Consti Executive 1
Consti Executive 1
001
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, protestant, vs. FIDEL VALDEZ RAMOS, protestee. RESOLUTION In her motion of 16 August 1995, reiterated in her Comment of 29 August 1995, Protestant Miriam Defensor-Santiago prayed that the revision of ballots in the remaining precincts of the pilot areas be dispensed with and the revision process in the pilot areas be deemed completed. We deferred action on that motion and required the Protestant and the Protestee to submit their respective memoranda on the issue of whether this case had been rendered moot by the election of the Protestant as a Senator in the May 1995 election and her assumption of office as such on 30 June 1995. The Protestant answers this issue in the negative. Relying on Sibulo vda. de De Mesa vs. Mencias,1 Lomugdang vs. Javier,2 and De Castro vs. Ginete,3 she asserts that an election contest involves not only an adjudication and settlement of the private interests of the rival candidates, but more importantly, the paramount need to dispel, once and for all, the uncertainty that beclouds the true choice of the electorate. Hence, it is imbued with public interest and should be pursued to its final conclusion to determine the bona fide winner. She further asserts that an election case may be rendered moot only if the term of the contested office has expired,4 thus her election as Senator and assumption of office as such cannot, under the rule laid down in Moraleja vs. Relova,5 be construed as an abandonment of the instant protest. Finally, she alleges that this Court has departed from the orthodox view that a case should be dismissed if it has been mooted.6 For his part, the Protestee submits that there is strong legal basis for this Tribunal to rule that the Protestant is deemed to have abandoned the instant protest, in light of the ruling in Dimaporo vs. Mitra7 which construed Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code). 8 He submits, however, that public interest requires that this protest be resolved on the merits considering that: (a) it involves a matter of paramount and grave public interest; and (b) it was filed merely to keep Protestant Santiago in the limelight in preparation for her Senatorial campaign. He likewise claims that a resolution on the merits would confirm his victory in the 11 May 1992 presidential election and prove that the instant protest is unfounded. Further more, it would establish guiding and controlling principles or doctrines with respect to presidential election protest cases, thereby educating the bench and the bar and preventing the indiscriminate filing of baseless protest cases. We cannot subscribe to the view of the Protestee that by filing her certificate of candidacy for Senator Protestant Santiago ipso facto forfeited her claim to the office of President pursuant to Section 67 of B.P. Blg. 881. Plainly, the said section applies exclusively to an incumbent elective official who files a certificate of candidacy for any office "other than the one he is holding in a permanent capacity." Even more plain is that the Protestant was not the incumbent President at the time she filed her certificate of candidacy for Senator nor at any time before that. Thus, the holding in Dimaporo does not apply to the Protestant. Neither do we find any convincing logic to the Protestee's proposition that this case should nevertheless be resolved on the merits because its filing was done in bad faith, i.e., merely to keep the Protestant in the limelight in preparation for her Senatorial campaign. If that were so, then public interest would be served if this case were put to an abrupt end after the Protestant won a seat in the Senate. Finally, neither do we find any cogent nor compelling reason to proceed with this case, in the event that we find it to be moot,
Facts: Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.
Held: It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.
