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Alberto Gonzales Files - F - 09 Clark Master e (pfp#361873233) Mcgeorge Edu-09 Clark Master e
Alberto Gonzales Files - F - 09 Clark Master e (pfp#361873233) Mcgeorge Edu-09 Clark Master e
Memorandum
Kathleen Clark*
In the fall of 2001, the Bush administration was looking for a place to
imprison and interrogate alleged al Qaeda members away from the prying eyes
of other countries and insulated from the supervision of United States courts.1
The Defense Department believed that the Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay,
Cuba might work, so it asked the Justice Department’s Office of Legal
Counsel (OLC) whether federal courts would entertain habeas corpus petitions
filed by prisoners at Guantánamo, or whether they would dismiss such
petitions as beyond their jurisdiction. On December 28, 2001, OLC responded
with a thorough and balanced analysis of how the federal courts were likely to
resolve the jurisdictional question.2 The memorandum prepared by OLC
explained the arguments against such jurisdiction,3 but it also explored
possible strengths in the opposing position.4 The memorandum predicted that
455
456 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY [Vol. 1:455
federal courts would not exercise jurisdiction but explained the risk of a
contrary ruling.5 Acting in reliance on this memorandum, the government
started imprisoning and interrogating alleged al Qaeda members at
Guantánamo the following month, cognizant of the risk that a federal court
might find habeas jurisdiction.
In 2004, the Supreme Court considered habeas corpus claims by prisoners
at Guantánamo, and reached a result contrary to that predicted by the Justice
Department memorandum, ruling that the district court did have jurisdiction.6
The fact that the Court came to a different conclusion than that advanced by
OLC does not, however, mean that the OLC attorneys failed to fulfill their
professional obligations to their client. The authors appropriately explained
the risk of an adverse decision, and they provided enough information for the
client to understand that risk and make decisions accordingly.7
Whenever a lawyer offers a legal opinion, there is always a possibility that
other legal actors will take a contrary view. If that risk is substantial and the
lawyer apprises the client of the magnitude of that risk, the lawyer has
adequately advised and informed the client.8 The authors of the Guantánamo
Memorandum certainly met that standard.9
During the summer of 2002, CIA officials had grown frustrated with the
interrogation of al Qaeda member Abu Zubaydah, who had stopped
cooperating with his interrogators.10 The CIA wanted to use harsher
5. Id. at 1 (“We conclude that the great weight of legal authority indicates that a federal
district court could not properly exercise habeas jurisdiction over an alien detained at GBC
[Guantánamo Bay, Cuba]. Nonetheless, we cannot say with absolute certainty that any such
petition would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.”).
6. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004) (holding that 28 U.S.C. §2241 gives the
district court jurisdiction “to hear petitioners’ habeas corpus challenges to the legality of their
detention at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base”).
7. See Guantánamo Memorandum, supra note 2, at 1 (“While we believe that the correct
answer is that federal courts lack jurisdiction over habeas petitions filed by alien detainees held
outside the sovereign territory of the United States, there remains some litigation risk that a
district court might reach the opposite result.”).
8. See infra Section II.
9. 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & WILLIAM W. HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING §3.2,
at 3-5 (3d ed. 2001) (“A thoughtful opinion on a difficult or unsettled question is not
incompetent even if it later proves to have been wrong. . . . On the other hand, . . . failure to
ascertain readily accessible precedents . . . may . . . be [a] violation[] of [Model] Rule 1.1.)”
[hereinafter HAZARD & HODES].
10. Michael Hirsh, John Barry & Daniel Klaidman, A Tortured Debate, NEWSWEEK, June
21, 2004; Dana Priest, CIA Puts Harsh Tactics on Hold; Memo on Methods of Interrogation
Had Wide Review, WASH. POST, June 27, 2004, at A1 (“The memorandum was drafted . . . to
help the CIA determine how aggressive its interrogators could be during sessions with suspected
al Qaeda members.”).
2005] ETHICAL ISSUES RAISED BY THE OLC TORTURE MEMORANDUM 457
11. David Johnston, Neil A. Lewis & Douglas Jehl, Nominee Gave Advice To C.I.A. on
Torture Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2005, at A1 (“C.I.A. lawyers went to extraordinary lengths
beginning in March 2002 to get a clear answer from the Justice Department about which
interrogation techniques were permissible in questioning Abu Zubaydah and other important
detainees. . . . ‘Nothing that was done was not explicitly authorized,’ a former senior intelligence
said.”).
