1) Dr. Ampil and the hospital were found liable for medical malpractice in leaving surgical gauze inside a patient after her operation, which led to serious complications. Dr. Fuentes was not found liable as he was under the direction of Dr. Ampil as the lead surgeon.
2) A medical technologist and clinic were found liable for issuing an incorrect test result indicating a patient had hepatitis when she did not, which led to her wrongful termination from employment.
3) Dr. Cantre was being sued for negligence after a patient suffered burns during a procedure following childbirth to stop bleeding. The case involved determining whether the doctor exercised due care and if the burns were a result of negligence.
1) Dr. Ampil and the hospital were found liable for medical malpractice in leaving surgical gauze inside a patient after her operation, which led to serious complications. Dr. Fuentes was not found liable as he was under the direction of Dr. Ampil as the lead surgeon.
2) A medical technologist and clinic were found liable for issuing an incorrect test result indicating a patient had hepatitis when she did not, which led to her wrongful termination from employment.
3) Dr. Cantre was being sued for negligence after a patient suffered burns during a procedure following childbirth to stop bleeding. The case involved determining whether the doctor exercised due care and if the burns were a result of negligence.
1) Dr. Ampil and the hospital were found liable for medical malpractice in leaving surgical gauze inside a patient after her operation, which led to serious complications. Dr. Fuentes was not found liable as he was under the direction of Dr. Ampil as the lead surgeon.
2) A medical technologist and clinic were found liable for issuing an incorrect test result indicating a patient had hepatitis when she did not, which led to her wrongful termination from employment.
3) Dr. Cantre was being sued for negligence after a patient suffered burns during a procedure following childbirth to stop bleeding. The case involved determining whether the doctor exercised due care and if the burns were a result of negligence.
G.R. No. 126297 January 31, 2007 FACTS: On April 4, 1984, Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City Hospital because of difculty of bowel movement and bloody anal discharge. Dr. Miguel Ampil diagnosed her to be sufering from "cancer of the sigmoid." On April 11, 1984, Dr. Ampil performed an anterior resection surgery on Natividad. He found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread on her left ovary, necessitating the removal of certain portions of it. Thus, Dr. Ampil obtained the consent of Natividads husband, Enrique Agana, to permit Dr. Juan Fuentes to perform hysterectomy on her. After Dr. Fuentes had completed the hysterectomy, Dr. Ampil took over, completed the operation and closed the incision. However, the operation appeared to be fawed. In the corresponding Record of Operation dated April 11, 1984, the attending nurses entered these remarks: "sponge count lacking 2 and "announced to surgeon searched (sic) done but to no avail continue for closure." After a couple of days, Natividad complained of excruciating pain in her anal region. She consulted both Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes about it. They told her that the pain was the natural consequence of the surgery. Dr. Ampil then recommended that she consult an oncologist to examine the cancerous nodes which were not removed during the operation. On May 9, 1984, Natividad, accompanied by her husband, went to the United States to seek further treatment and was told that she was free of cancer. On August 31, 1984, Natividad few back to the Philippines, still sufering from pains. Two weeks thereafter, her daughter found a piece of gauze protruding from her vagina. Upon being informed about it, Dr. Ampil proceeded to her house where he managed to extract by hand a piece of gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width. He then assured her that the pains would soon vanish. The pains intensifed, prompting Natividad to seek treatment at the Polymedic General Hospital. While confned there, Dr. Ramon Gutierrez detected the presence of another foreign object in her vagina -- a foul-smelling gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width which badly infected her vaginal vault. A recto-vaginal fstula had formed in her reproductive organs which forced stool to excrete through the vagina. Another surgical operation was needed to remedy the damage. Thus, in October 1984, Natividad underwent another surgery. A complaint for damages was then fled by Natividad and her husband against the Professional Services, Inc. (PSI), owner of the Medical City Hospital, Dr. Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes. They alleged that the latter are liable for negligence for leaving two pieces of gauze inside Natividads body and malpractice for concealing their acts of negligence. On February 16, 1986, Natividad died and was duly substituted by her children. ISSUES: 1. Whether Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes are liable for negligence andmalpractice 2. Whether PSI may be held liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil. HELD: This is a clear case of medical malpractice or more appropriately, medical negligence, the elements of which are duty, breach, injury and proximate causation. Dr, Ampil, as the lead surgeon, had the duty to remove all foreign objects, such as gauzes, from Natividads body before closure of the incision. When he failed to do so, it was his duty to inform Natividad about it. Dr. Ampil breached both duties. Such breach caused injury to Natividad, necessitating her further examination by American doctors and another surgery. That Dr. Ampils negligence is the proximate cause of Natividads injury could be traced from his act of closing the incision despite the information given by the attending nurses that two pieces of gauze were still missing. That they were later on extracted from Natividads vagina established the causal link between Dr. Ampils negligence and the injury. And what further aggravated such injury was his deliberate concealment of the missing gauzes from the knowledge of Natividad and her family. Dr. Fuentes is absolved of any liability. Under the "Captain of the Ship" rule, the operating surgeon is the person in complete charge of the surgery room and all personnel connected with the operation. Their duty is to obey his orders. Dr. Ampil, being the lead surgeon, was the "Captain of the Ship." That he discharged such role is evident from his following conduct: (1) calling Dr. Fuentes to perform a hysterectomy; (2) examining the work of Dr. Fuentes and fnding it in order; (3) granting Dr. Fuentes permission to leave; and (4) ordering the closure of the incision. It was this act of ordering the closure of the incision notwithstanding that two pieces of gauze remained unaccounted for, that caused injury to Natividads body. Clearly, the control and management of the thing which caused the injury was in the hands of Dr. Ampil, not Dr. Fuentes In the present case, it was duly established that PSI operates the Medical City Hospital for the purpose and under the concept of providing comprehensive medical services to the public. Accordingly, it has the duty to exercise reasonable care to protect from harm all patients admitted into its facility for medical treatment. It is worthy to note that Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes operated on Natividad with the assistance of the Medical City Hospitals staf, composed of resident doctors, nurses, and interns. As such, it is reasonable to conclude that PSI, as the operator of the hospital, has actual or constructive knowledge of the procedures carried out, particularly the report of the attending nurses that the two pieces of gauze were missing. The failure of PSI, despite the attending nurses report, to investigate and inform Natividad regarding the missing gauzes amounts to callous negligence. Not only did PSI breach its duties to oversee or supervise all persons who practice medicine within its walls, it also failed to take an active step in fxing the negligence committed. This renders PSI, not only vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, but also directly liable for its own negligence under Article 2176.
2. Orlando Garcia, Jr. (Community Diagnostics Center) vs. Ranida and Ramon Salvador G.R. No. 168512 March 20, 2007 FACTS: Respondent Ranida Salvador underwent a medical examination at the Community Diagnostics Center (CDC) as a prerequisite for regular employment. Garcia, a medical technologist, conducted the HBs Ag (Hepatitis B Surface Antigen) test. On October 22, 1993, CDC issued the test result indicating that Ranida was HBs Ag: Reactive. The result bore the name and signature of Garcia as examiner and the rubber stamp signature of Dr. Castro as pathologist. When Ranida submitted the test result to Dr. Sto. Domingo, the Company physician, the latter apprised her that the fndings indicated that she is sufering from Hepatitis B, a liver disease. Thus, based on the medical report submitted by Sto. Domingo, the Company terminated Ranidas employment for failing the physical examination. It was later determined that there was an error in the previous examination and that the respondent was not sufering from Hepatitis B. Respondent was rehired by the company. ISSUE: Whether Garcia (CDC) is liable for damages to the respondents for issuing an incorrect HBsAG test result. HELD: The Court held that CDC was negligent because there was no licensed physician in CDC as required by law. CDC is not administered, directed and supervised by a licensed physician as required by law, but by Ma. Ruby C. Calderon, a licensed Medical Technologist. In the License to Open and Operate a Clinical Laboratory for the years 1993 and 1996 issued by Dr. Juan R. Naagas, M.D., Undersecretary for Health Facilities, Standards and Regulation, defendant-appellee Castro was named as the head of CDC. However, defendant pathologist is not the owner of the Community Diagnostic Center nor an employee of the same nor the employer of its employees. Defendant pathologist comes to the Community Diagnostic Center when and where a problem is referred to him. Castros infrequent visit to the clinical laboratory barely qualifes as an efective administrative supervision and control over the activities in the laboratory. "Supervision and control" means the authority to act directly whenever a specifc function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, revise or modify acts and decisions of subordinate ofcials or units. Moreover, Garcia conducted the HBsAG test of respondent Ranida without the supervision of defendant-appellee Castro. Lastly, the disputed HBsAG test result was released to respondent Ranida without the authorization of defendant-appellee Castro. 3. DR. MILAGROS L. CANTRE v SPOUSES JOHN DAVID Z. GO and NORA S. GO G.R. No. 160889, April 27, 2007 QUISUMBING, J.: Facts: Petitioner Dr. Milagros L. Cantre is a specialist in OB- Gyne at the Dr. Jesus Delgado Memorial Hospital and was the attending physician of Nora Go who gave birth to her fourth child on April 20, 1992. After giving birth, Nora sufered profuse bleeding inside her womb due to some parts of the placenta which were not completely expelled after delivery. Nora sufered hypovolemic shock, resulting in a drop in her blood pressure and remained unconscious. To stop the bleeding, Dr. Cantre massaged Noras uterus and ordered a droplight to warm Nora and her baby. John David Go, Noras husband, noticed 2 by three 3 inches burn (as confmed by the nurses) in the inner portion of Noras left arm.
2 days later, John fled with the hospital a request for investigation as to cause of Noras injury. The Hospitals medical director Dr Abad called Dr. Cantera who explained that the blood pressure cuf caused the injury. Dissatisfed, John brought wife Nora to the NBI for a physical examination by a medico-legal ofcer who later on testifed that the injury is a burn caused by a droplight when placed near the skin for about 10 minutes and that it cannot be caused by the blood pressure cuf since the scar was not around the arm, but just on one side of the arm. Consequently, the hospital shouldered all the expenses for Noras afected arm skin grafting (in 1992) and another scar revision (in 1993). Unfortunately, the incident left an unsightly mark and pain in her left arm. When sleeping, she has to cradle her wounded arm. Her children cannot play with the left side of her body as the injured arm aches at the slightest touch. Spouses Go then fled a complaint for damages against Dr. Cantera, Dr. Abad, and the hospital.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are liable for damages?
Held: Yes, the petitioners are liable for damages. In cases involving medical negligence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur allows the mere existence of an injury to justify a presumption of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrument causing the injury, provided that the following requisites concur: (a)the accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someones negligence; (b) it is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and (c) the possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintif responsible is eliminated.
In this case, all the requisites are present: (a)the injury is not an ordinary occurrence in the act of delivering a baby; ( b)both the droplight and the blood pressure cuf are instruments within the exclusive control of the physician in charge under the "captain of the ship" doctrine. This doctrine holds the surgeon in charge of an operation liable for the negligence of his assistants during the time when those assistants are under the surgeons control; and (c)the injury could only be caused by something external and outside Noras control as she was unconscious while in hypovolemic shock.
Hence, the petitioner is obliged to pay Nora moral damages. Article 2217 of the Civil Code provides that moral damages include physical sufering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission. 4. FILINVEST LAND, INC. V. FLOOD-AFFECTED HOMEOWNERS OF MERITVILLE ALLIANCE, Represented by GABRIEL DELIM and VICTOR RAQUIPISO G.R. No. 165955, August 10, 2007
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,J.: Facts: Filinvest Land, Inc. (FILINVEST) is a domestic corporation engaged in realty development business One of its ventures is the Meritville Townhouse Subdivision (Meritville), the frst low-cost townhouse project in Pulang Lupa, Las Pias City, having its project site near Naga River. 54 homeowners, respondents , purchased their Meritville housing units from Filinvest. Subsequently, the Filinvest developed the Meritville area and built new subdivisions built with elevations higher than that of Meritville causing Meritville to become a rains catch basin during the wet season especially everytime the Naga River overfows.
Due to perennial food, the 54 homeowners townhouses sufered severe damages. As such, they sent letters demanding Filinvest to address the problem. In response, Filinvest installed in the area a pumping station with a capacity of 6,000 gallons per minute and improved the drainage system but these measures were not enough.
Homeowners then fled with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) a complaint against Filinvest praying that Filinvest be ordered to upgrade the elevation of the afected areas and repair the units from Block 17 to 25. In the alternative, they asked Filinvest to transfer them to its other food-free housing projects so that they could allowing them to "sell-back" their afected units.
Filinvest contends, however, that they already took appropriate measures to prevent fooding of Meritville, as approved by Las Pias City local government. HLURB decided in favor of the homeowners, ordering Filinvest to upgrade the area and pay P25,000 damages to each afected homeowner.
Issue: Whether or not Filinvest is liable for damages?
Held: No. Filinvest is NOT liable for damages. Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages. Further, negligence is defned as "the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human afairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would do." In this case, there was no showing that fooding was due to the negligence of Filinvest.
In addition, prior to developments, there was no fooding in the subdivision. The fooding was caused by Naga river, a public property, hence, it is the it is the Las Pias City government which has the duty to control the food in Meritville Townhouse Subdivision and should address the problem and not Filinvest. Republic Act No. 7924 (An Act creating MMDA) also provides that Flood control and sewerage management is one of the services to be provided by the individual local government units (LGUs) comprising Metropolitan Manila.
5. Corinthian Gardens Association, Inc. vs. Tanjangco 556 SCRA 154 June 27, 2008 Facts: The Tanjangcos owns lots located at Corinthian Gardens Subdivision managed by Corinthian Gardens Association, Inc. On the other hand, the Cuasos own lot adjacent to the lots of the Tanjangcos. Thereafter, Cuasos began the construction of their house over their lot. Before, during and after the construction of the house, Corinthian conducted periodic ocular inspections in order to determine compliance with the approved plans pursuant to the Manual Rules and Regulations of the Association. Unfortunately, the perimeter fence encroached on the lot of the Tanjangcos. Issue: Whether or not Corinthian is liable to the Tanjangcos. Held: Yes. It is not just or equitable to relieve a subdivision association of any liability arising from the erection of a perimeter fence which encroached upon another person's lot when by very its own Manual, it imposes its authority over all its members to the end that no construction can be started unless the plans are approved by thr Association. 6. National Power Corporation vs. Heirs of Noble Casiano 572 SCRA 71 November 27, 2008 Facts: Noble is a pocket miner in Dalicno, Ampucao, Itogon, Benguet. A trail leading to Sangilo, Itogon existed in Dalicno and this trail was regularly used by members of the community. NPC installed high tension electrical transmission lines traversing the trail. Eventually, some of the transmission lines sagged and dangled reducing their distance from the ground to only about eight to ten feet. As Noble was going uphill and turning left on a curve, the tip of the bamboo pole he was carrying touched one of the dangling high tension wires. Then he died. Issue: Whether or not NPC is liable. Held: Yes. NPC cannot excuse itself from its failure to properly maintain the wires by attributing negligence to the victim. It was held that to hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an impending danger to health and body. In this case, the trail where Noble was electrocuted was regularly used by members of the community. There were no warning signs to inform passersby of the impending danger to their lives should they accidentally touch the high tension wires. Also, the trail was the only viable way from Dalicno to Hogon. Hence, Noble should not be faulted for simply doing what was ordinary routine to other workers in the area.
7. Ngo Sin Sing and Ticia Dy Ngo v. Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc., and Contech Construction Technology Development Corporation G.R. No. 170596, November 28, 2008 Facts:
Petitioner decided to construct a 5-storey concrete building on their lot in Binondo, the NSS Building, and for this project, they contracted the services of Contech Construction Technology Development Corporation (Contech) as their General Contractor. Adjacent to their lot is a semi-concrete building known as the Li Seng Giap Building (LSG Building), owned by Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc. (respondent). During the construction of the NSS Building, the respondent received complaints from their tenants about defects in the building. There were cracks appearing on the foors, the steel door was bent, and concrete slabs of the walls were falling apart.
An inspection of the premises revealed that the excavation made by Contech on petitioners' land was close to the common boundary, exposing the foundation of the LSG Building. Petitioners had undertaken and completed the repairs on the LSG Building. However, more defects in the LSG Building appeared, i.e., tilted foors, cracks in the columns and beams, distorted window frames. Apparently, the LSG Building was continuously sagging and the respondent felt that it was no longer safe to occupy the building. Thereafter, petitioners and Contech were sued by respondents. The trial court found defendants negligent but plaintif also with contributory negligence because the LSG Building was originally a 2-storey building that added 2 more foors without the proper reinforcements for its structural integrity. The CA afrmed the RTC decision. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether the liability of petitioner be mitigated due to the contributory negligence of respondent Li Seng Giap & Sons, Co. Held: Yes. There is contributory negligence on the part of LSG. The building was supposed to be only 2 storeys. Verily, the foundation of the LSG Building, which was good to support only two foors, remained the same and could not support the weight of the present 4- storey building more so when the adjacent lot was excavated by petitioners. Thus, considering that respondent's negligence must have necessarily contributed to the sagging of the LSG Building, a reduction of the award is warranted.
8. Norman Gaid v. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 171636, April 7, 2009
Facts: Norman Gaid was driving his passenger jeepney along a two-lane road where the Laguindingan National High School is located. During that time, several students were coming out of the school premises so Gaid drove slowly upon reaching the vicinity of the school. Michael Dayata (Dayata), a student, attempted to board the jeepney from behild the left side of the road but was not noticed by Gaid and his conductor Mellalos. Dayata was pinned to the rear wheel of Gaids jeepney and was seen lying and caught in between the rear tires. Dayata was brought to the hospital but was later on pronounced dead. Consequently, Gaid was charged with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Issue: Whether petitioner should be held liable for damages resulting from the death of Dayata. Held: No. The petitioner had exercised extreme precaution as he drove slowly upon reaching the vicinity of the school and he cannot be faulted for not having seen the victim who came from behind on the left side. Negligence has been defned as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person sufers injury. The elements of simple negligence: are (1) that there is lack of precaution on the part of the ofender; and (2) that the damage impending to be caused is not immediate or the danger is not clearly manifest. The standard test in determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this: could a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Thus, lacking the frst element of simple negligence, petitioner should not be held liable.
