This document provides an overview of the key powers and functions of administrative agencies under Philippine administrative law. It discusses agencies' investigatory, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial powers. For investigatory powers, it outlines how agencies can initiate investigations and limits on compelling witness testimony. For quasi-legislative powers, it describes agencies' authority to promulgate rules and regulations with force of law. And for quasi-judicial powers, it examines agencies' authority to adjudicate matters like licensing and rate-setting.
This document provides an overview of the key powers and functions of administrative agencies under Philippine administrative law. It discusses agencies' investigatory, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial powers. For investigatory powers, it outlines how agencies can initiate investigations and limits on compelling witness testimony. For quasi-legislative powers, it describes agencies' authority to promulgate rules and regulations with force of law. And for quasi-judicial powers, it examines agencies' authority to adjudicate matters like licensing and rate-setting.
This document provides an overview of the key powers and functions of administrative agencies under Philippine administrative law. It discusses agencies' investigatory, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial powers. For investigatory powers, it outlines how agencies can initiate investigations and limits on compelling witness testimony. For quasi-legislative powers, it describes agencies' authority to promulgate rules and regulations with force of law. And for quasi-judicial powers, it examines agencies' authority to adjudicate matters like licensing and rate-setting.
L.T.J.F. 2 nd Semester S.Y. 2012-2013 Source: De Leon, Hector. Administrative Law: Text and Cases. (6 th ed. 2010) ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEWER
I. POWERS AND FUNCTIONS
Powers of Administrative Agencies
As to Nature: 1. Investigatory 2. Quasi-Legislative 3. Quasi-Judicial
As to Degree of Subjective Choice 1. Discretionary 2. Ministerial
Exercise of Powers and Functions 1. Discretionary To act officially according to the dictates of one's own judgment Not controlled by the judgment or conscience of others 2. Ministerial Performed in response to a duty imposed by law Mere execution of the law or carrying the law into effect Examples: Ascertaining facts and collecting information Ministerial Weighing pieces of evidence against each other - Discretionary 3. Remedies Arising out of a ministerial function mandamus Arising out of a discretionary function elevating the matter en consulta
II. INVESTIGATORY POWERS
1. Definition Power to inspect, secure or require the disclosure of information, reports records, etc. To require the production of documents This power is conferred on ALL administrative agencies
2. How Exercised Agencies may initiate an investigation: Upon a complaint Upon its own initiative As a mandatory duty
3. Limits of Investigatory Powers Requiring the production of documents is NOT the same as requiring the attendance of witnesses and the giving of testimony General Rule: Administrative agencies have no inherent power to require the attendance of witnesses Exceptions: ATENEO LAW SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 2-D [ATTY. ERENETA] L.T.J.F. 2 nd Semester S.Y. 2012-2013 Source: De Leon, Hector. Administrative Law: Text and Cases. (6 th ed. 2010) When the enabling statute expressly grants such power Through a court process, when a statute expressly provides for such application (eg: court enforcement of a subpoena)
4. Hearing A hearing is not a necessary part of an investigation A requirement that there be an investigation carries with it no command that a quasi- judicial hearing be conducted
5. Contempt Persons failing to obey orders related to an investigative proceeding may be held in contempt But an administrative agency cannot punish a person for contempt absent any statutory grant since this power is inherently vested with the courts
III. QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWERS
1. Conditions a) Statute must be complete in itself setting forth the policy to be implemented b) Statute must have fixed standards stating the boundaries or limits of the agency's authority
2. Binding Force and Effect a) A valid rule or regulation has the force and effect of law b) General Rule: Administrative rules and regulations have no retroactive effect or applications c) Exception: When expressly provided by such rule or regulation or enabling statute d) Power to make implementing or interpretative rule is legislative in character
3. Limitations of Power a) Cannot make rules that defeat the purpose of the enabling statute b) Cannot enlarge, alter, modify or limit the terms of the enabling statute c) Must be uniform in its application or operation d) Must be reasonable and not discriminatory
4. Regulations a) Administrative opinion of what a statute means b) Interpretative in nature c) Construction of the enabling statute d) Have validity in judicial proceedings only to the extent that they are correctly constructed administrative interpretations of the law are always subject to judicial determination e) Resembles judicial adjudication but is still legislative in character f) Entitled to great weight and respect by the courts but are NOT conclusive in nature regulations will be ignored if found to be erroneous g) Contingent Rules and Regulations When the statute takes effect after the happening of a specified event or term Discretion as to the execution of the law and NOT a discretion to make the law ATENEO LAW SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 2-D [ATTY. ERENETA] L.T.J.F. 2 nd Semester S.Y. 2012-2013 Source: De Leon, Hector. Administrative Law: Text and Cases. (6 th ed. 2010) Determination as to whether the event or term, which initiates the effect of the statute, is left to the administrative agency
5. Ordinance Power of the President a) Executive Orders Rules for the implementation or execution of Constitutional or statutory powers
b) Administrative Orders Rules on the aspects of government operations; made in pursuance of duties as administrative head
c) Proclamations Declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest; fixing a date (eg: National Holidays)
d) Memorandum Circulars On matters of internal administration; inter-agency matters
e) General or Special Orders Made in his capacity as commander-in-chief of the Armed Forced of the Philippines
6. Requisites of Validity of Administrative Rules a) Must be issued on the authority of law b) Must not be contrary to law or the Constitution in certain cases, notice and hearing may be required
7. Grant of Rule-Making Powers a) By a legislative act (express) b) By implication of powers granted (implied) c) Example: Power to fix the minimum wage has the implied power to adopt the rules to make it effective
8. Requirements of Reasonableness a) Must bear reasonable relation to the purpose sought to be accomplished b) Supported by reasonable grounds c) Free from constitutional infirmities and arbitrariness
9. Penal Rules and Regulations a) Requisites for validity 1. Enabling statute must itself provide for the imposition of a penalty 2. The statute must fix or define such penalty 3. Violation must be punishable under the enabling law itself the administrative agency merely executes the punishment imposed 4. Rules must be published b) What is delegated is NOT the power to define what constitutes a criminal offense but the power to impose the penalty prescribed by the statute