12. Mike Allen & Dana Priest, Memo on Torture Draws Focus to Bush; Aide Says
President Set Guidelines for Interrogations, Not Specific Techniques, WASH. POST, June 9,
2004, at A3. 18 U.S.C. §2340A provides: “Whoever outside the United States commits or
attempts to commit torture shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years,
or both, and if death results to any person from conduct prohibited by this subsection, shall be
punished by death or imprisoned for any term of years or for life.” Torture within the United
States could already be prosecuted under existing federal and state laws prohibiting assault,
maiming, and other forms of brutality. The extraterritorial reach of the federal torture statute
was necessary to implement the Convention Against Torture. Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 5, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY
DOC. NO. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture].
13. See Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, from Jay S.
Bybee, Asst. Atty. General, Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-
2340A, Aug. 1, 2002 [hereinafter Bybee Memorandum], available at http://www.gwu.edu/~
nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.08.01.pdf, reprinted in Greenberg & Dratel, supra note 2,
at 172.
14. Id. at 3 (“You have asked us to address only the elements of specific intent and the
infliction of severe pain or suffering.”).
15. John Yoo, Behind the ‘Torture Memos’; As Confirmation Hearings Near, Lawyer
Defends Wartime Policy, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 2, 2005, at 1P (acknowledging that
he “helped draft” the Bybee Memorandum); Toni Locy & Joan Biskupic, Interrogation Memo
To Be Replaced, USA TODAY, June 23, 2004, at 2A (identifying Yoo as “the memo’s principal
author”).
There have been news reports of another August 2002 memorandum on torture issued by
a different office within the Justice Department, analyzing the legality of specific proposed
interrogation techniques. This other torture memorandum has not yet been leaked or otherwise
made available to the public.
458 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY [Vol. 1:455
defined torture narrowly, developed defenses that might be raised in any future
torture prosecution, and asserted that the President could authorize torture
despite the treaty and statute prohibiting it. The government apparently acted
in reliance on this memorandum in setting interrogation policies for alleged al
Qaeda members.16
The Bybee Memorandum purported to provide objective legal advice to
government decision makers.17 Nevertheless, its assertions about the state of
the law are so inaccurate that they seem to be arguments about what the
authors (or the intended recipients) wanted the law to be rather than
assessments of what the law actually is. The following section will describe
the substantive inaccuracies in the memorandum. Section II will examine the
legal ethics implications of those inaccuracies, with particular attention to the
distinction between legal advocacy and legal advice.
Yoo is a law professor at the University of California at Berkeley whose views on unilateral
executive branch authority in national security affairs were well known by the time he was
chosen as a Deputy Assistant Attorney General. See John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics
by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167 (1996)
(arguing that courts have no role in national security matters and that Congress’s role is limited
to its spending power and the impeachment process); John C. Yoo, Clio at War: The Misuse of
History in the War Powers Debate, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1169 (1999) (arguing that historical
sources support unilateral executive branch power to initiate war). Bybee was also an academic
before being appointed as Assistant Attorney General, and he too had written about executive
branch power. See Jay S. Bybee, Advising the President: Separation of Powers and the Federal
Advisory Committee Act, 104 YALE L.J. 51 (1994); Adam Liptak, Author of ‘02 Memo on
Torture: ‘Gentle’ Soul for a Harsh Topic, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2004, at A1.
16. There is both direct and indirect evidence of such reliance. Defense Department
officials lifted much of the language from this OLC memorandum and incorporated it verbatim
in their own report on interrogation practices. WORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE
INTERROGATIONS IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL, HISTORICAL,
POLICY, AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS (2003) [hereinafter Working Group Report], at
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/03.04.04.pdf, reprinted in Greenberg
& Dratel, supra note 2, at 286; see Appendix to this article (comparing the Bybee Memorandum
with the Working Group Report); see also Douglas Jehl, David Johnston & Neil A. Lewis, C.I.A.
Is Seen as Seeking New Role on Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2005, at A16 (the August 1,
2002 memorandum was “sought by the C.I.A. to protect its employees from liability”).
