Dissension in the Court: June 2013

Posted on July 17, 2013 by Rafael L. Encarnacion Posted in Constitutional Law, Philippines -
Cases, Philippines - Law
By a vote of seven justices, with three inhibiting, one absent, and four dissenting, the Supreme
Court in a decision penned by J. Perez and promulgated last June 25, 2013 dismissed this
petition for certiorari assailing the earlier Resolutions of public respondent COMELEC which
ordered the cancellation of petitioners Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the position of
Representative of the lone district of Marinduque.
This case stemmed from a petition to deny due course or to cancel petitioner Reyess CoC filed
on October 2012 by private respondent Tan with the COMELEC alleging that Reyes
misrepresented in her CoC that (a) she is single and a resident of Marinduque, when she is
married to Rep. Mandanas of Bauan, Batangas and a resident of that town (and also of Quezon
City as admitted in the Directory of Congressional Spouses of the House of Representatives),
and (b) she is a Filipino citizen and not a permanent resident of another country, when she is an
American citizen and a permanent resident of the United States.
In her answer, Reyes averred that (a) she is not legally married to Rep. Mandanas, thus his
residence cannot be attributed to her, and (b) the evidence presented by Tan does not support the
allegation that she is a permanent resident or citizen of the United States.
On February 8, 2013, Tan filed a Manifestation with Motion to Admit Newly Discovered
Evidence consisting of, among others, (a) a copy of a January 2013 internet article of a Mr. Eli
Obligacion which provided a database record from the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
(BID) indicating that Reyes is an American citizen and a holder of a US passport, and (b) a
photocopy of a Certification of Travel Records from the BID which showed that Reyes used her
US passport in her various travels abroad.
On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution granting Tans petition
and cancelling Reyess CoC. It found that Reyes is not a Filipino citizen because she failed to
qualify for repatriation under RA 9225 by taking the required Oath of Allegiance and executing
an Affidavit of Renunciation of her American citizenship. In addition, it ruled that Reyes did not
comply with the one-year residency requirement under the 1987 Constitution.
On April 8, 2013, Reyes filed her motion for reconsideration claiming that she is a natural-born
Filipino citizen and that she has not lost such status by simply obtaining and using a US
passport. Additionally, she averred that while she was married to an American citizen in 1997,
this only resulted in her acquiring dual citizenship and not in her becoming a naturalized
American citizen, thus, there is no need for her to fulfill the twin requirements under RA
9225. She also attached to her motion an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship dated
September 21, 2012 and a Voter Certification in Boac, Marinduque dated April 17, 2012.
On May 14, 2013, the COMELEC en banc promulgated its Resolution denying Reyess motion
for reconsideration for lack of merit. Chairman Brillantes, however, dissented from the majority
and held that Tan failed to offer substantial evidence to prove that Reyes lost her Filipino
citizenship, noting that the internet article by Mr. Obligacion is hearsay, while the purported
copy of the BID certification is merely a photocopy and not even a certified true copy of the
original, thus similarly inadmissible as evidence. Chairman Brillantes also opined that (a) a
petition to deny due course tackles exclusively the issue of deliberate misrepresentation over a
qualification, and not the lack of qualification per se which is the proper subject of a quo
warranto proceeding, and (b) the issues pertaining to Reyess residence and citizenship require
exhaustive presentation and examination of evidence that are best addressed in a full blown quo
warranto proceeding rather than the summary proceedings in the present case.
On May 18, 2013, Reyes was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 elections by the
Marinduque Provincial Board of Canvassers.
On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring its May 14,
2013 Resolution final and executory, pursuant to the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which
provide that said resolutions shall become final and executory after the lapse of five days from
promulgation, unless restrained by the Supreme Court.
On June 7, 2013, Reyes took her oath of office before Speaker Belmonte of the House of
Representatives. On that same day, Reyes filed this Petition for Certiorari assailing the
COMELEC Resolutions and claiming that (a) the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when
she was duly proclaimed winner, and (b) the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion (i)
when it took cognizance of Tans newly discovered evidence without the same have been
testified and offered and admitted in evidence and without giving Reyes the opportunity to
question and present controverting evidence, in violation of Reyess right to due process, (ii)
when it declared that Reyes is not a Filipino citizen and did not meet the residency requirement,
and (iii) when by, enforcing RA 9225, it imposed additional qualifications to those enumerated
in the Constitution for a Member of the House of Representatives.
Without further proceedings, the majority of the SC justices dismissed the petition and held that:
A. The COMELEC retained jurisdiction to the exclusion of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) because (a) Reyes has not filed a petition with the HRET, and (b) the
jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the House of
Representatives which, based on jurisprudence, happens only after a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office at noon of the thirtieth day of June next
following his election. The majority also believed that the COMELEC en banc had already
disposed of the issue of petitioners lack of Filipino citizenship and residency last May 14, 2013
and so the Board of Canvassers which proclaimed petitioner as winner on May 18, 2013 cannot,
by such act, be allowed to render nugatory the COMELEC en banc decision, which per
COMELEC Rules of Procedure became final and executory on May 19, 2013. To prevent the
assailed Resolution from becoming final, petitioner should have filed a petition before the SC
within the 5-day period as provided in said Rules, but she failed to do so.
