Esotericism and The Critique of Historicism

Esotericism and the Critique of Historicism Author(s): Arthur M. Melzer Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol.
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American
Political
Science Review
Vol.
100, No. 2
May 2006
Esotericism and the Critique of Historicism

ARTHUR
{ { r
M. MELZER
m ihe relation of history
Michigan
to reason,
State University
" observes J?rgen Habermas, "remains constitutive for the
m JL
discourse premise
better or worse" (1987, 392). The worse of it is: the modern of modernity?for in history means that unless we can demonstrate?through of reason's imbeddedness
of "reason historical in history"?that and that all history our "knowledge" is fundamentally is merely reason's rational, temporary,
increasingly we must accept and local, To avoid
an
narrative" suspect "grand is fundamentally that reason into historical
arbitrary. this collapse
relativism,
we must
reassess
the crucial
premise:
historicity.
Why is the modern mind so utterly captivated by the idea that every mind is a prisoner of its times? This treatment in the work of Leo Strauss. His rediscovery of the theory of question receives itsmost probing
esotericism?which new of is the premodern to the whole historicist challenges reason a return to Socratic through understanding paradigm. rationalism. to history?poses of the relation of reason to a "posthistoricist" It points the way important relegitimation
which
it a misfortune considered more and more in prevalent that the second century, half of the previous a distinction one no longer made between / have always became the exoteric and Letter the esoteric. to Passow, 20 Oct. 1811
is why, in Strauss's view, modern philosophy in the specific double assault on culminates necessarily That
rationalism that confronts us today: "the victory of or
?Goethe,
As
we move into the twenty-first century, the science and rationalism legitimacy of Western is being radically challenged by two opposite the ancient force but mutually reinforcing movements: one of and the "postmodern" of religious orthodoxy or cultural relativism. This is the great in historicism of our time. Both branches of tellectual predicament
our own
of rational philos thodoxy through ophy [i.e., historicism]" (1965,30; see 1997a, 460; 1997b, serve the single 453). All of Strauss's varied writings less concerned he is aim of "philosophic apologetics": to elaborate a philosophical system than to ground the to these legitimacy of rationalism as such by responding
two challenges.
the self-destruction
so long at odds than normative political philosophy, stand joined together under with one another?now this sweeping double assault on the legitimacy of ratio
nalism as such.
profession?
empirical
political
science
no
less
Focusing here on the second of these, I argue that is the most powerful Strauss's critique of historicism of those that have been put forward. This is partly in due to the fact that Strauss, having been educated and around the Heideggerian circle, begins from a real for much of the historicist argument. But sympathy the unique power of his critique is above all due to that aspect of Strauss's thought that might at first seem least relevant: his theory of esoteric writing.
In the first place, historicism rests on certain sweep
to turn to It may be useful in these circumstances the thought of the controversial political philosopher Leo Strauss, who was the first clearly to identify and In Strauss's to confront this precise double challenge. that has led to the late-modern view, it is historicism
resurgence of faith, the perennial alternative to reason,
of human the history claims about ing empirical that the theory of esotericism (and thought?claims in a single stroke. For it demon it alone) undermines
strates that we have mistaken the pious and conven
that rationalism because it has slain the Enlightenment was God. slain had thought) (it itself arisen? Accord But why, then, has historicism or rationalism modern to Strauss, Enlightenment ing
eventually produced historicism?that is, its own self
for their true teaching, tional surface of past writings view and this has given us a systematically exaggerated is always a to which the human mind of the degree conventions. product of prevailing con On a deeper level, the theory of esotericism
fronts mental historicism issue of on "theory the central and question: practice." The the funda classical
of the peculiar defects of that destruction?because its dogmatic demand for certainty, realism, rationalism: historical efficacy, progress, and, above all, its insistence
on the harmony was of no theory accident: and practice, reason and so
theory
of esotericism?like
historicism
itself?is
ulti
of
in a rooted mately between relation the
comprehensive reason and
understanding rationalism history, the
ciety. Yet
he continues,
this fateful weakness of the battle

Melzer
of modern
it arose from
rationalism,
the peculiar
and politics,
tion, the or,
philosophic
truth and moral-political

philosopher between
ac
and reason
in Strauss's
vocabulary,
demands
Arthur Kedzie M. Hall,
itwas fighting
against
religion.
the city. But

inherent
the theory of esotericism,

and inescapable tension
by emphasizing
Michigan ([email protected]). Steven J.Dannhauser, Iwould like to thank Harold Ames, Werner and Richard Eric P?trie, Jerry Weinberger, Kautz, David Leibowitz, for and the Earhart Foundation for their helpful comments, Zinman a research grant.
of is Professor State University,
309 S. Political Science, MI 48824 East Lansing,
of their and society, reverses the historicist assumption at its historicism unity. It thus challenges underlying
core. Pursuing a still further tack, Strauss attempts to "his
toricize" historicism?to modern mind has been
why the explain historically so completely captivated by the
279
Esotericism
and the Critique
of Historicism
May2006
idea that every mind is a prisoner of its times. A crucial element of his explanation is this: "the rise of modern came simultaneously historical consciousness with the of the tradition of esotericism" interruption (1952a, in the practice of 58). Strauss argues that the decline esoteric writing produced cultural and political changes
that, for a variety of reasons, gave rise to a strong
the has
lines" reached
and the
how
can
one true,
ever esoteric
be
sure
that
one Par
author's
teaching?
ticularly in our hermeneutically skeptical age, which despairs of the possibility of reaching the "true" inter pretation of even ordinary texts, there is little patience for this whole new world of problems.
Yet, to these understandable objections, one must
ical desire for, as well as an intellectual receptivity the historicist paradigm. it is the purpose Thus, in multiple ways?which
this essay to elaborate?Strauss's theory of
polit
to, of
esotericism
informs his highly original, multifaceted, and powerful attack on historicism. His argument culminates in the claim that the recovery of esotericism opens the path to a "posthistoricist" of reason (both relegitimation normative and scientific) through a return to authentic
Socratic rationalism.
reply that the issue is not whether one likes esotericism but whether, in fact, it did exist. And the more we dislike it, the more we must distrust our instincts in this matter: our powerful, almost visceral inclination to insist that it did not exist. For, the simple fact is that there is a vast amount of historical of explicit state evidence?hundreds ments from every of Western stemming period use of eso to the widespread thought?testifying teric writing in the past. The famous Encyclopedia of
Diderot, for example, makes mention of esotericism
ESOTERICISM
The very mention of esotericism, however, calls to mind
the enormous
Strauss's
in at least twenty different articles. In fact, there is an article expressly devoted to the subject, entitled "Exo teric and Esoteric," where it is reported as a matter of common knowledge that "the ancient philosophers had
a double the other doctrine; internal, friend the one secret or external, public or esoteric" (1778, exoteric, vol. 13, bear
difficulty
access
of any serious
to which
effort
to engage
ob
thought, A
is powerfully clarification
structed
internal
both by external
obscurity. few
controversy
words of
and by its own,

regard
582).
deist
Similarly,
and
John Toland,
of Locke, wrote
the
sixteenth-century
treatise
a short
will be helpful before ing the theory of esotericism of historicism turning to a brief examination (which will also require some clarification) and then finally to
Strauss's efforts to use the one in combating the other.
to have rediscovered claimed the long fact that, prior to the rise of liberal regimes forgotten in the nineteenth freedom of thought century?where came to be taken for granted?almost all great thinkers "between the placed their most important reflections lines" of their writings, hidden behind a veneer of con ventional thinkers engaged in this pieties. Different for different tech reasons, using different practice beliefs. There is niques, and on behalf of different
religious esotericism, for example, and secular esoteri
Strauss
or, of the Exoteric ing the lengthy title, Clidophorus, and Esoteric Philosophy; that is, Of the External and Internal Doctrine The one open and of the Ancients: to popular prejudices and the public, accommodated established by Law; the other private and se Religions
cret, wherein, to the few capable and discrete, was taught
the real Truth stripped of all disguises (1720). Again, Leibniz states: "The ancients distinguished the 'exo
teric' one or which mode popular is suitable of for exposition those who from are the 'esoteric' con seriously to all
cerned
These
to discover
three writers
the truth" (1981, 260).

attribute esotericism an
cism. There is no single "Esoteric Philosophy" secretly uniting all thinkers who wrote esoterically. Generally thinkers during the Enlightenment and af speaking, terwards tended to employ a relatively loose kind of to avoid persecution and to concealment, primarily ensure the survival and effectiveness of their writings. Classical and Medieval writers, by contrast, tended to a more full-blown esotericism, moved by the fear that but also that society not only would harm philosophers rationalism would harm society. They also philosophic had pedagogical motives: a text that gives hints instead
of answers practices for themselves. the closest
cient philosophers most part maintain

closer to their own
and philosophic poets, but for the a discrete silence about thinkers
time. This silence is eventually bro
ken by Toland toward the end of his treatise: "I have more than once hinted that the External and Internal
Doctrine are as much now in use as ever;
to the Socratic method?it

discover
literary
approximation
forces found
seems
readers
to think and troubling.

