CSDP Missions and Operations

EXPO/B/SEDE/FWC/2009-01/Lot6/16 APRIL 2012
PE 457.062 EN

DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES OF THE UNION
DIRECTORATE B
POLICY DEPARTMENT
STUDY
CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS:
LESSONS LEARNED PROCESSES
Abstract
The first Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission was launched in 2003.
Since then the EU has launched 24 civilian missions and military operations. Despite the
tendency of military operations to attract more attention, the majority of CSDP (Common
Security and Defence Policy) interventions have been civilian missions. Since the
beginning the actors involved in CSDP recognised the need to learn from the different
aspects of missions and operations. The tools and methodologies to guarantee a
successful learning process have evolved over time together with the evolution of CSDP.
This study represents a first stock-taking exercise of the lessons learned processes at the
EU level. The study is divided in three major components. The first component looks at
the available literature on the subject of knowledge management with regard to CSDP
missions and operations. The study then draws upon short case-studies from the 21
missions and operations to-date with a specific focus on the lessons identified and
(possibly) learned in practice. The study concludes with a number of recommendations
targeted at how the lessons learning processes could be improved including specific
recommendations on the role of the European Parliament.

2
This study was requested by the European Parliament's Subcommittee on Security and Defence
AUTHORS:
DARI, Elisa, Research Consultant, Clingendael Institute of International Relations, The
NETHERLANDS
PRICE, Megan, Research Consultant, Clingendael Institute of International Relations, The
NETHERLANDS
VAN DER WAL, Jense, Research Assistant, Clingendael Institute of International Relations, The
NETHERLANDS
GOTTWALD, Marlene, Marie Curie EXACT Researcher, THE TRANS EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES
ASSOCIATION, BELGIUM
KOENIG, Nicole, Marie Curie EXACT Researcher, THE TRANS EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES
ASSOCIATION, BELGIUM
ADMINISTRATOR RESPONSIBLE:
Gerrard, QUILLE
Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union
Policy Department
WIB 06 M 081
rue Wiertz 60

Editorial Assistant: Delphine FUMEY
LINGUISTIC VERSIONS
Original: EN
ABOUT THE EDITOR
Editorial closing date: 13 April 2012.
European Union, 2012
Printed in Belgium

