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EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE CASES PEOPLE VS. CAYAT

Equal Protection Requisites of a Valid Classification Bar from Drinking Gin In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native non-Christians from drinking gin or any other liquor outside of their customary alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a native of the Cordillera, was caught with an A-1-1 gin in violation of this Act. He was then charged and sentenced to pay P5.00 and to be imprisoned in case of insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt but he challenged the constitutionality of the said Act. He averred, among others, that it violated his right to equal protection afforded by the constitution. He said this an attempt to treat them with discrimination or mark them as inferior or less capable race and less entitled will meet with their instant challenge. The law sought to distinguish and classify native non Christians from Christians. ISSUE: Whether or not the said Act violates the equal protection clause. HELD: The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the requisites of a reasonable classification. The SC emphasized that it is not enough that the members of a group have the characteristics that distinguish them from others. The classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. The requisites to be complied with are; (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon accident of birth or parentage. The law, then, does not seek to mark the non -Christian tribes as an inferior or less capable race. On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality. Facts: Law prohibits any member of a non-Christian tribe to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink, any intoxicating liquors of any kind. The law, Act No. 1639, exempts only the so -called native wines or liquors which the members of such tribes have beenaccustomed to take. Issue: Whether or Not the law denies equal protection to one prosecuted and sentenced for violation of said law. Held: No. It satisfies the requirements of a valid classification, one of which is that the classification under the law must rest on real or substantial distinctions. The distinction is reasonable. The classification between the members of the non- Christian and the members of the Christian tribes is not based upon accident of birth or parentage but upon the degree of civilization and culture. The term non-Christian tribes refers to a geographical area and more directly to natives of the Philippines of a low grade civilization usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities. The distinction is reasonable for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non- Christian tribes The prohibition is germane to the purposes of the law. It is designed to insure peace and order in and among the nonChristian tribes has often resulted in lawlessness and crime thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standards of life and civilization. This law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of the enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exists. The Act applies equally to all members of the class. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture is not an argument against the equality of its operation nor affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established. FACTS: The accused, Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province was sentenced by the justice of the peace of court of Baguio for violation of Act No. 1639 (secs. 2 and 3) SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any native of the Philippine Islands who is a member of a non-Christian tribe within the meaning of the Act Numbered Thirteen hundred and ninety-seven, to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act, except as provided in section one hereof; and it shall be the duty of any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the Insular or any provincial, municipal or township government to seize and forthwith destroy any such liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of a non-Christian tribe. SEC. 3. Any person violating the provisions of section one or section two of this Act shall, upon conviction thereof, be punishable for each offense by a fine of not exceeding two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, in the discretion of the court.

Page 2 of 6 (EQUAL PROTECTION CASES) At the trial, cayat admitted all the facts alleged in the information that on or about the January 25, 1937, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the accused, Cayat, being a member of the non-Christian tribes, did receive, acquire, and have in his possession and under his control or custody, one bottle of A gin, an intoxicating liquor, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639, but pleaded not guilty to the charge for the reasons adduced in his demurrer and submitted the case on the pleadings. The trial court found him guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him, The case was appealed and the accused challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the following ground: (1) That it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws; Issue: Whether or not there is discriminatory and denial of equal protection of the laws Held: The Legislature has passed Act No. 1639 undoubtedly to secure for them the blessings of peace and harmony; to facilitate, and not to mar, their rapid and steady march to civilization and culture. It is, therefore, in this light that the Act must be understood and applied. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable, (1) Must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) Must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) Must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) Must apply equally to all members of the same class. Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real and substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon "accident of birth or parentage, but upon the degree of civilization and culture. "The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way, to the geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities." The Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes. The exceptional cases of certain members thereof who at present have reached a position of cultural equality with their Christian brothers, cannot affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established. That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition "to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act. It is designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes. It has been the sad experience of the past, as the observations of the lower court disclose, that the free use of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standard of life and civilization. The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist The Legislature understood that the civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it must go measures of protection and security. FACTS: Being a member of a non-Christian tribe, the accused, Cayat, acquired and had under his possession a bottle of A-1-1 gin, a liquor other than the native wines of his tribe. This was in violation of Act. No. 1639 (sec 2 and 3). While he admitted to the facts, the pleaded not guilty. He was found guilty and fined to Php50. Sec. 2 makes it unlawful for any Philippine non-Christian native to buy or possess any alcoholic beverage or liquor other than the so-called native wines and liquors that they have been made accustomed to. It is then the duty of the police or any authorized agent to seize and destroy the liquor. Sec. 3 fines a violator of not more than Php200 or imprisoning them of as term not exceeding 6 months. Cayat now challenges the constitutionality of the Act for being: 1) 2) 3) ISSUE 1) 2) 3) HELD 1) 2) 3) RATIO Yes it does. No it is not. No it is not. Whether or not Act. No. 1639 satisfies the requirements of proper classification Whether or not Act. No. 1639 is violative of the due process clause Whether or not it is an improper exercise of police power discriminatory and denies equal protection of the laws violative of due process an improper exercise of police power