every cher
People
The idea
have naturally
of esotericism
these claims
to violate
is not so openly and professedly distinction approved as among the Ancients" (1720, 94) In another work, he repeats that esotericism is "practiced not by the Ancients alone; for to declare the Truth, it ismore in Use among theModerns, although they profess it is less allowed" (1751, 99). The historical ubiquity of esoteri cism is also reported by Condorcet (see 1955, 46, 64, who speaks of 90, 108-09, 136-38) and by Rousseau, "the distinction between so eagerly the two doctrines received by all the Philosophers, and by which they
professed in secret sentiments contrary to those they
though
the
ished ideal of our time: it is dishonest,

torial, anti-liberal, be expected of not over, serious it would and mystics, open undemocratic. astrologers, If Strauss up a Pandora's
elitist, conspira
It is a practice and theosophists, were box more right, of interpre to
taught publicly" (1992, 45n, emphasis added). It turns out, to cut to the bottom line, that it is difficult to find a single major philosopher writing before 1800
who erence did not to the somewhere practice make of open and approving regarding ref either esotericism,
philosophers.
tive difficulties:
exactly
how
is one
to read "between
his own writings or (more commonly) Admittedly, though, these statements
those of others. have never been
280
American
Political
Science Review
Vol.
100,
No. 2
collected and displayed. adequately (I plan to do so in a future writing.) the issue is to clarify the philosophical Here, sig is the true point of this nificance of esotericism. What notorious Straussian emphasis on noble lies and hidden teachings? For, truth to tell, many scholars would be to acknowledge that, at least now and then, willing thinkers of the past wrote between the lines. But they
are reluctant to entertain Strauss's more elaborate the
political
paradigms
power
of
and hegemony,
"normal science,"
linguistic
socially
conventions,
constructed
ories on this subject, partly because

of his motives, Indeed, a great deal this of which remain obscure. obscurity speculation, unfortunate loose
they are suspicious

has some encouraged of it rather
gender roles, or the epochal destinings of Being. To be as this list in sure, there has been much disagreement, of the "times," dicates, regarding the true determinant but this disagreement remarkable only renders more the underlying feels that there is everyone agreement: human thought. something in the times that determines This iswhat ismeant by "historicism." It is a paradigm of thought that cuts across almost all philosophical and academic divisions. As Karl Mannheim already wrote in his 1924 essay "Historicism":
Historicism into an intellectual of force our Weltanschau it extraordinary significance; epitomizes not only historicist like an ung. The principle organizes, invisible the work of the social and cultural hand, sciences, has developed also permeates everyday thinking. (1952, 84)
extravagant (see Atlas 2003 and Pfaff 2003). But given the subject matter, such speculation will never be put to rest until one supplies a clear and comprehensive answer to the question: What is the true purpose and of Strauss's doctrine of esotericism? meaning Part of the answer is very simple. If earlier thinkers
wrote esoterically, and we do not read esoterically, to overcome we
but
What
will
tice
not understand
of esoteric writing,
them. By
Strauss
emphasizing
sought
the prac intellectual

desire to
the great
loneliness,
theoretical
of modern
isolation,
readers.
the unique
We earnestly
learn from the great thinkers of the past?but they simply do not speak to us. Strauss hoped to explain and repair this lost connection. Strauss thought the un But, as I have suggested,
derstanding of esotericism was also crucial for over
true in 1924 has become truer still in our multiculturalist world of proliferat antifoundational, The traditional philosophic ing postmodernisms. aspi ration to view things from the standpoint of eternity or in terms of our common humanity has slowly lost all plausibility. All our belief and delight lies in the act of stripping proud rationalism or "logocentrism" of its
claims to reveal the universal, the necessary, and the
was
coming another, more specific affliction of the modern and theArt of Writing, mind. In a review of Persecution of esotericism, discussion Strauss's only book-length
George Sabine comments: "Strauss's argument about
feel in permanent. All human thought, we somehow our bones, is conditioned by something unthought, by an invisible background of drives or presuppositions that is historically given, hence arbitrary and change
able. all structures Thus, and temporary. tingent, of knowledge are local, con
But
cizing
even
as we
are under
we also sense
the spell of this histori

its dangers. Ever since
of philosophical is the esoteric interpretation writings combined with, and complicated by, another argument
against what he calls 'historicism'_So far as I can
imperative,
the two logical relation between Sabine is not among arguments" (1953,222). Although Strauss's most readers, he is right that sympathetic Strauss does link these two themes while never fully In what follows, I attempt spelling out the connection. see there
to do so.
is no close
and Disadvantage of His Of theAdvantage tory for Life (1874), the "crisis of historicism"?as in Ernst Troeltsch's influential it was later named und seine Probleme Der Historismus (1922)?has Nietzsche's
been a major preoccupation of modern thought.
THE "CRISIS OF HISTORICISM"

If the general
of Strauss's clearer, let us
historicism of the radical Historicism?especially seem to entail what a host of books Heidegger?would in the last several decades have loudly proclaimed: "the seem to lead to end of philosophy." Indeed, it would the relativizing of all moral, scientific, and philosoph ical thinking. For, if there are an indefinite number of
conflicting hensive cultures views of God, or Weltanschauungen?of the universe, and compre man?and if
content,
evidentiary
basis, and purpose

are specify somewhat more pre
claims
esotericism regarding to turn to historicism
cisely what it is and why it is problematic. Fredric Jameson "Always historicize!" proclaimed That at the beginning of The Political Unconscious.1 would seem to be the underlying imperative of mod
ern since under texts, reason Over the thought. the Renaissance?modern the ever increasing and indeed of last two centuries?arguably thinkers have labored to understand of human the
no standpoint outside them is possible from which to judge one truer than the others, it is hard to see how beliefs could be said to any of our most fundamental be superior to their opposites. to this crisis have been tried. A variety of responses Some thinkers such as Richard Rorty (1999, 275-77), and cel historicism completely although embracing
ebrating certain salutary consequences of relativism,
compulsion every the
doctrines, as manifestations
expression "times"?whether
nevertheless reject
grounds ten one faith in
often indignantly, that they still maintain, But the meaning of or relativism. complete
for senses, something Indeed, this deep rejection down, permanent are a not Of clear. always nonhistoricist lingering as such and universal,
latter are defined in terms of the forces the dialectical of production, unfolding
1
and relations of the Idea,
the Enlightenment
Jameson (1981, 9) quoted inHerman (2004, 1). compassion.
ideals
to
of equality,
escape
toleration,
or
even
relativism,
281
Esotericism
and the Critique
of Historicism
May2006
Nietzsche
at least himself sank back into metaphysics, to Heidegger. according Other thinkers, seeking to avoid complete histori cism, have attempted a return to some kind of Hegelian
rationalism: reason, they continue to acknowledge, is
but history is rational. Alexandre historical, Koj?ve is the most prominent and influential thinker here. to But the philosophical path that led "From Hegel was one of "deadly ruthless Nietzsche" logical to Karl L?with in his well ness"?at least according neo known work of that title (1964, 383). Koj?vian
hegelianism, at any rate, does seem to have slipped
us call them the historical, evidence?let theoretical, and experiential. First, there is the purely historical such as the dispiriting spectacle of the great evidence, of systems. But by itself this kind variety philosophical is not disproof. of evidence proves little: disagreement It needs to be supplemented by the second, "the oretical" kind of evidence: a philosophical analysis, a the line of argu "critique of reason" that, extending ment of Hume and Kant, shows the impossibility of ra while also tional ethics and of theoretical metaphysics of the positive dependence showing the inescapable
sciences on moral us as and metaphysical which, presuppositions. unlike historicism,
down that same slope into French postmodernism. our only choice is between Hegelian hyperrationalism
and complete to assume?the tends relativism?as latter most will continental win out almost thought every neo
If
But a critique of reason of this kind, Strauss argues, only

takes as far skepticism,
time.2 Finally, some thinkers?neo-Kantians,
and others?have tried Aristotelians, utilitarians, some to older historicism and revive simply ignore absolute. But often such thinkers end up having to retreat in the face of the historicist that objections soon had and that greet they previously ignored them at every turn. Toward the end of his career, for that example, John Rawls was forced to acknowledge A Theory of his quasi-Kantian (and quasi-utilitarian) Justice did not possess the universal and transhistorical to it (1985, 223; attributed validity that he originally The historicist 1993, 94,100,128-29). imperative is just too powerful, too deeply woven into the pattern of our to must be confronted be It thinking, simply ignored. head on before any stable return to a non-historicist view is possible.
is still compatible with philosophy. (Indeed, Strauss holds that it is precisely skepticism rightly understood, that is the most defen Socratic or zetetic skepticism, a theoretical sible philosophic position.) Furthermore, reason not in historicism culminate of could critique without contradicting itself, without relativizing its own claims (see 1953, 20, 24-27). historicist Strauss the complete Thus, argues, or of historicism radical existentialist position?the from and rests upon a critique Heidegger?emerges of thought that is no longer theoretical, but "commit ted": it addresses itself to and attempts to articulate a
particular experience, the so-called "experience of his
tory" or of "historicity." This is the third, "experiential" ground for historicism. To be sure, this inner experi ence is excited by the sorts of historical observations flux of historical earlier?the mentioned meaningless it extends beyond them. It conditions and beliefs?but
claims to represent a unique awareness or divination
HOW TO CONFRONT HISTORICISM

It turns out to be very difficult,
clear confrontation with historicism.
which has been given to recent generations almost like a special revelation. It is a feeling of anguish or angst which, when confronted honestly and spelled out, dis to arrange
only an ex
however,
It is not
closes
an
awareness
that
all meaning,
all
horizons
of
intelligibility,
and i.e.,
have
no other
ground
than man's
experience, than every
free
sci
tremely powerful
for this reason,
and pervasive
highly amorphous.
movement
As Strauss
but, partly
remarks,
choice. "The fundamental arbitrary an more fundamental experience
it is "not just one philosophical school among many, but a most powerful agent that affects more or less all present-day thought" (1959a, 57). Thus, "historicism appears in the most varied guises and on the most dif ferent levels. Tenets and arguments that are the boast of one type of historicism, provoke the smile of adherents of others" (1959a, 59). In short, there are many histori cisms, bearing different names and displaying varying and rigor. One must begin by degrees of sophistication what the serious case for historicism is reconstructing before trying to respond to it. Strauss suggests that the historicist position does not rest on any single line of argument but derives from the combined effect of at least three different kinds of
of the objective groundlessness ence, is the experience of all principles of thought and action, the experience of nothingness" (Strauss 1961, 155; see 1953, 19-28; 1989a, 32, 35-36). But Strauss suggests that appeal to this irreducible experience (much like the appeal to revelation) must confront the problem of the seeming multiplicity of
such experiences or revelations. We have many or ex
periences experience
know, situation then,
that claim of humble

that the
to put everything
experiences, for
in its proper
the
perspective?moral
example,
awe and wonder.