9. Spouses Luigi M. Guanio and Anna Hernandez-Guanio v. Makati Shangri-La Hotel and Resort, Inc., G.R. No. 190601, February 7, 2011 Facts: For their wedding, Sps Guanio booked at the Makati Shangri-La Hotel. They claimed that during the reception, the guests complained of delay in service of the food, the salmon were small and didnt correspond to the ones in the food tasting, the hotel waiters were ruled and unapologetic, and that they were compelled to pay for their drinks despite the open bar agreement. Thus, petitioners fled a complaint for breach of contract and damages before the RTC Makati. In their answer, the hotel alleged that the reason for the delay was the sudden increase of the guest list from 370 max to 480. The RTC found for the Sps Guanio, relying on the apology letter that said that the hotel disappointed the spouses. CA reversed the RTC decision, holding that the proximate cause of the injury was the unexpected increase in the guests, entirely attributable to the Sps Guanio. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether the doctrine of proximate is applicable in the case at bar. Held: No. The Court fnds that since petitioners complaint arose from a contract, the doctrine of proximate cause fnds no application to it. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delicts, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. What applies in the present case is Article 1170 of the Civil Code which reads: Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
10.FILIPINAS SYNTHETIC FIBER CORPORATION VS. DE LOS SANTOS, et al G.R. No. 152033 March 6, 2011
FACTS: On September 30, 1984, Teresa Elena Legarda-de los Santos, the wife of respondent Wilfredo de los Santos was fetched by Armando, from Rizal Theater after Teresas theater performance. Armando drove a 1980 Mitsubishi Galant Sigma, a company car assigned to Wilfredo. Two other members of the cast of production joined Teresa Elena in the Galant Sigma. While traveling along the Katipunan Road, the Galant Sigma collided with the shuttle bus owned by petitioner and driven by Alfredo S. Mejia (Mejia), an employee of petitioner Filipinas Synthetic Corp. The Galant Sigma was dragged about 12 meters from the point of impact, the Galant Sigma burst into fames and burned to death beyond recognition all four occupants of the car. A criminal charge for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple homicide was brought against Mejia, which was decided in favor of Mejia (shuttle driver). The families of the deceased against Mejia fled a consolidated civil case. The RTC ruled in favor of herein respondents. After the denial of the motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the CA and the CA afrmed the decision of the RTC. Hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether Mejia was negligent HELD: Yes. Petitioner argues that the RTC admitted that De los Santos made a turn along White Plains Road without exercising the necessary care which could have prevented the accident from happening. According to petitioner, the sudden turn of the vehicle used by the victims should also be considered as negligence on the part of the driver of that same vehicle, thus, mitigating, if not absolving petitioners liability. It was well established that Mejia was driving at a speed beyond the rate of speed required by law, specifcally Section 35 of Republic Act No. (RA) 4136. Under the New Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any trafc regulation. Apparently, in the present case, Mejias violation of the trafc rules does not erase the presumption that he was the one negligent at the time of the collision. Even apart from statutory regulations as to speed, a motorist is nevertheless expected to exercise ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with all the conditions encountered which will enable him to keep the vehicle under control and, whenever necessary, to put the vehicle to a full stop to avoid injury to others using the highway. A closer study of the Police Accident Report, Investigation Report and the sketch of the accident would reveal nothing but that the shuttle bus was traveling at such a reckless speed that it collided with the car bearing the deceased. 11.REGALA VS. CARIN G.R. NO. 188715 APRIL 6, 2011 Petitioner and respondent are adjacent neighbors at Spirig Street, BF Resort Village, Las Pias City. When petitioner decided to renovate his one storey residence by constructing a second foor, he under the guise of merely building an extension to his residence, to which respondent verbally consented on condition that petitioner would clean the area afected by the work.
In the course of the construction of the second foor, respondent and his wife Marietta sufered from the dust and dirt, which fell on their property. As petitioner failed to address the problem to respondents satisfaction, respondent fled a letter-complaint. In his letter-complaint, respondent related that, despite the lack of a building permit for the construction of a second foor, petitioner had demolished the dividing wall, failed to clean the debris falling there from, allowed his laborers to come in and out of his (respondents) property without permission by simply jumping over the wall, and trampled on his vegetable garden; and that despite his protestations, petitioner persisted in proceeding with the construction, he claiming to be the owner of the perimeter wall.
In fnding for respondent, the trial court declared that, apart from the fact that petitioner knowingly commenced the renovation of his house without the requisite building permit from the City Engineers Ofce, he misrepresented to respondent his true intent of introducing renovations. On appeal by petitioner, the Court of Appeals afrmed the trial courts decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was negligent?
HELD: No. In the present case, respondent failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the injuries he sustained were the proximate efect of petitioners act or omission. It bears noting that petitioner was engaged in the lawful exercise of his property rights to introduce renovations to his abode. While he initially did not have a building permit and may have misrepresented his real intent when he initially sought respondents consent, the lack of the permit was inconsequential since it only rendered petitioner liable to administrative sanctions or penalties.
The testimony of petitioner and his witnesses, specifcally Architect Punzalan, demonstrates that they had actually taken measures to prevent, or at the very least, minimize the damage to respondents property occasioned by the construction work. Architect Punzalan details how upon reaching an agreement with petitioner for the construction of the second foor, he (Punzalan) surveyed petitioners property and found that the perimeter wall was within the confnes of petitioners property; that he, together with petitioner, secured the consent of the neighbors (including respondent) prior to the start of the renovation as refected in a neighbors consent before the construction began, he undertook measures to prevent debris from falling into respondents property such as the installation of GI sheet strainers, the construction of scafoldings on respondents property, the instructions to his workers to clean the area before leaving at 5:00 p.m; and that the workers conducted daily clean-up of respondents property with his consent, until animosity developed between the parties.
12. Dr Rubi Li v Spouses Soliman G.R. No. 165279 VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
respondents 11-year old daughter, Angelica Soliman, underwent a biopsy of the mass located in her lower extremity at the St. Lukes Medical Center (SLMC). Results showed that Angelica was sufering4 a high-grade (highly malignant) cancer of the bone which usually aficts teenage children. Following this diagnosis and as primary intervention, Angelicas right leg was amputated by Dr. Jaime Tamayo in order to remove the tumor. As adjuvant treatment to eliminate any remaining cancer cells, and hence minimize the chances of recurrence and prevent the disease from spreading to other parts of the patients body (metastasis), chemotherapy was suggested by Dr. Tamayo. Dr. Tamayo referred Angelica to another doctor at SLMC, herein petitioner Dr. Rubi Li, a medical oncologist. However, she died, just eleven (11) days after the (intravenous) administration of the frst cycle of the chemotherapy regimen. Because SLMC refused to release a death certifcate without full payment of their hospital bill, respondents brought the cadaver of Angelica to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame for post-mortem examination. The Certifcate of Death6 issued by SLMC stated the cause of death as follows: Immediate cause : a. Osteosarcoma, Status Post AKA Antecedent cause : b. (above knee amputation) Underlying cause : c. Status Post Chemotherapy respondents fled a damage suit7 against petitioner, Dr. Leo Marbella, Mr. Jose Ledesma, a certain Dr. Arriete and SLMC. Respondents charged them with negligence and disregard of Angelicas safety, health and welfare by their careless administration of the chemotherapy drugs, their failure to observe the essential precautions in detecting early the symptoms of fatal blood platelet decrease and stopping early on the chemotherapy, which bleeding led to hypovolemic shock that caused Angelicas untimely demise. Further, it was specifcally averred that petitioner assured the respondents that Angelica would recover in view of 95% chance of healing with chemotherapy ("Magiging normal na ang anak nyo basta ma-chemo. 95% ang healing") and when asked regarding the side efects, petitioner mentioned only slight vomiting, hair loss and weakness ("Magsusuka ng kaunti. Malulugas ang buhok. Manghihina"). Respondents thus claimed that they would not have given their consent to chemotherapy had petitioner not falsely assured them of its side efects. In dismissing the complaint, the trial court held that petitioner was not liable for damages as she observed the best known procedures and employed her highest skill and knowledge in the administration of chemotherapy drugs on Angelica but despite all eforts said patient died Respondents appealed to the CA which, while concurring with the trial courts fnding that there was no negligence committed by the petitioner in the administration of chemotherapy treatment to Angelica, found that petitioner as her attending physician failed to fully explain to the respondents all the known side efects of chemotherapy. ISSUE: whether the petitioner can be held liable for failure to fully disclose serious side efects to the parents of the child patient who died while undergoing chemotherapy, despite the absence of fnding that petitioner was negligent in administering the said treatment. RULING: The petition is meritorious. The type of lawsuit which has been called medical malpractice or, more appropriately, medical negligence, is that type of claim which a victim has available to him or her to redress a wrong committed by a medical professional which has caused bodily harm. In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that a health care provider, in most cases a physician, either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and that that failure or action caused injury to the patient.51 This Court has recognized that medical negligence cases are best proved by opinions of expert witnesses belonging in the same general neighborhood and in the same general line of practice as defendant physician or surgeon. The deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualifed physicians stems from the formers realization that the latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in most instances are incapable of intelligently evaluating, hence the indispensability of expert testimonies.52 There are four essential elements a plaintif must prove in a malpractice action based upon the doctrine of informed consent: "(1) the physician had a duty to disclose material risks; (2) he failed to disclose or inadequately disclosed those risks; (3) as a direct and proximate result of the failure to disclose, the patient consented to treatment she otherwise would not have consented to; and (4) plaintif was injured by the proposed treatment." The gravamen in an informed consent case requires the plaintif to "point to signifcant undisclosed information relating to the treatment which would have altered her decision to undergo it.64 Examining the evidence on record, we hold that there was adequate disclosure of material risks inherent in the chemotherapy procedure performed with the consent of Angelicas parents. When petitioner informed the respondents beforehand of the side efects of chemotherapy which includes lowered counts of white and red blood cells, decrease in blood platelets, possible kidney or heart damage and skin darkening, there is reasonable expectation on the part of the doctor that the respondents understood very well that the severity of these side efects will not be the same for all patients undergoing the procedure. On the other hand, it is difcult to give credence to respondents claim that petitioner told them of 95% chance of recovery for their daughter, as it was unlikely for doctors like petitioner who were dealing with grave conditions such as cancer to have falsely assured patients of chemotherapys success rate. The element of ethical duty to disclose material risks in the proposed medical treatment cannot thus be reduced to one simplistic formula applicable in all instances. Further, in a medical malpractice action based on lack of informed consent, "the plaintif must prove both the duty and the breach of that duty through expert testimony.66Such expert testimony must show the customary standard of care of physicians in the same practice as that of the defendant doctor.67 the legal standard of disclosure is not subject to construction as a categorical imperative Nevertheless, juries that ultimately determine whether a physician properly informed a patient are inevitably guided by what they perceive as the common expectation of the medical consumer"a reasonable person in the patients position when deciding to accept or reject a recommended medical procedure."68(Emphasis supplied.)
13. Tison v Spouses Pomasin G.R. No. 173180 PEREZ, J.:
FACTS: Two vehicles, a tractor-trailer and a jitney,1 fgured in a vehicular mishap along Maharlika Highway in Barangay Agos, Polangui, Albay last 12 August 1994. Laarni Pomasin (Laarni) was driving the jitney towards the direction of Legaspi City while the tractor- trailer, driven by Claudio Jabon (Jabon), was traversing the opposite lane going towards Naga City.2 The opposing parties gave two diferent versions of the incident. Gregorio Pomasin (Gregorio), Laarnis father, was on board the jitney and seated on the passengers side. He testifed that while the jitney was passing through a curve going downward, he saw a tractor-trailer coming from the opposite direction and encroaching on the jitneys lane. The jitney was hit by the tractor-trailer and it was dragged further causing death and injuries to its passengers.3 On the other hand, Jabon recounted that while he was driving the tractor-trailer, he noticed a jitney on the opposite lane falling of the shoulder of the road. Thereafter, it began running in a zigzag manner and heading towards the direction of the truck. To avoid collision, Jabon immediately swerved the tractor-trailer to the right where it hit a tree and sacks of palay. Unfortunately, the jitney still hit the left fender of the tractor-trailer before it was thrown a few meters away. The tractor-trailer was likewise damaged.4 Multiple death and injuries to those in the jitney resulted. respondents fled a complaint for damages against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo. They alleged that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence, imprudence and carelessness of petitioners. Respondents prayed for indemnifcation for the heirs of those who perished in the accident , petitioners countered that it was Laarnis negligence which proximately caused the acciden the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners dismissing the complaint for damages, t The trial court considered the testimony of Jabon regarding the incident more convincing and reliable than that of Gregorios, a mere passenger, whose observation and attention to the road is not as focused as that of the driver. The trial court concluded that Laarni caused the collision of the jitney and the tractor-trailer. The Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court and ruled that the reckless driving of Jabon caused the vehicular collision. ISSUE: Who is the negligent party or the party at fault? RULING: The trial court found that the jitney driver was negligent. We give weight to this fnding greater than the opposite conclusion reached by the appellate court that the driver of the tractor-trailer caused the vehicular collision. One reason why the trial court found credible the version of Jabon was because his concentration as driver is more focused than that of a mere passenger So that as between the respective versions of the plaintifs thru their passenger and that of the defendants thru their driver as to the cause or antecedent causes that led to the vehicular collision in this case, the version of the driver of defendant should ordinarily be more reliable than the version of a mere passenger of Plaintifs vehicle, simply because the attention of the passenger is not as much concentrated on the driving as that of the driver, consequently the capacity for observation of the latter of the latter on the matter testifed to which is the precise point of inquiry --- the proximate cause of the accident --- is more reasonably reliable. Moreover, the passengers vision is not as good as that of the driver from the vantage point of the drivers seat especially in nighttime, thus rendering a passengers opportunity for observation on the antecedent causes of the collision lesser than that of the driver. There was no showing that the tractor-trailer was speeding. There is a preponderance of evidence that the tractor-trailer was in fact ascending. Considering its size and the weight of the tractor-trailer, its speed could not be more than that of a fully loaded jitney which was running downhill in a zigzagging manner. Neither can it be inferred that Jabon was negligent the negligence of Gregorios daughter, Laarni was the proximate cause of the accident. We did not lose sight of the fact that at the time of the incident, Jabon was prohibited from driving the truck due to the restriction imposed on his drivers license, The Court of Appeals concluded therefrom that Jabon was violating a trafc regulation at the time of the collision. Driving without a proper license is a violation of trafc regulation. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, the legal presumption of negligence arises if at the time of the mishap, a person was violating any trafc regulation. However, in Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,27 we held that a causal connection must exist between the injury received and the violation of the trafc regulation. It must be proven that the violation of the trafc regulation was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto In the instant case, no causal connection was established between the tractor-trailer drivers restrictions on his license to the vehicular collision. Furthermore, Jabon was able to sufciently explain that the Land Transportation Ofce merely erred in not including restriction code 8 in his license. 14) SPOUSES FERNANDO & LOURDES VILORIA vs. CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC. (CAI), GR No. 188288 (16 January 2012)
FACTS
Fernando agreed to buy airline tickets on board CAI after Margaret Mager of Holiday Travel (HT) agency informed him that there were no available seats at Amtrak. Subsequently, Fernando requested Mager to reschedule their fight. Mager informed him that fights to Newark, New Jersey, USA via CAI were fully booked and ofered the alternative fight via Frontier Air. Since alternative fight would be more costly and would mean traveling by night, Fernando opted to request for a refund. Mager denied his request as said tickets were non-refundable. When Fernando saw an Amtrak station nearby, he made inquiries and was told that there were seats available anytime. Fernando confronted Mager with the Amtrak tickets, telling her that she had misled them into buying CAI tickets by misrepresenting that Amtrak was already fully booked. Fernando reiterated his demand for a refund but Mager denied it.
Fernando sent a letter to CAI demanding a refund. Continental Micronesia denied his request and advised him that he may take said tickets to any CAI ticketing location for re- issuance of new tickets. When Fernando went to CAIs ticketing ofce to have the tickets replaced by a single round trip ticket to Los Angeles under his name, he was informed that Lourdes ticket was non-transferable, thus, cannot be used for the purchase of a ticket in his favor.
Sps. Viloria fled a complaint against CAI. CAI interposed, among other things, that it should not be liable for Magers acts because she was not a CAI employee. Citing Articles 1868 and 1869 of the Civil Code, RTC-Antipolo City ruled that Mager was CAIs agent, hence, bound by her bad faith and misrepresentation.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed RTC-Antipolo Citys decision and ruled that CAI cannot be held liable for Magers act in the absence of any proof that a principal-agent relationship existed between CAI and HT, as the contract was not an agency but that of a sale. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
assuming that an agency relationship existed between the two, would CAI be bound by the acts of HTs agents and employees such as Mager?
HELD Yes. SC mentioned that an examination of its pronouncements in China Air Lines, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, et al. [264 Phil 15 (1990)] will reveal that an airline company is not completely exonerated from any liability for the tort committed by its agents employees. A prior determination of the nature of the passengers cause of action is necessary. If the passengers cause of action against the airline company is premised on culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict for a tort committed by the employee of the airline companys agent, there must be an independent showing that the airline company was at fault or negligent or has contributed to the negligence or tortuous conduct committed by the employee of its agent. The mere fact that the employee of the airline companys agent has committed a tort is not sufcient to hold the airline company liable. There is no vinculum juris between the airline company and its agents employees and the contractual relationship between the airline company and its agent does not operate to create a juridical tie between the airline company and its agents employees. Article 2180 of the Civil Code does not make the principal vicariously liable for the tort committed by its agents employees and the principal-agency relationship per se does not make the principal a party to such tort; hence, the need to prove the principals own fault or negligence.
On the other hand, if the passengers cause of action for damages against the airline company is based on contractual breach or culpa contractual, it is not necessary that there be evidence of the airline companys fault or negligence. As SC stated in China Air Lines, "in an action based on a breach of contract of carriage, the aggrieved party does not have to prove that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent. All that he has to prove is the existence of the contract and the fact of its non-performance by the carrier."
SC denied the petition.
15) NOGALES vs CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER Case Digest ROGELIO NOGALES vs. CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER et al. G.R. No. 142625 December 19, 2006
Facts: Pregnant with her fourth child, Corazon Nogales ("Corazon"), who was then 37 years old, was under the exclusive prenatal care of Dr. Oscar Estrada ("Dr. Estrada") beginning on her fourth month of pregnancy or as early as December 1975. Around midnight of 25 May 1976, Corazon started to experience mild labor pains prompting Corazon and Rogelio Nogales ("Spouses Nogales") to see Dr. Estrada at his home. After examining Corazon, Dr. Estrada advised her immediate admission to the Capitol Medical Center ("CMC"). t 6:13 a.m., Corazon started to experience convulsionsAt 6:22 a.m., Dr. Estrada, assisted by Dr. Villafor, applied low forceps to extract Corazon's baby. In the process, a 1.0 x 2.5 cm. piece of cervical tissue was allegedly torn.At 6:27 a.m., Corazon began to manifest moderate vaginal bleeding which rapidly became profuse. Corazon died at 9:15 a.m. The cause of death was "hemorrhage, post partum.
Issue: Whether or not CMC is vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Estrada.
Ruling: Private hospitals, hire, fre and exercise real control over their attending and visiting "consultant" staf. The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which considers a person accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of others based on the former's responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas.
In general, a hospital is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor- physician. There is, however, an exception to this principle. The hospital may be liable if the physician is the "ostensible" agent of the hospital. This exception is also known as the "doctrine of apparent authority.
For a hospital to be liable under the doctrine of apparent authority, a plaintif must show that: (1) the hospital, or its agent, acted in a manner that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the individual who was alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital; (2) where the acts of the agent create the appearance of authority, the plaintif must also prove that the hospital had knowledge of and acquiesced in them; and (3) the plaintif acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and prudence. In the instant case, CMC impliedly held out Dr. Estrada as a member of its medical staf. Through CMC's acts, CMC clothed Dr. Estrada with apparent authority thereby leading the Spouses Nogales to believe that Dr. Estrada was an employee or agent of CMC.
16) Teoderico Manzanares v. People of the Philippines gr nos. 153760-61 oct. 12, 2006 Facts: At about 2:30 oclock in the afternoon of 13 January 1983, a vehicular collision took place along MacArthur Highway in Bulacan nvolving an Isuzu six-wheeler truck and a passenger jeepney. The Isuzu truck was owned by petitioner Manhattan Enterprises, Inc. and was then driven by petitioner Teodorico Manzanares. The passenger jeepney, on the other hand, was registered in the name of Teodoro Basallo. It was established during the trial that the passenger jeepney was heading southwards in the direction of Manila while the Isuzu truck was heading the opposite way. The incident resulted in the deaths of the driver of the passenger jeepney Jesus Basallo, Miguel Anas, Ferdinand Exaltacion, and Antonio Pasco. It also inficted serious physical injuries to some of the passengers. The families of the deceased Ferdinand Exaltacion[2] and Miguel Anas[3] instituted separate civil cases for damages against petitioners Manzanares, Manhattan Enterprises, Inc., the latters managing partner, Eduardo Yang, and the operator of the passenger jeepney, Teodoro Basallo. The heirs of Antonio Pasco opted to fle a complaint against petitioners Manhattan Enterprises Co. and Teodorico Manzanares. Two of those who sustained injuries also fled their respective complaints against petitioners and Teodoro Basallo. In her complaint,[6] Felicidad Tomaquin claimed that because of the incident, she would not be able to report to her work in a factory for more than twelve months while Cita Vicente demanded that she be paid her salary for the two-month period that she was unable to perform her job as a secretary in a law frm in Bulacan. Teodoro Basallo was sued on the basis of breach of contract of carriage as he was the registered owner of the passenger jeepney. Teodoro Basallo alleged that while he owned the passenger jeepney involved in the collision, the same was on lease to his brother and the jeepneysdriver, Jesus Basallo for P100.00 a day thus, he did not have a contract of carriage with anyone. ISSUE: whether respondent Basallo is presumed negligent having contributory negligence in this case. Held: no. As to petitioners argument that Jesus Basallo should be presumed negligent because he was driving with an expired license and the passenger jeepney owned by his brother Teodorico did not have a franchise to operate, we hold that the same fails to convince. The defense of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases committed through reckless imprudence, since one cannot allege the negligence of another to evade the efects of his own negligence.
17. Universal Aquarius, Inc. and Conchita Tan v. Q.C. Human Resources Management Corp.
FACTS Universal Aquarius, Inc. (Universal) is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of chemical products in Metro Manila. It operates a chemical plant in Antipolo City. Conchita Tan (Tan), as a proprietor under the name and style of Marman Trading (Marman), is engaged in the trading, delivery and distribution of chemical products in Metro Manila, with a depot in Antipolo City adjoining Universal's chemical plant. Q.C. Human Resources Management Corporation (Resources) is engaged in supplying manpower to various establishments. It supplied Universal with about seventy-four (74) temporary workers to assist Universal in the operation of its chemical plant in Antipolo City.
Rodolfo Capocyan, claiming to be the general counsel/national president of the labor organization called Obrero Pilipino (Universal Aquarius Chapter) sent a Notice of Strike to Universal. Resources informed the Regional Ofce of DOLE that the ofcers and members of Obrero Pilipino are its employees and not employees of Universal. Five days later, however, Copocyan and 36 other union members of Obrero picketed, barricaded and obstructed the entry and exit of Universal's Antipolo City chemical plant and intercepted Universal's delivery trucks thereby disrupting its business operations. Marman's depot, which adjoined Universal's plant, sufered a similar fate.
Universal and Tan fled a Complaint against the strikers and Resources before the RTC of Antipolo for breach of contract and damages sufered due to the disruption of their respective business operations. The strike ended after the forging of an agreement between Universal and Obrero.
ISSUE WON Universal and Tan has a cause of action against Resources
HELD Yes. Section 2, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defnes a cause of action as the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. It is the delict or the wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the primary right of the plaintif. Its essential elements are as follows: 1. A right in favor of the plaintif by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; 2. An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and 3. Act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintif or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintif for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.
It is only upon the occurrence of the last element that a cause of action arises, giving the plaintif the right to maintain an action in court for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.
The Complaint sufciently states a cause of action against Resources. The Complaint alleged that Universal had a contract of employment of temporary workers with Resources; and that Resources violated said contract by supplying it with unft, maladjusted individuals who staged a strike and disrupted its business operations. Given these hypothetically admitted facts, the RTC, in the exercise of its original and exclusive jurisdiction, could have rendered judgment over the dispute. However, with regard to Tan's claim for damages, the Court fnds that she has no cause of action against Resources. A thorough reading of the allegations of the Complaint reveals that Tan's claim for damages clearly springs from the strike efected by the employees of Resources. It is settled that an employer's liability for acts of its employees attaches only when the tortious conduct of the employee relates to, or is in the course of, his employment. The question then is whether, at the time of the damage or injury, the employee is engaged in the afairs or concerns of the employer or, independently, in that of his own. An employer incurs no liability when an employees conduct, act or omission is beyond the range of employment. Unquestionably, when Resources' employees staged a strike, they were acting on their own, beyond the range of their employment. Thus, Resources cannot be held liable for damages caused by the strike staged by its employees. 18. Cayao-Lasam v. Sps. Ramolete
FACTS Three months pregnant Editha Ramolete, respondent, was brought to the Lorma Medical Center (LMC) in San Fernando, La Union due to vaginal bleeding. Upon advice of petitioner relayed via telephone, Editha was admitted to the LMC on the same day. A pelvic sonogram was then conducted on Editha revealing the fetus weak cardiac pulsation. Due to persistent and profuse vaginal bleeding, petitioner advised Editha to undergo a Dilatation and Curettage Procedure (D&C) or "raspa." Petitioner performed the D&C procedure. Editha was discharged from the hospital the following day.
Editha was once again brought at the LMC, as she was sufering from vomiting and severe abdominal pains. Editha was attended by Dr. de la Cruz, Dr. Mayo and Dr. Komiya. Dr. Mayo allegedly informed Editha that there was a dead fetus in the latters womb. After, Editha underwent laparotomy, she was found to have a massive intra- abdominal hemorrhage and a ruptured uterus. Thus, Editha had to undergo a procedure for hysterectomy and as a result, she has no more chance to bear a child.
Editha and her husband Claro Ramolete (respondents) fled a Complaint for Gross Negligence and Malpractice against petitioner before the Professional Regulations Commission (PRC). Respondents alleged that Edithas hysterectomy was caused by petitioners unmitigated negligence and professional incompetence in conducting the D&C procedure and the petitioners failure to remove the fetus inside Edithas womb. Petitioner contended that it was respondents negligence and omission in insisting to be discharged against doctors advice and her unjustifed failure to return for check-up that contributed to her life-threatening condition.
Board of Medicine (the Board) of the PRC rendered a Decision,14 exonerating petitioner from the charges fled against her. The case was then elevated to the CA.
ISSUE WON respondent can claim damages against petitioner
HELD No. Medical malpractice is a particular form of negligence which consists in the failure of a physician or surgeon to apply to his practice of medicine that degree of care and skill which is ordinarily employed by the profession generally, under similar conditions, and in like surrounding circumstances. In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that the physician or surgeon either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would not have done, and that the failure or action caused injury to the patient. There are four elements involved in medical negligence cases: duty, breach, injury and proximate causation.
Respondents did not present any expert testimony to support their claim that petitioner failed to do something which a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would have done. Petitioner, on the other hand, presented the testimony of Dr. Augusto M. Manalo, who was clearly an expert on the subject. Dr. Manalo specializes in gynecology and obstetrics, authored and co-authored various publications on the subject, and is a professor at the University of the Philippines. According to him, his diagnosis of Edithas case was "Ectopic Pregnancy Interstitial (also referred to as Cornual), Ruptured." In stating that the D&C procedure was not the proximate cause of the rupture of Edithas uterus resulting in her hysterectomy. It is evident from his testimony that the D&C procedure was not the proximate cause of the rupture of Edithas uterus. the D&C procedure was conducted in accordance with the standard practice, with the same level of care that any reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances, and that there was nothing irregular in the way the petitioner dealt with Editha. In the testimony of Dr. Manalo, he stated further that assuming that there was in fact a misdiagnosis, the same would have been rectifed if Editha followed the petitioners order to return for a check-up. Based on the evidence presented in the present case under review, in which no negligence can be attributed to the petitioner, the immediate cause of the accident resulting in Edithas injury was her own omission when she did not return for a follow-up check up, in defance of petitioners orders. The immediate cause of Edithas injury was her own act; thus, she cannot recover damages from the injury.
19. CRESENCIA ACHEVARA, ALFREDO ACHEVARA, and BENIGNO VALDEZ vs. ELVIRA RAMOS, JOHN ARNEL RAMOS, and KHRISTINE CAMILLE RAMOS G.R. No. 175172 September 29, 2009 Ponente: PERALTA, J.:
FACTS: Respondents fled a complaint for damages against petitioners for the death of Arnulfo Ramos in a vehicular accident that happened along Barangay Tablac, Candon, Ilocos Sur. Crescencia Achevara was sued as the operator of the passenger jeep driven by Benigno Valdez (Valdez), which was involved in the vehicular accident.
Respondents alleged that Valdez was driving a passenger jeep in a reckless, careless, and negligent manner when he tried to overtake a motorcycle, causing the passenger jeep to encroach on the opposite lane and bump the oncoming vehicle driven by Arnulfo Ramos. Petitioners denied the allegations and claimed that Valdez was driving southward at a moderate speed when he saw an owner-type jeep coming from the south and heading north, running in a zigzag manner, and encroaching on the west lane of the road. To avoid a collision, Valdez drove the passenger jeep towards the shoulder of the road, west of his lane, but the owner-type jeep continued to move toward the western lane and bumped the left side of the passenger jeep. Petitioners alleged that it was Arnulfo Ramos who was careless and negligent in driving a motor vehicle, which he very well knew had a mechanical defect.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents may be held liable for the collision.
HELD: The court ruled in the negative. Foreseeability is the fundamental test of negligence. To be negligent, a defendant must have acted or failed to act in such a way that an ordinary reasonable man would have realized that certain interests of certain persons were unreasonably subjected to a general but defnite class of risks.
Seeing that the owner-type jeep was wiggling and running fast in a zigzag manner as it travelled on the opposite side of the highway, Valdez was made aware of the danger ahead if he met the owner-type jeep on the road. Yet he failed to take precaution by immediately veering to the rightmost portion of the road. The court fnds that Valdez is guilty of inexcusable negligence by neglecting to take such precaution, which a reasonable and prudent man would ordinarily have done under the circumstances and which proximately caused injury to another.
However, the court also believes that Arnulfo Ramos is guilty of gross negligence for knowingly driving a defective jeep on the highway. An ordinarily prudent man would know that he would be putting himself and other vehicles he would encounter on the road at risk for driving a mechanically defective vehicle. Under the circumstances, a prudent man would have had the owner-type jeep repaired or would have stopped using it until it was repaired. Gross negligence is the absence of care or diligence as to amount to a reckless disregard of the safety of persons or property.
The acts of negligence of Arnulfo Ramos and Benigno Valdez were contemporaneous when Ramos continued to drive a wiggling vehicle on the highway despite knowledge of its mechanical defect, while Valdez did not immediately veer to the rightmost side of the road upon seeing the wiggling vehicle of Ramos. The doctrine of last clear chance applies to a situation where the plaintif was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, but the defendant who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is made liable for all the consequences of the accident, notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintif. However, the doctrine does not apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered.
The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply to this case, because even if it can be said that it was Valdez who had the last chance to avoid the mishap, Valdez no longer had the opportunity to avoid the collision. Considering that the time the owner-type jeep encroached on the lane of Valdez to the time of impact was only a matter of seconds, he no longer had the opportunity to avoid the collision.
20. LAMBERT S. RAMOS vs. C.O.L. REALTY CORPORATION G.R. No. 184905 August 28, 2009 Ponente: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J
FACTS: A vehicular accident took place along Katipunan Avenue, Quezon City, between a Toyota Altis owned by C.O.L. Realty Corporation, and driven by Aquilino Larin (Aquilino), and a Ford Expedition, owned by Lambert Ramos (Ramos) and driven by Rodel Ilustrisimo (Rodel). A passenger of the Altis, Estela Maliwat (Estela) sustained injuries and was immediately rushed to the hospital for treatment.
C.O.L. Realty averred that its driver, Aquilino, was slowly driving the Toyota Altis along Rajah Matanda Street and has just crossed the center lane of Katipunan Avenue when the Ford Expedition violently rammed against the cars right rear door and fender. On the other hand, Ramos maintained that the Altis crossed Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street despite the MMDA order prohibiting vehicles to pass through the intersection and the concrete barriers placed thereon.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ramos may be held liable for the negligence of his employee Rodel.
HELD: There is no doubt that Aquilinos violation of the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street was the proximate cause of the accident. His negligence is established by the fact that he violated a trafc regulation. This fnds support in Article 2185 of the Civil Code which states that: "Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any trafc regulation. Moreover, it was the proximate cause of the accident, and thus precludes any recovery for any damages sufered by respondent from the accident.
Proximate cause is defned as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efcient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. The proximate legal cause is that acting frst and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the fnal event in the chain immediately efecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which frst acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the frst event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda, the accident would not have happened. This specifc untoward event is exactly what the MMDA prohibition was intended for. Thus, a prudent and intelligent person who resides within the vicinity where the accident occurred, Aquilino had reasonable ground to expect that the accident would be a natural and probable result if he crossed Katipunan Avenue since such crossing is considered dangerous on account of the busy nature of the thoroughfare and the ongoing construction of the Katipunan-Boni Avenue underpass. According to the principle embodied in Article 2179 of the Civil Code, that when the plaintifs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. As to the alleged Rodel's contributory negligence- the court fnds it unnecessary to delve into it, since it cannot overcome or defeat Aquilinos recklessness which is the immediate and proximate cause of the accident. *Causation 21) G.R. No. 173146 November 25, 2009 AGUSAN DEL NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (ANECO) vs. ANGELITA BALEN and SPOUSES HERCULES and RHEA LARIOSA NACHURA, J.: Facts: Petitioner ANECO is a duly organized and registered consumers cooperative, engaged in supplying electricity in the province of Agusan del Norte and in Butuan City. In 1981, ANECO installed an electric post traversing Balens residence which was ptotested by Miguel Balen with the District Engineers Ofce and with ANECO, but his protest just fell on deaf ears. On July 25, 1992, Balen, Lariosa and Exclamado were electrocuted while removing the TV antenna from Balens residence. The antenna pole touched ANECOs main distribution line which resulted in their electrocution. Exclamado died instantly, while Balen and Lariosa sufered extensive third degree burns. Respondents Balen and Lariosa then lodged a complaint for damages against ANECO. ANECO, however, denied liability, arguing that the proximate cause of the accident was respondents negligence in removing the TV antenna and in allowing the pole to touch the high-tension wires. Issue: WON ANECO's negligence is the proximate cause of the injuries sustained by respondents Held: The SC ruled in the afrmative. It held that it is in fact ANECO which provided the proximate cause of the injuries of respondents. One of the tests for determining the existence of proximate cause is the foreseeability test, which provides that where the particular harm was reasonably foreseeable at the time of the defendants misconduct, his act or omission is the legal cause thereof. Foreseeability is the fundamental test of the law of negligence. To be negligent, the defendant must have acted or failed to act in such a way that an ordinary reasonable man would have realized that certain interests of certain persons were unreasonably subjected to a general but defnite class of risk which made the actors conduct negligent, it is obviously the consequence for the actor must be held legally responsible. Thus applying aforecited test, ANECO should have reasonably foreseen that, even if it complied with the clearance requirements under the Philippine Electrical Code in installing the subject high tension wires above MIGUEL BALENs house, still a potential risk existed that people would get electrocuted, considering that the wires were not insulated. *Human Relation: Intentional Torts 22) G.R. No. 180764 January 19, 2010 TITUS B. VILLANUEVA vs. EMMA M. ROSQUETA ABAD, J.: Facts: Respondent Rosqueta, formerly Deputy Commissioner of the Revenue Collection and Monitoring Group of the Bureau of Customs, tendered her courtesy resignation from that post on January 23, 2001, shortly after President Arroyo assumed ofce. But on June 5, 2001, she withdrew her resignation, claiming that she enjoyed security of tenure and that she had resigned against her will on orders of her superior. Meantime, on July 13, 2001 President Arroyo appointed Valera to Rosquetas position. Challenging such appointment, Rosqueta fled a petition for prohibition, quo warranto, and injunction against petitioner Villanueva, then Commissioner of Customs, the Secretary of Finance, and Valera. Subsequently, the RTC issued a TRO, enjoining defendants from implementing Valeras appointment. While the preliminary injunction in the quo warranto case was again in force, Villanueva issued Customs Memorandum Order authorizing Valera to exercise the powers and functions of the Deputy Commissioner, prompting Rosqueta fled a complaint for damages against Villanueva. Issue: WON petitioner Villanueva is liable in damages to respondent Rosqueta for ignoring the preliminary injunction order that the RTC issued in the quo warranto case Held: The SC ruled in the afrmative. Under the abuse of right principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person must, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acts in bad faith, with intent to prejudice another. Complementing this principle are Articles 2010 and 2111 of the Civil Code which grant the latter indemnity for the injury he sufers because of such abuse of right or duty. It held that Villanueva cannot seek shelter in the alleged advice that the OSG gave him. Surely, a government ofcial of his rank must know that a preliminary injunction order issued by a court of law had to be obeyed, especially since the question of Valeras right to replace respondent Rosqueta had not yet been properly resolved. That petitioner Villanueva ignored the injunction shows bad faith and intent to spite Rosqueta who remained in the eyes of the law the Deputy Commissioner. *Human Dignity (guys pasensya na pero ako din naguguluhan at nalilito kung bakit andito ang kasong ito, ilang beses kung binasa pero di ko talaga marelate sa Torts and Damagaes subject natin) 23) G.R. No. 186496 August 25, 2009 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANTE GRAGASIN y PAR CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Facts: Accused-appellant Gragasin was convicted by the RTC of the crime of Rape as defned and penalized under Article 266-A and Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353. In giving full weight and credit to victim AAAs testimony, the trial court applied the doctrine that testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature deserve full credence, considering that no young woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a story of deforation, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being subjected to a public trial, if she was not motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against her. The CA afrmed the fndings of the RTC, but modifed the penalty and award of damages. acquittal. The accused appealed contending that his guilt was not proven reasonable doubt. Issue: WON accused-appellants guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt Held: The SC ruled in the afrmative. In rape cases, the gravamen of the ofense is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or without her consent. If the woman is under 12 years of age, proof of force and consent becomes immaterial, not only because force is not an element of statutory rape, but because the absence of free consent is presumed. In this case, considering that AAA was barely nine years old at that time, no proof of involuntariness on her part is necessary. AAA, being a minor at the time the act was committed against her, is considered by law to be incapable of consenting to the sexual act. Moreover, not only did AAA identify accused-appellant as her rapist; she also recounted the rape in detail, particularly how the sexual intercourse took place. A rape victim, who testifes in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, and remains consistent, is a credible witness. With respect to the absence of hymenal lacerations on AAAs genitalia, it is well settled that what is essential is that there was penetration, however slight, of the labia minora, which circumstance was proven beyond doubt in this case by the testimony of AAA. In sum, the prosecution was able to discharge its burden of proving accused-appellants guilt. On the award of damages, civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon a fnding of the fact of rape. Moral damages are automatically awarded upon such fnding without need of further proof, because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually sufered moral injuries entitling the victim to such award. Exemplary damages are awarded under Article 2230 of the Civil Code if there is an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying. There being no aggravating circumstance that can be considered, the award of exemplary damages would have to be deleted. 24.) ZENAIDA R. GREGORIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SANSIO PHILIPPINES, INC., and EMMA J. DATUIN G.R. No. 179799 September 11, 2009 NACHURA, J.: FACTS: Respondents Emma J. Datuin and Sansio Philippines, Inc. fled an afdavit of complaint for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against petitioner Zenaida R. Gregorio a proprietor of Alvi Marketing. The MTC issued a warrant of arrest and she was subsequently arrested while visiting her family house in Quezon City. On the other hand, Gregorio alleged that she could not have issued the bounced checks as she did not have a checking account with the bank on which the checks were drawn; the signature on the bounced checks were radically and patently diferent from her own signature. Gregorio then fled a complaint for damages against Sansio and Datuin, that as a result of her wrongful arrest and arraignment, she sufered helplessness, hunger and humiliation and being distraught. Datuin and Sansio meanwhile fled a Motion to Dismiss on grounds that Gregorios complaint arose from grounds of compensation arising from malicious prosecution. ISSUES: Is Gregorio entitled to damages arising from her wrongful? (yes) Is the complaint, a civil suit fled by Gregorio, is based on quasi-delict or malicious prosecution? HELD: Basic is the legal principle that the nature of an action is determined by the material averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought. Gregorios civil complaint, read in its entirety, is a complaint based on quasi-delict under Article 2176, in relation to Article 26 of the Civil Code, rather than on malicious prosecution. Gregorio claimed damages for the embarrassment and humiliation she sufered when she was suddenly arrested at her city residence in Quezon City while visiting her family. She was, at the time of her arrest, a respected Kagawad in Oas, Albay. Gregorio anchored her civil complaint on Articles 26,[21] 2176,[22] and 2180[23] of the Civil Code. Noticeably, despite alleging either fault or negligence on the part of Sansio and Datuin, Gregorio never imputed to them any bad faith in her complaint. YES. Article 26 of the Civil Code grants a cause of action for damages, prevention, and other relief in cases of breach, though not necessarily constituting a criminal ofense, of the following rights: (1) right to personal dignity; (2) right to personal security; (3) right to family relations; (4) right to social intercourse; (5) right to privacy; and (6) right to peace of mind. It appears that Gregorios rights to personal dignity, personal security, privacy, and peace of mind were infringed by Sansio and Datuin when they failed to exercise the requisite diligence in determining the identity of the person they should rightfully accuse of tendering insufciently funded checks. This fault was compounded when they failed to ascertain the correct address of petitioner, thus depriving her of the opportunity to controvert the charges, because she was not given proper notice. Although she was never found at the ofce address in the criminal complaint, Gregorio was conveniently arrested by armed operatives in Quezon City, while she was visiting family. She sufered embarrassment and humiliation over her sudden arrest and detention and she had to spend time, efort, and money to clear her tarnished name and reputation, considering that she had held several honorable positions in diferent organizations and ofces in the public service, particularly her being a Kagawad in Oas, Albay at the time of her arrest. There exists no contractual relation between Gregorio and Sansio. On the other hand, Gregorio is prosecuting Sansio, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, for its vicarious liability, as employer, arising from the act or omission of its employee Datuin.
25.) PO3 BENITO SOMBILON, JR vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 175528 September 30, 2009 LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS: AAA, a ffteen (15)-year old minor, was investigated by the appellant, P03 Sombilon in connection with a complaint for Theft . AAA alleged that Appellant, in conducting the investigation, took her inside a room and locked it. The Appellant pointed a gun at her, and asked her: Did you steal the necklace?. AAAs fngers were then electrocuted. Subsequently, she was asked: Dalaga ka na ba? (Are you a woman now?), and was told: I am single too. Simultaneously, she was touched all over her body including her breasts, her belly, and her private parts. She was also kissed on her cheek. She struggled to resist the sexual advances but Appellant prevailed. Thereafter, AAA was allowed to go home, but because of AAAs condition, her mother brought her to be examined by a doctor. The medical Certifcate disclosed injuries on the occiput region, forehead, fngers of bilateral hands, bilateral breast areas and there was slight body tremors, and thus, with the diagnosis of slight physical injuries. . ISSUE: Is the accused is guilty of the crime of acts of lasciviousness as defned under the RPC? Is the victim entitled to damages? HELD: YES. For an accused to be convicted of acts of lasciviousness under the foregoing provision, the prosecution is burdened to prove the confuence of the following essential elements: (1) that the ofender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; and (2) that it is done under any of the following circumstances: (a) by using force or intimidation; (b) when the ofended woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c) when the ofended party is under twelve (12) years of age. Lewd is defned as obscene, lustful, indecent, and lecherous. It signifes that form of immorality which has relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried on a wanton manner. The evidence shows that appellant committed lewd acts against AAA when he touched her all over her body. The appellant even previously asked AAA, as if it was a prelude for things to come, Dalaga ka na ba? and thereafter conveyed to her that he is single too. Appellant employed force and intimidation, he pointed a gun at the forehead. Further,the medical Certifcate shows that AAA sufered slight physical injuries which include multiple slight contusion of bilateral breast areas. As to the damages awarded, Article 2230 of the Civil Code provides that in criminal ofenses, exemplary damages as part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. In the case at bar, although relationship has not been alleged in the information, the ofense having been committed, however, prior to the efectivity of the new rules, the civil liability already incurred by appellant remains unafected thereby. A The Court declined retroactive application of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit: The retroactive application of procedural rules, nevertheless, cannot adversely afect the rights of the private ofended party that have become vested prior to the efectivity of said rules Also, the Court declared that upon a fnding of guilt of the accused for acts of lasciviousness, moral damages may be further awarded to the victim in the same way that moral damages are awarded to victims of rape even without need of proof because it is assumed that they sufered moral injury. Considering the immeasurable pain and anguish that the victim had to sufer in the hands of the petitioner; the trauma that she had to endure even after the incident; and the sexual perversity of petitioner, who is a police ofcer.
26. GMA Network, Inc. vs. Jesus Bustos G.R. No. 146848 October 17, 2006 Facts: In the August 1987 physicians licensure examinations conducted by the Board of Medicine of the PRC, a total of 941 failed out of the 2835 examinees. On February 10, 1998, over 200 unsuccessful examinees fled a Petition for Mandamus before the RTC of Manila to compel PRC to re-evaluate the test papers alleging that there were mistakes in the counting of the total scores and erroneous checking. Rey Vidal, a news writer and reporter of GMA Network, Inc., was assigned to gather news about said fling of mandamus and after securing a copy of the petition, narrated the news coverage for GMAs Headline News which aired on February 10, 1988. The respondents then fled a damage suit against Vidal and GMA contending that what was reported were false, malicious and one-sided. They further stated that as a measure to make a forceful impact on the latters audience, the former were made use of an unrelated and old footage to make it appear that the doctors were supporting and sympathizing with the complaining unsuccessful examinees. On the other hand, the GMA contended that the report was contextually a concise and objective narration of a matter of public concern and that the press freedom guarantee covered the telecast in question, undertaken as it was to inform, without malice, the viewing public on the conduct of public ofcials. The RTC found for GMA on the postulate that the Vidal telecast report in question is privileged. The respondents fled for a motion of reconsideration which was denied and thus, went on appeal to the CA. The CA reversed the decision and ordered GMA to pay, in solidum, damages to the respondents. Issue: Whether or not the insertion of the old flm footage constitutes malice to warrant the award of damages to the respondents. Held: The award of damages is untenable. An award of damages under the premises presupposes the commission of an act amounting to defamatory imputation or libel, which, in turn, presupposes malice. Libel is the public and malicious imputation to another of a discreditable act or condition tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person. On the other hand, malice is a term used to indicate the fact that the ofender is prompted by personal ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty, but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed. Malice implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifable harm. It is present when it is shown that the author of the libelous or defamatory remarks made the same with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof. Privileged matters may be absolute or qualifed. Absolutely privileged matters are not actionable regardless of the existence of malice in fact. On the other hand, in qualifedly or conditionally privileged communications, the freedom from liability for an otherwise defamatory utterance is conditioned on the absence of express malice or malice in fact. In the case at bench, the news telecast in question clearly falls under the second kind of privileged matter, the same being the product of a simple narration of the allegations set forth in the mandamus petition of examinees devoid of any comment or remark. Both the CA and the trial court in fact found the narration to be without accompanying distortive or defamatory comments or remarks. What at bottom petitioners then did was simply to inform the public of the mandamus petition fled against the respondent doctors who were admittedly the then chairman and members of the Board of Medicine. It was clearly within petitioner Vidals job as news writer and reporter assigned to cover government institutions to keep the public abreast of recent developments therein. It must be reiterated that the courts a quo had determined the news report in question to be qualifedly privileged communication protected under the 1987 Constitution. Likewise, the video footage was not libel in disguise; standing without accompanying sounds or voices, it was meaningless, or, at least, conveyed nothing derogatory in nature.
27. Joseph Saludaga vs. Far Eastern University G.R. No. 179337 April 30, 2008 Facts: Joseph Saludaga was a sophomore law student of respondent Far Eastern University when he was shot by Alejandro Rosete, one of the security guards on duty at the school premises on August 18, 1996. Saluduga was rushed to FEU-Dr. Nicanor Reyes Medical Foundation due to the wound he sustained. Meanwhile, Rosete was brought to the police station where he explained that the shooting was accidental. He was eventually released considering that no formal complaint was fled against him. Saludaga fled a complaint for damages against respondents on the ground that they breached their obligation to provide students with a safe and secure environment and an atmosphere conducive to learning. Respondents, in turn, fled a complaint against Galaxy Management and Development Corp., the agency contracted by respondent FEU to provide security services within its premises and Imperial, Galaxy's President, to indemnify them for whatever would be adjudged in favor of petitioner. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Saludaga, ordering FEU and de Jesus, President of FEU, to pay jointly and severally Saladuga the damages and Galaxy and Mariano to indemnify jointly and severally FEU and de Jesus. The respondents appealed to the CA which reversed the decision of the RTC. Issue: Whether or not the respondents are liable. Held: The respondent FEU is held liable. It is undisputed that petitioner was enrolled as a sophomore law student in respondent FEU. As such, there was created a contractual obligation between the two parties. On petitioner's part, he was obliged to comply with the rules and regulations of the school. On the other hand, respondent FEU, as a learning institution is mandated to impart knowledge and equip its students with the necessary skills to pursue higher education or a profession. At the same time, it is obliged to ensure and take adequate steps to maintain peace and order within the campus. In the instant case, we fnd that, when petitioner was shot inside the campus by no less the security guard who was hired to maintain peace and secure the premises, there is a prima facie showing that respondents failed to comply with its obligation to provide a safe and secure environment to its students. After a thorough review of the records, we fnd that respondent FEU failed to discharge the burden of proving that they exercised due diligence in providing a safe learning environment for their students. They failed to prove that they ensured that the guards assigned in the campus met the requirements stipulated in the Security Service Agreement. Indeed, certain documents about Galaxy were presented during trial; however, no evidence as to the qualifcations of Rosete as a security guard for the university was ofered. Respondents also failed to show that they undertook steps to ascertain and confrm that the security guards assigned to them actually possess the qualifcations required in the Security Service Agreement. A learning institution should not be allowed to completely relinquish or abdicate security matters in its premises to the security agency it hired. To do so would result to contracting away its inherent obligation to ensure a safe learning environment for its students. Respondent De Jesus should not be held solidarily liable with respondent FEU. However, respondents cannot be held liable for damages under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code because respondents are not the employers of Rosete. The latter was employed by Galaxy. The instructions issued by respondents' Security Consultant to Galaxy and its security guards are ordinarily no more than requests commonly envisaged in the contract for services entered into by a principal and a security agency. They cannot be construed as the element of control as to treat respondents as the employers of Rosete. For the acts of negligence and for having supplied respondent FEU with an unqualifed security guard, which resulted to the latter's breach of obligation to petitioner, it is proper to hold Galaxy liable to respondent FEU for such damages equivalent to the above- mentioned amounts awarded to petitioner. Unlike respondent De Jesus, we deem Imperial to be solidarily liable with Galaxy for being grossly negligent in directing the afairs of the security agency. It was Imperial who assured petitioner that his medical expenses will be shouldered by Galaxy but said representations were not fulflled because they presumed that petitioner and his family were no longer interested in fling a formal Respondents and Galaxy were able to litigate their respective claims and defenses in the course of the trial of petitioner's complaint. Evidence duly supports the fndings of the trial court that Galaxy is negligent not only in the selection of its employees but also in their supervision. Indeed, no administrative sanction was imposed against Rosete despite the shooting incident; moreover, he was even allowed to go on leave of absence which led eventually to his disappearance Galaxy and Imperial failed to make good their pledge to reimburse petitioner's medical expenses.
28. MEDARDO AG. CADIENTE v. BITHUEL MACAS MAGSAYSAY [G.R. NO. 161946 : November 14, 2008] QUISUMBING, Acting C.J.:
FACTS: At the intersection of Buhangin and San Vicente Streets in Davao City, Bithuel Macas, was standing on the shoulder of the road. Macas was bumped and run over by a Ford Fiera, driven by Chona C. Cimafranca. Cimafranca rushed the respondent to the Davao Medical Center. Macas sufered severe muscular and major vessel injuries, open bone fractures in both thighs and other parts of his legs. In order to save his life, the surgeon had to amputate both legs up to the groins. Records showed that the Ford Fiera was registered in the name of Atty. Medardo Ag. Cadiente. However, Cadiente claimed that when the accident happened, he was no longer the owner of the Ford Fiera. He alleged that he sold the vehicle to Engr. Rogelio Jalipa and turned over the Certifcate of Registration and Ofcial Receipt to Jalipa The victim's father, Samuel Macas, fled a complaint for torts and damages against Cimafranca and Cadiente. Cadiente later fled a third-party complaint against Jalipa. RTC: judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintif declaring Atty. Medardo Ag. Cadiente and Engr. Rogelio Jalipa jointly and severally liable for damages to the plaintif for their own negligence. CA: fndings of the trial court were in accordance with the established facts and was supported by the evidence on record. RTC Decision AFFIRMED. ISSUE: (1) Whether there was contributory negligence on the part of the victim; (2) whether the petitioner and third-party defendant Jalipa are jointly and severally liable to the victim. HELD: we fnd the petition without merit. Article 2179 of the Civil Code provides: When the plaintif's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintif may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintif who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full, but must proportionately bear the consequences of his own negligence. The defendant is thus held liable only for the damages actually caused by his negligence. A victim of recklessness on the public highways is usually without means to discover or identify the person actually causing the injury or damage. He has no means other than by a recourse to the registration in the Motor Vehicles Ofce to determine who is the owner. The protection that the law aims to extend to him would become illusory were the registered owner given the opportunity to escape liability by disproving his ownership. The policy behind vehicle registration is the easy identifcation of the owner who can be held responsible in case of accident, damage or injury caused by the vehicle. This is so as not to inconvenience or prejudice a third party injured by one whose identity cannot be secured. Therefore, since the Ford Fiera was still registered in the petitioner's name at the time when the misfortune took place, the petitioner cannot escape liability for the permanent injury it caused the respondent, who had since stopped schooling and is now forced to face life with nary but two remaining limbs. 29. FILIPINAS SYNTHETIC FIBER CORPORATION VS. WILFREDO DE LOS SANTOS, BENITO JOSE DE LOS SANTOS, MARIA ELENA DE LOS SANTOS AND CARMINA VDA. DE LOS SANTOS G.R. No. 152033, March 16 : 201 PERALTA, J.:
FACTS: Teresa Elena Legarda-de los Santos (Teresa Elena), the wife of Wilfredo de los Santos (Wilfredo), performed at the Rizal Theater as a member of the cast for the musical play, Woman of the Year. Wilfredos brother Armando de los Santos (Armando), husband of Carmina Vda. de los Santos, went to the Rizal Theater to fetch Teresa Elena after the latter's performance. He drove a 1980 Mitsubishi Galant Sigma (Galant Sigma), company car assigned to Wilfredo. At Katipunan Road (White Plains), the Galant Sigma collided with the shuttle bus owned by petitioner and driven by Alfredo S. Mejia (Mejia), an employee of petitioner. The Galant Sigma was dragged about 12 meters from the point of impact, across the White Plains Road landing near the perimeter fence of Camp Aguinaldo, where the Galant Sigma burst into fames and burned to death beyond recognition all four occupants of the car. A criminal charge for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple homicide was brought against Mejia, which was decided in favor of Mejia.
RTC: decided in favor of respondents. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing this Court fnds Filipinas Synthetic Fiber Corporation and Alfredo S. Mejia, defendants in both cases, jointly and severally, to pay the herein plaintifs damages.
CA: Decision of RTC AFFIRMED. ISSUE: (1) Whether or not SFC exercise the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees; (2) Whether or not Mejia was negligent and therefore liable for damages HELD: The petition lacks merit. Petitioner insists that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee.
Due diligence in the supervision of employees on the other hand, includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his or its employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and benefcial to their employer. To this, we add that actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant concern of the employer, acting through dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory functions. In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees may be deemed sufcient and plausible, it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence of said company guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it has been diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the actual supervision of their work. The mere allegation of the existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies, without anything more, is decidedly not sufcient to overcome such presumption. 30. Gancayco vs. City Government of Quezon City G.R. No. 177807 October 11, 2011 SERENO, J.: Facts: In the early 1950s, retired Justice Emilio A. Gancayco bought a parcel of land in (EDSA), Quezon City. Sometime in 1956, the Quezon City Council issued Ordinance No. 2904, entitled An Ordinance Requiring the Construction of Arcades, for Commercial Buildings to be Constructed in Zones Designated as Business Zones in the Zoning Plan of Quezon City, and Providing Penalties in Violation Thereof. An arcade is defned as any portion of a building above the frst foor projecting over the sidewalk beyond the frst storey wall used as protection for pedestrians against rain or sun. Ordinance No. 2904 required the relevant property owner to construct an arcade with a width of 4.50 meters and height of 5.00 Under this particular ordinance, the building owner is not allowed to construct his wall up to the edge of the property line, thereby creating a space or shelter under the frst foor. In efect, property owners relinquish the use of the space for use as an arcade for pedestrians, instead of using it for their own purposes. The ordinance was amended several times and as a result some properties were exempted from the construction of arcades. The ordinance covered the property of Justice Gancayco. Subsequently, sometime in 1965, Justice Gancayco sought the exemption of a two-storey building being constructed on his property from the application of Ordinance No. 2904 that he be exempted from constructing an arcade on his property. On 2 February 1966, the City Council acted favorably on Justice Gancaycos request and issued a Resolution subject to the condition that upon notice by the City Engineer, the owner shall, within reasonable time, demolish the enclosure of said arcade at his own expense when public interest so demands. Decades after, in March 2003, MMDA conducted operations to clear obstructions along the sidewalk of EDSA in Quezon City pursuant to Metro Manila Councils Resolution. The resolution authorized the MMDA and local government units to clear the sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila of all illegal structures and obstructions. On 28 April 2003, the MMDA sent a notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco alleging that a portion of his building violated the Building Code in relation to Ordinance No. 2904. The MMDA gave Justice Gancayco ffteen (15) days to clear the portion of the building that was supposed to be an arcade along EDSA. Justice Gancayco did not comply with the notice. Soon after the lapse of the ffteen (15) days, the MMDA proceeded to demolish the party wall, or what was referred to as the wing walls, of the ground foor structure. At the time of the demolition, the afected portion of the building was being used as a restaurant. On 29 May 2003, Justice Gancayco fled a Petition with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, seeking to prohibit the MMDA and the City Government of Quezon City from demolishing his property. In his Petition he alleged that the ordinance authorized the taking of private property without due process of law and just compensation, because the construction of an arcade will require 67.5 square meters from the 375 square meter property. In addition, he claimed that the ordinance was selective and discriminatory in its scope and application when it allowed the owners of the buildings located in the Quezon City-San Juan boundary to Cubao Rotonda, and Balete to Seattle Streets to construct arcades at their option. He thus sought the declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 2904 and the payment of damages. Alternately, he prayed for the payment of just compensation should the court hold the ordinance valid. The City Government of Quezon City claimed that the ordinance was a valid exercise of police power, regulating the use of property in a business zone. In addition, it pointed out that Justice Gancayco was already barred by estoppel, laches and prescription. Similarly, the MMDA alleged that Justice Gancayco could not seek the nullifcation of an ordinance that he had already violated, and that the ordinance enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality. It further stated that the questioned property was a public nuisance impeding the safe passage of pedestrians. Finally, the MMDA claimed that it was merely implementing the legal easement established by Ordinance No. 2904. The RTC rendered tis decision in favor of Gancayo by holding the assailed ordinance as unconstitutional. Upon appeal, The CA, partly granting the appeal, upheld the validity of Ordinance No. 2904 and lifted the injunction against the enforcement and implementation of the ordinance. In so doing, it held that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the right of the local government unit to promote the general welfare of its constituents pursuant to its police powers. The CA also ruled that the ordinance established a valid classifcation of property owners with regard to the construction of arcades in their respective properties depending on the location. The CA further stated that there was no taking of private property, since the owner still enjoyed the benefcial ownership of the property. Nevertheless, the CA held that the MMDA went beyond its powers when it demolished the subject property. It further found that Resolution No. 02- 28 only refers to sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila, thus excluding Justice Gancaycos private property. Lastly, the CA stated that the MMDA is not clothed with the authority to declare, prevent or abate nuisances. Issue: WON the wing wall of justice Gancaycos Building is a public nuisance. HELD: The wing walls of the building are not nuisances per se. The fact that in 1966 the City Council gave Justice Gancayco an exemption from constructing an arcade is an indication that the wing walls of the building are not nuisances per se. The wing walls do not per se immediately and adversely afect the safety of persons and property. The fact that an ordinance may declare a structure illegal does not necessarily make that structure a nuisance. Clearly, when Justice Gancayco was given a permit to construct the building, the city council or the city engineer did not consider the building, or its demolished portion, to be a threat to the safety of persons and property. This fact alone should have warned the MMDA against summarily demolishing the structure. Neither does the MMDA have the power to declare a thing a nuisance. Only courts of law have the power to determine whether a thing is a nuisance. 31. Santos vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 161877, March 23, 2006 GARCIA, J.:
Facts: Petitioner Ariel Santos y Cadiente, then the Labor Arbiter of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No. III, San Fernando, Pampanga, was charged with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. That on March 11, 1993 and June 15, 1993 respectively, in San Fernando, Pampanga, the above-named accused, being then the Labor Arbiter of the [NLRC], Regional Arbitration Branch No. III, San Fernando, Pampanga, while in the performance of his quasi-judicial functions, taking advantage of his position and committing the ofense in relation to his ofce, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, criminally and through evident bad faith and manifest partiality towards Abraham Mose, complainant in NLRC-RAB Case No. RO3-198-79 captioned Abraham Mose vs. Plaza Hotel/Apartments, cause undue injury to Conrado L. Tiu, the owner of the Plaza Hotel/Apartments, in the following manner: accused despite the pendency of the motion for reconsideration of his Order dated October 21, 1992 directing the issuance of a writ of execution and the opposition to the motion for execution as well as the motion to quash writ of execution, issued frst a writ of execution dated March 11, 1993 followed by an alias writ of execution dated June 15, 1993, without acting on the said motions and opposition anymore, and as a consequence thereof, undue injury was caused to Conrado L. Tiu while giving unwarranted beneft and advantage to Abraham Mose. In the same decision, the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) adjudged petitioner guilty as charged and, accordingly, sentenced him. Issue: Whether or not the act of petitioner was tainted with or attended by evident partiality causing undue injury to private complainant Conrado L. Tiu.
Held: The case was dismissed. According to the court the term undue injury in the context of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act punishing the act of "causing undue injury to any party," has a meaning akin to that civil law concept of actual damage. The Court said so inLlorente vs. Sandiganbayan, thus: In jurisprudence, undue injury is consistently interpreted as actual damage. Undue has been defned as more than necessary, not proper, [or] illegal; and injury as any wrong or damage done to another, either in his person, rights, reputation or property [; that is, the] invasion of any legally protected interest of another. Actual damage, in the context of these defnitions, is akin to that in civil law. In turn, actual or compensatory damages is defned by Article 2199 as, "Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss sufered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages. Fundamental in the law on damages is that one injured by a breach of a contract, or by a wrongful or negligent act or omissionshall have a fair and just compensation commensurate to the loss sustained as a consequence of the defendants act. Actual pecuniary compensation is awarded as a general rule, . Actual damages are primarily intended to simply make good or replace the loss caused by the wrong. Petitioner admitted issuing the two writs of execution without frst resolving Plaza Hotel's motion for reconsideration of his October 21, 1992 Order. He argued, however, that it was his ministerial duty to issue the writs aforementioned, the fnality of the decision sought to be enforced, i.e., the decision of Labor Arbiter Palumbarit, having set in upon the dismissal, with fnality, by this Court of Plaza Hotels petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 77105 assailing said decision.
From the foregoing narration of events, it is fairly clear that Plaza Hotels motion for reconsideration immediately referred to above was directed against petitioners order of October 21, 1992 directing the issuance of a writ of execution for the amount stated therein. Be this as it may, petitioners pose respecting his ministerial duty to order the execution of a fnal and executory decision of Andres Palumbarit is as simplistic as it is misleading.
As it were, petitioner failed to resolve said motion for reconsideration and instead issued on March 11, 1993 a writ of execution. Worse still, he proceeded to issue an alias writ of execution despite the issuance by the NLRC Proper of a TRO enjoining the implementation of the underlying writ. Under the circumstances, Plaza Hotel was within its right to secure the services of counsel - for a fee of P68,500.00 - and, to apply for injunctive relief and then pay P11,800.00 for the supersedeasbond to stay the implementation of the writ of execution in question. In net efect, Plaza Hotel incurred damages rendered necessary by the illegal or improper acts of petitioner.
Petitioner, being a labor arbiter of the NLRC, discharges quasi-judicial functions. His act of issuing the two writs of execution without frst resolving the pending motion for reconsideration of his October 21, 1992 Order, and despite the existence of a TRO was clearly tainted with or attended by evident partiality causing undue injury to private complainant Conrado L. Tiu.
32. MARIKINA AUTO LINE TRANSPORT CORPORATION and FREDDIE L. SUELTO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ERLINDA V. VALDELLON [G.R. No. 152040 March 31, 2006] FACTS: Erlinda V. Valdellon is the owner of a two-door commercial apartment located at No. 31 Kamias Road, Quezon City. The Marikina Auto Line Transport Corporation (MALTC) is the owner-operator of a passenger bus with Plate Number NCV-849. Suelto, its employee, was assigned as the regular driver of the bus. At around 2:00 p.m. on October 3, 1992, Suelto was driving the aforementioned passenger bus along Kamias Road, Kamuning, Quezon City, going towards Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA). The bus suddenly swerved to the right and struck the terrace of the commercial apartment owned by Valdellon located along Kamuning Road. Valdellon demanded payment of P148,440.00 to cover the cost of the damage to the terrace. The bus company and Suelto ofered a P30,000.00 settlement which Valdellon refused.Valdellon fled a criminal complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property against Suelto. Valdellon also fled a separate civil complaint against Suelto and the bus company for damages. Suelto maintained that, in an emergency case, he was not, in law, negligent. Both the trial court and the CA ruled in against herein petitioners. ISSUE: Whether or not the sudden emergency rule applies in the case at bar. HELD: No. It was the burden of petitioners herein to prove petitioner Sueltos defense that he acted on an emergency, that is, he had to swerve the bus to the right to avoid colliding with a passenger jeep coming from EDSA that had overtaken another vehicle and intruded into the lane of the bus. The sudden emergency rule was enunciated by this Court in Gan v. Court of Appeals,23 thus: [O]ne who suddenly fnds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon refection may appear to have been a better method unless the emergency in which he fnds himself is brought about by his own negligence. Under Section 37 of Republic Act No. 4136, as amended, otherwise known as the Land Transportation and Trafc Code, motorists are mandated to drive and operate vehicles on the right side of the road or highway. Moreover Section 35 of the law provides for the restriction as to speed. In relation thereto, Article 2185 of the New Civil Code provides that "unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent, if at the time of mishap, he was violating any trafc regulation." By his own admission, petitioner Suelto violated the Land Transportation and Trafc Code when he suddenly swerved the bus to the right, thereby causing damage to the property of private respondent. As already maintained and concluded, the severe damages sustained could not have resulted had the accused acted as a reasonable and prudent man would. The accused was not diligent as he claims to be. What is more probable is that the accused had to swerve to the right and hit the commercial apartment of the plaintif because he could not make a full stop as he was driving too fast in a usually crowded street. Petitioner Sueltos reliance on the sudden emergency rule to escape conviction for the crime charged and his civil liabilities based thereon is, thus, futile. 33. BANKARD, INC (PETITIONER) VS. DR. ANTONIO NOVAK FELICIANO (RESPONDENT) FACTS: Dr. Feliciano owns to PCIbank MasterCard. One of which is an extent of his own card given to his wife. On june 19, 1995 Dr. Feliciano used his card to pay breakfast bill in Toronto Canada. The card was dishonored for payment. Respondents guests and other Filipino doctors in Canada paid for the bill because of the incident. On june 20,1995, respondent reimbursed the cost of the breakfast to dr. bumanlag who was there when the card was dishonored. After payment, dr. Feliciano asked dr. bumanlag to accompany him to buy some clothes in eddie Fairview mall in Toronto. However, when dr. Feliciano presented his card as payment. The card was dishonored again. On October 5, 1995, respondent fled a complaint against bankard and mastercard international for breach of breach of contractual rights and damages before the RTC. Respondent alleged that he is a holder in good standing for more than ten years of PCIBank Mastercard. and that petitioner and Mastercard International reneged on their agreement by suspending the services of the card without notice to him. As a result of the suspension and confscation of his card in Toronto, Canada, respondent sufered social humiliation, embarrassment. The Canadian-based doctors, who were his guests during the breakfast meeting in Toronto and whom he expected to donate at least ffty thousand Canadian dollars to his charitable clinic in Makati, withdrew their contributions because of the incidents. Respondent prayed for P1,000,000.00 in actual damages representing the peso equivalent of the aborted contributions, P1,000,000.00 for moral damages, P200,000.00 for exemplary damages, and P100,000.00 for attorney's fees and costs of suit. Petitioner claims that it suspended respondent's card to protect him from fraudulent transactions. Issue: Whether or not the claims for damages should be awarded? Held: Yes. Considering the widespread use of access devices in commercial and other transactions, petitioner and other issuers of credit cards should not only guard against fraudulent uses of credit cards but should also be protective of genuine uses thereof by the true cardholders. In the case at bar, the duty is much more demanding for the evidence shows that respondent is a credit cardholder for more than ten (10) years in good standing, and has not been shown to have violated any of the provisions of his credit card agreement with petitioner. Considering the attendant circumstances, we fnd petitioner to have been grossly negligent in suspending respondent's credit card. To reiterate, moral damages may be awarded in a breach of contract when the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith, or is guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad faith. With respect to the amount of moral damages to be awarded, the well-entrenched principle is that the grant thereof depends upon the discretion of the court considering the circumstances of each case. In the case at bar, it is undisputed that respondent's PCIBank Mastercard was dishonored in a foreign country where the respondent was not expected to have family members or close friends nearby to lend him a helping hand. It was twice dishonored in public places. However, since moral damages are patently not meant to enrich the complainant at the expense of the defendant and should only be commensurate with the actual loss or injury sufered,we reduce the amount awarded by the Court of Appeals from P800,000.00 to P500,000.00. The award for attorney's fees is likewise afrmed. Plaintif was compelled to litigate to protect his interest, as the lower courts deemed it just and equitable to award him attorney's fees.The respondent had to vindicate his rights up to the highest court of the land. 34. ASIAN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs COMFAC CORPORATION G.R. No. 163915 October 12, 2006
FACTS: ASIAKONSTRUCT awarded respondent COMFAC Corporation a contract for raised fooring system for the PNOC-EDC, LGPP HVAC Marshalling Station Building, in Leyte and another contract for airconditioning and ventilation system for the PNOC-EDC Marshalling and Relay Building of Leyte HVAC Switchyard Project, costing P1,698,635 and P4,000,000, respectively. In November 1996, COMFAC turned over the project to PNOC, and issued the Certifcates of Completion, which were confrmed by Rene T. Soriao, Group Manager of ASIAKONSTRUCT. COMFAC then sent ASIAKONSTRUCT demand letters for the unpaid balance of P1,969,863.50. However, ASIAKONSTRUCT failed to pay the amount, prompting COMFAC to fle a complaint for collection. It also prayed for attorneys fees equivalent to 20% of the amount demanded, plus P2,000 attorneys fee per appearance, and exemplary damages of P500,000. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the COMFAC. ASIAKONSTRUCT elevated the case to the Court of Appeals with certain modifcations on the amount of damages to be awarded. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is entitled to attorneys fees
HELD:. Attorneys fees cannot be awarded. Attorneys fees are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal and equitable justifcations for the award of attorneys fees and its basis cannot be left to speculation and conjecture. Attorney's fee is allowed when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or incur expenses to protect his interest by reason of an unjustifed act or omission on the part of the party from whom it is sought. Indeed, COMFAC was forced to litigate to collect payments, but due to lack of fndings on the amount to be awarded, and since there is no sufcient showing of bad faith in ASIAKONSTRUCTs refusal to pay, other than an erroneous assertion of the righteousness of its cause, the attorneys fee cannot be awarded against it.
35. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS vs. ETHEL BRUNTY and JUAN MANUEL M. GARCIA G.R. No. 169891 November 2, 2006
FACTS: Rhonda Brunty, daughter of respondent and an American citizen, came to the Philippines for a visit sometime in January 1980. Prior to her departure, she, together with her Filipino host Juan Garcia, traveled to Baguio City on board a sedan, driven by Mercelita around midnight. Driving at approximately 70 km/hr, and unaware of the railroad track up ahead, they collided with PNR Train No. T-71. Mercelita was instantly killed when the sedan smashed into the train; the two other passengers sufered serious physical injuries. Rhonda Brunty was brought to a Hospital in Tarlac, where she was pronounced dead after ten minutes from arrival. Garcia, who had sufered severe head injuries, was brought via ambulance to the same hospital but then was transferred to two other hospitals for further treatment. Ethel Brunty then sent a demand letter to the PNR demanding payment of actual, compensatory, and moral damages, as a result of her daughters death. When PNR did not respond, Ethel Brunty and Garcia, fled a complaint for damages against the PNR. They alleged that the death of Mercelita and Rhonda Brunty, as well as the physical injuries sufered by Garcia, were the direct and proximate result of the gross and reckless negligence of PNR in not providing the necessary equipment at the railroad crossing. Plaintifs likewise averred that PNR failed to supervise its employees in the performance of their respective tasks and duties, more particularly the pilot and operator of the train. The RTC rendered its Decision in favor of plaintifs. The CA afrmed the decision but with partial modifcations increasing the death indemnity award from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00, and deleting the award for damages sustained by the sedan. ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in awarding the damages HELD: No but a modifcation of the same is in order, specifcally on the award of actual and moral damages in the aggregate amount of P1,000,000.00. Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in order to compensate a party for an injury or loss he sufered. They arise out of a sense of natural justice, aimed at repairing the wrong done. To be recoverable, they must be duly proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculation, conjecture, or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they have sufered, and on evidence of the actual amount thereof. Respondents, however, failed to present evidence for such damages; hence, the award of actual damages cannot be sustained. However, as the heirs of Rhonda Brunty undeniably incurred expenses for the wake and burial of the latter, we deem it proper to award temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence. Moral damages are not punitive in nature, but are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the physical sufering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused a person. Although incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages must nevertheless be somehow proportional to and in approximation of the sufering inficted. In the instant case, the moral sufering of the heirs of Rhonda Brunty was sufciently established by Ethel Brunty in her deposition, Considering the circumstances attendant in this case, we fnd that an award of P500,000.00 as moral damages to the heirs of Rhonda Brunty is proper. In view of recent jurisprudence, indemnity of P50,000.00 for the death of Rhonda Brunty and attorneys fees amounting to P50,000.00 is likewise proper.
36. CONRADO MAGBANUA and ROSEMARIE MAGBANUA-TABORADA v PILAR S. JUNSAY ( G.R. No. 132659, February 12, 2007 )
FACTS: Rosemarie Magbanua was a housemaid of Pilar Junsay. Rosemarie was charged as a co-accused for the crime of robbery that transpired to Pilar's house. The case for the prosecution relied on an alleged confession made by petitioner Rosemarie, admitting her participation in the crime of Robbery. However, Rosemarie was acquitted due to that fact that her testimony was held to be inadmissible because it was procured through physical maltreatment by the investigating ofcers. So together with her father, they instituted a Complaint for Damages. Petitioners maintained that Rosemarie sufered physical pain and mental torture due to the fling of the false criminal charge against her. Respondent Pilar fled a Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that the cause of action is barred by the Statute of Limitations which was opposed by the petitioners contending that their cause of action is for the malicious prosecution of Rosemarie. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss by respondent. Pilar fled an answer disclaiming petitioners allegation that she maltreated petitioner Rosemarie while the latter was being investigated by the police authorities. She posited that she was not present during the investigation. Petitioners fled a Reply reiterating that Pilar actually participated in the maltreatment of Rosemarie and she cannot deny her participation as she was always present in the police station during the investigation. RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the Complaint. In sustaining the respondents, the RTC said that the fling of the criminal complaint against petitioner Rosemarie was not prompted with a sinister design to vex, or humiliate her. The Court of Appeals afrmed the RTC in toto.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioners are entitled to damages for malicious prosecution.
RULING: Petitioners are NOT entitled to damages for malicious prosecution.
This Court has drawn the four elements that must be shown to concur to recover damages for malicious prosecution. For a malicious prosecution suit to prosper, the plaintif must prove the following: (1) the prosecution did occur, and the defendant was himself the prosecutor or that he instigated its commencement; (2) the criminal action fnally ended with an acquittal; (3) in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (4) the prosecution was impelled by legal malice -- an improper or a sinister motive. The gravamen of malicious prosecution is not the fling of a complaint based on the wrong provision of law, but the deliberate initiation of an action with the knowledge that the charges were false and groundless.
It is not disputed that the frst and second elements are present. The prosecution of petitioner Rosemarie for the crime of robbery did occur, and respondents Pilar, Ibarra and Juanito instigated its commencement. The trial court acquitted Rosemarie on the ground of insufciency of evidence. On the question of probable cause, the Court has ruled that for purposes of malicious prosecution, probable cause means such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. Thus, a fnding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufcient evidence to procure a conviction. RTC and the Court of Appeals found that there was no probable cause. During the investigation, Rosemarie admitted her participation to the robbery complained of. However, her admission was inadmissible because it was extracted under duress, which does not detract from the fact that based on petitioner Rosemaries admission, there was reason for the respondents to believe that the suit was not unfounded. Finally, in an action to recover damages based on malicious prosecution, it must be established that the prosecution was impelled by legal malice. There is necessity of proof that the suit was so patently malicious as to warrant the award of damages under Articles 19 to 21,of the Civil Code, or that the suit was grounded on malice or bad faith. Moreover, it is a doctrine well-entrenched in jurisprudence that the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution, for the law would not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. The Court found that there was no proof of a sinister design on the part of the respondents to vex or humiliate petitioner Rosemarie by instituting the criminal case against her and her co-accused. Respondent Pilar who was robbed of her valuable belongings can only be expected to bring the matter to the authorities. There can be no evil motive that should be attributed to one, who, as victim of a crime institutes the necessary legal proceedings. There was no other explanation or motive as to why respondents would institute baseless prosecution of petitioner Rosemarie. No evidence was shown that there was bad blood between respondent Pilar and petitioner Rosemarie prior to the supposed robbery.
37. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY v Ma. Victoria Jose (GR No. 152769, February 14, 2007)
FACTS: Victoria has been a MERALCO customer since 1987 with service address Quezon City. On July 14, 1995, Meralco Polyphase Inspector Santiago Inoferio visited the residence of Victoria to conduct an inspection. After inspection, Inoferio issued a Service Inspection Report where he stated that there was a burned out insulation. Inoferio recommended that Victorias billing be adjusted and her record updated. On October 3, 1995, Meralco issued to Victoria a diferential adjustment billing for P232,385.20. According to MERALCO, this defect caused the meter not to register the correct KWH consumption registering only 50% of the consumption. Victoria requested Meralco to reconsider its fnding on the ground that the defect was a fortuitous event and that it was due to the negligence of Meralco personnel that the defects were not earlier detected and repaired. Meralco did not accede to her request but ofered an installment payment scheme. Victoria refused to pay the billing adjustment. On November 21, 1995, she received from Meralco an Overdue Account Notice which contains a reminder that if she fails settle her account, they will disconnect her from their electric services. Victoria fled with RTC, Quezon City, a Complaint for Injunction with Damages and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. After trial, Victoria prevailed with an award Moral and Exemplary damages for P500,000.00 each and attorney's fees. Meralco appealed to CA which afrmed the trial court. ISSUE: Whether CA erred in holding that MERALCO is liable for Moral and Exemplary damages And attorney's fees.
RULING: The Court ruled that the awarded moral and exemplary damages were excessive. It was reduced to P100,000.00 and P50,000.00.
Meralcos gross negligence* in the maintenance of its devices and equipment and its arbitrary issuance of a diferential billing to Victoria brought upon the latter much anxiety and aggravation. It should therefore be liable to her for moral damages. It should also be liable for exemplary damages to curb similar arbitrary practices. However, the Court found that the award of both damages to be excessive. Moral damages and exemplary damages are not intended to enrich the complainant in order to punish the defendant. Moral damages are for reparation of the spiritual status quo ante; a means to assuage the moral sufering of the complainant brought about by the culpable action of the defendant. The award of moral damages must then be commensurate to the sufering or proportionate to the wrong committed. An award of P100,000.00 approximates the anxiety sufered by Victoria. As to exemplary damages, the purpose in holding a defendant liable for it is deterrence. Meralco must curb its callousness toward its customers and its inattention to its duty of keeping its facilities and equipment well maintained. The Court hold that the award of P50,000.00 would sufce.
(*Meralco acknowledged that the standard precaution it should take in the maintenance of its electric meters is to subject the same to polyphase meter test twice every year. It appears, however, that with reference to Meter No. 31D551-57, the same was subjected to polyphase meter test for the frst time in 1995, or seven years from its installation in 1987. Such delay in inspection constitutes gross negligence on the part of Meralco in the maintenance of said electric meter; thus, it should bear sole liability for any loss arising from the defects in said meter, including any unregistered and unbilled electric consumption.)
38. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ROLANDO CABINAN G.R. No. 176158, March 27, 2007 FACTS: On December 13, 2000, between 9:00 oclock and 10:00 oclock in the evening, victim Eleuterio Lucas was having a drinking spree at his residence in upper Bigte, Norzagaray, Bulacan with a group that included his brother, his bestfriend and Orlando Cabinan, brother of the accused-appellant. A commotion broke out after an altercation ensued between Eleuterios bestfriend and Orlando Cabinan. Eleuterio tried to pacify them. Orlando then left the place and went to a nearby billiard hall where his brother, accused- appellant Rolando Cabinan, was playing billiards. Orlando told the accused-appellant about the fght and immediately, the two (2) brothers proceeded to the house of Eleuterio. When the Cabinan brothers reached Eleuterios house, Orlando had a fstfght with one of the guests of victim Eleuterio. Eleuterio again tried to difuse the fght, but accused-appellant Rolando threw the bottle of gin he was holding, hitting Eleuterio on the head. The bottle exploded due to the impact. Accused-appellant ran away after the explosion. Victim Eleuterio, on the other hand, was rushed to the hospital, but because of the injuries he sustained, he died at the East Avenue Medical Center in Quezon City. Only the accused-appellant testifed for his defense. He alleged that when he threw the bottle, it exploded to his own surprise. He then ran away from the scene of the fght. He also claims he had no intention of killing the victim when he threw the gin bottle at him; that he wanted to difuse the fght between Roberto and Eleuterio hence he threw the bottle, unaware that it contained explosives. The prosecution, along with the victims family, adamantly prays for damages and other civil indemnities. The lower courts found him guilty of Murder. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is liable for damages HELD: Accused-appellants claim that he did not know that the bottle of gin was actually an explosive fails to persuade. He admitted having been at the scene of the crime because his brother sought his help after a mauling incident in Liwasan, Norzagaray. Evidently, he went to the crime scene purposely to take vengeance for his brother. If he really wanted to stop a duel he witnessed when he arrived there, then he could have resorted to peaceful and reasonable means to achieve this purpose. The circumstances that, frst, the bottle of gin thrown against the victim turned out to be an explosive, and second, the victim was hit exactly in the head are clear indicators of the malicious intent of the accused-appellant. We agree with the trial court that appellant is guilty of murder. Appellants attack was treacherous; it was sudden and made from behind, catching the victim unaware and unable to defend himself. The heirs of the victim are entitled to the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, which is mandatory and is granted without need of any evidence or proof of damages other than the commission of the crime. They are likewise entitled to the award of moral damages in view of the violent death of the victim and the resultant grief of his family. The award of actual damages was without basis as the heirs of the victim failed to submit documentary evidence to substantiate their claim. In lieu thereof, temperate damages, in the amount of P25,000.00, must be awarded considering that it was established that Eleuterios family incurred expenses for his hospitalization and burial. Finally, exemplary damages should also have been awarded to the heirs of the victim since the qualifying circumstance of treachery was established by the prosecution. If a crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance, either qualifying or generic, an award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is justifed under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code. This kind of damage is intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrongdoings, and as a vindication of undue suferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct.
39. EMMANUEL B. AZNAR V. CITIBANK N.A. PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 164273, March 28, 2007 FACTS: Emmanuel B. Aznar (Aznar), a known businessman in Cebu, is a holder of a Preferred Master Credit Card (Mastercard) bearing number 5423-3920-0786-7012 issued by Citibank with a credit limit of P150,000.00. As he and his wife, Zoraida, planned to take their two grandchildren, Melissa and Richard Beane, on an Asian tour, Aznar made a total advance deposit of P485,000.00 with Citibank with the intention of increasing his credit limit toP635,000.00. With the use of his Mastercard, Aznar purchased plane tickets to Kuala Lumpur for his group worth P237,000.00. On July 17, 1994, Aznar, his wife and grandchildren left Cebu for the said destination. Aznar claims that when he presented his Mastercard in some establishments in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, the same was dishonored and when he tried to use the same in Ingtan Tour and Travel Agency (Ingtan Agency) in Indonesia to purchase plane tickets to Bali, it was again dishonored for the reason that his card was blacklisted by Citibank. Such dishonor forced him to buy the tickets in cash. He further claims that his humiliation caused by the denial of his card was aggravated when Ingtan Agency spoke of swindlers trying to use blacklisted cards. Aznar and his group returned to the Philippines on August 10, 1994. Aznar fled a motion to re-rafe the case alleging impartiality of the president judge. The new judge ruled in favor of Aznar. On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of CITIBANK and held that Aznar had no personal knowledge of the blacklisting of his card and only presumed the same when it was dishonored in certain establishments; that such dishonor is not sufcient to prove that his card was blacklisted. ISSUE: Whether or not Aznar has established his claim against CITIBANK in the case at bar HELD: Aznar failed to prove with a preponderance of evidence that CITIBANK blacklisted his card or place the same on the hot list. Aznar in his testimony admitted that he had no personal knowledge that his card was blacklisted by CITIBANK and only presumed such fact from the dishonor of his card. It is settled that in order that a plaintif may maintain an action for damages of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintif a concurrence of injury to the plaintif and legal responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law; thus there must frst be a breach before damages may be awarded and the breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of the injury. It is not enough that one merely sufered sleepless nights, mental anguish or serious anxiety as a result of the actuations of the other party. It is also required that a culpable act or omission was factually established, that proof that the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is shown as the proximate cause of the damage sustained by the claimant and that the case is predicated on any of the instances expressed or envisioned by Arts. 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code. In culpa contractual or breach of contract, moral damages are recoverable only if the defendant has acted fraudulently or in bad faith, or is found guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligations. The breach must be wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith, oppressive or abusive. While the Court commiserates with Aznar for whatever undue embarrassment he sufered when his credit card was dishonored by Ingtan Agency, especially when the agencys personnel insinuated that he could be a swindler trying to use blacklisted cards, the Court cannot grant his present petition as he failed to show by preponderance of evidence that Citibank breached any obligation that would make it answerable for said sufering. Petition denied. 40. PCIB v. Alejandro GR No. 175587 September 21, 2007 Facts: Respondent, a resident of Hong Kong, executed a promissory note in favor of petitioner. In view of the fuctuations in the foreign exchange rates which resulted in the insufciency of deposits assigned by respondent as security for the loan, petitioner requested the latter to put up additional security for the loan. Respondent, however, sought a reconsideration of said request pointing out petitioner's alleged mishandling of his account due to its failure to carry out his instructions. Subsequently, petitioner fled a Complaint for Sum of Money with prayer for issuance of a writ for preliminary attachment. The trial court granted the application and issued the writ ex parte. Respondent fled a motion to quash the writ contending that the withdrawal of his unassigned deposits was not fraudulent as it was approved by the petitioner. The trial court issued an order quashing the writ. Issue: WON petitioner is liable for damages for the improper issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment against respondent. Held: Petitioner is liable for damages. Anent the actual damages, the CA is correct in not awarding the same inasmuch as the respondent failed to establish the amount garnished by the petitioner. Nevertheless, nominal damages may be awarded to a plaintif whose right has been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing that right, and for indemnifying the plaintif for any loss sufered by him. In this case, the award of nominal damages is proper considering that the right of respondent to use his money has been violated by its garnishment. 41. Manelco v. TEAM electronics corporation GR No. 131723 December 13, 2007 Facts: Respondent TEAM enetered into a Contract of lease with respondent Ultra for the use of the former's DCIM building until September 1991. A year thereafter, a team of petitioner's inspectors conducted a surprise inspection of the electric meters installed in the DCIM building and found the same to be tampered with and did not register the actual power consumption of the building. Petitioner informed TEAM ofthe results and demanded for payment. TEAM referred the demand letter to ULtra which, in turn, informed TEAM that its Executive Vice President had already met with petitioner's representative. For failure to pay the diferential billing, petitioner disconnected the electricity of DCIM building. TEAM demanded for reconnection but petitioner refused to heed the demand. Issue: WON petitioner is liable for damages. Held: Actual damages are compensation for an injury that will put the injured party in the position where it was before the injury. They pertain to such injuries or losses that are actually sustained and susceptible of measurement. Basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, not only must the amount of loss be capable of proof; it must also be actually proven with a teasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or the best evidence obtainable. Despite the appellate court's conclusion that no tampering was committed, it held ultra solidarily liable with petitioner only because the former, as occupant of the building, promised to settle the claims of the latter. This ruling is erroneous. Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated, or compensatory damages. In this case, to serve as an example -- that before a disconnection of electrical supply can be efected by a public utility, the requisites of the law must be complied with -- we afrm the award of 200,000 as exemplary damages. 42. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY v. MATILDE MACABAGDAL RAMOY G.R. No. 158991, March 04, 2008 Facts: National Power Corporation (NPC) fled with the MTC Quezon City a case for ejectment against several persons allegedly illegally occupying its properties in Baesa, Quezon City. Among the defendants in the ejectment case was Leoncio Ramoy, one of the plaintifs in the case at bar. The court rendered judgment for the plaintif [MERALCO] and ordering the defendants to demolish or remove the building and structures they built on the land of the plaintif and to vacate the premises." NPC wrote Meralco requesting for the immediate disconnection of electric power supply to all residential and commercial establishments beneath the NPC transmission lines along Baesa, Quezon City. Hence, the electric service connection of the herein respondents was disconnected. During the ocular inspection ordered by the Court and attended by the parties, it was found out that the residence of Leoncio and Matilde Ramoy was indeed outside the NPC property. The record also shows that at the request of NPC, defendant Meralco re- connected the electric service of four customers previously disconnected none of whom was any of the plaintifs. The RTC decided in favor of MERALCO by dismissing herein respondents' claim for moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees. However, the RTC ordered MERALCO to restore the electric power supply of respondents.
Issues: (1) WON MERALCO is liable for damages; (2) WON respondents are entitled to moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees Held: (1) LIABILITY OF MERALCO Clearly, respondents' cause of action against MERALCO is anchored on culpa contractual or breach of contract for the latter's discontinuance of its service to respondents under Article 1170 of the Civil Code. MERALCO failed to exercise the utmost degree of care and diligence required of it. It was not enough for MERALCO to merely rely on the Decision of the MTC without ascertaining whether it had become fnal and executory. Verily, only upon fnality of said Decision can it be said with conclusiveness that respondents have no right or proper interest over the subject property, thus, are not entitled to the services of MERALCO. (2) MORAL DAMAGES, EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of moral sufering, mental anguish, fright and the like. Mere allegations do not sufce; they must be substantiated by clear and convincing proof. No other person could have proven such damages except the respondent himself as they were extremely personal to him. In Francisco vs. GSIS, the Court held that there must be clear testimony on the anguish and other forms of mental sufering. Thus, if the plaintif fails to take the witness stand and testify as to his/her social humiliation, wounded feelings and anxiety, moral damages cannot be awarded. Thus, only respondent Leoncio Ramoy, who testifed as to his wounded feelings, may be awarded moral damages. His co-respondents did not present any evidence of damages they sufered. With regard to exemplary damages, Article 2232 of the Civil Code provides that in contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant, in this case MERALCO, acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner, while Article 2233 of the same Code provides that such damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right and the adjudication of the same is within the discretion of the court. The Court fnds that MERALCO fell short of exercising the due diligence required, but its actions cannot be considered wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent. Records show that MERALCO did take some measures, i.e., coordinating with NPC ofcials and conducting a joint survey of the subject area, to verify which electric meters should be disconnected although these measures are not sufcient, considering the degree of diligence required of it. Thus, in this case, exemplary damages should not be awarded. Since the Court does not deem it proper to award exemplary damages in this case, then the CA's award for attorney's fees should likewise be deleted, as Article 2208 of the Civil Code states that in the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees cannot be recovered except in cases provided for in said Article. 43. B.F. METAL v. LOMOTAN G.R. No. 170813, April 16, 2008 Facts: In the morning of 03 May 1989, respondent Rico Umuyon was driving the owner- type jeep owned by respondents, Spouses Rolando and Linafor Lomotan. Suddenly, at the opposite lane, the speeding ten-wheeler truck driven by Onofre Rivera overtook a car by invading the lane being traversed by the jeep and rammed into the jeep. The jeep was a total wreck while Umuyon sufered injuries, which entailed his hospitalization for 19 days. Also in view of the injuries he sustained, Umuyon could no longer drive, reducing his daily income from P150.00 to P100.00. Respondents instituted a separate and independent civil action for damages against petitioner BF Metal Corporation and Rivera before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal. The complaint essentially alleged that defendant Riveras gross negligence and recklessness was the immediate and proximate cause of the vehicular accident and that petitioner failed to exercise the required diligence in the selection and supervision of Rivera. The complaint prayed for the award of actual, exemplary and moral damages and attorneys fees in favor of respondents Among the documentary evidence presented were the 1989 cost estimate of Pagawaan Motors, Inc., an auto-repair shop, which pegged the repair cost of the jeep at P96,000.00, and the cost estimate of Fajardo Motor Works done in 1993, which refected an increased repair cost at P130,655.00. The trial court rendered its decision, holding the defendants negligent and ordering them to pay the plaintifs P96,700.00 for cost of the owner-type jeep , P15,000.00 for medical expenses, P50,000.00 for loss of earnings as actual damages, plus moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Petitioner and Rivera appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which afrmed such decision but modifed the amount of damages awarded to respondents, increasing the award for actual damages to P130,655.00, for cost of repairing the owner- type jeep. Petitioner now assails the damages awarded by the appellate court. It argues that the best evidence obtainable to prove with a reasonable degree of certainty the value of the jeep is the acquisition cost or the purchase price of the jeep minus depreciation for one year of use equivalent to 10% of the purchase price. Issues: (1) whether the amount of actual damages based only on a job estimate should be lowered; (2) whether Spouses Lomotan are also entitled to moral damages; and (3) whether the award of exemplary damages and attorneys is warranted Held: To justify an award of actual damages, there must be competent proof of the actual amount of loss. Credence can be given only to claims which are duly supported by receipts. In the instant case, no evidence was submitted to show the amount actually spent for the repair or replacement of the wrecked jeep. Spouses Lomotan presented two diferent cost estimates to prove the alleged actual damage of the wrecked jeep. However, neither estimate is competent to prove actual damages. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages. As correctly pointed out by petitioner, the best evidence to prove the value of the wrecked jeep is refected in the Deed of Sale showing the jeeps acquisition cost at P72,000.00. An award of moral damages would require, frstly, evidence of besmirched reputation or physical, mental or psychological sufering sustained by the claimant; secondly, a culpable act or omission factually established; thirdly, proof that the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the damages sustained by the claimant; and fourthly, that the case is predicated on any of the instances expressed or envisioned by Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil Code. In culpa aquiliana, or quasi-delict, (a) when an act or omission causes physical injuries, or (b) where the defendant is guilty of intentional tort, moral damages may aptly be recovered. This rule also applies, as aforestated, to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. In culpa criminal, moral damages could be lawfully due when the accused is found guilty of physical injuries, lascivious acts, adultery or concubinage, illegal or arbitrary detention, illegal arrest, illegal search, or defamation. Undoubtedly, petitioner is liable for the moral damages sufered by respondent Umuyon. Its liability is based on a quasi-delict or on its negligence in the supervision and selection of its driver, causing the vehicular accident and physical injuries to respondent Umuyon. Rivera is also liable for moral damages to respondent Umuyon based on either culpa criminal or quasi-delict. Since the decision in the criminal case, which found Rivera guilty of criminal negligence, did not award moral damages, the same may be awarded in the instant civil action for damages. However, there is no legal basis in awarding moral damages to Spouses Lomotan whether arising from the criminal negligence committed by Rivera or based on the negligence of petitioner under Article 2180. Article 2219 speaks of recovery of moral damages in case of a criminal ofense resulting in physical injuries or quasi-delicts causing physical injuries, the two instances where Rivera and petitioner are liable for moral damages to respondent Umuyon. Article 2220 does speak of awarding moral damages where there is injury to property, but the injury must be willful and the circumstances show that such damages are justly due. There being no proof that the accident was willful, Article 2220 does not apply. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right; the court will decide whether or not they should be adjudicated. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintif must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. Spouses Lomotan have shown that they are entitled to compensatory damages while respondent Umuyon can recover both compensatory and moral damages. To serve as an example for the public good, the Court afrms the award of exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 to respondents. Because exemplary damages are awarded, attorneys fees may also be awarded in consonance with Article 2208 (1). The Court afrms the appellate courts award of attorneys fees in the amount of P25,000.00. 44. SESBRENO v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 161390, April 16, 2008 Facts: On January 26, 1970, Mrs. Rosario Sen and other camineros hired the petitioner to prosecute certain civil cases, evidenced by an Agreement, whereby they agreed to pay Atty. Raul H. Sesbreo, thirty (30%) percent of whatever back salaries, damages, etc. that they may recover in the mandamus and other cases that were fled, whether or not the said cases will be amicably settled or decided by the courts by fnal judgment. The camineros obtained favorable judgment when the Court of First Instance (now RTC) of Cebu ordered that they be reinstated to their original positions with back salaries, together with all privileges and salary adjustments or increases. Aggrieved, the Commissioner of Public Highways and the District Engineer fled certiorari cases before this Court where the petitioner willingly rendered further legal assistance and represented the camineros. The camineros, represented by the petitioner, and the province of Cebu, through then Gov. Eduardo R. Gullas, forged a Compromise Agreement, whereby the camineros waived their right to reinstatement embodied in the CFI decision and the province agreed that it immediately pay them their back salaries and other claims. Instead of complying with the court order directing partial payment, the province of Cebu directly paid the camineros the full amount of their adjudicated claims. Thus, petitioner fled the complaint for Damages (Thru Breach of Contract) and Attorneys Fees against the Province of Cebu, the provincial governor, treasurer, auditor, and engineer in their ofcial and personal capacities, as well as against his former clients (the camineros). He alleged that by directly paying the camineros the amounts due them, the respondents induced the camineros to violate their written contract for attorneys fees. He likewise claimed that they violated the compromise agreement approved by the Court by computing the camineros money claims based on the provincial instead of the national wage rate which, consequently, yielded a lower amount. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner and against the respondent province of Cebu, awarding damages to the former. On appeal, the CA reversed the trial courts decision and dismissed the complaint. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not respondents are liable for damages for breach of contract. Held: In the instant case, the petitioner rightly commenced an action against both his clients and the judgment debtors. However, at the instance of the petitioner himself, the complaint against his clients was withdrawn on the ground that he had settled his diferences with them. He maintained the case against respondents because, according to him, the computation of the camineros money claims should have been based on the national and not the provincial wage rate. Thus, petitioner insists that the respondents should be made liable for the diference. While the respondents may have impaired the petitioners charging lien by satisfying the judgment without regard for the lawyers right to attorneys fees, we cannot apply the doctrine enunciated in Calalang v. Judge de Borja, because of the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case. In Calalang, this Court stressed that the judgment debtor may be held responsible for his failure to withhold the amount of attorneys fees in accordance with the duly registered charging lien. However, there is a disparity between the two cases, because, in this case, the petitioner had withdrawn his complaint against the camineros with whom he had a contract for legal services. The withdrawal was premised on a settlement, which indicates that his former clients already paid their obligations. Having been paid by his clients in accordance with the agreement, his claim against the respondents, therefore, has no leg to stand on. 45. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. TORIBIO JABINIAO, JR. and JOHN DOE GR No. 179499; April 30, 2009
FACTS:
Private complainant Maria Divina Pasilang testifed that at around 1:00 a.m. of 27 August 1998, she and her husband, the deceased Ruben Pasilang, were sleeping in their house in Cugman, Cagayan de Oro City. They were awakened when Maria Divina felt someone kick her thighs. When she opened her eyes, she saw appellant Jabiniao, who was short and muscular, wearing a pair of short pants but without any shirt on, with a holster on his shoulder and a bonnet or ski mask on his face. He had a masked companion who stayed at the door outside their house, acting as a lookout. Appellant Jabiniao pointed his gun at Maria Divina and Ruben and demanded money from them. They were not able to say a word as they were both trembling in fear. Appellant Jabiniao ransacked the drawer for money and other belongings and took P2,000.00 and Maria Divina's shoulder bag. Appellant Jabiniao removed his mask, revealing his face. Jabiniano started touching the thighs of Maria Divina and when he was about to tie Rubens feet, the latter was able to resist the same. Jabiniano ran towards the door and gunshots rang out hitting Ruben in the chest causing his death. The lower court awarded in their favour moral damages in the sum of 75, 000 Pesos and to pay actual damages of 2, 000 Pesos and 12, 000 Pesos for funeral expenses and temperate damages for wake and 9 days prayer in the sum of 6, 000 Pesos and to pay the cost. The Court of Appeals likewise found him guilty but modifed the damages to be awarded: P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P14,000.00 as actual damages, P25,000.00 as exemplary damages and P6,000.00 as temperate damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not the civil liabilities adjudged against Jabiliano were proper. HELD: The amount of P75,000.00 for civil indemnity awarded by the trial court as afrmed by the Court of Appeals, is sustained. The award for civil indemnity is mandatory and is granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. The amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity is awarded only if the crime is qualifed by circumstances which warrant the imposition of the death penalty. Though the penalty imposed on appellant was reduced to reclusion perpetua, the civil indemnity to be awarded remains at P75,000.00. The decrease in the award of moral damages from 75,000 to 50,000 Pesos was proper in accordance with jurisprudence. As held by the Court of Appeals, moral damages are awarded in cases of violent deaths even in the absence of proof of mental and emotional sufering of the victim's heirs, because the violent and sudden death of a loved one invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim's family. The award of exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 was also proper. Exemplary damages may be imposed when the crime is committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. As held above, appellant Jabiniao's crime was aggravated by (1) the use of an unlicensed frearm; (2) commission of the crime in the dwelling of the victims; and (3) treachery. The Court of Appeals, however, should have added an award for loss of earning capacity. Maria Divina testifed that Ruben was earning P200.00 a day prior to his death. The daily income of P200.00 is equivalent to a gross annual income P48,000.00. The formula for unearned income is as follows: Life expectancy x [Gross Annual Income (G.A.I.) less Living expenses (50% G.A.I.)] where life expectancy = 2/3 x (80 - age of the deceased ) Thus, the unearned income of Ruben, who was 29 years old at the time of his death, is computed as follows: Unearned income = 2/3 (80-29) (P48,000.00-P24,000.00) = 2/3 (51) (P24,000.00) = P816,000.00 In lieu of actual damages for funeral and burial expenses, we award the amount of P25,000 as temperate damages. 46. Heirs of PURISIMA NALA v. ARTEMIO CABANSAG GR No. 161188, June 13, 2008
FACTS:
Artemio Cabansag (respondent) fled an action for damages in October 1991. According to respondent, he bought a 50-square meter property from spouses Eugenio Gomez, Jr. and Felisa Duyan Gomez on July 23, 1990. Said property is part of a 400-square meter lot registered in the name of the Gomez spouses. In October 1991, he received a demand letter from Atty. Alexander del Prado (Atty. Del Prado), in behalf of Purisima Nala (Nala), asking for the payment of rentals from 1987 to 1991 until he leaves the premises, as said property is owned by Nala, failing which criminal and civil actions will be fled against him. Another demand letter was sent on May 14, 1991. Because of such demands, respondent sufered damages and was constrained to fle the case against Nala and Atty. Del Prado.
The lower court ordered Nala and Atty. Del Prado to pay Cabansag P150,000.00 by way of moral damages, P30,000.00 by way of exemplary damages, and P20,000.00 for reasonable attorneys fees and litigation expenses. The Court of Appeals, still found in favour of Cabansag but ordered the defendants to pay the amount of P30,000.00 by way of moral damages. It further ordered to pay him exemplary damages in the amount of P10,000.00 and P10,000.00, attorney's fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not Nala and Atty. Del Prado must be held liable for the payment of damages.
HELD: No, they are not liable. In order to be liable for damages under the abuse of rights principle, the following requisites must concur: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. It should be stressed that malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil Code. In the present case, there is nothing on record which will prove that Nala and her counsel, Atty. Del Prado, acted in bad faith or malice in sending the demand letters to respondent. In the frst place, there was ground for Nala's actions since she believed that the property was owned by her husband Eulogio Duyan and that respondent was illegally occupying the same. She had no knowledge that spouses Gomez violated the trust imposed on them by Eulogio and surreptitiously sold a portion of the property to respondent. It was only after respondent fled the case for damages against Nala that she learned of such sale. The bare fact that respondent claims ownership over the property does not give rise to the conclusion that the sending of the demand letters by Nala was done in bad faith. Nala was acting well within her rights when she instructed Atty. Del Prado to send the demand letters. She had to take all the necessary legal steps to enforce her legal/equitable rights over the property occupied by respondent. One who makes use of his own legal right does no injury. Thus, whatever damages are sufered by respondent should be borne solely by him.
47. City Government of Tagaytay v. Hon Guerrero G.R. Nos140743 &140745 September 17, 2009
Nachura, J.:
Facts: Tagaytay-Taal Tourist Development Corporation (TTTDC) is the registered owner of two parcels of land situated at Tagaytay City. TTTDC incurred real estate delinquency which prompted City Government of Tagaytay to sold at public auction the said properties. Being the sole bidder, a certifcate of sale was issued in favor of City of Tagaytay. Later on, a new certifcate of title was entered in the name of petitioner. Subsequently, the two parcels of land was sold to Ameurfna Melencio-Herrera and Emilina Melencio-Fernando. Petitioner sought for the nullifcation of the public auction on the ground that City of Tagaytay did not acquire jurisdiction over the properties thus outside its taxing power. The Melencios,as purchasers fled motion for intervention but was denied as it was fled beyond the period allowed by law. RTC Cavite ruled in favor of TTTDC and the public auction was nullifed. Hence, the Melencios claimed for damages against petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not the Melencios are entitled with damages consequent to the deprivation of their properties.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the afrmative. The City of Tagaytay is liable to return the full amount paid by the Melencios during the auction sale of the subject properties by way of actual damages. Also,the gross negligence of the City of Tagaytay in levying taxes and auctioning properties to answer for real property tax defciencies outside its territorial jurisdiction amounts to bad faith that calls for the award of moral damages. Moral damages are meant to compensate the claimant for any physical sufering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injuries unjustly caused. Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral sufering the person has undergone, by reason of defendant's culpable action. The social standing of the aggrieved party is essential to the determination of the proper amount of the award. The Melencios are likewise entitled to exemplary damages. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated, or compensatory damages.62 Article 2229 of the Civil Code grants the award of exemplary or corrective damages in order to deter the commission of similar acts in the future and to allow the courts to mould behavior that can have grave and deleterious consequences to society.63 In the instant case, the gross negligence of the City of Tagaytay in erroneously exacting taxes and selling properties outside its jurisdiction, despite the clear mandate of statutory law, must be rectifed.
48. Engr. Dueas vs. Guce-Africa G.R. No. 165679 October 5, 2009
Del Castillo, J.:
Facts: Anticipating a reunion for the forthcoming wedding of her sister, respondent entered into a contract with petitioner fort he renovation of an ancestral house located in Lipa City Batangas into four-bedroom house. The contract is supposed to be completed on or before April 18, 1998, wedding day of her sister. However, on the said date, the renovation was not completed which prompted respondent to fle breach of contract against petitioner. To his defense, petitioner claimed that the delay in the construction of the house was due to circumstances beyond his control, namely heavy rains, observance of Holy Week, and celebration of barangay festa. Ultimately, he was not able to complete the project because on May 27, 1998, respondent went to his house and told him to stop the work. The trial court awarded actual damages of P100,000.00 for the necessary repair of the structure and 200,000.00 for the completion of the construction. Petitioner claimed that the award is improper for want of evidentiary proof.
Issue: Whether or not evidentiary proof is necessary before actual damages be granted.
Held: The Supreme court agreed with petitioner.Article 2199 of the Civil Code provides that "one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss sufered by him as he has duly proved." To be recoverable, actual damages must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be proved with reasonable degree of certainty. There must be competent proof of the actual amount of loss, and credence can be given only to claims which are duly supported by receipts. In this case the trial court merely relied on the testimonies of respondent and her witness. However, respondent is entitled to temperate damages. Temperate or moderate damage are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages which may be recovered when the court fnds that some pecuniary loss has been sufered but its amount can not, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty. In this case, respondent sustained damages due to the breach committed by the petitioner. The transfer of the venue of the wedding, the repair of the substandard work, and the completion of the house necessarily entailed expenses. The Supreme Court deemed it proper that an award of temperate damages equivalent to 20% of the original contract price of P500,000.00, or P100,000.00 is just and reasonable.
49. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co., etc. v. BA Finance Corp. and Malayan Insurance Co., Inc.
FACTS: Petitioner Bitanga obtained from respondent BA Finance Corporation a P329,280 loan to secure which, he mortgaged his car to respondent BA Finance. The mortgage provides that the mortgagor agrees to insure the said car against loss or damage with an insurance company acceptable to the mortgagee and that it will make all loss payable to the mortgagee or its assigns. Bitanga thus had the mortgaged car insured by respondent Malayan Insurance which issued a policy stipulating that the loss will be payable to BA Finance Corp.
The car was stolen. On Bitangas claim, Malayan Insurance issued a check payable to the order of B.A. Finance Corporation and Lamberto Bitanga for P224,500, drawn against China Bank. Without the indorsement of his co-payee BA Finance, Bitanga deposited the check to his account with the Metrobank. Bitanga subsequently withdrew the entire proceeds of the check.
Upon due of Bitangas loan, he failed to settle it despite demands. When BA Finance learned of the loss of the car and the issuance of check by Malayan Insurance, it demanded the payment of the check from Metrobank but to no avail. It then fled a complaint before the RTC for sum of money and damages against Metrobank and Bitanga alleging that it is entitled to the entire proceeds of the check.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner is liable for the full amount of the check.
HELD: Yes. Clearly, petitioner, through its employee, was negligent when it allowed the deposit of the crossed check, despite the lone endorsement of Bitanga, ostensibly ignoring the fact that the check did not, it bears repeating, carry the indorsement of BA Finance. As has been repeatedly emphasized, the banking business is imbued with public interest such that the highest degree of diligence and highest standards of integrity and performance are expected of banks in order to maintain the trust and confdence of the public in general in the banking sector. Undoubtedly, BA Finance has a cause of action against petitioner.
The provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Law and underlying jurisprudential teachings on the black-letter law provide defnitive justifcation for petitioners full liability on the value of the check. To be sure, a collecting bank, Metrobank in this case, where a check is deposited and which indorses the check upon presentment with the drawee bank, is an indorser. This is because in indorsing a check to the drawee bank, a collecting bank stamps the back of the check with the phrase all prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsement guaranteed and, for all intents and purposes, treats the check as a negotiable instrument, hence, assumes the warranty of an indorser. Without Metrobanks warranty, the drawee China Bank would not have paid the value of the subject check. Petitioner, as the collecting bank or last indorser, generally sufers the loss because it has the duty to ascertain the genuineness of all prior indorsements considering that the act of presenting the check for payment to the drawee is an assertion that the party making the presentment has done its duty to ascertain the genuineness of prior indorsements. Accordingly, one who credits the proceeds of a check to the account of the indorsing payee is liable in conversion to the non-indorsing payee for the entire amount of the check.
50. SUNBANUN vs. GO GR NO. 163280
FACTS: Respondent Aurora B. Go leased the entire ground foor of petitioners residential house for one year which was to expire on 7 July 1996. As required under the lease contract, respondent paid a deposit of P16,000 to answer for damages and unpaid rent. To earn extra income, respondent accepted lodgers, mostly her relatives, from whom she received a monthly income of P15,000. Respondent paid the monthly rental until March 1996 when petitioner drove away respondents lodgers by telling them that they could stay on the rented premises only until 15 April 1996 since she was terminating the lease. The lodgers left the rented premises by 15 April 1996, and petitioner then padlocked the rooms vacated by respondents lodgers. Respondent fled an action for damages against petitioner. Respondent alleged that she lost her income from her lodgers for the months of April, May, and June 1996 totaling P45,000. Respondent, who worked in Hongkong, also incurred expenses for plane fares and other travel expenses in coming to the Philippines and returning to Hongkong.
On the other hand, petitioner argued that respondent violated the lease contract when she subleased the rented premises. Besides, the lease contract was not renewed after its expiration on 7 July 1996; thus, respondent had no more right to stay in the rented premises.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner is liable for damages to respondent.
HELD: Yes. In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner ejected respondents lodgers three months before the expiration of the lease contract on 7 July 1996. Petitioner maintains that she had the right to terminate the contract prior to its expiration because respondent allegedly violated the terms of the lease contract by subleasing the rented premises. Petitioners assertion is belied by the provision in the lease contract which states that the lessee can use the premises as a dwelling or as lodging house. Furthermore the lease contract clearly provides that petitioner leased to respondent the ground foor of her residential house for a term of one year commencing from 7 July 1995. Thus, the lease contract would expire only on 7 July 1996.
However, petitioner started ejecting respondents lodgers in March 1996 by informing them that the lease contract was only until 15 April 1996. Clearly, petitioners act of ejecting respondents lodgers resulted in respondent losing income from her lodgers. Hence, it was proper for the trial court and the appellate court to order petitioner to pay respondent actual damages in the amount of P45,000.
51. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Sps. Heshan
FACTS: Respondent Edward Heshan purchased three (3) roundtrip tickets from petitioner Northwest Airlines, Inc. for their trip from Manila to St. Louis, Missouri, USA and back to attend an ice skating competition where then seven year old daughter, Dara was to participate.
After the ice skating event ended, the Heshans proceeded to the airport to take the connecting fight from St. Louis to Memphis on their way to Los Angeles. At the airport, the Heshans frst checked-in their luggage at the airports curbside check-in near the entrance. When the check-in counter opened, Edward took to the line where he was second in the queue but he was asked to step aside and wait to be called again.
After all the other departing passengers were given their boarding passes, the Heshans were told to board the plane without any boarding pass given to them and to just occupy open seats therein. Inside the plane, there was only one seat available which was occupied by Dara, and the spouses Heshans were directed to occupy two folding seats. To respondents, the two folding seats were crew seats intended for the stewardesses.
Upset that there were not enough passenger seats for them, the Heshans complained to the cabin crew about the matter but were told that if they did not like to occupy the seats, they were free to disembark from the plane which they did. The Heshans were later endorsed to and carried by Trans World Airways to Los Angeles. Respondents sent a letter to petitioner to demand indemnifcation for the breach of contract of carriage. Petitioner replied that respondents were prohibited to board the fight for verbally abusing the fight crew. As their demand remained unheeded, respondents fled a complaint for breach of contract with damages at the RTC of Quezon City.
ISSUE: WON petitioner Northwest Airlines, Inc. is liable for moral and exemplary damages to respondent.
HELD: Yes. The petition fails. An examination of the evidence presented by petitioner shows that it consisted only of depositions of its witnesses. It had in its possession and disposition pertinent documents such as the fight manifest and the planes actual seating capacity and layout which could have clearly refuted respondents claims that there were not enough passenger seats available for them. It inexplicably failed to ofer even a single piece of documentary evidence. The Court thus believes that if at least the cited documentary evidence had been produced, it would have been adverse to petitioners case.
Petitioner failed to satisfactorily explain why it did not issue boarding passes to respondents who were confrmed passengers, even after they had checked-in their luggage three hours earlier. That respondents did not reserve seats prior to checking-in did not excuse the non-issuance of boarding passes.
Nonetheless, the petition is in part meritorious. There is a need to substantially reduce the moral damages awarded by the appellate court. While courts are given discretion to determine the amount of damages to be awarded, it is limited by the principle that the amount awarded should not be palpably and scandalously excessive. 52. Oceaneering Contractors (Phils.) Inc. V. Barreto G.R. No. 184215 February 9, 2011 PEREZ, J.:
Facts: Nestor N. Barretto (Barretto), doing business under the name and style of N.N. B. Lighterage,) entered into a Time Charter Agreement with petitioner Oceaneering Contractors (Phils.), Inc whereby the latter hired the barge of petitioner for the purpose of transporting construction. On 5 December 1997, Barrettos Bargeman, Eddie La Chica, executed a Marine Protest,reporting that the barge capsized in the vicinity of Cape Santiago, Batangas. Barretto fled a complaint for damages against Oceaneering contending that the accident was attributable to the incompetence and negligence. Oceaneering, on the other hand, averred that the accident was caused by the negligence of Barrettos employees and the dilapidated hull of the barge which rendered it unseaworthy. Oceaneering prayed for the grant of its counterclaims for the value of its cargo in the sum of P4,055,700.00, salvaging expenses in the sum of P125,000.00, exemplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses. The RTC rendered a decision, dismissing both Barrettos complaint and Oceaneerings counterclaims for lack of merit. On appeal, CA held that the agreement executed by the parties, by its express terms, was a time charter where the possession and control of the barge was retained by Barretto; that the latter is, therefore, a common carrier legally charged with extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by him; and, that the sinking of the vessel created a presumption of negligence and/or unseaworthiness which Barretto failed to overcome and gave rise to his liability for Oceaneerings lost cargo despite the latters failure to insure the same. Applying the rule, however, that actual damages should be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty, the CA denied Oceaneerings claim for the value of its lost cargo and merely ordered the refund of the P306,000.00 it paid for the time charter, with indemnity for attorneys fees in the sum of P30,000.
ISSUES: (1)WON THE CA ERRED IN DENYING OCEANEERINGS COUNTERCLAIMS FOR ACTUAL DAMAGES AMOUNTING TO (A) P3,704,700.00 REPRESENTING THE VALUE OF THE MATERIALS IT LOST DUE TO THE SINKING OF [BARRETOS] BARGE; AND (b) P125,000.00 REPRESENTING THE EXPENSES IT INCURRED FOR SALVAGING ITS CARGO.
(2)WON THE CA ERRED IN AWARDING OCEANEERINGS COUNTERCLAIM FOR ATTORNEYS FEES IN THE REDUCED AMOUNT OF P30,000.00 ONLY.
HELD: In fnding Oceaneerings petition impressed with partial merit, uppermost in our mind is the fact that actual or compensatory damages are those damages which the injured party is entitled to recover for the wrong done and injuries received when none were intended. Pertaining as they do to such injuries or losses that are actually sustained and susceptible of measurement, they are intended to put the injured party in the position in which he was before he was injured. Insofar as actual or compensatory damages are concerned, Article 2199 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides as follows:
Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss sufered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.
Conformably with the foregoing provision, the rule is long and well settled that there must be pleading and proof of actual damages sufered for the same to be recovered.In addition to the fact that the amount of loss must be capable of proof, it must also be actually proven with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or the best evidence obtainable. The burden of proof of the damage sufered is, consequently, imposed on the party claiming the same who should adduce the best evidence available in support thereof, like sales and delivery receipts, cash and check vouchers and other pieces of documentary evidence of the same nature
Applying the just discussed principles to the case at bench, we fnd that Oceaneering correctly fault the CA for not granting its claim for actual damages. The court inclined to grant only the items which were duly proved by the vouchers and receipts on record which sums all add up to of P2,577,620.00 from which should be deducted the sum of P351,000.00 representing the value of the nine steel pipes salvaged by Oceaneering, or a total of P2,226,620.00 in actual damages representing the value of the latters lost cargo. Although included in its demand letters as aforesaid and pleaded in its answer, Oceaneerings claim for salvaging expenses in the sum of P125,000.00 cannot, likewise, be granted for lack of credible evidence to support the same.
The Court also fnd that the CA erred in awarding the full amount of P306,000.00 in favor of Oceaneering, as and by way of refund of the consideration it paid Barretto for the Time Charter Agreement. Aside from not being clearly pleaded in the answer it fled a quo, said refund was claimed in Oceaneerings demand letters only to the extent of the unused charter payment in the reduced sum of P224,400.00 which, to our mind, should be the correct measure of the award.
For lack of sufcient showing of bad faith on the part of Barretto, we fnd that the CA, fnally, erred in granting Oceaneerings claim for attorneys fees. The rule is settled that there can be no recovery of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation other than judicial costs except in the instances enumerated under Article 2208 of the Civil Code. Being the exception rather than the rule,attorneys fees are not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit,in view of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. 53. G.R. No. 170071 March 9, 2011 HEIRS OF JOSE MARCIAL K. OCHOA vs. G & S TRANSPORT CORPORATION, G.R. No. 170125 G & S TRANSPORT CORPORATION vs.HEIRS OF JOSE MARCIAL K. OCHOA, DEL CASTILLO, J.: FACTS: Jose Marcial K. Ochoa rode a taxicab, driven by Bibiano Padilla Jr. and owned by defendant coporation. While going up the Boni Serrano (Santolan) fy-over, it overtook another cab driven by Pablo Clave and tried to pass a ten-wheeler cargo truck. Because of the narrow space between the left side railing of the fy-over and the ten-wheeler truck, the Avis cab was unable to pass and because of its speed, Padilla was unable to control it. Padilla turned the wheel to the left causing his taxicab to ram the railing throwing itself of the fy-over and fell on the middle surface of EDSA below. Ochoa was declared dead on arrival from the accident. The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the heirs. Padilla failed to employ reasonable foresight, diligence and care needed to exempt G & S from liability for Jose Marcials death. The CA found insufcient the evidence adduced by G & S to support its claim that it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. However, with respect to the award of P6,537,244.96 for Jose Marcials loss of earning capacity, the CA declared the same unwarranted. It found the Certifcation22 issued by Jose Marcials employer, as self-serving, unreliable, and biased. The CA noted that same is unsupported by competent evidence such as income tax returns or receipts. Anent moral damages, the CA found the award of P300,000.00 excessive and thus reduced the same to P200,000.00 as to make it proportionate to the award of exemplary damages which is P50,000.00. ISSUE: WON the CA erred in declaring that the award of the heirs claim for lost earning is unwarranted and whether the award of moral damages is proper. HELD: The CA in this case deleted the award for lost income after it found the USAID Certifcation to be self-serving and unreliable. The Court disagrees. A research on USAID reveals that it is the "principal [United States] agency to extend assistance to countries recovering from disaster, trying to escape poverty, and engaging in democratic reforms."48 It is an "independent federal government agency that receives over-all foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of the State [of the United States]."49 Given this background, it is highly improbable that such an agency will issue a certifcation containing unreliable information regarding an employees income. Besides, there exists a presumption that ofcial duty has been regularly performed.50 Absent any showing to the contrary, it is presumed that the Chief of Human Resources Division of USAID, has regularly performed his duty relative to the issuance of said certifcation and therefore, the correctness of its contents can be relied upon. Verily, the USAID certifcation cannot be said to be self-serving because it does not refer to an act or declaration made out of court by the heirs themselves as parties to this case.1awphi1 While the trial court applied the formula generally used by the courts to determine net earning capacity, we, however, fnd incorrect the amount of P6,537, 244.96 arrived at. The award should be P6,611,634.59. As to the award of Moral damages, it should be noted that Moral and exemplary damages are based on diferent jural foundations.57 They are diferent in nature and require separate determination.58 The amount of one cannot be made to depend on the other. Under this circumstance, we thus fnd as sufcient and "somehow proportional to and in approximation of the sufering inficted"61 an award of moral damages in an amount of P100,000.00. 54. RICARDO B. BANGAYAN vs. RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION AND PHILIP SARIA G.R. No. 149193 April 4, 2011 Ponente: SERENO, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Bangayan had a savings account and a current account with one of the branches of respondent Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC). Bangayan purportedly signed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement with respondent RCBC in favor of nine corporations. Under the Surety Agreement, the funds in petitioner Bangayans accounts with RCBC would be used as security to guarantee any existing and future loan obligations, advances, credits/increases and other obligations, including any and all expenses that these corporations may incur with respondent bank. Bangayan contests the veracity and due authenticity of the Agreement on the ground that his signature thereon was not genuine, and that the agreement was not notarized. Respondent RCBC refutes this claim.
Then occurred diferent transactions between RCBC with other entities in relation to the Surety Agreement. RCBC issued commercial letters of credit in favor of diferent corporations. Mr. Lao, of RCBC, claimed that the bank would not have extended the letters of credit in favor of the three corporations without petitioner Bangayan acting as surety. After all the transactions in relation to the letters of credit issued by RCBC in relation to the Surety Agreement, Bangayans account was depleted.
Two of the seven checks that were drawn against petitioner Bangayans Current Account were presented for payment to respondent RCBC were returned by respondent RCBC with the notation "REFER TO DRAWER. Five other checks of petitioner Bangayan were presented for payment to respondent RCBC. These fve checks were dishonored by respondent RCBC on the ground that they had been drawn against insufcient funds ("DAIF") and were likewise returned.
Thus, Bangayan, demanded that respondent bank restore all the funds to his account and indemnify him for damages. Bangayan fled a complaint for damages against respondent RCBC. In its defense, RCBC claims that Bangayan signed a Surety Agreement in favor of several companies that defaulted in their payment of customs duties that resulted in the imposition of a lien over the accounts. Also, it funded a letter of credit of Lotec Marketing with the account of petitioner Bangayan, who agreed to guarantee Lotec Marketings obligations under the Surety Agreement; and, that the bank applied Bangayans deposits to satisfy part of Lotec Marketings obligation which resulted in the depletion of the bank accounts.
ISSUE: Whether respondent RCBC was justifed in dishonoring the checks, and, consequently, whether petitioner Bangayan is entitled to damages arising from the dishonor.
HELD: Yes. RCBC was justifed in dishonoring the checks. Bangayan is not entitled to damages.
Whatever damage to petitioner Bangayans interest or reputation from the dishonor of the seven checks was a consequence of his agreement to act as surety for the corporations and their failure to pay their loan obligations, advances and other expenses.
First, there was no malice or bad faith on the part of respondent RCBC in the dishonor of the checks, since its actions were justifed by petitioner Bangayans obligations under the Surety Agreement. Both the trial and the appellate courts gave credence to the Surety Agreement, which categorically guaranteed the four corporations obligations to respondent RCBC under the letters of credit. As petitioner failed to discharge his burden of demonstrating that his signature was forged, there being no positive and convincing evidence to prove such fact, there is no reason to overturn the factual fndings of the lower courts with respect to the genuineness and due execution of the Surety Agreement. Second, the mere absence of notarization does not necessarily render the Surety Agreement invalid. Third, that the annex of the Surety Agreement does not bear petitioner Bangayans signature is not a sufcient ground to invalidate the main agreement altogether. Fourth, petitioner Bangayan never contested the existence of the Surety Agreement prior to the fling of the Complaint. It must be also be emphasized that petitioner Bangayan did not complain against the four corporations which had beneftted from his bank account.
With respect to the frst two dishonored checks, respondent RCBC had already put on hold petitioner Bangayans account to answer for the customs duties being demanded from the bank by the BOC. On the other hand, the fve other checks were subsequently dishonored because petitioner Bangayans account was by that time already depleted due to the partial payment of Lotec Marketings loan obligation. Under Articles 2199 and 2200 of the Civil Code, actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of or in recompense for loss or injury sustained. They proceed from a sense of natural justice and are designed to repair the wrong that has been done.
In all seven dishonored checks, respondent RCBC properly exercised its right as a creditor under the Surety Agreement to apply the petitioner Bangayans funds in his accounts as security for the obligations of the four corporations under the letters of credit. Thus, petitioner Bangayan cannot attribute any wrong or misconduct to respondent RCBC since there was no malice or bad faith on the part of respondent in dishonoring the checks. Any damage to petitioner arising from the dishonor of those checks was brought about, not by the banks actions, but by the corporations that defaulted on their obligations that petitioner had guaranteed to pay. The trial and the appellate courts, therefore, committed no reversible error in disallowing the award of damages to petitioner. 55. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. GILBERTO VILLARICO, SR., GILBERTO VILLARICO, JR., JERRY RAMENTOS, AND RICKY VILLARICO G.R. No. 158362 April 4, 2011 Ponente: BERSAMIN, J.
FACTS: The Court of Appeals (CA) found Gilberto Villarico, Sr., Gilberto Villarico, Jr., Jerry Ramentos, and Ricky Villarico guilty of murder for the killing of Haide Cagatan, and imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua on each of them, thereby modifying the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 16, in Tangub City that had pronounced them guilty of homicide aggravated by dwelling. ISSUE: Whether or not the civil liability of the respondents has been properly set forth. HELD: No. The civil liability must be modifed to accord with pertinent law and jurisprudence. There is no question that the CA justly pronounced all the four accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, and punished them with reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 63, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code, considering the absence of any generic aggravating circumstance. However, the CA did not explain why it did not review and revise the grant by the RTC of civil liability in the amount of only P50,000.00. Thereby, the CA committed a plainly reversible error for ignoring existing laws, like Article 2206 of the Civil Code, which prescribes a death indemnity separately from moral damages, and Article 2230 of the Civil Code, which requires exemplary damages in case of death due to crime when there is at least one aggravating circumstance; and applicable jurisprudence. Plain oversight might have caused both the RTC and the CA to lapse into the serious omissions. Nonetheless, a rectifcation should now be made, for, indeed, gross omissions, intended or not, should be eschewed. Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, we grant to the heirs of Haide P75,000.00 as death indemnity; P75,000.00 as moral damages; and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. As clarifed in People v. Arbalate, damages in such amounts are to be granted whenever the accused are adjudged guilty of a crime covered by Republic Act No. 7659, like the murder charged and proved herein. Indeed, the Court, observed in numerous cases it has previously decided that the "principal consideration for the award of damages is the penalty provided by law or imposable for the ofense because of its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the ofender. The litmus test, therefore, in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character of the crime committed, which would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty, regardless of whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua. 56. Phil. Savings Bank v. Sps. Castillo (G.R. No. 193178, May 30,2011) FACTS: Respondent spouses Alfredo Castillo and Elizabeth Capati-Castillo and Romeo Capati and Aquilina Lobo obtained a loan with real estate mortgage over their respective properties from petitioner Philippine Savings Bank, as evidenced by a Promissory Note. From the release of the loan in May 1997 until December 1999, petitioner had increased and decreased the rate of interest with notifcation of such in writing to the respondents. While the respondents neither gave their confrmation thereto nor did they formally question the changes, respondent Alfredo Castillo nevertheless requested petitioner in writing for the reduction of the interest rates to which the latter denied. When respondents defaulted in their payment in December 1999 due to fnancial constraints, petitioner initiated an extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the mortgaged properties with the latter as the only bidder. Thereafter, the respondents failed to redeem the property within the redemption period. As such, the respondents fled a case for Reformation of Instruments, Declaration of Nullity of Notarial Foreclosure Proceedings and Certifcate of Sale, Cancellation of Annotations on TCT Nos. 233242 and 227858, and Damages. The CA afrmed with modifcations the ruling of the RTC in favor of the respondents. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents are entitled to an award of damages. HELD: NO. Moral damages are not recoverable simply because a contract has been breached. They are recoverable only if the party from whom it is claimed acted fraudulently or in bad faith or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligations. The breach must be wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith, and oppressive or abusive. Likewise, a breach of contract may give rise to exemplary damages only if the guilty party acted in a fraudulent or malevolent manner.
In this case, the Court is not sufciently convinced that fraud, bad faith, or wanton disregard of contractual obligations can be imputed to petitioner simply because it unilaterally imposed the changes in interest rates, which can be attributed merely to bad business judgment or attendant negligence. Bad faith pertains to a dishonest purpose, to some moral obliquity, or to the conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty attributable to a motive, interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Respondents failed to sufciently establish this requirement. Thus, the award of moral and exemplary damages is unwarranted.
57. People of the Phils. v. Rosendo Rebucan y Lamsin (G.R. No. 182551, July 27, 2011)
FACTS: Accused-appellant Rosendo Rebucan was charged with the crime of double murder for allegedly assaulting Felipe Lagera and Ranil Tagpis with the use of a long bolo, thereby inficting upon the latter wounds which caused their death.
After trial, the RTC convicted accused-appellant of the crime of double murder and awarded damages to the heirs of the victims. On appeal, in addition to the damages that were reduced by the CA, exemplary damages were also awarded. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the award of damages by the lower court is proper.
HELD: YES. Anent the award of damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases.
Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. Similarly, moral damages may be awarded by the court for the mental anguish sufered by the heirs of the victim by reason of the latters death. The purpose for making such an award is not to enrich the heirs of the victim but to compensate them for injuries to their feelings. The award of exemplary damages, on the other hand, is provided under Articles 2229-2230 of the Civil Code.
Thus, the Court afrms the Court of Appeals award of damages. In lieu of actual or compensatory damages, the Court further orders the award of P25,000.00 temperate damages to the heirs of the two victims in this case. Such award of damages in homicide or murder cases is proper when no evidence of burial and funeral expenses is presented in the trial court. Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered, as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victim sufered pecuniary loss, although the exact amount was not proven. 58. People vs evangelio gallo G.R. No. 124736. September 29, 1999 Facts : Gallo and three others entered the house of bbb and ccc without consent and against the will of the occupants. At that time bbb and ccc are out of their house, only the household helper aaa and eveyn tutoring her niece were present. The 4 accused tied the housemates. The household helper aaa was brought to the comfort room and the aggressors tried to have carnal knowledge of her. As she tried to evade the rape her head was slammed over the concrete wall causing her to lose consciousness. When she regained consciousness she was already in pain and her vagina bleeding as a result of the rape committed when she was unconscious. a case of robbery with rape was fled against gallo and conspirators . the trial court found them guilty and sentenced them to death and ordered to pay damages. Court of appeals modifed the sentence to reclusion perpetua in view of the abolition of death penalty
ISSUE WHETHER OR NOT AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES TO THE OWNER OF THE HOUSE WHO WERE NOT AROUND THE HOUSE WHEN CRIME COMMITTED IS PROPER
HELD the owners of house bbb and ccc are entitled frst to restitution of the things stolen under restitution, only when it is impossible that the appellants shall pay the value of the things stolen. They are also not entitled to moral damages as there is no showing that they sufered moral shock, moral anguish, moral sufering, social humiliation, besmirch reputation or wounded feelings. AAA as rape victim shall be entitled as under existing jurisprudence for civil damages of 75,000, and moral damages of 75,000 and exemplary damages of 30,000 without her being required to prove it as in ordinary cases provided the case of rape is established against the accused Evelyn shall not be entitled to award because she was not included as a party in the criminal complaint and it would be violative of the due process as to the accused if it be allowed
59 Development bank vs traverse development corporation G.R. No. 169293 Facts: traverse obtained a real estate mortgage from dbp amounting to p910,000 which amount traverse would use for the construction of a three story building in a lot it owned in tarlac. To secure the loan traverse mortgaged the land upon which the building is to be constructed. DCP also required traverse to acquire fre insurance which it did. The property was insured under FGU insurance but was later changed to Central for the same amount of 1 million upon nearing of the expiration allegedly for the convenience of DBP. Fire razed the property. Traverse reported it, requested necessary investigation and claimed the proceeds of the insurance policy but central refused and answered that there was no total destruction instead asserts to pay only expenses for repair. Due to the refusal and delay of Central, Traverse fled a case for damages against central. Traverse also impleaded as co-defendant DBP allegedly for latters act or omission that compelled traverse to litigate. Accordingly, the RTC and CA sustained the case in favour of traverse and ordered central to pay the amount of 1 million to DBP and latter to extinguish the obligation under loan of traverse. It further ordered Central to pay nominal damages and for Central and DBP to be solidarily liable for attys fee and cost of litigation. DBP now, thru special civil action of certiorari, claims that the judge committed grave abuse of discretion for making DBP soidarily liable for attys fee and cost of litigation because evidence does not show that its acts and omissions compelled traverse to litigate
Issue: whether DBP shall be solidarily liable for attys fee and cost of litigation
Held: No. Liability for attys fees and cost of litigation remains to be exception and cannot be awarded absent clear facts and legal and equitable justifcation that indeed there was and act or omission on part of a party attended with bad faith that compelled the other party to litigate for the protection of his interest
Evidence does not show that there was an act/ omission of DBP that was accompanied by bad faith that in efect compelled traverse to litigate. Contrary to what traverse allege, DBP exerted reasonable efort by arranging meetings between the insurer and traverse and also blacklisted central.