SPS BENITEZ Vs CA - Ejectment of Portion Encroached Upon
SPS BENITEZ Vs CA - Ejectment of Portion Encroached Upon
G.R. No. 104828 January 16, 1997 SPOUSES RAFAEL BENITEZ AND AVELINA BENITEZ, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES RENATO MACAPAGAL and ELIZABETH MACAPAGAL, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.: May possession of a lot encroached upon by a part of another's house be recovered in an action for ejectment? This is the main question raised by the petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals, Sixth Division, 2 dated March 24, 1992, in CA-G.R. SP No. 26853 denying due course to petitioner's appeal and affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig in Civil Case No. 61004, which in turn affirmed the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan, Metro Manila, Branch 58. The Facts On January 22, 1986, petitioners Rafael and Avelina Benitez purchased a 303-squaremeter parcel of land with improvement from the Cavite Development Bank, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 41961 (now, TCT No. 55864). Subsequently, private respondents Renato and Elizabeth Macapagal bought a 361square-meter lot covered by TCT No. 40155. On September 18, 1986, they filed Civil Case No. 53835 with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 157 against petitioners for the recovery of possession of an encroached portion of the lot they purchased. The parties were able to reach a compromise in which private respondents sold the encroached portion to petitioners at the acquisition cost of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) per square meter. On July 17, 1989, private respondents purchased still another property, a 285.70 square-meter-lot covered by TCT No. 3249-R, adjacent to that of petitioners. After a relocation survey was conducted, private respondents discovered that some 46.50 square meters of their property was occupied by petitioners' house. Despite verbal and
written demands, petitioners refused to vacate. A last notice to vacate was sent to petitioners on October 26, 1989. On January 18, 1990, private respondents filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan, Branch 58, Civil Case No. 61004 for ejectment against petitioners. The MeTC of San Juan decided in favor of the former, with the following disposition: 3
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiffs and against the defendants ordering them and all persons claiming rights under them to vacate and surrender possession of the subject premises to the plaintiffs as well as to pay the following: 1. The amount of P930.00 a month starting July 17, 1989 until they finally vacate the subject premises; 2. The amount of P5,000.00 for and as attorney's fees; and 3. Cost of suit.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 167, affirmed said decision. 4 The RTC said: 5
The controversy in this case is not an encroachment or overlapping of two (2) adjacent properties owned by the parties. It is a case where a part of the house of the defendants is constructed on a portion of the property of the plaintiffs. So that as new owner of the real property, who has a right to the full enjoyment and possession of the entire parcel covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 41961, plaintiffs have the right to demand that defendants remove the portion of the house standing on plaintiff's realty. . .
On further appeal, the respondent Court found no merit in petitioners' plea. In a Resolution dated March 24, 1992, the Sixth Division of said Court found the petition to be a mere rehash of the issues and arguments presented before the lower courts. It ruled in part that: 7
3) Petitioners were fully aware that part of their house encroached on their neighbor's property, while respondents became aware of it only after purchasing said property. Petitioners cannot claim good faith as against the respondents. 4) Since petitioners are not builders in good faith, they cannot demand that respondents sell the disputed portion; what the law provides is that the builders in bad faith can be ordered to dismantle said structure at their own expense. In the interim period that petitioners' structure remains, they should pay reasonable rent until they remove the structure.
Hence, this petition. The Issues The main issue is whether the possession of the portion of the private respondents' land encroached by petitioners' house can be recovered through an action of ejectment, not accion publiciana. Corollarily, petitioners question (a) the validity of the imposition of "rental" for the occupancy of the encroached portion, (b) the denial of their claimed preemptive right to purchase the encroached portion of the private respondents' land, and (c) the propriety of a factual review of the CA's finding of bad faith on the part of petitioners. In a nutshell, petitioners insist that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case at bar because its real nature is accion publiciana or recovery of possession, not unlawful detainer. It is not forcible entry because private respondents did not have prior possession of the contested property as petitioners possessed it ahead of private respondents. It is not unlawful detainer because petitioners were not the private respondents' tenants nor vendee unlawfully withholding possession thereof. Said court also has no jurisdiction to impose payment of "rentals" as there is no lessor-lessee relationship between the parties. They pray for a review of the factual finding of bad faith, insisting that the facts uphold their position. Due to their alleged good faith, they claim the pre-emptive right to purchase the litigated portion as a matter of course. Finally, they insist that the award of attorney's fees is unwarranted as private respondents allegedly had knowledge of the encroachment prior to their acquisition of said land. Private respondents counter that petitioners are estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the MeTC after they voluntarily participated in the trial on the merits and lost; that there is no law giving petitioners the option to buy the encroached property; and that petitioners acted in bad faith because they waived in their deed of sale the usual seller's warranty as to the absence of any and all liens and encumbrances on the property, thereby implying they had knowledge of the encroachment at the time of purchase. The Court's Ruling The petition lacks merit and should be denied. First Issue: MeTC Has Jurisdiction
The jurisdictional requirements for ejectment, as borne out by the facts, are: after conducting a relocation survey, private respondents discovered that a portion of their land was encroached by petitioners' house; notices to vacate were sent to petitioners, the last one being dated October 26, 1989; and private respondents filed the ejectment suit against petitioners on January 18, 1990 or within one (1) year from the last demand. Private respondents' cause of action springs from Sec. 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a landlord, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such landlord, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper inferior court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs. . .