17. Bybee Memorandum, supra note 13, at 1 (“You have asked for our Office’s views
regarding the standards of conduct under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment as implemented by Sections 2340-2340A of
title 18 of the United States Code.”).
2005] ETHICAL ISSUES RAISED BY THE OLC TORTURE MEMORANDUM 459
18. The memorandum is divided into six sections. The first four sections address the
scope of the torture statute and argue that only treatment that results in the most extreme pain
constitutes torture. Section I examines the torture statute itself. Section II, which examines the
ratification history of the Convention Against Torture, argues that the legal distinction between
torture, on the one hand, and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, on the other, supports the
narrow definition of torture claimed in the first section. Section III, which examines cases
decided under the Torture Victims Protection Act, and Section IV, which examines European
and Israeli court decisions, also discuss the distinction between torture and cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment. Section V makes the separation of powers argument, and Section VI
describes the defenses of necessity and self-defense and asserts that they will be available to
interrogators who are prosecuted under the torture statute.
19. Bybee Memorandum, supra note 13, at 6. For criticism of this aspect of the
memorandum, see David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Time Bomb, in THE
TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA (Karen J. Greenberg ed., 2006) 35, 57-59; Sanford Levinson, In
Quest of a “Common Conscience”: Reflections on the Current Debate About Torture, 1 J. NAT’L
SECURITY L. & POL’Y 231 (2005); Harold Hongju Koh, Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary
Committee Regarding the Nomination of Alberto Gonzales as U.S. Attorney General, Jan. 7,
2005, available at http://www.law.yale.edu/outside/html/Faculty/index.htm; Ruth Wedgwood
& R. James Woolsey, Law and Torture, WALL ST. J., June 28, 2004, at A10 (“the OLC opinion
bends over backwards to limit the definition of “severe pain or suffering” in a way that only
Savoranola could love”).
20. 42 U.S.C. §1395w-22(d)(3)(B) (2000).
21. Id. The statute states:
The term “emergency medical condition” means a medical condition manifesting
itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that
460 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY [Vol. 1:455
26. See id. at 42 (“a defendant could . . . appropriately raise a claim of self-defense”); id.
(“we assume self-defense can be an appropriate defense to an allegation of torture”); id. at 43
(“Under the current circumstances, we believe that a defendant accused of violating Section
2340A could have, in certain circumstances, grounds to properly claim the defense of another.
. . . Whether such a defense will be upheld depends on the specific context within which the
interrogation decision is made”); id. at 45 (“we conclude that a government defendant may also
argue that his conduct of an interrogation, if properly authorized, is justified on the basis of
protecting the nation from attack”); id. at 46 (“we believe that [the defendant] could argue that
his actions were justified by the executive branch’s constitutional authority to protect the nation
from attack”).
27. Id. at 40 (“It appears to us that under the current circumstances the necessity defense
could be successfully maintained in response to an allegation of a Section 2340A violation.”);
id. at 41 (“While every interrogation that might violate Section 2340A does not trigger a
necessity defense, we can say that certain circumstances could support such a defense.”).
28. Luban, supra note 19, at 66 (quoting Article 2(2) of the Convention Against Torture,
supra note 12).
29. Bybee Memorandum, supra note 13, at 31-39.
30. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
462 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY [Vol. 1:455
Regulation of the land and naval Forces,”31 all of which suggest that Congress
was well within its constitutional authority in banning torture.
On each of these three points – the threshold of pain that constitutes
torture, the necessity defense, and unilateral executive power – the Bybee
Memorandum presents highly questionable legal claims as settled law. It does
not present either the counter arguments to these claims or an assessment of
the risk that other legal actors – including courts – would reject them.32
Despite these obvious weaknesses, the memorandum apparently became the
basis for the CIA’s use of extreme interrogation methods, including
“waterboarding,” and shaped Defense Department interrogation policy.33 In
fact, much of the memorandum was used verbatim in an April 2003 Defense
Department Working Group Report on interrogation methods, which then
became the basis for Defense Department policy.34
The legal analysis in the Bybee Memorandum was so indefensible that it
could not – and did not – withstand public scrutiny. Press reports about and
excerpts from the memorandum began to surface in early June, 2004, and there
was a wave of criticism.35 The Justice Department resisted congressional
pressure to turn over the memorandum, insisting that the President had a right
to confidential legal advice.36 When The Washington Post posted the complete
text of the memorandum on its Web site, the wave of criticism turned into a
flood.37 Eight days later, the Bush administration disavowed the
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cls. 10, 11, 14; see Richard B. Bilder & Detlev F. Vagts,
Speaking Law to Power: Lawyers and Torture, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 689 (2004).
