Professional Documents
Culture Documents
In Re Freeman
In Re Freeman
THE COURT has considered appellant’s counsel’s motion to publish the court’s
opinion of June 12, 2008, and the record and file herein, and is of the opinion the
IT IS ORDERED, the motion to publish is granted. The opinion filed by the court
on June 12, 2008 shall be modified on page 1 to designate it is a published opinion and
A majority of the panel has determined that this opinion will not be
printed in the Washington Appellate Reports but it will be filed for public
record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
DATED:
FOR THE COURT:
___________________________________
JOHN A. SCHULTHEIS, Chief Judge
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
parte order of protection against Rob Freeman that was made permanent upon full hearing
in 1998. Rob1 was in the military and did not return to Washington or contact Robin after
their dissolution. In 2006, after Rob was injured in Iraq, he attempted to modify the
permanent order, which prevented him from obtaining a security clearance to continue his
military career in a less physically demanding role. A court commissioner denied his
motion. Revision was also denied. On appeal, Rob contends that the motion to modify
1
We use the parties’ first names in this opinion for clarity.
the order should have been granted. We conclude that Rob has made the requisite
Robin cross-appeals the denial of attorney fees on revision and seeks fees on
appeal. Finding no error, we affirm the decision below and deny her request for fees on
appeal.
FACTS
obtained an ex parte temporary order of protection on January 23, 1998, effective until a
commissioner made the order permanent. The court found that Robin was in reasonable
fear due to two incidents. In the first incident Rob admitted that he physically forced
Robin’s 16-year-old daughter into her room after she refused to go. She crouched down
and he pushed her from the hallway into her room. In the second incident he inventoried
or displayed his guns to Robin. Rob’s training as a Green Beret and with weapons
caused Robin to remain fearful.2 The order prevented Rob’s contact with Robin as well
as her four children then aged 18, 16, 12, and 10 years old.
2
The commissioner expressly declined to resolve Robin’s claim that Rob sexually
assaulted her when she was unconscious after taking pills in a suicide attempt, which was
her main claim to support the permanent order.
On May 31, 2006, Rob moved to modify or terminate the order of protection. Rob
asserted that he was severely injured on a mission in Iraq where he suffered the loss of a
hand, among other injuries. The injuries required retraining and reassessment of his
however, for such a clearance given the existence of the permanent order of protection.
Rob argued that he had no contact with his former wife since the entry of the order, he
currently lived in Missouri, he had no violations of any law, and he posed no danger to
anyone.
Robin responded that she was fearful of Rob during her marriage as well as during
the separation and divorce, and she and her children continue to be fearful of him. She
asserted that even after the divorce was final, Rob continued to harass her and violate the
order of protection. She pointed to unexplained events that she attributed to Rob,
including: rattling of the windows, doors, and walls of her house; repositioning of the
driver’s seat of her car; receiving Rob’s mail at her house; reappearance of missing
flower vases; and a hole kicked into her bedroom wall. Robin conceded that she had
never seen Rob do any of these things. But she stated: “I am terrified of this man. For
my safety and the safety of my children, I wish to keep this protection order in place.”
Robin’s daughter, who was 16 years old at the time that the order of protection was
entered and 25 at the time of the hearing, testified that after the order was entered in
1998, she saw Rob across the street from her high school and in the student parking lot,
watching her. Rob’s counsel argued that Rob had lived outside of the state since 1998
and he did not intend to return. Even if Robin proved early violations of the protective
order, he argued, there has been no contact for at least six years.
Finding that Robin is currently in fear of Rob and concluding that the fear is
objectively reasonable, the motion to modify or terminate the order was denied. Revision
DISCUSSION
pending a full hearing. RCW 26.50.070. After notice and hearing, an order of protection
can be made permanent “if . . . the court finds that the respondent is likely to resume acts
members or minor children when the order expires” on other terms. RCW 26.50.060(2).
The court may modify the terms of an order of protection upon application and
Nat’l Elec. Contractors Ass’n v. Riveland, 138 Wn.2d 9, 28, 978 P.2d 481 (1999) (the
legislature’s use of the term “may” in a statute generally confers discretion). We will not
disturb such an exercise of discretion on appeal absent a showing of abuse. State ex rel.
Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775 (1971). Abuse of discretion occurs
superior court that is before us for review.” In re Interest of Mowery, 141 Wn. App. 263,
The modification statute does not specify the grounds upon which a modification
should be granted or assign the burden to one party or the other. The provision for
renewal of an order of protection, however, requires only that the petitioner state the
reason for a renewal and the court “shall grant the petition for renewal unless the
respondent proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent will not
resume acts of domestic violence against the petitioner or the petitioner’s children or
family or household members when the order expires.” RCW 26.50.060(3). Then the
court “may renew the protection order for another fixed time period or may enter a
permanent order as provided in this section.” Id. The respondent’s burden would
a minimum, the respondent must show that he will more likely than not refrain from
resuming acts of domestic violence, i.e., acts of actual physical harm, injury or assault or
Washington courts have held that no recent or new act of domestic violence need
136 Wn. App. 512, 515-16, 150 P.3d 124 (2007). Rather, a past history of abuse or
threatened abuse plus present fear is sufficient to meet the standard. Spence v. Kaminski,
103 Wn. App. 325, 332-33, 12 P.3d 1030 (2000). The trial court in this case found that
Robin has a current fear of Rob, which, it concluded, was objectively reasonable. We
disagree.
At worst, the past acts in this case involve an assault to the then-16-year-old
Yasmeen Abdullah, the victim of the assault, is no longer covered by the order.
members.” Ms. Abdullah was named in the order as a minor to whom the order applied.
She is no longer a minor and the order does not apply to her, a point the commissioner
The other past act involved a perceived threat with firearms. According to Robin,
she accused Rob of taking her jewelry from the home, and Rob pulled his rifles out to
show her that he did not have the jewelry among his possessions, all the while assuring
her that he would not hurt her. At that time, Robin told Rob that she was scared and he
said, “fine, fine you’re scared.” CP at 26. The commissioner scolded Rob for not being
sensitive to Robin’s fear of weapons and told Rob that he should conduct himself more
carefully if he wanted to protect his career and reputation.4 It was Robin’s concern
3
The commissioner stated: “I’m not sure this order covers her any longer since
she is an adult.” CP at 50.
4
The commissioner warned Rob: “[F]or someone in your situation who has been
trained to use force and to use weapons of force you need to be very careful to conduct
yourself[,] and your actions in regard to Ms. Freeman have been careless in terms of
protecting your own reputation if you felt that that was in danger. I think that’s probably
all I should say. I will just alert you to the special position you find yourself in because
regarding Rob’s firearms and military training that inflicted the fear of imminent harm,
injury, or assault.
Rob correctly points out that the authority that address “current fear” and a past
incident that makes the current fear reasonable also involved facts that would satisfy the
requirement of imminence because the opportunity for conflict in those cases continued
to exist. See Spence, 103 Wn. App. at 332-33 (the parties’ continuing relationship while
they struggled over custody issues, together with evidence that the petitioner continued to
be afraid of the respondent, was sufficient to persuade a rational person that the petitioner
was in fear of imminent physical harm); Barber, 136 Wn. App. at 513, 515 (evidence of
postdivorce abuse and respondent’s acts that inflicted current fear of harm). See also
Hecker v. Cortinas, 110 Wn. App. 865, 870, 43 P.3d 50 (2002) (holding, in case where
there were recent acts of pounding on walls, “the [Domestic Violence Prevention Act,
chapter 26.50 RCW,] does not require infliction of physical harm; rather, the infliction of
It is reasonable that a past act could inflict current fear, but that fear must still
relate to a threat of imminent harm, injury, or assault. Here, due to time and distance,
there is no evidence to support a current fear that physically harmful acts or threats of
Rob argues that he has moved on with his life. He has had no contact with Robin
of your training and your career. That means you probably have to conduct yourself a
little differently [than] other people who are in a similar situation.” CP at 32.
or her children since he was deployed to Kentucky in 1998, and he has not returned to the
state of Washington since then. Rob points out that he was never charged with violating
the protection order and none of the suspicious goings on could be attributed to him.