That petitioners occupied the land prior to private respondents' purchase thereof does not negate the latter's case for ejectment. Prior possession is not always a condition sine qua non in ejectment. 9 This is one of the distinctions between forcible entry and unlawful detainer. In forcible entry, the plaintiff is deprived of physical possession of his land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; thus, he must allege and prove prior possession. But in unlawful detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right thereto under any contract, express or implied. In such a case, prior physical possession is not required. 10 Possession can also be acquired, not only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one's will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right. 11 Possession of land can be acquired upon the execution of the deed of sale thereof by its vendor. Actual or physical occupation is not always necessary. In the case before us, considering that private respondents are unlawfully deprived of possession of the encroached land and that the action for the recovery of possession thereof was made within the one-year reglementary period, ejectment is the proper remedy. 12 The MeTC of San Juan had jurisdiction. In addition, after voluntarily submitting themselves to its proceedings, petitioners are estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the MeTC. 13 This Court will not allow petitioners to attack the jurisdiction of the trial court after receiving a decision adverse to their position. Second Issue: Compensation For Occupancy
Petitioners erroneously construed the order of the MeTC to pay private respondents Nine Hundred Pesos (P930.00) a month starting July 17, 1989 until they (petitioners) finally vacate the subject premises as "rentals". Technically, such award is not rental, but damages. Damages are recoverable in ejectment cases under Section 8, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court. 14 These damages arise from the loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not the damages which private respondents may have suffered but which have no direct relation to their loss of material possession. 15 Damages in the context of Section 8, Rule 70 is limited to "rent" or "fair rental value" for the use and occupation of the property. 16 There is no question that petitioners benefited from their occupation of a portion of private respondents' property. Such benefit justifies the award of the damages of this kind. Nemo cum alterius, detrimenti locupletari potest. No one shall enrich himself at the expense of another. Third Issue: Option To Sell Belongs To Owner Article 448 of the Civil Code 17 is unequivocal that the option to sell the land on which another in good faith builds, plants or sows on, belongs to the landowner. The option is to sell, not to buy, and it is the landowner's choice. Not even a declaration of the builder, planter, or sower's bad faith shifts this option to him per Article 450 of the Civil Code. 18 This advantage in Article 448 is accorded the landowner because "his right is older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing." 19 There can be no pre-emptive right to buy even as a compromise, as this prerogative belongs solely to the landowner. No compulsion can be legally forced on him, contrary to what petitioners asks from this Court. Such an order would certainly be invalid and illegal. Thus, the lower courts were correct in rejecting the petitioners' offer to buy the encroached land. Fourth Issue: A Review of Factual Findings Is Unwarranted Petitioners ask this Court to review the alleged error of the respondent Court in appreciating bad faith on their part. According to them, this is contradictory to the fact that private respondents acquired their lot and discovered the encroachment after petitioners bought their house. After careful deliberation on this issue, this Court finds this petition for review inadequate as it failed to show convincingly a reversible error on the part of the respondent Court in this regard. Thus, for very good reasons, this Court has consistently and emphatically declared that review of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals is not a function that is normally undertaken in petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Such findings, as a general rule, are binding and conclusive. 20 The jurisdiction of this Court is limited to reviewing errors of law unless there is a showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the records or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute reversible error. 21
Even respondent Court has taken note of the inadequacy of the petition before it, as it wryly said: 22
The Petition for Review is not certainly a manifestation of clarity nor an example of a wellorganized summation of petitioners' cause of action. . . xxx xxx xxx A careful scrutiny of the above issues discloses that they are mere repetitions in a rehashed form of the same issues with the same supporting arguments raised by petitioners when they appealed from the decision of the (MeTC) to the RTC. . .
This petition is no different. We share the foregoing sentiments of the respondent Court. In essence, respondent Court merely affirmed the decision of the MeTC. The Court of Appeal's finding of petitioners' bad faith did not alter nor affect the MeTC's disposition. Petitioners want this Court to declare them in good faith and to determine their rights under Article 448, Civil Code. However, the mere fact that they bought their property ahead of the private respondents does not establish this point. Nor does it prove that petitioners had no knowledge of the encroachment when they purchased their property. Reliance on the presumption in Article 526 of the Code is misplaced in view of the declaration of the respondent Court that petitioners are not builders in good faith. What petitioners presented are mere allegations and arguments, without sufficient evidence to support them. As such, we have no ground to depart from the general rule against factual review. In sum, the petition has not shown cogent reasons and sufficient grounds to reverse the unanimous ruling of the three lower courts. The MeTC, RTC and the Court of Appeals were all in agreement in sustaining private respondents' rights. And we uphold them. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Resolution is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur. Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 25-27. 2 Penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Campos, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Alfredo M. Marigomen and Fortunato A. Vailoces. 3 Rollo, pp. 25-26. 4 Penned by Judge Alfredo C. Flores, C.A. Rollo, pp. 10-13. 5 CA Rollo, pp. 11-12.
6 CA Rollo, p. 13. 7 Rollo, p. 27. 8 Ibid. 9 Pharma Industries Inc., vs. Pajarillaga, 100 SCRA 339, 345, October 17, 1980. 10 Sumulong vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 372, 382-383, May 10, 1994 and Javelosa vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124292, promulgated on December 10, 1996, p. 10. 11 Pharma Industries Inc., vs. Pajarillaga, op cit. 12 Del Castillo vs. Aguinaldo, 212 SCRA 169, 173-174, August 5, 1992. 13 Tejones vs. Gironello, 159 SCRA 100, 104, March 21, 1988 and Romualdez vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 226 SCRA 408, 414, September 14, 1993. 14 Rule 70, Section 8 provides: Sec. 8. Immediate execution of judgment. How to stay same. If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient bond, approved by the justice of the peace or municipal court and executed to the plaintiff to enter the action in the Court of First Instance and to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as found by the judgment of the justice of the peace or municipal court to exist. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment, on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. . . 15 Hualam Construction and Dev't. Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 612, 624 -625, October 16, 1992 and Araos vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 770, 776, June 2, 1994. 16 Ibid. and De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 715, 721, April 8, 1991. 17 Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof. 18 Art. 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad faith may demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, in order to replace things in their former condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower the proper rent.
19 Depra vs. Dumlao, supra, p. 483. 20 De la Serna vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 325, 329, June 21, 1994; Tay Chun Suy vs. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 151, 156, January 7, 1994; First Philippine International Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 259, 307-308, January 24, 1996; and Liberty Construction & Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106601, promulgated on June 28, 1996, p. 7. 21 Meneses vs. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 162, 171, July 14, 1995; The Municipality of Candijay, Bohol vs. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 530, 534, December 28, 1995; and Tanedo vs. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 80, 91, January 22, 1996. 22 Rollo, p. 26.
