AMERICAN

INTELLIGENCE
JOURNAL THE MAGAZINE FOR INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS
__NMIA__________________________
Vol. 29, No. 2, 2011
Counterintelligence, Operations Security, and Information
Assurance
Page i American Intelligence Journal Vol 29, No 1
American
Intelligence
Journal
The American Intelligence Journal (AIJ) is published by the National Military Intelligence Association (NMIA),
a non-profit, non-political, professional association supporting American intelligence professionals and the U.S.
Intelligence Community, primarily through educational means. The Board of Directors is headed by Lieutenant General James
A. Williams (USA, Ret), and the president of NMIA is Colonel Joe Keefe (USAF, Ret). NMIA membership includes active duty,
former military, and civil service intelligence personnel and U.S. citizens in industry, academia, or other civil pursuits who are
interested in being informed on aspects of intelligence. For a membership application, see the back page of this Journal.
Authors interested in submitting an article to the Journal are encouraged to send an inquiry with a short abstract of the text
to the Editor by e-mail at <[email protected]>. Articles and inquiries may also be submitted in hard copy to Editor, c/o
NMIA, 256 Morris Creek Road, Cullen, Virginia 23934. Comments, suggestions, and observations on the editorial content of
the Journal are also welcome. Questions concerning subscriptions, advertising, and distribution should be directed to the
Production Manager at <[email protected]>.
The American Intelligence Journal is published semi-annually. Each issue runs 100-200 pages and is distributed to key
government officials, members of Congress and their staffs, and university professors and libraries, as well as to NMIA mem-
bers, Journal subscribers, and contributors. Contributors include Intelligence Community leaders and professionals as well as
academicians and others with interesting and informative perspectives.
Copyright NMIA. Reprint and copying by permission only.
THE MAGAZINE FOR INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS
Vol. 29, No. 2 2011 ISSN 0883-072X
NMIA Board of Directors
LTG (USA, Ret) J ames Williams, CEO
Col (USAF, Ret) J oe Keefe, President
Mr. Antonio Delgado, J r., Vice President
Dr. Forrest R. Frank, Secretary / Director
Mr. Mark Lovingood, Treasurer / Director
Col (USAF, Ret) William Arnold, Awards Director
MSgt (USAF, Ret) Thomas B. Brewer, Director
CDR (USNR, Ret) Calland Carnes, Chapters Director
Mr. J oseph Chioda, PMP, Membership Director
Lt Gen (USAF, Ret) David Deptula, Director
Col (USAFR, Ret) Michael Grebb, Director
COL (USA, Ret) Charles J . Green, Director
COL (USA, Ret) David Hale, Director
COL (USA, Ret) William Halpin, Director
MG (USARNG) Edward Leacock, Advisor
Mr. Gary McDonough, Director
Mr. J on McIntosh, Director
Editor - COL (USA, Ret) William C. Spracher, Ed.D.
Associate Editor - Mr. Kel B. McClanahan, Esq.
Editor Emeritus - Dr. Anthony D. McIvor
Production Manager - Ms. Debra Hamby-Davis
LTG (USA, Ret) Harry E. Soyster, Emeritus Director
RADM (USN, Ret) Rose LeVitre, Emeritus Director
LTG (USA, Ret) Patrick M. Hughes, Emeritus Director
Lt Gen (USAF, Ret) Lincoln D. Faurer, Emeritus Director
COL (USA, Ret) Michael Ferguson, Emeritus Director
MGen (USA, Ret) Barbara Fast, Emeritus Director
Vol 29, No 1
Page ii American Intelligence Journal
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Accenture
Advanced Government Solutions, Inc.
Advanced Technical Intelligence Center
American Military University
AMERICAN SYSTEMS
ANSER, Analytic Services Inc.
BAE Systems
CACI
CALNET Inc;
Computer Sciences Corporation
Concurrent Technologies Corporation
DynCorp International
Eagle Ray, Inc.
EKS Group, LLC
General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems
General Dynamics Information Technology
GeoEye
Henley-Putnam University
Institute of World Politics
ITSC Library
JB&A, Inc.
KMS Solutions, LLC
L-3 Communications
Liberty University
Northrop Grumman
MacAulay-Brown, Inc
Parsons Infrastructure & Technology Group, Inc.
Pluribus International Corporation
Riverside Research Institute
Science Applications International Corporation (SA
SOS International, Ltd.
SPARTA Inc. a PARSONS company
Sytera, LLC
TAD PGS
Thermopylae Sciences & Technology
The SI
Zel Technologies, LLC.
Page iii American Intelligence Journal Vol 29, No 1
Table of Contents
AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE JOURNAL
The opinions expressed in these articles are those of the authors alone. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S.
government, nor of the National Military Intelligence Association, nor those of the organizations where the authors are
employed.
President's Message.....................................................................................................................................................................1
Editor's Desk ................................................................................................................................................................................2
A Grounded Theory of Counterintelligence
by Dr. Hank Prunckun..................................................................................................................................................6
Counterintelligence in Irregular Warfare: An Integrated J oint Force Operation
by Aden C. Magee......................................................................................................................................................16
Financial Counterintelligence: Fractioning the Lifeblood of Asymmetrical Warfare
by R.J . Godlewski ........................................................................................................................................................24
Counterintelligence in Cleared Industry
by COL (USA, Ret) Stanley Sims and William D. Stephens.....................................................................................34
Proactive Pursuit of Insider Betrayal
by Darlene M. Holseth ................................................................................................................................................40
China and S&T Intelligence Gathering Activities Against the United States
by Dr. Stphane Lefebvre............................................................................................................................................46
On the "Front" Line of Chinese Espionage: A New Lexicon for Understanding Chinese Front Companies
by LCDR (USNR) J ohn D. Dotson.............................................................................................................................55
The U.S. and China: Shall We Duel or Dance?