10. Amendment or Repeal of Rules and Regulations a) Administrative agencies have the authority to modify or repeal the rules it has promulgated b) Discretionary and not subject to judicial approval c) Substantive Requirements for Validity ATENEO LAW SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 2-D [ATTY. ERENETA] L.T.J.F. 2 nd Semester S.Y. 2012-2013 Source: De Leon, Hector. Administrative Law: Text and Cases. (6 th ed. 2010) 1. Made in accordance with statutory procedural requirements (notice and hearing in some cases) 2. No retroactive effect unless authorized by the enabling statute 3. Even if the administrative agency is not bound by res judicata, it cannot repeal its own previous enactment with retroactive effect 4. Procedural rules are liberally construed d) Procedural Requirements for Validity 1. Filing of 3 copies of such regulation or rule at the University of the Philippines Law Center 2. Permanent register shall be kept by the issuing agency 3. Records office of the agency shall carry out the requirements of the Administrative Code 4. The rule or regulation shall become effective 15 days from the date of filing unless otherwise provided or when emergency situations require and earlier date 5. For rules with penal sanctions must be published in full text 6. In fixing of rates no rule shall be valid unless the proposed rates have been published for 2 weeks, at least before the implementation thereof
11. Requirements of Notice and Hearing and/or Publication a) When fixing of rates apply to all enterprises in general (eg: fixing of maximum tuition fees for private schools) Legislative in nature No need for notice and hearing b) When rate fixing applies to specifically named persons Quasi-judicial in nature requires notice and hearing Publication is required as a condition precedent c) When rules are merely internal AND interpretative in nature Acts of regulating the agency and NOT the public Publication is not required
IV. QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS
1. Adjudicatory Function a) Primarily regulatory b) Powers incidental to the administrative duty c) Extent of powers and jurisdiction largely depends on enabling statute d) Grant of power or function must be in the law itself
2. Nature of Particular Acts a) Licensing, Enabling, Approving 1. Discretionary 2. Not quasi-judicial when there are no conflicting claims involved b) Fixing of rates and charges 1. Application to a general class of people or situations Quasi-legislative action No need for prior notice and hearing 2. Application to a specific case or person Quasi-judicial act A need for notice and hearing ATENEO LAW SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 2-D [ATTY. ERENETA] L.T.J.F. 2 nd Semester S.Y. 2012-2013 Source: De Leon, Hector. Administrative Law: Text and Cases. (6 th ed. 2010) c) Requirements for valid rates 1. Not confiscatory in nature 2. Within the requirements of the enabling statute 3. Reasonable 4. Not unjust
3. Classifications of Adjudicatory Powers a) Enabling powers granting or revocation of a permit or authorization b) Directing powers eg: corrective powers of BIR assessors and public utility c) Dispensing powers: Authority to relax a prohibition or exempt a subject (person or agency) from an affirmative duty Sanctions (forgives) a deviation from a standard d) Summary powers power to apply compulsion or force to effectuate a legal purpose without a judicial warrant (eg: abatement of nuisance) e) Equitable powers power to make application of rules of equity (eg: issue injunctions)
4. Delegation to Administrative Agencies a) Legislative Powers 1. Legislature must declare a policy and fix a standard 2. Completeness Test: Subject, matter and extent of operation are stated Enables one to know his rights and obligations b) Detailed Standards when not required 1. Necessities of modern legislation dealing with complex economic and social problems 2. Regulatory enactments under police power c) If personal judgment is unrestrained (in the opinion) it is not a standard
5. Limitations on Quasi-Judicial Powers a) An administrative agency may not perform functions which are judicial in nature (eg: awarding of damages) b) Exceptions to the rule requiring a standard (uncontrolled discretion) in such cases, the standard of reasonableness will be applied 1. Handling State funds and property 2. Purely administrative (internal) in nature 3. Recommendations (which are not binding) 4. If it is impractical to law down a comprehensive rule 5. Exercise of police power 6. Nature of privileges (use of property, engaging in occupations and acts) 7. Situations where the State is supreme and has no relation to personal and property rights
V. CASE DIGESTS AND DOCTRINES
Bagatsing v. COP Facts: There is the sale of Petron shares for the government's privatization program. Petitioners state that the sale contravenes the governments policy that only non-performing assets should be ATENEO LAW SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 2-D [ATTY. ERENETA] L.T.J.F. 2 nd Semester S.Y. 2012-2013 Source: De Leon, Hector. Administrative Law: Text and Cases. (6 th ed. 2010) disposed of. But Proclamation 50 classifies 2 types of government assets for privatization: 1. Non- performing assets and 2. GOCC not necessary to maintain.
Issue: Whether the privatization of Petron violated the proclamation or not
Held: Such privatization was made in accordance with the proclamation. Such approval by the COP cannot be reviewed by the Court since it is exclusively an executive function.
Doctrine: The State has uncontrolled discretion in handling its properties and assets as long as private rights, properties and interests are not affected.
Beja v. CA Facts: Rogelio A. Dayan, the PPA General Manager filed an Administrative Case against petitioner Beja and Hernando G. Villaluz for grave dishonesty, grave misconduct, willful violation of reasonable office rules. The PPA general manager indorsed it to the AAB (Administrative Action Board) for "appropriate action." Beja filed with the AAB a manifestation and motion to suspend the hearing, which the AAB denied.
Issue: 1. Can the PPA general manager issue a preventive suspension order against petitioner? 2. Whether or not it is within the jurisdiction of the AAB to initiate and hear administrative cases against PPA personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager?
Held: 1. Yes. Even if the proper disciplining authority is the PPA board of directors, a preventive suspension is not a penalty thus it can be exercised by the general manager 2. The PPA is an agency attached to the DOTC, which has a larger measure of independence in terms of supervision and control from the Department to which it is attached. The department head or secretary concerned may only entertain matters or decisions by the PPA elevated to him. The transmittal of the complaint by the PPA General Manager to the AAB was premature.
Doctrine: Attached agencies, having a greater degree of independence from the principal agency, has the quasi-judicial power to initiate and hear administrative cases against its personnel.
Carmelo v. Ramos Facts: The Mayor of Manila issued an executive order creating a committee to investigate the anomalies involving the license inspectors and other personnel. The committee issued a subpoena to respondent, a private citizen, requiring him to appear before it in connection with an administrative case against another person. Respondent refused to appear causing petitioner to file in the CFI a petition to declare respondent in contempt.