ISBN: 978-92-823-3756-1
Doi: 10.2861/8670

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CSDP Missions and Operations: Lessons Learned Processes
3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABBREVIATIONS 10
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 12
COMPONENT I: CSDP LESSONS LEARNED THEORY AND PRACTICE 17
1. INTRODUCTION 17
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 18
2.1 WHY IS IT IMPORTANT TO DO LESSONS LEARNED? 18
2.2 EU DOCUMENTS 19
2.3 INDEPENDENT LITERATURE 21
2.4 EVOLUTION IN THE LEARNING PROCESSES 22
3. THE PROCESS OF LEARNING LESSONS 24
3.1 AREAS OF LEARNING 24
3.2 DIFFERENT ACTORS, DIFFERENT METHODS 27
3.2.1 The European Union Military Staff (EUMS) 27
3.2.2 Civilian Planning and Conduct Capabilities (CPCC) 29
3.2.3 The Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) 31
4. CONCLUSIONS 32
COMPONENT II: REVIEW OF CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS 34
1. EUROPEAN UNION POLICE MISSION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
(EUPM BIH) 35
1.1 FORMAL PROCESS OF IDENTIFYING LESSONS 35
1.2 IDENTIFIED LESSONS THAT HAVE BEEN DOCUMENTED 35
1.2.1 The planning phase of EUPM 36
1.2.2 The mandate of EUPM and the co-ordination of EU actors in BiH 36
1.2.3 The execution of the mandate of EUPM 36
1.3 LESSONS LEARNED? 36
4
2. EUFOR CONCORDIA IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF
MACEDONIA (FYROM) 38
2.2.1 Cooperation with NATO within the Berlin Plus arrangements 38
2.2.2 Co-ordination of EU efforts in FYROM 39
2.2.3 Financial mechanism of Concordia 39
3. OPERATION ARTEMIS IN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 41
3.1 PROCESS OF IDENTIFYING LESSONS 41
3.2.1 Rapid reaction capacity 41
3.2.2 Framework Nation Concept 42
3.2.3 Scope and duration of the Operation 42
3.2.4 Operational assets 42
3.2.5 Comprehensive approach and civil-military coordination 42
3.2.6 EU-UN cooperation and handover 43
4. EUROPEAN UNION POLICE MISSION (EUPOL) PROXIMA AND THE
EUROPEAN UNION POLICE ADVISORY TEAM (EUPAT) FYROM 44
4.2.1 The planning phase of EUPOL Proxima 45
4.2.2 The co-ordination between ESDP missions and other EU instruments 45
5. EUFOR ALTHEA BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 47
5.2.1 The planning phase of EUFOR Althea 47
5.2.2 The co-ordination and coherence of EU efforts in BiH 48
5.2.3 The military execution of EUFOR Althea 48
5
6. EU MISSION TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE FOR SECURITY SECTOR
REFORM, RD CONGO (EUSEC RD CONGO) & EU POLICE MISSION, RD
CONGO (EUPOL RD CONGO) 50
6.2.1 Addressing Political Challenges 51
6.2.2 Local Ownership 51
6.2.3 Coordination among multiple SSR actors 52
6.2.4 Quick (Visible) Impact vs. Long Term Reform 53
6.2.5 Staffing 53
7. EUROPEAN UNION RULE OF LAW MISSION FOR IRAQ (EUJUST LEX-
IRAQ) 55
7.2.1 Design of the mission mandate 55
7.2.2 Adequacy of the training curricula 56
7.2.3 Impact of the mission 56
8. EU SUPPORT TO AMIS II (SUDAN) 58
8.2.1 EU-AU cooperation 58
8.2.2 EU-UN-NATO cooperation 59
9. ACEH MONITORING MISSION (AMM) 60
9.2.1 The fast deployment of the AMM 60
9.2.2 EU-ASEAN cooperation 61
6
9.2.3 The position of the AMM in relation to the conflicting parties 61
9.2.4 The human rights component of the AMM mandate 61
9.2.5 Lessons learned? 62
10. EU BORDER ASSISTANCE MISSIONS (EUBAM RAFAH) 63
10.2.1 Implementation of the mission mandate 64
10.2.2 Impact of the mission 64
11. EUROPEAN BORDER ASSISTANCE MISSION (EUBAM) MOLDOVA-
UKRAINE 66
11.2.1 The financial mechanism during the first six months of the mission 67
11.2.2 The strategic underpinning of the EUBAM 67
11.2.3 The legal advisory capacity of EUBAM 67
12. EU POLICE MISSION FOR THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES (EUPOL
COPPS) 69
12.2.1 The mission mandate and its implementation 69
12.2.2 Internal and external cooperation 70
12.2.3 Support and impact 70
13. EUFOR RD CONGO 72
13.2.1 Command of the Operation 72
13.2.2 Time frame of the Operation 73
13.2.3 EU-UN cooperation 73
7
14. EUROPEAN UNION POLICE MISSION (EUPOL) AFGHANISTAN 75
14.2.1 Adequacy of the mission mandate 76
14.2.2 Deployment 76
14.2.3 Leadership 76
14.2.4 Corruption and gender sensitivity 77
14.2.5 Cooperation with other actors 77
14.2.6 Best practices 78
15. EUFOR TCHAD/RCA 80
15.2.1 Adequacy of the mandate 81
15.2.2 Operational design 81
15.2.3 Resourcing (budget, troops and capabilities) 81
15.2.4 Logistics 82
15.2.5 Intelligence 82
15.2.6 Comprehensive approach and civil-military coordination 82
15.2.7 Lack of a comprehensive strategy 83
15.2.8 EU-UN cooperation and hand-over 83
16. EUROPEAN UNION SECURITY SECTOR REFORM (EU SSR) GUINEA-
BISSAU 85
16.2.1 The planning phase of EU SSR Guinea-Bissau 86
16.2.2 The coherence of the activities of the Commission and the Council in Guinea-Bissau 86
16.2.3 The SSR policy of the EU in Guinea-Bissau 86
8
17. EU RULE OF LAW MISSION IN KOSOVO (EULEX) 88
17.2.1 Ability to react to a dynamic political situation 89
17.2.2 Coordination among EU actors 89
17.2.3 Resourcing and Administrational Issues 90
17.2.4 Executive Mandate and addressing serious crimes 90
17.2.5 MMA in practice 91
18. EUROPEAN UNION MONITORING MISSION GEORGIA (EUMM) 93
18.2.1 The planning phase of the EUMM 93
18.2.2 The co-ordination and coherence of EU efforts in Georgia 94
18.2.3 The co-ordination with other international actors in Georgia 94
18.2.4 The reference to the mission area in the EUMM mandate 94
19. EUROPEAN UNION NAVAL FORCE SOMALIA (EUNAVFOR)
ATALANTA 95
19.2.1 The cooperation with international actors 96
19.2.2 The detention and prosecution of arrested pirates 96
19.2.3 Fighting the consequences rather than the causes of conflict 96
19.2.4 The use of private companies to secure vessels 96
20. EUROPEAN UNION TRAINING MISSION SOMALIA (EUTM) 98
20.2.1 The focus on training of the EUTM 98
20.2.2 The political context of the EUTM 98
9
COMPONENT III: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 101
1. CONCLUSIONS 101
1.1 CHALLENGES TO LEARNING 102
1.2 AREAS OF IMPROVEMENT AND THE WAY FORWARD 104
2. RECOMMENDATIONS 108
2.1 GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS ON IMPROVING KNOWLEDGE
MANAGEMENT 108
2.2 RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 109
ANNEX I: VISUALISATIONS OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN LESSONS
LEARNED PROCESSES 111
ANNEX II: LESSONS OVERVIEW MATRIX 113
ANNEX III: CSDP CASE STUDIES TIMELINE 115
COMPREHENSIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY 116
10
ABBREVIATIONS
BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina
CHG Civilian Headline Goals
CiLMA Civilian Lessons Management Application
CIVCOM Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
CMPD Crisis Management Planning Directorate
CPCC Civilian Planning and Conduct Capabilities
CSDP Commons Security and Defence Policy
DG IX Directorate General of Civilian Crisis Management
DG RELEX Directorate General of External Relations
EDA European Defence Agency
EEAS European Union External Action Service
ELMA European Union Military Staff Lessons Management Application
ENTRi Europes New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management
EP European Parliament
ESDP European Security and Defence Policy
EUISS European Union Institute of Security Studies
EUMC European Union Military Committee
EUMS European Union Military Staff
EUSR European Union Special Representative
EU European Union
FFM Fact Finding Mission
FPI Foreign Policy Instrument
FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
HoM Head of Mission
MMA Mentoring, Monitoring, and Advising
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OPLAN Operational Plan
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PMG Politico-Military Group
PSC Political and Security Committee
SG/HR Secretary General / High Representative
SSR Security Sector Reform
UN-DPKO United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The following ad hoc study reviews the existing literature and current knowledge on the topic of
lessons learned processes for EU Common Security and Defences Policy missions and operations,
with an overview of several past and current EU crisis management interventions. The study,
requested by the European Parliament Sub-Committee on Security and Defence (SEDE), was
elaborated by researchers at the Netherlands Institute for International Relations, Clingendael,
Conflict Research Unit and at the Trans European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA). Research was
conducted between January and March 2012. In that time, the authors undertook an extensive
review of pertinent literature, including academic papers, official EU documents and archived
sources, media reports, sources from other international defence and security coalitions, such as
NATO and the UN-DPKO, publications of independent agencies affiliated to the EU, such as the EU
Institute for Security Studies and the European Defence Agency, and research institutions unaffiliated
with the EU. In addition, several interviews were carried out (under the Chatham House Rule) with EU
officials and staff, both within and outside of EEAS structures, as well as mission staff. These sources
inform both the structure and the content of the study. Upon the submission of the initial draft, a
workshop was held in Brussels to provide the authors with comments. This workshop was attended
by key interviewees, European Parliament and SEDE representatives, members of the public and
external experts selected for their unique knowledge on the topic. The forum provided an
opportunity to offer feedback to strengthen the draft in terms of precision, accuracy and relevance.
Since the beginning of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) interventions in 2003 the EU has
launched 24 missions and operations. The EU recognised from CSDPs inception, the need to learn
from its own experience in crisis management to improve capacities and efficacy. The methodologies
and tools used for learning lessons and identify best practices have been evolving together with
CSDP engagement. The literature review has revealed how, as the number of missions and
operations increased, knowledge management moved from an ad hoc and bureaucratic exercise to a
more systematic and defined set of processes. Formalised processes for collecting and learning
lessons are still supplemented by informal ways of sharing lessons and finding solutions. However, it
is unclear if these informal mechanisms, corridor talks and information sharing through personal
networks, contribute to change. While formalised processes mainly capture lessons at the planning
and operational level, informal mechanisms seem to be used to address more politically sensitive
lessons, such as the decision-making process of launching missions and operations, and mandate
writing. More formal effort devoted to assessing the political and strategic level of CSDP could spur
more rigorous discussion on the rationale underpinning EU crisis management intervention and on
the adequacy of the tools adopted in missions and operations to achieve the desired objectives.
Various actors are involved in the learning processes, EU Military Staff (EUMS), Civilian Planning and
Conduct Capability (CPCC) and the Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) being the
headliners. The tools and procedures have been established separately for the civilian and military
side, which is reflected in different approaches followed by the three main actors. EUMS leads the
learning process for the military side and has developed a sophisticated and comprehensive
approach to learning, including specific concepts, structures and tools. In 2008, specific guidelines
were delineated on the identification and implementation of civilian missions best practices and
lessons. CMPD and CPCC share the responsibility for identifying lessons from civilian missions,
leaving some ambiguity about who is accountable for initiating or overseeing the implementation of
new policies or practices in light of these lessons (and thereby learning). The development of civilian
concepts and tools for institutional learning (identification, analysis, and implementation) is still
ongoing. It would be beneficial if all actors dedicated to lessons learned aligned their concepts and
13
terminology for processing the lessons that emerge from missions and operations. Recognising there
have been attempts to improve the communication between the strategic, planning and operational
level, much can still be done to bridge the various levels. Both for the civilian as for the military side,
the main challenge lies in successfully implementing the new practices and policies to address
lessons and improve efficiency.
This study identifies several challenges to learning embedded in the current lessons structures and
procedures. The negative perception that lessons learned processes are a shaming and blaming
exercise has been frequently flagged for discouraging cooperation. This perception could be
counteracted by shifting to ideas to improve the system or by including more best practices
alongside lessons identified. Sensitivity of the actors involved in CSDP with regard to the content of
lessons learned reports results in the polishing and censoring of such reports. Seminars, such as the
one organised by EUISS on EUFOR Tchad, and joint-exercises like those organised by the EUMS,
provide opportunities for identifying and discussing sensitive lessons at a strategic and political level.
These less formal events allow for a more open and candid evaluation of the practices and policies
guiding the political-strategic actors during the planning phase. Related to this, political sensitivity
also restricts access to lessons documents to EU External Action Service bodies and relative
committees. This limits the capacities of other relevant EU actors, such as Foreign Policy Instrument,
the European Parliament, ENTRi partners, and the European Defence Agency, to use lessons reports
to improve their performance, or assist with implementing solutions and best practices.
The study also describes challenges to learning, embedded in the way lessons learned processes are
organised and carried out. The first is the lack of clear and methodical dissemination strategies for the
lessons identified by formal mechanisms. A more proactive approach of passing lessons to targeted
actors responsible for implementation could help in closing the learning cycle. Despite attempts to
follow more systematic collection of lessons, a second issue is weak coordination, particularly on the
civilian side. The unclear division of labour and responsibilities between CMPD and CPCC creates
parallel and yet non-complementary lines of reporting. Thirdly, lessons learned efforts are crippled by
insufficient dedicated staff. Following through with the 2008 Guidelines, which envisage a dedicated
Best Practice and Lessons Learned officer for each mission, could increase the capacity to identify,
share and learn lessons. To make full use of these dedicated officers, the establishment of a network
could allow Best Practice officers in the fields and in Brussels to communicate and share lessons
between missions as well as vertically from up through the ranks of the EEAS bodies in Brussels. More
human resources would not necessarily require a grand investment, but rather a few very
strategically placed staff members.
In general throughout this study it emerges how lessons learned systems need a higher profile with
the EEAS and EU more widely. Especially the support of high profile personalities could ensure that
more attention is paid to the systematic identification and implementation of lessons across CSDP.
General recommendations on improving knowledge management
The EUMS and CMPD could identify the target audience of the lessons learned documents to
improve the strategy of disseminating lessons learned. A proactive approach would be to send
relevant lessons reports to specific officers who can apply them directly in their work.
Including best practices in lessons learned reports could help to alleviate the negative
perception that lessons learned processes are a blaming and shaming exercise.
Aligning lessons learned concepts used by the various bodies within EEAS and adopting
common definitions could enhance civilian and military coordination, and serve a more
comprehensive approach to lessons learned. Similarly, joint training on learning

14
methodologies and tools for EUMS, CPCC and CMPD Best Practice and Lessons officers could
further promote a common approach.
Formalising the analysis of the root causes underpinning lessons identified as well as
proposing solutions to the issues could help ensure the implementation of the lessons in
procedures and policies.
Given its particular relevance to the lessons on financial procedures, FPI could be more
formally integrated into the lessons learned process of CPCC, similar to the way ATHENA is
involved in the lessons learned cycle of EUMS.
Clarifying the division of labour between CPCC and CMPD with regard to lessons learned could
help to establish a more structured, comprehensible and cooperative system for lessons
learned.
Exercises that involve all levels of actors from Brussels to the missions, such as the one planned
for 2012, could increase the shared understanding of actors respective roles and encourage
more accountability. Also joint training of personnel from CPCC, CMPD and missions could
promote harmonisation and deeper understanding of the dynamics at play at each working
level.
In order to improve the framework for learning lessons at the political strategic level,
consideration should be given to systematising and developing informal tools for sharing and
learning, such as EUISS seminars, workshops and exercises. This could also involve the actors
responsible for the political-strategic aspect of CSDP, providing a new (possibly less political)
forum for discussion.
Mission staff, such as the Political Adviser or the Best Practice officer, could be included in
strategic evaluations, discussions and analysis of CSDP performance at the Brussels level.
Designating a Lessons Learned and Best Practice officer per mission (as suggested in the 2008
Guidelines) could lead to building a network of Best Practices officers. More specialised training
could also be provided to all officers involved in lessons learned processes both at mission and
Brussels level.
Allowing ENTRi training institutes to use lessons learned and best practice documents in the
development of courses curricula may be a very cost-effective lesson implementation method.
Teams responsible for lessons learned reports could include both EU staff and independent
experts. This could facilitate a more transparent and impartial approach to lessons learned
studies.
The gap between the mission level and lessons learned actors in Brussels should be addressed.
Further research is needed on this aspect in order to identify ways to improve this relationship.

