The Legality of Killing Americans With Drones Laid Out in Govt Memo
The Legality of Killing Americans With Drones Laid Out in Govt Memo
~ See also Geoffrey S. Com & Eric Talbot Jensen, Untying the Gordian Knot: A Proposal for Determining
Applicability of the Laws of War to the War on Terror, 81 Temp. L. Rev. 787, 799 (2008) ("lf. .. the ultimate
purpose ofthe drafters ofthe Geneva Conventions was to prevent 'law avoidance' by developing de facto law
triggers--a purpose consistent with the humanitarian foundation of the treaties--then the myopic focus on the
geographic nature of an arrned conflict in the context of transnational counterterrorist combat operations serves to
frustrate that purpose."); cf also Derek Jinks, September 11 and the Laws of War, 28 Yale J. Int'l L. I, 40-41 (2003)
(arguing that if Common Article 3 applies to wholly internal conflicts, then it "applies a fortiori to anned conflicts
with international or transnational dimensions," such as to the United States's armed conflict with al-Qaida).
26
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a further reason for skepticism about an approach that would categorically deny that an operation
is part of an anned conflict absent a specified level and intensity of hostilities in the particular
location where it occurs.
For present purposes, in applying the more context-specific approach to determining
whether an operation would take place within the scope of a particular armed conflict, it is
sufficient that the facts as they have been represented to us here, in combination, support the
judgment .that DoD's operation in Yemen would be conducted as part of the non-international
armed conflict between the United States and al-Qaida. Specifically, DoD proposes to target a
leader of AQAP, an organized enemy force
35
that is either a component of al-Qaida or that is a
co-belligerent of that central party to the conflict and engaged in hostilities against the United
States as part of the same comprehensive.r.rmed conflict, in league with the principal enemy. See
supra at 9-10 & n.5. More.over, DoD would conduct the operation in Yemen, where, according
te--the facts related to us, AQAP has a significant and organized presence, and from which AQAP
is conducting terrorist training in an organized manner and has executed and is planning to
execute attacks against the United States. Finally, the targeted individual himself, on behalf of
that force, is continuously planning attacks from that Yemeni base of operations against the
United States, as the conflict with al-Qaida continues. See supra at 7-9. Taken together, these
facts support the conclusion that the DoD operation would be part of the non-international armed
conflict the Court recognized in Hamdan?
6
J.l Cf Prosecutor v. Haradnizaj, No IT-04-84-T 60 (ICTY Trial Chamber I, 2008) ("an armed conflict can
exist only between parties that are sufficiently organized to confront each other with military means-a condition
that can be evaluated with respect to non-state groups by assessing "several indicative factors, none of which are, in
themselves, essential to establish whether the 'organization' criterion is fulfilled," including, among other things, the
existence of a command structure, and disciplinary rules and mechanisms within the group, the ability of the group
to gain access to weapons, other military equipment, recruits and military training, and its ability to plan, coordinate,
and carry out military operations).
36
We note that the Department of Defense, which has a policy of compliance with the law of war "during
all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and in all other military operations," Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Instruction 5810.01D, Implementation ofthe DoD Law of War r o g r a m ~ 4.a, at 1 (Apr. 30,
201 0) (emphasis added), has periodically used force--albeit in contexts different from a conflict such as this-in
situations removed from "active battlefields," in response to imminent threats. See, e.g., Nat'! Comm'n on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report 116-17 (2004) (describing 1998 cruise missile attack
on al-Qaida encampments in Afghanistan following al-Qaida bombings of U.S. embassies in East Africa); W. Hays
Parks, Memorandum of Law: Executive Order 12333 and Assassination, Army Lawyer, at 7 (Dep't of Anny
Pamphlet 27-50-204) (Dec. 1989) ("Assassination") at 7 n.8 (noting examples of uses of military force in "[s]elf
defense against a continuing threat," including ''the U.S. Navy air strike against Syrian military objections in
Lebanon on 4 December 1983, following Syrian attacks on U.S. Navy F-14 TARPS flights supporting the
multinational peacekeeping force in Beirut the preceding day," and "air strikes against terrorist-related targets in
Libya on the evening of 15 April 1986"); see also id at 7 {"A national decision to employ military force in self
defense against a legitimate terrorist or related threat would not be unlike the employment of force in response to a
threat by conventional forces; only the nature of the threat has changed, rather than the international legal right of
self defense. The terrorist organizations envisaged as appropriate to necessitate or warrant an armed response by
U.S. forces are well-financed, highly-organized paramilitary structures engaged in the illegal use of force.");
Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996 on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons ~ 42, I 996 I.C.J. 226,
245 ("Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion") (fundamental law-of-war nonns are applicable even where military
force might be employed outside the context of an armed conflict, such as when using powerful weapons in an act of
national self-defense); cf also 91!1 Commission Report arl 16-17 (noting the Clinton Administration position-with
respect to a presidential memorandum authorizing CIA assistance to an operation that could result in the killing of
Usarna Bin Ladin "if the CIA and the tribals judged that capture was not feasible"--that "under the law of armed
27
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There remains the question whether DoD would conduct its operation in accord with the
rules governing targeting in a non-international armed conflict-namely, international
humanitarian law, commonly known as the laws of war. See Dinstein, Conduct of Hostilities at
17 (international hwnanitarian law "takes a middle road, allowing belligerent States much
leeway (in keeping with the demands of military necessity) and yet circumscribing their freedom
of action (in the name ofhumanitarianism'').
