T2 B24 Aircraft As Weapons 1 of 2 FDR - Undated Report - Aviation Security 1950-2000 671
T2 B24 Aircraft As Weapons 1 of 2 FDR - Undated Report - Aviation Security 1950-2000 671
T2 B24 Aircraft As Weapons 1 of 2 FDR - Undated Report - Aviation Security 1950-2000 671
When hijacking was an all too frequent occurrence in the late 1960's
and 1970-71, air carriers voluntarily cooperated with the Federal
Government on measures to counter the threat, but not without some
concern. One history describes the situation at the time as follows:
1 Kent, Richard J., Jr., "Safe, Separated and Soaring: A History of Federal Civil Aviation Policy 1961-1972," U.S. Department of
Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, 1980, pp. 349-50.
2 President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, "Report to the President," Washington, DC, May 15,1990, p.160.
baggage screening was improved. Domestic airline sabotage declined
until there were no fatal incidents in the 1970 's.3
While there were 134 domestic hijackings between 1961 and 1972, and
seven explosions aboard commercial aircraft between 1955 and 1976 in
, | these domestic security incidents did not contain
clearly "terrorist" elements until a hijacking at LaGuardia Airport in
September 1976. A group called "Fighters for Free Croatia" hijacked a
TWA flight bound for Chicago. After stops in Montreal, Quebec; Gander,
Newfoundland; and Iceland for refueling, they dropped leaflets over
London and Paris landed in Paris and surrendered.6 Ironically, the
perpetrators believed that security screening was tight at LaGuardia
and decided to use simulated explosives made from material smuggled on
board rather than traditional weapons, which probably would have been
discovered. The group met the profile and triggered more than usual
rigorous searching. The ruse was bolstered by a genuine bomb that had
been planted in a New York subway locker; the hijackers notified
police, and the bomb exploded during examination.7
3 Rochester, Stuart I., "Takeoff at Mid-century: Federal Civil Aviation Policy in the Eisenhower Years 1953-1961,"
U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Washington DC, 1976, pp. 262-3 & 275.
4 Kent, Richard J., Jr., "Safe, Separated and Soaring: A History of Federal Civil Aviation Policy 1961 - 1972," U.S. Department of
Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, DC, 1980, p. 338. The recommendations and the test were devised by
the FAA Task Force on Deterrence of Air Piracy, created by Acting Administrator Dave Thomas on February 17, 1969.
5 Id., p. 340.
6 St. John, Peter, "Air Piracy, Airport Security, and International Terrorism," Quorum Books, New York, Westport, Connecticut, and
London, 1991, p. 31.
7 Preston, Edmund, "Troubled Passage: The Federal Aviation Administration During the Nixon-Ford Term 1973-1977,"
U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, 1987, pp. 215-17. This incident should not be confused with
the self-service baggage locker bombing at LaGuardia Airport in New York on December 29, 1975. See also: Moore, Kenneth C.,
In the 93rd Congress, 1st Session, Senator Cannon, Chairman of the
Aviation Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce, introduced
the "Air Transportation Security Act of 1973" as S.39, "A Bill to amend
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to provide a more effective program to
prevent aircraft piracy and for other purposes."8 For most of the last
25 years, the executive branch of the Federal Government has maintained
that providing security is a cost of doing business, which should be
borne by the air carriers and airports just as they bear the cost of
ensuring safe operations. The most authoritative statement of this
position was recorded during the hearings in February and March 1973,
which led to amendments to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, now
codified in title 49, United States Code. These amendments were
contained in two related titles of Public Law 93-366: title I--the
Antihijacking Act of 1974, and title II--the Air Transportation
Security Act of 1974. In those hearings, the views of a high-ranking
Transportation Department official clearly indicated that the users of
civil aviation should bear its costs, and those costs explicitly
included those derived from the application of security measures.9
Through the 1970's and into the 1980's, concerted action by the world
aviation community reduced the number of hijacking attempts. A number
of approaches to the problems caused by the threat of terrorism and
other criminal acts against civil aviation were taken in those two
decades. They include:
The 1980's saw a change in the nature of violent acts against aviation.