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 166802 July 4, 2008
SPS. ALBERTO GUTIERREZ and EPIFANIA GUTIERREZ, petitioners, vs. SPS. ROGELIO and JOSEPHINE VALIENTE, HON. ALEXANDER TAMAYO, Presiding Judge, Branch 15, Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan and SHERIFF IV PABLO R. GLORIOSO, respondents. DECISION AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Resolution1 dated October 22, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 86957 which dismissed outright the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition of petitioners Spouses Alberto and Epifania Gutierrez (Spouses Gutierrez) for being deficient in form, and the CA Resolution2 dated January 20, 2005 denying their Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Admit Annexes and to Allow Payment of Additional Docket Fees. The present controversy involves a boundary dispute between owners of adjoining Lot 6098-D and Lot 6098-E situated in Banga, Meycauayan, Bulacan. Lot 6098-D is a 250-square meter parcel of land owned by Spouses Gutierrez under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-5728
(M). Lot 6098-E is a 425-square meter parcel of land owned by respondents Rogelio and Josephine Valiente (Spouses Valiente) under TCT No. T-26901 (M). Lot 6098-E was previously owned by Crispin Gutierrez, the brother of petitioner Alberto Gutierrez, under TCT No. 5729 (M). On January 28, 1997, Spouses Valiente bought said Lot 6098-E thru a Deed of Extra-judicial Settlement of Estate with Sale from the surviving heirs of Crispin Gutierrez, namely, his widow Milagros, and daughters Maricris and Marissa. The vendors told the vendees that a portion of the lot was occupied by Spouses Gutierrez at the mere tolerance of the vendees. Sometime in April 1997, Spouses Valiente conducted a relocation survey to verify the boundaries of their lot. The relocation survey revealed that Spouses Gutierrez occupied a 99-square meter portion of the lot of Spouses Valiente. When Spouses Valiente demanded the return of the encroached area, Spouses Gutierrez refused, claiming ownership of the occupied portion under their title. Thus, on May 23, 1997, Spouses Valiente filed a complaint3 against Spouses Gutierrez for Quieting of Title and Recovery of Possession with Damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 15, Malolos, Bulacan, docketed as Civil Case No. 355-M-97. On August 8, 1997, Spouses Gutierrez filed a Motion to Dismiss.4 On October 30, 1997, the RTC issued an Order5 denying the Motion to Dismiss and required Spouses Gutierrez to submit their Answer. Instead of filing an Answer, Spouses Gutierrez filed on November 7, 1997 a Motion for Reconsideration.6 On November 19, 1997, Spouses Valiente filed an Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Declare Defendants in Default and Render Judgment.7 On November 21, 1997, the RTC issued an Order8 denying the Motion for Reconsideration of Spouses Gutierrez and reset the hearing to December 11, 1997. At the scheduled hearing of December 11, 1997, Spouses Gutierrez and their counsel failed to appear.9 Thereupon, Spouses Valiente moved that their Motion to Declare Defendants in Default and to Render Judgment be granted considering that Spouses Gutierrez have not filed their answer within the allowable period given them.10 Finding merit in the motion, the RTC issued an Order11 declaring Spouses Gutierrez in default and allowed Spouses Valiente to present their evidence ex-parte. On December 17 and 18, 1997, Spouses Valiente presented their evidence ex-parte. Upon the submission of their evidence, Spouses Valiente rested their case and submitted it for decision. On February 12, 1998, Spouses Gutierrez filed a Motion to Set Aside Order of Default.12 However, the records do not show that the RTC acted on the motion. On August 17, 1999, Spouses Valiente filed a Manifestation with Motion to Render Judgment13 since no decision had been rendered 18 months from submission of the case for decision. On March 13, 2000, Spouses Valiente filed an Ex-Parte Manifestation14 reiterating their motion to render judgment.
On May 15, 2000, the RTC, now acting through a different judge, issued an Order15 directing the verification and relocation survey of Lots 6098-D and 6098-E by the government Geodetic Engineer to determine the exact description, monuments and areas, as appearing on both titles of the lots, for the reconveyance of the encroached portion to the party entitled thereto. The relocation survey, however, was delayed several times due to the interference of Spouses Gutierrez.16 Two years later, or on May 17, 2002, Geodetic Engineer Joel Atienzo (Engr. Atienzo) submitted his Surveyor's Report17 with a Sketch Plan.18 He stated in his report that an existing alley with an area of 45 square meters was within the boundary of Lot 6098-E. On July 3, 2002, Spouses Valiente filed their Comments on the Surveyor's Report19 seeking clarification of the Surveyor's Report since the Sketch Plan delineated two other portions apparently encroached in Lot 6098-E, with areas of 17.95 square meters and 44 square meters, but Engr. Atienzo did not state them as encroached upon in his Surveyor's Report. At the hearing on September 20, 2002, the parties manifested in open court their agreement to the Surveyor's Report and intimated that Spouses Gutierrez were willing to negotiate with respect to the payment of the property encroached upon per Surveyor's Report.20 During the November 20, 2002 hearing attended by both parties, Engr. Atienzo clarified in open court that the 17.95-square meter, 45-square meter and 44-square meter portions delineated in the Sketch Plan were also encroachments on Lot 6098-E.21 On the same day, the RTC issued an Order22 directing the parties to submit their joint commitments on the issues of encroachment and/or payment, considering that there are three encroached portions of the subject lot but only one was reported to be within the boundary of Lot 6098-E. On March 7, 2003, Spouses Valiente filed a Manifestation23 stating that the parties could no longer submit any commitment on the issues on encroachment and/or payment thereof because no agreement was arrived at between the parties regarding said issues. They also manifested that with the declaration in open court of Engr. Atienzo that the 17.95-square meter, 45-square meter and 44-square meter portions delineated in his Sketch Plan are the encroached areas in Lot 6098E, then the RTC may finally dispose of the case sans the parties' joint commitments. No other pleading was filed by the parties. Thus, on June 23, 2003, the RTC issued an Order24 approving the Surveyor's Report and directing Spouses Gutierrez to reconvey to Spouses Valiente the 17.95-square meter, 45-square meter and 44-square meter encroached portions of Lot 6098-E. No motion for reconsideration or appeal from said Order was filed by Spouses Gutierrez. On August 11, 2003, Spouses Valiente filed a Motion for Execution,25 which was granted by the RTC in an Order26 dated February 5, 2004. On May 25, 2004, respondent Sheriff gave Notice to Spouses Gutierrez of the Writ of Execution. On May 28, 2004, Spouses Gutierrez filed their Urgent Motion to Quash Writ of Execution and to Stay Notice of May 25, 200427 on the ground that the Orders dated May 15, 2000 and June 23,