37
The 1949 Geneva Conventions to which the
United States is a party do not themselves directly impose extensive restrictions on the conduct
of a non-international armed conflict-with the principal exception of Common Article 3, see
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 630-31. But the norms specifically described in those treaties "are not
exclusive, and the laws and customs ofwar also impose limitations on the conduct of participants
in non-international armed conflict." U.S. Tadic Submission at 33 n.53; see also, e.g.,
Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, Preamble
("Hague Convention (IV)"), 36 Stat. 2277, 2280 (in cases "not included" under the treaty, "the
inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the
law of nations, as they result from the usages among civilized peoples, from the laws of
humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience").
In particular, the "fundamental rules" and "intransgressible principles of international"
customary law," Advisory Opinion of8 July 1996 on the Legality ofthe Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons f179, 1996 LC.J. 226, 257 ("Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion"), which
apply to all armed conflicts, include the "four fundamental principles that are inherent to all
targeting decisions" -namely, military necessity, huma.nlty (the avoidance of tmnecessary
suffering), proportionality, and distinction. United States Air Force, Targeting, Air Force
Doctrine Document 2- 1.9, at 88 (June 8, 2006); see also generally id at 88-92; Dinstein,
Conduct of Hostilities at 16-20, 115-16, 119-23. Such fundamental rules also include those
listed in the annex to the Fourth Hague Convention, see Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion
~ 80, at 258, article 23 ofwhlch makes it "especially forbidden" to, inter alia, kill or wound
treacherously, ref...:sc: surrender, declare a denial of quarter, or cause wmecessary suffering, 36
Stat. at2301-02.
conflict, killing a person who posed an imminent threat to the United States would be an act of self-defense, not an
assassination"). As we explain below, DoD likewise would conduct the operation contemplated here in accord with
the laws of war and would direct its lethal force against an individual whose activities have been determined to pose
a "continued and imminent threat" to U.S. persons and int.erests.
37
Cf Nuclear Weapon.s Advisory p i n i o n ~ 25, 1996 LC.J. at 240 (explaining that the "test" of what
constitutes an "arbitrary" taking of life under international human rights Jaw, such as under article 6( 1) of the
International Covenant of Civil and Political rughts (ICCPR), must be determined by "the law applicable in armed
conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities," and "can only be decided by reference to the law
applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from terms of the Covenant itself'); Written Statement of the
Government of the United States of America before the International Court of Justice, Re: Request by the United
Nations General Assembly for an Advisory Opinion on the Legality of/he Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons at 44
(June 20, 1995) (lCCPR prohibition on arbitrary deprivation oflife "was clearly understood by its drafters to
exclude the lawful taking of human life,'' including killings "lawfully committed by the military in time of war");
Dinstein, Conduc1 of Hostilities at 23 (right to life under human rights law "does not protect persons from the
ordinary consequences of hostilities"); cf. also infra Part VI (explaining that the particular contemplated operations
here would satisfy due process and Fourth Amendment standards because, inter alia, capturing al-Aulaqi is currently
infeasible).
.,.
28
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DoD represents that it would conduct its operation against al-Aulaqi in compliance \vith
these fundamental law-of-war norms. See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Instruction
5810.01D, Implementation ofthe DoD Law ofWar r o g r a m ~ 4.a, at 1 (Apr. 30, 2010) ("It is
DOD policy that ... [m)embers of the DOD Components comply with the law of war during all
armed conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and in all other military operations.").
In particular, the targeted nature of the operation would help to ensure that it would comply with
the principle of distinction, and DoD has represented to us that it would make every effort to
minimize civilian casualties and that the officer who launches the ordnance would be required to
abort a strike if he or she concludes that civilian casualties will be disproportionate or that such a
strike will in any other respect violate the laws of war. See DoD May 18 Memorandum for OLC,
at 1 ("Any official in the chain of command has the authority and duty to abort" a strike "if he or
she concludes that civilian casualties will be disproportionate or that such a strike will otherwise
violate the laws of war.").
Moreover, althtmgh DoD would specificaiJy target al-Aulaqj, and would do so without
advance warning, such'characteristics of the contemplated operation would not violate the laws
of war and, in particular, would not cause the operation to violate the prohibitions on treachery
and perfidy-which are addressed to conduct involving a breach of confidence by the assailant.
See, e.g., Hague Convention IV, Annex, art. 23(b), 36 Stat. at 2301-02 ("[I]t is especially
forbidden ... to kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or
army"); cf also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection ofVictims of International Anned Conflicts, art. 37(1) (prohibiting the killing,
injuring or capture of an adversary in an international armed conflict by resort to acts "inviting
the confidence of[ the] adversary ... v.ith intent to betray that confidence," including feigning a
desire to negotiate under truce or flag of surrender; feigning incapacitation; and feigning
noncombatant status).
38
Those prohibitions do not categorically preclude the use of stealth or
surprise, nor forbid military attacks on identified, individual soldiers or officers, see U.S. Army
Field Manua127-10, ~ 31 (1956) (article 23(b) ofthe Annex to the Hague Convention IV does
not "preclude attacks on individual soldiers or officers of the enemy whether in the zone of
hostilities, occupied territory, or else-where"), and we are not aware of any other law-of-war
grounds precluding the use of such tactics. See Dinstein, Conduct of Hostilities at 94-95, 199;
Abraham D. Sofaer, Terrorism, The Law, and the National Defense, 126 Mil. L. Rev. 89, 120-21
(1989).
39
Relatedly, "there is no prohibition under the laws of war on the use oftechnologically
advanced weapons systems in armed conflict-such as pilotless aircraft or so-called smart
32
Although the United States is not a party to the First Protocol, the State Department has announced that
"we support the principle that individual combatants not kill, injure, or capture enemy personnel by resort to
perfidy." Remarks of Michael J, Matheson, Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State, The Sixth Annual American
Red Cross-Washington College of Law Conference on International Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on Customary
International Law and the /977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 Am. U. J. oflnt'l L. &
Pol'y4J5,425(1987). (U)
39
There is precedent for the United States targeting attacks against particular commanders. See, e.g.,
Patricia Zengel, Assassination and the Law of Armed Conflict, 134 Mil. L. Rev. 123, 136-37 (1991) (describing
American warplanes' shoot-down during World War II of plane carrying Japanese Admirallsoroku Yamamoto); see
also Parks, Assassination, Anny Lawyer at 5.
29
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bombs-as long as they are employed in conformity with applicable laws of war." Koh, The
Obama Administration and International Law. DOD also informs us that if al-Aulaqi offers to
surrender, DoD would accept such an offer.
40
,-
In light of all these circumstances, we believe DoD's contemplated operation against al-
Aulaqi would comply with international law, including the laws of war applicable to this armed
conflict, and would fall within Congress's authorization to use "necessary and appropriate force"
against al-Qaida. In consequence, the operation should be understood to constitute the lawful
conduct of war and thus to be encompassed by the public authority justification. Accordingly,
the contemplated attack, if conducted by DoD in the manner described, would not result in an
"unlawful" killing and thus would not violate section 11 I 9(b).
B.
We next consider whether the CIA's contemplated operation against al-Aulaqi in Yemen
would be covered by the public authority justification. We conclude that it would be; and thus
that operation, too, would not result in an "unlawful" killing prohibited by section 1119. As with
our analysis ofthe contemplated DoD operation, we rely on the sufficiency of the particular
factual circumstances of the CIA operation as they have been represented to us, without
determining that the presence of those specific circumstances would be necessary to the
conclusion we reach.
40
See Geneva Conventions Common Article 3(1) (prohibiting "violence to life and person, in particular
murder of all kinds," with respect to persons "taking no active part in the hostilities" in a non-international anned
conflict, "including members of armed forces who have laid down their anns"); see also Hague Convention IV,
Annex, art. 23(c), 37 Stat. at2301-02 ("it is especially forbidden ... [t]o kill or wound an enemy who, having laid
down his arms, or having no longer means of defence, has surrendered at discretion"); id art. 23(d) (forbidding a
declaration that no quarter will be given); 2 William Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 788 (J 920) ("The time
has long passed when 'no quarter' was the rule on the battlefield, or when a prisoner could be put to death simply by
virtue of his capture.'').
30
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31
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We explain in Part VI why the Constitution would impose no bar to the CIA's
contemplated operation under these circumstances, based on the facts as they have been
represented to us. There thus remains the question whether that operation would violate any
statutory restrictions, which in turn requires us to consider whether 18 U.S.C. 1119 would
apply to the contemplated CIA operation.
42
Based on the combination of circumstances that we
understand would be present, we conclude that the public authority justification that section 1119
incorporates-and that would prevent the contemplated DoD operation from violating section
1119(b }-would also encompass the contemplated CIA
43
operatiOn.
42
We address potential restrictions ili.;osed by two other criminal!aws-18 U.S.C. 956(a) and 244 l-
in Parts IV and V of this opinion.
~
We note, in addition, that the "lawful conduct of war'' variant ofthe public authority justification,
although often described with specific reference to operations conducted by the armed forces, is not necessarily
limited to operations by such forces; some descriptions of that variant of the justification, for example, do not imply
such a limitation. See, e.g., Frye, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 221 n.2 ("homicide done under a valid public authority, such as
execution of a death sentence or killing an enemy in a time of war''); Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law at l 093 ("the
killing of an enemy as an act of war and within the rules of war'').
32
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Specifically, we understand that the CIA, like DoD, would carry out the attack against an
operational leader of an enemy_ force. as oart of the United States's ongoing non-international
armed conflict with al-Qaida. -
\the CIA-
-would conduCl the operation in a manner that
accords with the rules of international humanitarian law governing this armed conflict, and in
circumstances
See supra at 10-11.
44
44
- . .
Ifthe killing by a member of the anned forces would comply with the law of war and otherwise be lawful,
actions of CIA officials facilitating that killing should also not be unlawful. See, e.g., Shoot Down Opinion at 165 n.
33 ("[O]ne cannot be prosecuted for aiding and abetting the commission of an act that is not itself a crime.") (citing
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 373 U.S. 262 (1963)).
Nor would the fact that CIA personnel would be involved in the operation itself cause the operation to
violate the laws of war. It is true that CIA personnel, by virtue of their not being part ofthe anned forces, would not
enjoy the immunity from prosecution under the domestic law of the countries in which they act for their conduct in
targeting and killing enemy forces in compliance with the laws of war-an immunity that the armed forces enjoy by
virtue of their status. See Report of the Special 71, at 22; see also Dinstein, Conduct of Hostilities, at
31. Nevertheless, lethal activities Conducted in accord with the Jaws of war, and Wldertaken in the course of
lawfully authorized hostilities, do not violate the laws of war by virtue of the fact that they are carried out in part by
government actors who are not entitled to the combatant's privilege. The contrary view "arises ... from a
fundamental confusion between acts punishable Wlder international law and acts with respect to which international
Jaw affords no protection." Rkhard R. Baxter, So-Called "Unprivileged Belligerency": Spies, Guerillas, and
Saboteurs, 28 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 323, 342 (195 I) ("the law of nations has not ventured to require of states that they .
. . refrain from the use of secret agents or that these activities upon the part of their military forces or civilian
population be punished"). Accord Yoram Dinstein, The Distinction Between Unlawful Combatants and War
Criminals, in International Law at a Time of Perplexity: Essays in Honour ofShabtai Rosenne 103-16 (Y. Dinstein
ed., 1989);
Statements in the Supreme Court's
decision in Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), are sometimes cited for the contrary view. See, e.g., id at 36 n.12
(suggesting that passing through enemy lines in order to commit "any hostile act" while not in uniform "renders the
offender liable to trial for violation of the laws of war"); id. at 31 (enemies who come secretly through the lines for
purposes of waging war by destruction oflife or property "without uniform" not only are "generally not to be
entitled to the status of prisoners of war," but also "to be offenders against the Jaw of war subject to trial and
punishment by military tribunals"). Because the Court in Quirin focused on conduct taken behind enemy lines, it is
not clear whether the Court in these passages intended to refer only to conduct that would constitute perfidy or
treachery. To the extent the Court meant to suggest more broadly that any hostile acts performed by unprivileged
belligerents are for that reason violations of the laws of war, the authorities the Court cited (the Lieber Code and
Colonel Winthrop's military law treatise) do not provide clear support. See John C. Dehn, The Hamdan Case and
the Application of a Municipal OjJellSe, 7 J. Int' 1 Crim. J. 63, 73-79 (2009); see also Baxter, So-Caffed
"Unprivileged Belligerency," 28 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. at 339-40; Michael N. Schmitt, Humanitarian Law and Direct
Participation in Hostilities by Private Contractors or Civilian Employees, 5 Chi. J. Int'l L. 511, 521 n.45 (2005); W.
Hays Parks, Special Forces' Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms, 4 Chic. J. Int'l L. 493, 51 q-11 n.3 1 (2003). We note
33
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Nothing in the text or legislative history of section 1119 indicates that Congress intended
to criminalize such an operation. Section 1119 incorporates the traditional public authority
justification, and did not impose any special limitation on the scope of that justification. As we
have explained, supra at 17-19, the legislative history of that criminal prohibition revealed
Congress's intent to close a jurisdictional loophole that would have hindered prosecutions of
murders carried out by private persons abroad. It offers no indication that Congress intended to
prohibit the targeting of an enemy leader during an armed conflict in a manner that would accord
with the laws of war when performed by a duly authorized government agency. Nor does it
indicate that Congress, in closing the identified loophole, meant to place a limitation on the CIA
that would not apolv to DoD.
Thus, we
conclude that just as Congress did not intend section 1119 to bar the particular attack that DoD
contemplates, neither did it intend to prohibit a virtually identical attack on the same target, in
the same authorized conflict and in similar compliance with the laws of war, that the CIA would
carry out in accord with
in this regard that DoD's current Manual for Military Commissions does not endorse the view that the commission
of an unprivileged belligerent act, without more, constitutes a violation of the international Jaw ofwar. See Manual
for Military Commissions, Part IV, 5(13), Comment, at IV-1 1 (2010 ed., Apr. 27, 2010) (murder or infliction of
serious bodily injury "committed while the accused did not meet the requirements of privileged belligerency" can be
tried by a military commission "even if such conduct does not violate the international law of war").
~ l A s one example, the Senate Report pointed to the Department of Justice's conclusion that the Neutrality
Ac[, 18 U.S. C. 960, prohibits conduct by private parties but is not applicable to the CIA and other government
agencies. !d. The Senate Report assumed that the Department's conclusion about the Neutrality Act was premised
on the assertion that in the case of government agencies, there is an "absence of the mens rea necessary to the
offense." !d. Jn fact, however, this Office's conclusion about that Act was not based on questions of mens rea, but
instead on a careful analysis demonstrating that Congress did not intend the Act, despite its words of general
applicability, to apply to the activities of government officials acting within the course and scope of their duties as
officers of the United States. See Application ofNeurra!ity Act to Officio{ Government Activities, 8 Op. O.L.C. 58
(I 984).
34
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See also infra at 3 8-41 (explaining that the CIJ\ operation under the circumstances
described to us would comply vrith constitutional due process:and the Fourth __ Amendment's
"reasonableness" test for the use of deadly force). .. -
Accordingly, we conclude that, just as the combination of circumstances present here
supports the judgment that the public authority jus',tification would apply to the contemplated
operation by the armed forces, the combination of circumstances also supports the judgment that
the CIA's operation, too, would be encompassed by that justification .. The CIA's contemplated
operation, therefore, would not result in an "unlawful" killitw mder section 1111 and thus would
not violate section 1119. -
IV.
For similar reasons, we conclude that the contemplated DoD and CIA operations would
not violate another federal criminal statute dealing vrith "murder" abroad, 18 U.S.C. 956(a).
That law makes it a crime to conspire Vlithin the jurisdiction of the United States "to commit at
any place outside the United States an act that would constitute the offense of murder,
kidnapping, or maiming if committed in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States" if any conspirator acts within the United States to effect any object ofthe
conspiracy.
46
Cf also VISA Fraud Investigation, 8 Op. O.L.C. at 287 (applying similar analysis in evaluating the effect
of criminal prohibitions on certain otherwise authorized Jaw enforcement operations, and explaining that courts have
recognized it may be lawful for law enforcement agents to disregard otherwise applicable Jaws "when taking action
that is necessary to attain the permissible law enforcement objective, when the action is carried out in a reasonable
fashion"); id at 288 (concluding that issuance of an otherwise unlawful visa that was necessary for undercover
operation to proceed, and done in circumstances-"for a limited purpose and under close supervision"--that were
"reasonable," did not violate federal statute).
35
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Like section 1119(b), section 956(a) incorporates by reference the understanding of
"murder" in section 1111 of title 18. For reasons we explained earlier in this opinion, see supra
at 12-14, section 956(a) thus incorporates the traditional public authority justification that section
I 111 recognizes. As we have further explained both the CIA and DoD operations, on the facts
as they have been represented to us, would be covered by tha1 justification. Nor do we believe
that Congress's reference in section 956(a) to ''the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of
the United States" reflects an intent to transfonn such a killing into a "murder" in these
circumstances-notwithstanding that our analysis of the applicability of the public authority
justification is limited for present purposes to operations conducted abroad. A contrary
conclusion would require attributing to Congress the surprising intention of criminalizing
through section 956(a) an otherwise lawful killing of an enemy leader that another statute
specifically prohibiting the murder of U.S. nationals abroad does not prohibit. --
The legislative ill story of section 956(a) further confirms our conclus_ion that that statute
should not be so construed. When the provision was first introduced in the Senate in 1995, its
sponsors addressed and rejected the notion that the conspiracy prohibited by that section would
apply to "duly authorized" actions undertaken on behalf of the federal government. Senator
Biden introduced the provision at the behest of the President, as part of a larger package of anti-
terrorism legislation. See 141 Cong. Rec. 4491 (1995) (statement of Sen. Biden). He explained
that the provision was designed to "fill[] a void in the law," because section 956 at the time
prohibited only U.S.-based conspiracies to commit certain property crimes abroad, and did not
address crimes against persons. Id at 4506. The amendment was designed to cover an offense
"committed by terrorists" and was "intended to ensure that the government is able to punish
those persons who use the United States as a base in which to plot such a crime to be carried out
outside the jurisdiction of the United States." Jd Notably, the sponsors of the new legislation
deliberately declined to place the new offense either within chapter 19 of title 18, which is
devoted to "Conspiracy," or vvithin chapter 51, which collects "Homicide" offenses (including
those established in sections !Ill, 1112, 1113 and 1119). Instead, as Senator Biden explained,
"[s ]cction 956 is contained in chapter 45 of title 18, United States Code, relating to interference
with the foreign relations of the United States," and thus was intended to "coverO those
individuals who, without appropriate govenunental authorization, engage in prohibited conduct
that is harmful to the foreign relations of the United States." Id at 4507. Because, as Senator
Biden explained, the provision was designed, like other provisions of chapter 45, to prevent
private interference with U.S. foreign relations, "[i]t is not intended to apply to duly authorized
actions undertaken on behalfofthe United States Government." !d.; see also 8 Op. O.L.C. 58
(1984) (concluding that section 5 ofthe Neutrality Act, 18 U.S.C. 960, which is also in chapter
45 and which forbids the planning of, or participation in, military or naval expeditions to be
carried on from the United States against a foreign state with which the United States is at peace,
prohibits only persons acting in their private capacity from engaging in such conduct, and does
not proscribe activities undertaken by government officials acting within the course and scope of
their duties as United States officers). Senator Daschle expressed this same understanding when
he introduced the identical provision in a different version of the anti-terrorism legislation a few
months later. See 141 Cong. Rec. 11,960 (1995) (statement of Sen. Daschle). Congress enacted
the new section 956(a) the following year, as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, tit. VII, 704(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1294-95 (1996). As far as
36
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we have been able to determine, the legislative history contains nothing to contradict the
construction of.s.ection 956(a) described by Senators Biden and Daschle.
Accordingly, we do not believe sectin11 956(a) would prohibit the contemplated
operations.
v.
\Ve next consider the potential application of the War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. 244 I,
which makes it a federal crime for a member of the Armed Forces or a national of the United
States to "commitO a war crime." Jd. 244l(a). Subsection 2441(c) defines a "war crime" for
purposes of the statute to mean any conduct (i) that is defined as a grave breach in any of the
Geneva Conventions (or any Geneva protocol to which the U.S. is a party); (ii) that is prohibited
by four specified articles of the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907; (iii) that is a "grave breach"
of Common Article 3 ofthe Geneva Conventions (as defmed elsewhere in section 2441) when
committed "in the context of and in association with an armed conflict not of an international
character"; or (iv) that is a willful killing or infliction of serious injury in violation of the 1996
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices.
Of these, the only subsection potentially applicable here is that dealing with Common Article 3
of the Geneva Conventio'iis:-.;
7
In defining what conduct constitutes a "grave breach" of Common Article 3 for prnposes
of the War Crimes Act, subsection 2441(d) includes "murder," desQribed in pertinent part as
"[t]he act of a person who intentionally kills, or conspires or attempts to kill ... one or more
persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including those placed out of combat by sickness,
woW1ds, detention, or any other cause." 18 U.S. C. 2441 ( d)(l )(D). This language derives from
Common Article 3(1) itself, which prohibits certain acts (including murder) against "[p]ersons
taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of anned forces who have laid down
their anns and those placed 'hors de combat' by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other
cause." See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, [1955], art. 3(1 ), 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3318-20. Although Common Article 3 is most commonly
applied with respect to persons within a belligerent party's control, such as detainees, the
language of the article is not so limited-it protects all "(p]ersons takinf! no active part in the
hostilities" in an armed conflict not of an international character.
Whatever might be the outer bounds of this category of covered persons, we do not think
it could encompass al-Aulaqi. Common Article 3 does not alter the fundamental law-of-war
principle concerning a belligerent party's right in an armed conflict to target individuals who are
part of an enemy's armed forces. See supra at 23. The language of Common Article 3 "makes
clear that members of such armed forces [of both the state and non-state parties to the conflict]
... are considered as 'taking no active part in the hostilities' only once they have disengaged
47
The operations in question here would not involve conduct covered by the Land Mine Protocol. And the
articles of the Geneva Conventions to which the United States is currently a party other than Common Article 3, as
well as the relevant provisions of the Annex to the Fourth Hague Convention, apply by their tenus only to armed
conflicts between two or more of the parties to the Conventions. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, [ 1955], art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3406.
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from their fighting function ('have laid down their arms') or are placed hors de combat; mere
suspension of combat is insufficient." International Committee of the Red Cross, Interpretive
Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian
Law 28 (2009); cf also id. at 34 ("individuals whose continuous function involves the
preparation, execution, or command of acts or operations amotmting to direct participation in
hostilities are assuming a continuous combat function," in which case they can be deemed to be
members of a non-state anned group subject to continuous targeting); accord Gherebi v. Obama,
609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 65 (D.D.C. 2009) ("the fact that 'members of armed forces who have laid
down their arms and those placed hors de combat' are not 'taking [an] active part in the
hostilities' necessarily implies that 'members of armed forces' who have not surrendered or been
incapacitated are 'taking [an] active part in the hostilities' simply by virtue of their membership
in those armed forces"); id. at 67 ("Common Article 3 is not a suicide pact; it does not provide a
free pass for the members of an enemy's armed forces to go to or fro as they please so long as,
for example, shots are not fired, bombs are not exploded, and places are not hijacked"). Al-
Aulaqi, an active, high-level leader of an enemy force who is continually involved in planning
and recruiting for terrorist attacks, can on that basis fairly be said te be taking "an active part in
hostilities." Accordingly, targeting him in the circumstances posited to us would not violate
Common Article 3 and therefore would not violate the \V ar Crimes Act.
VI.
We conclude with a discussion of potential constitutional limitations on the contemplated
operations due to al-Aulaqi's status as a U.S. citizen, elaborating upon the reasoning in our
earlier memorandum discussing that issue. Although we have explained above why we believe
that neither the DoD or CIA operation would violate sections 1119(b), 956(a) and 2441 oftitle
18 of the U.S. Code, the fact that a1-Au1aqi is a United States citizen could raise distinct
questions under the Constitution. As we explained in our earlier memorandum, Barron
Memorandum at 5-7, we do not believe ~ t al-Aulaqi' s U.S. citizenship imposes constitutional
limitations that would preclude the contemplated lethal. action lJ.Ilder the facts represented to us
by DoD, the CIA and the Intelligence Community.
Because al-Aulaqi is a U.S. citizen, the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, as well
as the Fourth Amendment, likely protects him in soine respects even while he is abroad. See
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. I, 5-6 (1957) (plurality opinion); United States v. Verdugo- Urquidez,
494 U.S. 259, 269-70 (1990); see also In re Terrorist Bombings ofUS. Embassies in East
Africa, 552 F.3d 157, 170 n.7 (2d Cir. 2008).