Recommendations to the European Parliament
The EP is in a position to raise the profile of the added value of lessons learned exercises.
Advocating for the appointment of an influential personality within EEAS to champion
progress in collecting, analysing and implementing lessons, is one way the EP could exercise
their influence.
15
The EP could advocate for the appointment of dedicated Best Practice and Lessons officers in
each mission (or possibly shared among missions within a single country). This could be
followed up by overseeing the creation of a network of Best Practice officers, including those
within CPCC, CMPD and EUMS to form a community of experts, to enhance horizontal as well
as vertical learning. The EP could promote the idea among Member States (who must second
qualified individuals) and convene conferences of Best Practices and Lessons officers, in order
to support the activity as well as benefit from it.
Financial mechanisms and budget management can be an entry point for dialogue between
EP and EEAS on lessons learned and best practices, as the EP has a Treaty-based budgetary
oversight role. As part of its civilian mission budgetary oversight capacity, the EP could ensure
that proportionate and adequate portions of the CFSP budget is dedicated to evaluation and
lessons learned mechanisms.
According to their Treaty-based budgetary oversight role, the EP could support the function of
Best Practice officers in enhancing the cost-effectiveness of missions. Supporting Best Practice
officers in their pursuit of more effective and efficient practices can have positive financial
implications that the EP could endorse.
The EP could encourage debate concerning the accessibility of the Councils official documents
on lessons learned, particularly with regards to the access of EU bodies involved in CSDP,
however placed outside of the EEAS structures. Partial disclosure of relevant sections could be
an acceptable compromise, as could de-classifying lessons of completed missions, especially
their planning processes.
The EP could take the lead in reviewing whether the ENTRi system is effective and fulfilling its
potential. It could also advocate for ENTRi becoming a tool for lessons dissemination and
implementation.
Inter-parliamentary networks could be mobilised to improve relevant national training and
recruitment structures and encourage Member States to follow up with the resources they
have committed to CSDP.
The EP could underwrite lessons learned reviews conducted by external actors, such as
impartial research institutes, academic institutes, and NGOs. This could allow for more
transparency and augment the available body of literature on CSDP lessons learned.
The EP could also organise de-briefing sessions for seconded personnel returning from the
missions on a bi-annual bases, and organised per region or theme. This would allow for
homogenous de-briefing methods and for informing the EP and staff in Brussels of ground-
level mission experience.
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COMPONENT I: CSDP LESSONS LEARNED THEORY AND PRACTICE
1. INTRODUCTION
The first European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)(
1
) mission was deployed in 2003. Since then
the EU has launched 24 civilian missions and military operations. Despite the tendency of military
operations to attract more attention, the majority of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)
intervention are civilian missions. Since the beginning, the actors involved in CSDP recognised the
need to learn from their experience in the different aspects of missions and operations. The tools and
methodologies to guarantee a successful learning process have evolved over time together with the
evolution of CSDP itself. This study aims to map where the lessons learning processes stand now and
where they are going, while at the same time looking at the way it has evolved and changed over
time.
The study is divided in three major components. The first component will look at the available
literature on the subject of knowledge management with regard to CSDP missions and operations.
The literature review will help frame the topic and will identify the main official documents of the EU
that set the rationale and procedures for lessons learned. Based on this background, the discussion
will move to the processes that are currently in place and how the relevant actors are using them (or
not) to conduct lessons learned. The research for this component was gathered primarily through
interviews with EU officials and staff within the Crisis Management bodies of the European External
Action Services (EEAS), namely EU Military Staff (EUMS), Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
(CPCC), and the Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD). Additionally, interviews were
conducted with actors outside of the EEAS structures, who play a role in identifying and learning
lessons, such as staff from the European Defence Agency (EDA), the ATHENA unit at the Council of
the European Union and Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) at the European Commission.
After this overview of the broader mechanisms for knowledge management, the study will turn its
attention to the review of 20 CSDP case studies(
2
), with a specific focus on the lessons identified and
(possibly) learned in practice. Attention will be especially paid to how the systems of learning have
worked in practice and what are some of the lessons that have emerged in the individual cases. The
aim of the case study review is to demonstrate the outcomes of the lessons learned processes,
discussed in Component I, as applied to missions and operations. The review of the case studies is
based on EU official documents as well as open sources, since most EU lessons learned documents
are classified or only partially declassified.
The final section will provide an overall conclusion and a number of recommendations targeted at
how the lessons learning processes could be improved. Specific recommendations are also given on
the role of the European Parliament in catalysing change and improvement in the way lessons are
learned.

1
ESDP missions and operations become CSDP missions and operations with the Lisbon Treaty. For consistency, the study
will generally use CSDP to refer to both pre- and post-Lisbon missions and operations.
2
The selection of the case studies reviewed was made by the European Parliament in the inception of the study.
Policy Department DG External Policies
18
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature concerning CSDP missions and lessons learned mechanisms can be divided into two
distinct groups. On the one hand, there are official EU documents, Council of the European Union
documents, such as concept papers, annual reports or guidelines that define, regulate and
standardise the mechanisms of identifying lessons and implementing them in the strategic,
preparatory, and planning phases of new missions. On the other hand, a number of external reviews
and commentaries of the EU policies provide a critical analysis of CSDP missions and lessons learned
processes. Such studies are carried out by think tanks, academia or independent researchers, with or
without the auspices of the EU.
2.1 Why is it important to do lessons learned?
Since the earliest days of Argyris and Schn's (1978) organisational learning theory, the process of
learning and change within organisational environments has been acknowledged as a field with a
self-evident value as an applied discipline(
3
). Within military structures, the lessons learned process
has been a necessary standard operating procedure for much longer than its contemporary label
would suggest (Vetock, 1988).
We only learn lessons when things change as a result of our new knowledge. Until then, we have
merely identified an area where the organization is not living up to its potential. In a successful
learning organization, lessons are identified and turned into lessons learned effectively and
efficiently; the organizations Lessons Learned capability enables the organization to reach its full
potential, (NATO, Lessons Learned Handbook Second Edition, September 2011).
As clearly stated in the foreword to the NATOs Lessons Learned Handbook, it is crucial for any
organisation to be able not only to identify areas for improvement but also to change in order to
correct and improve functioning. The formalisation and standardisation of collecting lessons and
integrating them into implemented practices aims to guarantee that lessons are truly learned.
However, as 'lessons learned' systems have gained prominence in the field of public policy, increasing
numbers of institutions have adopted lessons learned systems to reduce the risk of repeating
mistakes and increase the chance that successes are repeated. (Ibid.). Learning from experience is
especially crucial for a policy as young and as rapidly-expanding as CSDP. The types of missions and
the contexts in which they operate vary greatly. Thus, the institutions devoted to planning and
conduct need to reflect meaningfully on their own experiences in order to improve flexibility and
efficiency. In the CSDP context, Smith (2011: 7) conceptualised the learning process as a process of
deliberate reform, consisting of: 1) regularly benchmarking the existing EU rules / values / purposes in
a policy domain; 2) actively generating policy-relevant lessons as a result of new missions; 3)
deliberately transforming those lessons into cumulative knowledge through feedback / monitoring /
evaluation processes; and 4) institutionalizing and disseminating that knowledge for application to
future operations.
It is essential that CSDP missions and operations strive to be ever more efficient and effective in their
impact. This message becomes all the more clear in times of limited financial resources. The latest
Council Conclusions document on CSDP clearly states the need to do better with less (Council
Document, 17991/11, 2011). In the same document, the Council recognises how improvement in the
performance of CSDP missions and operations can be achieved through lessons learned