2003 directing reconveyance of the encroached portions exceeded the nature of the reliefs prayed for in the complaint. On June 9, 2004, the RTC issued an Order28 denying the motion to quash of Spouses Gutierrez. It held that the May 15, 2000 Order had long attained finality and that the order for reconveyance in the June 23, 2003 Order is related to the reliefs prayed for in the complaint. Spouses Gutierrez filed a Motion for Reconsideration29 but it was denied by the RTC in an Order30 dated September 9, 2004. On October 14, 2004, Spouses Gutierrez filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition31 in the CA assailing the RTC Orders dated May 15, 2000, June 23, 2003, June 9, 2004 and September 9, 2004. On October 22, 2004, the CA issued a Resolution32 dismissing outright the petition for: (a) defective verification because it did not give the assurance that the allegations of the petition are true and correct based on authentic records; (b) failure to attach material portions of the record, to wit: Motion to Dismiss Complaint, Order dated October 30, 1997 and the Motion for Reconsideration thereto, Order dated November 21, 1997, Motion to Declare Defendants in Default, Order dated December 11,1997, Motion to Set Aside Order of Default, Motion to Require the Acting Chief, Survey Party of CENRO, Tabang Guiguinto, Bulacan to Submit Verification/Relocation, Orders dated April 26, 2001 and November 20, 2002, Motion for Writ of Execution dated August 11, 2003, Motion for Reconsideration dated July 1, 2004 and the Opposition thereto and Reply.33 and (c) insufficient payment of docket fees. On November 22, 2004, Spouses Gutierrez filed their Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Admit Annexes and to Allow Payment of Additional Docket Fees,34 attaching thereto (a) an amended verification, (b) copies of the required documents and portions of the record, and (c) a postal money order for P680.00. In a Resolution35 dated January 20, 2005, the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration of Spouses Gutierrez, holding that strict compliance with the rules of Court is indispensable for the prevention of needless delays or for the orderly expeditious dispatch of judicial business. It also found no merit to the claim of Spouses Gutierrez that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed orders. Hence, the present petition with the following assigned errors: A. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING THE SUBMISSION AND/OR AMENDMENT OF THE VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION ON NON-FORUM AND THE SUBMISSION OF THE ALLEGED MATERIAL PORTIONS OF THE RECORD; AND THE FULL PAYMENT OF THE BALANCE OF THE APPELLATE DOCKET FEE OF P680.00;36
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS DEPARTURE FROM THE USUALLY ACCEPTED JUDICIAL PROCEDURE WHEN THE LATTER AWARDED RELIEFS IN THE JUDGMENT OF DEFAULT NOT PRAYED FOR IN THE COMPLAINT; AND IN ISSUING A WRIT OF EXECUTION OF A JUDGMENT/ORDER THAT WAS CONDITIONAL AND WHICH COULD NOT BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.37 Spouses Gutierrez invoke liberality and the primordial interest of substantial justice over the strict enforcement of the rules of technicality. They submit that the CA should have resolved the petition on the merits, instead of indulging on strict technicalities. They contend that the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it did not quash the Writ of Execution because the Orders dated May 15, 2000 and June 23, 2003 cannot be the basis of the Writ of Execution: the May 15, 2000 Order being an interlocutory order and the June 23, 2003 Order exceeded the reliefs prayed for in the complaint. On the other hand, Spouses Valiente submit that the CA correctly dismissed the petition for procedural and substantive infirmities since Spouses Gutierrez not only failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the rules but also failed to show that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed orders. On the procedural aspect of the case, the Court finds in favor of Spouses Gutierrez. On the matter of defective verification, Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court states that a pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records. This Court has consistently held that this requirement is formal, not jurisdictional.38 It is a condition affecting the form of the pleading; non-compliance with this requirement does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith.39 Thus, the appellate court could have simply ordered the correction of the pleading or act on the unverified pleading, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rule may be dispensed with in order to serve the ends of justice.40 Besides, there appears to be no intention to circumvent the need for proper verification since Spouses Gutierrez submitted an amended verification in their Motion for Reconsideration. With regard to the failure to attach material portions of the record in support of the petition, Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court requires that petition for certiorari shall be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material portions of the records as are referred to therein, and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto; and failure of compliance shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. In the present case, the CA dismissed the petition for failure to attach the following documents:
Motion to Dismiss Complaint, Order dated October 30, 1997 and the Motion for Reconsideration thereto, Order dated November 21, 1997, Motion to Declare Defendants in Default, Order dated December 11,1997, Motion to Set Aside Order of Default, Motion to Require the Acting Chief, Survey Party of CENRO, Tabang Guiguinto, Bulacan to Submit Verification/Relocation, Orders dated April 26, 2001 and November 20, 2002, Motion for Writ of Execution dated August 11, 2003, Motion for Reconsideration dated July 1, 2004 and the Opposition thereto and Reply,41 These documents, however, are not at all relevant to the petition for certiorari. Since the issue of whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion pertain only to the Orders dated May 15, 2000, June 23, 2003, June 9, 2004 and September 9, 2004, copies of said Orders would have sufficed as basis for the CA to resolve the issue. It is in these Orders that the RTC supposedly made questionable rulings. Thus, the attachment of these Orders in the petition was already sufficient even without the other pleadings and portions of the case record. Moreover, Spouses Gutierrez corrected the purported deficiency by submitting the required documents in their Motion for Reconsideration. In Air Philippines Corporation v. Zamora,42 the Court clarified that not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be attached to the petition; only those pleadings, parts of case records and documents which are material and pertinent, in that they may provide the basis for a determination of a prima facie case of abuse of discretion, are required to be attached to a petition for certiorari, and omission to attach such documents may be rectified by the subsequent submission of the documents required.43 As to the shortage of payment of the docketing fee, the same cannot be used as a ground for dismissing the petition. In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion,44 the Court held that the strict regulations set in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals45 that a court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fees does not apply where the party does not deliberately intend to defraud the court in payment of docket fees, and manifests its willingness to abide by the rules by paying additional docket fees when required by the court. The liberal doctrine in Sun Insurance has been repeatedly reiterated in Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor,46 Proton Pilipinas Corporation v. Banque Nationale de Paris47 and Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation v. Alonzo-Legasto,48 and continues to be the controlling doctrine. Since the deficiency in payment was not at all intentional, as there was a willingness to comply with the rules when Spouses Gutierrez remitted the deficiency by postal money order in their Motion for Reconsideration, the Sun Insurance doctrine applies. It cannot be gainsaid that the emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.49 Technicality and procedural imperfection should thus not serve as basis of decisions.50 As has often been stated, it is far better to dispose of a case on the merits which is a primordial end rather than on a technicality, if it be the case, that may result in injustice.51 In any event, the contentions of Spouses Gutierrez on the substantive aspect of the case fail to invite judgment in their favor.
