CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, Petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, Respondent

G.R. No.
83896 February 22, 1991
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner, Vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondent.

FACTS: Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 which allowed appointive officials of the President to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions on the ground that the Constitution prohibits members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other office. Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General argued that the Department of Justice DOJ Opinion No. 73, series of 1987, as further elucidated and clarified by DOJ Opinion No. 129, series of 1987 9 and DOJ Opinion No. 155, series of 1988, 10 being the first official construction and interpretation by the Secretary of Justice of Section 13, Article VII and par. (2) of Section 7, Article I-XB of the Constitution, involving the same subject of appointments or designations of an appointive executive official to positions other than his primary position, as "reasonably valid and constitutionally firm," and that Executive Order No. 284, promulgated pursuant to DOJ Opinion No. 73, series of 1987 is consequently constitutional. ISSUE: Whether or not E.O. No. 284 is constitutional.
HELD: No. E.O. 284 contravenes the Phil. Constitution when it allowed cabinet members, its deputies and assistants to other positions in the other government agencies and government owned and controlled corporations. The court held that the respondent erred in interpreting the provisions of the Constitution as regards the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VII is admitting of broad exceptions vis-avis Sec. 7 par. (2) Article I-XB as quoted Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries. The Court explains that a foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. According to the Court, the provisions sought to remedy the multiple appointments of cabinet officials in various top level positions in other agencies and GOCCs which according to the magistrates constitute a blatant betrayal of public trust that consequentially, it evolved into one of the serious causes of discontent with the Marcos regime. Moreover, respondents' reading of the provisions in question would render certain parts of the Constitution inoperative. Such absurd consequence can be avoided only by interpreting the two provisions under consideration as one, i.e., Section 7, par. (1) of Article I-XB providing the general rule and the other, i.e., Section 13, Article VII as constituting the exception thereto. In the same manner must Section 7, par. (2) of Article I-XB be construed vis-a-vis Section 13, Article VII.
The Court rules that in the light of the construction given in Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than two (2) positions in the government and government corporations.
G.R. No. L-543
August 31, 1946
JOSE O. VERA, ET AL., petitioners, Vs. JOSE A. AVELINO, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS: On May 1946 national elections, certain specified acts of terrorism and violence were reported in the Provinces of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac. In their report submitted to the President and the Congress of the Philippines, The Commission on Elections stated that the voting in said region did not reflect the true and free expression of the popular will. When the Senate convened on May 25, 1946, it proceeded with the selection of its officers. Thereafter, in the course of the session, a resolution was approved referring to the report and ordering that, pending the termination of the protest lodged against their election, the herein petitioners, Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero who had been included among the sixteen candidates for senator receiving the highest number of votes, proclaimed by the Commission on Elections shall not be sworn, nor seated, as members of the chamber. Petitioners immediately instituted this action against their colleagues responsible for the resolution. They pray for an order annulling it, and compelling respondents to permit them to occupy their seats, and to exercise their senatorial prerogatives. In their pleadings, respondents traverse the jurisdiction of the court, and assert the validity of the Pendatun Resolution. ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction in the case at bar.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court upholding the Principle of Separation of Powers held that they have no jurisdiction over the Pendatun Resolution, as the Senate under the Philippine Constitution is solely vested with the power to deny reinstatement or punish a member of the higher house. The Senate, as a branch of the legislative department, had the constitutional power to adopt rules for its proceedings (section 10 [3], Article VI of the Constitution), and by legislative practice it is conceded the power to promulgate such orders as may be necessary to maintain its prestige and to preserve its dignity. Citing the Alejandrino case, the Court could not order one branch of the legislature to reinstate a member thereof, since doing so would establish judicial predominance, and to upset the classic pattern of checks and balances. Under our form of government the judicial department has no power to revise
even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department, or of either house thereof, taken in pursuance of the power committed exclusively to that department by the constitution. The court must enforce the constitutional directive and must not question, nor permit respondents to be questioned in connection with their votes in the Pendatun Resolution.
G.R. No. 118702
March 16, 1995
CIRILO ROY G. MONTEJO, petitioner, Vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. SERGIO A.F. APOSTOL, intervenor.
FACTS: Petitioner, who represents the First Disctrict of Leyte, pleads the annulment of section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 of the COMELEC, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it violates the principle of equality of representation. To remedy the alleged inequity, petitioner seeks to transfer the municipality of Tolosa from his district to the Second District of the province. Intervenor, representing the Second District, opposed the inclusion of Tolosa in his district alleging that the Comelec has no jurisdiction to promulgate Resolution No. 2736 in the first place.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC has the constitutional power to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another.
HELD: No. The Court declared the resolution void as the COMELEC has no power to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another legislative district. The Court held that COMELEC erred in the interpretation of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, under Section 2 of the Ordinance, it only empowered the COMELEC to make minor adjustments of the reapportionment and this was clarified in the debates of the Commission being used by the court as an extrinsic aid in its construction of the provision cited. Consistent with the limits of its power to make minor adjustments, Section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the respondent COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another district. The power granted by Section 3 to the respondent COMELEC is to adjust the number of members (not municipalities) "apportioned to the province out of which such new province was created. . . ." according to the Court it is the Congress that has the power to reapportion. The court further held that respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736 transferring the municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of Leyte.

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G.R. No.

83896 February 22, 1991

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner, Vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondent.

G.R. No. L-543

August 31, 1946

JOSE O. VERA, ET AL., petitioners, Vs. JOSE A. AVELINO, ET AL., respondents.

G.R. No. 118702

March 16, 1995

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