Doe Vs Mukasey Decision
Doe Vs Mukasey Decision
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JOHN DOE, INC., JOHN DOE, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
stayed on appeal, enjoins FBI officials from (1) issuing NSLs under
section 2709, (2) enforcing the nondisclosure requirement of
3511(b).
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brief), for Defendants-Appellants.
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companies or Internet service providers. An NSL, in the context of
fact that an NSL has been received, see 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c), and (2)
§ 3511(b).
officials from (1) issuing NSLs under section 2709, (2) enforcing the
379 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“Doe II”). The District Court ruled that
1
For authority to issue NSLs in other contexts, see 12 U.S.C.
§ 3414(a)(5) (financial records); 15 U.S.C. § 1681u (credit history);
15 U.S.C. § 1681v (full credit reports); 50 U.S.C. § 436 (information
concerning investigation of improper disclosure of classified
information).
2
All references to sections are to those in the current version
of Title 18, unless otherwise indicated.
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416-22, and that subsection 2709(c) could not be severed from section
Court, and we also conclude that the relief ordered by the District
Background
provider (John Doe, Inc.), the provider’s former president (John Doe),
the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”), and the American Civil
3
There is some slight confusion as to the status of John Doe,
Inc., and John Doe in this litigation, but the confusion has no
bearing on any of the issues or the resolution of this appeal. The
captions of the District Court’s first and second opinions list John
Doe as a plaintiff, but do not list John Doe, Inc., see Doe v.
Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Doe I”), and Doe II,
500 F. Supp. 2d 379, and there is no reference to John Doe, Inc., in
either opinion. The first opinion states that John Doe is “an
internet access firm.” Doe I, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 475. The second
opinion does not indicate whether John Doe is the corporation or its
former president. The second opinion grants in part the motion “of
John Doe.” See Doe II, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 425. However, the
Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint lists as parties both the
corporation and the former president, and the briefs filed in this
Court by all parties include John Doe, Inc., and John Doe in the
captions as the Plaintiffs-Appellees. We will assume that both the
corporation and its former president have been and continue to be
Plaintiffs-Appellants, and they are so identified (by pseudonyms) in
the caption of this appeal.
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the Attorney General, the Director of the FBI, and the General Counsel
The NSL. In February 2004, the FBI delivered the NSL at issue in
this litigation to John Doe, Inc. The letter directed John Doe, Inc.,
“to provide the [FBI] the names, addresses, lengths of service and
advised John Doe, Inc., that the law “prohibit[ed] any officer,
pursuant to the NSL provisions. The letter also asked that John Doe
office.
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 201, 100 Stat. 1848, 1867-68
(1986). It was amended in 1993 by Pub. L. No. 103-142, 107 Stat. 1491
(1993), in 1996 by Pub. L. No. 104-293, 110 Stat. 3461 (1996), and in
2001 by the USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 365
(2001).
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Subsection 2709(a) imposes a duty on ECSPs to comply with
2709(b) authorizes the Director of the FBI and other FBI officials to
this lawsuit was filed (the current versions are unchanged) are set
4
Subsection 2709(a) provides:
18 U.S.C. § 2709(a).
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a blanket nondisclosure requirement prohibiting an ECSP from
existed in 2004 (it has since been changed), is set out in the margin.5
in May 2004. They contended that section 2709 violated the First and
18 U.S.C. § 2709(b).
5
Subsection (c), in 2004, provided:
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private records relating to constitutionally protected speech and
NSL recipients from disclosing that the FBI had sought or obtained
Supp. 2d 471, 494-506 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Doe I”), and that the
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See USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, §§ 115,
116(a), Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192, 211-14 (Mar. 9, 2006)
6
There is an exception to the disclosure prohibition for those to
whom disclosure is necessary to comply with the NSL or for an
attorney, see 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c)(1), but these persons become subject
to the nondisclosure requirement, see id. § 2709(c)(3).