simply to establish guiding and controlling principles or doctrines with respect to election protests involving the office of the President or the Vice-President. I. The key then to the resolution of the aforestated issue is the consideration of public interest and public policy and their encompassing effects on election cases which have been unequivocally expressed in the cases cited by the Protestant. In Sibulo vda. de De Mesa vs. Mencias,9 this Court stated: It is axiomatic that an election contest, involving as it does not only the adjudication and settlement of the private interests of the rival candidates but also the paramount need of dispelling once and for all the uncertainty that beclouds the real choice of the electorate with respect to who shall discharge the prerogatives of the offices within their gift, is a proceeding imbued with public interest which raises it onto a plane over and above ordinary civil actions. For this reason, broad perspectives of public policy impose upon courts the imperative duty to ascertain by all means within their command who is the real candidate elected in as expeditious a manner as possible, without being fettered by technicalities and procedural barriers to the end that the will of the people may not be frustrated (Ibasco vs. Ilao, et al., G.R. L-17512, December 29, 1960; Reforma vs. De Luna, G.R. L-13242, July 31, 1958). So inextricably intertwined are the interests of the contestants and those of the public that there can be no gainsaying the logic of the proposition that even the voluntary cessation in office of the protestee not only does not ipso facto divest him or the character of an adversary in the contest inasmuch as he retains a party interest to keep his political opponent out of the office and maintain therein his successor, but also does not in any manner impair or detract from the jurisdiction of the court to pursue the proceeding to its final conclusion (De Los Angeles vs. Rodriguez, 46 Phil. 595, 597; Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 62 Phil. 584, 587; Galves vs. Maramba, G.R. L-13206). Upon the same principle, the death of the protestee De Mesa did not abate the proceedings in the election protest filed against him, and it may be stated as a rule that an election contest survives and must be prosecuted to final judgment despite the death of the protestee. (In Silverio vs. Castro, 19 SCRA 520 [1967], where the trial court proceeded with the trial of an election protest and decided it even if the protestee had already died and his Vice-Mayor had assumed office by succession, this Court, instead of dismissing the appeal brought on behalf of the deceased protestee, required the Vice-Mayor to intervene on the side of the appellant) In Lomugdang vs. Javier,10 this Court declared: Determination of what candidate has been in fact elected is a matter clothed with public interest, wherefore, public policy demands that an election contest, duly commenced, be not abated by the death of the contestant. We have squarely so ruled in Sibulo vda. de Mesa vs. Judge Mencias, G.R. No. L-24583, October 26, 1966, in the same spirit that led this Court to hold that the ineligibility of the protestant is not a defense (Caesar vs. Garrido, 53 Phil. 57), and that the protestee's cessation in office is not a ground for the dismissal of the contest nor detract the Court's jurisdiction to decide the case (Angeles vs. Rodriguez, 46 Phil. 595; Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 62 Phil. 584). In the same Sibulo case, already cited, this Court likewise ruled that by virtue of Section 7, Republic Act 2264, the vice-mayor elect has the status of a real party in interest in the continuation of the proceedings and is entitled to intervene therein. For if the protest succeeds and the protestee is unseated, the vice mayor succeeds to the office of mayor that becomes vacant if the duly elected cannot assume the post.
In Moraleja vs. Relova,11 this Court ruled: As to the contention that by accepting such appointment as Technical Assistant, protestant has abandoned his protest, all that need be said is that once the court has acquired jurisdiction over an election contest, the public interest involved demands that the true winner be known without regard to the wishes or acts of the parties, so much so that there can be no default, compromise nor stipulation of facts in this kind of cases. (Francisco, How To Try Election Cases, p. 163, citing Civilio v. Tomacruz, 62 Phil. 689). In the same manner that the acceptance by the protestee of an appointment to another position is not a ground for dismissal of the protest (Philippine Law on Elections by Martin, 1970 ed., pp. 258-259, citing Calvo v. Maramba, G.R. No. L-13206, January 7, 1918) like the resignation of the protestee from the contested office (Angeles v. Rodriguez, 46 Phil. 595), simply because it is of public interest that the real winner be known, neither can the acceptance of a more or less temporary employment, such as that of a technical assistant of the Vice-Governor, which is a primarily confidential position, be considered as inconsistent with protestant's determination to protect and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate. In such instances, the plight of protestant may be viewed in the same light as that of an employee who has been illegally dismissed and who, to find means to support himself and family while he prosecutes his case for reinstatement, accepts a temporary employment elsewhere. Such employee is not deemed to have abandoned the position he seeks to recover. (Tan v. Gimenez, et al. G.R. No. L-12525, February 19, 1960, 107 Phil. 17; Potot v. Bagano, G.R. No. L-2456, January 25, 1949, 82 Phil. 679). Of course, the case of protestant who accepts a permanent appointment to a regular office could be different, but We are not ruling on it here. In De Castro vs. Ginete,12 this Court stated: The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed elected by the board of canvassers is really the lawful choice of the electorate. What is sought in an election protest is the correction of the canvass of the votes, which is the basis of the proclamation of the winning candidate. An election contest involves a public office in which the public has an interest. Certainly, the act of a losing candidate of recognizing the one who is proclaimed the winner should not bar the losing candidate from questioning the validity of the election of the winner in the manner provided by law. The factual milieu in these cases is not on all fours with the instant protest. In Sibulo vda. de De Mesa, as in the later case of Silverio vs. Castro,13 the protestee had been proclaimed the winning mayoralty candidate and had assumed office, and then died during the pendency of the election protest. While in Lomugdang, it was the protestant who died during the pendency of the protest. In Moraleja, the election protest survived the protestant's acceptance of temporary employment during the pendency of his election protest. Likewise, in De los Angeles vs. Rodriguez,14 cited in Sibulo vda. de De Mesa, an election protest was continued despite the resignation from office of the protestee. Finally, in De Castro, the only issue presented was whether the protest should be dismissed on the ground ofestoppel. In this proceeding, the protestant congratulated the protestee after the latter was proclaimed the winner by the board of canvassers and even exhorted those present during the inauguration and installation into office of the protestee to support the latter's administration. May the above dicta apply to the case of Protestant Santiago who assumed the office of Senator after her election as such in the 8 May 1995 election? This question was impliedly raised but not resolved in Moraleja. For after holding that the acceptance by the protestant therein of a temporary appointment during the pendency of his protest did not amount to an abandonment thereof, nor could it be considered inconsistent with his determination to protect and pursue the public interest involved in the election
protest, this Court noted: "Of course, the case of a protestant who accepts a permanent appointment to a regular office could be different, but We are not ruling on it here."15 Indeed, it would be entirely different where the protestant pursued the new position through a popular election, as in the case of Protestant Santiago who filed a certificate of candidacy for Senator in the 8 May 1995 election, campaigned for such office, and submitted herself to be voted upon. She knew that the term of office of the Senators who would then be elected would be six years, to commence at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election16 and to end at noon of 30 June 2001. Knowing her high sense of integrity and candor, it is most unlikely that during her campaign, she promised to serve the electorate as Senator, subject to the outcome of this protest. In short, she filed her certificate of candidacy for the Senate without any qualification, condition, or reservation. In so doing, she entered into a political contract with the electorate that if elected, she would assume the office of Senator, discharge its functions and serve her constituency as such for the term for which she was elected. These are givens which are in full accord with the principle enshrined in the Constitution that, public office is a public trust, and public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people and serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. 17 Indeed, it has been aptly said: It is impossible that government shall be carried on, and the functions of civil society exercised, without the aid and intervention of public servants or officers, and every person, therefore, who enters into civil society and avails himself of the benefits and protection of the government, must owe to this society, or, in other words, to the public, at least a social duty to bear his share of the public burdens, by accepting and performing, under reasonable circumstances, the duties of those public offices to which he may be lawfully chosen.18 In this jurisdiction, an elected public official may even be held criminally liable should he refuse to discharge an elective office.19 The term of office of the Senators elected in the 8 May 1995 election is six years, the first three of which coincides with the last three years of the term of the President elected in the 11 May 1992 synchronized elections. The latter would be Protestant Santiago's term if she would succeed in proving in the instant protest. that she was the true winner in the 1992 elections. In assuming the office of Senator then, the Protestant has effectively abandoned or withdrawn this protest, or at the very least, in the language of Moraleja, abandoned her "determination to protect and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate." Such abandonment or withdrawal operates to render moot the instant protest. Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it would dissipate the aura of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential election, thereby enhancing the all too crucial political stability of the nation during this period of national recovery. It must also be stressed that under the Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, an election protest may be summarily dismissed, regardless of the public policy and public interest implications thereof, on the following grounds: (1) The petition is insufficient in form and substance; (2) The petition is filed beyond the periods provided in Rules 14 and 15 hereof; (3) The filing fee is not paid within the periods provided for in these Rules;