On the matter of whether the May 15, 2000 Order is final or interlocutory, it must be clarified that since the May 15, 2000 Order merely directed the conduct of a verification and relocation survey to determine the metes and bounds of the parties' respective lots to find out which lot was encroached upon, such May 15, 2000 Order did not finally dispose of the case. It awaited the results and submission of the Surveyor's Report for the final adjudication on the boundary dispute; thus the May 15, 2000 Order was merely interlocutory in nature. The word interlocutory refers to something intervening between the commencement and the end of the suit which decides some point or matter but is not a final decision of the whole controversy.52 In that sense, it does not attain finality since there leaves something else to be done by the RTC with respect to the merits of the case. It is the June 23, 2003 Order which finally disposed of the case, having settled the parties respective rights and liabilities, by ordering the reconveyance of the encroached portions of Lot 6098-E. There is no merit to petitioners argument that the RTC, by ordering reconveyance, exceeded the reliefs prayed for in the complaint. Spouses Valiente prayed for the following reliefs in their complaint: a) The verification and relocation survey of the spouses-plaintiffs' subject parcel of land (Lot 6098-E) and that of the spouses-defendants (Lot 6098-D) (at the expense of the losing party or if to be advanced by either party, to be reimbursed later on by the parties concerned by order of the Honorable Court) to settle once and for all who is correct in the parties respective claims; b) The spouses-defendants to pay to the spouses-plaintiffs the following sum: P25,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as attorney's fees plus the sum of P1,000.00 as court appearance fee for the latter's counsel every appearance and attendance in court; c) The Cost of Suit. Plaintiffs further pray for such other reliefs and remedies as the Honorable Court may deem just and equitable in the premises.53 (Emphasis supplied). While the complaint does not categorically state reconveyance as the specific relief desired, it does contain a general prayer "for such other reliefs and remedies as the Honorable Court may deem just and equitable in the premises." In BPI Family Bank v. Buenaventura,54 this Court ruled that the general prayer is broad enough "to justify extension of a remedy different from or together with the specific remedy sought."55 Even without the prayer for a specific remedy, proper relief may be granted by the court if the facts alleged in the complaint and the evidence introduced so warrant.56 The court shall grant relief warranted by the allegations and the proof even if no such relief is prayed for.57 The prayer in the complaint for other reliefs equitable and just in the premises justifies the grant of a relief not otherwise specifically prayed for. In the present case, this general prayer should be interpreted to include the prayer for reconveyance of the encroached portions since this is already evident from the allegations
contained in the body of the Complaint and in the prayer of Spouses Valiente that the respective claims of the parties should be settled once and for all. At any rate, the issues raised by Spouses Gutierrez refer to the validity of the Orders dated May 15, 2000 and June 23, 2003 which are not proper grounds in a motion to quash execution. A motion to quash execution is only proper where: (a) the writ of execution varies the judgment; (b) there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or unjust; (c) execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution; (d) it appears that the controversy has never been submitted to the judgment of the court; (e) the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for interpretation thereof; or (f) it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance or is issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority.58 None of these instances apply here. Spouses Gutierrez should have addressed the issues regarding the validity of the Order dated June 23, 2003 in motion for reconsideration or appeal. Since no motion for reconsideration or appeal was filed by Spouses Gutierrez within the reglementary period, the order for reconveyance had become final and executory. Having lost the right to appeal, they can no longer assail the validity of June 23, 2003 in a motion to quash or a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the CA. A motion to quash execution and a petition for certiorari and prohibition, are not and should not be substitutes for a lost appeal.59 They are not procedural devises to deprive the winning party of the fruits of the judgment in his or her favor. Courts should frown upon any scheme to prolong litigations. A judgment which has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, hence, may no longer be modified in any respect except only to correct clerical errors or mistakes. Once a judgment or order becomes final, all the issues between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest.60 The Court stresses once again that it is an important fundamental principle in the judicial system that every litigation must come to an end. Access to the courts is guaranteed. But there must be a limit thereto. Once a litigants rights have been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent court, he should not be granted an unbridled license to come back for another try. The prevailing party should not be harassed by subsequent suits. For, if endless litigations were to be encouraged, then unscrupulous litigants will multiply in number to the detriment of the administration of justice.61 Thus, litigation of this case must now cease. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Except for the procedural aspect, the dismissal of the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition in CA-G.R. SP No. 86957 for lack of merit is AFFIRMED. The Order dated June 9, 2004 denying petitioners Motion to Quash and Order dated September 9, 2004 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Malolos, Bulacan, stand.
Footnotes
1
Penned by Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo and concurred in by Associate Justices Romeo A. Brawner and Magdangal M. de Leon, CA rollo, p. 41.
2
Id. at 94. Id. at 30. Id. at 50. Id. at 55. Id. at 56. Id. at 60. Id. at 59. Rollo, p. 144. Id. Id. CA rollo, p. 63. Rollo, p. 145. Id. at 147. CA rollo, p. 23. Rollo, pp. 148-157. Id. at 159. Id. at 161. Id. at 163.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Id. at 168. Id. at 171. Supra note 20. Id. at 169. Id. at 39. CA rollo, p. 71. Id. at 26. Id. at 35. Id. at 28. Id. at 73. Id. at 29. Id. at 2. Id. at 41. Id at 41-42. Id. at 43. Id. at 94. Rollo, p. 16. Id. at 18.
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
Gordoland Development Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 163757, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 425, 433; Benguet Corporation v. Cordillera Caraballo Mission, Inc., G.R. No. 155343, September 2, 2005, 469 SCRA 381, 384.
39
Gordoland Development Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, supra note 38; Benguet Corporation v. Cordillera Caraballo Mission, Inc., supra note 38; Shipside Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 404 Phil. 981, 995 (2001).
40
Ballao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 162342, October 11, 2006, 504 SCRA 227, 233; Pfizer, Inc. v. Galan, 410 Phil. 483, 492 (2001).
41
Supra note 33. G.R. No. 148247, August 7, 2006, 498 SCRA 59. Id. at 69-70. G.R. Nos. 79937-38, February 13, 1989, 170 SCRA 274, 285. G.R. No. L-75919, May 7, 1987, 149 SCRA 562. G.R. No. 140954, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 460, 475. G.R. No. 151242, June 15, 2005, 460 SCRA 260, 274-276. G.R. No. 169108, April 18, 2006, 487 SCRA 339, 347.