anguished experience
How
of
do we
historic ex
ity is the basic experience

of man as man?
that reveals
Furthermore,
the fundamental
on careful
For a different for the view, see Robert Pippin, who attacks Koj?ve of his defense of Hegel and who attacks Strauss for not shortcomings Idealism does possess the resources for resisting seeing that German the slide into historicism See also Habermas' The (1997, 209-65). Discourse where he tries to show that his Philosophical of Modernity can resist the attacks of Nietzsche, version of historical rationalism and Bataille. Derrida, Foucault, Heidegger,
in fact turn out to have amination such experiences subtle presuppositions that can and must be brought to light and tested by reason. Thus, the crucial appeal
to revelatory experience cannot completely escape or
trump the authority of rational argument (see 1953,18, 22; 1989a, 32; 1989b, 215; 1989d, 255; 1959b, 260).
Because Strauss sees historicism as resting on such
a complex
combination
of different
kinds of evidence,
282
American
Political
Science Review
Vol. 100, No. 2 are that

of
his response to it is equally complex. His writings and arguments fairly brimming with observations
are meant as replies to one or another of the strands
case. But Strauss does have a basic over and pursued arching strategy that is clearly enunciated inNatural Right and History and indeed in his (1953) scholarly corpus as a whole. Near the end of the first that to judge chapter of that work, Strauss declares historicism: the historicist
We a nonhistoricist in the first place, need, understanding no less urgently of nonhistoricist But we need philosophy. a nonhistoricist of historicism, that is, an understanding of the genesis not of historicism that does understanding take see Strauss for granted the 1952b, 585-86). announces here soundness of historicism ((1953, 33;
to historicism itself. Sooner or later, Strauss self suggests, they must bring about the dialectical of historicism. overcoming adherence
This point is clearest with reference to Strauss's sec
ond line of investigation, his effort to give an historical of A truly consistent histori historicism itself. analysis cism, he points out, "must be applied to itself."
us then to the historicist would Precisely approach compel of the essential to raise the question relation of historicism as to what modern the question or, more man, spe exactly, as distinguished cific need, characteristic of modern man, from pre-modern to turn his passionate underlies man,
history. (1959a, 73) Strauss seeks to give an historical explanation for the to his modern mind's inclination strange and unique historicism. toricism. He historicizes Similarly, Strauss's first line of attack, his effort to
recover classical sistent compels roots?so or of nonhistoricist understanding a con of result is also the necessary thought, he argues, historicism. For, historicism, genuine a less more one to seek sympathetic provincial, an authentic
two-pronged
approach.
of historicism, First, to assess the overall plausibility it is not sufficient to contest an argument here or an
observation there. We need a clear view of the al
is not a specific or isolated ternative. But historicism thesis; it is or rests on a comprehensive interpretation
of human experience. Thus, historicism as a whole must
be confronted by an alternative whole. Now, historicist to see at that we are privileged thought is something a (then) living its peak in the thought of Heidegger, of towering genius who tended to dazzle philosopher To free our minds and silence all of his contemporaries.
from dazzlement of and the to consider phenomena what and an alternative em interpretation experiences
understanding
as more
of past
fully
thought,
to overcome
to uncover
it. Strauss
its hidden
is think
look like, we need to phasized by historicism might is to be at its see nonhistoricist thought peak?which in classical thought. The prob found, Strauss believed, of classi lem is that the contemporary interpretation and cal thought is itself based on the presuppositions cir To avoid historicism. of methods historiographical of nonhistoricist philosophy." That is what Strauss at tempts to provide or prepare in the new interpretation or Socratic rationalism of classical political philosophy and third fourth in the chapters of Natural presented (1953) and inmany of his other writ Right and History
ings. cularity, we need a new, "nonhistoricist understanding
famous efforts at a "destruction ing here of Heidegger's "intention of the tradition." For example, Heidegger's to disin was to uproot Aristotle: he thus was compelled ter the roots, to bring them to light, to look at them with wonder." More generally, "by uprooting and not simply [Heidegger] made rejecting the tradition of philosophy, it possible for the first time after many centuries?one
hesitates to say how many?to see the roots of the
tradition as they are" (Strauss 1997c, 450; see 1997a, 458, 462-63; 1964, 9). But this earlier thought, toward which a consistent historicist must strain to move ever
closer, The is all nonhistoricist historian who started in character. out with thought Therefore: that true
the conviction
understanding in terms teaching of
of human
of its particular its particular time, necessarily the view, constantly upon him urged is unsound. that his initial conviction
of every is understanding time or as an expression with himself familiarizes by his (Strauss subject matter, 1952a, 158)
begin
cism
In light of this newly revived alternative, we may that histori to seriously entertain the possibility
has been a colossal mistake. But to help con
firm this suspicion, we also need a history of histori could have cism, one that explains how that mistake could have seemed so right to arisen, how historicism In his vari so many great minds and yet be wrong. of ous studies of early modern Machiavelli, thought,
Hobbes, forgotten?and and Spinoza, Strauss attempts to uncover of modern the problematic?foundations
philosophy downward
and to explain, in these terms, its relentless spiral into historicism.
The Self-Overcoming
or
These tant to
of Historicism
of investigation, sense it is impor own their
the Rise
two add,
of
"Posthistoricism"
lines make in
the possibility He comes at length to "understand had opened without which Heidegger intending it: the of a genuine return to classical philosophy" possibility (1997c, 450). This end result is what Strauss explicitly of historicism" calls the "self-destruction (1952a, 158). means debt to Heidegger Strauss's acknowledged that it is precisely historicism at its peak that eventually, the radical new openness if unintentionally, produced of nonhistoricist to and reinvigoration thought at its sees peak. Thus, in both of his lines of attack, Strauss his own path of thought as not simply sui-generis, but of historicism. This as representing the self-overcoming Strauss seems is perhaps the ground of the confidence that the future would bring a settled to have harbored of thought (see 1946, modes return to nonhistoricist 326; 1959a, 77).
To put this point in a more today assert lary, many people contemporary have that we vocabu entered a
particular not only
good
right but also are required,
as itwere,
by the consistent
postmodern
era characterized
by the final break with
283
Esotericism
and the Critique
of Historicism
May2006
modern thought and the triumph of some version of historicism. Yet Strauss would argue (as we will see) that historicism is not truly postmodern al because, it is ul elements, though rejecting important modern of the underlying ten timately the fullest expression dency of modern thought. But he further argues that this modernist historicism is internally unstable and to it back that, worked itself, through, points beyond classical philosophy. One might call this condition?in which in overcoming the historicism, itself, opens
path to the recovery of Socratic rationalism?"post
truth?or, Strauss's thought
worse, answer aspired
that
there
is no
truth.
Why, start, effect,
then, modern
are
we so tempted
by this faulty reasoning?

is that, to "realism": from to have the an to over
not used by Strauss him historicism" (an expression In these what Strauss stands for is authentic terms, self).
postmodernism?which is post-historicism.
OF HISTORICISM
We are now in a
ESOTERICISM AND THE CRITIQUE

position to examine Strauss's spe
cific arguments The radical new against historicism. to earlier thinking created by Heidegger's openness of the tradition also opened destruction attempted the way for Strauss's rediscovery of the long-forgotten this discovery, practice of esoteric writing. And pre pared by historicism, was crucial to Strauss's efforts to refute historicism. In the remainder of this paper, I pick
out six strands of Strauss's complex argument against
historicism and show the crucial role played in each by the doctrine or the phenomenon of esotericism. Very briefly, the first two strands concern Strauss's reply to the historical evidence for historicism, whereas the remaining ones involve his response to the theoreti cal and experiential grounds. At the same time, the sec
ond two strands are part of Strauss's effort to recover a
of nonhistoricist genuine understanding thought at its that of Socratic the final is, peak, rationalism, whereas
two strands concern Strauss's
come the gulf between theory and practice. It sought not merely to understand the world but to change it (1959d, 40-55). Thus, it tended to identify the ratio nal with the real or the powerful?with what works or what wins. More crudely stated, it tended to worship success. We moderns lack the Olympian detachment from the world and from history that was the hallmark of classical thought. Consequently, all our thinking is an if shaped by unspoken epistemological premise: there is a truth, it will show itself in the world, it will win out in the marketplace of ideas, itwill be proved by It is of because this very questionable history. premise that we have become inordinately dispirited by the fa and miliar, age-old spectacle of sectarian disagreement that we have drawn the unwarranted from conclusion it that there is no transhistorical truth. But in addition to this reply, Strauss also argues that there is in fact much less disagreement among the major philosophers than a conventional reading of their works would lead one to think. Prior to the nineteenth in one degree or century, all philosophers, of their thought to another, adjusted the presentation the particular conventions in their time and prevailing place. This esoteric practice had the effect of system the appearance of philosophical atically exaggerating same At the have in time, disagreement. philosophers clined to hide their deepest thoughts and experiences, those at the root of the philosophic life. This especially has had the effect of systematically their obscuring one might call the unity points of agreement?what of philosophic experience. For example, it is axiomatic inmodern classical schol be arship that there are fundamental disagreements
tween Plato and Aristotle. But Strauss,
rise of historicism
attempt
to
explain
the
historically.
1. Historical
Evidence
The simplest and most common strand of the historicist involves the appeal to historical evidence. It argument argues, as Strauss puts it, that human history presents "the depressing spectacle of a disgraceful variety of and beliefs and, above all, of the passing-away thoughts of every thought and belief ever held by men." There have been almost as many distinct as there philosophies have been philosophers. This experience of centuries of seems finally to have exposed the great disagreement delusion of nonhistoricist is no final, thought. There universal truth (1953,18-19; see 1959a, transhistorical, 62-63).
This of counts. is an extremely The spectacle weak of argument sectarian on a number disagreement,
ically, rejoined a long tradition of ancient Greek and medieval Arabic commentators on Plato and Aristotle that regarded them as in essential agreement on the most important questions.3 Similarly, Strauss argues that an appreciation of esoteric practices is necessary to see the hidden unity of early modern thought:
We ments that dom no longer understand those that among they all thinkers, one and in spite they were the same it.... of great disagree united by the fact king become
reading
esoter
to understand learn again those themselves and the more fa they understood we become miliar with the art of allusive and elusive writing which all of them employ, to different although degrees. The series of those thinkers will to sight as a line then come of warriors who their fight against occasionally interrupt their common to engage or less heated in a more enemy thinkers as 3
fought as Hobbes of darkness, to us the more clearer we
called
power?the This will
Strauss points out, has been well known since ancient times without conclusion. leading to this historicist then, does it have that effect on us? Indeed, it Why, is an obvious fallacy to argue from the fact that people that no one of them has the disagree to the conclusion
The classic work here is Alfarabi's The Harmonization of the the Divine and Aristotle. See Opinions of the Two Sages, Plato Strauss's in his "Farabi's Plato." See also Strauss (1945) discussion 1946 (345-49, see And Carol Poster 1997 (221): "In the 354-55). on Aristotle, 15,000 extant pages of the Greek Commentaries the fundamental is almost universally ac unity of Plato and Aristotle knowledged."
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but 231, This
never emphasis is not
hostile
disputation
among
themselves.
(1958,
added) of course, that there exist real dis
to deny,
Still, ignorance of the among philosophers. agreements has led to a systematic of esoteric writing phenomenon it of the history of philosophy, portraying misreading as far more diverse and chaotic than in fact it has been.
This doctrine also explains a related puzzle. Precisely if the evidence for historicism is as obvious as the his toricist insists, then why was it not noticed by earlier centuries? Why are modern thinkers alone in drawing the historicist is pro conclusion? Again the solution
vided by esotericism. Unlike earlier readers, we alone
2. Historical
Evidence
II
The historicist would reply that, even if this were so, the mere issue of diversity does not get at the main lesson to be drawn from the historical evidence. As Strauss (1959a, 63, emphasis added) writes, "most historicists consider decisive the fact, which can be established by historical studies, that a close relation exists between and the historical situation in each political philosophy in which it emerged." For example, R. G. Collingwood, his The Idea of History, writes:
The Republic of Plato is an account, not of
naively take writings for for insight. esotericism and unique