(4) The cash deposit, or the first P100,000.00 thereof, is not paid within 10 days after the filing of the protest; and (5) The petition or copies thereof and the annexes thereto filed with the Tribunal are not clearly legible.20 Other grounds for a motion to dismiss, e.g., those provided in the Rules of Court which apply in a suppletory character, 21 may likewise be pleaded as affirmative defenses in the answer. After which, the Tribunal may, in its discretion, hold a preliminary hearing on such grounds. 22 In sum, if an election protest may be dismissed on technical grounds, then it must be, for a decidedly stronger reason, if it has become moot due to its abandonment by the Protestant. II. There is yet another reason why this case should now be dismissed. This Tribunal cannot close its eyes to the fact that the Protestant has decided to waive the revision of the remaining unrevised ballots from 4,017 precincts out of the 17,527 precincts of the designated three pilot areas. This is an unabashed reversal from her original stand in her Motion and Manifestation dated 18 October 1993. Taking this into account, this Tribunal declared in its resolution of 21 October 1993: After deliberating on the foregoing pleadings and the arguments of the parties, the Tribunal rules for the Protestant insofar as the revision of the remaining ballot boxes from her pilot areas are concerned, and against the immediate application of Rule 61 of the Rules of the Tribunal to the Protestee in respect of the Counter-Protest. At this stage of the proceedings in this case it cannot be reasonably determined whether the revised ballots are "considerable" enough to establish a trend either in favor of or against the Protestant as would justify an appropriate action contemplated in Rule 61 of the Rules of the Tribunal, or whether the unrevised ballots from said areas would not, in the language of the Protestant, "materially affect the result of the representative sample of the ballot boxes so far revised." As to the 1,300 ballot boxes from Makati, the proper time to raise the objections to the ballot boxes and its contents would be during the revision stage. Consequently, we resolved therein to: A. ORDER the revision of the remaining unrevised ballot boxes enumerated in the aforequoted paragraph A of the 5 October 1993 Resolution and for that purpose to DIRECT the Acting Clerk of Court of the Tribunal to collect said ballot boxes and other election documents and paraphernalia from their respective custodians in the event that their revisions in connection with other election protests in which they are involved have been terminated, and if such revisions are not yet completed, to coordinate with the appropriate tribunal or court in which such other election protests are pending and which have already obtained custody of the ballot boxes and started revision with the end in view of either seeking expeditious revisions in such other election protests or obtaining the custody of the ballot boxes and related election documents and paraphernalia for their immediate delivery to the Tribunal; and B. REQUIRE the Protestant to inform the Tribunal, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, if after the completion of the revision of the ballots from her pilot areas she would present evidence in connection therewith.
Until the present, however, the Protestant has not informed the Tribunal whether after the completion of the revision of the ballots from her pilot areas, she still intends to present evidence in connection therewith. This failure then, is nothing short of a manifest indication that she no longer intends to do so. It is entirely irrelevant at this stage of the proceedings that the Protestant's revisors discovered in the course of the revisions alleged irregularities in 13,510 out of the 17,525 contested precincts in the pilot areas and have objected to thousands of ballots cast in favor of the Protestee. Revision is merely the first stage, and not the alpha and omega, of an election contest. In no uncertain terms then, this Tribunal declared in its resolution of 18 March 1993 that: Protestant knows only too well, being a lawyer and a former judge herself, that the revision phase of her protest is but the first stage in the resolution of her electoral protest and that the function of the revisors is very limited. In her 12 February 1993 Comment on Protestee's 5 February 1993 Urgent Motion for the issuance of a resolution which, inter alia, would clarify that revisors may observe the objections and/or claims made by the revisors of the other party as well as the ballots subject thereof, and record such observations in a form to be provided for that purpose, Protestant unequivocally stated: 8. Further, the principle and plan of the RPET [Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal] is to subdivide the entire election contest into various stages. Thus, the first stage is the Revision Proper. Second is the technical examination if so desired by either party. Third is the reception of evidence. And Fourth, is the filing of parties' memoranda. and described the function of the revisors as "solely to examine and segregate the ballots according to which ballots they would like to contest or object (contested ballots) and those which they admit or have no objections (uncontested ballots)." Indeed, revisors do not have any judicial discretion; their duties are merely clerical in nature (Hontiveros vs. Altavas, 24 Phil. 632 [1913]). In fact, their opinion or decision on the more crucial or critical matter of what ballots are to be contested or not does not even bind the Tribunal (Yalung vs. Atienza, 52 Phil. 781 [1929]; Olano vs. Tibayan, 53 Phil. 168 [1929]). Thus, no undue importance may be given to the revision phase of an election contest. It can never serve as a logical or an acceptable basis for the conclusion that massive fraud or irregularities were committed during an election or that a Protestant had won in said election. If that were so, a Protestant may contest all ballot boxes and, in the course of the revision thereof, object for any imagined ground whatsoever, even if the same be