Issue: Does the committee have the power to subpoena a witness and ask for their punishment for refusal to comply?
ATENEO LAW SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 2-D [ATTY. ERENETA] L.T.J.F. 2 nd Semester S.Y. 2012-2013 Source: De Leon, Hector. Administrative Law: Text and Cases. (6 th ed. 2010) Held: None. Before one can apply to the courts for the punishment of a hostile witness, he must first show that he has authority to take testimony or evidence. The delegated power to investigate does not imply a delegation of the power to take evidence or testimony. The power to take evidence becomes implied or a necessary exercise of the investigatory powers when there is a statutory grant of such powers. There is none in this case and to be sure, there is nothing said in the executive order of the Mayor creating the committee about such a grant of power. All that the order gives to this body is the power to investigate anomalies involving certain city employees. Even granting that the mayor has the implied power to require the appearance of witnesses before him, he cannot delegate this power to a body like the petitioner's committee.
Doctrine: Administrative agencies have no inherent power to require the attendance of witnesses before them nor to require them to testify unless a statute confers such power upon them.
CIR v. Benguet Facts: An executive order imposed VAT rates of either 10% or 0% (zero-rated) to any person who imports goods depending on the classification of the transaction. Respondent applied for and was granted by the BIR zero-rated status on its sale of gold to Central Bank. In 1988, the CIR ruled that the sale of gold to Central Bank is considered as export sale subject to zero-rate. Petitioner then filed for tax credits after its sale pursuant to the 1988 ruling. The application was denied pursuant to a 1992 BIR ruling which classified the sale of gold to the Central Bank as non-export sales thus subject to 10% VAT. The 1992 ruling revoked the 1988 ruling and was applied retroactively.
Issue: Can the 1992 BIR Ruling be applied retroactively and is the ruling itself valid?
Held: No. The ruling in question is invalid. Respondent should not be faulted for relying on the BIR's interpretation of the said laws. Even if the government is not estopped from collecting taxes this principle must give way to exceptions based on and in keeping with the interest of justice and fair play.
Corona v CA Facts: 2 PPA police officers filed in the AAB a complaint for dishonesty against private respondent, the district manager of the Port of Manila. Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss assailing the jurisdictional competence of the AAB on the ground that it was the General Manager of the PPA who had jurisdiction over the case. AAB denied the motion to dismiss. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction challenging the jurisdiction of the AAB over the administrative cases against him. The trial court granted said petition.
Issue: Whether or not the Secretary of the DOTC and/or the AAB have jurisdiction to initiate and hear administrative cases against PPA personnel.
Held: The Court denied the petition and cited the Beja case. The DOTC secretary's jurisdiction over disciplinary matters, according to the PPA charter is only appellate in nature. He does not have the power to initiate the proceedings against a subordinate official of the PPA. The DOTC ATENEO LAW SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 2-D [ATTY. ERENETA] L.T.J.F. 2 nd Semester S.Y. 2012-2013 Source: De Leon, Hector. Administrative Law: Text and Cases. (6 th ed. 2010) may not "act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate.
Cruz v. Youngberg Facts: The petitioner attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155, which at present prohibits the importation of cattle from foreign countries into the Philippines. The statute was enacted for the sole purpose of preventing the introduction of cattle diseases. It grants to the Governor-General, at his discretion, the authority to lift the prohibition if the decease among foreign cattle has ceased to be a menace.
Issue: Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative powers on the Governor-General.
Held: There is none. The law only confers authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of its objectives. The promotion of industries affecting the public welfare and the development of the resources of the country are objects within the scope of the police power.
Dela Cruz v. COA Facts: The COA issued Memorandum No. 97-038 directing all unit heads/auditors/team leaders which have effected payment of any form of additional compensation to cabinet secretaries, in violation of the rule on multiple positions, to immediately cause the disallowance of such additional compensation. The NHA auditor issued a notice of disallowance pursuant to the COA memorandum. Petitioners, who are members of the NHA board of directors, contend that the disallownace is not applicable to them since: The constitutional ban against dual or multiple positions applies only to the members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants. It does not cover other appointive officials. NHA directors are not secretaries
Issue: Whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of COA in issuing such order?
Held: There is none. The statute creating the NHA mandates that executive secretaries will form ex-oficio memebrs of the NHA board. Since the secretaries hold such positions in an ex-oficio capacity, they are not considered to be holding multiple offices since it is merely an imposition of additional duties as executive secretaries. Since the Executive Department Secretaries, as ex- oficio members of the NHA Board, are prohibited from receiving "extra (additional) compensation" it follows that petitioners who sit as their alternates (agents) cannot likewise be entitled to receive such compensation.
Dimatulac v. Villon Facts: This case involves the murder of SPO3 Dimatulac, a relative of the petitioner. A complaint was filed against Mayor Yabut, the suspect. Upon investigation, the prosecutor recommended that the lesser crime of homicide be filed against the suspects. Before the Information for homicide was filed, petitioners appealed the prosecutor's resolution to the Secretary of the Department of Justice. While the appeal was still pending with the DOJ, the trial court proceeded with the ATENEO LAW SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 2-D [ATTY. ERENETA] L.T.J.F. 2 nd Semester S.Y. 2012-2013 Source: De Leon, Hector. Administrative Law: Text and Cases. (6 th ed. 2010) arraignment. The DOJ secretary initailly issued a resolution holding that murder was committed and ordered the amendment of the Information. However, the order was reversed on the ground that it was rendered moot and academic by the arraignment.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC could proceed with the arraignment despite the pending review of the case by respondent Secretary of Justice.
Held: It is undebatable that petitioners had the right to appeal to the DOJ from the resolution (recommendation) of the prosecutor. It is an invocation of the Secretary's power of control over prosecutors. The Secretary of Justice is only enjoined to refrain, as far as practicable, from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the prosecutor once a complaint or information is filed in court. There was on the part of the public prosecution, indecent haste in the filing of the information for homicide, depriving the State and the offended parties of due process. It was grave error for the DOJ to reconsider its resolution and order solely on the basis of the information that the YABUTs had already been arraigned. In so doing, the DOJ relinquished its power of control and supervision over the Provincial Prosecutor and the Assistant Provincial Prosecutors. The Court granted the petition.