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out in the margin.7 Second, in the Reauthorization Act, Congress
7
Subsection 2709(c), as amended by the Additional Reauthorization
Act, provides:
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added provisions for judicial review, now codified in section 3511, to
court for an order modifying or setting aside the NSL, see 18 U.S.C.A.
recipient of the fact that the FBI has sought or obtained access to
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further provides that if the Attorney General or senior governmental
was made “in bad faith.” Id. The text of section 3511 is set out in
the margin.9
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court may modify or set aside such a nondisclosure
requirement if it finds that there is no reason to believe
that disclosure may endanger the national security of the
United States, interfere with a criminal, counterterrorism,
or counterintelligence investigation, interfere with
diplomatic relations, or endanger the life or physical
safety of any person. If, at the time of the petition, the
Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, an Assistant
Attorney General, or the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, or in the case of a request by a department,
agency, or instrumentality of the Federal Government other
than the Department of Justice, the head or deputy head of
such department, agency, or instrumentality, certifies that
disclosure may endanger the national security of the United
States or interfere with diplomatic relations, such
certification shall be treated as conclusive unless the
court finds that the certification was made in bad faith.
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that disclosure may endanger the national security of the
United States, interfere with a criminal, counterterrorism,
or counterintelligence investigation, interfere with
diplomatic relations, or endanger the life or physical
safety of any person. If the recertification that disclosure
may endanger the national security of the United States or
interfere with diplomatic relations is made by the Attorney
General, Deputy Attorney General, an Assistant Attorney
General, or the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, such certification shall be treated as
conclusive unless the court finds that the recertification
was made in bad faith. If the court denies a petition for an
order modifying or setting aside a nondisclosure requirement
under this paragraph, the recipient shall be precluded for
a period of one year from filing another petition to modify
or set aside such nondisclosure requirement.
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The first appeal. On the Government’s appeals in Doe I and Doe
the identity of the NSL recipient in that case. See Doe v. Gonzales,
informed the District Court in the pending case that it was no longer
that had been sent to John Doe with respect to information from John
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summary judgment, that, despite the amendments to the NSL statutes,
2709(c) and 3511(b), see id. at 425-26.10 The Court stayed enforcement
10
The Court rejected the Plaintiffs’ challenge to the
constitutionality of the provisions authorizing courtroom closure for
proceedings under section 3511, see 18 U.S.C. § 3511(d), and requiring
a district court, upon the Government’s request, to review ex parte
and in camera Government submissions that may include classified
information, see id. § 3511(e). See Doe II, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 422-24.
The Plaintiffs-Appellees have not taken a cross-appeal to challenge
these rulings.
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discretion to censor speech but failed to provide necessary procedural
See Doe II, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 405-06. However, the Court rejected
U.S. 428, 437 (2000), and City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
violate the First Amendment because they permit the FBI to issue
duration. See id. at 419-22. Specifically, the Court noted that the
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contains “no requirement that the government act affirmatively and
statute were not severable from the remainder of the statute. See id.
not have wanted the NSL statute to operate without the nondisclosure
Discussion
issue because the Government has withdrawn it, but the prohibition on
I. Applicable Principles
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judicial order “forbidding certain communications when issued in
509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (emphasis and internal quotation marks
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976). “Any prior restraint on expression
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and (3) the burden of going to court to suppress speech and the burden
in FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 227 (1990)); Thomas
cases and controversies the Court will treat its precedents with the
U.S. at 536.
530 (1988), and the Supreme Court has acknowledged that terrorism
might provide the basis for arguments “for heightened deference to the
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The last set of principles implicated by the Plaintiffs’
Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
materials, see 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a), the Court noted that the statute
required by Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58, Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390
U.S. 139, 141 (1968), and Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 417 (1971).
After ruling that “the reading into [subsection 1305(a)] of the time
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purpose,” Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. at 370, the Court imposed
issue in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). After ruling
provision of the Sentencing Reform Act, see Booker, 543 U.S. at 258-
11
The Court explained that it had lacked the authority to impose
missing time limits in state statutes invalidated in Freedman and
Teitel, see Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. at 369, and could not
have remedied the absence of constitutionally required judicial review
procedures in Blount because the statute had been enacted after the
relevant Executive Branch officer had explicitly opposed inclusion of
a judicial review provision, id. at 369-70.
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lack of procedural due process, see id. at 32-33, we required action
States v. Monsanto, 924 F.2d 1186 (2d Cir. 1991) (in banc), we
Northern New England, 546 U.S. 320, 330 (2006). The Court has also
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The Court recently applied this approach to severance in Booker.