32. See Luban, supra note 19, at 56.
33. “Waterboarding” involves strapping a prisoner to a board and dunking him under
water so that he feels like he is about to drown. Douglas Jehl & David Johnston, C.I.A. Expands
Its Inquiry into Interrogation Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2004, §1, at 10; see also Johnston,
Lewis & Jehl, supra note 11 (reporting that the Justice Department approved the technique of
“strapping a subject down and making him experience a feeling of drowning”).
34. See Working Group Report, supra, note 16. And see the Appendix to this article for
a comparison of the Bybee Memorandum with the DOD Working Group Report. Unlike the
Bybee Memorandum, the DOD Working Group Report provided additional legal analysis
warning that its arguments are not accepted by other legal actors.
35. See Dana Priest & R. Jeffrey Smith, Memo Offered Justification for Use of Torture;
Justice Dept. Gave Advice in 2002, WASH. POST, June 8, 2004, at A1; Susan Schmidt, Ashcroft
Refuses To Release ‘02 Memo; Document Details Suffering Allowed In Interrogations, WASH.
POST, June 9, 2004, at A1.
36. Schmidt, supra note 35.
37. The Washington Post posted the memorandum on its Web site on June 14, 2004. See
David Ignatius, Small Comfort, WASH. POST, June 15, 2004, at A23. Critical commentary on
the memorandum included Stephen Gillers, Tortured Reasoning; The U.S. Department of Justice
Attorneys Who Advised the White House on Military Prisoner Policy Bear Responsibility – Both
Ethical and Moral – for the Abuse Scandals, AM. LAW., July 2004, at 65; Wedgwood &
2005] ETHICAL ISSUES RAISED BY THE OLC TORTURE MEMORANDUM 463
Woolsey, supra note 19. But see Eric Posner & Adrian Vermuele, A ‘Torture’ Memo and Its
Tortuous Critics, WALL ST. J., July 6, 2004, at A22 (defending the memorandum and claiming
that its “arguments are standard lawyerly fare, routine stuff”).
38. See Mike Allen & Susan Schmidt, Memo on Interrogation Tactics Is Disavowed;
Justice Document Had Said Torture May Be Defensible, WASH. POST, June 23, 2004, at A1;
Locy & Biskupic, supra note 15 (quoting a Justice Department official as saying, “We’re
scrubbing the whole thing . . . . It will be replaced.”).
39. Memorandum for James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney General, from Daniel Levin,
Acting Asst. Attorney General, Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§2340-2340A,
Dec. 30, 2004, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/dagmemo.pdf.
40. See Jim Lobe, Give Rumsfeld the Pinochet Treatment, INTER PRESS SERVICE NEWS
AGENCY (May 25, 2005) http://www.ipsnews.net/interna.asp?idnews=28823 (Amnesty Inter-
national “called on state bar associations to investigate administration lawyers who helped
prepare legal opinions that sought to justify or defend the use of abusive interrogation
methods. . .”).
41. See Memorandum from Richard Thornburgh, Attorney General, to All Justice
Department Litigators (June 8, 1989), reprinted in In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 489-493
(D.N.M. 1992); Dept. of Justice, Communications with Represented Persons, 59 Fed. Reg.
39,910 (Aug. 4, 1994). The Justice Department resisted the application of several state ethics
rules to federal prosecutors, including the restriction on a lawyer’s contacting a person who is
already represented by counsel (Model Rule 4.2) and the restriction on prosecutors’ subpoenaing
lawyers before grand juries (Model Rule 3.8). See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The
Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors, 88 GEO. L.J. 207 (2000); Jesselyn Alicia Radack, The Big
Chill: Negative Effects of the McDade Amendment and the Conflict Between Federal Statutes,
14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 707 (2001).