Evangelista v. Jarencio Facts: Petitioner is the head of an agency vested with all the powers of an investigating committee including the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths and take testimony or evidence. The agency was created through an Executive Order by the President. Respondent was issued a subpoena commanding him to appear to testify in a certain investigation of the agency. Respondent challenged the legality of the subpoena.
Issue: Whether or not the agency is authorized to issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact finding investigations.
Held: Yes. Administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations, whether or not adjudication is involved and whether or not probable cause is shown. It is enough that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose. When investigative and accusatory duties are delegated by statute (in this case the Executive Order) to an administrative body, it too may take steps to inform itself as to whether there is probable violation of the law. The subpoena meets the requirements if the inquiry is: (a) within the authority of the agency; (b) the demand is not too indefinite; and (c) the information is reasonably relevant.
Fortich v. Corona Facts: The Office of the President issued a 1997 resolution which substantially modified it's 1996 decision. Said decision had long been final and executory after DAR filed its motion for reconsideration beyond the reglementary period.
Issue: Was the subsequent modification a void or a valid exercise by the President of his prerogatives?
ATENEO LAW SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 2-D [ATTY. ERENETA] L.T.J.F. 2 nd Semester S.Y. 2012-2013 Source: De Leon, Hector. Administrative Law: Text and Cases. (6 th ed. 2010) Held: The failure to file a motion for reconsideration is not excusable. While the Court has allowed a relaxation of procedural rules, it was never meant to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules. To warrant the relaxation of the rules, there must be justifiable reasons for it. Absent any justifiable reasons, the earlier OP decision can no longer be disturbed.
Doctrine: Relaxation of procedural rules is warranted only if there are justifiable reasons to do so.
Hilado v. CIR Facts: Petitioner filed his income tax return and claimed an amount as a deductible pursuant to a circular by the Secretary of Finance. Petitioner's claim was disallowed since the Secretary's successor subsequently issued a new circular, which revoked the earlier one. The revocation was due to an erroneous interpretation of a tax statute by the previous Secretary.
Issue: Was the revocation valid and within the authority of the secretary?
Held: Yes. Construction of a statute by those administering it is not binding on their successors if the latter believes that a different construction should be given. The circular, having been issued on a wrong construction of the law cannot give rise to a vested right to the petitioner.
Miller v. Mardo Facts: Re-organization plan 20-A gave jurisdiction to the DOLE regional offices over cases of unclaimed wages, overtime and separation pay. Before the effectivity of the plan, DOLE had no power to settle such cases.
Issue: Is Plan 20-A invalid as it confers judicial powers to the Regional Offices?
Held: Yes. What the enabling statute contemplates is merely administrative functions and not judicial functions. Legislature may confer quasi-judicial functions but even such prerogatives must be limited to only those incidental to their administrative functions. Just because the statute granted the power to reorganize the administrative agencies, it does not grant the creation or delegation of quasi-judicial functions to the agencies, absent a clear or implied authority to do so.
Doctrine: Quasi-judicial functions cannot be implied from a mere grant of power to create functions in connection with the reorganization of the executive branch.
Olsen v. Rafferty Facts: Under the tariff law, certain products from the Philippines were admitted to the United States duty-free. The Governor-General issued an Executive Order requiring the adoption of rules by the Collector of Customs and Internal Revenue to insure that the US government will not be defrauded by an exporter who may introduce products to the US free of duty, but are not products of the Philippines. The agencies have the duty to ascertain whether exported articles from the Philippines qualify under the tariff law to be free of duty. Petitioner brought an action for mandamus to secure an order directing respondents to issue a certificate of origin of cigars for ATENEO LAW SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 2-D [ATTY. ERENETA] L.T.J.F. 2 nd Semester S.Y. 2012-2013 Source: De Leon, Hector. Administrative Law: Text and Cases. (6 th ed. 2010) export to the US.
Issue: Does the Executive Order confer a legal right on which an action in court may be predicated? Can the courts compel the agencies to perform their duties as stated in the Executive Order?
Held: No. The order is nothing more or less than a command from a superior to an inferior. The custom of issuing certificates of origin is based on no statute. Disobedience from such an order can be punished only by the power which issued it. The presentation of certificates of origin is not based on a right conferred by the Tariff Act but is simply a method by which such proof can be made. Since it is not based on a right, the enforcement of the order is beyond the power of the courts.
Rubi v. Mindoro Facts: Petitioner and his companions are being held on a reservation against their will. Legislature has conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro do exercise such function.
Issue: Is there unlawful delegation of legislative power?
Held: No. Discretion may be delegated on matters involving questions of fact. In this case, it is the interest of law and order. Legislature merely conferred discretionary authority as to the execution of the law. Who but the provincial governor and the board are better qualified to judge when such course is deemed necessary.
Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora Facts: The Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) was created by former President Corazon Aquino to receive, gather and evaluate intelligence reports and information of illegal activities affecting the national economy. The function of the EIIB was to conduct anti-smuggling operations in areas outside the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. 11 years later, President Estrada issued EO 191 which deactivated the EIIB since its functions overlap with those of the Bureau of Customs and NBI. President Estrada then issued EO 196 which created the Presidential Anti-Smuggling Task Force Aduana. Finally, EO 223 was issued which separated from service all personnel of the EIIB. The petitioners are challenging the authority of the President to abolish the EIIB.
Issues: Does the EO 223 violate the security of tenure of EIIB personnel? Is the reorganization or abolition done in bad faith? Is the abolition a usurpation of the power of Congress to decide whether or not to abolish EIIB?
Held: 1. No. EO 223 did not violate the security of tenure of EIIB personnel. There is no such thing as an absolute right to hold an office. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. Security of tenure will ATENEO LAW SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 2-D [ATTY. ERENETA] L.T.J.F. 2 nd Semester S.Y. 2012-2013 Source: De Leon, Hector. Administrative Law: Text and Cases. (6 th ed. 2010) not prevent the abolition done in good faith.