Reform Act intact. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 258. Concluding that
based prior restraint that must be tested against all the substantive
speech concerning the fact and details of the issuance of an NSL, see
U.S. 530, 537 (1980), and it is a prior restraint in the literal sense
speak, see Alexander, 509 U.S. at 550. From these premises, the
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strict scrutiny review because it prohibits disclosure in
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Hoffmann-Pugh v. Keenan, 338 F.3d 1136, 1140 (10th Cir. 2003); In re
Records, 864 F.2d 1559, 1564 (11th Cir. 1989), and judicial misconduct
Review Board, 784 F.2d 467, 478-79 (3d Cir. 1986) (in banc), and on a
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to believe that disclosure may endanger the national security of the
§ 3511(b)(2).
nondisclosure requirement? and (3) which side has the burden of proof?
The enumerated harms. The first issue concerns the scope of the
harms that senior FBI officials must certify in order to impose the
all the enumerated harms are keyed to the same standard that governs
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information sought by an NSL, i.e., “relevant to an authorized
the purposes for which an NSL is issued. We readily accept that view
McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“[C]ourts
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. . . must . . . satisfy themselves . . . that the CIA in fact had
Appellants at 9.
The burden of proof. The third issue concerns the burden of proof
that there is no good reason to believe that disclosure may risk one
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reason to believe that disclosure may risk one of the enumerated
may risk one of the enumerated harms, and that a district court, in
such a good reason exists, rather than find the negative, i.e., that
no good reason exists to believe that disclosure may risk one of the
disclosure may result in one of the enumerated harms, and to mean that
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a district court, in order to modify or set aside a nondisclosure
is far more limited than the broad categories of information that have
12
We note that none of the decisions discussing the
appropriateness or limits of grand jury secrecy has referred to a
nondisclosure requirement in that context as a prior restraint. See
also McGehee, 718 F.2d at 1147 (noting that neither the CIA’s
classification of portions of a former employee’s proposed book as top
secret nor a court order rejecting a First Amendment challenge
“constitutes a prior restraint in the traditional sense”).
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been at issue with respect to typical content-based restrictions. Cf.
those whom the grand jury declines to indict. See Douglas Oil Co. of
jury has ended, see Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 630-36 (1990),
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requirement of subsection 2709(c) is imposed at the demand of the
secrecy.
could not be prohibited, see 44 F.3d at 110, but that the First
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individual had filed a complaint or had testified, and of information
not there was probable cause that judicial misconduct had occurred.
897 F.2d 138 (4th Cir. 1990), and United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d
Times, 467 U.S. 20. We fail to appreciate the analogy between the
Doe, Inc., who had no interaction with the Government until the
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other contexts do not persuade us to use a significantly diminished
standard of review. In any event, John Doe, Inc., has been restrained
exercise of the State’s power lies at the very center of the First
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must demonstrate that the nondisclosure requirement is “narrowly
serve,” Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997). Since “[i]t is
compelling than the security of the Nation,” Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S.
requirement is imposed and tested, see Doe II, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 399.
above, see Part III, supra, two aspects of that process remain
ordering nondisclosure.13
13
The Plaintiffs challenged the nondisclosure requirement on the
ground that the discretion vested in senior FBI officials in
determining whether to issue an NSL was unconstitutionally broad, see
Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. 147. The District Court rejected this claim.
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(i) Absence of requirement that the Government initiate judicial
review. The Plaintiffs alleged, and the District Court agreed, that
requirement in the more than 40,000 NSL requests that were issued in
the Department of Justice (“OIG Report”).14 See Doe II, 500 F. Supp.
See Doe II, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 406-09. In this Court, the Plaintiffs
renewed this argument only in footnotes. Under the circumstances, we
deem the issue forfeited on appeal. See United States v. Restrepo, 986
F.2d 1462, 1463 (2d Cir. 1993) (“We do not consider an argument
mentioned only in a footnote to be adequately raised or preserved for
appellate review.”).
14
An unclassified version of the OIG Report, formally titled “A
Review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Use of National
Secu r i t y L e t t e r s , ” i s a v a i l a b l e at
<http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0703b/final.pdf>, last visited Oct.