by Maj (USAF) David J . Berkland..............................................................................................................................70
Operation Cardinal: "So You Must Be a Spy"
by Bill Streifer .............................................................................................................................................................75
Internet and Ideology: The Counterintelligence Challenges of the "Net Wolf"
by Thomas F. Ranieri and Spencer Barrs...................................................................................................................80
The Counterintelligence Certificate Program at the National Intelligence University
by LTC (USAR, Ret) J oseph P. ONeill ......................................................................................................................90
Into the Snake Pit: The Magnification of the Counterintelligence Threat in the Post-Cold War World
by LT (USN) Michael A. Cantilo................................................................................................................................95
Counterintelligence, U.S. Security, and Clausewitz: The Need for Another Wunderliche Trinity
by Col (USAF) Eric S. Gartner ...................................................................................................................................99
The Regional Knowledge System: A Complex Response to Complex Conflicts
by COL (USA) Laurel J . Hummel and Dr. Peter Siska............................................................................................107
Enhancing the ODNI Analytic Standards: An Evolving Framework
by MAJ (USA) Michael J . Adamski .........................................................................................................................116
Vol 29, No 1
Page iv American Intelligence Journal
Avatars or Robots? The Human Factor in Overcoming Information Overload
by Dr./Col (USAF, Ret) Gordon R. Middleton.........................................................................................................120
The Utility of Airborne ISR Assets for Stability and Reconstruction
by Maj (USAF) Colby J . Kuhns................................................................................................................................128
Hidden in Plain Sight: The Ever-Increasing Use of Open Source Intelligence
by Bianna Ine.............................................................................................................................................................141
Data-Frame Theory of Sensemaking as a Best Model for Intelligence
by David T. Moore and Dr. Robert R. Hoffman.......................................................................................................145
Profiles in Intelligence series...
A Swiss Spy: Hans Hausamann
by Dr. Kenneth J . Campbell ......................................................................................................................................159
NMIA Bookshelf...
Leland McCaslins Secrets of the Cold War: US Army Europes Intelligence and Counterintelligence Activities
against the Soviets
reviewed by Maj (USAF) Matthew G. Goodman......................................................................................................163
Shawn Engbrechts Americas Covert Warriors: Inside the World of Private Military Contractors
reviewed by Dr. Rebecca Frerichs.............................................................................................................................164
Douglas Wallers Will Bill Donovan: The Spymaster Who Created the OSS and Modern American Espionage
reviewed by Dr. Russell G. Swenson.........................................................................................................................165
J ennet Conants A Covert Affair: Julia Child and Paul Child in the OSS
reviewed by Lt Col (USAF) Richard D. Cimino......................................................................................................167
Larry L. Watts With Friends like These: The Soviet Blocs Clandestine War Against Romania
reviewed by Dr. J oseph L. Gordon............................................................................................................................169
Paul Marshall and Nina Sheas Silence: How Apostasy and Blasphemy Codes Are Choking Freedom Worldwide
reviewed by Erik D. J ens...........................................................................................................................................170
Review Essay regarding Loch K. J ohnsons The Threat on the Horizon: An Inside Account of Americas Search for
Security after the Cold War
reviewed by LTC (USAR, Ret) Christopher E. Bailey.............................................................................................171
Table of Contents (Continued)
AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE JOURNAL
The opinions expressed in these articles are those of the authors alone. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S.
government, nor of the National Military Intelligence Association, nor those of the organizations where the authors are
employed.
American Intelligence Journal Page 1
Vol 29, No 2
PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE
Made in the USA: Stolen and Transferred to an
Unnamed Country with a Cool Wall,
Great Noodles and Countless Cyber Hackers
T
his is a line from an economic espionage poster
produced by the National Counterintelligence
Executive (NCIX). Funny, catchy, but not at all
taken seriously, not yet anyway. A prediction: this cyber
security theme will soon achieve a place in our lexicon
comparable to Loose Lips Sink Ships and Uncle Sam
Wants You because this is a war, and one just as
dangerous and all-consuming.
Last month we had an unprecedented event. The former
Director of National Intelligence (VADM Mike McConnell),
the former Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security
(Michael Chertoff), and a former Deputy Secretary of Defense
(William Lynn) discussed in the open Chinas Cyber
Thievery Is National Policy And Must be Challenged (Wall
Street Journal). Saying their comments would have been
classified three months ago, they referred extensively to an
October 2011 NCIX Report to Congress: Foreign Spies
Stealing U.S. Economic Secrets in Cyberspace. Chinese
cyber espionage has been hugely successful, resulting in the
loss of billions of dollars and millions of jobs for the U.S.
with equally large impacts on U.S. national security. It is
much more efficient for the Chinese to steal innovations and
intellectual property the source code of advanced economies
than to incur the cost and time of creating their own. They
turn those stolen ideas directly into production, creating
products faster and cheaper than the U.S. and others.
Unfortunately, since these three distinguished national
security leaders made a very public alarm call, the volume of
the resulting national dialogue has been disappointedly quiet.
During recent Congressional testimony, FBI Director Robert
Mueller said the cyber threat will surpass the threat from
terrorists. In the same way we changed to address terrorism,
we have to change to address cybercrime. National
Intelligence Director James Clapper commented, The Cyber
Threat is one of the most challenging ones we faceWe
foresee a cyber-environment in which emerging technologies
are developed and implemented before security responses can
be put in place.
This AIJ offers a superb array of articles, focused on
counterintelligence, operations security, and information
assurance, critical tools in cyber defense. Youll find leading-
edge dialogue in plain language from a mixture of scholars
and intelligence practitioners.
Two recent and very public examples of cyber terrorism: the
WikiLeaks release of sensitive U.S. data and the legal travails
of Megaupload had similar characteristics government
secrets or proprietary materials were stolen; they were used
other than intended, for substantial gain of those involved in
the activities; and the defensive response was overwhelmingly
damaging. The WikiLeaks case led to the questioning of the
IC need to share initiatives. Megaupolad is impacting the
free flow of information (PARS/SLARS efforts in Congress),
using tactics and achieving objectives common to any terrorist
organization.