2. The reorganization was done in good faith since it was aimed to achieve economy and simplicity in the bureaucracy. Task Force Aduana is to be comprised of people who are already in public service and employees of existing agencies. It encourages the utilization of personnel and resources of the already existing departments. The task force was intended to lessen the expenses of the EIIB. 3. There exists a distinction between the words deactivate and abolish. To deactivate means to render inactive or ineffective or to break up by discharging or reassigning personnel. In deactivation, the office continues to exist but it remains dormant. On the other hand, to abolish means to do away with, to annul, abrogate or destroy completely. Be that as it may, deactivation and abolition are both reorganization measures. The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature. The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are concerned, the Presidents power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular office, or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures. These laws are PD 1772 and RA 8760 which authorizes the President to reorganize the National Government to improve productivity and efficiency of its operations. Gaminde v. COA Facts: Thelma Gaminde was appointed as Commissioner of Civil Service Commission in 1993. Her term was to expire on February 1999. She sought clarification from the Office of the President as to her term and the latter opined that petitioners term of office would expire on February 02, 2000, not on February 02, 1999. On February 04, 1999, Corazon Alma G. de Leon, Chairman of the CSC, wrote the Commission on Audit requesting opinion on whether or not Gaminde may be paid her salary notwithstanding the expiration of her appointment on February 02, 1999. The COA issued an opinion that indeed petitioners term has expired. The CSC resident auditor disallowed the salaries pertaining to petitioner and her co-terminus staff.
Issue: Whether or not Gamindes term expired on February 1999 as stated in her appointment paper or on February 2000 as claimed by her.
Held: Term of an office must be distinguished from tenure of the incumbent. Term means the time during which an officer may claim an office as a right and fixes the interval of succession. Tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office. Term of office is not affected by the hold-over of the incumbent after expiration of the term.
The term of the appointed commissioner begins and ends pursuant to the terms provided for by the Constitution. However, the tenure is counted from the moment the appointed official actually assumes office. Until a successor is nominated and assumes office, the incumbent holds the office for a period not exceeding 7 years (same duration as the term). An incumbents tenure may overlap his term. He may hold an office beyond the 7-year term when a successor has not yet been appointed provided that his 7-year tenure is not yet over. Since he has exceeded his lawful term (but not his tenure), he now becomes a de facto officer.
In the case of Gaminde, her term is supposed to end on February 1999 but her 7-year tenure is to end on February 2, 2000 since she assumed office on June 11, 1993. She served as de facto ATENEO LAW SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 2-D [ATTY. ERENETA] L.T.J.F. 2 nd Semester S.Y. 2012-2013 Source: De Leon, Hector. Administrative Law: Text and Cases. (6 th ed. 2010) officer in good faith until February 02, 2000, and thus entitled to receive her salary and other emoluments for actual service rendered. Consequently, the Commission on Audit erred in disallowing in audit such salary and other emoluments, including that of her co-terminous staff.
Lacson v. Roque Facts: The deputy chief of police was acquitted in a criminal prosecution case instituted at the instance of Mayor Lacson. He criticized the court, specifically Judge Montesa (the trial judge) for being incompetent. Judge Montesa responded by filing a libel case against the mayor. The President wrote to the mayor stating: In view of the pendency of the case against you, for libel, and pursuant to the present policy of the administration, requiring the suspension of any local elective official which is being charged before the courts with any offense involving moral turpitude, you are hereby suspended from office. Issue: Was the suspension order legal? Held: No. The Charter of the City of Manila is silent regarding the suspension or removal of the mayor. But the Revised Administrative Code does confer upon the President the power to remove any person from any position of trust or authority under the Government of the Philippines for disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. Even so, these members of the Court opine that the alleged offense for which Mayor Lacson has been suspended is not one of the grounds just enumerated, and are in complete agreement with the majority that the suspension is unwarranted and illegal. The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or suspend municipal officers is without doubt not well taken. There is neither statutory nor constitutional provision granting the President sweeping authority to remove municipal officials. The Constitution provides that the President "shall . . . exercise general supervision over all local governments," but supervision does not contemplate control. The President's supervisory authority over municipal affairs is qualified by the proviso as may be provided by law Clearly, the provision was not to be self-executing but requires legislative implementation. Even if, for the sake of argument, the mayor can be removed or suspended for disloyalty to the Republic, the offense of libel or oral defamation is not disloyalty, dishonesty, or oppression within the legal or popular meaning of these words. Removal For Cause like "misconduct in office." has been universally accepted to mean legal cause, and not merely cause which the appointing power in the exercise of discretion may deem sufficient Moreover, the cause must relate to and effect the administration of the office and must be restricted to something to a substantial nature directly affecting the rights and interest of the public. Rudeness of an officer not amounting to illegality of conduct or oppression is not such misconduct as will give cause for removing him from office." nothing in the Constitution, law or decision warrants the petitioner's suspension.
Federico v. COMELEC Facts: Edna Sanchez and Osmundo Maligaya were candidates for municipal mayor of Sto. Tomas, Batangas. Armando Sanchez was the husband of Edna and the gubernatorial candidate for Batangas. When Armando died a few days before the elections, Edna withdrew her COC for the position of mayor and filed a new COC for the position of governor as substitute candidate for her deceased husband. Renato Federico became the substitute candidate for Edna for the position of mayor. Maligaya opposed this substitution and sought to have Federico ineligible to run because ATENEO LAW SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 2-D [ATTY. ERENETA] L.T.J.F. 2 nd Semester S.Y. 2012-2013 Source: De Leon, Hector. Administrative Law: Text and Cases. (6 th ed. 2010) the period to file the COC for substitute candidates have already lapsed after December 14, 2009. The COMELEC gave due course to the substitution however, the names on the ballots were not changed since they were already printed. Edna Sanchez won the position for mayor (it was her name printed on the ballot) however, the Board of Canvassers proclaimed Federico, the substitute candidate, as the winner. Maligaya then filed a petition to annul the proclamation of Federico as mayor of Sto. Tomas. The COMELEC En Banc gave due course to Maligaya's petition and annulled the proclamation.
Issues: Whether or not: There was a valid substitution of Federico and Sanchez Maligaya's petition to annul the proclamation was filed on time Granting that Federico was disqualified, should he be succeeded by Maligaya or the Vice-Mayor under the local government code (LGC)?