3
Sometimes described as the practice-oriented, learning organisation theory. See Senge, P.M., The Fifth Discipline,
London: Century Business, 1990
19
mechanisms, identification of best practices and impact assessment (Ibid.). Since lessons learned
exercises aim to improve the performance, impact and effectiveness of missions and operations, they
can be seen as a cost-effective tool to help achieve EU goals.
2.2 EU Documents
With regard to military operations the available official documents setting the procedures and
rationale for lessons learned processes are few. In 2001, the European Capability Action Plan gave
responsibility to the EU Military Committee (EUMC) to monitor and evaluate the procurement and
planning of EU military capabilities, spurring some lessons learned processes focused on these
aspects of operation deployment. With the setting up of crisis management procedures in 2003, the
Political and Security Committee (PSC) was identified as the body mandated to initiate the evaluation
of lessons learned of military operations through the EUMC (Council Document, 11127/03, 2003).
There is no specific reference in this document as to how the lessons learned process would be
carried out. However, interviews revealed that lessons learned processes were initially based on a
long-standing experience of the military forces to carry out evaluations of military operations
(interview with EEAS official, 24 January 2012). In 2007, the EU Military Staff established its own
internal lessons learned system based on the NATO Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre
(Council Document, 15812/07, 2007). The system was supported by the creation of a database where
all lessons learned were stored, the European Lessons Management Application (ELMA) (Council
Document, 14384/08, 2008).
On the civilian side, the earliest EU official document found containing reference to CSDP lessons
learned was the conceptualisation of missions in the field of Rule of Law (Council Document,
14513/02, 2002). In this first section dedicated to lessons learned, attention is given to both learning
from others with more experience in crisis management, such as the UN, and to establishing internal
mechanisms and procedures to learn from the EU experience itself. This was followed in 2003 by the
Report on planning and mission support capability for civilian crisis management (Council Document,
13835/03, 2003). Herein, the PSC describes lessons learned as top priority, previously identified by
the Secretary General/High Representative (SG/HR). Also dating from 2003, the Suggestions for
procedures for coherent, comprehensive EU crisis management, assign to the PSC the mandate to
request Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) to evaluate lessons learned
(Council Document, 11127/03, 2003). Moreover, the Civilian Headline Goal 2010 (2007) includes a
robust and systematic lessons learned process, in the means necessary to improve the quality of
CSDP missions. Its predecessor, the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 (2004), also referred to the need for a
more systematic implementation of the lessons identified, both from missions and operations and
from the Civilian Headline Goals process itself. The references to lessons learned in the first years of
CSDP focus on the importance and relevance of conducting lessons learned, but do not delineate
how this should be carried out. Lessons learned are mentioned in reference to civilian missions, while
no reference is made to lessons learned for military operations in this nascent period of CSDP (1999-
2003).
2008 saw the first official EU document dedicated to setting the standards for lessons learned
procedures regarding CSDP civilian missions. The Guidelines for identification and implementation of
lessons and best practices in civilian ESDP missions (Council Document, 15897/08 2008; hereafter the
Guidelines) were preceded a few months earlier by a document from the general Secretariat of the
Council to the PSC titled, Towards an architecture for evaluation of civilian ESDP missions (Council
Document, 11207/08, 2008). This prior Council document outlines the existing tools to conduct
lessons learned, while highlighting the lack of a conceptual framework to combine all the tools into a
coherent system and systematise their use. The Guidelines thus aim to fill this gap with regard to
20
civilian missions; military operations are not included in this document. The Guidelines set the
rationale that should underpin the identification of lessons learned as well as the process that should
be followed for each step, from identification through analysis, to implementation. The stated
purpose of formalising and standardising the learning processes is to introduce a culture of
improvement of practice reflecting the high political ambition of ESDP, [...], while at the same time
maintain a light and flexible structure (2008: 2). The document also refers to an internal
methodology document that should explain in more detail the steps taken to complete the lessons
cycle. However, this internal methodology document is restricted, rendering it impossible to say
which directions it contains.
The Guidelines aim to be fairly comprehensive in describing the entire cycle of identifying lessons
and subsequently learning. They delineate the process of conducting lessons learned as follows: The
cycle of lessons learned and best practices starts with the identification of lessons and continues with
their analysis, endorsement, implementation and dissemination. To ensure that the learning cycle is
complete, a further step is to transform the lessons learned into new or revised policies, working
methods and best practices and to disseminate them,(2008). Various new tools for capturing and
integrating lessons were suggested. Among them were mentioned, the creation of Best Practice
officers in each mission, the writing of thematic reports applicable across missions, and the creation
of a restricted website to store all lessons learned documents. The document, however, fails to
specify which actors are in the lead for each phase of the learning cycle, or what resources will be
dedicated to these activities. These problems remain only partially resolved to this day. For example,
Best Practice officers are appointed by the Head of Mission according to need (hence not
systematically) and even in the best cases they are double if not triple-hatted officers with other tasks
in their dossier(
4
). This new conceptual framework for formalising knowledge management was built
on the existing practices for military operations of the EUMS, and also on the experience of
international institutions such as the UN and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) (Council Document, 15987/08, 2008). In 2003, a prolonged dialogue took place with the OSCE
and the UN on lessons learned and best practices with regard to crisis management (Grevi, Helly and
Keohane, 2009 : 101).
The 2008 Guidelines establish that all reports on lessons learned should inform a comprehensive
annual report. To date, two annual reports have been produced: for 2009 and 2010(
5
). At the time of
writing, the 2011 annual report is under way. The first annual report included a review of the ongoing
missions and key lessons identified therein, as well as a review of the implementation of the lessons
learned procedures as described in the Guidelines. For 2009, it is clear that lessons learned were not
yet a systematic practice and some of the proposed tools (for example, the civilian website database)
were not yet implemented. A number of concepts were revised during 2009. However, it is not clear
whether such revisions were driven by a formal process of learning lessons from previous
experiences. The annual report highlights how, until 2009, lessons focused in particular regarding
types of missions (with a focus on rapid deployment, particularly small as well as big missions), types
of mandates (with a focus on police, SSR, rule of law, monitoring) and mission support issues of
relevance across missions regardless of type, size or mandate. (2009: 22) As will be shown in
Component II, these focuses reverberate back through lessons identified in missions and operations,
at times with notable regularity. From the 2009 report, it emerges that, in the previous years,
missions lessons learned reports have identified lessons at the strategic and operational planning