Hijacking, seemingly the preferred form of criminal and terrorist
"Airport, Aircraft, and Airline Security," Second Edition, Butterworth-Heinemann, a division of Reed Publishing (USA), Inc., Boston,
London, Oxford, Singapore, Sydney, Toronto, and Wellington, 1991, pp. 28, 165, and 389.
8 S.39 was introduced on January 4, 1973. Senator Cannon then noted that there were more than 1,700 Federal security officers on
duty at U.S. airports.
9 "Anti-Hijacking Act of 1973": Hearings on H.R. 3858, H.R. 670, H.R. 3953, and H.R. 4287 (and all identical or similar bills) before
the Subcommittee on Transportation and Aeronautics, House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93rd Cong. 222 (1973)
(statement of Hon. Egil Krogh, Jr., Under Secretary, Department of Transportation), February 27, 1973. See also Kent, Richard J.,
Jr., "Safe, Separated and Soaring: A History of Federal Civil Aviation Policy 1961 - 1972," U.S. Department of Transportation,
Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, DC, 1980.
activity, was joined once again by the placement of explosive devices
aimed at the total destruction of aircraft, passengers, and crew. The
vast majority of criminal and terrorist acts against civil aviation J -
during this decade occurred overseas rather than in the United States. M \f(W*
Some believe the decline in hijacking may have been due to more , ,«-c '
effective security at airports.10 In any case, the threat has broadened H J
to include the introduction of bombs aboard aircraft and murderous J^
attacks within airports. The following terrorist incidents are ^
illustrative examples of what FAA seeks to prevent through effective
security measures efficiently applied:
June 13, 1985: Trans World Airlines (TWA) Flight 847 from Athens,
Greece was hijacked. The hijacking lasted 17 days before the
terrorists released the aircraft and its remaining hostages in Beirut,
Lebanon. U.S. Navy diver Robert Stethem was killed by the hijackers.
The International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985
(P.L. 99-83, Title V, Pt. B) was enacted soon thereafter. It
established security standards and procedures concerning foreign air
transportation; required the Secretary of Transportation to conduct
assessments of security measures at foreign airports; and, designated
Annex 17 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago
Convention), standards and appropriate recommended practices, as the
guidelines that must be used by the Secretary of Transportation.11
June 23, 1985: Air India Flight 182 from Toronto and Montreal to s
India crashed at sea after an explosion in the front cargo hold, K
probably caused by a bomb. All 329 passengers were killed,
including 22 U.S. citizens. The same day at Tokyo's Narita
Airport, a checked bag being transferred from a Canadian Pacific
to an Air India flight exploded, killed two baggage handlers and
injured others.
April 2, 1986: A bomb placed onboard TWA Flight 840 detonated (I,
enroute from Rome, Italy. Four passengers were killed but the
aircraft made a safe landing in Athens, Greece.
10 Simon, Jeffrey D., "The Terrorist Trap: America's Experience with Terrorism," Indiana University Press, Bloomington and
Indianapolis, 1994, pp. 349-50 and 396-99.
" FAA Security Specialists conduct these assessments and provide their findings to the Secretary through appropriate channels.
Air India jet departing from JFK International Airport. Five
individuals were charged with sabotage, but only two were
convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.
November 11, 1989: A bomb placed onboard Avianca Flight 203 (5>
petonated over Columbia in the cabin area destroying the aircraft
lin-flight. One hundred and seven passengers and crew were
killed.
July 19, 1994: An Alas Chiricanas Airline plane exploded in flight over (? ,/
Banama, killing all 21 people on board, including three U.S. citizens.
It was the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland during
a flight from Frankfurt on December 21, 1988, that stimulated the most
significant changes in aviation security since the early 1970's.
