Villavicencio V Lukban Digest
Villavicencio V Lukban Digest
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Held/ Ratio:
1. Yes. When it is impossible for a party to sign an application for the writ of habeas corpus, another person may
submit it in his/her behalf. In the case at bar, the way the expulsion was conducted by the officials made it
impossible for the women to sign a petition for habeas corpus. They were first isolated from society and then
shipped. It was consequently proper for the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf, in this case, the
petitioners who were relatives and friends of the deportees.
2.
No. The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the SC or any judge thereof enforceable anywhere in the Phils.
Whether the writ shall be made returnable before the SC or before an inferior court rests in the discretion of the
SC & is dependent on the particular circumstances. In the case at bar, it was not shown that the CFI of Davao was
in session, or that the women had any means by which to advance their plea before that court. On the other
hand, the petitioners and their attorneys were in Manila and it was shown that the case involved parties situated
in different parts of the Islands. The failure of the superior court to consider the application and then to grant the
writ would have amounted to a denial of the benefit of the writ.
3.
Yes. The forcible taking of the women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties,
who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of their liberty & their freedom of locomotion just
as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. In this case, there was no law, order, or regulation which justified
the action of the respondents in restraining the petitioners of their liberty. There was no showing of any law or
order which authorized or conferred upon the Mayor of the city or the Chief of Police the right to force the women
to change their domicile from Manila to another locality. On the contrary, Phil. penal law during that time
specifically punishes any public officer who, not being expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any
person to change his residence.
4.
No. Only Mayor Lukban is guilty of contempt. He was primarily responsible for setting forth this whole chain of
events and had under his power as head of the city government to facilitate the return of the women to Manila
but failed. The rest of the respondents are not guilty of contempt. Some were merely following the orders of their
superiors or merely fulfilling a duty. Another was merely drawn into the case through miscommunication.
An officers failure to produce the body of a person in obedience to a writ of habeas corpus, when he has power to
do so, is contempt committed in the face of the court.
Dispositive: In resume- as before stated, no further action on the writ of habeas corpus is necessary . The respondents
Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yigo, and Diaz are not found to be in contempt of court. Respondent Lukban is
found in contempt of court and shall pay into the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court within five days the sum of one
hundred pesos.