Held: 1. Federico's substitution was not valid. The filing of the substitute COC was filed after the deadline on December 14, 2009. While it is true that the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) allows the substitution of candidates not later than the mid-day of the election, that provision was superseded by RA 9369. RA 9369 authorizes the use of the Automated Election System and it mandated COMELEC to set a deadline for the filing of the COC and petition of registration to participate in the election. The automated system was aimed to improve the transparency and credibility of election. There was a need for the early printing of the ballots thus the early filing of the COC's was necessary. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, different dates were set to govern different situations of the candidates. In case of death or disqualification, the substitute had until midday of election day to file the COC. In case of a withdrawal, which is the situation at bench, the substitute only had until December 14, 2009 to file the COC. This is because withdrawal is voluntary. Generally, a candidate has sufficient time to ponder on his candidacy and to withdraw while the printing has not yet started. The sudden death of then Governor Armando Sanchez and the substitution by his widow in the gubernatorial race could not justify a belated substitution in the mayoralty race.
2. Maligaya's petition to annul the proclamation was field on time. Maligaya became aware of the Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of Winning Candidates (COCVP) in favor of Federico on May 27, 2010. From that day, he had 10 days to question the dubious proceedings. Since he filed the petition to annul on Jun 1, 2010, it was indeed filed on time.
3. There being no valid substitution, there was only one qualified candidate Maligaya. Being the only candidate, he received the highest number of votes. Accordingly, he should be proclaimed as the duly elected mayor. Considering Maligaya was the winner, there was simply no vacancy thus the claim that the vice-mayor should succeed under the LGC has no legal basis.
NOTE: If a candidate who obtained the highest number of vote is later declared disqualified or not eligible, it does not follow that the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes will be declared the winner of the elective office. The reason behind this is that the defeated candidate (2 nd placer) is not the choice of the people. This rule does not seem to apply to the case at bar since Federico was not the people's choice it was supposed to be Sanchez. The void substitution had the effect of nullifying the votes for Sanchez simply because she was not the proper candidate to begin with. It is like voting for someone whose name is not on the ballot.
ATENEO LAW SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 2-D [ATTY. ERENETA] L.T.J.F. 2 nd Semester S.Y. 2012-2013 Source: De Leon, Hector. Administrative Law: Text and Cases. (6 th ed. 2010) NTC v. Hamoy Facts: National Transmission Commission (NTC), through its President and CEO,Alan Ortiz, appointed respondent Hamoy as Vice President for VisMin Operations and Maintenance. Respondent assumed his duties on March 1, 2003. On January 19, 2004, Oritz issued an order detailing respondent to NTC's Power Center-Diliman to handle Special Projects (VP for Special Projects). In 2005, Office Order No. 2005-0256 was issued designating respondent as Officer-In- Charge (OIC) of the Power Systems Reliability Group (PSRG), concurrent with his duties as Vice President for Special Projects. Respondent wrote to Ortiz asking that he be returned to his original assignment as VP of VisMin Operations. He reasoned that his detail already exceeded 1 year and his designation as OIC of PSRG violated the CSC Memorandum Circular 21 because he did not give his consent thereto. The NTC Board approved the reassignment of respondent to PSRG and announced the opening of the position of VP for VisMin Operations. Respondent appealed to the CSC for the annulment of the order of his reassignment since it violated his security of tenure. The CSC denied the appeal since respondent was appointed under a third-level position, which was not station-specific. This means he can be reassigned or transferred from one unit to another within the same agency without violating his right to security of tenure. The CSC also ruled that his detail did not exceed the 1 year period as it was superseded by his reassignment to the PSRG.
Issues: Whether or not: the position of respondent Hamoy was a third-level or second-level position the position was station-specific Hamoy's reassignment was made in accordance with civil service law
Held: The reassignment from VP VisMin for Operations to VP for Special Projects was invalid.
There are 3 classes of positions in the career service: 1. First Level clerical, trade, custodial services which involve non-professional or sub- professional work 2. Second Level technical and scientific positions which involve professional work 3. Third Level positions in the Career Executive Service (CES)
Under the Administrative Code, the CES (3 rd level) positions belong to those appointed by the President of the Philippines such as Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director and Regional Director. Appointees to CES positions who do not possess the required CES eligibility do not enjoy security of tenure. Respondent was appointed by the NTC CEO, not by the President of the Republic. On this basis alone, he cannot be considered part of the CES.
For years, the Commission has promulgated several policies identifying positions in the Career Service performing executive and managerial functions as belonging to the Third Level covered by the Career Executive Service (CES) and those outside the CES, thus, requiring third level eligibility for purposes of permanent appointment and security of tenure. However, to classify other positions not included in the above enumeration (secretary, regional director, etc) as covered by the CES and require appointees thereto to acquire CES or CSE eligibility before acquiring security of tenure will lead to unconstitutional and unlawful consequences. It will result either: in (1) vesting the appointing power for non-CES positions in the President, in violation of the Constitution; or, (2) including in the CES a position not held by presidential appointee, contrary to the Administrative Code.
ATENEO LAW SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 2-D [ATTY. ERENETA] L.T.J.F. 2 nd Semester S.Y. 2012-2013 Source: De Leon, Hector. Administrative Law: Text and Cases. (6 th ed. 2010) The position of Hamoy (VP for VisMin Operations) is station-specific. As VisMin stands for Visayas-Mindanao, respondent necessarily has to hold office in Cebu where NTC has offices for its Visayas-Mindanao operations. Having been appointed to a station-specific position, whatever reassignment may be extended to respondent cannot exceed 1 year.
NOTE: A reassignment is a movement of an employee from one organizational unit to another in the same department or agency which does not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary and does not require the issuance of an appointment. A detail, on the other hand, is a movement from one agency to another. Respondents movement was a reassignment (despite the use of the term detailing in the order of the CEO) as he was moved from one department from another within the same agency.
Rodriguez v. Tan Facts: Petitioner claims that on December 30, 1947, defendant Tan usurped the office of Senator of the Philippines and until 1949 has continuously collected the salaries and privileges thereto. Tan filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the Senate Electoral Tribunal judgment is a bar to this action under res judicata and the Tribunal denied without reservation the claim of petitioner for damages.