"Libyan agents struck again, according to U.S. intelligence, on Dec. 23, 1988, when Pan Am Flight 103
was destroyed by a bomb over Lockerbie, Scotland. Two hundred and seventy people died in the terrorist
incident." (Washington Post: "Terror Strikes: Palestinian Terror and the Rise of Libya" © Copyright 1999
The Washington Post Company)
The crash of Flight 103, which had been full of Americans heading home for Christmas, left a crater in the
ground at Lockerbie. Investigators combed the countryside for clues. (CORBIS/Bryn Colton)
ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL: Since the Act, both the Office of the
Secretary and the FAA have specialized organizations that handle
aviation security. Both are headed by senior executives who report
lirectly to the Secretary or the Administrator. Concerns about
security are not filtered. There are 18 Civil Aviation Security
Liaison Officers (CASLO) overseas to cover foreign airports and 19
Federal Security Managers here at home stationed at our largest and
busiest U.S. airports (Category X). All report to the Associate
Administrator for Civil Aviation Security. FAA published rules that
improve air carrier and airport security personnel education, training
and performance, establish employment standards, and provide for
employment investigations and criminal history record checks for those
requiring unescorted access to sensitive areas of an airport.
The key to any effective aviation security system is the vigilance and
abilities of the people staffing the screening checkpoints. To aid
screening personnel, FAA is not only conducting aviation security human
factors research, but evaluating better equipment, improving training,
and modifying procedures to make air carrier personnel more effective
and efficient.
The aviation system within the United States has been on alert since
1995, and security measures overseas have been adjusted a number of
10
The primary FAA focus in the late 1990' s has been to implement the
White House Commission recommendations and the provisions of the
12 White House Office of the Press Secretary, "Statement by the President at Hangar 12, JFK International Airport,"
July 25, 1996.
13 BWG, "Domestic Security Baseline Final Report," Washington, DC, December 12, 1996, pp. 78-79. This report contains
sensitive information and is not available to the public. It is subject to the provisions of 14 CFRpart 191. No part of it may be
released without the express written permission of the Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security (ACS-1), Federal Aviation
Administration, Washington, DC 20591.
11
15 Id.
16 White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, "Final Report to President Clinton," Washington, DC,
February 12, 1997, available on: http://www.aviatkmcommission.dot.gov.
12
monitor and inspect air carrier and airport security, taking compliance
and enforcement measures, such as finding violations and assessing
civil penalties when necessary to maintain discipline in the system.
The FAA also has a responsibility to protect its own assets, thereby
contributing to the maintenance of the safety and security of the
commercial aviation system. FAA facility and National Airspace System
security issues support the ability of the FAA to accomplish its
mission. These latter security responsibilities are among those
addressed by the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure
Protection, which was established in July 1996,17 and published its
final report in October 1997.18
In addition, the FAA must ensure that designated personnel at air route
traffic control centers, terminal radar approach control facilities,
and other staffed facilities are properly trained and equipped in
matters related to security and that they meet the standards of
integrity necessary for them to perform their security duties in
support of the National Airspace System. Security is taken into
account during the design and refurbishment of FAA facilities. The FAA
strives to provide for effective air traffic control voice and data
communications security, and ensure effective navigation system
security, including that of the Global Positioning System.
" Executive Order 13010 of July 15, 1996, Critical Infrastructure Protection, 61 Fed. Reg. 37347 (1996).
18 The Report of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, "Critical Foundations: Protecting America's
Infrastructures," Washington, DC, October 13, 1997.
19 Section 101 of the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, Public Law 101-604, November 16, 1990.
Air carriers also must counter other crimes unrelated to air piracy or
terrorism, such as theft and fraud.23 Air carriers' security interests
are inherently broader than the prevention of terrorism, and their
security programs deal with more than is required by Federal Aviation
Regulations.
In the 1986 report of his task force on terrorism, then Vice President
George Bush asserted that the United States views terrorism as a threat
to the national security.24 A logical evolution of this view could lead
21 An Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) on Certification of Screening Companies was published in the "Federal
Register" at 62 Fed. Reg. 12724 (1997) on March 17, 1997; the comment period closed on May 1,1997. Comments were received
and analyzed, a draft NPRM prepared, and concurrence scheduled for February 20, 1998. Having a reliable and consistent way to
measure actual screening performance was critical. It was decided to add more specific screening improvements to the rule based on
data gathered by threat image projection (TIP) systems. On March 4, the FAA decided to withdraw the ANPRM, and a notice to that
effect was published on May 13, 1998. Special evaluations by field agents were conducted to validate data gathered by TIP, which
was found to be a reliable means of measuring performance. The NPRM was published on January 5, 2000.
