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Comparison of Single and Double Hull Tankers
Comparison of Single and Double Hull Tankers
PURPOSE
1. The purpose of this discussion paper is to provide information in light of the loss
of the oil tanker Prestige on the comparative merits and disadvantages of single
and double hull tankers.
DISCUSSION
2. It has been some eleven years since the United States’ Oil Pollution Act
(OPA 90) and subsequently regulation 13F of Annex 1 of the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships effectively mandated
double hulls for new build oil tankers of over 5,000 deadweight tonnes as a
means of preventing or reducing oil pollution in the event of a grounding or
collision resulting in bottom or side shell damage.
3. A double hull tanker can be defined as a ship designed for the carriage of oil in
bulk where the cargo spaces are protected from the environment by a double
hull consisting of double side and double bottom spaces dedicated to the
carriage of ballast water. These ballast spaces extend for the full length of the
cargo carrying area and a typical form of construction is shown at Attachment 1.
4. The effectiveness of double hull tankers in reducing the risk of pollution was
heavily debated during the development of the requirements mentioned at
paragraph 2 above. If it is accepted that the highest risk of collision or
grounding is likely to occur near ports where tankers typically travel at slow
speeds in congested and constrained waters, then there is a greater probability
that any collision or grounding is likely to be low energy.
5. Under these circumstances, double hulls will reduce the risk of an oil spill during
the most critical part of a voyage, for example:
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(a) There have been incidents in the Lake Maracaibo Channel in
Venezuela when:
• Nissos Amorgos, a single hull tanker, struck an underwater
object, puncturing its hull and spilling a considerable amount of
crude oil;
• Olympic Sponsor, a double hull tanker, was damaged at the
same location, suffered a hole in the outer hull, but the inner hull
remained intact and no oil was spilled; and
• Icaro, a double hull tanker, ran aground but no cargo was lost.
(b) Two cases of grounding off Milford Haven in Wales are also worth
noting:
• Borga was a double hull tanker that grounded. The outer hull
was holed but there was no oil spilled because the inner hull was
undamaged; and
• Sea Empress on the other hand was single hull, went aground in
the same location and sustained damage to the hull resulting in
considerable pollution to the environment.
6. When double hulls were first mandated there were a number of risk related
concerns expressed. It was suggested by some that there were inherent
problems with these designs that could compromise their safe operation.
7. The more significant areas of concern (with each of these items considered
further below) included:
• maintenance;
• operations;
• construction;
• salvage;
• design;
• stability; and
• ventilation and access.
Maintenance
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10. However, the structure within the double hull ballast spaces is far more
accessible than those in a single hull ship. Usually they will be between 2 and
3.5 metres wide (or high) allowing easy close up inspection, subject to the side
tanks being fitted with side stringers to serve as inspection platforms at
reasonable intervals. There should therefore be no reason for neglecting the
inspection and maintenance of this structure and its coatings, subject to
compliance with standard safety precautions prior to ballast tank entry.
11. Cargo tank internal inspection on both single and double hull tankers remains
problematic; however, with a lengthy process of tank washing, gas freeing and
ventilation required before these tanks can be entered safely. Close up access
can also be difficult if adequate staging is not provided, as most “cherry pickers”
will not pass through cargo tank access openings and the alternative of partial
flooding of the tank together with use of a raft is often less than satisfactory.
This issue has been recognised, however, and permanently fitted arrangements
for close up internal inspections will be required to be provided on both new and
existing tankers before 2005.
Operations
12. Double hull tankers have two distinct operational disadvantages in terms of
stability (see also paragraphs 32-36) over single hull tankers. First, for a given
depth of ship, adding a double bottom raises the ship’s centre of gravity and
thereby reduces the ship’s reserves of stability. Second, free surface effects in
cargo and ballast tanks during cargo operations may cause double hull tankers
to lose stability and suffer an angle of loll, particularly if the design does not
incorporate a longitudinal centreline bulkhead subdividing the cargo space. The
necessary operational procedures to maintain stability in such cases may
restrict cargo operations.
13. The most obvious potential hazard which all operators of double hull tankers
need to guard against is that of cargo leakage into the ballast spaces. Leakage
can arise from small fractures in bulkhead plating between cargo and ballast
tanks caused by unpredicted local stress concentration, fatigue, construction
defects, or eventually corrosion through failure of the ballast spaces’ protective
coating system. The structural design of double hull tankers renders them more
susceptible to minor failures of this type than single hull ships.