totally unfounded and ridiculous to all ballots credited to the Protestee; and then, at the end of the day, said Protestant may even announce to the whole world that contrary to what is reflected in the election returns, Protestee had actually lost the elections. All told, a dismissal of this election protest is inevitable. III. However, three Members of the Tribunal outrightly disagree with the foregoing disquisitions. Hence, a reply to the important points they raise is in order. Mr. Justice Puno's perception that the majority would dismiss this "election protest as moot and academic on two (2) grounds: first, that the findings of irregularities made by the revisors of the protestant in the course of the revision of ballots in 13,510 contested precincts are entirely irrelevant; and second, she abandoned her protest when she filed her certificate of candidacy in the 8 May 1995 senatorial elections," is inaccurate. The dispositive portion of this resolution leaves no room for any doubt or miscomprehension that the dismissal is based on the ground that the protest "has been rendered moot and academic by its abandonment or withdrawal by the Protestant as a consequence of her election and assumption of office
as Senator and her discharge of the duties and functions thereof. " There is, therefore, ONLY ONE reason or ground why the protest has been rendered moot and academic, i.e., it has been abandoned or withdrawn. This was the very issue upon which the parties were required, in the resolution of 26 September 1995, to submit their respective memoranda. The majority neither conveyed, asserted nor even suggested, as Mr. Justice Puno has apparently understood, that this protest has become moot and academic because the finding of irregularities by the Protestant's revisors in the course of the revision of the ballots in 13,510 contested precincts in the pilot areas are "entirely irrelevant," and that the Protestant has abandoned this protest by filing a certificate of candidacy for the office of Senator in the 8 May 1995 elections. The majority's views on "irrelevancy" and "on the filing of the certificate of candidacy" are not the grounds themselves, but parts only of the arguments to strengthen the conclusion reached, i.e.,abandonment. Otherwise stated, in order to make the point crystal clear, the majority never held that the irrelevancy of the finding of irregularities is a ground why this protest has become moot and academic. It only declared that the Protestant's: (a) waiver of revision of the unrevised ballots from the remaining 4,017 contested precincts in the pilot areas; and (b) failure to comply with the resolution of 21 October 1995 requiring her to inform the Tribunal within ten days from notice if she would still present evidence after completion of the revision of the ballots from her pilot areas rendered such "findings" of irregularities entirely irrelevant considering the Tribunal's disquisitions on what revision is in its 18 March 1993 resolution. In his dissent, Mr. Justice Puno lifted the words "entirely irrelevant"; from the fourth paragraph under the heading "II" of this Resolution. It must, however, be stressed that the said paragraph is inexorably linked to the preceding two paragraphs relating to the above-mentioned waiver and non-compliance, which provide the major premises for the fourth paragraph; more concretely, the latter is nothing more than the logical conclusion which the major premises support. The reasons adduced by Mr. Justice Puno for the Protestant's turn-around are mere speculations. In any event, the protestant's possible "belief . . . that the contested ballots in 13,500 precincts when properly appreciated will sufficiently establish her electoral victory," cannot stand against her previous insistence to proceed with the revision of the remaining unrevised ballots and the aforementioned finding of the Tribunal in its resolution of 21 October 1993. The Tribunal is not to blame for "the slow pace of the protest," if at all she so believes in such a state of things. Neither can the thought of cutting costs be a valid reason. The Protestant knew from the outset that the revision of the ballots in the pilot areas was a crucial phase of this protest because, under Rule 61 of the Rules of the Tribunal, the protest could forthwith be dismissed if the Tribunal were convinced that she would probably fail to make out a case but only after examination of the ballots from the pilot areas and the evaluation of the evidence offered in connection therewith. It goes without saying that every ballot then in the pilot areas counts. Then too, it was never the view of the majority that the Protestant's filing of the certificate of candidacy for a seat in the Senate in the 8 May 1995 election was the sole and exclusive operative act for what Mr. Justice Puno perceives to be the majority's second ground why this protest has become moot and academic. To the majority, such filing was only the initial step in a series of acts performed by the Protestant to convincingly evince her abandonment of this protest, viz., campaigning for the office of Senator, assumption of such office after her election and her discharge of the duties and functions of the said office. Precisely, in the resolution of 26 September 1995, this Court directed the Protestant and the Protestee to submit their respective memoranda on the issue [o]f whether or not the protest has not been rendered moot and academic by the election of the Protestant as Senator and her subsequent assumption of office as such on 30 June 1995 . (emphasis supplied) As to the concept of abandonment, Mr. Justice Puno and Mr. Justice Kapunan cite Black's Law Dictionary and the cases of Roebuck vs. Mecosta Country Road Commission,23 Dober vs. Ukase Inv. Co., 24 and McCall vs. Cull,25cited therein. We have turned to the primary sources of these cases, meticulously perused them, and found none materially significant to this protest.