B. The COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it took cognizance of the newly
discovered evidence because it is not bound to strictly adhere to the technical rules of procedure
in the presentation of evidence, and since the proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to
cancel a CoC are summary in nature. There was no denial of due process because petitioner had
five months from the filing of Tans petition to the issuance of the COMELEC First Divisions
Resolution to adduce evidence, but she did not avail herself of the opportunity given her.
C. A doubt was clearly cast on petitioners citizenship which petitioner failed to clear. Early on,
Reyes contended that it was Tans burden to prove that Reyes is not a Filipino citizen. Tan was
able to substantiate his allegation by evidence establishing that Reyes is a holder of an American
passport. The burden now shifted to Reyes to present evidence either that she is a natural-born
citizen and has not lost the same or that she has availed of the privileges under RA 9225 but she
failed to do that, and so the conclusion is that she remains to be an American citizen. Notably, in
her motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc, Reyes admitted that she is a
holder of a US passport, but she averred that she is only a dual Filipino-American citizen, thus
RA 9225 does not apply to her. Still, attached to the said motion is an Affidavit of Renunciation
of Foreign Citizenship which she explained was attached if only to comply with the rules, even
as a superfluity. Given that the Affidavit was executed in September 2012 or even before the
COMELEC issued the assailed Resolutions raising RA 9225 compliance as an issue, this must be
taken as an admission by petitioner that RA 9225 applies to her.
D. As to the issue of residency, the majority agrees with the ruling of the COMELEC First
Division that petitioner cannot be considered a resident of Marinduque because she did not show
that she had re-acquired her Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225, and so it follows that she
has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA. The only proof presented by petitioner to
show that she has met the one-year residency requirement is her claim that she served as
Provincial Administrator of the province from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011, but no amount
of her stay in the said locality can substitute the fact that she has not abandoned her domicile of
choice in the USA.
E. The COMELEC did not impose additional qualifications on candidates for the House of
Representatives who have acquired foreign citizenship. It merely applied the qualifications
prescribed in the Constitution that the candidate must be a natural-born citizen and must have
one-year residency prior to the date of elections. Thus, it was proper for the COMELEC to
inquire into Reyess compliance with RA 9225 to determine if she re-acquired her status as a
natural-born citizen.
All in all, the majority believed, considering that the petition for denial and cancellation of the
CoC is summary in nature, that the COMELEC is given much discretion in the evaluation and
admission of evidence. They also cited an earlier case where the SC held that the rule that
factual findings of administrative bodies will not be disturbed by the courts except when there is
absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such findings should be applied
with greater force when it concerns the COMELEC, as the latter was created and explicitly made
independent by the Constitution itself and intended by its framers to be placed on a level higher
than statutory administrative organs. Citing another case, they noted that for an act to be struck
down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent
and gross and, in this case, petitioner failed to adequately and substantially show that grave
abuse of discretion exists.
In his dissenting opinion, J. Brion, joined by J. Carpio, J. Villarama, and J. Leonen, expressed his
strong reservations to the majoritys outright dismissal of this petition after an initial review,
based solely on the petition and its annexes and its finding that there was no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of COMELEC. The dissenters believed that the majority ought to have at
least required public respondent COMELEC to comment on the petition in light of the gravity of
the issues raised, the potential effect on jurisprudence, and the affected personal relationships
within and outside the Court, before any further action can be made. That this case at least
deserves further proceedings from the SC is supported by the following considerations:
First, the issues raised by petitioner on the jurisdiction of the COMELEC, on her right to due
process and the COMELECs failure to properly appreciate and evaluate the evidence against
her, and on the alleged imposition by the COMELEC of a qualification for the position of
congressman other than those mentioned in the Constitution, among others, are all substantial
issues deserving more than the hasty dismissive action the majority made. For example,
comments should have been solicited at least on how petitioners admitted marriage affected her
citizenship and on how the COMELEC arrived at the conclusion that petitioner was a naturalized
American citizen based on submitted evidence that could only show that petitioner was the
holder of a US passport.
Second, unless the case is clearly and patently shown to be without basis, the SC should, out of
delicadeza, at least hear and consider both sides before making a ruling that would favor the son
of a member of the SC (bloggers note: petitioners rival candidate was the son of J. Velasco).
Third, the majoritys holding that the jurisdiction of the HRET only begins after the candidate
has assumed office on June 30 is contrary to prevailing jurisprudence and the HRET Rules
(which both hold the proclamation of the winner as the reckoning point and trigger that brings
election contests within the HRETs exclusive jurisdiction) and is, in fact, a major retrogressive
jurisprudential development that can emasculate the HRET. In this particular case, any election
protest or petition for quo warranto filed after June 30 or more than fifteen (15) days from
Reyess proclamation on May 18, 2013 shall be dismissed outright by the HRET for having been
filed out of time under the HRET Rules. In making this kind of ruling, the SC should have at
least undertaken a full-blown proceeding.
All told, the dissenters believe that the COMELEC does not have an airtight case based on
substantial evidence on the citizenship and residency issues, and much less a similar case on the
jurisdictional issue, to justify a very prompt outright dismissal action from the SC. They also
believe that petitioner Reyes is not lacking in arguably meritorious positions to support her
cause, even if only to the extent of being fully heard by the SC. If the SC is really serious in
administering justice in this case, the proper course of action is to require the COMELEC to
comment on the petition and to decide matters from that point.