464 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY [Vol. 1:455
comply with state ethics rules in the states where they represent the
government.42 Both Jay Bybee and John Yoo were subject to the D.C. Rules
of Professional Conduct. Bybee is licensed by the District of Columbia and
thus was and is directly subject to those rules.43 Yoo is licensed by
Pennsylvania but was subject to the D.C. Rules by operation of the McDade
Amendment, because he practiced in D.C. when he worked for the Office of
Legal Counsel.44
Second, these OLC lawyers had as their client an organization – the
executive branch of the United States government – rather than any individual
officeholder.45 Although White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales requested
the Bybee Memorandum, he was not the client. Instead, he was simply a
constituent of the organizational client. Ordinarily, lawyers must accept the
decisions made by such constituents when those constituents are authorized to
act on behalf of the organization.46 But where a lawyer knows that a
constituent is acting illegally and that conduct could be imputed to the
organization, the lawyer must take action to prevent or mitigate that harm.47
Where the constituent can exercise control over the lawyer’s future career,
taking such action may jeopardize the lawyer’s advancement. Nevertheless,
the legal ethics rules require lawyers to take action to protect entity clients
from harm committed by their constituents.
Third, in analyzing the performance of the lawyers who wrote the Bybee
Memorandum, it is important to analyze whether they were acting as legal
advisors or as legal advocates. Different ethics rules apply to these two
distinct functions. The role of the lawyer as an advocate before a tribunal is
a familiar one. In that role, the lawyer may make any legal argument as long
as it is not frivolous.48 She does not need to give the court her honest
assessment of how the law applies in the case. Her only obligation of candor
regarding legal argument is that if her opponent fails to mention directly
adverse controlling authority, she must bring it to the tribunal’s attention.49
When a lawyer gives legal advice, on the other hand, she has a
professional obligation of candor toward her client. One finds this obligation
in Rule 2.1, which states that in representing a client, “a lawyer shall . . .
render candid advice.”50 In advising a client, the lawyer’s role is not simply
to spin out creative legal arguments. It is to offer her assessment of the law as
objectively as possible. The lawyer must not simply tell the client what the
client wants to hear, but instead must tell the client her best assessment of what
51. Comment 1 to D.C. Rule 2.1 states that “a lawyer should not be deterred from giving
candid advice by the prospect that the advice will be unpalatable to the client.” D.C. RULES,
supra note 45, R. 2.1 cmt. 1. Model Rule 2.1 is identical. ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 48,
R. 2.1. cmt. 1. A leading treatise on legal ethics explains:
[A] client may consult a lawyer to have her own preconceptions confirmed rather than to
seek genuine advice. A lawyer may be tempted to play sycophant to such a client, to
ensure continued employment. Rule 2.1 prohibits such an approach, however, first by
requiring that a lawyer’s advice be candid; and second, by requiring the lawyer to exercise
judgment that is both independent and professional.
1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 9, §23.2; see also ABA/BNA Lawyers’ Manual on Professional
Conduct 704 (“lawyers must . . . resist the urge to tell the client only what the client wants to
hear and instead must give honest and straightforward advice, regardless of how unpleasant or
unpalatable that advice might be.”); Timothy L. Hall, Moral Character, the Practice of Law, and
Legal Education, 60 MISS. L.J. 511, 533 (1990) (“Rule 2.1 relieves an attorney of any notion
that serving as a client’s ‘yes man’ is required.”).
52. D.C. Rule 1.4(b) states: “A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.” D.C.
RULES, supra note 45, R. 1.4(b). Model Rule 1.4(b) is identical. ABA MODEL RULES, supra
note 48, R. 2.1. See 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 9, §7.4 (“If the client is to make
turning-point decisions about his legal affairs, he must be armed with sufficient information for
intelligence decisionmaking.”); Bilder & Vagts, supra note 31, at 693 (“unless public officials
are given competent, objective, and honest advice as to the legal consequences of proposed
actions and decisions, they cannot make informed and intelligent policy judgments or properly
balance the national interests involved”).
53. Telephone conversation with David Luban, Dec. 15, 2004. See David Luban, Selling
Indulgences: The Unmistakable Parallel Between Lynne Stewart and the President’s Torture
Lawyers, SLATE, Feb. 14, 2005 (“Independence means saying what the law is – as mainstream
lawyers and judges understand it – regardless of what the client wishes it to be. Candor requires
lawyers with eccentric theories to warn their clients whenever their legal advice veers away from
the mainstream.”), available at www.slate.com/id/2113447; see also W. Bradley Wendel,
Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 NW. U.L. REV. 1167 (2005) (arguing that “pro-
fessionalism” requires lawyers who advise clients contrary to the views of the prevailing
professional interpretive community to warn their clients of such inconsistency).