The first two cases above refer to abandonment of property. Roebuck involved the issue of whether a roadway had been abandoned by the Mecosta Road Commission. The Court therein held that in order for there to be an abandonment of land dedicated to public use, two elements must concur, viz., (a) intention to relinquish the right or property, but without intending to transfer title to any particular person; and (b) the external act which such intention is carried into effect. While Dober, on the issue of whether the plaintiff therein abandoned a certain property, quoted Corpus Juris that the intention to abandon must be determined from the facts and circumstances of the case. There must be a clear, unequivocal and decisive act of the party to constitute abandonment in respect of a right secured an act done which shows a determination in the individual not to have a benefit which is designed for him. It is, of course, settled that a public office is not deemed property. 26 Only McCall involved the issue of abandonment of office. It is stated therein as follows: Abandonment is a matter of intention and, when thought of in connection with an office, implies that the occupant has quit the office and ceased to perform its duties. As long as he continues to discharge the duties of the office, even though his source of title is two appointments, one valid and the other invalid, it cannot be said he has abandoned it. It was said in Steingruber v. City of San Antonio, Tex. Com. App., 220 S.W. 77, 78: "A public office may be abandoned. Abandonment is a species of resignation. Resignation and abandonment are voluntary acts. The former is a formal relinquishment; the latter a relinquishment through nonuser. Abandonment implies non-user, but non-user does not, of itself, constitute abandonment. The failure to perform the duties pertaining to the office must be with actual or imputed intention on the part of the officer to abandon and relinquish the office. The intention may be inferred from the acts and conduct of the party, and is a question of fact. Abandonment may result from an acquiescence by the officer in his wrongful removal or discharge, but, as in other cases of abandonment, the question of intention is involved. Strictly speaking, McCall is inapplicable to this protest for, as correctly stated in the dissent of Mr. Justice Kapunan, the Protestant could not abandon the office of President which she was not holding at the time she filed the certificate of candidacy for Senator. But the majority of the Tribunal never declared, nor even implied, that she abandoned the office of President because it knew that she had yet nothing to abandon. Precisely, she filed this protest to be declared the winner for that office, to thereafter assume and perform the duties thereof, and exercise the powers appertaining thereto. What the Tribunal explicitly states is that the Protestant abandoned this Protest, thereby rendering this protest moot. Mr. Justice Puno also insists that abandonment raises a question of fact and that the Tribunal cannot resolve it "for lack of competent evidence"; moreover, he notes that the Protestee "has not adduced evidence which can be the basis for a finding that she intentionally abandoned her protest; on the contrary, the Protestee does not want the protest to be dismissed on a technicality but prays that it be decided on the merits." Suffice it to say that the Protestant herself has not denied nor questioned the following facts, which by themselves, constitute overwhelming proof of the intention to abandon the protest: (a) Filing of a certificate of candidacy for Senator for the 8 May 1995 elections; (b) Campaigning for the office of Senator in such election; (c) Taking her oath of office as Senator upon the commencement of the term therefor; (d) Assumption of office as Senator; and (e) Discharge and performance of the duties appertaining to the office of Senator.
These acts speak for themselves res ipsa loquitur to negate any proposition that the Protestant has not abandoned this protest. Thus, what initially appears to be the correct view in the dissent is, in the final analysis, misplaced. This must also be the verdict upon the following pronouncements of Mr. Justice Puno: A more fundamental reason prevents me from joining the majority. With due respect, I submit that the majority ruling on abandonment is inconsistent with the doctrine that an election contest is concerned less with the private interest of the candidates but more with public interest. Under a republican regime of government, the overarching object of an election contest is to seek and enforce the judgment of the people on who should govern them. It is not a happenstance that the first declaration of policy of our Constitution underlines in bright that "sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." The first duty of a citizen as a particle of sovereignty in a democracy is to exercise his sovereignty just as the first duty of any reigning government is to uphold the sovereignty of the people at all cost. Thus, in Moraleja vs. Relova, we emphatically held that ". . . once the court has acquired jurisdiction over an election contest, the public interest involved demands that the true winner be known without regard to the wishes or acts of the parties so much so that there can be no default, compromise nor stipulation of facts in this kind of cases." Wisely, this Tribunal has consistently demurred from dismissing election contests even on the ground of death of the protestee or the protestant. The majority appears to stray away from this lodestar of our Constitution. It will dismiss the case at bar even while the protestee and the protestant are yet alive, even while the term of the 1992 president-elect has yet to expire, and even while the protestee and the protestant together plead, that