toricism.
the pious and conventional surface of past their true teaching. We take our blindness In short, it is the modern of forgetfulness for the strange that is largely responsible of the modern mind to his susceptibility
Thus, on the level of historical evidence, when that is read properly?that evidence is, in light of the phe
nomenon to historicism. of esotericism?it Indeed, as by Strauss no means goes points on to clearly argue, it
actually
Far seems
points
from
away from it.
ing ideal of political

received describes
life, but of the Greek
ideal as Plato
the unchang
it. The Ethics of Aristotle it and reinterpreted not an eternal but the morality of the morality the politi Hobbes' Leviathan Greek expounds gentleman. absolutism in their English cal ideas of seventeenth century form. tions Kant's of German ethical theory pietism. the moral convic expresses in (1946, 229. Quoted by Strauss
the historicist inference, history legitimizing to prove rather that all human and cer thought, the same is concerned with tainly all philosophic thought, or the same fundamental themes fundamental problems, an unchanging framework and therefore that there exists facts in all changes persists and principles. (1953,23; even of human see 32; knowledge 1959a, 59-60, answers of both 69-72) us,
which
At
a minimum,
if permanent
elude
1952b, 575) is by now a vast store of historical evidence, compiled over the past two centuries by philosophers that even the and intellectual historians, demonstrating greatest thinkers of the past were merely mouthpieces of their times, which they naively for the assumptions for timeless Truth. As Karl Marx mistook (1978, 489, "What emphasis added) puts it in a famous passage, else does the history of ideas prove than that intellec as tual production changes its character in proportion ideas of The is material changed? ruling production There
each age have ever been the ideas of its ruling class."
the fundamental questions of life are within our grasp, of ignorance" and this crucial "knowledge is all that for a Socratic is needed life of erotic skepticism and
passionate questing.
3. Ancients
The most
and
serious
Moderns
case for historicism, according
Marx considers this historical finding to be not merely true but perfectly obvious. for this Marx is not wrong. The historical evidence
view is indeed massive. But Strauss's rediscovery of es
not to Strauss, from this first category derives historical of evidence?these arguments?but purely rather from the second and third categories: what I and experiential have called the theoretical grounds. that theoretical offer elaborate Historicists analyses to show the inherent limitations of human purport this theoretical Furthermore, knowledge. "critique of
reason," when properly interpreted, also helps to ar
otericism makes possible the following reply: of course the great thinkers of the past appear to be prisoners of but that their times, hawkers of prevailing conventions, hid their true thoughts be is because they deliberately hind a veil of conventionality. Through most of history, the the price of real intellectual freedom was precisely
well-cultivated time. Thus, appearance two to address a of being prisoner of Collingwood's of one's examples,
of history" or ticulate the fundamental "experience the deepest of "historicity" that is somehow experi ence of the modern mind. This combination of philo reveal and inner experience that, sophical critique some twenty-five hun from its very origins in Greece
dred years ago, Western rationalism was fundamen
on presuppositions tally deluded and nihilistic?based that it could not defend or even fully articulate?and has that the whole history of philosophy subsequent
been the overreaching, and Heidegger, self-destruction inevitable, step-by-step Both rationalist enterprise. as Strauss reports, ultimate "regard consequence of Nietzsche as decisive this
the lines in Plato's if one reads carefully and between and Aristotle's Ethics, one easily sees that Republic about the the former ultimately had grave reservations life as did the latter about the Greek ideal of political of the Greek gentleman (see Strauss 1964, morality 50-138; Jaffa 1952). In this way, the doctrine of eso
writing?and massive erwise teric it alone?can historical evidence the oth away explain in favor of histori
the nihilism
(or before)
which
... and
according
whose
to them began
in Plato
is the
present decay" (1983, 33). Strauss has considerable sympathy Although this line of argument, he has one basic objection:
began... reason to wonder was not the whether inevitable the self-destruction outcome of mod
for "I
of
cism (see 1959a, 63-64; 503n21).
1953, 199n43; 1959c, 227; 1941,
ern
rationalism
as distinguished
from
pre-modern
285
Esotericism
and the Critique
of Historicism
May2006
rationalism.
..."
(1965,
31). ancient
This
led
to Strauss's
cen
For the early modern

were conscious of
thinkers, precisely
making a radical
because
and
they
tral intellectual
mental gulf
project:
first,
to uncover
and modern
the funda
rational
subversive
between
ism and, then, to demonstrate that, unlike the latter, the former?which is nonhistoricist thought at its
peak?was genuinely self-knowing and able to give
break with the past, took considerable pains to ob scure that break, at least in its full range and mean
ing. ficult For for example, us to "Locke recognize... are then makes how dif it particularly he deviates much
an adequate of itself. And both parts of justification this project to refute historicism rely decisively on the
rediscovery of esotericism.
from the natural

prudent man_We
right tradition. He was

apparently
an eminently
confronted
To begin with, there is the central question?which such a depends decisively on how we read?of whether fundamental divide actually exists: ismodern thought from classical different (and Christian) essentially thought? Such a view seems to have been the self of the Enlightenment, which boasted of understanding its novelty and was much preoccupied with the famous
"quarrel between the ancients and the moderns." But
with an unbroken tradition of perfect respectability that stretches from Socrates to Locke" (Strauss 1953, that there is clearly some 165). Scholars recognize thinkers, but they are thing new in the early modern dubious of the claims to fundamen understandably tal originality that they occasionally make, primarily these claims are surrounded because by longer and
more ters on statements emphatic which indicate?at clearly religion least, and to related mat nonesoteric
somehow this crucial perspective was lost. It is certainly not the view prevailing today. cen A revisionist view took over in the nineteenth when the reaction the romantic tury against Enlight
enment and the turn away from reason to tradition
readers?a continuing tradition (1952c, 1-5).

Strauss's rediscovery
dependence
of
on
the Christian
then, was
esotericism,
for his the crucial precondition moderns" theme: for his rejection
phy of "continuity" and "secularization"
"ancients famous of the historiogra

and his recov
inclined a new generation of historians?especially the "historical school" of Savigny and Gierke?to down the play the radicalness of this break and to emphasize essential continuity of the tradition reaching back from modern times to ancient Greek and Roman thought.
Moreover, the postenlightenment reaction also in
ery of the radical but partly hidden break in western to decouple it possible classical thought that makes the relentless downward from spiral and philosophy of modern philosophy. self-destruction
volved a return to Christianity and an effort to reinter terms. As Strauss in Christian pret the enlightenment puts it, "from this [Christian] reaction to the Enlight itself [became] interpreted enment, the Enlightenment
as Christianly motivated." He adds, referring to esoteri
4. The New Philosophy
Interpretation of Classical
cism: "and this succeeds because the Enlightenment had always accommodated reasons, itself, for political to Christianity. The thus created fable convenue is the basis of the view ruling today" (1983a, 112, emphasis in the original). One example of "the view ruling today" is the widespread claim?found in different forms in and others?that the enlight Hegel, Dilthey, Weber,
enment modern, represents, but merely not a radical break with of Christian the a "secularization" pre and
This decoupling of ancient thought from modern was of course just a first step. Strauss then needed to demon
strate that classical rationalism, "theoretical" unlike modern, was
actually
tique of
able to defend
reason, both
itself against
the historicist
and "experiential."
cri
not able He believed, however, that itwas manifestly to defend itself?so in the long as it was understood traditional way, a way decisively methods shaped by of interpretation that presuppose the truth of histori
cism. have To seen, escape for this a new, Strauss circle, nonhistoricist saw the need, as we of interpretation
thought. especially of Protestant on the history of western Subsequent scholarship has been philosophy largely shaped by these two re visionist views, which one may call the "continuity thesis" and the "secularization thesis." Nietzsche and see who the whole of Western rationalism, Heidegger,
notwithstanding its inner mutations, as more or less of a
thought. His recovery of the art of esoteric shows that the classical philoso interpretation?which phers were not so much reflecting their times as hiding classical
from them?opened the way to a comprehensive, new
piece, would also seem to be heirs of this later tradition of historiography.4