Finally, we address the two incidents in which Yasmeen thought she saw Rob
across the street from her school and in the student parking lot in 1998, after the entry of
the orders of protection. The order required Rob to be 1,000 feet from the minor
children’s schools. It is unclear from the record whether Rob actually violated the order;
Robin did not attempt to prosecute Rob for a violation. And Yasmeen presented no
testimony that Rob did anything on these occasions to threaten her or attempt to contact
her.5
Rob notes the hardship the order visits on his career, which is, though not part of
the standard, rather compelling when considering the amount of time that has passed
since the entry of the order and considering the current status of the parties.
It is not appropriate for the mere passage of time without any other showing
to lift a person’s reasonable fears that they may be a victim of domestic
violence by someone who has hurt them in the past.
Rob showed more than the mere passage of time. He showed a compelling need
for lifting the order and a lack of opportunity for contact. Further, there is no evidence
5
Because this allegation was contained in testimony rather than in a pleading, Rob
did not have an opportunity to respond as he was not present for the hearing.
that Rob had hurt his wife or the other children at anytime.
The commissioner did not consider all of the relevant facts and misapprehended
others. Due to these changed circumstances, Robin’s current fear is not reasonable. The
denial of the motion to terminate or modify the order is based on untenable reasons and
grounds.
On cross-appeal, Robin contends that the superior court abused its discretion for
failing to award her attorney fees on revision. She sought them under RCW
RCW 26.50.060(1)(g) provides that “[u]pon notice and after hearing, the court
may” order attorney fees upon the issuances of a protection order. RCW 26.50.060(3)
provides that “[t]he court may award court costs, service fees, and reasonable attorneys’
fees” upon hearing for renewal. The trial court’s decision whether to award attorney fees
is plainly discretionary upon the issuance of an order of protection or renewal. But the
statute concerning modification or termination of an order does not address attorney fees.
Washington follows the American rule—that each party in a civil action will pay
its own attorney fees and costs—unless modified by contract, statute, or a recognized
ground in equity. Cosmopolitan Eng’g Group, Inc. v. Ondeo Degremont, Inc., 159
Wn.2d 292, 296-97, 149 P.3d 666 (2006). Our courts decline to award attorney fees
under a statute unless there is a clear expression of intent from the legislature authorizing
such an award. Id. at 303. There are express provisions for attorney fees upon the
issuance of an order of protection and upon its renewal. But there is no mention of an
award for modifications of such orders. We can, therefore, presume no legislative intent
Robin also claims she was entitled to attorney fees for Rob’s intransigence. As
Rob correctly notes, this argument was raised for the first time on appeal, and it should
not be considered. RAP 2.5(a); King County v. Guardian Cas. & Guar. Co., 103 Wash.
509, 175 P. 166 (1918) (question regarding authority for fees should not be considered
for the first time on appeal); Bierce v. Grubbs, 84 Wn. App. 640, 645, 929 P.2d 1142
(1997) (fee issue could not be raised for first time on appeal); Draper Mach. Works, Inc.
v. Hagberg, 34 Wn. App. 483, 488, 663 P.2d 141 (1983) (challenge to amount of fees
Finally, Robin seeks attorney fees for a frivolous appeal. Under RAP 18.9(a), an
appeal is frivolous if there are no debatable issues upon which reasonable minds might
differ and it is so totally devoid of merit that there is no reasonable possibility of reversal.
Malted Mousse, Inc. v. Steinmetz, 150 Wn.2d 518, 535, 79 P.3d 1154 (2003). As is
evidence from this opinion, Rob’s appeal was not frivolous. Further, as stated above,
CONCLUSION
We reverse the denial of the termination of the order of protection and remand for
the entry of an order consistent with this opinion. We affirm the trial court’s decision on
attorney fees and deny the request for attorney fees on appeal.
___________________________________
Schultheis, C.J.
WE CONCUR:
___________________________________
Brown, J.
___________________________________
Thompson, J. Pro Tem.