4
EULEX Kosovo is currently the only exception, as it has a dedicated team of officers for best practices and training.
5
Both the 2009 and 2010 annual reports are only partially declassified, thus the analysis brought forward in this paper is
based on the material that is accessible to the public.
21
levels. However, the 2009 annual report emphasises areas at the strategic planning level, where
improvement is still needed in addressing lessons, such as the planning phase, press and public
information, horizontal issues and third parties (Council Document, 16927/09, 2011). At the
operational planning and conduct level, more attention should be paid to identifying and
implementing lessons in the following areas: chain of command, co-operation between actors,
training, rapid deployment, operational planning phase, conduct, finance and procurement, third
parties, training and recruitment, press and public information, logistics and communication, and
security. Further, an attempt is being made to formalise the closure of the lessons learning cycle with
the introduction of various dedicated tools. These include intentions to follow through with the
recommendation to appoint a designated lessons learned and Best Practice officer in each mission,
and the joint Council Secretariat-Commission Traffic Lights documents. These documents address a
number of issues afflicting CSDP intervention and track the steps taken to solve the issues and
implement solutions.
The second annual report of 2010 shifts its attention towards broadening and improving the system
of learning. It proposes the introduction of benchmarking at the operational level and conducting an
impact assessment for each mission. The 2010 annual report also identifies areas in the learning cycle
that need more attention. Implementation of lessons is stated to be the area that needs most
significant improvement, especially when it comes to strengthening the concepts that underpin
CSDP missions, such as Mentoring Monitoring and Evaluating (MMA) and Security Sector Reform
(SSR). Thematic lessons reports are strongly encouraged to capture horizontal lessons relevant for
multiple missions, such as lessons on SSR, MMA and crisis management best practices of EU partners.
The 2010 annual report envisages more cooperation between the civilian and military CSDP
concerning lessons learned. The common 2011 annual report incorporates lessons from both
experiences.
2.3 Independent literature
Many external commentators have discussed and studied European Defence Policy and CSDP
missions and operations over the past 10 years (Grevi, Helly and Keohane, 2009; Asseburg and
Kempin, 2011; Menon, 2011; Bossong, 2012; among others). In a few papers, academics, think tanks
or NGOs focus exclusively on the EU process of learning lessons (Bossong, 2012; Smith, 2011;
Raemmler, 2010; Arteaga, 2011). There seems to be widespread agreement on the need for the EU to
have functional and standardised processes in place to capture lessons and learn from them. This is
seen as crucial if the EU aims to be a competitive and credible crisis management actor. In this sense,
the EU would appear to be responding to these calls. However, some commentators have started to
ask if the formalisation of the processes in standardised procedures is really necessary or even useful
(Bossong, 2012). This doubt stems from the recognition that informal practices for lessons learned
have been in place since the first operations and missions, and they are still widely relied upon by
staff in Brussels and the field as a pragmatic way of conveying problems and proposing possible
solutions.
Informal practices are often essential to identifying lessons, disseminating and integrating them in
planning and change of policies and concepts. Commentators have come to wonder if these informal
practices are actually more effective and productive than formalised ones (Smith, forthcoming). In
several instances, interviewees have confirmed the wide use of informal mechanisms, such as
information sharing within personal networks, for learning and improving various phases of CSDP. It
remains unclear to what extent these informal strategies catalyse real change since they cannot be
methodically tracked or accounted for. Also informal mechanisms are highly dependent on personal
relationships, posing doubts about reliability and reach. Formal and informal mechanisms are
22
preferred according to the area of learning and on the sensitivity of the lessons identified. In his
recently published study, Bossong identifies the proliferation of the number of missions as the main
obstacle to the informal processes of learning (2012: 18). Together with the role of informal practices
of learning, Bossong points out how the high profile of those advocating and leading the learning
processes is vital for its success. However, commentators still point at the fact that only a few of the
many proposals contained in the 2008 Guidelines have become operative (Bloching, 2011; Keohane,
2011).
While describing lessons learned practices with regard to EU SSR missions, Babaud has demonstrated
how lessons learned are predominantly an EU internal affair, as most relevant documents and reports
are confidential and classified (2009). In practice, this restriction means lessons learned documents
are available only to staff within a limited number of EU bodies, mainly EEAS structures. This
protectionist approach can get in the way of institutional and horizontal learning, as documents
cannot reach relevant people, including EU staff outside of the crisis management structures.
Accountability and transparency are also victims of the classification of lessons learned documents.
2.4 Evolution in the learning processes
The necessity of learning from experience was clear from the time the rationale for CSDP missions
was defined. In the first few years of CSDP activities, however, the processes of evaluating and
learning from the EUs performance in crisis management did not follow precise procedures. Yet, this
did not prevent the EU from learning. On the contrary, a number of lessons-learned reports were
written for civilian missions, with a special focus on the planning phase. For the EU Police Mission in
Bosnia and Herzegovina lessons learned reports were redacted during the planning phase, after the
first 100 days and again after the first year. Interviewees who were involved in planning and
conducting civilian missions in these first few years confirmed that lessons learned were carried out
and that the informal systems in place succeeded in bringing about change in the procedures and
policies concerning CSDP missions. An example of this learning-based progress can be seen in the
evolution from pure policing missions, like EUPM BiH to more comprehensive and integrated Rule of
Law missions such as EULEX Kosovo (Council Document, November 2006, press release).
It was with the sharp increase in the number and complexity of missions and operations, between
2005 and 2006, that the actors involved recognised the need for a more formalised process of
knowledge management. The discussions that followed resulted in the codification of the processes
and procedures to be followed in order to capture lessons learned and to disseminate them. The
2008 Guidelines provided a conceptual framework and rationale for dedicating specific resources to
lessons learning processes for civilian missions. One reason for this change was the augmentation of
staff within the crisis management structures and the fast turnover of personnel both in Brussels and
at mission level. Institutional memory became more difficult to retain, requiring a new system to
guarantee the continual improvement of CSDP engagement.
The expansion of CSDP activities into new areas brought about other issues that spurred the
standardisation of lessons learned processes. By opening the way to theatres of intervention beyond
EU neighbours, such as Aceh in Indonesia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, the missions
complexity and confrontation with unfamiliar obstacles increased. For example, the need to exert
political leverage beyond Europes traditional realm of influence brought on new challenges in Africa
and Asia (see case study on EUSEC and EUPOL RD Congo in Component II). Both the resources
dedicated and the relevance of CSDP missions were put under stress, and the EU was pressed to
reform its review mechanisms to increase efficiency and sustainability (interview with EU official, 1
February 2012). This process resulted in the agreement to build a more cohesive architecture for
23
identifying and learning lessons. Stated in the Council Conclusions on CSDP of December 2011, The
Council also recognises the need to continuously improve the performance of CSDP missions and
operations, including through evaluation of outcomes, benchmarking, impact assessment,
identifying and implementing lessons learned and developing best practices for effective and
efficient CSDP action, (Council Document, 17991/11, 2011).
24
3. THE PROCESS OF LEARNING LESSONS
Lessons learning processes attempt to assess most aspects of CSDP missions and operations. In
general, there is a tendency to standardise and formalise the process as much as possible at all levels.
More recently, attention has shifted from methodically collecting lessons to ensuring
implementation. There is a common recognition that implementation of lessons needs more effort.
Unless the lessons identified are translated into changes in practice and policies they cannot be
considered learned. In particular, lessons need to be integrated in the revision of the concepts
underpinning CSDP.
3.1 Areas of learning
As pointed out in the 2009 annual report with regard to civilian intervention, lessons have been
identified especially in the strategic and operational planning as well as in the missions conduct
phase. In the strategic planning phase, lessons have been identified concerning press and public
information, horizontal issues, the planning procedures and third parties. In the operational planning
phase, lessons identified have focused on the chain of command, cooperation between EU actors,
training, rapid deployment, operational planning phase and conduct. At the level of conduct of
missions and operations, lessons have emerged in the areas of finance and procurement, third
parties, training and recruitment, press and public information, logistics and communication, and
security. As it will be shown in the Component II, a number of recurrent themes run through the
lessons identified in the case studies (see Annex II, Matrix). These themes correspond to a large extent
with the themes that are pointed out in the 2009 annual report.
A number of areas had not yet been targeted by lessons learned cycles in 2009, such as lessons from
the political/strategic level, issues concerning Member States, mission support and conduct(
6
). The
2010 annual report attempts to address these missed areas. However, even with this report in place,
lessons learned are still not effectively carried out at the strategic/political level or with regard to
missions mandates (interview with EEAS staff, 24 January 2012). As one can see in the lessons
overview in Annex II, reviews in almost every case study address the feasibility and scope of the
mandates. The (initial) mandates of some operations were too broad and ambiguous (e.g. EUPM).
Others were very concrete and narrowly defined (e.g. EUJUST LEX-Iraq). Furthermore, reviews of
mandates also touch on the adequacy of the mandates (e.g. EUPOL Afghanistan and EUFOR
Tchad/RCA) and the combination of short- and long long-term impact (e.g. EUPOL COPPS). Clearly
these are more sensitive areas, and it was acknowledged during interviews that it is more difficult to
formalise the process of learning when it comes to the decision-making process of launching a
mission and writing the mandate. An interviewee suggested that the lack of a formalised process of
learning at the political level does not mean that learning and improving does not take place
(interview with EEAS official, 26 January 2012). In this sphere, informal mechanisms are used by the
actors involved in order to bring change and improvement. Such informal mechanisms involve
personal relationships and corridor talks, the impact of which cannot be accounted. On the side of
military operations, exercises are run at the political/strategic level, namely among the EU
institutional level players, including the PSC, Crisis Management Board, Crisis Platform, CIVCOM,
EUMC, Politico-Military Group, CMPD, EUMS, and CPCC. These exercises have been described as
crucial for capturing lessons at the political/strategic level, however the decision making process for

6
In the version of the document accessible to the public, further explanation on these three areas is classified so further
comments on what are the lessons that need more attention in these areas are not possible.
25
launching an operation or the process of writing the mandate remain unaddressed (interview EEAS
staff, 24 January 2012).
An area that has been at the centre of lessons learning processes has been the funding and financial
mechanisms for both missions and operations. Financing has been an issue for many missions and
operations, to the point that a special unit within the Council, ATHENA, has been created for military
operations. This unique unit is exclusively tasked to manage a common fund used to speed up the
process of procurement and deployment. ATHENAs inception can be attributed to experience of the
first operations launched in 2003 and the lessons thus derived.
The proposal is based on the model approved by the Council in June 2002 for the financing of
common costs of EU military operations on a case-by-case basis, as interpreted in the course of
operations CONCORDIA and ARTEMIS to address practical problems and as amended to abide by the
Council decision of 22 September. It aims at providing the EU with the means to finance common
costs as from the initial phase of any operation and with the flexibility to meet operational
challenges, while avoiding any extra costs and maintaining a strict and constant control by the
Member States, acting unanimously, on spending, (Council Document, 13668/03, 2003)
In addition to being the response to a lesson identified, ATHENA also runs its own internal lessons
learning cycle. Because of its small size, approximately 10 staff members, the process of learning is
fairly agile, informal and at the same time direct. ATHENA is supposed to review its mechanisms every
three years, but in the first eight years of activity its Council Decision Mandate has been adjusted four
times. Each review process resulted in the adoption of Council amendments to improve its functions
and efficiency(
7
). A special committee formed by representatives of Member States monitors the use
of the ATHENA fund for common costs. What can be funded under the common cost banner is
specified in a list, agreed upon by the participating Member States. What is or is not on the list is a
politically sensitive consideration. Hence, while implementing lessons has been a fairly
straightforward process for ATHENA, adding items to the list of common costs is, reasonably, more
resistant to quick change.
In the case of civilian missions, financial oversight falls under the European Commission. The Foreign
Policy Instrument (FPI) unit of the European Commission is responsible for the financing of CSDP in
general. One interviewee identified this arrangement as not suited for purpose, and thus a prominent
source of issues that hamper the operational capacity of missions (interview with EEAS official, 20
January 2012). Several cases reviewed in Component II, for example, AMM Aceh, EUBAM Moldova-
Ukraine, and EULEX, mention financial flexibility as an area for learning. This topic was also frequently
brought up by interviewees. In 2007, a common recognition emerged among the involved EU bodies
that a number of issues concerning mission support needed to be addressed. This led to a joint
exercise between the (then) Directorate-General for the External Relations (DG RELEX) of the Council
Secretariat and FPI of the Commission (interview with EU official, 9 February 2012). The exercise
aimed at finding solutions to specific problems identified. A Traffic Light Document was
subsequently produced and reviewed every six months to track the state of each issue (Council
Document, 16927/09, 2011). Traffic Light Documents cannot be accessed by the wider public(
8
).

