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GR 167614
GR 167614
CONCURRING OPINION BRION, J.: I concur with the ponencias conclusion that Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act (R.A. No. 8042), is unconstitutional insofar as it provides that In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
My conclusion, however, proceeds from a different reason and constitutional basis. I believe that this provision should be struck down for violations of the constitutional provisions in favor of labor[1] and of the substantive aspect of the due process clause.[2] Given these bases, I see no necessity in invoking the equal protection clause. Underlying this restraint in invoking the equal protection clause is my hesitation to join the ponencia in declaring a classification as suspect and in using the strict scrutiny standard without clearly defined parameters on when this approach applies. I begin by reading the assailed provision Section 10, R.A. No. 8042 in its constitutional context. Section 18, Article II of the Constitution declares it a state policy to affirm labor as a primary social economic force and to protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare. This policy is emphatically given more life and vitality under Article XIII, Section 3 of the Constitution which reads: Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace. The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns to investments, and to expansion and growth. On June 7, 1995, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8042 to establish a higher standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant workers, their families and of overseas Filipinos in distress.[3] The express policy declarations of R.A. No. 8042 show that its purposes are reiterations of the very same policies enshrined in the Constitution. R.A. No. 8042, among others, recites that: (b) The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. Towards this end, the State shall provide adequate and timely social, economic and legal services to Filipino migrant workers.[4] x x x (e) Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. In this regard, it is imperative that an effective mechanism be instituted to ensure that the rights and interests of distressed overseas Filipinos, in general, and Filipino migrant workers, in particular, documented or undocumented, are adequately protected and safeguarded. These declared purposes patently characterize R.A. No. 8042 as a direct implementation of the constitutional objectives on Filipino overseas work so that it must be read and understood in terms of these policy objectives. Under this interpretative guide, any provision in R.A. No. 8042 inimical to the interest of an overseas Filipino worker (OFW) cannot have any place in the law. Further examination of the law shows that while it acknowledges that the State shall promote full employment, it states at the same time that the State does not promote overseas employment as a means to sustain economic growth and national development. The existence of overseas employment program rests solely on the assurance that the dignity and fundamental human rights and freedoms of Filipino citizens shall not, at any time, be compromised or violated. In blunter terms, the overseas
employment program exists only for OFW protection. Having said all these, the law concludes its Declaration of Policies with a statement the lawmakers may have perceived as an exception to the laws previously declared policies, by stating [n]onetheless, the deployment of Filipino overseas workers, whether land-based or sea-based, by local service contractors and manning agencies employing them shall be encouraged. Appropriate incentives may be extended to them. Thus, in express terms, the law recognizes that there can be incentives to service contractors and manning agencies in the spirit of encouraging greater deployment efforts. No mention at all, however, was made of incentives to the contractors and agencies principals, i.e., the foreign employers in whose behalf the contractors and agencies recruit OFWs. The matter of money claims the immediate subject of the present case is governed by Section 10 of the law. This section grants the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) jurisdiction over OFW money claims. On liability for money claims, the sections states: SECTION 10. Money Claims. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages. The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. Such liabilities shall continue during the entire period or duration of the employment contract and shall not be affected by any substitution, amendment or modification made locally or in a foreign country of the said contract. Any compromise/amicable settlement or voluntary agreement on money claims inclusive of damages under this section shall be paid within four (4) months from the approval of the settlement by the appropriate authority. In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the worker shall be
entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
Under these terms, the law protects the OFW as against the employer and the recruitment agency in case of illegal termination of service, but limits this liability to the reimbursement of the placement fee and interest, and the payment of his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less. After earlier declaring the principal/employer and the contractor/recruitment agency jointly and solidarily liable, the limitation of liability appears to be a step backward that can only be justified, under the terms of the law, if it is an appropriate incentive. To be appropriate, the incentive must necessarily relate to the laws purpose with reasonable expectation that it would serve this purpose; it must also accrue to its intended beneficiaries (the recruitment/placement agencies), and not to parties to whom the reason for the grant does not apply. These considerations bring us to the question can the disputed portion of Section 10 stand constitutional scrutiny? I submit that it cannot as it violates the constitutional provisions in favor of labor, as well as the requirements of substantive due process. The best indicator of the effect of the disputed portion of Section 10 on OFWs can be seen from the results of the pre-R.A. No. 8042 rulings of this Court that the ponencia painstakingly arranged in tabular form. The ponencias table shows that by our own past rulings, before R.A. No. 8042, all illegal dismissals merited the payment of the salaries that the OFWs would have received for the unexpired portion of their contracts.[5] After R.A. No. 8042, our rulings vary on the computation of what should be paid to illegally dismissed OFWs, but in all cases the principals/agencys adjudged liability was for less than the unexpired portion of the OFWs contract.[6] Anyway viewed, the situation of illegally dismissed OFWs changed for the worse after R.A. No. 8042. In this sense, the disputed portion of Section 10 is one that goes against the interests of labor, based on R.A. No. 8042s own declared purposes and, more importantly, on constitutional standards. Section 10 diminished rather than enhanced the protection the Constitution envisions for OFWs. The more significant violation, however, that the disputed portion of Section 10 spawns relates to its character as a police power measure, and its failure to meet the substantive due process requirements of Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.