Stuart Varney (whom I have admired since his early days at
CNN) did a recent piece contrasting the Facebook IPO and the
bankruptcy of American Airlines. Facebook is the new
entrepreneurial way to success for American Business.
Facebook has about 3,000 employees for a $70-$100 billion
company. American Airlines is the old face: 70,000
employees, 80% union, large pension debt, and losing billions
annually. Chinas new entrepreneurial approach is simpler,
cheaper, less risky, and with a much greater return on
investment. And it is using every tenet of Sun Tzus The Art
of War; including know your enemy. Ed Giorgio, formerly
of NSA, points out the asymmetric advantage for China:
They know us much better than we know them (virtually
every one of their combatants reads English and virtually none
of ours reads Mandarin).
NCIX also put out an insightful Black Market Price List for
obtaining specific elements of your personnel information on
the black market. I find these numbers cheap compared to the
potential take:
Your social security number, $3.
Your mothers maiden name, $6.
Mag-stripe data from a secure premium-level credit
card, $80.
Name and password for your online bank account,
$1,000.
The cyber threat is so large that its scope is hard to grasp, and
the cost for the U.S. to defend and respond is also growing
quickly. The list of high-profile computer breaches by China
is endless: Googles Gmail, Yahoo, Adobe, Rackspace,
Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, The Pentagon, NASA,
State and Energy, DoD Labs, The World Bank, NASDAQ, the
International Monetary Fund, EMCs RSA, and two Canadian
economic ministries. Economic espionage, including cyber, is
even more pervasive. Thefts of Valspar paint formulas, as a
minor example, are estimated to be worth over $20M in R&D
costs. And China is not even the biggest threat; number one is
said to be Russia (both state and criminal), number two is
Israel, then France, Brazil, and the list goes on. Countering
these efforts is costly. The FY2012 Presidential budget
request has over $4B easily identifiable for cyber security
defense, or over $12B, depending upon how you count. The
Air Force has 30,000 personnel that have been transferred
from support functions to cyber warfare. Over 90,000
uniformed service personnel engage in cyber warfare. And
American Intelligence Journal Page 2 Vol 29, No 2
THE EDITOR'S DESK
things cyber in the U.S. government are too numerous to
list: Cyber Czar, National Cyber Security Division, Cyber
Command, Cyber Genome, etc.
Who among our readers believes they may have access to
electronic information which may be of interest to our
adversaries? If so, have you read and understood the NCIX
report? (http://www.ncix.gov/publications/reports/fecie_all/
Foreign_Economic_Collection_2011.pdf). Another
important read related to this volume of AIJ is the NCIXs
most recent National Counterintelligence Strategy of the
United States. (http://www.ncix.gov/publications/policy/
NatlCIStrategy2009.pdf).
NMIA holds at least two symposia each year. Our NMIA
symposium in November, titled Intelligence Support to Small
Unit Operations, received outstanding feedback. It was based
on the premise that if you are at the pointy end of the spear
you will have different perspectives and resources than if you
are a D.C. analyst. We had an outstanding group of speakers
and panelists, folks you dont normally get to hear from and
engage with.
Our Spring 2012 National Intelligence Symposium provides a
Community-wide overview of both substantive and resource
developments and challenges impacting the intelligence
mission. We are privileged to welcome our Keynote Speaker,
the Honorable James R. Clapper, Director of National
Intelligence; the heads of the DoD intelligence agencies; and
the Service intelligence chiefs addressing how the IC will meet
the dynamic demands on intelligence in the face of our
countrys deficit and budget challenges.
We are in the initial stages of planning for our Fall 2012
Symposium, likely to be held in September, which will be
focused on the Defense Attach world and the Foreign Area
Officer (FAO) community. NMIA is also planning two
workshops for later this year, one on Intelligence
Education and one on Counterintelligence Developments.
Our annual Intelligence Community Awards Banquet will be
on Sunday, May 20. Individuals and organizations can
register now at www.nmia.org. This always proves to be a
great event with good food, updated venue, a superb
networking opportunity, but most importantly a chance to
recognize the best and brightest from across the intelligence
discipline. Our National Military Intelligence Foundation
(NMIF) has completed its annual scholarship awards for
students pursuing courses of study in intelligence and related
disciplines. This year we had a record number of awardees
and record scholarship dollars thanks to the generosity of our
sponsors and the success of our programs.
Joe Keefe
From the Editors Desk
The theme of this issue of AIJ echoes that of an NMIA
National Intelligence Symposium held a couple of years
ago. That forum featured several panel discussions held at
the classified level led by senior officials from DIAs
relatively new Defense Counterintelligence and HUMINT
Center (DCHC, or DX, as it is affectionately known by
its internal office symbol) and ODNIs National
Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX). The Board of
Directors thought it would be illuminating to follow up that
effort with a Journal issue focused on the same concerns,
but obviously at the unclassified level so that all AIJ
readers can benefit. The result is the enclosed collection of
articles, whose principal focus is on the theme
Counterintelligence, Operations Security, and Information
Assurance.
An article in the September 28, 2011, edition of The
Washington Post caught my eye. By Derrick Dortch, it was
titled Counterintelligence: A Quiet but Critical Mission.
The author observes, Every so often we hear about a big
espionage case in which someone has been caught spying
on the United States. Robert Hanssen, a former FBI agent,
and Aldrich Ames, a former CIA employee, both gave
secrets to the Russians. Then there were 10 Russian spies
caught in 2010. Each time it seems we are still a bit
startled. But it goes on more than we know. Here where I
work at DIA, employees were bowled over a decade ago
when one of their own, long-time Cuba analyst Ana
Montes, was arrested in September 2001 while spying for
the Cuban government. That case garnered much less
attention than Hanssens or Ames, in part because it hit
the news shortly after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and thus
got shoved to the back pages of the paper. American
citizens had more immediate worries on their minds at the
time. Yet, it was the classical situation of an insider
betraying her country, and I must admit I was personally
acquainted with the perpetrator from having attended
regional warning meetings and National Intelligence
Estimate coordination sessions alongside her over twelve
years earlier while working for the Army Intelligence Chief
in the Pentagon. How is it we fail to see the warning signs
until too late? Darlene Holseth explores this problem in
her insightful article about insider betrayal.