22 Category X airports are generally among the busiest and most complex of all U.S. airports. Category I airports are also among the
busiest airports, followed by progressively smaller airports in Categories II, III, and IV. The precise definitions of each category and
the identification and location of airports within each category are sensitive information subject to the provisions of 14 CFR §191.1
et seq.
23 President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, May 15, 1990, p. 46.
24 Bush, George, "Public Report of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism," Washington, DC, February 1986,
p. 7.
16
Several years later, Senator Lautenberg, who had been a member of the
post-Pan Am Flight 103 President's Commission on Aviation Security and
Terrorism, expressed similar views in his opening statement at a
hearing of the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee
on August 1, 1996:
25"The Bombing of Pan Am Flight 103: A Critical Look at American Aviation Security": Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Government Activities and Transportation of the House Committee on Government Operations, 101st Cong. 34 (1989) (statement of
Mr. Noel Koch, President, International Security Management, Inc.).
26 "Aviation Security": Hearings before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 104th Cong. 13 (1996)
(statement of Senator Lautenberg).
28White House Press Release, "Remarks by the President on American Security in a Changing World," at
George Washington University, Washington, DC, August 5, 1996.
17
29 White House Press Release, "Remarks by the President during White House Commission on Aviation Safety
Announcement," the Oval Office at the White House, September 9, 1996.
30White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, "Final Report to President Clinton," Washington, DC, February 12,
1997, p. 27.
31 Section 314 of the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, Public Law 104-264, October 9, 1996.
18
For many years, the Federal Government and the FAA have been fulfilling
a major responsibility by fostering and funding security research,
engineering and development (R,E&D), which was accelerated by the
Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990. From 1991 to 1996, the FAA
spent over $209 million on R,E&D on explosives and weapons detection
technology development, airport security technology, security systems
integration, aircraft and container hardening, and human factors. This
effort will continue.
The FAA must continue research and development in the aviation security
field to provide the technologies and other tools to support the
strategic goals, cope with new threats and improve existing
countermeasures. The result must be usable products to meet FAA
requirements for future deployment, which will, in turn, require the
commitment and expenditure of significant human and financial
resources. Particular attention must be paid to the development of
hardening standards for new aircraft and completion of the transition
to hardened containers to prevent catastrophic damage. Human factors
work must continue to be emphasized to aid in the solution of a variety
of problems including the identification of threats, interaction with
advanced technology, hiring qualifications and specialized training.
32 The White House, "A National Security Strategy for a New Century," May 1997, p.10.
33 The White House, "A National Security Strategy for a New Century," May 1997, p. 10; reaffirmed in publications with the same
title dated October 1998 and December 1999.
19
A major thrust for the R&D program will be the systematic assessment of
the many devices and techniques which are applicable to checkpoint
security. Based on these assessments a security screening checkpoint
model will be developed and a trade off analysis performed. The result
will be an architecture for the checkpoint of the future. This
architecture will address the mandates of both security and operations,
and will form the basis for prototype configurations to be tried in
airport testbeds.
TABLE II
Total $144,200,000
34 This was authorized and funded by Title V of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Public Law 104-208.
21
signed by FAA and the Academy on May 19, 1997. The panel was asked to
assess the results of the advanced security equipment deployments,
hardened cargo container tests and planned deployments, and formulate
recommendations on how to more effectively deploy explosives detection
systems and hardened containers to improve security. The consensus
report was published in November 1999. The panel will continue as the
National Research Council (NRC) Committee on the Assessment of
Technologies Deployed to Improve Aviation Security for an additional
three years.
Terrorism, for the most part, affects U.S. interests overseas, and the
threat to U.S. civil aviation is assessed to be higher abroad than it
is within the United States. However, members of foreign terrorist
groups and representatives from state sponsors of terrorism are present
in the United States. There is evidence that a few foreign terrorist
groups have well-established capability and infrastructures here.
The destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988 and the French airline UTA
Flight 772 in 1989, coupled with the events in Asia and the Pacific in
1995 and the hijacking of Indian Airlines Flight 814 in 1999, remind us
that aviation security is an international concern. Even though the
threat of terrorism within the United States has increased, the threat
still remains greater overseas.
35 Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-264) and Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997
(P. L. 104-208)
22
The U.S. Government has worked with the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) to strengthen international security standards.
U.S. Customs Service and FBI resources devoted to counterterrorism have
increased. We have issued final rules requiring enhanced passenger
manifests and background checks for security screeners. FAA and the
airlines have worked together to implement domestic passenger-bag match
voluntarily, based on systemwide use of the Computer-Assisted Passenger
Pre-screening System (CAPPS), which will be required by regulation.
All of this work will continue.
In the coming years, we will continue to increase the number of EDS and
explosives trace detection devices deployed at a steady rate to be
joined by purchases of several hundred advanced checkpoint x-ray
devices. We expect 20 more than the current 170 voluntary airport
consortia to be formed. The number of explosives detection canine
teams subsidized and certified by FAA rose from 87 teams at 26 airports
in 1996 to 174 teams at 39 airports in 1999. Growth in this program
will continue but slowly; we have teams at all major airports now for
the first time in the 27 year history of the program.
Changes in the current system, which have been debated for years, have
occurred only incrementally, often in response to a crisis or loss of
an aircraft. One of the common threads weaving throughout all reports,
books, hearings, articles, and recommendations over the years has been
the need for better and more standardized aviation security training
and an increased role for the Federal Government in both.
Many new, more complicated but more effective types of equipment are
being deployed at U.S. airports. The operators of advanced security
equipment need far more detailed training, management attention, and
motivation to ensure that devices are properly and effectively
operated. Much more in the way of following operational procedures and
making decisions needs to be done by the screeners, placing additional
burdens on the selection, training, and maintenance of at least this
part of the screener work force.
36"The Bombing of Pan Am Flight 103: A Critical Look at American Aviation Security": Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Government Activities and Transportation of the House Committee on Government Operations, 101st Cong. 34 (1989) (statement of
Mr. Noel Koch, President, International Security Management, Inc.).
24
37 Wallis, Rodney, "Combatting Air Terrorism," Brassey's (US), Washington, New York, London, 1993, p. 117.
38 "Aviation Security": Hearings before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 104th Cong. 93 (1996)
(statement of Senator Hollings).
25
The FAA takes human factors into account (as required by the provisions
of Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990)40 by providing appropriate
training and developing utilization standards, clear guidance, and
operational procedures in partnership with the airlines to ensure the
effective use of security equipment by trained and properly motivated
air carrier and contractor personnel. FAA is already taking steps to
improve initial and recurrent training curricula for checkpoint
screeners and their supervisors. Such FAA involvement will increase.
39White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, "Final Report to President Clinton," Appendix I, dated February 19,
1997, unnumbered p.8.
40Sections 105 and 107 of Public Law 101-604, November 16, 1990, adding sections 316 (d) and (g) to the former Federal Aviation
Act of 1958, now 49 U.S.C. 44912 (a) and 44935 (b), respectively.
26
The FAA provides formal training through airport security seminars for
law enforcement officers and airport personnel with aviation security
responsibilities. Aviation security special agents are also asked by
individual airlines to provide 1- or 2-hour blocks of instruction in
airline training courses. Similar participation occurs in industry
association-sponsored schools and conferences as part of FAA's
partnership efforts. Specialized courses of instruction on specific
topics have been prepared by the FAA and are presented on request.
While air carriers should not have to bear all the costs of
security, they should bear a substantial portion of the personnel
costs to provide security screening and the operational costs of
using the advanced security equipment that the Federal Government
provides. At the same time, the Federal Government should continue
to control the quality of aviation security and security screening
by setting higher, but realistically achievable, standards for
screener selection, training, and performance.
27
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Fiscal Years Est. Est.
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