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
Peoso v. Dona, G.R. No. 154018, April 3, 2007, 520 SCRA 232, 240; Ginete v. Court of Appeals, 357 Phil. 36, 53 (1998).
50
Composite Enterprises, Inc. v. Caparoso, G.R. No. 159919, August 8, 2007, 529 SCRA 470, 480; Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad, G.R. No. 154798, October 20, 2005, 473 SCRA 559, 566.
51
Tan v. Dumarpa, G.R. No. 138777, September 22, 2004, 438 SCRA 659, 665; Serrano v. Galant Maritime Services, Inc., 455 Phil. 992, 998 (2003).
52
Pobre v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141805, July 8, 2005, 463 SCRA 50, 60; Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 140576-99, December 13, 2004, 446 SCRA 166, 177.
53
CA rollo, p. 34. G.R. Nos. 148196 & 148259, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 431.
54
55
Id. at 445. See also Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112140, June 23, 2005, 461 SCRA 34; First Metro Investment Corporation v. Este Del Sol Mountain Reserve, Inc., 420 Phil. 902 (2001).
56
Eugenio, Sr. v. Velez, G.R. No. 85140, May 17, 1990, 185 SCRA 425, 432-433.
57
Arroyo, Jr. v. Taduran, 466 Phil. 173, 180 (2004); Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Court of Appeals, 388 Phil. 27, 41 (2000).
58
Reburiano v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 294, 302 (1999); Limpin, Jr. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-70987, January 30, 1987, 147 SCRA 516, 522-23.
59
Cf Conejos v. Court of Appeals, 435 Phil. 849, 855 (2002); Del Mar v. Court of Appeals, 429 Phil. 19, 30 (2002).
60
61
Aguilar v. Manila Banking Corporation, G.R. No.157911, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 354, 381; Ferinion v. Sta. Romana, 123 Phil. 191, 195 (1966).
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 149118 February 16, 2006
FLAVIANA LIM CAJAYON and CARMELITA LIM CONSTANTINO, Petitioners, vs. SPOUSES SANTIAGO and FORTUNATA BATUYONG, Respondents. DECISION TINGA, J.: This petition for review on certiorari challenges the two rulings of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP. No. 50952. The first decision dated 27 November 20001 upheld the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirming the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) order for ejectment, while the Resolution dated 5 July 20012 denied the motion for reconsideration. First, the factual background of the case. Flaviana Lim Cajayon and Carmelita Lim Constantino (petitioners) and Isagani P. Candelaria (Candelaria) were co-owners of a 260-square meter lot, then covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-10870. On 1 February 1995, a partition agreement3 was entered into by petitioners and Candelaria, wherein Lot 6-A, Psd 00-034294, containing an area of 100 square meters, more or less, was adjudicated to Candelaria, while Lot 6-B, Psd 00-034294, containing an area of 160 square meters, more or less, was given to petitioners. TCT No. C-10870 was cancelled and TCT No. 288500 was issued in the name of petitioners. On 30 May 1995, Candelaria sold his property, including the improvements thereon, to Spouses Santiago and Fortunata Batuyong (respondents). TCT No. 294743 was issued in their names over the said parcel of land.4
On 21 May 1996, petitioners started the construction of a seven (7)-door bungalow-type building that allegedly intruded into the lot of respondents. At the instance of respondents, petitioners were summoned by barangay officials to a meeting on the matter. It was then agreed upon that petitioners would defer the construction work pending the result of a relocation survey to be conducted by a government surveyor. A verification survey was conducted by Geodetic Engineer Florentina C. Valencia. She submitted a report dated 12 November 1996 which yielded the findings that Lot 6-A (Candelarias) and Lot 6-B (petitioners) were not correctly positioned geographically on the ground with respect to TCT No. 294743. Thus, as per survey, sub-lot B with an area of 10.43 square meters serves as right of way of Lot 6-B (petitioners lot) while sub-lot C with an area of 10.18 square meters was the portion of Lot 6-A (respondents lot) presently occupied by petitioners.5 Despite the delineation of said boundaries, petitioners proceeded with the forestalled construction, allegedly occupying at least 20.61 square meters of respondents lot, including the portion being used as right of way for petitioners tenants. After respondents secured a permit from the barangay and the Caloocan City Building Official to fence their lot, they made demands to petitioners to vacate the encroached portion but to no avail. Respondents brought the matter to the barangay but no amicable settlement was reached. A Certificate to File Action was issued to them by the Barangay Lupon Tagapayapa. A final demand was made through a letter dated 20 May 1997 upon petitioners to vacate the encroached premises. Petitioners, however, vehemently refused to vacate and surrender the premises. On 14 April 1997, respondents filed an ejectment case against petitioners before the Metropolitan Trial Court6 (MeTC) of Caloocan City, docketed as Civil Case No. 23359. In a Decision7 dated 2 July 1998, the MeTC ordered petitioners to vacate and surrender possession of a portion of respondents lot and to pay P500.00 per month as fair rental value from May 1996 until the premises is finally vacated, plus P5,000.00 as attorneys fees and costs of the suit.8 On appeal, the RTC9 affirmed the judgment of the MeTC.10 In doing so, the RTC debunked the three (3) arguments posed by petitioners. First, contrary to petitioners submission, the RTC ruled that the MeTC had jurisdiction over the instant complaint. The RTC noted that the issue of jurisdiction was never raised in the court a quo while on the other hand, petitioners actively participated in the proceedings therein by filing their Answer and Position Paper. Evidently, petitioners raised the question of jurisdiction as a mere afterthought as he did so only after he obtained an adverse judgment. Second, the allegations of the complaint sufficiently averred a case for ejectment which the RTC found to be within the jurisdiction of the court a quo. Third, the trial court ruled that petitioners categorically recognized the validity of the verification survey done by Engineer Valencia, as shown by the presence of petitioner Flaviana Cajayon during the verification survey and setting of monuments per survey report.11 Petitioners filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration but it was denied in an Order12 dated 12 January 1999 of the RTC. They elevated the case to the Court of Appeals by way of petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. On 27 November 2000, the appellate
