DENISE A.

ATOTUBO 2
ND
YEAR LO1 LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
G.R. No. 133250 July 9, 2002

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
vs.
PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS:
In 1973, the Commissioner on Public Highways signed a contract to reclaim areas of Manila Bay with
the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP).

In 1977, PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084, tasked with
developing and leasing reclaimed lands. Under P.D. 1085, these lands were transferred to the care of
PEA as part of the Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered
into an agreement that all future projects under the MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA.

By 1988, President Corazon Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA. It was
followed by the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register of Deeds of Paranaque to
PEA covering the three reclaimed islands known as the FREEDOM ISLANDS.

Afterwards, in 1995, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-Philippine
corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with another 250 hectares, PEA and AMARI entered
the JVA which would later transfer said lands to AMARI. This caused a stir especially when Sen.
Maceda assailed the agreement in his privilege speech, claiming that such lands were part of public
domain. As a result, the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. The
Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate Committee Report No. 560 dated
September 16, 1997.7 Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to
transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not
classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title
covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.

Petitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of preliminary
injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI and from implementing the
JVA. Following these events, under President Estradas admin, PEA and AMARI entered into an
Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves claim that the contract is null and void.

Issue
Whether or not the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the stipulations
in the (Amended) JVA between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution

Held:
The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of
title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private
corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only
sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and
existing laws.

The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the
public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer
needed for public service. The government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA
has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the
public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state,
the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.

Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34
hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of
the public domain.

Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares111 of still
submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the
public domain.

PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed lands as
alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer
of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain.




























G.R. No. 164527 August 15, 2007

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, R-II BUILDERS, INC., R-II HOLDINGS, INC.,
HARBOUR CENTRE PORT TERMINAL, INC., and MR. REGHIS ROMERO II, respondents.

Facts: Petitioner Francisco Chavez in his capacity as taxpayer seeks to declare null and void the Joint
Venture Agreement (JVA) between the NHA and R-II Builders Inc (RBI) for being unconstitutional
and invalid, and to enjoin respondents particularly respondent NHA from implementing and/or
enforcing the said project and other agreements related thereto. On March 1, 1988, then President
Corazon C. Aquino issued Memorandum Order No. 161 (MO 161) approving and directing the
implementation of the Comprehensive and Integrated Metropolitan Manila Waste Management Plan.
Specifically, respondent NHA was ordered to conduct feasibility studies and develop low-cost housing
projects at the dumpsite and absorb scavengers in NHA resettlement/low-cost housing projects.

Pursuant to MO 161-A, NHA prepared the feasibility studies which resulted in the formulation of the
Smokey Mountain Development Plan and Reclamation of the Area Across R-10 or the Smokey
Mountain Development and Reclamation Project (SMDRP). SMDRP aimed to convert the Smokey
Mountain dumpsite into a habitable housing project, inclusive of the reclamation of the area across R-
10, adjacent to the Smokey Mountain as the enabling component of the project. Once finalized, the Plan
was submitted to President Aquino for her approval.

On January 17, 1992, President Aquino proclaimed MO 415, approving and directing the
implementation of the SMDRP through a private sector joint venture. Said MO stipulated that the land
area covered by the Smokey Mountain dumpsite is conveyed to the NHA as well as the area to be
reclaimed across R-10. In the same MO 415, President Aquino created an Executive Committee
(EXECOM) to oversee the implementation of the Plan and an inter-agency technical committee
(TECHCOM) was created composed of the technical representatives of the EXECOM. Based on the
evaluation of the pre-qualification documents, the EXECOM declared the New San Jose Builders, Inc.
and RBI as top two contractors. Thereafter, TECHCOM submitted its recommendation to the EXECOM
to approve the RBI proposal which garnered the highest score.

On October 7, 1992, President Ramos authorized NHA to enter into a JVA with RBI. Afterwards,
President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 465 increasing the proposed area for reclamation across R-10
from 40 hectares to 79 hectares. On September 1, 1994, pursuant to Proclamation No. 39, the DENR
issued Special Patent No. 3591 conveying in favor of NHA an area of 211,975 square meters covering
the Smokey Mountain Dumpsite. The land reclamation was completed in August 1996. Sometime later
in 1996, pursuant likewise to Proclamation No. 39, the DENR issued Special Patent No. 3598 conveying
in favor of NHA an additional 390,000 square meter area. After some time, the JVA was terminated.
RBI demanded the payment of just compensation for all accomplishments and costs incurred in
developing the SMDRP plus a reasonable rate of return. In a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
executed by NHA and RBI, both parties agreed to terminate the JVA and other subsequent agreements,
which stipulated, among others, that unpaid balance may be paid in cash, bonds or through the
conveyance of properties or any combination thereof.

Issues:
Whether RBI can acquire reclaimed foreshore and submerged land areas because they are
allegedly inalienable lands of the public domain
Whether RBI can acquire reclaimed lands when there was no declaration that said lands are no
longer needed for public use.
Whether RBI, being a private corporation, is barred from the Constitution to acquire lands of the
public domain.

Held:
1. Yes. The reclaimed lands across R-10 were classified alienable and disposable lands of public domain
of the State. First, there were three presidential proclamations classifying the reclaimed lands across R-
10 as alienable or disposable hence open to disposition or concession. These were MO 415 issued by
President Aquino, Proclamation No. 39 and Proclamation No. 465 both issued by President Ramos.
Secondly, Special Patents Nos. 3591, 3592, and 3598 issued by the DENR classified the reclaimed areas
as alienable and disposable.
Admittedly, it cannot be said that MO 415, Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 are explicit declarations that
the lands to be reclaimed are classified as alienable and disposable. We find however that such
conclusion is derived and implicit from the authority given to the NHA to transfer the reclaimed lands to
qualified beneficiaries. In line with the ruling in Chavez v. PEA, the court held that MO 415 and
Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 cumulatively and jointly taken together with Special Patent Nos. 3591,
3592, and 3598 more than satisfy the requirement in PEA that [t]here must be a law or presidential
proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to
disposition or concession.
2. Yes. Even if it is conceded that there was no explicit declaration that the lands are no longer needed
for public use or public service, there was however an implicit executive declaration that the reclaimed
areas R-10 are not necessary anymore for public use or public service. President Aquino through MO
415 conveyed the same to the NHA partly for housing project and related commercial/industrial
development intended for disposition to and enjoyment of certain beneficiaries and not the public in
general and partly as enabling component to finance the project. Also, President Ramos, in issuing
Proclamation No. 39, declared, though indirectly, that the reclaimed lands of the Smokey Mountain
project are no longer required for public use or service. In addition, President Ramos issued
Proclamation No. 465 increasing the area to be reclaimed from forty (40) hectares to seventy-nine (79)
hectares, elucidating that said lands are undoubtedly set aside for the beneficiaries of SMDRP and not
the public. MO 415 and Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 are declarations that proclaimed the non-use of
the reclaimed areas for public use or service as the SMDRP cannot be successfully implemented without
the withdrawal of said lands from public use or service.
3. Yes. When Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 were issued, inalienable lands covered by said
proclamations were converted to alienable and disposable lands of public domain. When the titles to the
reclaimed lands were transferred to the NHA, said alienable and disposable lands of public domain were
automatically classified as lands of the private domain or patrimonial properties of the State because the
NHA is an agency NOT tasked to dispose of alienable or disposable lands of public domain. The only
way it can transfer the reclaimed land in conjunction with its projects and to attain its goals is when it is
automatically converted to patrimonial properties of the State. Being patrimonial or private properties of
the State, then it has the power to sell the same to any qualified personunder the Constitution, Filipino
citizens as private corporations, 60% of which is owned by Filipino citizens like RBI.


G.R. No. 135385 December 6, 2000

ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.

FACTS: Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371),
otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (Implementing Rules).
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing
Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State's ownership over lands of
the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian
doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domains" and
"ancestral lands" which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b)
violate the rights of private landowners.

ISSUE
Whether or not Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) is unconstitutional

HELD
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and
Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions
of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law
with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should
be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in
conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza
voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and
petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate
opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371
are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the
law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been
violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a),
7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon
join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was
redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant
to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.