By the Office of the Solicitor Generals (OSG) own representations, the disputed Section 10 is a police power measure adopted to mitigate the solidary liability of placement agencies. It redounds to the benefit of the migrant workers whose welfare the government seeks to promote. The survival of legitimate placement agencies helps [assure] the government that migrant workers are properly deployed and are employed under decent and humane conditions.[7] To constitutionally test the validity of this measure, substantive due process requires that there be: (1) a lawful purpose; and (2) lawful means or method to achieve the lawful purpose.[8] I see nothing inherently unconstitutional in providing incentives to local service contractors and manning agencies; they are significant stakeholders in the overseas employment program and providing them with encouragement as R.A. No. 8042 apparently envisions in its Declaration of Policies will ultimately redound to the benefit of the OFWs they recruit and deploy for overseas work. The Constitution itself also expressly recognizes the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to expansion and growth.[9] As entities acting for the principals/employers in the overseas employment program, the recruitment/manning agencies deserve no less. Viewed from this perspective, the purpose of encouraging greater efforts at securing work for OFWs cannot but be constitutionally valid. Thus, the issue before us in considering substantive due process is reduced to whether the means taken to achieve the purpose of encouraging recruitment efforts (i.e., the incentive granted limiting the liability of recruitment/ manning agencies for illegal dismissals) is reasonable. The first significant consideration in examining this issue is the question of liability who is liable when a foreign principal/employer illegally terminates the services of an OFW? Under Philippine law, the employer, as the contracting party who violated the terms of the contract, is primarily liable.[10] In the overseas employment situation, the protective measures adopted under the law and the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) rules to protect the OFW in his or her overseas contract best tell us how we regard liability under this contract. First, POEA Rules require, as a condition precedent to an OFW deployment, the execution of a master contract signed by a foreign principal/employer before it can be accredited by the POEA as an entity who can source its manpower needs from the Philippines under its overseas employment program. [11] The master contract contains the terms and conditions the foreign principal/employer binds itself to in its employment relationship with the OFWs it will employ. Second, signed individual contracts of employment between the foreign principal/employer or its agent and the OFW, drawn in accordance with the master contract, are required as well.[12] Third, the foreign aspects or incidents of these contracts are submitted to the Philippine labor attachs for verification at site.[13] This is a protective measure to ensure the existence and financial capability of the
foreign principal/employer. Labor attaches verify as well the individual employment contracts signed by foreign principals/employers overseas. Fourth, the POEA Rules require the issuance by the foreign principalemployer of a special power of attorney authorizing the recruitment/manning agency to sign for and its behalf, and allowing itself to sue or be sued on the employment contracts in the Philippines through its authorized recruitment/manning agency.[14] Fifth, R.A. No. 8042 itself and its predecessor laws have always provided that the liability between the principal and its agent (the recruitment/manning agency) is joint and solidary,[15] thus ensuring that either the principal or the agent can be held liable for obligations due to OFWs. Finally, OFWs themselves can sue at the host countries with the assistance of Philippine embassies and labor offices.[16] These measures collectively protect OFWs by ensuring the integrity of their contracts; by establishing the responsible parties; and by providing the mechanisms for their enforcement. In all these, the primary recourse is with the foreign principal employer who has direct and primary responsibility under the employment contract. Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 affects these well-laid rules and measures, and in fact provides a hidden twist affecting the principal/employers liability. While intended as an incentive accruing to recruitment/manning agencies, the law, as worded, simply limits the OFWs recovery in wrongful dismissal situations. Thus, it redounds to the benefit of whoever may be liable, including the principal/employer the direct employer primarily liable for the wrongful dismissal. In this sense, Section 10 read as a grant of incentives to recruitment/manning agencies oversteps what it aims to do by effectively limiting what is otherwise the full liability of the foreign principals/employers. Section 10, in short, really operates to benefit the wrong party and allows that party, without justifiable reason, to mitigate its liability for wrongful dismissals. Because of this hidden twist, the limitation of liability under Section 10 cannot be an appropriate incentive, to borrow the term that R.A. No. 8042 itself uses to describe the incentive it envisions under its purpose clause. What worsens the situation is the chosen mode of granting the incentive: instead of a grant that, to encourage greater efforts at recruitment, is directly related to extra efforts undertaken, the law simply limits their liability for the wrongful dismissals of already deployed OFWs. This is effectively a legally-imposed partial condonation of their liability to OFWs, justified solely by the laws intent to encourage greater deployment efforts. Thus, the incentive, from a more practical and realistic view, is really part of a scheme to sell Filipino overseas labor at a bargain for purposes solely of attracting the market. Ironically, the OSG unabashedly confirmed this view in its Comment when it represented that [b]y limiting the liability to three months, Filipino seafarers have better chance of getting hired by foreign employees.[17]