Strauss seeks to revive the more earlier a idea of a radi
cal rift. But

to recover
once
in
lost, this view
is extremely
superficial
difficult
way.
anything
than
of classical thought that was not only understanding more genuine, in his view, but also more able to fend off the historicist critique. it is not possible here to elaborate in any Obviously, detail Strauss's interpretation of ancient thought. But let me briefly touch on three central aspects of that that are both crucial to the reply to his interpretation toricism and that depend on esoteric reading. Classical Skepticism.
or Strauss extreme returned
The
See the excellent of the continuity discussion thesis and the secular ization thesis in Tanguay 2001. On Heidegger's reliance on Savigny and the historical 2001 4nl. For Strauss's critique school, see Velkley of the most famous version of the secularization the thesis, Weber's see from decayed Calvinism, ory of the origin of modern capitalism see Strauss 1991, Strauss and secularization, 1953, 60n22. On Hegel 191-92. See also Strauss 1989e, 82-83, 95.
first aspect
of classical
is the mini
rational via medieval lat the
malism ism.
thought on via Maimonides the and, thought, especially ter's It is with Alfarabi. recommendation, express
skepticism to classical
help of these thinkers, who speak explicitly of their own esotericism and that of the classical writers, that
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of the phe Strauss was led to his own rediscovery nomenon. And guided by Alfarabi's esoteric reading of Plato, Strauss came to the view that the true Platonic does not differ essentially from the philosopher?who not the dog Socratic or Aristotelian philosopher?was matic metaphysician who knows the Ideas but rather the zetetic skeptic who knows his own ignorance and who lives inwonder and questioning. Strauss found cru cial confirmation for this unorthodox reading of Plato
in another long-neglected source, Xenophon?a writer
typically
man nalists
detached
from and contemptuous

realm; they the necessary,
of the hu
are and ratio the
things,
the merely mortal the universal, seeking
eternal. It follows that true wisdom is the preserve not of the philosophers but of the poets who immerse themselves in human life, who know it from the inside, and who are able to imitate and articulate the unique of the human in all its inescapable experience partic
ularity, new contingency, interpretation, and the changeableness. to meet need In this Strauss's fundamen
who, since the end of the eighteenth century, had been as philosophically dismissed for the good superficial reason that if one does not see the esoteric depths of his
Socratic writings Strauss's one sees only the sometimes charm
tal difficulty?the to skeptical ra inevitable challenge tionalism posed by divine and poetic wisdom?is the and the defining task of classical political philosophy
core meaning of the Socratic revolution.
ing, sometimes
In
boring recollections
new, skeptical
of a retired general.
of clas
interpretation
rationalism, Xenophon:
Socrates mology was that his
sical
derived
from Alfarabi,
Plato
and
But this is not at all the teaching of the surface of the Platonic of the conventional schol dialogs?or on it?which based rather in Strauss's hold, arship
words, that "the opposite, or the opponent, of classi
so far from knowledge
committed being was knowledge
cos to a specific of ignorance.
It is knowledge of ignorance is not ignorance. Knowledge of the elusive character of the truth, of the whole. Socrates, man character in the light of the mysterious then, viewed familiar therefore that we are more He held of the whole. as man the ultimate of man than with with the situation causes man of that situation. We may also say that he i.e., viewed of the see in the light of the unchangeable and permanent problems. ideas, (1959d,
cal political philosophy is sophistry, the teaching and is the the practice of the Greek sophists." Socrates the great defender of virtue and citizen-philosopher, justice against the sophists. But in Strauss's esoteric reading, it is not the sophists but the poets who are
truly central. "The great the alternative to classical politi
cal philosophy
question
is poetry." Again:
character
"I limit myself

and claim of
to the
classi
concerning
cal political
problem
philosophy,
it tried
to the question
to solve, concerning
concerning
the obsta
the
fundamental
38-39;
which
1989d, 262). and skeptical way, clas in this minimalist Understood a smaller target for much sical philosophy presents
attack. On this basis, of modern classical rationalism remains rela
cle it tried to overcome. That problem and that obsta of cle appeared clearly in Aristophanes' presentation For "Aristophanes' Socrates" (1989f, 169,171,168-69). is the most of Socrates important docu presentation
ment available to us on the ancient disagreement and
tively unscathed
ology, the rise
by such things as the refutation

science?and by the
of tele
"theoret
ical" critique of reason that forms the second ground for example, On this interpretation, of historicism. classical rationalism escapes the central Heideggerian identifies "being" with "in charge that it dogmatically or "object" (1953, 30; 1989d, 262). Similarly, telligible" that the aforementioned it is only on this interpretation amid the flux of historical evidence?the persistence,
answers, of the same fundamental questions? may be
as such" between poetry and philosophy opposition (1966, 311).5 of this second The crucial significance interpre the surface, the real prob tive claim is this: beneath classical political philosophy lem that Socrates?and was something quite similar to the generally?faced in Strauss's that confronts philosophy great problem and our own time: the double challenge of religion and,
not peals Socrates of course to many was historicism, of the same but poetry?for and poetry experiences ap phenomena a
of philosophy taken as a decisive vindication against "No more the claims of historicism. [than the perma to legitimize philos nence of the problems] is needed ophy in the original Socratic sense" (1953, 32). Re and Poetry. The Double Challenge of Religion is the second key lated to this emphasis on skepticism of classical thought: aspect of Strauss's reinterpretation with religion and the centrality of the confrontation "in the true the that if is For it philosopher poetry.
original Socratic sense" possesses no completed means meta
as does historicism.
in many
Indeed,
the Nietzschean
restatement
attack on
of the
respects
as epitomized by Aristophanes poetic (see 1966, 3-8; 1989f, 103). Thus, the main purpose on Strauss's of the dialogs of Plato and Xenophon, ancient attack
esoteric reading, is to show how Socrates, by virtue
was able turn to political of his unique philosophy, life successfully to defend the philosophic against this to its legitimacy, the religious and the double challenge poetic (or "historicist"). is not only able Indeed, Socratic political rationalism to defend itself, in Strauss's view, but also to form the
basis of a counterattack against historicism and against
physical
character
system but lives "in the light of the mysterious

of the whole," through what can he
in the face of the sacred claims defend his rationalism if we have no of the city and the poets? Similarly, if of the larger whole, certain theoretical knowledge of we must fall back on our direct human experience
the human?well, isn't the philosopher very clumsy
for this, as is classically argued by ill-equipped are Clouds? For, the philosophers in the Aristophanes and
5 to is nothing that has caused me Nietzsche: "...there Consider on Plato's than the hap more meditate secrecy and sphinx nature there the pillow of his deathbed petit fait that under pily preserved or nor anything was found no "Bible," Pythagorean, Egyptian, a volume of Aristophanes" Platonic?but (1966, 41).
287
Esotericism
and the Critique
of Historicism
May2006
un its third, "experiential" basis. Radical historicism derstands itself to rest ultimately on a unique inner ex that has been granted to the late perience of historicity modern mind like a revelation. But Strauss suggests that this unique "discovery of History" may in fact be "an arbitrary interpretation of phenomena which had known and had been been which always interpreted much more adequately of 'the prior to the emergence historical consciousness' than afterward" (1953,32,33). That more Strauss tries to adequate interpretation,
show, can be found in Socrates' sympathetic under
romanticism
and
historicism?as
exhaustive,
a habit
of that stems from and hides the basic presupposition modern thought. But standing opposed to both of these which harmonist views is the classical understanding,
denies that practice rules theory or theory, practice.
there is an unbridgeable gulf, a fundamental or the two?which between incompatibility opposition to protect must therefore be mediated by esotericism, Rather
each Thus, from the the other. third element of Strauss's new un
derstanding
of
classical
thought?the
a direct attack on
theory
historicism
of
to the challenge of poetic standing of and response wisdom. To put it differently, through his esoteric in of Plato, Xenophon, and Aristophanes, terpretations of the So Strauss brings out the striking resemblance cratic turn to the historicist turn?and the fundamental superiority of the former to the latter. The Theory of Esotericism: The Conflict of Theory and Practice. The third theme of Strauss's esoteric tension reading of classical thought is the necessary between the philosopher and the city, theory and prac tice. This theme follows from the first two, from So cratic skepticism and the critique of poetry and re cannot be skeptics: they have and For cities ligion. need their certainties. And because these certainties cannot be grounded in reason, they require divine and
support. poetic sion between Therefore, rationalism there and social is an inescapable between ten existence,
esotericism?constitutes
It (as well as on the modern harmonist view generally). holds that the philosopher's deepest knowledge?the not an that makes him a philosopher?is knowledge expression of his society's beliefs for the simple reason could never that this socially destructive knowledge form the basis of a society. His truths are not the ex pression of his historical actuality because such truths in any historical actuality. The could not be embodied is based argues that historicism theory of esotericism on a fundamentally incorrect understanding of the re lation of reason and history (see 1952a, 7-8, 21; 1993, 66, 75-76).
THE GROWTH OF HISTORICISM FROM THE ABANDONMENT OF ESOTERICISM