7
Available documents: Council of the European Union, 2004. ATHENA: Review; Council of the European Union, 2004.
Council Decision amending Decision 2004/197/CFSP establishing a mechanism to administer the financing of the common
costs of the European Union operations having military or defence implications (ATHENA); Council of the European Union,
2006. ATHENA - Review 2006 - Outcome of proceedings; Council of the European Union, 2007. COUNCIL DECISION
amending Decision 2004/197/CFSP establishing a mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of European
Union operations having military or defence implications (ATHENA)
8
The team responsible for this study could not access the documents in question.
26
However, most of the measures needed for solving the issues were considered to be implemented
within the purview of the actors involved in the exercise, and this process was completed in 2009.
With regards to operational support, the official and formal way of recording and learning lessons is
not producing desired changes, particularly with regards to financial mechanisms issues affecting
missions. In AMM Aceh (2005), EULEX Kosovo (2008) and EUMM Georgia (2008), among others,
lessons concerning the complexity and sluggishness of procurement procedures were identified. Yet,
FPI the Commission unit in charge of mission budgets, has no access to the lessons documents nor is
consulted during the redaction of lessons learned reports, neither from CPCC nor CMPD(
9
). Financial
mechanisms issues identified in the missions can reach FPI in two ways: a) Through regular contact
between FPI staff and CPCC staff, whereby FPI provides budgeting and resource management advice
and support; b) through FPIs seat in CIVCOM meetings where lessons documents are discussed and
agreed upon.
Because the financial regulations were not set up for crisis management activities, they are widely
considered by the actors involved as inflexible and ill-fit for the context of crisis management
(interview with EEAS official, 20 January 2012). However, changing the financial regulations has
proven a difficult task. Any change has to fall within the existing financial regulations and needs to be
a co-decision of the Council and the European Parliament. The regulations are meant to be applicable
across several fields, such as agriculture and fisheries. This rigidity, coupled with the fact that FPI is
not accountable to the Council, encumbers the opportunity to change and learn from the
experiences of the missions with regard to procurement and finance (interview with EU official, 9
February 2012).
Since an early stage of CSDP, lessons have been repeatedly identified about the lack of available
personnel for civilian crisis management as well as about the inadequate or inconsistent level of
training of the seconded staff from Member States. While the EUMS engages closely with National
Ministers of Defence via the EUMC, there is no comparable engagement of the CPCC with Ministers of
Interior or Foreign Affairs, often the ports of call for national secondments. Among examples of
staffing gaps are EUPOL Proxima (in administration, finance, communications, IT and transport), EU
SSR Guinea Bissau (which had a staffing shortage of nearly a fifth of key positions) and EULEX Kosovo.
In other cases (e.g. EUSEC and EUPOL RD Congo) the limited resources prompted the sharing of staff
in certain common functions. With regard to the level of training of the seconded staff, several cases
(i.e. AMM Aceh, EUPOL COPPS) show that seconded staff lacked certain types of expertise (e.g. on
human rights or gender issues). Furthermore, the cases of EUSEC and EUPOL RD Congo and EUPOL
Afghanistan show a lack intercultural mediators to bridge possible cultural gaps between the EU and
the local situation.
The Civilian Headline Goal (CHG) 2008 and 2010 aimed at addressing these issues, among others, by
planning and developing the necessary civilian capabilities for future CSDP missions. The CHG 2008
gives a set of guidelines and recommendations for Member States more effective recruitment of
personnel. The objective of the CHG process was to identify the specific requirements for potential
mission scenarios. Member States were then expected to declare their capacity to collectively cover
all the requirements. Despite these efforts, recruitment and training of personnel remain issues. In
2009, Korski and Gowan pointed out that the CHG was not succeeding in improving the availability of
trained personnel for civilian missions. As a supplementary means to solve the recruitment gap
annual High-Level seminars have been launched in 2009 on Facilitating the deployment of civilian

9
FPI has its own evaluations, conducted by external consultants, of the efficiency of CSDP and the soundness of its
financial management systems.
27
personnel for CSDP (Council document, 16109/11, 2011). The aim of the seminars is to give an
opportunity to Member States to identify common problems and learn from each others progress
(Ibid.: 4). Responsibilities for recruitment and training fall primarily to the Member States, while in
Brussels CMPD identifies which missions require in-mission specialisation training or pre-deployment
training.
Training of new and current mission staff is another means for the transmission and implementation
of lessons. The use of in-mission training for these purposes has been identified multiple times as
crucial to ensure the quality and standards of mission staff (interviews with EEAS staff, 18 January
2012, 20 January 2012). Moreover, trainings within missions and also for staff of the EEAS crisis
management bodies, could benefit from a section dedicated to understanding and supporting the
lessons learning processes. In 2011, Europes New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management
(ENTRi) was launched to respond to the need for standardised and rigorous training of crisis
management personnel. ENTRi is sponsored by the European Commission and 13 participating
Member States, and its courses are also open to UN-DPKO, OSCE and AU personnel. This new training
system is an example of productive coordination between FPI, CMPD and Member States in order to
improve CSDP capacity and effectiveness. However in a workshop held in February 2012 on training
effectiveness, a series of challenges were highlighted. Among them, the unsystematic use of ENTRi by
Member States deploying personnel, the still insufficient number of qualified staff members for
missions, and the fact that a third of seconded staff is deployed without adequate training. Moreover,
while Member States are responsible for developing the course curricula through participating
training institutes, they are not able to use lessons learned documents of CSDP missions or
operations in order to incorporate the lessons and best practices that emerged from previous CSDP
experience.
There seems to be limited capacity for vertical learning between the strategic and the operational
level. One consequence of this disconnect is reflected in critiques of mission mandates, alluded to
above. Interviewees pointed out how mandates are written in most cases on the basis of abstract
concepts and are not informed by knowledge derived from the operational realities at mission level
(interview with EEAS staff, 20 January 2012; interview with mission staff, 13 February 2012). The
bridges between the operational/mission level and the strategic/mandate-writing level should be
further strengthened to help ensure that mandated tasks reflect realistic capabilities on the ground.
For example, in EULEX Kosovo, witness protection capacities were initially underestimated, and the
mission was not fully capable to carry out its tasks without eventual adjustments (see EULEX case
study, Component II).
3.2 Different actors, different methods
The EEAS structures involved directly in lessons learned processes are CMPD, CPCC and EUMS. These
three bodies collaborate with each other on lessons learned cycles, and at the same time their lessons
learned activities often run parallel to each other.
3.2.1 The European Union Military Staff (EUMS)
EUMS has drawn from military experience in conducting evaluations and lesson learning processes,
including that of NATO. Hence, since the launch of Concordia FYROM in 2003, lessons in military
operations have been identified and integrated in a more methodical manner(
10
) than for civilian