The Post writer goes on to lament the recent loss of a friend
who he claimed knew better than most about such issues.
That individual was Brian Kelley, a former CIA case
officer, Air Force CI officer, and NCIX official. Dortch
describes Kelley as a hero, an honorable man who was
awarded the Distinguished Career Intelligence Medal.
The writer characterizes the field of CI and one of its noted
practitioners this way: Counterintelligence is what quiet
professionals like Brian do every day to protect us. He
American Intelligence Journal Page 3
Vol 29, No 2
sacrificed much during his service, then became an
educator at CIA University and the Institute of World
Politics. He was passionate about his work and an example
for those who are interested in spy catcher careers.
Dortch next ticks off a list of agencies for aspiring CI
officers to consider: CIA, which has CI analysts and
officers; DIA, which absorbed the Counterintelligence Field
Activity (CIFA) into the consolidated DCHC; FBI; the
Navys NCIS, which many TV watchers assume just
investigates murders, but is also involved in the CI arena;
the Armys INSCOM, whose 902
nd
MI Group focuses on
CI, plus the Armys CID; the Air Forces OSI; DoDs
Defense Security Service (DSS), whose Director Stan Sims
and CI Chief Bill Stephens have contributed an excellent
article explaining DSSs role in promoting sound CI
practices in cleared industry; the Department of Energy,
whose Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence deals
with threats to this countrys nuclear energy capacity and
other scientific national security matters; and, finally,
NCIX, whose mission is to be the unifying agency of the
U.S. CI community.
In fact, the just-retired NCIX, Robert Bear Bryant (no kin
to the legendary Alabama football coach), recently was
guest speaker for a luncheon meeting of the Standing
Committee on Law and National Security of the American
Bar Association (ABA). Bryant spent four decades in the
CI business. Since his 2009 appointment as NCIX, he has
established a U.S. CI program that reflects the evolving
threats to American interests with a strong focus on insider
threats, emerging technical threats, cybersecurity and
economic espionage. Prior to his NCIX stint, he served as
the Deputy Director of the FBI where he was involved in
the successful investigations and prosecutions of the spies
Aldrich Ames, Earl Pitts and Harold Nicholson, according
to the ABA announcement.
Closely related to CI are the fields of Operations Security
(OPSEC) and Information Assurance (IA). It seemed to
make sense to dedicate an issue of AIJ to all three, in the
hopes that intelligence-focused experts would contribute
their thoughts about CI, operations-focused personnel about
OPSEC, and information technology specialists about IA.
OPSEC is defined in Wikipedia (which NIU academicians
are expected to shy away from!) as a process that identifies
critical information to determine if friendly actions can be
observed by adversary intelligence systems, determines if
information obtained by adversaries could be interpreted to
be useful to them, and then executes selected measures that
eliminate or reduce adversary exploitation of friendly
critical information.
The IA focus follows up the theme of a 2010 AIJ issue,
Cyber Security and Operations. As I said at the time,
this is a burgeoning, complicated field for which the
definitive policies and organizational relationships are still
evolving. From time to time, AIJ will feature articles on
cyber matters that hopefully will help solidify the
significance of this decidedly 21
st
century threat. In this
issue, Tom Ranieri, a repeat performer in our pages,
discusses the Internet in terms of ideology and the CI
challenges thus posed. In May 2011, DIA held an event
called Cyber Awareness Seminar/IC Focus, sponsored
jointly by the DCHC and the Directorate for Technical
Collection. It was taught by the DoD Cyber Crime Centers
Defense Cyber Investigations Training Academy (DCITA),
the premier defense academic institution for digital
forensics and cyber investigations. That same month,
White House officials launched an International Strategy
for Cyberspace, which the administration touted as
unifying U.S. engagement with international partners on a
range of cyber issues for the first time. The strategy being
a whole-of-government effort, participants at the launch
included Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Homeland
Security Secretary J anet Napolitano, Commerce Secretary
Gary Locke, Attorney General Eric Holder, then-Deputy
Defense Secretary Bill Lynn, and Deputy National Security
Advisor for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism J ohn
Brennan. One of the CI-related goals of the new strategy is
to protect U.S. networks from terrorists, cyber criminals
Interested in
publishing an article in the
American Intelligence Journal?
Submit a manuscript for consideration
to
the Editor
<[email protected]>
American Intelligence Journal Page 4 Vol 29, No 2
THE EDITOR'S DESK
and states, and will respond to hostile acts in cyberspace as
it would to any other threat to the country.
A huge concern of the U.S. federal government is how to
capitalize on the benefits of the sweeping trend toward use
of social media without endangering national security.
According to one contract firm engaged with the
government in this arena, The use of social networks is
now allowed in the federal agency enterprise for public
engagement, interagency collaboration, and federated
communication. Hundreds of thousands of users have
access to read and write on Facebook, Twitter, Skype,
LinkedIn, wikis, blogs, etc. But today there is little to no
information assurance, data leakage prevention, eDiscovery
content moderation, logging or social network application
controls. Several of the articles in this issue of the
Journal cite the growing use of social media and its
consequences for CI and IA.
Such developments greatly worry government officials at
all levels, as several of our authors in this issue of AIJ will
attest. Federal agencies are frantically trying to educate
their workers about the rapidly expanding threat picture.