the Tribunal should determine the true will of the people by deciding their dispute on the merit[s] and not on technicalities that trifle with the truth. I submit that it is the better stance for the Tribunal to decide this election contest on the merit[s] and vindicate the political judgment of the people which far surpasses in significance all other considerations. Our duty to tell the people who have the right to govern them cannot depend on the uncertain oscillations of politics of the litigants as often times they are directed by the wind of convenience, and not by the weal of the public. For one, the majority has, in no uncertain terms, demonstrated the dissimilarities in the factual settings of the instant protest vis-a-vis the earlier cases that enunciated the doctrine relied on by Mr. Justice Puno. Then, too, it must be reiterated, to avoid further miscomprehension, that the Moraleja ruling even conceded that the matter of abandonment "could be different" if the petitioner therein had accepted "a permanent appointment to a regular office" during the pendency of his protest. In short, Moraleja in fact intimates abandonment of an election protest if, in the meantime, the Protestant accepts a permanent appointment to a regular office. If that be so, then would it be, and for weightier reasons, against a protestant who voluntarily sought election to an office whose term would extend beyond the expiry date of the term of the contested office, and after winning the said election, took her oath and assumed office and thereafter continuously serves it. In Moraleja, the Supreme Court was meticulous in excluding abandonment from the enumeration of specific "acts or wishes" of the parties which must be disregarded because of the public interest component of an election protest. As reflected in the above quotation from Mr. Justice Puno's dissent, only default, compromise, orstipulation of facts are included. Finally, with all due respect, the above pronouncement of Mr. Justice Puno forgets that, as distinctly pointed out in the early part of this Resolution, the Rules of the Tribunal allow summary dismissal of election protests even for less important grounds, to repeat, such as the petition filed with the Tribunal or the annexes attached thereto are not clearly legible, or the filing fees and cash deposits were not filed within the periods fixed in the Rules,27 and the additional provision for dismissal under Rule 61. All these provisions of the Rules would then be put to naught or, at the very least, modified or amended in a way
not authorized by the Rules, if the theory of Mr. Justice Puno be accepted. Such theory would unreasonably bind the Tribunal to the technical minutiae of trial on the merits to bring to their ultimate end all protests or contests filed before it including those filed by candidates who even forgot to vote for themselves and obtained no votes in the final count, but, unable to accept defeat, filed a protest claiming massive fraud and irregularities, vote-buying, and terrorism. Consequently, all the time and energy of the Justices of the Supreme Court would be spent appreciating millions of revised ballots to the prejudice of their regular judicial functions in the Court, as the electoral protest of every Juan, Pedro, and Jose who lost in the presidential elections would have to be heard on the merits. Public policy abhors such a scenario and no public good stands to be thereby served. WHEREFORE, the Tribunal hereby resolved to (1) GRANT the Protestant's Motion of 16 August 1995 to dispense with the revision of ballots and other election documents in the remaining precincts of the pilot areas; (2) DISMISS the instant election protest, since it has been rendered moot and academic by its abandonment or withdrawal by the Protestant as a consequence of her election and assumption of office as Senator and her discharge of the duties and functions thereof; and (3) DISMISS, as a consequence, the Protestee's Counter-Protest. No pronouncements as to costs. SO ORDERED. In re Bermudez Political Law De Jure vs De Facto Government Bermudez as a lawyer, quotes the first paragraph of Section 5 (not Section 7 as erroneously stated) of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution, which provides in full as follows: Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992. The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992. Bermudez claims that the said provision is not clear as to whom it refers, he then asks the Court to declare and answer the question of the construction and definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice President Salvador Laurel and the elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice President Arturo M. Tolentino being referred to under the said Section 7 (sic) of ARTICLE XVIII of the TRANSITORY PROVISIONS of the proposed 1986 Constitution refers to, . . .
ISSUE: Whether or not said provision is ambiguous. HELD: No. Petitioners allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the aforequoted provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President Aquino and Vice-President Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the extension of their term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections. Hence, the second paragraph of the cited section provides for the holding on the second Monday of May, 1992 of the first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under said 1986 Constitution. In previous cases, the legitimacy of the government of President Aquino was likewise sought to be questioned with the claim that it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution. The said cases were dismissed outright by this court which held that: Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and in law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government.