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1) So as to qualify under the equal protection of laws, the law in question must satisfy the requirements of proper classification. These are: 1) must rest on substantial distinctions 2) must be germane to the purposes of the law 3) must not be limited to existing conditions only 4) must apply equally to all members of the same class According to the court, the classification is real and substantial, as the term non-Christian tribes refers, not to religious belief, but to geography and to the level of civilization (remember Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro). Secondly, it has a clear purpose. The prohibition of possessing alcoholic beverages other than local wines is designed to insure peace and order in the tribes, as free use of those prohibited beverages often led to lawlessness and crimes. Thirdly, it is not limited as it is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist. This is due to the fact that the process of civilization is a slow process. Lastly, it applies equally to all members of the class. 2) Due process means: 1) 2) 3) 4) there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department it shall be reasonable in its operation it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure it shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the state or a class

Also noted by the court is that due process does not always accord notice and hearing. Property may be seized by the government in 3 circumstances: 1) 2) 3) in payment of taxes when used in violation of law when property causes a corpus delicti

In this case, the third circumstance is present. 4) In discussing police power, the court states that the Act serves a purpose, that of peace and order. In discussing whether the means are reasonable, the courts merely stated that this is in the realm of the legislative.

INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE VS. QUISUMBING

International School Inc., pursuant to PD 732, is an educational institution targeted towards dependents of foreign diplomats and other temporary residents. As such, they hire their teachers both from the Philippines and from abroad. To indicate whether they are foreign hires or local hires, they take into consideration 1) domicile 2) home economy 3) economic allegiance 4) was the school responsible for bringing the individual to the Philippines. The problem lies in the salary of the teachers. As foreign hires, they are accorded benefits that local hires do not have. These include, housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Their salaries are also higher by 25%. The school gives 2 reasons: 1) dislocation factor and 2) limited tenure. In a new collective bargaining agreement, ISA educators contested this difference in salary. Filing a strike, DOLE assumed jurisdiction. Acting secretary Trajano decided in favor of the school, and DOLE secretary Quisumbing denied the motion for reconsideration. Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification is discriminatory to Filipinos. Respondents claim, however, that this is not so as a number of their foreign educators are in fact local-hires. ISSUE: Whether or not the 25% difference in salary is discriminatory. HELD: Yes it is. RATIO: In deciding the case, the court points first to the 1987 Constitution, particularly the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, which the court says this discrimination is against.

Page 4 of 6 (EQUAL PROTECTION CASES) They also point to international law, which likewise looks down on discrimination. It then goes further to say that this is even worse when the discrimination is done in the workplace. Pointing again to the Constitution, they assert that it promotes equality of employment opportunities to all, as well as the Labor Code, which ensure equal opportunity for all. Article 135 of the Labor Code looks down on discrimination in terms of wages. Article 248 declares such a practice unfair. Also cited is the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Article 7 talks about the ensuring of remuneration, as well as fair and equal wages and remuneration. In this case, there is no evidence in a difference of workload nor of performance, so the presumption is that all the employees are performing at equal levels. There is no evidence of the foreign hires being 25% more efficient. The schools claimed need to entice these foreign hires is not a good defense, either. As for compensation, the other forms of compensation are enough. Before ending, the court says, however, that the foreign and local hires are not part of the same bargaining unit, nor is there any showing of an attempt to consolidate the two. International School (IS) pays its teachers who are hired from abroad, or foreign-hires, a higher salary than its local-hires, whether the latter are Filipino or not (most are Filipino, but some are American). It justifies this under the dislocation factor that foreigners must be given a higher salary both to attract them to teach here, and to compensate them for the significant economic disadvantages involved in coming here. The Teachers Union cries discrimination. HELD: Discrimination exists. Equal pay for equal work is a principal long honored in this jurisdiction, as it rests on fundamental norms of justice 1. Art. XIII, Sec. 1 of the Constitution (Social Justice and Human Rights) exhorts Congress to give the highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and ennhance the right od all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalitites. The Constitution also provides that labor is entitled to humane conditions of work.. These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace, but include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees. Lastly, the Constitution directs the State to promote equality of employment opportunities for all, regardless of sex, race, or creed. It would be an affront to both the spirit and the letter of these provisions if the State closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment. 2. International law, which springs from general principles of law, likewise proscribes discrimination. General principles of law include principles of equity, i.e., fairness and justice, based on the test of what is reasonable. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and numerous other international Conventions all embody the general principle against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its national laws. Facts: Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad, the local-hires of private respondent School, mostly Filipinos, cry discrimination. We agree. That the local-hires are paid more than their colleagues in other schools is, of course, beside the point. The point is that employees should be given equal pay for work of equal value. Private respondent International School, Inc. (the School, for short), pursuant to Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. To enable the School to continue carrying out its educational program and improve its standardof instruction, Section 2(c) of the same decree authorizes the Schoolto employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees. Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. These include housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires. The Schooljustifies the difference on two "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. Issue: Whether or Not the grants provided by the school to foreign hires and not to local hires discriminative of their constitutional right to the equal protection clause. Held: The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. This rule applies to the School, its "international character" notwithstanding. The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work equal to that of foreign-hires. The Court finds this argument a little cavalier. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against that employee; it is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly. While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-hires,salaries should not be used as an enticement to the prejudice of local-hires. The local-hires perform the same services as foreign-hires and they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter. For the same reason, the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot

Page 5 of 6 (EQUAL PROTECTION CASES) serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare," "to afford labor full protection." The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good. Should such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations. In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. Wherefore, the petition is given due course. The petition is hereby granted in part. The orders of the secretary of labor and employmentdated June 10, 1996 and march 19, 1997, are hereby reversed and set aside insofar as they uphold the practice of respondent school of according foreign-hires higher salaries than local-hires. SMITH, BELL & CO. vs NATIVIDAD 40 Phil 136, 144-145 (1919) Facts: -Smith, Bell & Co. is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippine Islands; majority of the stockholders are British; owner of a motor vessel known as the Bato brought to Cebu for the purpose of transporting Smith, Bell & Co.s merchandise between ports in the islands. -application for registration was made at Cebu at the Collector of Customs---denied. Because they were not citizens of the US/Phils. -Act 2671, Sec. 1172. Certificate ofPhilippine Register.upon registration of a vessel of domestic ownership, and of more than 15 tons gross, a certificate of Philippine register shall be issued for it. If the vessel is of domestic ownership and of 15 tons gross or less, the taking of the certificate of Philippine register shall be optional with the owner. -domestic ownership, as used in this section, means ownership vested in the (a) citizens or native inhabitants of the Phil Islands; (b) citizens of the US residing in the Phil. Islands; (c) any corporation or company composed wholly of citizen of Phils./US or both -plaintiffs contention: Act No. 2671 deprives the corp. of its property without due process of law because by the passage of the law, the company was automatically deprived of every beneficial attribute of ownership of the Bato and that they are left with a naked title they could not use. Issue: WON Smith, Bell & Co. were denied of the due process of law by the Phil. Legislature in its enactment of Act 2761. Ruling: No. (judgment affirmedplaintiff cant be granted registry.) RD: Act No. 2761, in denying to corporations such as Smith, Bell & Co. Ltd., the right to register vessels in the Phils. Coastwide trade, falls within the authorized exceptions. Specifically within the purview of the police power. Literally and absolutely, steamship lines are the arteries of the commerce in the Phils. If one be severed, the lifeblood of the nation is lost. If these are protected, security of the country and general welfare is sustained.