For instance, in the department in which I work, DoD
Directive 5240.06, dated May 17, 2011, mandates annual
refresher training in Counterintelligence Awareness and
Reporting via a briefing given at the SECRET/NOFORN
level. In October 2011, new DIA employees began to
receive this training as part of their TOUCHSTONE classes
required for all newcomers. I am certain other departments
and agencies have taken similar steps. The increasing
attention and interest in CI is reflected by the fact that NIU
now has an approved certificate program in the subject,
which has proven to be quite popular with students. This
program is laid out in the pages that follow by one of its
designers, retired LTC J oe ONeill.
This issue of the Journal leads off with an article by an
Australian colleague, Hank Prunckun, on the need for CI to
be grounded in theory, which is important because most
articles tend to focus on practice instead. Aden McGee
discusses CI in irregular warfare and the need for it to be
treated as a joint commodity. One of our veteran authors,
R.J . Godlewski, looks at the financial aspects of CI and
explains how money contributes to asymmetrical warfare.
Continuing our emphasis on China, which we intend to do
with every issue of the Journal, we offer a wealth of
viewpoints on that behemoth and daunting CI challenge, by
such experts as Stphane Lefebvre of Canada; J ohn Dotson,
who teaches in NIUs Reserve Program; and Maj Dave
Berkland, who works on the Air Staff in the Pentagon. Bill
Streifer digs back into history to examine what the OSS
was up to in China, and specifically Manchuria, in the final
years of World War II. As usual, we also can count on
another historian, Ken Campbell, to profile an international
intelligence stalwart of the World War II era, this time
examining the career of a Swiss intelligence official, Hans
Hausamann. Moving back into the present, LT Mike
Cantilo surveys the overall CI threat in the post-Cold War
period, while Col Eric Gartner of OSI examines CI and
security in the context of Clausewitzian theory, based on
research he conducted while at the National War College.
Although not directly related to our CI theme, MAJ Mike
Adamski evaluates ODNI analytic standards. Dr. Gordon
Middleton of Patrick Henry Colleges Strategic Intelligence
Program suggests ways of overcoming information
overload, and DIA librarian Bianna Ine explains how Open
Source Intelligence (OSINT) can benefit the IC, which
apparently ODNI has figured out based on the
establishment of its widely utilized Open Source Center.
An NMIA award-winning paper at the Air Command and
Staff College is presented in this issue of AIJ, as Maj Colby
Kuhns, a veteran U-2 pilot, advocates for the potential
utility of airborne intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) assets in stability operations and
explains why these get short shrift in the heat of battle
when priorities seem to point in a different direction. A
little less operationally focused, yet filling the bill in terms
of our goal of having Journal articles bridge the divide
between theory and practice, is part two in a series of
articles about critical thinking and sensemaking by David
SAVE THE DATE
Annual Intelligence
Awards Banquet
20 May 2012
McLean Hilton
<www.nmia.org>
American Intelligence Journal Page 5
Vol 29, No 2
Moore and Robert Hoffman, this time offering what they
call the Data-Frame Theory of sensemaking as a model
intelligence types should follow.
Finally, as a precursor for the Spring 2012 issue of AIJ, the
overall theme of which will be Cultural Intelligence and
Regional Issues, COL Laurie Hummel and Peter Siska of
the Department of Geography and Environmental
Engineering at West Point expound on their concept of a
regional knowledge system. COL Hummel, currently
deployed to Afghanistan assisting a counterpart service
academy in Kabul, is working on another article with some
remote colleagues in her spare time that will tie in nicely
with some other regional pieces in the works to provide us
with an intriguing next issue. If any of you Journal
readers, regional experts or not, culturally attuned or not,
would like to contribute to that issue, please contact either
myself or Kel McClanahan, my associate editor and book
review overseer, and let us know whats on your mind and/
or ready to come off the point of your pen. My new e-mail
address for AIJ business is [email protected], which feeds
directly into the account that many of you have been using,
[email protected]; phone number is
(202) 231-8462. Kel can be reached at
[email protected]. The suspense date for
getting manuscripts in to us is April 30, 2012. Remember,
not all articles in a given issue have to fit the announced
theme, but we would like a solid core of 6-8 of them to do
so. If a manuscript relates to the theme, it has a better
chance of passing muster with this editorial team and with
the Board of Directors, which has the final say in what gets
published. For a taste of coming attractions, the Fall
2012 issue of the Journal will explore Information
Warfare and the Spring 2013 issue will follow up the
theme of the Fall 2011 National Intelligence Symposium
and highlight Intelligence/Information Support to Small
Unit Operations. We look forward to hearing from our
readers and aspiring authors!
Bill Spracher
American Intelligence Journal Page 75
Vol 29, No 2
Operation Cardinal:
"...So You Must be a Spy"
by Bill Streifer
J
ohn W. Brunner was a member of the Office of
Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II, in
charge of the cryptography section of the
Communications Center at OSS HQ in Kunming, China.
The following is a brief history of the OSS:
Early in World War II, President Roosevelt realized
that the existing intelligence agencies were not
providing him with the information he needed, so he
asked World War I hero, prominent international
lawyer and, incidentally, his Columbia University
classmate William Wild Bill Donovan to go to
Europe to find out what was happening there.
Donovans report was so impressive that Roosevelt
asked him in 1941 to head an organization called the
Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI).
When the U.S. was drawn into the war, this
organization was renamed the Office of Strategic
Services (OSS) and given broad new powers and
independence. The OSS not only provided most of
the usable intelligence in all theaters of operations
but also conducted propaganda operations and
provided large scale support to resistance/guerrilla
operations in all theaters.
When the war ended, J . Edgar Hoover, who wanted
to take control of all of the OSS international
operations, asked President Truman to discontinue
the OSS, which Truman ordered done. By mid-
September, however, he realized that this would
leave him without a reliable intelligence service, so
on September 20, 1945 he ordered that the Research
and Analysis and Photographic branches of OSS be
transferred to the State Department, the guerrilla
branches discontinued, the field intelligence
operations transferred to the War Department and
that the independent status of OSS be terminated as
of October 1. The field intelligence operations
assumed the name of Strategic Services Unit of the
War Department (SSU). They quickly resumed
responsibility for Research and Analysis as well. On
October 1, the OSS effectively ceased to exist, but
only on paper.