The so-called incentive is rendered particularly odious by its effect on the OFWs - the benefits accruing to the recruitment/manning agencies and their principals are taken from the pockets of the OFWs to whom the full salaries for the unexpired portion of the contract rightfully belong. Thus, the principals/employers and the recruitment/manning agencies even profit from their violation of the security of tenure that an employment contract embodies. Conversely, lesser protection is afforded the OFW, not only because of the lessened recovery afforded him or her by operation of law, but also because this same lessened recovery renders a wrongful dismissal easier and less onerous to undertake; the lesser cost of dismissing a Filipino will always be a consideration a foreign employer will take into account in termination of employment decisions. This reality, unfortunately, is one that we cannot simply wish away with the disputed Section 10 in place. Thus, this inherently oppressive, arbitrary, confiscatory and inimical provision should be struck down for its conflict with the substantive aspect of the constitutional due process guarantee. Specifically, the phrase for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired terms, whichever is less in the fifth and final paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. 8042 should be declared unconstitutional. With these conclusions, I see no need to further test the validity of the assailed clause under the equal protection guarantee. My restraint in this regard rests on two reasons.
First, I believe that the ponencias use of the strict scrutiny standard of review on the premise that the assailed clause established a suspect classification is misplaced. Second, I do not see the present case as an occasion to further expand the use of the strict scrutiny standard which the Court first expanded in Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,[18]
A suspect classification is one where distinctions are made based on the most invidious bases for classification that violate the most basic human rights, i.e., on the basis of race, national origin, alien status, religious affiliation, and to a certain extent, sex and sexual orientation. [19] With a suspect classification, the scrutiny of the classification is raised to its highest level: the ordinary presumption of constitutionality is reversed and government carries the burden of proving that its challenged policy is constitutional. To withstand strict scrutiny, the government must show that its policy is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest; if this is proven, the state must then demonstrate that the legislation is narrowly tailored to achieve the intended result.[20] In the present case, I do not actually intended to classify relation with local workers Section 10. The congressional see the slightest indication that Congress OFWs between and among themselves, and in when it adopted the disputed portion of intent was to merely grant recruitment and
manning agencies an incentive and thereby encourage them into greater deployment efforts, although, as discussed above, the incentive really works for the foreign principals benefit at the expense of the OFWs. Even assuming that a classification resulted from the law, the classification should not immediately be characterized as a suspect classification that would invite the application of the strict scrutiny standard. The disputed portion of Section 10 does not, on its face, restrict or curtail the civil and human rights of any single group of OFWs. At best, the disputed portion limits the monetary award for wrongful termination of employment a tort situation affecting an OFWs economic interest. This characterization and the unintended classification that unwittingly results from the incentive scheme under Section 10, to my mind, render a strict scrutiny disproportionate to the circumstances to which it is applied. I believe, too, that we should tread lightly in further expanding the concept of suspect classification after we have done so in Central Bank, [21] where we held that classifications that result in prejudice to persons accorded special protection by the Constitution[22] requires a stricter judicial scrutiny. The use of a suspect classification label cannot depend solely on whether the Constitution has accorded special protection to a specified sector. While the Constitution specially mentions labor as a sector that needs special protection, the involvement of or relationship to labor, by itself, cannot automatically trigger a suspect classification and the accompanying strict scrutiny; much should depend on the circumstances of the case, on the impact of the illegal differential treatment on the sector involved, on the needed protection, and on the impact of recognizing a suspect classification on future situations. In other words, we should carefully calibrate our moves when faced with an equal protection situation so that we do not misappreciate the essence of what a suspect classification is, and thereby lessen its jurisprudential impact and value. Reserving this approach to the worst cases of unacceptable classification and discrimination highlights the importance of striking at these types of unequal treatment and is a lesson that will not be lost on all concerned, particularly the larger public. There is the added reason, too, that the reverse onus that a strict scrutiny brings directly strikes, in the most glaring manner, at the regularity of the performance of functions of a coequal branch of government; inter-government harmony and courtesy demand that we reserve this type of treatment to the worst violations of the Constitution. Incidentally, I believe that we can arrive at the same conclusion and similarly strike down the disputed Section 10 by using the lowest level of scrutiny, thereby rendering the use of the strict scrutiny unnecessary. Given the OSGs positions, the resulting differential treatment the law fosters between Philippine-based workers and OFWs in illegal dismissal situations does not rest on substantial distinctions that are germane to the purpose of the law. No reasonable basis for classification exists