2005] ETHICAL ISSUES RAISED BY THE OLC TORTURE MEMORANDUM 467
In giving legal advice, a lawyer may provide advice that is contrary to the
weight of authority, spinning out imaginative, even “forward-leaning” legal
theories for the client to use.54 When doing so, however, the candor obligation
requires the lawyer to inform the client that the weight of authority is contrary
to that advice, and that other legal actors may come to the opposite conclusion.
A lawyer who fails to warn a client about the possible illegality of proposed
conduct has violated her professional obligations.55
If a lawyer fails to candidly advise a client, she harms the client and may
harm others affected by the client’s actions. A lawyer who inaccurately
advises a client that a proposed legal action is illegal may be foreclosing an
option that should be open to the client’s consideration, usurping the client’s
role in an attempt to limit the client’s options. Similarly, a lawyer who
inaccurately advises a client that proposed illegal action is legal also harms the
client. On one level, a client may want to hear that conduct she wants to
engage in is legal, since that makes it easier for the client to engage in the
desired activity. But the client may face serious long-term consequences for
An alternative approach would allow a government lawyer to opine that the state of the law
is at the extreme as long as she publicly explains and defends that position, allowing the public
to assess and critique it. See The Role of the Legal Adviser of the Department of State: A Report
of the Joint Committee Established by the American Society of International Law and the
American Branch of the International Law Association, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 358, 363 (1991) (“the
most effective check on government advocacy of dubious or irresponsible legal positions will
be the willingness of the Legal Adviser to publicly state, defend and be accountable for such
arguments before other officials and Congress, the public and the community of international
lawyers”).
54. See Golden, supra note 1 (“‘Legally, the watchword became “forward-leaning,”’ said
a former associate White House counsel, Bradford Berenson, ‘by which everybody meant: “We
want to be aggressive. We want to take risks.”’”); Michael Isikoff, Daniel Klaidman & Michael
Hirsh, Torture’s Path, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 27, 2004 (quoting Alberto Gonzales as asking a
meeting of White House and Justice Department lawyers regarding the preparation of this memo,
“Are we forward-leaning enough on this?”) An unnamed lawyer who participated in the
meeting recalled, “That’s a phrase I heard Gonzales use many times.” Id. But, at his
confirmation hearings as the nominee to be Attorney General, Gonzales denied using that phrase.
SEN. KENNEDY: . . . did you ever talk to any members of the OLC while they were
drafting the memoranda? Did you ever suggest to them that they ought to lean
forward on this issue about supporting the extreme uses of torture? Did you ever, as
reported in the newspaper?
MR. GONZALES: Sir, I don’t recall ever using the term sort of leaning forward in
terms of stretching what the law is.
Panel I of a Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee: The Nomination of Alberto Gonzales
To Be Attorney General, FEDERAL NEWS SERV., Jan. 6, 2005.
55. See Summit, Rovins & Feldesman v. Fonar Corp., 213 A.D.2d 201 (N.Y. App. Div.
1995) (lawyer sued for negligently failing to predict and explain to client the likelihood that
corporate strategy would not succeed).
468 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY [Vol. 1:455
such illegal conduct. While a client can choose to act illegally, the
consequences of illegal conduct should not come as a surprise to the client.
Just as a patient can take action that is contrary to medical advice, a client can
take action even though it is against the law. But such a decision should not
be accompanied by his lawyer’s false assurance that the conduct is legal.
The harm to the client from failing to advise about the illegal character of
proposed conduct may be even greater when the client is an entity rather than
an individual. Indeed, a lawyer working for an entity client has an enhanced
obligation to guard the interests of the entity against wrongdoing by the
entity’s constituents.56
The Bybee Memorandum purports to offer legal advice. Its authors, Jay
Bybee and John Yoo, had an obligation to be candid with their client, the
executive branch. The constituent who requested the Bybee Memorandum,
then White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, may have wanted a particular
answer to his questions about the torture statute. But the OLC lawyers had a
professional obligation to give accurate legal advice to their client, whether or
not the client’s constituent wanted to hear it. Based on the available facts, it
appears that Bybee and Yoo failed to give candid legal advice, violating D.C.