The only thing that changed when OSS morphed
into SSU was that guerrilla operations were no
longer necessary. In a short time, the name changed
again (in China) to External Survey Detachment of
the Navy (ESD). On J anuary 22, 1946 the SSU was
renamed the Central Intelligence Group. By 1947,
this had changed to the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) in which final form it still exists and even
resumes guerrilla operations when needed.
J ohn W. Brunner
Former OSS
During World War II, President Truman was eager for the
Soviet Union to end its neutrality in the war against J apan.
Major General J ohn R. Deane, who headed the U.S.
military mission in Moscow, was certain that U.S. armed
forces could not defeat the J apanese Kwantung Army in
northern Korea and Manchuria with anything like the
facility with which the task could be accomplished by the
Red Army already facing it. It therefore was extremely
important, Deane said, that Russia be induced to accept
this as her mission. Then, on August 8, 1945, at a
hurriedly summoned news conference, the President made a
brief, yet extremely important, announcement. With a
broad grin, Truman said, Russia has just declared war on
J apan. That is all. The following day, he addressed the
nation. The military arrangements made at [the Potsdam
Conference] were of course secret, the President said.
One of those secrets was revealed yesterday when the
Soviet Union declared war on J apan.
According to Londons Sunday Observer, the Soviet
invasion of Manchuria and northern Korea was part of a
five-point secret agreement between Roosevelt and Stalin
prior to Yalta. Although the New York Times called the
report highly speculative, Secretary of State Byrnes later
acknowledged that U.S. military leaders were aware of the
agreement but secrecy was imposed for sound reasons,
saying its disclosure would tip-off to J apan that the Soviet
Union was planning to enter the war in the Pacific. The
agreement called for Manchuria to become an independent
republic temporarily within the Soviet zone of occupation.
American military historians refer to the Soviet invasion of
American Intelligence Journal Page 76 Vol 29, No 2
Manchuria as August Storm, while Russian historians
simply call it the Manchurian Strategic Offensive.
During the Potsdam Conference on J uly 26, 1945, U.S. and
Soviet Chiefs of Staff met to discuss the line of demarcation
between the American and Soviet zones of operation in
Korea and in Manchuria, if and when the Soviet Union
declared war on J apan. General Marshall, Soviet General
Antonov, and Air Marshall Fallalev agreed upon a line
which ran from Cape Boltina on Koreas northeastern
coast, through a number of cities in China, and thence
along the southern boundary of Inner Mongolia. U.S.
aviation would operate south of the lineincluding the
cities of Mukden, Manchuria, and Konan, Koreaand
Soviet aviation would operate north of the line. U.S. and
Soviet commanders also agreed that the line applied both to
reconnaissance as well as combat missions; that U.S. air
operations north of this line and Soviet air operations south
of this line must be coordinated; and that the line was
subject to change. Since the United States had no intention
of sending ground troops into China, only aviation and
naval operations were discussed.
On August 9, the Soviet invasion of Manchuria and Korea
began. The following day, Colonel Charles Bonesteel III
and Colonel Dean Rusk drew a new line along Koreas 38
th
parallel to halt the marching Russian army. And that
same day, the U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union sent a
telegram to President Truman and Secretary of State
Byrnes which read, Considering the way Stalin is
behaving in increasing his demands on [T.V.] Soong
[Chang Kai-sheks emissary to the United States]I
cannot see that we are under any obligation to the Soviets
to respect any zone of Soviet military operation. General
Deane concurred.
MUKDEN, MANCHURIA, AND KONAN,
KOREA
I
n anticipation of a sudden collapse or J apanese
surrender, General Marshall issued a basic outline
plan, designated BLACKLIST, which called for the
progressive and orderly U.S. occupation of J apan and
Korea as well as the care and evacuation of Allied POWs
and civilian internees at the earliest possible date. After
J apan surrendered, General Albert Wedemeyer, the
commander of U.S. forces in China, requested that the OSS
organize POW rescue missions behind J apanese lines. The
missions drew OSS personnel from Special Operations
(SO) and Secret Intelligence (SI) with skills in clandestine
operations, communications, medicine, and language
training in J apanese, Chinese, and Russian. Each team
was assigned an area, and each was named after a bird.
Operation Cardinals area of operations included the Hoten
POW camp in Mukden, Manchuria, and two smaller camps
where General Wainwright and Governor General Arthur
E. Percival were being held prisoner by the J apanese. The
Cardinal team was comprised of Major J ames T. Hennessy
(Special Ops team leader), Major Robert F. Lamar
(physician), Technician Edward A. Starz (radio operator),
Staff Sergeant Harold Hal B. Leith (Russian and Chinese
linguist), and Sergeant Fumio Kido (a Niseisecond-
generationJ apanese interpreter). Cheng Shih-wu, a
Chinese national, accompanied the OSS team as
interpreter.
On August 16 at 4:30 in the afternoon, a B-24 with extra
fuel tanks departed Hsian, China, for Mukden, the former
capital of Manchuria. Six hours later, with Soviet troops
120 miles away and J apanese aircraft in the area, six men
and 17 cargo parachutes were deployed along with 1,300
OSS Map Reflecting the Soviet-U.S. Demarcation Line of Responsibility for Northern Korea and Manchuria.
American Intelligence Journal Page 77
Vol 29, No 2
pounds of rations and a half ton of equipment: weapons,
ammunition, two radios, and batteries. Despite a 20- mph
wind, the decision was made to jump. Our first priority
was to rescue the POWs, Leith said. As the B-24 left the
area, a kamikaze pilot headed his Zero straight for the
aircraft. Fortunately, Lieutenant Paul Hallberg, the B-24
pilot, pulled back on the controls and the Zero passed
underneath, avoiding a collision.