The connection
more
the philosopher's
theory and practice.
way of life and the citizen's,
between
between
complex and
historicism
more
and esotericism
than I have
is even
intimate
Once absent again, this is a theme almost wholly from the traditional on classical thought. scholarship But here we have a theme that not only derives from esoteric of reading but also points to the derivation esoteric writing. It is largely because philosophy and
the city are that inherently philosophers another, opposed, must are write dangerous esoterically. one to
indicated, as will be seen ifwe turn now to the question of the historical causes of historicism. Recall that Strauss follows a two-part strategy in con fronting historicism. The first part, which we have now is the effort to revive nonhistoricist discussed, thought
at its peak?Socratic skeptical rationalism?by distin
Now, this fact, in turn, points to a more direct and essential relation between esotericism and historicism
than and same we have seen are, thus are far. What two classical esotericism answers what is to the the re historicism fundamental opposing namely, and
question;
lation between
rationalism and
theory
politics,
and practice,
thought
that is, between

action, reason and
it from narrow and dogmatic modern ratio guishing nalism (the "ancients-moderns" then by distinction), a new interpretation of it that is untainted producing and historiographical meth by historicist assumptions ods, and finally by showing that, properly understood, it is capable of defending itself against the theoretical historicist critique of reason and, what is more, that it
constitutes a superior interpretation of the fundamen
history? Generally speaking, two answers are possible: either they are in harmony or opposition. The belief in a harmony of and theory Strauss will argue, is the defining char practice?which, acteristic of modern thought?itself logically divides into two opposite on which of the forms, depending
two forces is seen as dominant. Thus, one view is
tal experiences at the root of historicism. It also leads to a superior understanding of the relation of theory
and practice, reason and history.
The second part of Strauss's response is to apply to itself, as a consistent historicism requires: historicism to give an historical explanation of the modern mind's
strange causal compulsion account of to "always historicism historicize." is naturally came Strauss's quite com
that of the Enlightenment to which theory according is in harmony with practice because it is able to rule practice, to bring society into accord with reason. The still harmonist?view is the historicist opposite?but to which theory is in harmony with thesis, according serves practice, being an practice because it ultimately outgrowth or expression of existing social life (see 1993, 65-66, 71, 75). are We in the habit of this fa regarding
mous opposition?Enlightenment rationalism versus
plex, but one

modern historical
important
strand of it is this: "the rise of

simultaneously
consciousness
with
the interruption of the tradition of esotericism" there is a crucial causal con (1952a, 58). Somehow, nection between the decline in the practice of esoteric reading and writing and the rise of historicism. This is
the in fact, for three case, The first we have already distinct seen. reasons. Over the last two cen
turies, the forgetfulness
of esotericism
has led modern
288
American
Political
Science Review
Vol. 100, No. 2
readers
the merely
to identify
exoteric
the true thought of past writers with

and conventional surface of their
error has led to the writings. This crucial interpretive of overestimate systematic disagreement philosophic the false appearance that all and has also produced human thought is merely the reflection of prevailing
conventions.
secularization (1953, self-legitimating 1959d, 40-41, 51; 1989e, 83-89; 1991, 1989d, 242-45).
This great modern effort to eliminate
13-16, 33, 178; 106n5, 210-12;

all transcen
But the rise of historicism, Strauss will argue, derives not only from the decline of esoteric reading but also from the decline of esoteric and more fundamentally writing. If the classics were right regarding the essen then the tial incompatibility of theory and practice, reduction or removal of the esoteric shield that protects from each other must eventu society and philosophy to arises, according ally do harm to both. Historicism
Strauss, of these as two a reaction harms. against or consequence of each
dence, to unify theory and practice, initially took the In such thinkers as form of enlightenment rationalism. the traditional Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, and Diderot, to keep theory and attempt of classical esotericism life from the corro practice apart, to shelter political It was sive effects of philosophic reason, was discarded. the enlightenment replaced by its opposite: project to or scientific knowledge disseminate in the philosophic the world of practice hope of progressively bringing
into conformity with reason.6
5. Historicism
as
a Reaction
to the Harm
to Society Resulting of Esotericism

To find the historical modern phenomenon,
modernity itself. On
from the Decline
a uniquely origins of historicism, one must look to the origins of

Strauss's reading, we have seen,
were primar the philosophic initiators of modernity to the moved kingdom of darkness by opposition ily or what he calls "antitheological ire" (1959d, 44; see level, this means 1987a, 294). On the deepest they sought to assure themselves of the falsity of the claims of revelation (see 1958, 231; 1987b, 296-97). Believing
that a theoretical refutation of revelation?one based
But as history teaches (along with the contemporary of modernization in third-world countries), experience reason on the world this unleashing of theoretical a host of of practice, whatever its benefits, produced It led to a dangerous universalism, problems. political and ideological doctrinairism, imperialism epitomized by the French Revolution (and, later, the Communist it uprooted peoples from their ancient tra revolution); ditions and local customs; it fostered alienation, skep and the decay of traditional mores. ticism, materialism, The great Enlightenment effort to make men more rooted and at home on earth was having precisely the opposite of its intended effect. These political dangers were first pointed out by the
great romantics and conservatives who rose up in reac
tion against the Enlightenment, starting with Rousseau the "his and Burke. It is these thinkers?and especially took the crucial turn to history. torical school"?who
Of course, having rediscovered the classical insight con
not possible, on a completed metaphysics?was they were forced into the realm of practice. Revelation refuted by history, could be refuted "experimentally," as it were, if philosophers their con would abandon and actively conspire to create templative detachment a new world of justice and prosperity, a world in which men could be wholly "at home," attached, and satisfied, of religion and thus a world in which the phenomenon to wither could be observed and religious experience (1987c, 12-13). that thinkers demanded this end, the modern theory abandon the Utopian form of classical thought it root itself in the actual and become "realistic"?that and the practical?so that, on one hand, it would be in transforming the world, and powerful and effective
so that, on the other, it would avoid erecting standards
cerning politics,
and
the danger they might

to the
rationalism poses to that undiluted that conflict simply have accepted

classical solution of esotericism. In
returned
away To
transcend and so devalue historical that permanently against all transcendent reality. They set themselves a of all notions standards, "beyond," both religious in other words, the and philosophical. They demanded,
harmonization or unification of theory and practice:
forward toward historicism because, stead, they moved and seemingly total opposition for all their passionate in the de tomodernity, modern thinkers remained they cisive respect: they were still at war with the "kingdom of darkness" and still clung to the underlying, modern that also moti strategy to unify theory and practice vated their Enlightenment opponents. They merely saw in the necessity of pursuing that strategy of unification an opposite way by subordinating thought to social to pre reality instead of the reverse. They endeavored vent or combat the harms done by theory to practice by thought theory within practice, by making imbedding reason ground itself in local tradition, by historicizing 1972, 285). (1953,13-16; In Strauss's telling, the long, tortured history of mod ern philosophy is largely the story of the conflict be
tween reason and social life unleashed by the aban
donment
6
of esotericism.
The more
that philosophic
of the ideal and

and source the is, of of the
the historically
rational and the
actual,
real. By
of the ought
overcoming
these classical ground human

and so rootedness,
dualisms,
they hoped
to eliminate
to remove
every
every
alienation
or dissatisfaction,
the actual, to seal off the of appeal beyond from claiming to be higher, everything sphere
to produce an an absolute attachment, this-worldliness, unqualified and loyalty, a and thus
because Of course the modern thinkers, precisely they were trying ran an increased to change risk of persecution. the world, Thus, a loose form of esotericism to protect forced to employ they were different from strict, classical But this is fundamentally themselves. it saw the and because it was more esotericism because transparent as a tem conflict of reason and society or the danger of persecution soon efforts, would that, through their enlightening porary problem be overcome (see Strauss 1952a, 33-34).
289
Esotericism
and the Critique
of Historicism
May2006 about the modern mind that leads it to find historicism so immediately plausible?
moved liberated by the Enlightenment, rationalism, more into the the it open, aggressively posed dan life and thus the gers to healthy moral and political more it generated a hostility toward reason. This led to
persecution far worse among among non-philosophers the philosophers?to but La to something des trahison
Historicism
answer we
is True?of
have seen.
Modern
Our
Thought.
of
Part of the
esotericism
ignorance
of phi clercs, the flight from reason, the politicization antirationalism. For, the losophy, the rise of philosophic modern philosophers, impressed by the social dangers of reason but unwilling to abandon the modern hope to reason and eliminate all transcendence by harmonizing were ever more to in life, engage political compelled
extreme efforts to reinterpret and tame reason, to force
causes us to mistake the conventional and historically for the true surface parochial teaching in the writings of past philosophers.
But For has a Strauss variety worked of another, provides deeper the modern he suggests, reasons, a very unusual itself into and also answer. mind unnatu
it into the service of practical 256-63, 302-23). Thus arose

ative to "always historicize"?the
life (1953,13-16, the great modern

visceral
26, 252, imper

of
suspicion
to humble rationalism and the eagerness still it?that us. (It is most visible today in a to move continues truth are form: rationalism and universal popularized
dangerous because they encourage persecution and
ral condition?what he occasionally calls, playing on the "cave beneath the the famous Platonic metaphor, see Meier 1994, cave" (1952a, 155; 1987c, 112n2,37-38; term for the imbedded 3n2). "The cave" is Plato's ness of the human mind in its historical situation. For Plato, we naturally grow up in a cave of prejudice and from the limitations of the human illusion?deriving
senses and the arbitrary conventions of social life. But
imperialism; truth is culturally