Rule 2.1, and that they failed to inform their client about the state of the law
of torture, violating D.C. Rule 1.4.
Because of the secrecy surrounding the Bush administration’s torture
policy, we do not know exactly what techniques have been used against
prisoners, or whether CIA interrogators or managers were informed of the
Bybee Memorandum. With Congress controlled by the President’s party and
no Independent Counsel statute in place, it is unclear how or when the facts
surrounding the torture policy will be revealed.57
If bar disciplinary authorities investigate Yoo and Bybee, these two
attorneys will have an opportunity to explain or defend their actions. In that
setting, they might assert that the ethical obligations of candor and adequately
informing their client did not apply because the Bybee Memorandum was
never intended as legal advice in the traditional sense. In fact, David Luban
and other scholars have speculated that this Bybee Memorandum was not
intended as legal advice at all, but instead as an immunizing document, to
ensure that CIA officials who engage in torture would not be prosecuted for
that conduct.58 Indeed, the Bybee Memorandum might prove helpful to
CONCLUSION
Why would otherwise competent and skilled lawyers ever risk violating
the ethics rules that require candid legal advice and adequate informing of
clients? Yoo has publicly defended the Bybee Memorandum in general terms
but has not addressed its substantive inadequacies.61 Bybee, now a judge on
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, has remained silent.62
Perhaps Yoo and Bybee thought that they would never have to explain their
legal advice because the Bybee Memorandum would never be made public.
Perhaps they thought that Bush administration actions based on their advice
59. D.C. Rule 1.2(e) states: “A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a
client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent . . . .” D.C. RULES, supra note
45, R. 1.2(e). Model Rule 1.2(d) is identical. ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 48, R. 1.2(d).
60. Alternatively, John Yoo might argue that he wrote the Bybee Memorandum at the
direction of Jay Bybee or Alberto Gonzales, and that he was merely a subordinate lawyer,
relying on the judgment of his supervisors. Subordinate lawyers can rely on “a supervisory
lawyer’s reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional duty.” D.C. RULES, supra
note 45, R. 5.2(b). Model Rule 5.2(b) is identical. ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 48, R.
5.2(b). Such a defense would not succeed, however, if violations of Rule 2.1 and 4.1 were
determined to be clear, not arguable questions upon which reasonable minds could disagree.
61. John Yoo, A Crucial Look at Torture Law, L.A. TIMES, July 6, 2004, at B11; John
Yoo, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, supra note 15.
62. If the Bybee Memorandum had been available at the time that Bybee was nominated
to the Ninth Circuit, Senators would likely have asked him about his legal conclusions. The
Judiciary Committee members questioned White House Counsel Alberto Gonzalez extensively
about his role in this memorandum even though he was the recipient – rather than an author –
of this inadequate legal advice. See Panel I of a Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee:
The Nomination of Alberto Gonzales to Be Attorney General, FEDERAL NEWS SERV., Jan. 6,
2005.
470 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY [Vol. 1:455
would never come to light.63 Perhaps this advice reflected what they sincerely
believed the law should be.
Bybee and Yoo are not the only government lawyers for whom the Bybee
Memorandum may raise ethical concerns.64 News reports indicate that several
White House lawyers reviewed drafts of the Bybee Memorandum.65 Did the
White House lawyers object to the flawed analysis in the memorandum, or did
they instead actually insist that the memorandum include such analysis?66 Still
other Bush Administration lawyers, DOD General Counsel William Haynes
and Department of the Air Force General Counsel Mary Walker read the final
Bybee Memorandum and insisted that it become the basis of Defense
Department interrogation policy, despite the glaring legal inaccuracies
apparent on its face.67 The Defense Department’s Working Group on Detainee
Interrogations adopted the Bybee Memorandum nearly verbatim in its April
2003 report.68 The Defense Department withdrew that Report in March, 2005,
three months after the Justice Department issued a replacement of the August
63. In contrast, the Bush administration recognized that it would likely face a court
challenge of its decision to house prisoners in Guantánamo, and hence needed an accurate
assessment of how courts would rule in such a case.