14. Sediment build up in ballast tanks has proved to be more of a problem for
double hull than single hull tankers. The cellular nature of the double bottom
ballast tanks can result in much greater retention of ballast water sediment,
especially when ballast is taken on in estuarial waters, bringing an increase in
the potential risks associated with the transfer of unwanted marine pests.
15. Piping systems in double hull tankers can be fully segregated with cargo pipes
able to be run almost exclusively through cargo tanks and ballast pipes through
ballast tanks. This overcomes the problem with single hulled tankers whereby a
leaking ballast pipe run through a cargo tank can sometimes become a potential
source of pollution by contaminating the clean water ballast.
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16. Double hull tankers in general give improved cargo out turns over single hull
ships. The smoother internal tank surfaces coupled with pump suctions
recessed into wells in the double bottom make cargo discharge and tank
washing much easier, giving an overall reduction in cargo residue retained
within the cargo spaces.
Construction
18. Probably the most significant of these is the protection of the ballast tanks. The
interiors of these compartments are the areas most prone to attack because of
the extremely corrosive nature of salt water carried within them on unladen
voyages.
19. This aspect attains far greater significance in a double hull tanker because of
the increased surface area of the structure inside the ballast tanks. Because
these tanks are much longer and narrower than those in single hull tankers,
their surface area can be two to three times that of the ballast tanks in a single
hull ship.
21. The confined spaces of double hull ballast tanks, whether sides or bottom, are
far more restrictive to work in than the comparatively spacious ballast tanks of
the single hull tanker, so anything of this nature over above the yard standard is
generally at the request and additional expense of diligent owners, because it
adds production complications for the shipyard.
22. Some features of the double hull design make life easier for the builder. The
double sides and double bottom form natural three-dimensional rigid building
blocks, less susceptible to deformation than the predominantly two-dimensional
components of the single hull ship. However, the number of cruciform joints
where primary structural members terminate on double skin structure is
significantly increased. Many of these are located in critical areas (defined as
areas where high stress levels combined with potential stress concentration
features may lead to premature failure of primary structure).
Salvage
23. If a double hull tanker should run aground and rupture the outside shell, the
available damage statistics suggest that the inner hull will, in most cases, not be
breached. A single hull tanker, by contrast, would spill some cargo that would
lighten the ship and make it easier to re-float. The size of the spill would largely
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depend upon the extent and location of the damage, resulting heel angle and
associated tidal action.
24. Damage to an 'L' shaped double bottom ballast tank on the other hand would
cause flooding on one side resulting in a considerable list should the ship not
come to rest on supporting ground, but remain free-floating. This may need to
be corrected by the filling of an opposite tank. In any case, if the ship remained
aground with damage to an 'L' shaped tank, then the consequent heel when the
ship floated free would need to be considered in the salvage plan.
25. In the Prestige incident, one side was flooded and the ballast tanks on the
opposite side were filled to bring the ship upright, causing the hull stresses to
exceed the design limits by some 68%. The relative merits of single and double
hull designs in the event of a casualty will depend on weather conditions at the
time, as well as the availability and competency of the salvors but, in general, it
will probably take longer to re-float a damaged double hull than a similarly
damaged single hull tanker.
Design
26. The tanker designs produced by today’s shipbuilders, although approved by all
the major classification societies, are based on the assumption that the owner
will undertake all necessary repairs to the fabric during its lifetime. There is no
such thing as a maintenance-free tanker. The design process therefore,
although important, is not the sole factor in determining the long-term integrity of
the structure.
27. The history of ship structural design is one of evolution rather than revolution.
Designers learn from past experience and each new ship tends to be a
development of a previous successful design. This is because of the extremely
complex interaction of the many variables that affect the stresses in the
structure of a ship at sea, eg:
28. Clearly, the 'design' or calculated stress levels in any element of the structure
should have a safety factor based on previous successful experience. It is
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impossible to calculate accurately the true stress levels in service throughout
any tanker's structure entirely from first principles.
29. The difficulty of accurately predicting stress within the structure of a double hull
tanker is compounded by the higher hull girder bending moments. Double hull
tankers operate with global stress levels some 30% higher than those with
single hulls because of the uniform distribution of cargo and ballast over the
length of the ship. In a single hull tanker, the ballast tanks can be positioned to
minimise longitudinal bending and shear stresses, resulting in values well below
the acceptable maximum.