20, 2008. An unclassified version of a follow-up 2008 OIG Report,
formally titled “A Review of the FBI’s Use of National Security
Letters: Assessment of Corrective Actions and Examination of NSL Usage
i n 2 0 0 6 , ” i s a v a i l a b l e a t
<http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0803b/final.pdf>, last visited Oct.
20, 2008.
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to believe that most recipients of NSLs wish to disclose that fact to
that it should give the Government prompt notice, perhaps within ten
second Freedman safeguards, the NSL could inform the recipient that
Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58. The NSL could also inform the recipient
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prevails in court. If the Government is correct that very few NSL
requirement (perhaps no more than three have done so thus far), this
Freedman safeguard.
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“participation” in the investigation is entirely the result of the
supra.
the one in Freedman.” Br. for Appellants at 33. Although the risk of
Attorney General Guidelines, and internal FBI policies.’” Doe II, 500
Fourth, the Government points out that the Supreme Court did not
apply the third Freedman requirement to the licensing scheme that was
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FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 229. Under subsection 2709(c), however, the
Freedman, “where only one film was censored,” id. at 229. The typical
about such receipt. FW/PBS does not provide a basis for ignoring the
Nevertheless, once the NSL arrived, John Doe, Inc., did wish to speak
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The availability of a minimally burdensome reciprocal notice
We conclude, as did the District Court, see Doe II, 500 F. Supp. 2d at
contended, and the District Court agreed, that the judicial review
id. at 418, the District Court faulted the review provision in several
respects. First, the Court stated that the statute “requires the
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to place on the Government the burden to show a “good” reason to
that an enumerated harm may result will present a district court with
that “the disclosure of the NSL itself or its contents may endanger
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correct.” Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 426 (1995).
Appellants at 10 n.4.
must receive some indication that the judgment has been soundly
15
The Government sought to amplify its grounds for nondisclosure
in a classified declaration submitted ex parte to the District Court
and made available for our in camera review. This declaration will be
available to the District Court on remand.
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reached. As the Supreme Court has noted in matters of similar
e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). That
harm, and have expressly read the enumerated harms as being linked to
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limited and particularized occurrence as the receipt of an NSL and
was made in bad faith.” 18 U.S.C. § 3511(b)(2). See Doe II, 500 F.
scrutiny, save only in the rarest of situations where bad faith could
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obligation to enforce constitutional requirements. “Under no
Executive.” United States v. Smith, 899 F.2d 564, 569 (6th Cir. 1990).
V. Remedy
the burden to show that a good reason exists to expect that disclosure
requirement, and (5) rule that subsections 3511(b)(2) and (b)(3) are
is treated as conclusive.
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Implementing these conclusions requires us to apply the
supra. We are satisfied that conclusions (1), (2), and (3) fall
suggested.
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to be within our judicial authority to conform subsection 2709(c) to
upon judicial review, to the 10-day period in which the NSL recipient
16
The District Court ruled that those opportunities were
constitutionally flawed because they unduly prolonged the duration of
the nondisclosure requirement, see Doe II, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 421-22.
We are satisfied, however, that, once the Government has initiated
judicial review and prevailed on the merits, limiting an NSL recipient
to annual opportunities thereafter to terminate the nondisclosure
requirement does not violate First Amendment procedural requirements.
The information subject to nondisclosure is extremely limited, and,
once the need for secrecy--avoiding risk of harm related to
international terrorism--has been shown, that need is not likely to
dissipate soon.
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Government would not be obliged to initiate judicial review.
adapt the authority now set forth in subsection 3511(c) for the
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We leave it to the Government to consider how to discharge its
of subsection 3511(b) only to the extent that they fail to provide for
concluding that Congress would not have wanted the NSL authorization
officials from issuing NSL letters under section 2709, enforcing the
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provisions for judicial review of the nondisclosure requirement
disagree that section 2709 and subsection 3511(b) must be stricken and
3511(b) and leave intact the remainder of subsection 3511(b) and the
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required). As a result of this ruling, we modify the District Court’s
requirement with respect to the NSL issued to John Doe, Inc. Although
Conclusion
17
With the Government having withdrawn its request for the
information originally sought by the NSL issued to John Doe, Inc., and
our severance ruling having retained the entirety of section 2709, we
need not consider the constitutionality of using NSLs to request
information.
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and 3511(b) are construed in conformity with this opinion and
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