10
Powever, ln Lhe flrsL few years of acLlvlLy of CSu operaLlons lessons learned processes were hlghly bureaucraLlc, malnly
a boxchecklng exerclse (lnLervlew wlLh LLAS offlclal, 24 !anuary 2012).
28
missions. The fact that military personnel train together on their specific area of expertise facilitates
the horizontal exchange of experience and lessons sharing. Exercises are particularly effective to this
end and also for finding solutions to the lessons that emerged in previous operations. In 2008, the
first exercise focusing on the cooperation between a Military Operational Headquarter and the
Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability was carried out (Council Document, 14384/08, 2008). The
yearly military exercise of 2010 (MILEX 10) aimed explicitly to exercise and evaluate military aspects
of EU crisis management at the military strategic and operational level based on a scenario for an
envisaged EU-led crisis management operation. (Council Document, 8443/10, 2009). For 2012, the
aim is to involve all levels in the exercise, from the political strategic level to the Civ/Mil strategic level
and the Civ/Mil operational level (interview with EEAS official, 24 January 2012).
Since 2007, EUMS can also count on the restricted website, European Lessons Management
Application (ELMA), as a tool to access and address lessons. In the first few years of existence, ELMA
was simply a receptacle for lessons identified. The cycle of learning was not systematically closed
through the implementation of the lessons. Also there was no quality control on the lessons that
were entered in the database, which often resulted in repetitive and superficial lessons. Between
2009 and 2010, the EUMS worked toward a coherent framework for the use of the tool. The new
concept focused more on the quality of the lessons entered in the system, as well as on the
completion of the cycle of learning by tracking each step of the process (see Annex I: Visualisation).
The database follows a lesson from its inception (lesson observation), through its analysis (when the
root causes of the problem are assessed and identified), to its implementation and integration. In this
way, the system can point to obstructions in the process of learning as well as highlight the
successful implementation of a lesson. Each step involves relevant actors to ensure the inclusion of all
aspects and expertise, but also as a quality check. In the first stages, lessons observations go through
the assessment of the EU Military Committee and each lesson has to be agreed upon unanimously by
the Member State representatives in the EUMC. The database tracks the cycle of each lesson,
including the action plan that is developed to address the issue identified by the lesson. Lessons are
also subdivided into categories, such as concepts, training, systems, personnel etc., in order to target
the area(s) where change is necessary and follow up so as to close the cycle of learning. To guide this
complex process, EUMS has established a Lessons Learned Cell.
The Cell is comprised of two standing dedicated officers, who respond to the deputy director
responsible for the integration of lessons. Within the military structures, there are points of contact in
each functional area for lessons learned, for example, within movement and transportation, medical
and health, logistics, engineering, situational awareness etc. The point-of-contact officers are all
double-hatted, involved in the planning or operational phase and in the analysis of lessons. This
double role brings its risks, as it can mean officers contributing to the lessons learned cycle are
somewhat protective in describing their own role. To counteract that, more training on the topic of
lessons learned processes has helped to encourage more personal responsibility and accountability,
and also stronger critical analysis in the identification of lessons. In the process of lesson learning, the
concept developed by EUMS tries to involve as many stakeholders and relevant parties as possible.
Lessons observations for example can be drawn from Member States, ATHENA, Operational
Headquarters, CMPD and of course EUMS itself (interview with EEAS official, 24 January 2012).
According to the concept developed by EUMS, the cycle of learning should be initiated according to
operational requirements. Therefore, operational commanders should be trigger points to initiate the
process. More pro-activity at this level is needed to guarantee the methodical identification of
lessons. However, that would reportedly entail a mindset shift away from considering lessons
identified as a negative reflection of ones performance (be it officers involved in the operations, or
29
Member States) to considering lessons learned processes as an opportunity for improvement. At the
other end of the process, lessons need to be more pro-actively disseminated to relevant actors to
ensure that the lessons are institutionalised. However, at the moment a clear strategy to identify the
recipient of each lesson still needs to be developed, as ELMA does not include a targeted
dissemination mechanism.
It was reflected by EEAS interviewees that, during the planning phases, there is no time to conduct
lessons cycles or consult lessons learned documents (interviews with EEAS staff, 24 January 2012; 20
January 2012). Rather, officers involved in the planning phases have the lessons in their minds
(interviews with EEAS staff, 24 January 2012; 20 January 2012). It was widely argued that between
missions there is more time available for reflection and analysis of lessons identified during
deployment. Military exercises represent an opportunity to experiment and identify lessons and also
think over lessons and learn new strategies. It was noted, however, that the civilian counterparts
(mainly CPCC) rarely are able to fully participate in exercises. The large number of on-going civilian
missions and the CPCCs comparatively small staff translates into limited staff availability. Seminars,
such as that held by EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) on EUFOR Tchad, have also been
identified as a crucial space where the learning process can be supported, promoted and reinforced.
On the operational side, the European Defence Agency (EDA) has proved to be an effective partner in
finding solutions to lessons identified during operations. Placed outside of EEAS, and not officially
involved in the cycle of learning lessons, EDA works to address challenges identified in military
operations and offer more efficient and cost-effective options. For example, the experiences in
Afghanistan and in Libya exposed issues in the use of helicopters (see EUPOL Afghanistan case study,
Component II). While technical issues about the helicopters themselves were addressed by NATO,
EDA addressed the lack of training of the pilots by organising training programmes focused on the
specific technology and conditions of operations. Although EDA does not receive lessons learned
documents, they have a seat in the EUMC and thereby keep abreast of topical issues discussed in the
meetings. Also personal networks and relationships of the EDA staff play an important role in
identifying the areas where EDA can provide solutions, enabling them to concentrate on the areas
where they can make a difference (interview with EU official, 2 February 2012).
3.2.2 Civilian Planning and Conduct Capabilities (CPCC)
CPCC is the body within EEAS that manages the operational planning and conduct of CSDP civilian
missions. Civilian missions represent a much larger portion of CSDP intervention. However, as
compared to EUMS, civilian mechanisms and concepts for lessons learned are more embryonic.
Lessons from civilian missions are collected after the planning phase as well as after the end of a
mission. These lessons are then passed to CIVCOM for discussion and approval and finally sent to PSC,
and the process is becoming increasingly systematic. Also 6-month reports from the Heads of Mission
include a section on lessons learned. This section does not contain a pre-determined template for
what kind of lessons the component should contain, which leaves space for some flexibility and
context-specific analysis. However, the sections are kept brief and there is the risk of important but
more technical issues not finding their way to CPCC. Lessons pertaining to a more strictly operational
level tend to stay within the mission. The lessons that are shared with CPCC are those concerning
strategic issues where the bodies in Brussels can have an impact. This retention of mission experience
within the mission hampers the opportunity to learn horizontally among missions (interview with
mission official, 13 February 2012).
At the moment, there is no repository for the lessons learned reports that arrive from the missions. A
database modelled on ELMA is being developed for civilian missions (CiLMA). It is not yet clear who
30
will take the lead in using CiLMA, and there is as yet no clear vision about who will be responsible for
which aspect between CPCC and CMPD. The database alone will not compel people to consult the
documents in their work. In fact, in several interviews the admission was made that lessons learned
documents are not necessarily consulted on a regular basis by those involved in the planning and
conduct of missions (interviews with EEAS staff, 20 January 2012; 24 January 2012; 26 January 2012).
Interviews suggest that those involved in planning and conduct of a mission count more on what
he/she has retained in his/her mind of the lessons identified in previous missions. This personal
knowledge is often shared with other members of CPCC in informal ways, through dialogue,
meetings, and exchange of experiences among officials. An example of the latter is the mission in
South Sudan (AMIS), where communication has been promoted between those involved in the
planning phase and officers who were involved in a similar mission in Afghanistan. To promote this
exchange of knowledge, CPCC is about to launch an internal chat room, where the staff can share
experiences, lessons and best practices. This informal system allows the discussion of sensitive issues
that otherwise may be censored out of official lessons learned documents (interview with EEAS
official, 26 January 2012). Recurrent visits to the missions, contact between the Head of operations,
the Civilian Operational Commander, his Deputy and the Head of Missions and internal reviews are
some of the additional mechanisms to identify the areas that most need intervention and
improvement.
The Head of Operation holds monthly meetings with each mission, while within CPCC the Head of
Operation meets weekly with the Heads of Section. During these meetings, issues arising from the
conduct of the mission, best practices and lessons are discussed. An obstacle to a more systematic
process of learning lessons is the limit on the resources available to CPCC for the task. All lessons
learned officers are double- if not triple-hatted. Having full time officers within CPCC dedicated to
learning lessons, with an appropriate mandate and sufficient tools and skills to fulfil that mandate,
would go a long way to improve the quality and regularity of the effort. At mission level, Best Practice
officers are rarely appointed, EULEX Kosovo is the only mission that has a Best Practice and Training
Office comprising a handful of dedicated officers. However, to incorporate these functions into the
mission, the initial EULEX Operational Plan was amended (interview mission staff, 13 February 2012).
The lessons learned material is passed to CMPD to inform the Annual Report on Lessons Learned and
for thematic reports (see Annex I: Visualisation). CPCC does not share every lesson identified with
CMPD. The decision about which lessons are deemed for internal use only is based on perceived
relevance to CMPD, or if it is exclusively an internal technical issue (interview with EEAS official, 26
January 2012). Before the lessons reports reach CMPD, the documents are passed to CIVCOM for the
approval of the Member States. It has been noted that this practice results in a significant watering
down of content of the lessons learned. Hence, what CMPD ultimately receives is felt to be heavily
edited and, at times, censored. If reports are too far removed from reality, lessons cannot play a role
in improving missions (interview with EEAS official, 24 January 2012). This seems to be particularly
true for political lessons, which carry a higher level of sensitivity for Member States (interview with
EEAS official, 24 January 2012). Around political issues the learning process operates at an informal
level, based on person-to-person negotiations and dialogue. In contrast, the assessment of the Iraq
police-training programme was pointed out as a very beneficial and successful evaluation process
precisely because of the openness in the review, and the changes in practice that resulted. CIVCOM
advises on steps to be taken in response to lessons identified or can ask for follow up. In the case of
the closing of the Guinea Bissau mission, CIVCOM suggested to CMPD to carry out a thematic
lessons-learned report on SSR, instead of a mission-specific report. Member States can be the trigger
for initiating lessons learned processes through CIVCOM or EUMC. There is an increasing interest
31
from Member States in the efficiency and relevancy of CSDP missions, especially concerning how
money is being used and what is achieved with it.
3.2.3 The Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD)
The establishment of CMPD aimed at improving military and civilian cooperation and increasing
alignment between the two types of actors. CMPD is the author of the main lessons learned reports
at the political and strategic level, such as the Annual Reports and thematic reports. However, at the
moment, CMPD lessons learned officers do not systematically receive the 6-month reports from the
Heads of Mission or from CPCC, nor lessons learned documents from military operations. For the
Annual Report, CPCC provides CMPD with pre-selected information about lessons identified and
learned in the past year. For 2009 and 2010, the Annual Report covered only civilian missions but for
2011 a joint military and civilian Annual Report is being redacted.
Previous to CMPD (which exists since 2010), mission-specific lessons reports tended to be carried out
after the planning phase and after a missions conclusion. Mission reports explicitly addressing the
mandate of the mission, such as the one redacted by the Directorate General of Civilian Crisis
Management (DG IX) in 2006 on EUPM BiH, have not been done since the institution of EEAS. CMPD
can initiate mission-specific lessons reports at any point in time, however to date CMPD has been
involved mainly in Annual Reports and thematic reports. This year, an end of mission report will be
redacted for EUPM BiH, planned to close summer 2012. Because many lessons are highly context
specific, CMPD has started carrying out thematic lessons learned, which aim to provide more widely
transferable lessons. The first thematic report concerned Human Rights and Gender mainstreaming
(Council Document, 17138/1/10, 2010), and a report is now being redacted about Security Sector
Reform. Currently strategic reviews of missions conducted by CMPD do not include a section on
lessons learned or identified. However, planners at the political/strategic level would benefit from
more systematic lessons learning procedures that capture past experiences of writing mandates and
decision-making processes of launching previous missions (interview with EEAS official, 24 January
2012).
The formal process of collecting lessons learned for a thematic report starts with a notification being
sent to all relevant parties by CMPD, informing them that a lessons learned process is being initiated.
It also organises an informal meeting with other EEAS bodies in order to discuss the aim of the report
and gather views on the reports scope and relevance. This is followed by sending a questionnaire to
the mission(s), asking as many people as possible from the mission to contribute, facilitating
comparisons between different sources within the mission. In Brussels, meetings are conducted with
the relevant EEAS bodies, the Council, the Commission as well as civil society organisations that have
a specific expertise in the country or region in question. The questionnaire is supplemented by a
team of CMPD officers visiting the mission(s) to meet with as many key parties as possible, including
key partners (NATO or UN for example), as well as local and national stakeholders, and NGOs. CMPD
also collects all the documents from CPCC, missions and others on lessons learned relevant to the
report. Once ready, the report is submitted to PSC for review and acceptance. No document to date
describes the division of labour between CMPD and CPCC or their specific tasks regarding lessons
learned processes (for an overview of the reporting lines for civilian missions, see Annex I:
Visualisation).
Also, from 2007/2008 onward, check lists have been used by CMPD in the planning phases of a new
mission to ensure that the planners take into consideration the key principles, as well as dos and
donts. These lists, however, are currently not used for mission reviews. Moreover, CMPD is involved
in the ongoing development of CiLMA. However, CMPD is lacking the human resources needed to
32
enter all the existing lessons into the database. At the moment, CMPD has only one officer who is
fully dedicated to lessons learned. All other officers involved are double-hatted.
CMPD is, furthermore, involved in the training of new and current missions staff, representing an
opportunity for the implementation of lessons identified in previous missions. CMPD is responsible
for identifying the type of training needed for each mission and gaps to be addressed through
training of missions personnel. However, the curriculum of the training courses and the training of
mission staff itself is the responsibility of Member States. In practice this can lead to inconsistent
quality of secondees from different Member States. As mentioned earlier, certain measures have
recently been taken to improve the quality and uniformity of training, notably the ENTRi programme.
However, classified lessons learned and best practices documents cannot be shared with the
institutes running the courses. The ability to build the curricula on existing experience from CSDP
missions would represent an area with strong potential for both reinforcing and improving current
lessons learned practices (interview with an ENTRi partner institute training & research fellow, 2
March 2012).