court rendered a Decision13 dismissing the petition. Holding that the exclusive jurisdiction to try unlawful detainer cases is vested with the MeTC, the appellate court ratiocinated, thus: The complaint in the instant case establishes jurisdictional facts necessary to sustain the action for unlawful detainer and the remedy it seeks is merely to obtain possession of the controverted lot from respondents. Specifically, it alleges that sometime on May 21, 1996, petitioners started construction works in the area which intruded into a portion of respondents property; that the parties eventually agreed to stop the construction subject to the result of a survey to be conducted thereon; that a survey was conducted in the presence of the parties and a report was submitted by Engr. Valencia on November 12, 1996, showing an encroachment of about 20.61 square meters of respondents lot including that portion being used as a right of way for petitioners tenants; that even after the boundaries had been verified, petitioners resumed the construction on the area; that despite verbal and written demands, the last of which was made on March 20, 1999, petitioners refused to vacate and surrender the encroached area. Surely, respondents resort to unlawful detainer when petitioners failed to leave the controverted premises upon demand is in order.14 The appellate court also held that the fact that petitioners houses already stood on the controverted lot long before the purchase of the land by respondents failed to negate the case for ejectment.15 The appellate court emphasized that prior physical possession is not a condition sine qua non in unlawful detainer cases. The court likewise sustained the RTC findings on the validity of the verification survey conducted by Engineer Valencia that petitioners have encroached on a 20.61 square meter portion of respondents lot. On 5 July 2001, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution16 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioners now come to us via the present petition, submitting as issues the question of jurisdiction and the weight to be accorded to the verification survey results.17 Petitioners anchor their petition on the court a quos lack of jurisdiction over the instant suit. The averments in the complaint do not make out a case for ejectment, they claim, as their entry into the disputed lot was not made by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. Neither was their possession of the disputed property by virtue of the tolerance of respondents or the latters predecessor-in-interest. Respondents counter that the jurisdictional elements necessary to maintain an action for unlawful detainer clearly obtain in the case at bar, namely: (a) after the parties agreed to the conduct of a survey by a government surveyor and after the survey, it was determined that the structures introduced by herein petitioners have encroached a portion of herein respondents lot; (b) notices to vacate and surrender of possession of the encroached portion were made to petitioners, the last being on March 20, 1997; and (c) the suit was instituted on April 11, 1997 or within one (1) year from date of last demand.18 Respondents also stress that possession of the premises by petitioners took place more than one year before the filing of the complaint and the absence of an allegation in the complaint that such
possession of the disputed portion was merely by virtue of respondents tolerance does not deprive the lower court of its original and exclusive jurisdiction nor will it negate respondents action for unlawful detainer.19 It is settled that jurisdiction of the court in ejectment cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought.20 The Complaint21 filed by respondents (plaintiffs therein) alleged these material facts:1avvphil.net 2. That defendants and Isagani P. Candelaria were the former co-owners of a certain piece of land located in Maypajo, Caloocan City containing an area of 260 square meters, more or less, under TCT No. C-10870 issued by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City; 3. That on February 1, 1995, said co-owners subdivided this parcel of land by virtue of a Partition Agreement wherein Lot 6-A, Psd 00-034294, containing an area of 100 square meters, more or less, was given to Isagani P. Candelaria, while Lot 6-B, Psd 00-034294, containing an area of 160 square meters, more or less, was given to defendants. A copy of said Partition Agreement is hereto attached as Annex "A"; xxx xxx xxx 5. That on May 30, 1995, Isagani P. Candelaria sold his share to the herein plaintiffs, including the improvements thereon, in the sum of P100,000.00, under a Deed of Absolute Sale x x x; xxx xxx xxx 7. That sometime in May 21, 1996, defendants started construction works in the area and intruded into the lot owned by the plaintiffs causing the latter to protest and report the matter to the barangay authorities; 8. That on the same day, the parties were summoned to appear before the Barangay Chairman wherein defendants agreed to stop the construction works, and in a subsequent conference on June 7, 1996, they agreed to defer the matter pending the result of a survey to be conducted by a government surveyor; xxx xxx xxx 11. That the following day, September 5, 1996, Geodetic Engineer Florentina C. Valencia conducted a survey of the aforesaid property and placed the concrete monuments thereon in the presence of plaintiffs and defendants; 12. That on November 12, 1996, a verification survey report was submitted by Geodetic Engineer Florentina C. Valencia together with the survey verification plan xxx;
13. That despite defendants knowledge of the property boundary, and despite repeated serious objections from plaintiffs, defendants proceeded to construct a seven-door bungalow-type semi-concrete building, occupying at least 10.18 square meters and another 10.43 square meters for the right of way, thus encroaching upon at least 20.61 square meters of plaintiffs lot, and further demolishing plaintiffs wall. xxx xxx xxx 20. That despite repeated and continuous demands made by plaintiffs upon defendants, both oral and written, the last being on March 20, 1997, defendants in manifest bad faith, wanton attitude, and in a malevolent and oppressive manner and in utter disregard of the property rights of plaintiffs, have failed and refused, and still fail and refuse to vacate the same up to the present time x x x.22 From the above-quoted allegations taken in tandem with the textbook distinctions between forcible entry and unlawful detainer, it is clear that the complaint makes out a case for forcible entry, as opposed to unlawful detainer. The distinctions between the two forms of ejectment suits, are: first, in forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior physical possession of the premises until he was deprived thereof by the defendant, whereas, in unlawful detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession; second, in forcible entry, the possession of the land by the defendant is unlawful from the beginning as he acquires possession thereof by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, while in unlawful detainer, the possession of the defendant is inceptively lawful but it becomes illegal by reason of the termination of his right to the possession of the property under his contract with the plaintiff; third, in forcible entry, the law does not require a previous demand for the defendant to vacate the premises, but in unlawful detainer, the plaintiff must first make such demand, which is jurisdictional in nature.23 Respondents had been in prior physical possession of the property in the concept of owner prior to petitioners intrusion on 21 May 1996. When petitioners encroached upon respondents lot and started construction works thereon the latter was dispossessed of the area involved. Despite various demands by respondents to vacate, petitioners obstinately refused to do so. Clearly, petitioners entry into the said property was illegal from the beginning, precluding an action for unlawful detainer. On the other hand, to establish a case of forcible entry, the complaint must allege that one in physical possession of a land or building has been deprived of that possession by another through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.24 It is not essential, however, that the complaint should expressly employ the language of the law. It would be sufficient that facts are set up showing that dispossession took place under said conditions.25 The words "by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth" include every situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another, who has had prior possession thereof. To constitute the use of "force" as contemplated in the abovementioned provision, the trespasser does not have to institute a state of war. Nor is it even necessary that he use violence against the person of the party in possession. The act of going on the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of