VILLEGAS VS. HIU CHIONG

F: An ordinance of the City of Manila prohibited the employment of aliens in any occupation or business unless they first secured a permit from the Mayor of Manila and paid a fee of P500. Respondent, an alien, employed in Manila, brought suit and obtained judgment from the CFI declaring the ordinance null and void. HELD: The ordinance is a tax measure. In imposing a flat rate of P500, it failed to consider substantial differences in situations among aliens and for that reason violates the rule on uniformity of taxation. It also lays down no guide for granting/denying the permit and therefore permits the arbitrary exercise of discretion by the Mayor. Finally, the ordinance denies aliens due process and the equal protection of the laws Political Law Delegation of Powers Administrative Bodies Pao Ho is a Chinese national employed in the City of Manila. On 27 March 1968, then Manila mayor Antonio Villegas signed Ordinance No. 6537. The said ordinance prohibits foreign nationals to be employed within the City of Manila without first securing a permit from the Mayor of Manila. The permit will cost them P50.00. Pao Ho, on 04 May 1968 filed a petition for prohibition against the said Ordinance alleging that as a police power measure, it makes no distinction between useful and non-useful occupations, imposing a fixed P50.00 employment permit, which is out of proportion to the cost ofregistration and that it fails to prescribe any standard to guide and/or limit the action of the Mayor, thus, violating the fundamental principle on illegal delegation of legislative powers. Judge Arca of Manila CFI ruled in favor of Pao Ho and he declared the Ordinance as being null and void. ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Mayor of Manila. HELD: The decision of Judge Arca is affirmed. Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. It has been held that where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayors action, expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring a permit, enumerates no conditions for its grant or refusal, and entirely lacks standard, thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits, such ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity per se lawful. Ordinance No. 6537 is void because it does not contain or suggest any standard or criterion to guide the mayor in the exercise of the power which has been granted to him by the ordinance. The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution. Antonio Villegas vs. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho Facts: The respondent, Hiu, is an employed alien in Manila, filed a petition before the CFI Manila Branch I, questioning the constitutionality of Ordinance 6537. The ordinance in question requires aliens in the city of manila to secure a employment permit from the city before engaging in any retail, trade, occupation or business in the city, it also imposes a P50.00 regulatory tax fee to aliens employed in the City. There is also imposable penalty in violating the said ordinance.

Page 6 of 6 (EQUAL PROTECTION CASES) The Lower court declared the ordinance in question as null and void for being violative of due process and equal protection of the law. The petitioner-mayor, then filed a petition for certiorari to review the judgment of the lower court. Issue: Whether or not the ordinance in question is violative of due process? Held: Yes. The lower court did erred in declaring the ordinance null and void. As decided, equal protection requires valid and substantial classification base from real distinction. The imposition of P50.00 as a regulatory fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but also the ordinance in question fails to establish real and valid differences between aliens who are required to pay it, whether the alien is casual or permanently employee, full-time or part-time, whether a lowly employee or a highly paid executive. Moreover, the ordinance in question is considered an arbitrary and undefined legislation that violates the rights of equal protection. This is so since, the ordinance in question failed to provide the limitations of the exercise of the delegated power of the petitioner and that it does not provide the purposes to be attained by requiring permit for aliens before engagement of business or employment. Aliens, once admitted in the Philippines, is also entitled to the benefits of shelter of equal protection and due process laws.

PHILCONSA VS. GIMENEZ

Salaries of the Members of Congress Other Emolument Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails the validity of RA 3836 insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives, and to the elective officials of both Houses (of Congress). The provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase of salaries of the members of Congress during their term of office, contrary to the provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. The same provision constitutes "selfish class legislation" because it allows members and officers of Congress to retire after twelve (12) years of service and gives them a gratuity equivalent to one year salary for every four years of service, which is not refundable in case of reinstatement or re election of the retiree, while all other officers and employees of the government can retire only after at least twenty (20) years of service and are given a gratuity which is only equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, which, in any case, cannot exceed 24 months. The provision on vacation and sick leave, commutable at the highest rate received, insofar as members of Congress are concerned, is another attempt of the legislator to further increase their compensation in violation of the Constitution. The Sol-Gen counter argued alleging that The grant of retirement or pension benefits under Republic Act No. 3836 to the officers objected to by the petitioner does not constitute "forbidden compensation" within the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution. The law in question does not constitute class legislation. The payment of commutable vacation and sick leave benefits under the said Act is merely "in the nature of a basis for computing the gratuity due each retiring member" and, therefore, is not an indirect scheme to increase their salary. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3836 is constitutional. HELD: Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution, which reads: "The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided by law, receive an annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including per diems and other emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of travelling expenses to and from their respective district in the case of Members of the House of Representatives and to and from their places of residence in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos." When the Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation for the Members of Congress, the amount fixed by it was only P5,000.00 per annum but it embodies a special proviso which reads as follows: "No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to approval of such increase." In other words, under the original constitutional provision regarding the power of the National Assembly to increase the salaries of its members, no increase would take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the members of the Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase. The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the term compensation "other emoluments". This is the pivotal point on this fundamental question as to whether the retirement benefit as provided for in Republic Act 3836 fall within the purview of the term "other emoluments." "Emolument" as "the profit arising from office or employment; that which is received as compensation for services or which is annexed to the possession of an office, as salary, fees and perquisites." It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it is a part of compensation for services of one possessing any office. Republic Act 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. RA 3836 is hereby declared unconstitutional by the SC.