esotericism?the
we must
all therefore strive to see that in relative.) This is how the decline
of the classical effort
abandonment
to insulate practice from theory, to hide from politics?has contributed powerfully of historicism.7
philosophy to the rise
6. Historicism as an Effect of the Harm to Philosophy Resulting from the Decline of Esotericism
Strauss's explanation of the historical origins of histori cism also points to a second and still more direct way in which the decline of esotericism to the contributed rise of historicism. the develop Earlier, we discussed ment of historicism in terms of the growth of the im to?the perative profound need and desire for?such a view. The political dangers of enlightenment ratio nalism and ultimately the theological problem created a need within modern thought to deny all transcen
dence, a need to see theoretical reason as subordinate
at the same time, these elemental illusions tend to be so that there crude and riddled with contradictions, to follow for is a clear dialectical those willing path, these illusions and into the light it, leading beyond of reality. In speaking of the cave beneath the cave, has created for Strauss suggests that modern thought itself a second, artificial layer of prejudice and historical one that, being a product of philo entrapment?and is much more difficult to escape. The sophical thought, in its historical modern mind is uniquely imprisoned
situation.
With this strange-seeming claim, Strauss is just giving to the observation his own elaboration of a long line of thinkers?Schiller, and Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger
among them?to the effect that modern thought, es
is pecu pecially as compared with ancient thought, it lacks direct connection liarly abstract and derivative:
of to pretheoretical, touch with commonsense the sources of its It experience. own premises, is out con
to practice and incapable of transcending its histori cal situation. But it still remains to ask: how did the
modern thinkers come to be not only so eager, but also
1967, cepts, and questions (see Schiller 1966; Hegel 94; Husserl 1970, 366-67, 373-75; Strauss 1959a, 75, 1983, 31; Klein 1968, 117-25, 1985, 65-84). Because of this, when we moderns study the thought of some
earlier modern philosopher have the same or even when we consider
so able to embrace the historicist thesis? Historicism is not one of those perennial philosophical positions, if desired. Almost all past ages seem always available to have found it quite implausible. What is it, then,
our own
almost
thought
in an honest
and reflective
we
way, we
are struck
always
experience:
Not that this was the only root of the will to historicism. More was the original, fundamental the underlying project of modernity: to make man absolutely effort at home in his time and place and therefore manifestly to a religious indifferent beyond. Historicism is the ultimate of this original, modern antitranscendent expression impulse. But this impulse arrived all the quicker at its final, historicist destination because its first incarnation, rationalism, Enlightenment their own, more evils that generated produced political immediately reason to history. Still, this latter for subordinating practical motives concern does not stand on its own, because would not philosophers have been so vitally concerned with these merely problems political if the primary modern project had not first given them a fundamen tal stake in?a theoretical concern with?the course of political and religious history.
by the fact that this thought is based on presuppositions that remain unproved and even unexamined, that it is based on ideas and attitudes that were inherited from some time in the past and never radically questioned. In short, our repeated experience is of the historical
the imbeddedness, we moderns is why our own inner historicity, naturally of our own minds. That gravitate to historicism
and find it so immediately

experience.
plausible:
it corresponds
to
to Strauss, then, there is a relative truth According to historicism: it is true of modern thought. Somehow the modern mind, for all its proud claims to liberation, is actually more enslaved to its history and traditions,
more trapped in a cave, than was the case in earlier ages.
And
then modern
by naively
thinkers compound their particular generalizing
this problem situation?the
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100,
No. 2
historicity
man thought
of their own minds?attributing

as such.
it to all hu
example,
negative
or
conquering
posture
toward
as the Source of the Historic The Idea of Progress Modern To account for the rise of ity of Thought. in modern historicism times, as Strauss is attempting to do, it remains to explain why modern thought is so out of touch with its so abstract and self-ignorant, own foundations, and thus so trapped in its historical
cave. Strauss cites a number of different factors. First,
the unity of theory and took this as practice?and subsequent generations their starting point. To be sure, modern thought is char and disagreement, acterized by great turbulence but for
mainly because each successive generation has gone
nature
or
a demand
further
Rousseau
in the same direction.

reworks Locke;
Locke
Kant
reworks Hobbes;
reworks Rousseau;
modern
thought rests on a long tradition of philoso phy stretching back two thousand years, and it is the nature of tradition to cause many things to be taken this philosophical for granted and forgotten. Second, in ways tradition was for a very long time intertwined, now difficult to disentangle, with a tradition of rev and unquestioning elation, of intellectual acceptance
obedience.
senses that Hegel reworks Kant; and so forth. Everyone one has to study the to study any modern philosopher, up to his time, because modern history of philosophy is a historical every thinker is sequence: philosophy left picking up the ball where the preceding generation
it. As Strauss often asserts, there is a "modern a common sui generis. Modern enterprise. never make They philosophers a truly new project," are never
beginning.
Third, modern through an in philosophy emerged and classical revolt medieval thought. against dignant has had two character of modernity This polemical It has made difficult for it particularly consequences. thinkers to recognize, beneath all their noisy modern the degree and character of their contin opposition, on earlier thought. And it has given ued dependence
modern philosophy a reactive and academic charac
Now, ifmodern thought as a whole rests on the idea of progress, what does this methodological posture do to philosophy? The idea of progress means that the are laid by one thinker, the conclusions are premises
drawn at a later date by others. Thus, progress has
did not itmeans that modern philosophy ter, because with the arise "naturally" from a direct confrontation or from wonder at the permanent riddles phenomena of life, but from a reaction against an already existing ideas. In other words, classical body of philosophical life and was defined against nonphilosophic philosophy the realm of commonsense "opinion" out of which it by contrast, is defined philosophy, emerged. Modern an false against scholasti philosophy, existing against
cism, and so has a far more academic and historically
character (Strauss 1989c, 49-50; 1959d, 27 contingent 29; 1959a, 73-77; 1987c, 37-38, 112n2; 1952a, 154-58; see Klein 1968,117-25). that is most But the feature of modern thought ac and historicity, for its self-ignorance responsible on the idea reliance to is its famous Strauss, cording to being practical In its commitment of progress. in its resulting need fi effective?and and politically and arrive at settled skepticism nally to overcome
answers?modern rationalism embraces a kind of hy
out over time. It of spreading philosophy from his own the philosopher separates temporally his thought historical. foundations and thus makes makes the more The more that philosophy progress, its basic presuppositions?what they are, how they to are to be justified, and what the real alternatives lost in the past and unavailable them are?become modern to it. In other words, from the beginning, itself and progressive?prided thought?enlightened in its freedom from tradition and its willing especially anew. But the great irony ness to question everything creates a new, is that the belief in progress necessarily more inescapable kind of tradition. Under the sway of this idea, not just religion or custom, but philosophy itself prompts one to accept the teachings of the past the effect
without serious examination and move on. All modern
it hopes once and for all to lay perfoundationalism: and on this foundations down solid, even indubitable, edifice of basis to build up a great and ever-increasing In a word, it seeks to make philos reliable knowledge. like the technical arts. ophy progressive, This idea [of progress]
questions generations can erect structure. (Strauss can can on In 1959a, be settled
is why thinkers stand on the shoulders of giants?that their thought is so ungrounded. of times in modern In the sum, growth not of now the development, historicism?meaning the will to such a view, but of the inner sense of its largely due to the rise of the idea of plausibility?is progress. For this latter idea is what caused modern on its own his to be so uniquely dependent philosophy cave a the cave. in beneath and traditions, tory trapped the modern mind, And eventually judging of things
from its own inner experience, came to its unique "in
sight," which all earlier ages had found implausible: of all human thought. historical imprisonment
the
implies that the most

once and their once for laid all an so further
elementary
that future but
with dispense the foundations the
discussion,
this way, 76).
foundations
ever-growing are covered up.
and the Decline The Rise of Progress of Esotericism. If the idea of progress was crucial in this way to the then what does all this have to rise of historicism, in the modern and its decline do with esotericism answer idea of esotericism the is The that period?
and of progress are opposites?opposite conceptions
of how is clearest in the field of nat

modern philoso foundations. characterizes
philosophy
(Earlier,
should
we
relate
saw that
to its own
esotericism
roots
is,
or
in a
This progressive
ural science, but
attitude
also
different
enlightenment
sense,
the opposite
rationalism?opposite
of both
historicism
concerning
and
how
phy
as a whole.
The
basic
Hobbes,
foundations
and
were
Descartes?for
laid by
Machiavelli,
Bacon,
philosophy
should relate to political
practice).
Because
291
Esotericism
and the Critique
of Historicism
May2006
of this essential opposition, the decline of esotericism was the crucial precondition for the rise in modernity of the idea of progress and therewith of historicism. The point here is this. We have seen that the of progress tends to historicize methodology philo sophical thinking by putting a thinker out of touch with or presuppositions. his foundations But the practice of esotericism?considering it now in its pedagogical to have the precise op and use?is meaning designed it permits, indeed forces, posite effect: when successful, a thinker to examine and fully appropriate his founda tions. There are at least two distinct ways in which
esotericism exercises this self-appropriating function.
escape
dependence
on
such
unexamined
presupposi
must be tions, then the primary task of philosophy forward to elaborate come, not moving progressively its principles, but moving backward to search its origins
and not foundations. progress, but In a word, return. philosophy must embrace,
The philosophical need for return to the ordinary is an imperative Strauss shares with and pretheoretical thinkers, such as Husserl, Heidegger, many late modern in Strauss's and Wittgenstein?although, view, the truest fulfillment of this need is rather to be found in the famous Socratic turn, that is, his return to the with human things. No matter how high philosophy,
divine madness, soars toward the sun, it must always
First, the esoteric writer, by hiding his true thoughts, refuses to give the philosophic reader anything that he can take on authority or take for granted. By limit ing himself to hints and puzzles, he forces the reader to rediscover everything for himself. Such compulsion
is necessary because philosophy has a natural ten
recollect
its origin
of
in and continued
dependence
on the
the test
the world cave, commonsense
the opinion, of things. surface
average-everyday, It must continually
dency
to
to decay
over
time?to
people
turn
tend
into a tradition,
to accept too
as they present itself by returning to the phenomena to the ordinary, prephilosophic conscious themselves
ness.
"historicize"?because
But here
losophy of
is the great problem

