration by the prosecution to any and all witnesses, Annuziato v. Manson, 566 F.2d 410 (2nd Cir. 1977); threats of prosecution to any and all witnesses, United States v. Sutton, 542 F.2d 1239 (4th Cir. 1976); any and all witnesses' failure to name or identify the defendant as a participant in crime, Jones v. Jago, 428 F. Supp. 405 (N.D. Ohio 1977), aff'd, 575 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1978); and any and all evidence which is of obvious substantial value to the defense, as in mitigation of sentence, Brady v. Maryland, thus encompassing evidence of all mitigating circumstances under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2929.04(B). Suppression of exculpatory evidence undermines the reliability of the guilt determination process. In such a situation reversal of the conviction is the appropriate remedy. State v. Johnston, 39 Ohio St. 3d 48, 529 N.E.2d 898 (1988). Defendant requests this Court to order the State of Ohio to disclose the specifically requested evidence and any other evidence properly discoverable pursuant to Brady, Bagley, and the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure. Failure to disclose the requested exculpatory information will result in a violation of Defendants rights to due process, compulsory process, fair trial, equal protection, effective assistance of counsel, confrontation of witnesses against him, and against cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. Const. amends. V, VI, VIII, IX and XIV; Ohio Const. art. I, 1, 2, 5, 9, 10, 16 and 20. Defendant will supplement this motion if and when he becomes aware of specific information in the States possession to which he believes he is entitled. However, due to the obvious difficulty of asking for specific information that is known only to the States agents, coupled with the mandate that he nonetheless make a request for favorable evidence, Defendant now propounds the instant motion and respectfully requests that this Court entertain further similar motions if and when they become necessary.

Respectfully Submitted, _________________________________________

Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a copy of this document was delivered to the office of the Prosecutor on .

_____________________________

Attorney for Defendant

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