Issue: Whether or not Tan, who has been proclaimed and discharged the duties of senator, can be ordered to reimburse the salaries he has received during his incumbency to Rodriguez, who has been legally declared elected by the Tribunal?
Held: A de facto officer is still entitled to compensation for services rendered. Tan, who has been proclaimed and had assumed office, but was later ousted as a result of an election protest, is a de facto officer during the time he held the office of senator, and is entitled to the compensation, emoluments and allowances which are provided for the position by the Constitution. This is the policy and the rule that has been followed consistently in this jurisdiction. The emoluments must go to the person who rendered service unless the contrary is provided.
Almeda v. Perez Facts: A complaint was filed with the Secretary of Justice charging MA with having acquired, during his incumbency as a government employee, cash and properties from unknown sources. Such acquisitions were manifestly out of proportion to the salary and other lawful income of MA, and therefore in violation of RA 1379 (Anti-Graft Law)
After finding that there is reasonable ground to believe that MA committed the acts charged, the Solicitor General filed a petition for forfeiture against MA. A motion for Leave to Amend Petition for Forfeiture was field which was subsequently granted by the respondent judge. The amended petition added other counts and items of alleged unlawful acquisitions and disbursements. The petitioners objected to the amendment contending that RA 1379 is penal in substance and effect, hence, the presentation of the amended petition without a previous preliminary investigation under the Act cannot be allowed; that the amendment would have the effect of presenting a charge under RA 1379 within 1 year from the date of a general election; and that the amendment may not be made on a matter of substance after the defendants had pleaded. ATENEO LAW SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 2-D [ATTY. ERENETA] L.T.J.F. 2 nd Semester S.Y. 2012-2013 Source: De Leon, Hector. Administrative Law: Text and Cases. (6 th ed. 2010)
Issue: Is the proceeding under RA 1379 civil or criminal?
Held: 1. The proceeding in civil in nature The proceeding for forfeiture is civil in nature and not criminal. In the first place, a proceeding under the Act does not terminate in the imposition of a penalty but merely in the forfeiture of properties illegally acquired in favor of the State. Secondly, the procedure outlined in the Act leading to forfeiture is that provided for in a civil action. The preliminary investigation required prior to the filing of the petition is expressly provided to be one similar to a preliminary investigation in a criminal case. If the investigation is only similar to that in a criminal case, but the other steps in the proceedings are those for civil proceedings, it stands to reason that the proceeding is not criminal. Had it been a criminal proceeding there would have been, after a preliminary investigation, a reading of information, a plea of guilty and a trial thereafter, with the promulgation of the judgment in the presence of the defendants. These proceedings are not provided for in the law.
2. As the proceeding for forfeiture is a civil one, amendment of the charges or the petition for forfeiture may be made as in ordinary civil actions, before trial or in the course of trial without the need of another investigation. It follows that amendments setting forth newly discovered acquisitions may be inserted in the petition without obtaining the consent of the petitioners.
Arias v. Sandiganbayan Facts: 6 persons were convicted in connection with the overpricing of land purchased by the Bureau of Public Works. The accused were prosecuted because the parcels of rice land which had been assessed at Php5.00 per square meter in 1973 were sold as residential land in 1978 fro Php80.00 per square meter. Petitioners D and A were 2 of the accused. D was then Engineer of the Province of Rizal who headed and supervised the acquisition of private lands, and A was then Auditor of Rizal Engineering District who passed upon and approved in audit the acquisition as well the payment of lands.
Issue: Did the Sandiganbayan commit a reversible error in convicting petitioners in connection with the overpricing of the lands?
Held: Yes. The mere fact that the correct valuation is Php5.00 per square meter is insufficient ground to convict them for overpricing. There can be no overpricing for purposes of criminal conviction where no proof adduced during orderly proceedings has been presented and accepted. We could be setting a bad precedent if a head office plagued by common problems dishonest or negligent subordinates, overwork, multiple assignments or plain incompetence is suddenly swept into a conspiracy connection simply because he did not primarily examine every single detail, painstakingly trace every step from inception and investigate the motives of every person involved in a transaction before affixing his signature as the final approving authority.
Mere signature or approval insufficient to prove conspiracy It can be argued that Arias should have probed records, inspected documents and questioned persons. It is doubtful if any auditor for a fairly sized office could personally do all these things in all vouchers presented for his ATENEO LAW SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 2-D [ATTY. ERENETA] L.T.J.F. 2 nd Semester S.Y. 2012-2013 Source: De Leon, Hector. Administrative Law: Text and Cases. (6 th ed. 2010) signature. The Court would be asking for the impossible. The auditor is not expected to personally look into reimbursement voucher's accuracy, propriety and sufficiency. There should be other grounds than the mere signature or approval to sustain conspiracy charge and conviction. Since the prosecution has not shown any positive and convincing evidence of conspiracy, the petitioners are acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt.
Canonizado v. Aguirre Facts: Petitioner was a Commissioner of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM). Section 8 of RA 8551 provides, Upon the effectivity of this Act, the terms of current Commissioners are deemed expired which shall constitute a bar to their reappointment or an extension of their terms except for current Commissioners who have served less than 2 years of their terms of office who may be appointed by the President for a maximum term of 2 years.
Petitioner was compelled to leave his position as Commissioner by virtue of section 8 and accept his appointment of Inspector General of the Internal Affairs Service (IAS). Section 8 was eventually declared to be violative of petitioner's constitutional right to security of tenure. The Supreme Court ordered their reinstatement and the payment of full backwages.
Respondents, upon motion for reconsideration, contend that petitioner must be deemed to have abandoned his claim for reinstatement to NAPOLCOM since the offices of NAPOLCOM Commissioner and Inspector General of IAS are incompatible.