Hundreds of Chinese descended on the drop zone; one
offered to lead four members of the Cardinal team down a
dirt road toward the Hoten POW camp. After walking a
half mile, they were confronted by a platoon of J apanese
troops. When the Chinese guide saw the J apanese
approaching, he ran away, and Major Hennessy waved a
white handkerchief to signal their peaceful intentions. A
J apanese sergeant ordered the team to halt and squat
down while J apanese soldiers aimed their rifles at us and
clicked their bolts, Hennessy said. While in the squatting
position, the team was ordered to throw their weapons on
the ground while Hennessy attempted to explain that the
war was over and they were only there to establish contact
with the POWs. The J apanese sergeant, who remained
suspicious and unconvinced, responded that he had heard
that the war with the United States was over, but that the
J apanese were still fighting the Soviet Union.
The J apanese were officially notified of the armistice 45
minutes after the Cardinal team set foot in Mukden. It was
only by sheer tact and presence of mind, and utilizing the
services of a J apanese interpreter, that Major Hennessy was
able to convince the J apanese commander that the war was
indeed over. The following morning, the Cardinal team
was driven to J apanese secret police (Kempeitai)
headquarters where they met a Kempeitai colonel who
bowed deeply and informed the Americans that he was
surrendering. With hand gestures, he declared his
intention to commit hara-kiri in full view of the Cardinal
team. They declined the offer.
Accompanied by an escort of J apanese soldiers, members of
the Cardinal team were taken to the Hoten POW camp
where 1,600 British, Australian, Dutch, and American
prisonersmalnourished and emaciatedsurvived nearly
3 years of internment. When it was discovered that
General Wainwright was not among the prisoners, an
attempt was made to contact OSS headquarters in China.
When that failed, Major General George M. Parker, the
highest-ranking American POW, and Colonel Matsuda, the
commandant of the camp, informed the Cardinal team that
General Wainwright and other high-ranking officers were
in Sian, about 100 miles northwest of the Hoten POW
Camp. The next morning, Leith and Lamar, accompanied
by a Lieutenant Hijikata, a guard, and an interpreter
boarded a train for Sian. After long delays and a change of
trains, they arrived at the camp at 3:00 the following
morning.
After a brief rest, the OSS team met Generals King and
Moore, Governor Tjarda Von Starkenbergh, General
Wainwright, and Arthur E. Percival, Governor General
during the fall of Singapore, a defeat which Churchill
described as the biggest humiliation in British military
history. Leith recalls that Wainwright looked thin and his
hearing was failing. He had experienced a brutal
captivity, Leith later wrote. General MacArthur described
seeing Wainwright for the first time:
I rose and started for the lobby, but before I could
reach it, the door swung open and there was
Wainwright. He was haggard and aged He walked
with difficulty and with the help of a cane. His eyes
were sunken and there were pits in his cheeks. His
hair was snow white and his skin looked like old
shoe leather. He made a brave effort to smile as I
took him in my arms, but his voice wouldnt come.
For three years he had imagined himself in disgrace
for having surrendered Corregidor. He believed he
would never again be given an active command.
This shocked me. Why, J im, I said, your old
corps is yours when you want it.
General MacArthur Embracing General Wainwright upon the Latters
Liberation from Japanese POW Camp.
American Intelligence Journal Page 78 Vol 29, No 2
When the Soviet Army began occupying Mukden on or
about August 21, it issued passes to the Cardinal team
which allowed the members to move freely about.
However, since vehicles were in short supply, none was
supplied to the Americans. That evening, a Soviet Army
mission of four officers and an interpreter arrived at Hoten.
They took control of the camp from the J apanese and
announced that the POWs were liberated. The prisoners,
now armed with J apanese weapons, patrolled the camp.
According to Colonel Victor Gavrilov, Institute of War
History at the Russian Defense Ministry, the POWs had
been starved and tortured by the J apanese guards; they
could have hardly made good warriors.
After a brevet promotion to Major, Leith accompanied
Wainwright and the other VIPs to PeiLing airport, north of
the city, where a C-47 and a B-24 awaited their arrival.
Days later, the 19-man POW Recovery Team No. 1, under
the command of Lieutenant Colonel J ames F. Donovan,
arrived in Mukden to reinforce and assist the initial OSS
contact team. After the Cardinal team was relieved, Hal
Leith, who spoke Russian and Chinese fluently, remained
behind to keep an eye on the Russians and the Communist
Chinese 8
th
Route Army. However, the problem of
repatriating the officers and men from the Hoten POW
camp remained.
Without informing the Soviet side, Gavrilov said, the
U.S. command started sending one plane after another to
Mukden in order to transfer its men, and supply them with
essentials. At first, the Soviet command detained the
crews of these planes to clarify the situation. Later,
however, the headquarters of the Baikal Front ordered its
forces to assist U.S. aviation in the delivery of goods to the
POWs at Hoten.
Between August 27 and September 20, over 1,000 B-29s
began flying POW supply missions to 157 camps
throughout the Far East. Each aircraft carried 10,000
pounds of much-needed food and medical supplies.
However, the planned altitude of 500 to 1,000 feet for
parachute drops proved too low for efficient operation of
the cargo parachutes, and reports began to pour in of
barrels plummeting to earth, resulting in damage, injury,
and, in some instances, the death of civilians and military
personnel. As Leith noted in his diary, The B-29 air drops
have improved the food situation 200%. I am really glad.
Meanwhile, OSS headquarters received a message from the
Cardinal team which read, Unless dropping can be
improved, recommend it cease as it has done more harm
than good.