30. The consequence is most likely to be small fatigue fractures in early years of
service, especially in larger double hull tankers, unless great care is exercised
in the design detail and supervision of workmanship during construction.
31. Whilst these issues are important they are less relevant in existing designs of
single hull tankers. From a practical perspective, particular attention has to be
paid to the detection of fatigue cracks in the structure of double hull tankers to
minimise the potential for cargo leakage into ballast tanks and the associated
hazard presented by an accumulation of hydrocarbon gas within these confined
spaces.
Stability
32. The transverse stability—the ability of a ship to remain upright and a measure of
its resistance either to take on a list or to capsize completely—of single hull
tankers has never really been a problem. Single hull tankers need longitudinal
bulkheads which run throughout the length of the cargo tanks to provide
longitudinal strength. The transverse spacing of these bulkheads can be
chosen to give tank sizes of approximately equal capacity and bottom support
structure of manageable proportions.
33. This is not the case with double hull tankers where the inner hull provides
sufficient longitudinal strength without the need for additional longitudinal
bulkheads for structural purposes, resulting in much wider cargo tanks with
substantially increased free surface effect.
34. The free surface effect is the degradation in transverse stability which occurs
when there are slack surfaces—the liquid surface in any tank which is not filled
so full that surface movement is effectively restricted by the deck structure in
way of the tank hatch.
35. When combined with the effect of the double bottom ballast tanks that
effectively raise the centre of gravity of the cargo, there is a consequential large
reduction in intact stability. This can readily occur during simultaneous cargo
and ballast handling operations and requires careful management of all liquid
transfer operations, ideally supported by the provision of appropriate quality
operational information on board the double hull tanker in question.
36. In terms of damage stability, ensuring compliance owing to the intact stability
issues referred to above is not easy and much more care needs to be taken in
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distributing the cargo on board a double hull than single hull tanker. Whilst this
task is helped by the use of on board computers, it is underpinned by the need
to provide an accurate and comprehensive trim and stability manual, ideally
before the ship enters commercial service.
37. The cellular nature of the wing and double bottom tanks of double hull tankers
makes the adequate ventilation of these spaces an important issue given
personnel will be expected to regularly and safely enter them to check for
corrosion, cargo leakage and ballast water sediment build up.
38. Proper consideration has to be given at the design stage to ensure the provision
of sufficient openings to permit good ventilation, because tank entry is a safety
critical operation on board any tanker, but especially so in the circumstances
mentioned above where access is particularly constrained and the provision of
timely assistance especially restricted by the hull’s structural configuration.
39. Ease of access for close up structural inspection is an issue for all oil tankers,
especially in the case of the comparatively large single hull tanker cargo and
ballast tanks. Rafts, remotely controlled vehicles, both in and out of water,
ladder access and staging are all used with varying degrees of success.
40. In the case of double hull tankers, whilst the double bottom ballast spaces are
easier to inspect, this may not be the case for the side tanks unless “inspection
friendly” fore and aft stringers, horizontal structural members running the length
of the tanks, are provided at convenient heights to serve as platforms for this
purpose.
41. Cargo tanks on board double hull ships, being comparatively free of internal
structure, need some provision for inspection of the deckhead areas, especially
if heated cargoes are being carried when corrosion can be expected to be much
more rapid because of the vacuum bottle or “Thermos” insulating effect
stemming from the double hull design itself.
CONCLUSION
42. AMSA currently inspects all high-risk oil tankers under its port State control
regime, defined as being all eligible oil tankers of age 15 years and over and oil
tankers of construction other than double hull regardless of age.
43. These inspections usually take place once the tanker in question has safely
reached port and are of necessity limited in the extent to which structural areas
can be examined given the hazardous nature of the cargo these ships carry.
44. The structural integrity of an oil tanker, be it single or double hull, relies not only
on the good quality of initial design, construction and continuing competent
operation, but also on an effective program of inspection, maintenance and
repair being conducted by the owner/operator.
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All those who have responsibility for monitoring these standards must be aware
of the different problems posed by double hulls and the appropriate inspection
and check procedures to counter them.
Acknowledgement
The Australian Maritime Safety Authority gratefully acknowledges the use of material
in the form of text and illustrations provided by the Oil Companies International
Marine Forum (OCIMF) during the preparation of this discussion paper.
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Attachment 1