Issue: Whether petitioner's acceptance of the IAS position should result in an abandonment of his claim for reinstatement to the NAPOLCOM
Held: Canonizado harbored no willful desire or intention to abandon his official duties. In fact, he lost no time disputing what they perceived to be an illegal removal. The removal of the petitioners by virtue of the provisions of said law does not amount to voluntary relinquishment. It is well stated rule that he who, while occupying one office, accepts another incompatible with the first, ipso facto vacates the first office and his title is thereby terminated without any other act or proceeding. However, this rule does not apply in the case at bar because at no point did Canonizado discharge the functions of the two offices simultaneously. He was forced out of his first office by the enactment of section 8 of RA 8551. The rule on incompatibility of duties never came into play since petitioner never occupied the two positions concurrently. Canonizado was compelled to leave his office by an unconstitutional provision of law. He held a second office during the period that his appeal was pending. A contrary ruling would deprive petitioner his right to earn a living and a right to lead a productive life. Prohibiting him from accepting a second position during the pendency of his position would be to unjustly compel him to bear the consequences of an unconstitutional act which cannot be attributed to him. However, before Canonizado can re-assume his post as Commissioner, he should first resign as Inspector General of IAS.
Sinaca v. Mula Facts: During the 1998 elections, the two opposing factions of the ruling party LAKAS-NUCD- ATENEO LAW SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 2-D [ATTY. ERENETA] L.T.J.F. 2 nd Semester S.Y. 2012-2013 Source: De Leon, Hector. Administrative Law: Text and Cases. (6 th ed. 2010) UMPD (LAKAS) filled in separate candidates for the position of mayor of the Municipality of Malimano, Surigao del Norte. One faction headed by Robert Z. Barbers (hereafter BARBERS Wing) nominated Grachil G. Canoy (CANOY), while the other group lead by Francisco T. MATUGAS (hereafter MATUGAS Wing) endorsed the candidacy of Teodoro F. Sinaca, Jr. (TEODORO).
Miguel H. Mula (MULA), a candidate for vice-mayor and belonging to the BARBERS Wing, filed before the COMELEC a petition for disqualification against TEODORO. The COMELEC issued a resolution disqualifying TEODORO as candidate for mayor and ordering the cancellation of his COC because of prior conviction of bigamy, a crime involving moral turpitude.
Petitioner Emmanuel D. Sinaca, (EMMANUEL), an independent candidate, withdrew his certificate of candidacy for Sangguniang Bayan Member, joined and became a member of the LAKAS party and was nominated by the LAKAS MATUGAS Wing as the substitute mayoralty candidate for the Municipality of Malimono. He then filed his COC on the basis of such nomination. Mula opposed the substitution on the following grounds:
a. The substitute, before he filed his Certificate of Candidacy as LAKAS candidate, was an independent candidate. Being so, he cannot rightfully substitute the disqualified one;
b. Substitution generally takes place when by reason of a candidates disqualification the party to which he belongs loses such representation. In the instant case, the disqualification did not at all prejudice LAKAS NUCD-UMDP because Mr. Garchil G. Canoy is still there representing the party after the disqualification.
Issue: Whether or not the substitution of EMMANUEL was valid
Held: The substitution was valid
EMMANUEL was properly nominated as substitute candidate by the LAKAS party MATUGAS wing to which TEODORO, the disqualified candidate. The fact that EMMANUEL was an independent candidate prior to his nomination is immaterial. What is more significant is that he had previously withdrawn his certificate of candidacy as independent candidate for Sangguniang member before he filed his certificate of candidacy as a substitute for TEODORO at which time he was, for all intents and purposes, already deemed a member of the LAKAS party MATUGAS wing. Even the fact that EMMANUEL only became a member of the LAKAS party after the disqualification of TEODORO, will not affect the validity of the substitution. There is nothing in the Constitution or the statute which requires as a condition precedent that a substitute candidate must have been a member of the party concerned for a certain period of time before he can be nominated as such.
It stands to reason that with the disqualification of TEODORO, who is a member of the LAKAS MATUGAS wing, the substitute must come from the same faction as the candidate to be substituted and since it was MATUGAS who indorsed the nomination of TEODORO, then MATUGAS nomination of EMMANUEL in substitution of TEODORO is sufficient and in order.
Quinto v. COMELEC Facts: Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the COMELEC for issuing a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their positions. In this defense, the ATENEO LAW SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 2-D [ATTY. ERENETA] L.T.J.F. 2 nd Semester S.Y. 2012-2013 Source: De Leon, Hector. Administrative Law: Text and Cases. (6 th ed. 2010) COMELEC avers that it only copied the provision from Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369. Issue: Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution was valid.
Held: NO. In the Farias case, the petitioners challenged Sec. 14 of RA. 9006 repealing Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) for giving undue benefit to elective officials in comparison with appointive officials. Incidentally, the Court upheld the substantial distinctions between the two and pronounced that there was no violation of the equal protection clause. However in the present case, the Court held that the discussion on the equal protection clause was an obiter dictum since the issue raised therein was against the repealing clause. It didn't squarely challenge Sec. 66.
Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 unduly discriminated appointive and elective officials. Applying the 4 requisites of a valid classification, the proviso does not comply with the second requirement that it must be germane to the purpose of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote one's candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence of the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electorate arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work. Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to whether they occupy high positions in government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the government will also be considered as ipso facto resigned once he files his certificate of candidacy for the election. This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use his position in the government to wield influence in the political world.
The provision s directed to the activity any and all public offices, whether they be partisan or non partisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or barangay level. Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Facts: This is a motion for reconsideration filed by the Commission on Elections. The latter moved to question an earlier decision of the Supreme Court declaring Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 unconstitutional. Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 provides that, Any person holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. Be it noted that petitioners of the above-entitled case are appointive officials who intend to be elected in the previously held 2010 elections and who felt aggrieved by the issuance of the questioned resolution.
Issue: Whether or not Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is constitutional. ATENEO LAW SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 2-D [ATTY. ERENETA] L.T.J.F. 2 nd Semester S.Y. 2012-2013 Source: De Leon, Hector. Administrative Law: Text and Cases. (6 th ed. 2010)
Held: The Supreme Court overruled its previous decision declaring the assailed resolution unconstitutional. Here, it strongly upholds the constitutionality of the resolution saying that it does not violate the equal protection clause. It is settled that the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The test used is reasonableness which requires that:
1. The classification rests on substantial distinctions; 2. It is germane to the purposes of the law; 3. It is not limited to existing conditions only; and 4. It applies equally to all members of the same class.
In the case under consideration, there is a substantial distinction between public and elective officials which has been rendered moot and academic by the ruling made in the case of Farinas, etl. al. vs. Executive Secretary, et. al.
Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is constitutional.