In northern Korea on August 29, an aberrant parachute
drop nearly caused an international incident when
parachutes failed to open properly and a barrel crashed to
the ground nearly injuring a Soviet colonel. Later that
afternoon, when another B-29, called the Hog Wild,
appeared over the Konan POW Camp and refused to obey
instructions by Soviet fighter pilots to land immediately,
Soviet Major Savchenko, the commander of the 14
th
Fighter
Bomber Regiment, convened a war council to determine
how best to respond. According to Savchenkos vice
commander, Ivan Tsapov, Being in charge of the zone, we
demanded that our rules be obeyed. Even Russian transport
and bomber plane pilots kept order. They gave notice on
flights in our zone a day earlier. Americans did not want
to do so. When Lieutenant J oseph Queen, the B-29s
airplane commander, continued to ignore demands to land
and instead flew out to sea, Yak fighters fired on the
American bomber, causing one of the B-29s four engines
to burst into flames. Queen then crash-landed his B-29 on
a Soviet airdrome after six members of the crew parachuted
into the cold and turbulent Sea of J apan. As the B-29 came
to a stop, the crew jumped to safety while Russians threw
dirt on the engine to extinguish the fire. Staff Sergeant
Arthur Strilky, the Hog Wilds radio operator, later stated,
The chances of living through that crash are so remote
that I still feel that J oe saved all of us.
When General MacArthur learned of the incident, he fired
off an angry cable to General Antonov, Chief of General
Staff, Soviet Armed Forces, and a member of the Soviet
Supreme High Command, which read, The American
plane was plainly marked and its mission could not fail to
have been identified as purely benevolent. In response,
Antonov sent a cable to MacArthur which read, I feel,
Dear General, that you will agree that in the action of the
Soviet fliers in this incident, there were manifested only
measures of self-defense against an unknown plane, and
that there were no other intended acts. Later, the Soviet
front received an order from Antonov to arrange
transportation of the prisoners from Mukden to Dalian by
rail instead of by air. Apparently, this was done to rule
out unauthorized landings, Gavrilov said, and to prevent
another willful act, like that which the commander of the
Hog Wild had committed. Besides, by rail was also safer.
And on September 10, 750 Mukden POWs left by train for
Dalian; the remaining prisoners departed the following
day. Victor Gavrilov credits Soviet forces with the release
of the POWs at Mukden. Hal Leith, a member of
Operation Cardinal, credits the OSS.
The camp is deserted, Leith said, and Operation
Cardinals primary mission was accomplished. Camp
Hoten once again assumed its role as a prison, this time for
5,000 J apanese soldiers who had been captured by the
Russians. Cardinal turned out to be the most challenging
and difficult of the OSS mercy missions due to the
large number of POWs to contend with and the distance
from home base. Although some OSS team members
American Intelligence Journal Page 79
Vol 29, No 2
survived the encounter relatively unscathed, others were
forced to suffer various forms of indignity including being
stripped naked and having their faces slapped by the
J apanese. Later, increased Soviet hostilities prompted
Donovan to request that American personnel withdraw
from the area immediately. On October 5, Major-General
Kovtun Stankevich, garrison commander of Soviet forces
in northern Manchuria, accused Leith of spying. You are
fluent in Russian but you dont have a Russian name so
you must be a spy, Stankevich said. Leith and the others
were offered two choices: Leave immediately or get a free
trip to Siberia.
After denying the accusation to no avail, Leiths party,
along with Charles Renner, the French Consul General
and his family, departed Mukden for Beijing on a C-46
transport plane the following day. At the airport, we put
sugar in the tank of our jeep, Leith said. We didnt want
to leave anything useful for the Russians, any more than
we already had. Months later, after Soviet forces left
Manchuria, Leith returned to Mukden.
[Editors Note: The above article was based in part on an
earlier article, cited below, which appeared in the Summer/
Fall 2010 issue of The OSS Society Journal. Permission
was obtained by the author.]
Notes:
Operation Cardinal: So You Must be a Spy is based on
conversations with Ivan Tsapov, Arthur Strilky, Hal Leith, and
J ohn W. Brunner, plus information from the following sources:
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), U.S. State
Department, diplomatic papers, Potsdam Conference, J uly 26,
1945.
University of Wisconsin Digital Collections.
BLACKLIST, third edition, August 8, 1945.
Cables between General Douglas MacArthur and Army General
A.E. Antonov.
Newspaper Articles:
Calgary Herald (AP), Washington Sees Early End to War in the
Pacific, August 8, 1945, p. 1.
New York Times, The American Mood on the Eve of Victory,
August 13, 1945, p. 18.
Schenectady Gazette (AP), Secret Agreement on Russian Claim
to Kuriles Known to Military Leaders, J anuary 29, 1946, p. 1.
Journal Articles:
Clemens, Peter. Operation Cardinal: The OSS in Manchuria,
August 1945, Intelligence and National Security, 13, no. 4,
1998, pp. 71-106.
Gavrilov, Viktor. Saving General Wainwright, Ria Novosti,
May 9, 2005
http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20050905/41306298.html.
Streifer, Bill. OSS in Manchuria: Operation Cardinal, The
OSS Society Journal, Summer/Fall 2010, pp. 22-25.
Books:
Deane, J ohn R. A Strange Alliance. Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1973.
Leith, Harold. POWs of Japanese Rescued. Victoria, BC,
Canada: Trafford, 2003.
MacArthur, Douglas. Reminiscences. New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Co., 1964.
Tsapov, Ivan. Life in the Sky and on the Land. Moscow: Delta
NB, 2004 (in Russian).
Yu, Maochun. OSS in China: Prelude to Cold War. New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996.
Bill Streifer, BA, MBA, is the author of fiction and non-
fiction on military and intelligence topics during World
War II and the Cold War. His current book project, The
Flight of the Hog Wild, by Bill Streifer and Irek Sabitov
with an introduction by Dr. Benjamin C. Garrett, Senior
Scientist at the FBIs forensic WMD laboratory, concerns a
possible intelligence/aerial reconnaissance mission over
Soviet-held northern Korea. On August 29, 1945, an
American B-29 Superfortress on a POW supply mission
was shot down by Soviet fighters, an incident which some
believe may have been the first military encounter of the
Cold War.
OSS Officer Hal Leith Flanked by Soviet Counterparts.