return: once one leaves
that confronts
the cave,
a phi
it is very
and unquestioningly the conclusions of the passively of the past. This tendency is deadly great philosophers to genuine philosophy which requires that one always think everything and for through from the beginning oneself. In the modern period, this dangerous natural to rely on the findings of others was artifi tendency cially strengthened by the idea of progress which turns this very tendency into a virtue, into a philosophical method. whereas such dependence is harmful to For, it is very useful for system clarity and self-knowledge, building. But premodern rationalism, which seeks not to build aware of just systems but to see clearly, is exquisitely this danger to philosophy. It puzzles over the question: how do you transmit to others something that can never be given from without, but only generated genuinely from within? The answer it found is esotericism: by hiding the truth in the right way, one entices others to discover it for themselves. Esotericism is the liter of the Socratic method. A properly ary counterpart esoteric text does not allow the philosophic reader to on the writer or on foundations form a dependence laid in the past; rather it artfully compels him to develop and rely on his own inner powers. In precise opposition to the method of progress, esotericism is a device for them forcing thinkers to be self-reliant, for constraining to stand, not on the shoulders of others and thus within history, but on their own two feet. Esotericism
There also
to return to it.As Socrates remarks, difficult genuinely one's eyes can no longer see in the dark (Republic 516eff). Few things are more difficult than trying to
regain over, lost this innocence loss of access or to become or awareness naive again. More is not confined
to the philosophers but afflicts to some themselves, extent the society around them. Even where there is no deliberate of popular cultivation enlightenment, or science within a the very existence of philosophy culture tends to modify or distort its natural, prephilo
sophic consciousness. The second danger to philoso
is to a certain extent a phy, then, is this: philosophy self-undermining activity because, to remain healthy, it awareness of its origins in the world needs to maintain of pretheoretical and yet it inevitably tends experience,
to obscure cessible. Now, in the modern period, this second natural dan or transform that world, to render it inac
has been, once again, artificially ger to philosophy the ideas of progress and enlighten strengthened by ment. The great, but obstructed task for philosophy is return; but the idea of progress proclaims that the is rather to move ever for proper task of philosophy ward, without looking back. It teaches that the ori
gin, the prescientific, commonsense world is a realm
of mere scended
liberate
as Preserving
seems to be
and folklore that should be tran superstition and forgotten. Similarly, the related idea of involves modern in the de enlightenment philosophy
attempt to transform popular awareness, a new sci ag to
the Possibility
a second way
of Return.
in which
abolish
scientific form entific of
traditional
commonsense consciousness, culture. In
esotericism?in to the methodology of opposition crucial in enabling the philosophic mind progress?is to appropriate its own foundations, although I am less certain that I understand Strauss correctly on this point. It concerns a second natural danger to the genuinely life. Even if a thinker remains free of ex philosophic cessive reliance on others, his thought may still rest on certain fundamental of which he presuppositions aware. That, of course, is the core of is insufficiently the historicist If philosophy is to hope to critique.
society
and the old world
of pre
to replace and it with a secularized, disenchanted, these modern ways, philosophy
tears up its own roots and closes off every gressively access to the pretheoretical world. It climbs up a ladder and then throws that ladder away. That is why mod
ern thought awareness is so that un-Socratic, comes only so from lacking in the self continually returning
to and grounding
life.
oneself
in the experiences
of ordinary
292
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Science Review
Vol. 100, No. 2
Classical
markably
thought
concrete,
avoids
self-aware,
these evils?it
and rooted
remains
in ordinary
re
experience?because and enlightenment

are just formidable seen, classical natural
not of progress it is a philosophy but of return. And, though there

obstacles possesses commonsense, thought as we to return, a device for have deal
the bounds set by this latter con activity. But within if not heighten, cern, Plato does also seek to preserve, the moral and religious hopes, longings, and beliefs of the pretheoretical world.
To all summarize having the second revived skeptical half the of Strauss's over to seeks argument, historicism?Socratic alternative great rationalism?he
ing with
protect
these:
and
through
the
esotericism,
the philosophers
pretheoretical
preserve
awareness of the city. They do not allow it to be cor rupted or degraded by their own theoretical pursuits.
In other words, Strauss often emphasizes that Socrates
to give an historical account of the unique modern to historicism. He traces the historicist susceptibility
imperative?the need to see reason as imbedded in
because he became practiced esotericism fully aware on the city. But this dependence is of his dependence not limited to his bodily needs?of which, presumably,
earlier thinkers were not unaware. It is also and es
on the city as the dependence pecially an intellectual It of prephilosophical natural repository experience. is this he seeks to protect. Esotericism is, then, the of return: it for a philosophy necessary supplement to needs to which to that preserve philosophy helps it from the effects of philosophy. return?preserve self for the inherently It is the natural corrective it pos itmakes character of philosophy: undermining sible for philosophic activity to live safely side by side awareness that it needs. with the prephilosophic has also a This preservative aspect of esotericism second dimension. Esoteric writings help to secure the access to the pretheoretical perspective philosophers' within that perspective not only by protecting living it in and preserving society but also by presenting the writings books. As Strauss frequently emphasizes, have a unique direct of classical political philosophy
ness, freshness, and concreteness that are not to be
to a reaction against the political dan history?largely es abandoned gers that resulted when philosophers oteric restraint in favor of crusading Enlightenment rationalism. More ultimately, he traces it to the modern effort to combat "the kingdom of darkness" through the denial of all transcendence, including that of theory
over practice.
Strauss also tries to explain the genesis of the that of the modern mind inner experience unique not only desirable causes but it to find historicism thought, he argues, is immediately plausible. Modern from classical thought in that different fundamentally to ground philosophy the former attempts through progress and the latter through return. Classical phi to legitimize itself, to illuminate losophy endeavored and test its basic presuppositions, through the constant with the world of prephilo return to and confrontation to preserve (relying on esotericism sophic experience in the face of this con that world from transformation But
frontation).
their surface found in modern writings because?on as distinguished from their depth?they deliberately the ordinary citizen's perspective adopt and elaborate on political things. They do not look down on the po outside litical world from some scientific standpoint
and above, but rather take on the internal, practical,
point of view. These writings are for prephilosophical to every kind of excessive ever the great corrective are of Socratic simplicity agents They sophistication. and return, helping one to recall and to get back in
touch with elemental, pretheoretical their access commonsense.
Modern hope that thought is built on the opposite and dis success in its enlightening, transforming, by in the world and by its continual progress enchanting the kinds of things that it can explain, all explaining of the kinds of things that to or experience testimony it cannot explain will simply wither away. The world of traditional society, with its spirits, gods, and poets, will refuted by history. In short, modern simply disappear, through the thought hopes to legitimize itself precisely obliteration of pretheoretical experience. cut itself off from its But having thus systematically
own roots and foundations, modern "progress philoso
Thus,
a manner
in two ways,
that
the classical philosophers

to the
wrote
prephilo
in
preserved
to its surprise that it rests phy" eventually it has lost of which on choices and presuppositions carries an im awareness. And that is why historicism thinkers that it simply for modern mediate plausibility discovers
did inner not possess experience, for earlier whenever generations: we honestly our recurring is introspect,
is, by hiding esoterically?that sophical. By writing and its pretheo sheltered the truth?they society from corruption. And by writing retical perspective
exoterically?that is, by presenting an alternative, salu
of the historicity But eventually,

esotericism, ings and arguments
of our own historicism

are
thought. facilitates
like restores
the recovery
Strauss's to view read
of
the
tary doctrine on the surface of their writings?they in literary form a version scribed and preserved view. prephilosophical
I am even not claiming, purpose of course, of classical that preserving esotericism.
de of the
the
which?if
something correct?
prephilosophical
the primary
perspective
of the city is the only or

Pre
lost path of Socratic rationalism while also uncovering as the char the hidden history of the rise of historicism a acteristic modern prejudice. This will in turn lead to
genuine postmodernism?which is posthistoricism.8
itself is obviously amore urgent and serving philosophy fundamental aim, and it is one that is in some tension that Plato with the first. It seems clear, for example, ideas about seeks not simply to protect existing Greek
the gods but to reform them in such a way as to make
philosophy
appear
to be a pious
and thus respectable
Strauss argues, as I have tried to show, that the decline Although to the rise of of esoteric writing in the practice greatly contributed be re therefore he did not hold that this practice must historicism, be undone?a somehow stored and the Enlightenment change which to be overturned. He order for historicism he hardly envisioned?in
293
Esotericism
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May2006
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Esotericism and The Critique of Historicism

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Esotericism and the Critique of Historicism Author(s): Arthur M. Melzer Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol.

Esotericism and the Critique of Historicism

increasingly we must accept and local, To avoid

narrative" suspect "grand is fundamentally that reason into historical

arbitrary. this collapse

in a rooted mately between relation the

comprehensive reason and

understanding rationalism history, the

this fateful weakness of the battle

truth and moral-political

the city. But

the theory of esotericism,

of is Professor State University,

309 S. Political Science, MI 48824 East Lansing,

toricize" historicism?to modern mind has been

why the explain historically so completely captivated by the

and the Critique

and by its own,

the truth" (1981, 260).

cient philosophers most part maintain

to the Socratic method?it

to think and troubling.

ished ideal of our time: it is dishonest,

his own writings or (more commonly) Admittedly, though, these statements

those of others. have never been

ories on this subject, partly because

they are suspicious

the prac intellectual

the spell of this histori

THE "CRISIS OF HISTORICISM"

basis, and purpose

esotericism regarding to turn to historicism

compulsion every the

and relations of the Idea,

and the Critique

But a critique of reason of this kind, Strauss argues, only

time.2 Finally, some thinkers?neo-Kantians,

HOW TO CONFRONT HISTORICISM

choice. "The fundamental arbitrary an more fundamental experience

that claim of humble

awe and wonder.

ity is the basic experience

Vol. 100, No. 2 are that

understanding in terms teaching of

and to explain, in these terms, its relentless spiral into historicism.

particular not only

right but also are required,

by the final break with

and the Critique

truth?or, Strauss's thought

worse, answer aspired

Why, start, effect,

by this faulty reasoning?

ESOTERICISM AND THE CRITIQUE

fought as Hobbes of darkness, to us the more clearer we

power?the This will

but 231, This

never emphasis is not

added) of course, that there exist real dis

naively take writings for for insight. esotericism and unique

away from it.

ing ideal of political