since the distinctions the OSG pointed out do not justify the different treatment of OFWs and Philippine-based workers, specifically, why one class should be excepted from the consequences of illegal termination under the Labor Code, while the other is not. To be sure, the difference in work locations and working conditions that the OSG pointed out are not valid grounds for distinctions that should matter in the enforcement of employment contracts. Whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, the integrity of contracts be they labor, commercial or political is a zealously guarded value that we in the Philippines should not demean by allowing a breach of OFW contracts easy to undertake. This is true whatever may be the duration or character of employment; employment contracts, whatever their term and conditions may be subject only to their consistency with the law, must be respected during the whole contracted term and under the conditions agreed upon. Significantly, the OSG could not even point to any reason other than the protection of recruitment agencies and the expansion of the Philippine overseas program as justification for the limitation of liability that has effectively distinguished OFWs from locally-based workers. These reasons, unfortunately, are not on the same plane as protection to labor in our constitutional hierarchy of values. Even RA 8042 repeats that the State does not promote overseas employment as a means to sustain economic growth and national development. Under RA 8042s own terms, the overseas employment program exists only for OFW protection. Thus viewed, the expansion of the Philippine overseas deployment program and the need for incentives to achieve results are simply not valid reasons to justify a classification, particularly when the incentive is in the form of oppressive and confiscatory limitation of liability detrimental to labor. No valid basis for classification thus exists to justify the differential treatment that resulted from the disputed Section 10. In light of all these, I vote to strike down the disputed portion of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042. ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice [1] CONSTITUTION, Article II, Section 18 and Article XIII, Section 3; see p. 2 of this Concurring opinion. [2] Id.; Article III, Section 1 contains both the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution, as follows: Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. [3] Long title of R.A. No. 8042. Its short title is Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. The law came soon after the Gancayco Commission rendered its report on the situation of overseas Filipino
workers. The Commission was convened following the execution of Flor Contemplacion, a Filipino domestic helper executed in Singapore on March 17, 1995. [4] See and compare with Section 3, Article XIII of the Constituion [5] See: Ponencia, p. 23. [6] Ibid., pp. 21-22. [7] OSG Memorandum, rollo, pp. 668-678; cited in the ponencia, p. 11. [8] See: City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 308; Planters Committee v. Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 79310 and 79744, July 14, 1989, 175 SCRA 343; Balacuit v. CFI of Agusan del Norte, G.R. No. L-38429, June 30, 1998, 163 SCRA 182. [9] CONSTITUTION, Article XIII, Section 3. [10] LABOR CODE, Article 279; Vinta Maritime Co., Inc and Elkano Ship Management, Inc. v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 113911, January 23, 1998; Tierra International Construction, et al., v. NLRC, G.R. No. 101825, April 2, 1996. [11] POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-Based Workers (POEA Rules for Land-Based Workers), Part III, Rule 1, Sections 1 to 4; Rule 2, Section 2. [12] POEA Rules for Land-Based Workers, Part V, Rile I, Sections 1 to 4; POEA Rules and Regulations Governing Recruitment and Employment of Seafarers (POEA Rules for Seafarers), Part IV, Rule I, Sections 1 and 2. [13] POEA Rules for Land-Based Workers, Part III, Rule 1, Section 1; POEA Rules for Seafarers, Part III, Rule 1, Sections 1 to 4 [14] POEA Rules for Land-Based Workers, Part III, Rule 1, Sections 2 (a) to 3, and Rule 2, Section 2 (a); POEA Rules for Seafarers, Part III, Rule 1, Sections 2 (b) and 4, and Rule 2, Section 2(a). [15] POEA Rules for Land-Based Workers, Part II, Rule 2, Section 1 (f) (3); POEA Rules for Seafarers, Part II, Rule 2, Section 1 (e) (8); Datuman v. First Cosmopolitan Manpower and Promotion Services, G.R. No. 156029, November 14, 2008; See: Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code (1976), Book I, Rule V, Section 10; See also: Catan v. NLRC, G.R. No. 77279, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 691, and Royal Crown International v. NLRC, G.R. No. 78085, October 16, 1989, 178 SCRA 569. [16] Assistance is provided by Labor Attaches who report to the DOLE functionally and to the Philippine Ambassador at the foreign post. Assisting him are welfare officers of the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) and the POEA representatives, all of them functionally reporting to the DOLE. [17] OSG Comment; rollo, p. 555. [18] G.R. No. 148208, December 15, 2004, 446 SCRA 299. [19] City of Cleburn, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 413 U.S. 432 (1985); Loving v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). [20] Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). [21] Supra note 18. [22] In the Central Bank case, the classification was based on salary grade or officer-employee status. In the words of the decision, It is akin to a distinction based on economic class and status, with the higher grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades.