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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event:
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CIA Participant:
Interview of John Brennan
Interview
October 8, 2003
Top- Secret--
C hris tine H eal ey
Team 2
H eadquarters
Kevin Scheid; Ll oy d Sal vetti; Barbara Grewe;
C hris tine H eal ey
Office- of General C ouns el

9/11 Closed by Statute

Brennan's CIA Career
John Brennan entered the Agency in 1980 and went through the Directorate of
Operation's career trainee program. H e moved to the Directorate of Intel l igence and
I ris ing to s erve as head of the is s ues branch of NESA for two y ears .
Brennan was ' l in the C ounterterroris t C enter from Augus t
1990 to March 1992. H e next s erved as the deputy divis ion chief) 'until
1994. Brennan next s erved as executive as s is tant (EA) to the Deputy Director for
Intel l igence. Later he handl ed the Pres ident's Dail y Briefforl
White H ous e official s , incl uding George Tenet. Tenet.4ked Brennan to as s is t with
preparations for Tenet's confirmation hearings for peptity Director of C entral
. Intel l igence and Brennan l ater s erved as DDC I Tenet's EA from 1995 1996. In the
1 6 Brennan became the de uty -director of NESAt
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In Augus t 1999, Brennan became the chief of s taff for DC I Tenet. H e became the
Deputy Executive Director "of C IA in March of 2001 and the Director of the Terroris t
Threat Integration C enter in March 2003.
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Divis ion (NESA
hel d anal y s t pos itions in the Near Eas t South As ia
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137-
tAr. Jr
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Brennan was as ked about the DC I decl aration of war memo. H e s aid he does not
s pecifical l y remember s eeing the memo. H e s aid however that 1997 through 1999 was a
time of increas ing concern about terroris mi
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Brennan s aid there was "an increas ing drumbeat" during this period and the decl aration
of war was part of things moving forward in the intel l igence community .

Terroris t Threat Integration C enter (TTIC )

Brennan's firs t point about TTIC was that it is al Lure" of five principal partners .
Of t has ,'

l at the center; DoD,, DH 4--I FBI-I i and

Stat here is al s o repres entation from the C apitol Pol ice and the'Department of
Energy . State and l ocal government official s are not integrated into TTIC .
Approximatel y ] !s taff* anal y s ts ,or perform-anal y tic work, but he is
s til l uncertain of what s houl d be the right s ize for TTIC .
Bi'ennan s aid that TTIC is s til l grappl ing with/what its Mis s ion is . When TTIC was s et
up, there Was unanimity among the principal s thatTTIC 's mis s ion was to integrate
informatiOn s y s tems to enabl e-TTIC pers onnel -to have 360 degree acces s to information
and bri4 an integrated pers pective-to the Pres ident and the country 's s enior l eaders hip
/on terroris t is s ues . H owever, there were many practical day -to-day is s ues that were
/ unres ol ved -- s tartingWith hoW doy Ou define "terroris t threat"?
Brennan s tated that within 60/day s of the center's es tabl is hment he decided that he
bel ieved "terroris t 0U-ear/s houl d be defined broadl y . H is vis ion is that TTIC s houl d be
the center of-gravity --for terroris m anal y s is , to incl ude s trategic anal y s es , in much the
-s ame a mil itary joint command brings together forces from different s ervices . H e
, bel ieves 'otherUSG terroris m units wil l eventual l y migrate to TTIC or wil l have cl earl y

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defined s eparate res pons ibil ities within their parent organization. Doing this woul d
require new memoranda of unders tanding and new bus ines s practices for TTIC than what
has y et been es tabl is hed. H e s ugges ted that al l the major pl ay ers in TTIC s upported this
vis ion, except for C IA.



C oncerns about the direction of TTIC l ed to the appointment of a DC I tas k force l ed by
Richard Kerr. Other tas k force members incl ude Dal e Wats on (former FBI), Fl oy d
C arter, Paul Redmond (former C IA and former DH S), Tom Wol fe (former C IA/DI),
Rebecca Donnegan (former C IA/01G), Aris Pappas (former C IA), and Patrick H ughes
(retired general , former director of DIA). They were to make recommendations to the
DC I about the future of TTIC during the week of October 12 th . According to Brennan,
the group is l ooking acros s the government at the fact that many entities do s imil ar
things , but in fact gaps and s eams s til l exis t. Brennan s tated that he was going to pres ent
his vis ion of what the TTIC s houl d be to the DC I at the s ame time as the Kerr group. H e
emphas ized that he wanted decis ions about the future of TTIC to be made quickl y s o that
appropriate arrangements coul d be made before TTIC moves to its new l ocation next
y ear.
Brennan s tated that he s aw TTIC as the unique opportunity to get terroris m anal y s is right
in the United States Government. TTIC coul d s erve as a central hub for s trategic anal y tic
expertis e with dis crete areas of res pons ibil ity franchis ed out to various units as
appropriate. For ins tance, he s tated JITF-C T s houl d continue with its force protection
mis s ion.
Brennan s aid that s ome are concerned that his vis ion of TTIC coul d be a s l ippery s l ope
that coul d l ead to whol es al e changes for the C IA. Every one accepts his concept of TTIC
as a terroris m anal y s is center of gravity except C IA. H e acknowl edged that he had ideas
about res tructuring C IA (and by extens ion the entire IC ) that he advanced whil e he was
C IA's Deputy Executive Director and that thes e ideas are s imil ar to the ideas found in
Larry Kinds vater's paper on res tructuring the intel l igence community al ong a Gol dwater-
Nichol s model .
Brennan al s o s aid s ome have concerns he wants a Department of Terroris m but he woul d
argue agains t a s eparate organization. Brennan s ay s he wants a joint organization
becaus e new and s eparate organizations l ead to bureaucratic competition. (H e made the
s ame point about the idea of creating an MI-5. It woul d be another s tovepipe and
competitor, al though he acknowl edged the need for devel oping the capabil ity of anal y s is
of domes tic intel l igence.) Brennan s aid he s upported "red teams " and competitive
anal y s is but as s erted it s houl d be done in a s tructured way not in the current "ad hoc"
manner. In his view, TTIC as an organization needs to be l egis l ated but it is s til l earl y
with s everal is s ues needing res ol ution.
e is try ing to pers uade C IA official s
that C IA has to s hare information and real ize how it fits into the big/
picture and the overal l government effort. Brennan s tated that Maureen Bagins ki is
deferring on her efforts 0devel op a s trategic intel l igence effort until [after-decis ions on
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TTIC are m a adel . H e is try ing to get the C TC anal y s ts doing s trategic naIY5is -

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moved to the TTIC . H e cl aimed even thes e "s trategic" anal y s ts at
C TC are pul l ed in too man directions and wear too many hats , and s o s ome matters are
dropped. The remaining houl d remain in C TC to inform and drive
operations . The FBI wil l put as ide . devel oping a s trategic anal y tical unit, deferring to
TTIC . DH S is rel y ing on TTIC for anal y s is that wil l be us ed by the information anal y s is
component of the department.
Brennan also argued that C ongres s s houl d addres s how the H omel and Security Act
interacts with the National Security Act of 1947 and make cl ear the divis ions of l abor
expected within the homel and s ecurity /national s ecurity s tructure. (H e emphas ized
throughout the interview that official s s houl d have cl earl y articul ated res pons ibil ities .)
Brennan did des cribe, however, one ins tance where the divis ion of l abor is cl ear. H e s aid
that in the pas t when C IA had warning information about a threat to a domes tic entity the
CIA''
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l a tear-l ine report. Now, the Department of H omel and Security (DH S) has the
s tatutory res pons ibil ity to provide al erts to s tate and l ocal governments and the private
s ector. (FBI is res pons ibl e for interaction with s tate and l ocal l aw enforcement.)
Other TTIC Issues
TTIC is not an operational unit, i.e. it is not invol ved in the col l ection of intel l igence
information either overs eas or domes tical l y . If it was one woul d have to recons ider the
authority given to the organization. TTIC does , however, identify col l ection
requirements and feed them into the col l ection agencies (C IA, NSA, FBI, etc). TTIC is
try ing to put together a requirements s y s tem becaus e there are gaps in eh current s y s tem.
TTIC receives reporting from al l the col l ection agencies to incl ude receiving unproces s ed
NSA reporting.
TTIC coul d have the effect of having a "forcing function" on l arger is s ues . The terroris m
chal l enge is bigger than any agency . Addres s ing the mis s ion, s tructure, information
s y s tems and pers onnel des ign of TTIC coul d force the community , es pecial l y C IA, to
rethink the community s tructure, to promote thinking about terroris m and other is s ues in
a joint manner. In C IA, the DO/DI s tructure inhibits reorganization. Government has
become more matrixed and the Executive and Legis l ative branches need to decide how to
organize government agencies to deal with today 's and tomorrow is s ues . In s ome
res pects rethinking the organizational des ign of the community to addres s terroris m coul d
l ead to a form of a Gol dwater Nichol s reorganization of the intel l igence community .
In May 2004, TTIC wil l movel
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I In September 2004,
the FBI's C ounterterroris m Divis ion and C IA's C TC wil l move'
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Brennan s tated that TTIC has res pons ibil ity for the Threat Matrix. TTIC has a program
office to ful fil l the requirements of the MOU on information s haring with res pect to
technol ogy and bus ines s practices.
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TTIC is devel oping a "red cel l " capabil ity . It wil l have no production res pons ibil ity . It
wil l "wal l ow in the data" and produce al ternative anal y s is . The Red C el l wil l focus on
terroris t s kil l s s ets , work backwards on terroris t event to think through terroris t thinking
and methods of operations ; it wil l l ook for s traws in the wind.
TTIC participates in war gaming exercis es but through DH S or the FBI. DH S engages
with s tate and l ocal governments and the FBI engages with s tate/l ocal l aw enforcement
el ements in war gaming.
The threat matl ixl
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It is produced for the topmost officials of the government to inform them
and to report on actions taken with res pect to the terroris t threat information. Not every
piece of threat information is dis s eminated but high impact, low probability information
is disseminated to government leaders.

TTIC Accomplishments
Brennan s tated that he is try ing to s et up bus ines s practices that can drive col l aboration
and integration of information through information s haring s tandards and metadata
s tandards . H e bel ieves there needs to be a combined and col l ective effort to force
compl iance in the agencies . With res pect to integration and expl oitation, Brennan s aid
that TTIC is us ing cutting edge techniques as wel l as brute force techniques to mine
terroris m-rel ated data, and has made identifications this way . Brennan expres s ed his
concern about the rich environment of information that does not get captured, particul arl y
s tate and l ocal information.
Brennan s tated that TTIC is try ing to identify knowl edge gaps but that a proces s does not
y et exis t to bring forward requirements on the domes tic s ide. It is not eas y to ans wer the
ques tion where is the bes t pl ace to go to get domes tic information neces s ary in counter-
terroris m (for ins tance, on critical infras tructures ).
nrennan s aid that TTIC movie have been s ent to JTTFs .
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Brennan cl arified that TTIC wil l s til l have a rol e in the USG's watchl is t effort. H e s aid
TTIC took over the TIPOFF program and it wil l maintain the TIPOFF data bas e as a 24/7
s ervice to agencies s uch as FTTTF, Dept. of State, DoD, DH S, etc. FBI's watchl is t
center wil l bring in domes tic information and have acces s to the TTIC databas e. The
National Watchl is t C enter, headed by a TSA official , wil l report to the Attorney General
via the FBI; it wil l s ervice al l the agency centers .
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In res pons e to the ques tion of who is in charge of warning Brennan s aid that it is cl ear in
the l aw that the DC I has res pons ibil ity to do terroris t warning. What el ement in the
bureaucracy wil l produce the terroris t warning remains uncl ear. No one has tol d C TC
that they do not have res pons ibil ity for terroris t warning. A decis ion has to be made and
formal l y articul ated about which intel l igence community el ement, TTIC or C TC . The
Kerr Group s tudy wil l addres s the warning is s ue and make recommendations on the
s ubject to the DC I.
Answering TTIC Critics
Some members of Congress have been highly critical of TTIC. They have argued that
the Homeland Security Act called for an intelligence fusion center at the Department of
Homeland Security and the creation of TTIC flaunts and undermines this requirement.
Notable among these critics is C hairman C hris topher C ox of the Select Committee on
Homeland Security. Brennan's response is that the Secretary of H omel and Security 's
juris diction ends at the water's edge, 95% of threat information comes from abroad, and
that onl y a joint entity s uch as TTIC can ens ure a worl dwide view of the terroris t threat.
Other critics charge TTIC is too much of a C IA organization. Brennan s aid the center is
"purpl e" and woul d l ike to be more s o. TTIC is not a C IA organization but an
independent unit reporting directl y to the DC I. H e does not view hims el f as a C IA
officer whil e s erving as the director of TTIC . With res pect to TTIC 's interaction with
s tate and l ocal governments , he s aid the C enter's interaction has been done when
reques ted by DH S
Brennan s aid that TTIC can not bring peopl e into the center on detail becaus e it "does not
exis t" (through s tatute). H owever, he s aid becaus e individual s come to TTIC on
as s ignment they come with their home agency authorities which enabl es the C enter
through thes e individual s to do many things .
Brennan does n't accept the criticis m that there is too much invol vement by Was hington
and TTIC in any and al l threats . H e s aid that y ou have to jump on matters even if they
are l ow probabil ity becaus e of the potential for high impact. H e s aid s enior
pol icy makers are "in the weeds " becaus e 9/11 was s o devas tating and there is "no margin
for error." TTIC has to be abl e to inform pol icy makers about the context of the threat
and how the threat is being handl ed.
NOTE: Brennan promis ed a copy of his power point s l ides dis cus s ed during the
interview.