Soliven Vs. Makasiar 167 SCRA 393 G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988 Facts: In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President; and (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause. Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the xecutive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners' contention that they have been denied the administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual support. Issue: Whether or Not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President. Whether or Not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause
Held: With respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counteraffidavits. Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded. The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:
Held. The Presidents executive privilege is not absolute and must bend to Amendment 4 and Amendment 5 requirements of speedy and fair trials and of the ability of defendants to face their accusers. Courts are not required to proceed against the President as if the President was any other individual. Courts should review communications claimed to be privileged in camera (by the judge only in chambers
Nixon v Fitzgerald Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination nder oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation. What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained. The petitions fail to establish that public respondents, through their separate acts, gravely abused their discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for cannot issue. WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos. 82585, 82827 and 83979. The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution dated April 26, 1988 is LIFTED. US v NIXON Facts. The special prosecutor in the Watergate scandal subpoenaed the tape recordings of conversations involving the President and his advisers regarding the scandal. The Presidents counsel moved to quash the subpoena citing Article II of the United States Constitution (the Constitution) and its grant of privilege to the President. The Presidents counsel also argued it was a non -justiciable question because it was a disagreement between parts of the executive branch. Brief Fact Summary. A cost-management expert for the Air Force was fired after he testified in front of Congress about cost overruns in certain military projects. The Defendant, the President of the United States Richard Nixon (Defendant), claimed that he made the firing decision. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The President of the United States (President) is shielded by absolute immunity from civil damages for acts done in his official capacity as President. Facts. The Plaintiff, Ernest Fitzgerald (Plaintiff), was fired from his job with the Air Force as costmanagement analyst because he embarrassed his superiors by testifying about certain cost-overruns. The Air Force said he was fired because of reorganization and a reduction in force. An internal memo was passed through White House staff saying the Plaintiff was a top notch cost expert but with very low marks of loyalty and recommended that they let him bleed. At a press conference, the Defendant said he personally made the decision to fire the Plaintiff. The White House later retracted the statement saying that the Defendant had confused the Plaintiff with another employee. The Plaintiff brought suit and the Defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground of absolute immunity from suit. Issue. Does the President have absolute immunity from suit for actions taken in his official capacity? official acts as a matter of public policy rooted in the structure of government mandated by the separation of power principle. This immunity stems from the Presidents unique position in the constitution scheme and the immense importance of his duties. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) is worried about diverting the Presidents energies to the concerns related to private lawsuits. Dissent. Justice Byron White (J. White) felt that this decision places the President above the law. Discussion. The President must be empowered with the maximum ability to deal fearlessly and impartially with the duties of his office. If not, his visibility would subject him to numerous suits for civil damages. To keep the public safe, there is the constitutional remedy of impeachment, vigilant oversight by Congress and the press.
Clinton v Jones Brief Fact Summary. The Respondent, Paula Jones Corbin (Respondent), filed a complaint containing four counts against the Petitioner, President Clinton (Petitioner), alleging the Petitioner made unwanted sexual advances towards her when he was the Governor of Arkansas.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The United States Constitution (Constitution) does not automatically grant the President of the United States immunity from civil lawsuits based upon his private conduct unrelated to his official duties as President. Facts. The Respondent filed a complaint against the Petitioner alleging that the Petitioner made unwanted sexual advances towards her when he was the Governor of Arkansas. The Petitioner filed motions asking the district court to dismiss the case on grounds of presidential immunity and to prohibit the Respondent from re-filing the suit until after the end of his presidency. The district court rejected the presidential immunity argument, but held that no trial would take place until the Petitioner was no longer president. Both parties appealed to the United States Supreme Court (Supreme Court), which granted certiorari. Issue. Whether the President can be involved in a lawsuit during his presidency for actions that occurred before the tenure of his presidency and that were not related to official duties of the presidency? Held. Affirmed. The President of the United States can be involved in a lawsuit during his tenure for actions not related to his official duties as President. It was an abuse of discretion of the District Court to order a stay of this lawsuit until after the Presidents tenure. The District Courts decision to order a stay was premature and a lengthy and categorical stay takes no account whatsoever of the Respondents interest in bringing the suit to trial. Concurrence. It is important to recognize that civil lawsuits could significantly interfere with the public duties of an official. The concurring judge believed that ordinary case-management principles were likely to prove insufficient to deal with private civil lawsuits, unless supplemented with a constitutionally based requirement that district courts schedule proceedings so as to avoid significant interference with the Presidents ongoing discharge of his official responsibilities. Discussion. A sitting President of The United States does not have immunity from civil lawsuits based on the Presidents private actions unrelated to his public actions as President. The doctrine of separation of powers does not require federal courts to stay all private actions against the President until he leaves office. The doctrine of separation of powers is concerned with the allocation of official power among the three co-equal branches of government