64. The Bybee Memorandum is not the only memorandum on torture issued by the Justice
Department in August 2002. Another Justice Department memorandum written the same month
and addressing the legality of specific proposed interrogation techniques has not yet been made
public. Douglas Jehl, C.I.A. Says Approved Methods of Questioning Are All Legal, N.Y.TIMES,
March 19, 2005, at A7; Johnston, Lewis & Jehl, supra note 11 (“when the [Central Intelligence
A]gency asked about specific [interrogation] practices, Mr. Bybee responded with a second
memorandum, which is still classified.”). We do not know whether that memorandum did a
better job than the first in providing candid legal advice.
65. Other Bush administration lawyers reviewed the draft memorandum before it was
finalized. Dana Priest, CIA Puts Harsh Tactics on Hold; Memo on Methods of Interrogation
Had Wide Review, WASH. POST, June 27, 2004, at A1 (reporting that the memorandum was
reviewed by lawyers at the National Security Council, by deputy White House counsel Timothy
E. Flanigan, and by David S. Addington, counsel to the Vice President).
During the Senate Judiciary Committee’s hearing on his nomination to be Attorney
General, Alberto Gonzales resisted answering questions about his role in shaping the
memorandum. See Johnston, Lewis & Jehl, supra note 11 (referring to “Gonzales’s
unwillingness to discuss his legal advice on the issue” of torture).
66. Dana Priest, supra note 65 (reporting that lawyer David Addington was “particularly
concerned” that the memorandum “include a clear-cut section on the president’s authority”);
Neil A. Lewis & Eric Schmitt, Lawyers Decided Bans on Torture Didn’t Bind Bush, N.Y.
TIMES, June 8, 2004, at A1 (reporting that Addington was involved in Defense Department
discussions of interrogation policy, which ultimately resulted in adoption verbatim of much of
the language of the Bybee Memorandum).
67. See Lewis & Schmitt, supra note 66.
68. See Working Group Report, supra, note 16; Appendix to this article.
2005] ETHICAL ISSUES RAISED BY THE OLC TORTURE MEMORANDUM 471
69. Josh White, Military Lawyers Fought Policy on Interrogations; JAGs Recount
Objections to Definition of Torture, WASH. POST, July 15, 2005, at A1.
70. Id. (“the judge advocate generals (JAGs) for the Army, Air Force and Marines”
expressed their opposition in letters to Defense Department’s general counsel, but “the JAG
concerns ultimately were overruled by the general counsel’s office”).
71. Not all politically appointed lawyers accepted the Justice Department’s position on
torture. See Lewis & Schmitt, supra note 66 (noting that the State Department’s chief lawyer,
William H. Taft, objected to the Justice Department’s conclusions); Jane Mayer, The Memo:
How an Internal Effort To Ban the Abuse and Torture of Detainees Was Thwarted, NEW
YORKER, Feb. 27, 2006, at 32 (Alberto J. Mora, General Counsel of the Navy, opposed adoption
of John Yoo’s arguments in Defense Department’s Working Group Report).
Not all military lawyers showed such good judgment in assessing interrogation policy. An
October 2002 memorandum by an Army lawyer at Guantánamo is also problematic in its legal
analysis, claiming that harsh interrogation tactics such as the “use of a wet towel to induce the
misperception of suffocation” do not violate the torture statute as long as it is used to obtain
information rather than “maliciously or sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” Diane
E. Beaver, Joint Task Force 170, Dept. of Defense, Legal Brief on Proposed Counter-Resistance
Strategies, Oct. 11, 2002, at 5, 6, available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB127/02.10.11.pdf, reprinted in Greenberg & Dratel, supra note 2, at 229, 233, 235.
This is a more explicit adoption of the same kind of “specific intent” analysis suggested by the
August 2002 OLC memorandum. However, there is no indication that the author of this
memorandum, Lt. Col. Diane Beaver, relied on or had access to the Bybee Memorandum.
72. Amnesty International, United States of America: Human Dignity Denied; Torture and
Accountability in the “War on Terror,” Oct. 27, 2004, available at http://web.amnesty.org/
library/Index/ENGAMR511452004.
472 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY [Vol. 1:455
Appendix
Comparison of
DOD Working Group Report (April 2, 2003) and
Bybee Memorandum (Aug 1, 2002)
Specific intent III.A.1.a I.A. Verbatim, except for one change of tense
Harm caused III.A.1. c.ii I.C.2 Verbatim, except for minor stylistic
by or resulting changes
from predicate
acts