force over the property, and this is all that is necessary.26 In the case at bar, petitioners encroachment into respondents property in an oppressive and malevolent manner, coupled with their refusal to vacate the premises despite knowledge of the proper boundaries and heedless of respondents serious objections, indelibly connotes "force" within the meaning of the law. Petitioners contend that while they concede they might have intruded on respondents property, the action is barred by prescription because it was filed more than one (1) year after the occurrence of the alleged intrusion. The contention is baseless. Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court allows a plaintiff to bring an action in the proper inferior court for forcible entry or unlawful detainer within one (1) year, respectively, after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession. In forcible entry, the one-year period is counted from the date of actual entry on the land.27 Records show that the ejectment suit was instituted on 11 April 1997. Petitioners actual entry into the property, according to the complaint, took place on 21 May 1996. Thus, the suit was filed well within the one (1)-year period mandated by law. As a collateral issue, petitioners claim that they are at least entitled to the rights of a builder in good faith on the premise that they are not the owners of the property encroached upon. This contention is not tenable. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title.28 In the instant case, when the verification survey report came to petitioners knowledge their good faith ceased. The survey report is a professionals field confirmation of petitioners encroachment of respondents titled property. It is doctrinal in land registration law that possession of titled property adverse to the registered owner is necessarily tainted with bad faith. Thus, proceeding with the construction works on the disputed lot despite knowledge of respondents ownership put petitioners in bad faith. Now, the second issue. Petitioners question the evidentiary weight of the verification survey report. They point out that since the survey was a unilateral act of respondents, done as it was without their consent, they should not be bound by its findings.29 In raising the issue, petitioners are in effect asking this Court to reassess the factual findings of the courts below, a task which is beyond this Courts domain. Factual matters cannot be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. This Court at this stage is limited to reviewing errors of law that may have been committed by the lower courts.30 We find no ample reason to depart from this rule, more so in this case where the Court of Appeals has affirmed the factual findings of the RTC and the MeTC. Moreover, there is a presumption that official duty is regularly performed,31 i.e., government officials who perform them are clothed with the presumption of regularity,32 as the courts below pointed out.33 In this case, the verification survey was conducted by a government functionary. Even prescinding from the presumption of regularity, what appears on record is that the verification survey was conducted with the agreement of both parties and in their presence. That
was the finding made by the courts below and affirmed by the appellate court without any wrinkle.34 WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, this Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.1avvphil.net SO ORDERED. DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice WE CONCUR: LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairman ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES Asscociate Justice ATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairman, Third Division CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairmans Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and concurred in by Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes and Mariano M. Umali.
Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and concurred in by Associate Justices Oswaldo D. Agcaoili and Bienvenido L. Reyes.
3
Rollo, p. 64. Id. at 68-69. Id. at 127. Presided by Judge Belen B. Ortiz. Rollo, pp. 126-130. Id. at 130. Presided by Acting Judge Adoracion G. Angeles. Rollo, pp. 152-156. Decision dated 9 October 1998. Id. at 72. Id. at 168-169. Id. at 7-16. Id. at 11-12. Id. at 13. Id. at 29-30. Id. at 40-41. Id. at 276. Id. at 237.
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19
20
Ross Rica Sales Center v. Spouses Ong, G.R. No. 132197, 16 August 2005, citing Caniza v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1107 (1997) and Ten Forty Realty and Development Corp. v. Cruz, G.R. No. 151212, 10 September 2003, 410 SCRA 484; Ganila, et. al. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150755, 28 June 2005, citing Heirs of Demetrio Melchor v. Melchor, G.R. No. 150633, 12 November 2003, 415 SCRA 726, 732; Tecson v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 152978, 4 March 2005.
21
22
23
Muoz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102693, 23 September 1992, 214 SCRA 216 citing Dikit v. Icasiano, 89 Phil. 44 (1951); Medel v. Militante, 41 Phil. 44 (1921); Maddamu v. Judge, 74 Phil. 230 (1944); Aguilar v. Cabrera, 74 Phil. 666 (1944); Banayos v. Susana Realty, Inc. L-30336, 30 June 1976, 71 SCRA 557; Pharma Industries, Inc. v. Pajarillaga, et al., No. L-53788, 17 October 1980, 100 SCRA 339.
24
Rules of Court, Rule 70, Sec. 1. O. Herrera, Remedial Law, Vol. III 406 (1999 ed.).
25
26
David v. Cordova, G.R. No. 152992, 28 July 2005, citing Mediran v. Villanueva, 37 Phil. 752 (1918); Joven v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80739, 2 August 1992, 212 SCRA 700.
27
Varona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124148, 20 May 2004, 428 SCRA 577; Gener v. De Leon, G.R. No. 130730, 19 October 2001, 367 SCRA 631, citing Sps. Pedro Ong and Veronica Ong v. Socorro Parel and Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143173, 28 March 2001; Sarona v. Villegas, 131 Phil. 365 (1968).
28
Evadel Realty and Development Corp. v. Soriano, G.R. No. 14429, 20 April 2001, 357 SCRA 395.
29
Rollo, p. 52.
30
Filinvest Land v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138980, 20 September 2005, citing Alvarez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142843, 6 August 2003, 408 SCRA 419.
31
32
Republic v. Nolasco, G.R. No. 155108, 27 April 2005; People v. De La Cruz, G.R. No. 148730, 26 June 2003, 405 SCRA 112.
33
Said the MeTC: As rightly pointed out by the plaintiffs in their position statement, there is no law that prohibits the conduct of a verification survey. Indeed, a survey enjoys the presumption of accuracy until it can be proven otherwise. (Rollo, p. 129) On appeal, the RTC further elucidated, thus: Anent the conclusion of the court a quo that indeed the defendants-appellants have encroached upon a portion of the plaintiffs-appellees lot, this Court finds no reason to disturb the same.
It must be pointed out that there was already an admission at the barangay level that the defendants-appellants have encroached on the lot of the plaintiffsappellees as evidenced by Exhibit "R" which was not controverted. This fact stems from a verification survey conducted by no less than a representative from the DENR, a government entity. The rule is that: "Government officials are presumed to perform their functions with regularity and strong evidence is necessary to rebut this presumption." Moreover, it has been held that: "Absent a strong showing to the contrary, the Court must accept the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty." (Rollo, p. 155, citations omitted).
34
Rollo, p. 14.