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In Hamdi, a plurality of the Supreme Court used the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test
to analyze the Fifth Amendment due process rights of a U.S. citizen captured on the battlefield in
Afghanistan and detained in the United States who wished to challenge the government's
assertion that he was a part of enemy forces, explaining rbat "the process due in any given
instance is determined by weighing 'the private interest that will be affected by the official
action' against the Government's asserted interest, 'including the function involved' and the
burdens the Government would face in providing greater process." 542 U.S. at 529 (plurality
opinion) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
We believe similar reasoning supports the constitutionality of the contemplated
operations here. As explained above, on the facts represented to us, a decision-maker could
reasonably decide that the threat posed by al-Aulaqi's activities to United States persons is
"continued" and "imminent"
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In addition to the nature of the threat posed by ai-Aulaqi's activities, both agencies here
have represented that they intend to capture rather than target al-Aulaqi if feasible; yet we also
understand that an operation by either age_nc:;y tQ__captl._!_re al-Aulaqi in Yemen would be infeasible
at this time.
. Cf, e.g., Public
Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, HCJ 769/02 40, 46 I.L.M. 3 75,
394 (Israel Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice, 2006) (although arrest,
investigation and trial "might actually be particularly practical under the conditions of belligerent
occupation, in which the army controls the area in which the operation takes place," such
alternatives "are not means which can always be used," either because they are impossible or
because they involve a great risk to the lives of soldiers). -
Although in the "circumstances of war," as the Hamdi plurality observed, tile risk of
erroneous deprivation of a citizen's liberty in the absence of sufficient process ... is very real,"
542 U.S. at 530, the plurality also recognized that "the realities of combat" render certain uses of
force "necessary and appropriate," including against U.S. citizens who have become part of
enemy forces-and that "due process analysis need not blink at those realities," id. at 531.
we conclude that at least where, as here,
the target's activities pose a "continued and imminent threat of violence or death" to U.S.
persons, "the highest officers in the Intelligence Community have reviewed the factual basis" for
the lethal operation, and a capture operation would be infeasible-and where the CIA and DoD
"continue to monitor whether changed circumstances would permit such an aliernative,"
see also DoD lvfay 18 Memorandum for OLC at 2-the of
combat" and the weight of the government's interest in using an authorized means ofletha) force
against this enemy arc such that the Constitution would not require the government to provide
further process to the U.S. person before using such force. Cf. Hamdi 542 U.S. at 535 (noting
that Court "accordfs] the greatest respect and consideration to the judgments of military
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authorities in matters relating to the actual prosecution of war, and ... the scope of that
discretion is vvide") (plurality opinion).
Similarly, assuming that the Fourth Amendment provides some protection to a U.S.
person abroad who is part of al-Qaida and that the operations at issue here would result in a
"seizure" within the meaning ofthat Amendment,
The
Supreme Court has made clear that the constitutionality of a seizure is detennined by
"balanc[ing] the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment
interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion."
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (I 985) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007). Even in domestic law enforcement operations, the Court has
noted that "[w]here the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of
serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to
prevent escape by using deadly force." Garner, 471 U.S. at 11. Thus, "if the suspect threatens
the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime
involving the infliction or threatened infliction of physical harm, deadly force may be
used if necessary to prevent escape and if. where feasible, some warning has been given." !d. at
11-12.
The Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" test is situation-dependent. Cf Scott, 550 U.S.
at 382 (Garner "did not establish a magical on/off switch that triggers rigid preconditions
whenever an officer's actions constitute 'deadly force'"). What would constitute a reasonable
use of lethal force for purposes of domestic law enforcement operations will be very different
from what would be reasonable in a situation like such as that at issue here. In the present
drcumstances, as we understand the facts, the U.S. citizen in question has gone overseas and
become part of the forces of an enemy with which the United States is engaged in an anned
conflict; that person is engaged iri continual planning and direction of attacks upon U.S. persons
from one of the enemy's overseas bases of operations; the U.S. government does not know
precisely when such attacks will occur; and a capture operation would be infeasible.
. at least where high-level government officials have determined that a
capture operation overseas is infeasible and that the targeted person is part of a dangerous enemy
force and is engaged in activities that pose a continued and imminent threat to U.S. persons or
interests the use of lethal force would not violate the Fourth
Amendment. and
thus that the intrusion on any Fourth Amendment interests would be outweighed by "the
importance of the governmental interests [that] justify the intrusion," Garner, 4 71 U.S. at 8,
based on the facts that have been represented to us.
Please let us know if we can be of further assistance.
I
CERTIFIED: u { LDLlf cz,Lu..A;
Acting Assistant AttQ.Ul.kl' .. General
ATRUECUYY
Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
1
by /