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Vital-Gozon v. CA
Vital-Gozon v. CA
CA
Facts:
In 1987, by virtue of E.O. 119 issued by then Pres. Cory Aquino, a reorganization of the
Ministry of Health was effected. At the time of such reorganization, Dr. Alejandro Dela Fuente
was the Chief of Clinics of the National Children’s Hospital. In February 1988, Dr. Dela Fuente
received a notice from the Deparment of Health that he would be re-appointed as Medical
Specialist II. Such a position was considered as two ranks lower than his previous position of
Chief of Clinics. This prompted Dr. Dela Fuente to file a protest with the DOH Reorganization
Board. The protest was ignored. Dela Fuente then filed a case before the CSC. In the meantime,
the position of Chief of Clinics (then changed to Chief of Medical Professional Staff) were turned
over and thereafter exercised by a Dr. Merencilla. CSC ruled in favor of Dr. Dela Fuente. It ruled
that Dr. Dela Fuente is deemed having retained his previous position. Neither an MR nor an
appeal was filed assailing such a decision thereby rendering the decision as final and executory.
Months have elapsed but still there was no action on the part of Vital-Gozon et. al. to execute the
decision of the CSC. CSC also told him that they believed they have no coercive powers to
enforce their own decision. This prompted Dela Fuente to file a petition before the CA to compel
Vital-Gozon et. al. to restore him to the position of Chief of Clinics and pay him his backwages
plus damages for Vital-Gozon’s refusal to comply with the CSC resolution. CA granted the
decision insofar as his restoration to his former position but denied insofar as the grant of
damages ruling that the petition is not the correct vehicle to claim such damages not the CA is
the correct forum for such relief. CA also took note to representation by the SolGen of Dr. Vital-
Gozon saying that pursuant to the ruling in Urbano and Co cases, the SolGen is not authorized to
represent her. MR was filed by Dela Fuente arguing that CA has the power to grant damages in a
mandamus action by virtue of BP 129 which gave the SC, CA and RTCs concurrent jurisdiction
over such petitions and that CA was given the power to conduct hearings and receive evidence
to resolve factual issues. To require him to separately litigate the matter of damages he
continued, would lead to that multiplicity of suits which is abhorred by the law. CA eventually
granted the MR and ordered setting a date for reception of evidence on the la Fuente's claim for
damages. It based its judgment on the last phrase of Sec. 3 Rule 65 ROC which expressly allows
the award of damages in a mandamus petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the matter of
damages in a special civil action of mandamus.
Held:
Yes. CA has jurisdiction to award damages in mandamus petitions. Sec. 3 of Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court explicitly authorized the rendition of judgment in a mandamus action
"commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required
to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant." The provision makes plain that the
damages are an incident, or the result of, the defendant's wrongful act in failing and refusing to
do the act required to be done. It is noteworthy that the Rules of 1940 had an identical
counterpart provision. The Solicitor General's theory that the rule in question is a mere
procedural one allowing joinder of an action of mandamus and another for damages, is
untenable, for it implies that a claim for damages arising from the omission or failure to do an
act subject of a mandamus suit may be litigated separately from the latter, the matter of
damages not being inextricably linked to the cause of action for mandamus, which is certainly
not the case.
Issue:
WON the SolGen is authorized to represent Vital-Gozon in this case
Held:
Yes. The doctrine laid down in the Urbano and Co cases already adverted to, 45 is quite
clear to the effect that the Office of the Solicitor General is not authorized to represent a public
official at any stage of a criminal case. This observation should apply as well to a public official
who is haled to court on a civil suit for damages arising from a felony allegedly committed by
him (Article 100, Revised Penal Code). Any pecuniary liability he may be held to account for on
the occasion of such civil suit is for his own account. The State is not liable for the same. A
fortiori, the Office of the Solicitor General likewise has no authority to represent him in such a
civil suit for damages. Here, Dr. Vital-Gozon is not charged with a crime, or civilly prosecuted for
damages arising from a crime, there is no legal obstacle to her being represented by the Office
of the Solicitor General.