EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-31864. September 29, 1972.]

THE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION OF EL DEPOSITO, BARRIO CORAZON DE JESUS, SAN JUAN,
RIZAL, represented by its President NAPOLEON VILORIA, PANTALEON PENARANDA, JULIAN
PENARANDA, PILAR DEL PILAR, MIGUEL POMPERADA, ESTER PORRAS, TEODULO ROBLANDO,
PABLO RELATO, ABRAHAM REMPULA, HUGO ROBETO, ASUNCION REYES, ERNESTO SALAZAR,
FEDERICO SALAZAR, JUANITO SALLEGUE, SAMONTE NESTOR, BEN SANTOS, ELEUTERIA SANTOS,
DOMINGO SARMOY, CORA SASTRE, TRANSFIGURACION SOMBE, PEDRO SUBONG, IGMEDIO
TAMBONG, SALVADOR TERUEL, ALFREDO TORRES, CELSO TORRES, ROQUE TUMAMPIL, TITA
TUTANES, CATALINA UNANA, DIONISIA VIGIL, ASUNCION VILLANUEVA, DELMO VILLANUEVA,
JOSE VILORIA, JR., BENIGNO VIRAY, DOMINADOR WINDECA, SALVADOR YULO, JOSUE DAGON,
FELIPE TORRENTE, LEON LUCAS, JACINTO PASCUAL, and THREE HUNDRED SIXTY ONE OTHER
MEMBERS, THE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION OF EL DEPOSITO, BARRIO HALO HALO, SAN JUAN,
RIZAL, represented by its President AQUILINO BELO, JUAN GARCIA, GREGORIO GARCIA, PABLO
REANO, DOMINADOR TIBAR, GERONIMO LAZARRAGA, and ONE HUNDRED THIRTY OTHER
MEMBERS, Petitioners, v. HON. GUARDSON LOOD, Judge of The Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch VI, Pasig, Rizal, THE MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN, RIZAL, MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SAN
JUAN, MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF SAN JUAN, RIZAL, ENGINEERING DISTRICT OF RIZAL, ACTING
THRU NICOLAS ALDANA, ENGINEER II, Pasig, Rizal, Respondents.

H. A. Jambora, for Petitioners.

Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting Assistant Solicitor General Dominador L. Quiroz and
Solicitor Santiago M. Kapunan for Respondents.


SYLLABUS


1. REMEDIAL LAW; INJUNCTIONS: ISSUANCE THEREOF DISCRETIONARY WITH COURT; REFUSAL TO ISSUE
WRIT IN INSTANT CASE, NOT ABUSE OF DISCRETION. Where the petitioners houses were built upon
land of the Metropolitan Water District, admittedly a public land to which petitioners have no right to
possession of, and their shanties pose a veritable danger to public health, respondent court, in issuing its
orders denying the motion for a writ of preliminary injunction allegedly "to maintain the status quo" and stay
demolition and removal of their houses and structures found to be public nuisance per se and serious
hazards to public health and welfare, committed no error, much less abuse of authority or discretion,
grave or otherwise.

2. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; NUISANCE PER SE; ABATEMENT WITHOUT JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS.
Petitioners constructions which have been duly found to be public nuisance per se (without provision for
accumulation or disposal of waste matters and constructed without building permits contiguously to and
therefore liable to pollute one of the main water pipelines which supplies potable water to the Greater Manila
area) may be abated without judicial proceedings under our Civil Code.


D E C I S I O N


PER CURIAM:



Petitioners filed on April 15, 1970 this action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to set
aside respondent courts questioned orders dated February 9, 1970 and March 30, 1970 denying petitioners
motions for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to stay the demolition and removal of their houses
and structures on a parcel of public land in barrios Corazon de Jesus and Halo Halo in San Juan, Rizal,
(more popularly known as "El Deposito" from the Spanish times), pending final outcome of Civil Case No.
11078 filed by them before respondent court.

Petitioners action below was one for declaratory relief to declare as null and void as ex post facto
legislation, municipal ordinance No. 89, as amended, of respondent Municipality of San Juan, prohibiting
squatting on public property and providing a penalty therefor, under which ordinance, petitioners claimed,
respondents were summarily demolishing and removing their houses and improvements.

On April 20, 1970, upon issuance of summons requiring respondents to answer the petition, the Court
issued a temporary restraining order restraining respondents, until further orders, "from proceeding with
the summary destruction, removal and demolition of all other houses found in the premises of the land in
barrio Corazon de Jesus and barrio Halo Halo, San Juan, Rizal, by reason of Ordinance No. 89-Amd. as
amended, passed by the Municipal Council of San Juan, Rizal, on April 26, 1968 . . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

Respondents filed their answer in due course and the case was thereafter submitted for decision with the
filing by the parties of their respective memoranda in lieu of oral argument.

As restated by petitioners themselves in their memorandum, the main issue at bar is whether respondent
judge "exceeded his authority and jurisdiction and gravely abused his discretion" 1 in issuing the questioned
orders of February 9, and March 30, 1970, denying the preliminary injunction sought to stay demolition and
removal of petitioners houses and structures. Petitioners raise as issues also the issue of validity and
constitutionality of municipal ordinance No. 89-Amended as questioned by them in their action below, and
whether respondent Engineer may remove or demolish their houses without a special court demolition order
under said challenged ordinance; and furthermore, "whether the filing of the petition for compulsory
registration in LRC Cad. Case No. N-6, LRC Cad. Rec. No. N-511 which placed in issue the status of the land
as demanded for reasons of public interest where the houses and other improvements of the petitioners as
claimants in the cadastral proceeding are found, precludes the enforcement of municipal ordinance No. 89-
Amd." 2

Subsequent events have cleared up the matter of this last issue as to the alleged pendency of a petition in
petitioners favor for compulsory registration of the land in question, as shown by proceedings held in the
Rizal court of first instance and this Court as hereinafter recounted.

A motion to reopen the cadastral proceeding 3 was filed under date of August 2, 1971 by petitioners as
claimants, citing the passage on June 19, 1971 of Republic Act No. 6236 which extended the time limit (not
to extend beyond December 31, 1976) for filing of applications for free patents and for judicial confirmation
of imperfect and incomplete titles to public agricultural lands.

The court of first instance of Rizal, Branch I, presided by Judge Emilio V. Salas had denied such reopening of
the proceedings as per its order dated August 20, 1971, "it appearing that the instant case was dismissed
without prejudice in our order dated April 6, 1970, which order was affirmed by the Supreme Court in its
resolution in G.R. No. L-32156 dated August 10, 1970, which became final and executory since September
1, 1970." 4

Petitioners-claimants motion for reconsideration, notwithstanding withdrawal of the opposition of
respondent municipality of San Juan, Rizal, was denied in the Rizal court of first instances order dated
November 16, 1971.

A special civil action for certiorari and mandamus was then filed on December 13, 1971 by petitioners-
claimants and docketed as Case L-34438 of this Court. 5 Said action was dismissed for lack of merit per the
Courts resolution therein of December 16, 1971. Reconsideration was denied for lack of merit per the
Courts resolution of May 23, 1972, after the Court had received the comment of the therein respondent
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System, (as successor-in-interest of Nawasa) asserting its
ownership of the property since its survey in 1910 as conducted for the Metropolitan Water District
(predecessor-in-interest of Nawasa) and approved by the Director of Lands. In its comment, said therein
respondent MWSS further averred that within the property which had been declared for taxation purposes in
the name of the old Metropolitan Water District (with a total area of 132,597 square meters, of which
14,138 square meters are used for public roads) 6 are "aqueducts and an
underground
reservoir", and that its predecessor-in-interest (Nawasa) had sold a portion (16,409 sq. meters) of the
property to the Municipality of San Juan (on which are constructed the municipalitys elementary school,
home economics building and gymnasium), leased a portion thereof (4,102 sq. meters) for the
municipalitys public high school, and "leased some lots to those who have squatted on the said property."
50,000 square meters or five hectares of the property were likewise leased by the Nawasa to the
Pinaglabanan Commemorative Commission (created by Executive Order No. 263 of the President of the
Philippines dated August 15, 1957) 7 for a 99-year period from August 21, 1963 for the site of the national
shrine to commemorate the "Battle of Pinaglabanan" on August 28 and 29, 1896 between the Katipunan
revolutionaries and the Spanish garrison defending the gunpowder dump (called the "polvorin") in San Juan,
Rizal.

Final entry of the dismissal order of December 16, 1971 was made as of June 12, 1972. Hence, it is quite
clear that as of now, there exist no proceedings, cadastral or otherwise, questioning the public character of
the land and asserting petitioners alleged claims of ownership thereto.

On the main issue at bar, the Court is satisfied that by no means may respondent court be said to have
exceeded its authority or gravely abused its discretion in issuing its questioned orders denying petitioners
motion below for a writ of preliminary injunction allegedly "to maintain the status quo" and stay demolition
and removal of their illegal constructions found to be public nuisances per se and serious hazards to public
health, 8 by virtue of the following principal considerations:chanrob1es vi rtual 1aw li brary

1. As found in respondent courts extended two-page order of February 9, 1970 9 and ten-page order of
March 30, 1970 10 denying reconsideration, petitioners motions to maintain the alleged status quo were
based on the same grounds already reiterated before and denied by then Judge (now appellate associate
justice) Andres Reyes who was then presiding over respondent court in an order dated September 19, 1968,
11 which was upheld in a similar action for certiorari by the Court of Appeals in its decision of February 4,
1969. 12

2. In both said proceedings before Judge Reyes and the Court of Appeals, petitioners succeeded in obtaining
restraining orders or preliminary writs of injunction to stay demolition, which were dissolved upon said
courts handing down their order or decision on the merits of the injunction petitions submitted by
petitioners. With petitioners definitely having lost their bid to reopen the cadastral proceedings to pursue
their alleged claims of ownership over the lands occupied by their constructions, supra, no further reason or
justification exists to continue the stay order against the removal and demolition of their constructions.

3. As was well stated in then Judge Reyes order of September 19, 1968, petitioners failed after several
hearings "to show that they have even a color of title to entitle them to exercise the right of possession to
the premises in question. On the other hand, the land is admittedly public land and consequently the
petitioners have no right to possession thereof . . ." 13

4. Petitioners lack of right to the injunction sought by them was further shown in the Court of Appeals
decision of February 4, 1969, where it noted that "their very evidence, their documentary proof, would
justify that their houses were built upon land of the Metropolitan Water District, that is to say, of the
Philippine Government, therefore, such tax declarations of petitioners houses themselves are the best proof
of their admission that their possession of the lands they occupy was not and could not be adverse" 14 and
that "their shanties pose a veritable danger to public health." 15

5. No error, much less abuse of authority or discretion, could be attributed to respondent courts statements
and reasons for denying the injunction sought by petitioners, as per its order of March 30, 1970, denying
reconsideration, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com. ph

". . . The issues raised by the pleadings to determine whether or not the petitioners are entitled to a writ of
preliminary injunction, or a status quo, in the words of the petitioners, had been resolved several times not
only by this Court but also by the Court of Appeals, and this Court believes that insofar as the same grounds
are concerned, they are res judicata.
x x x


"Lastly, the Court does not lose sight of the fact that the land in question is public land, in the sense that it
is untitled. However, as the government now contends, the land in question is clothed with a public purpose
to be utilized for public service by the government. This fact has not been denied and as a matter of fact,
the petitioners admit that the land in question is public land. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw l ibrary

6. The question of validity or unconstitutionality of municipal ordinance No. 89-Amended need not be
resolved in this proceeding, as it should first properly be submitted for resolution of the lower court in the
action below. Suffice it to note that the Solicitor General appears to have correctly stated the actual
situation in that petitioners do not dispute the authority of the San Juan council to pass ordinances providing
for the summary abatement of public nuisances, and that the ordinance in question may not be faulted for
being ex post facto in application since it "does not seek to punish an action done which was innocent before
the passage of the same. Rather, it punishes the present and continuing act of unlawful occupancy of public
property or properties intended for public use." 16 At any rate, the decisive point is that independently of
the said ordinance, petitioners constructions which have been duly found to be public nuisances per se
(without provision for accumulation or disposal of waste matters and constructed without building permits
contiguously to and therefore liable to pollute one of the main water pipelines which supplies potable water
to the Greater Manila area) may be abated without judicial proceedings under our Civil Code. 17

As stated in Sitchon v. Aquino, 18 the police power of the state justifies the abatement or destruction by
summary proceedings of public nuisances per se.

No error, much less any abuse of discretion, grave or otherwise, may therefore be attributed against
respondent court in having issued its orders denying for imperative reasons of public health and welfare the
preliminary injunction sought again by petitioners to allow them to continue occupying the land in question
with their condemned constructions and structures.

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the petition. The temporary restraining order
heretofore issued on April 20, 1970 is hereby dissolved and such dissolution is declared immediately
executory. No pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

Makalintal, J., is on official leave.

Antonio, J., did not take part.



City of Manila vs. Gerardo Garcia et.al
Jun28

FACTS:
1.Plaintiff is the owner of certain parcels of land. Without the knowledge and consent of plaintiff, defendants
occupied the property and built their houses.2.Having discovered, plaintiff through its mayor gave each defendant
written permits, each labeled as lease contract to occupy specific areas. For their occupancy, defendants were
charged nominal rentals.3.After sometime, plaintiff, through its treasurer, demanded payment of their rentals and
vacate the premises for the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary Schools expansion.4.Despite the demand, defendants
refused to vacate the said property. Hence, this case was filed for recovery of possession.5.The trial court ruled in
favor of plaintiff taking judicial notice of Ordinance 4566 appropriating P100k for the construction of additional
building of Epifanio De Los Santos Elementary School.6.Defendants appealed.
ISSUE: WoN the trial court properly found that the city needs the premises for school purposes
HELD: YES The trial court ruled out the admissibility of the documentary evidence presented by plaintiff
Certification of the Chairman, Committee on Appropriations of the Municipal Board which recites the amount of
P100k had been set aside in Ordinance 4566 for the construction of additional building of the said school.
But then the decision under review, the trial court revised his views. He then declared that there was a need for
defendants to vacate the premises for school expansion; he cited the very document. Because of the courts
contradictory stance, defendants brought this case on appeal. However, the elimination of the certification as
evidence would not profit defendants. For, in reversing his stand, the trial judge could well have taken because he
was duty bound to take judicial notice of Ordinance 4566 . The reason being that the city charter of Manila
requires all courts sitting therein to take judicial notice of all ordinances passed by the municipal board of Manila.
And, Ordinance4566 itself confirms the certification aforesaid that an appropriation of P100,000.00 was set aside for
the construction of additional building of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School.
Further defendants entry to the said property is illegal. Their constructions are as illegal, without permits. The city
mayor doesnt have the authority to issue permits. The permits issued are null and void.



Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-26053 February 21, 1967
CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GERARDO GARCIA CARMENCITA VILLANUEVA, MODESTA PARAYNO NARCISO
PARAYNO, JUAN ASPERAS, MARIA TABIA SIMEON DILIMAN, AQUILINO BARRIOS
LEONORA RUIZ, LAUREANO DIZO, BERNABE AYUDA LEOGARDA DE LOS SANTOS,
ISABELO OBAOB ANDREA RIPARIP, JOSE BARRIENTOS, URBANO RAMOS,
1
ELENA
RAMOS, ESTEFANIA NEPACINA, MODESTA SANCHEZ, MARCIAL LAZARO, MARCIANA
ALANO, HONORIO BERIO SEDORA ORAYLE, GLORIA VELASCO, WILARICO RICAMATA,
BENEDICTO DIAZ, ANA DEQUIZ (MRS.) ALUNAN, LORENZO CARANDANG, JUAN
PECAYO, FELICIDAD MIRANDA EMIGDIO EGIPTO, defendants-appellants.
Mauricio Z. Alunan for defendants-appellants.
City Fiscal's Office for plaintiff-appellee.
SANCHEZ, J .:
Plaintiff City of Manila is owner of parcels of land, forming one compact area, bordering Kansas,
Vermont and Singalong streets in Malate, Manila, and covered by Torrens Titles Nos. 49763, 37082
and 37558. Shortly after liberation from 1945 to 1947, defendants entered upon these premises
without plaintiff's knowledge and consent. They built houses of second-class materials, again without
plaintiff's knowledge and consent, and without the necessary building permits from the city. There
they lived thru the years to the present.
In November, 1947, the presence of defendants having previously been discovered, defendants
Felicidad Miranda (Emigdio Egipto), Modesta C. Parayno, Benedicto Diaz, Laureano Dizo, Jose
Barrientos, Elena Ramos, Estefania Nepacina, Modesta Sanchez, Honorio Berio, Gloria Velasco,
Ana Dequis Alunan and Benedicto Ofiaza (predecessor of defendant Carandang) were given by
Mayor Valeriano E. Fugoso written permits each labeled "LEASE contract" to occupy
specific areas in the property upon conditions therein set forth. Defendants Isabelo Obaob and
Gerardo Garcia (in the name of Marta A. Villanueva) received their permits from Mayor Manuel de la
Fuente on January 29 and March 18, respectively, both of 1948. The rest of the 23 defendants
exhibited none.
For their occupancy, defendants were charged nominal rentals.1wph 1. t
Following are the rentals due as of February, 1962:
NAME
Area
in sq.m.
Monthly
Rental
Amt. due from
date of delinquency
to Feb. 1962
1. Gerardo Garcia 66.00 P7.92 P1,628.97
2. Modesta C. Parayno 87.75 10.53 379.08
3. Juan Asperas 39.00 4.68 9.36
4. Maria Tabia 35.20 5.76 570.24
5. Aquilino Barrios
(Leonora Ruiz)
54.00 4.32 99.36
6. Laureano Dizo 35.00 2.80 22.40
7. Bernabe Ayuda 39.60 3.17 323.34
8. Isabelo Obaob 75.52 9.06 208.38
9. Jose Barrientos 39.53 4.74 744.18
10. Cecilia Manzano in
lieu of Urbano Ramos (deceased) 46.65 5.60
Paid up to
Feb. 1962.
11. Elena Ramos 34.80 2.78 186.26
12. Estefania Nepacina 41.80 3.34 504.34
13. Modesta Sanchez 33.48 2.68 444.88
14. Marcial Lazaro 22.40 1.79 688.32
15. Marciana Alano 25.80 2.06 255.44
16. Honorio Berio 24.00 1.92 188.16
17. Gloria Velasco 32.40 2.59 56.98
18. Wilarico Ricamata 45.83 3.67 739.68
19. Benedicto Diaz 40.20 4.82
Paid up to
March 1962.
20. Ana Dequis Alunan 64.26 7.71 30.84
21. Lorenzo Carandang 45.03 5.40 437.40
22. Juan N. Pecayo 25.52 3.06 30.60
23. Felicidad Miranda 48.02 5.76 132.48


P7,580.69
Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School is close, though not contiguous, to the property. Came
the need for this school's expansion; it became pressing. On September 14, 1961, plaintiff's City
Engineer, pursuant to the Mayor's directive to clear squatters' houses on city property, gave each
of defendants thirty (30) days to vacate and remove his construction or improvement on the
premises. This was followed by the City Treasurer's demand on each defendant, made in February
and March, 1962, for the payment of the amount due by reason of the occupancy and to vacate in
fifteen (15) days. Defendants refused. Hence, this suit to recover possession.
2

The judgment below directed defendants to vacate the premises; to pay the amounts heretofore
indicated opposite their respective names; and to pay their monthly rentals from March, 1962, until
they vacate the said premises, and the costs. Defendants appealed.
1. We are called upon to rule on the forefront question of whether the trial court properly
found that the city needs the premises for school purposes.
The city's evidence on this point is Exhibit E, the certification of the Chairman, Committee on
Appropriations of the Municipal Board. That document recites that the amount of
P100,000.00 had been set aside in Ordinance 4566, the 1962-1963 Manila City Budget, for
the construction of an additional building of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School. It
is indeed correct to say that the court below, at the hearing, ruled out the admissibility of
said document. But then, in the decision under review, the trial judge obviously revised his
views. He there declared that there was need for defendants to vacate the premises for
school expansion; he cited the very document, Exhibit E, aforesaid.
It is beyond debate that a court of justice may alter its ruling while the case is within its
power, to make it conformable to law and justice.
3
Such was done here. Defendants' remedy
was to bring to the attention of the court its contradictory stance. Not having done so, this
Court will not reopen the case solely for this purpose.
4

Anyway, elimination of the certification, Exhibit E, as evidence, would not profit defendants.
For, in reversing his stand, the trial judge could well have taken because the was duty
bound to take judicial notice
5
of Ordinance 4566. The reason being that the city charter of
Manila requires all courts sitting therein to take judicial notice of all ordinances passed by the
municipal board of Manila.
6
And, Ordinance 4566 itself confirms the certification aforesaid
that an appropriation of P100,000.00 was set aside for the "construction of additional
building" of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School.
Furthermore, defendants' position is vulnerable to assault from a third direction. Defendants
have absolutely no right to remain in the premises. The excuse that they have permits from
the mayor is at best flimsy. The permits to occupy are recoverable on thirty days' notice.
They have been asked to leave; they refused to heed. It is in this factual background that we
say that the city's need for the premises is unimportant. The city's right to throw defendants
out of the area cannot be gainsaid. The city's dominical right to possession is paramount.
If error there was in the finding that the city needs the land, such error is harmless and will
not justify reversal of the judgment below.
7

2. But defendants insist that they have acquired the legal status of tenants. They are wrong.
They entered the land, built houses of second-class materials thereon without the knowledge
and consent of the city. Their homes were erected without city permits.
These constructions are illegal. In a language familiar to all, defendants are squatters:
Since the last global war, squatting on another's property in this country has become a
widespread vice. It was and is a blight. Squatters' areas pose problems of health, sanitation.
They are breeding places for crime. They constitute proof that respect for the law and the
rights of others, even those of the government, are being flouted. Knowingly, squatters have
embarked on the pernicious act of occupying property whenever and wherever convenient to
their interests without as much as leave, and even against the will, of the owner. They are
emboldened seemingly because of their belief that they could violate the law with impunity.
The pugnaciousness of some of them has tied up the hands of legitimate owners. The latter
are thus prevented from recovering possession by peaceful means. Government lands have
not been spared by them. They know, of course, that intrusion into property, government or
private, is wrong. But, then, the mills of justice grind slow, mainly because of lawyers who, by
means, fair or foul, are quite often successful in procuring delay of the day of reckoning.
Rampancy of forcible entry into government lands particularly, is abetted by the apathy of
some public officials to enforce the government's rights. Obstinacy of these squatters is
difficult to explain unless it is spawned by official tolerance, if not outright encouragement or
protection. Said squatters have become insensible to the difference between right and
wrong. To them, violation of law means nothing. With the result that squatting still exists,
much to the detriment of public interest. It is high time that, in this aspect, sanity and the rule
of law be restored. It is in this environment that we look into the validity of the permits
granted defendants herein.
These permits, erroneously labeled "LEASE " contracts, were issued by the mayors in 1947
and 1948 when the effects of the war had simmered down and when these defendants could
have very well adjusted themselves. Two decades have now elapsed since the unlawful
entry. Defendants could have, if they wanted to, located permanent premises for their abode.
And yet, usurpers that they are, they preferred to remain on city property.
Defendants' entry as aforesaid was illegal. Their constructions are as illegal, without
permits.
8
The city charter enjoins the mayor to "safeguard all the lands" of the City of Manila.
9

Surely enough, the permits granted did not "safeguard" the city's land in question. It is our
considered view that the Mayor of the City of Manila cannot legalize forcible entry into public
property by the simple expedient of giving permits, or, for that matter, executing LEASES .
Squatting is unlawful and no amount of acquiescence on the part of the city officials will
elevate it into a lawful act. In principle, a compound of illegal entry and official permit to stay
is obnoxious to our concept of proper official norm of conduct. Because, such permit does
not serve social justice; it fosters moral decadence. It does not promote public welfare; it
abets disrespect for the law. It has its roots in vice; so it is an infected bargain. Official
approval of squatting should not, therefore, be permitted to obtain in this country where there
is an orderly form of government.
We, accordingly, rule that the Manila mayors did not have authority to give permits, written or
oral, to defendants, and that the permits herein granted are null and void.
3. Let us look into the houses and constructions planted by defendants on the premises.
They clearly hinder and impair the use of that property for school purposes. The courts may
well take judicial notice of the fact that housing school children in the elementary grades has
been and still is a perennial problem in the city. The selfish interests of defendants must
have to yield to the general good. The public purpose of constructing the school building
annex is paramount.
10

In the situation thus obtaining, the houses and constructions aforesaid constitute public
nuisance per se. And this, for the reason that they hinder and impair the use of the property
for a badly needed school building, to the prejudice of the education of the youth of the
land.
11
They shackle the hands of the government and thus obstruct performance of its
constitutionally ordained obligation to establish and maintain a complete and adequate
system of public education, and more, to "provide at least free public primary instruction".
12

Reason dictates that no further delay should be countenanced. The public nuisance could
well have been summarily abated by the city authorities themselves, even without the aid of
the courts.
13

4. Defendants challenge the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Manila. They say
that the case should have been started in the municipal court. They prop up their position by
the averment that notice for them to vacate was only served in September, 1961, and suit
was started in July, 1962. Their legal ground is Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. We
have reached the conclusion that their forcible entry dates back to the period from 1945 to
1947. That entry was not legalized by the permits. Their possession continued to remain
illegal from incipiency. Suit was filed long after the one-year limitation set forth in Section 1 of
Rule 70. And the Manila Court of First Instance has jurisdiction

HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. BALANDAN, et
al.- Attractive Nuisance Doctrine

Attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial (e.g. water tanks) as
well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water
and its location.

FACTS:
Guillermo Balandan and his wife is claiming damages in the sum of P2,000 for the death of their son,
Mario. Petitioner was the owner of an Ice plant, who had in their premises 2 tanks filled of water, 9 feet
deep. The factory was fenced but Ingress and egress was easily made because the gates were always
open and there was no guard assigned in the said gate. Also the tanks didnt have any barricade or
fence. One day when Mario was playing with his friend, they saw the tank inside the factory and began
playing and swimming inside it. While bathing, Mario sank to the bottom of the tank, only to be fished out
later, already as a cadaver, having died of asphyxia secondary to drowning. The lower decided in the
favor of the parents saying that the petitioner is liable for damages due to the doctrine of attractive
nuisance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of attractive nuisance is applicable in this case?

RULING: NO.
The doctrine of attractive nuisance states that One who maintains on his premises dangerous
instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise
ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender
years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises. American
Jurisprudence shows us that the attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of
water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than
the mere water and its location. In the case bar, the tanks themselves cannot fall under such doctrine thus
the petitioners cannot be held liable for Marios death.



Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-3422 June 13, 1952
HIDALGO ENTERPRISES,
INC
., petitioner,
vs.
GUILLERMO BALANDAN, ANSELMA ANILA and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Quisumbing, Sycip, Quisumbing and Salazar for petitioner.
Antonio M. Moncado for respondents.
BENGZON, J .:
This is an appeal by certiorari, from a decision of the Court of Appeals requiring Hidalgo
Enterprises, Inc. to pay Guillermo Balandan and his wife, damages in the sum of P2,000 for the
death of their son Mario.
It appears that the petitioner Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. "was the owner of an ice-plant factory in the
City of San Pablo, Laguna, in whose premises were installed two tanks full of water, nine feet deep,
for cooling purposes of itsengine. While the factory compound was surrounded with fence, the tanks
themselves were not provided with any kind of fence or top covers. The edges of the tanks were
barely a foot high from the surface of the ground. Through the wide gate entrance, which is
continually open, motor vehicles hauling ice and persons buying said commodity passed, and any
one could easily enter the said factory, as he pleased. There was no guard assigned on the gate. At
about noon of April 16, 1948, plaintiff's son, Mario Balandan, a boy barely 8 years old, while playing
with and in company of other boys of his age entered the factory premises through the gate, to take
a bath in one of said tanks; and while thus bathing, Mario sank to the bottom of the tank, only to be
fished out later, already a cadaver, having been died of "asphyxia secondary to drowning."
The Court of Appeals, and the Court of First Instance of Laguna, took the view that the petitioner
maintained an attractive nuisance (the tanks), and neglected to adopt the necessary precautions to
avoid accidents to persons entering its premises. It applied the doctrine of attractive nuisance, of
American origin, recognized in this Jurisdiction in Taylor vs. Manila Electric 16 Phil., 8.
The doctrine may be stated, in short, as follows: One who maintains on his premises dangerous
instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to
exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a
child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the
premises. (See 65 C.J.S., p. 455.)
The principle reason for the doctrine is that the condition or appliance in question although its danger
is apparent to those of age, is so enticing or alluring to children of tender years as to induce them to
approach, get on or use it, and this attractiveness is an implied invitation to such children (65 C.J.S.,
p. 458).
Now, is a swimming pool or water tank an instrumentality or appliance likely to attract the little
children in play? In other words is the body of water an attractive nuisance?
The great majority of American decisions say no.
The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as
well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the
mere water and its location.
There are numerous cases in which the attractive nuisance doctrine has not been held not to
be applicable toponds or reservoirs, pools of water, streams, canals, dams, ditches,
culverts, drains, cesspools or sewer pools, . . . (65 C.J.S., p. 476 et seg. citing decisions of
California, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Iowa, Louisiana, Miss., Missouri, Montana,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Nebraska, Wisconsin.)
In fairness to the Court of Appeals it should be stated that the above volume of Corpus Juris
Secundum was published in 1950, whereas its decision was promulgated on September 30, 1949.
The reason why a swimming pool or pond or reservoir of water is not considered an attractive
nuisance was lucidly explained by the Indiana Appellate Court as follows:
Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children. Lurking in their waters is
always the danger of drowning. Against this danger children are early instructed so that they
are sufficiently presumed to know the danger; and if the owner of private property creates an
artificial pool on his own property, merely duplicating the work of nature without adding any
new danger, . . . (he) is not liable because of having created an "attractive nuisance."
Anderson vs. Reith-Riley Const. Co., N. E., 2nd, 184, 185; 112 Ind. App., 170.
Therefore, as petitioner's tanks are not classified as attractive nuisance, the question whether the
petitioner had taken reasonable precautions becomes immaterial. And the other issue submitted by
petitioner that the parents of the boy were guilty of contributory negligence precluding recovery,
because they left for Manila on that unlucky day leaving their son under the care of no responsible
individual needs no further discussion.
The appealed decision is reversed and the Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. is absolved from liability. No
costs.
Feria, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.


Separate Opinions
PABLO, J ., disidente:
La recurrente tiene dos estanques de agua, de nueve pies de profundidad, como anexos
indispensables a su fabrica de hielo; estan constuidos dentro de un
solar
que esta cercado pero con una puerta de entrada siempre abierta en donde pasan libremente los
coches que distribuyen hielo y las personas que lo compran de la fabrica; cualquiera puede entrar
sin distincion alguna, no hay ningun guardia en la puerta que impida la entrada de cualquiera
persona. A dichos dos entanques tiene libre acceso el publico.
Es evidente que la recurrente debio haber cercado dichos estanques como medida ordinaria de
precaucion para que los ninos de corta edad no pueden entrar, tanto mas cuanto que los bordes de
esos estanques solo tienen un pie de altura la superficie del terreno. El cerco puesto en el
perimento del solar, con puerta continuamente abierta, no es suficiente medida para impedir que los
ninos puedan meterse en los entanques. Ese cerco con su puerta abierta es como un velo
transparente con que se cubre una mujer semidesnuda en un teatro, pica la curiosidad y atrae la
atencion del publico.
Los nios son curiosos por naturaleza y los de ocho aos no tienen perfecto conocimiento de las
cosas. Alucinados por la natural atraccion de las aguas, se meteran en ellas con peligro de sus
vidas, a menos que exista algo que les impida.
Voto con la confirmacion de la decision apelada.



NUISANCE:#1:AC ENTERPRISES vs. FRABELLE PROPERTIES CORP
FACTS:ISSUE:RULING:
#2:ONGSIAKO, ET. AL. vs. ONGSIAKO, ET.
AL.G R # L -
7 5 1 0 M a r c h 3 0 , 1 9
5 7 FACTS:
There are 3 causes of action filed in this case. One of which is the
obstruction of thedikes constructed by the defendants in 1937. Such dikes
obstructed the natural flow of excesswater from the plaintiffs higher
tenement. It was alleged that from time immemorial before the partition of the
Hacienda Esperanza, the water coming from the portion of the estate assigned
to plaintiffs had been flowing regularly and without artificial obstruction towards
the other areas of that same hacienda subsequently assigned to the defendants, as a
result of the partition in 1929.The CFI granted the Motion to Dismiss filed by the
defendant on the ground of prescription.
ISSUE:
May the dikes be demolished?
RULING:
The SC affirmed the Order appealed from.Considering that the action was
filed in 1951, the legal easement sought to be enforcedhad been
extinguished by non-user and the action is therefore barred by prescription.