4. CONCLUSIONS
Learning lessons to improve performance was a goal since the inception of CSDP interventions. EU
civilian missions evolved before the concept for systematic lessons learned processes was fully in
place. The sharp increase in the number and scope of CSDP missions resulted in the awareness that
more formal and methodical evaluation and learning mechanisms were needed. Both the military
and the civilian side have developed more standardised and coherent mechanisms in the past few
years. The EUMS, benefitting from standard military practice, more resources and fewer active
operations, has been able to develop a more sophisticated process of learning lessons. On the civilian
side, CPCC concentrates on operational aspects of missions, strategic reviews, and supporting
missions lessons learning process such as the six-monthly lessons reports(
11
). Alternatively, CMPD
focuses on the strategic and political level, for example identifying lessons that contribute to the
development of concepts and policy. This situation creates some gaps and produces a less
streamlined process than that of the military. Despite the efforts undertaken to learn lessons in a
more methodical and systematic way, several aspects can still benefit from improvement.
Several challenges can be identified that could hamper the capacity for institutional learning within
CSDP. First, while lessons are identified and learned in various (thematic) areas, the political and
strategic level that involves decision-making processes, concept development, and the writing of
mission mandates is still under-represented in explicit lesson learned documentation. The human
resources dedicated to learning lessons at this level, for example within the CMPD, but also PSC and
CIVCOM, are not proportional to the daunting demands of the task at hand. Second, despite
attempts to homogenise the methodologies and tools used, the various actors conducting lessons
learned processes apply different methods, definitions and standards. Third, access to relevant
documents remains limited to the few actors involved in CSDP and this constrains the sharing of
information and also transparency. Fourth, there seems to be a perception that lessons learned
exercises are exclusively underlining the negative outcomes of missions and operations, which
appears to lead to Member States and other involved actors resisting the process.

11
CPCC, however, is not in charge of missions lessons learned processes, as it is for evaluation and quality control. It
simply undergirds the lesson learned process, which is the responsibility of the mission staff.
33
Overall, it can be concluded that improvement has been made, but that lessons learned practices and
tools have not yet been normalised and entrenched in the functioning of missions and operations.
Horizontal learning across missions remains a challenge as a result of both institutional culture and a
lack of resources. Lessons documents tend to be filtered and diluted as they move up from the
missions through the EEAS structures in Brussels depending on their sensitivity. Moreover, formal and
informal mechanisms exist next to each other. In some cases, such as for the political/strategic
sphere, they have proven to complement each other.

34
COMPONENT II: REVIEW OF CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

This section of the study addresses 21 past and present CSDP missions and operations to draw
generic lessons learned as a basis for identifying common elements of the lessons identified and
lessons learned. Among the 21 interventions are 14 civilian missions and 7 military operations. The
civilian case studies include, among others, seven police missions, two Security Sector Reform (SSR)
missions, two border missions, two monitoring missions and two Rule of Law missions. By analysing
the lesson learning processes of each mission/operation and the content of the lessons, this
component seeks to identify common themes and facilitate some cross comparison. An overview of
the types of lessons emerging from the review of each case study is provided in Annex II: Lessons
Overview Matrix.
The case studies follow a common analytical framework. Each case study gives a short description of
the mission/operation, after which an overview of the lessons learned process for that specific
mission/operation is presented under the heading Formal process of identifying lessons. In addition
to an overview of official EU lessons learned practices followed by the mission/operation, this section
addresses the nature of the process (ranging from ad hoc to a systematic and pre-planned process) as
well. After that, the content of a few prevalent themes of the lessons identified are listed under the
heading Identified lessons that have been documented. Every case study ends with an overview of
the lessons that have been learned (implemented into practice) under the heading Lessons
learned?, from either the experience from the missions/operations or from previous CSDP
missions/operations.
The case studies are analysed by a survey from the existing literature, including open official sources
of the EU, publications from research institutes and other academic literature(
12
). Additionally, several
interviews with EU officials and staff from missions have been carried out.

12
The authors did not have access to classified EU documents.
35
1. EUROPEAN UNION POLICE MISSION IN BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA (EUPM BIH)
The European Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was established as the first
ESDP mission on 1 January 2003 (Council Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP), following up on the UNs
International Police Task Force. After the initial period of three year, the EU decided to extend the
mission with a modified mandate and size, following an invitation by the BiH authorities. The
mandate of EUPM was extended again until 31 December 2011 and later on until 30 June 2012. As
part of a broad effort of the EU and others actors to address rule of law, EUPM primarily supports law
enforcement agencies in BiH. It devotes efforts in the fight against organised crime and corruption.
1.1 Formal process of identifying lessons
Bearing in mind that, as the first ESDP mission, EUPM might establish procedures and models for
future ESDP missions, the EU has issued several papers concerning lessons identified during the
EUPM. The first of these papers focused on the planning of EUPM, and was addressed by the
Secretariat and the Commission in a Joint Paper in April 2003 (Councils Secretariat Document
11206/03, 2003). A second review took place after the first 100 days of the mission and was carried
out by the Councils Secretariat, in cooperation with the EUPM Headquarters (HQ) in July 2003
(Councils Secretariat Document 11760/03, 2003). Almost a year later, in June 2004, the Police Unit of
the Council Secretariat, in cooperation with EUPM HQ and endorsed by the EUSRs office, issued a
third review regarding the first year of operation of the EUPM in BiH (Councils Secretariat Document
8247/04, 2004). The next lesson learning review was released by the Secretariat in November 2006
and considered the co-ordination and coherence between the military operation in BiH (EUFOR
Althea), the civilian mission in BiH (EUPM) and the EU Special Representative (EUSR) (Councils
Secretariat Document 15376/06, 2006). The latest reference to lesson learning for EUPM was made in
the annual EU report of 2009 on the identification and implementation of lessons and best practices
in civilian CSDP missions. It is suggested that there is an urgent need for a horizontal review on the
role of CSDP missions in supporting the fight against organised crime. However, as the 2010 report
on the identification and implementation of lessons and best practices remarks, such a review has
not been carried out to date.
It appears that the lesson learning process during the EUPM mission was not entirely ad hoc. The first
three papers on the subject refer to an ongoing review and lesson learning process of the EU Police
Mission. The timing of the lesson reviews seems to be based on the different phases of the mission:
after the planning phase, the opening phase (after 100 days) and after the first year of EUPM. In the
reviews, it becomes clear that the Political and Security Committee, the Councils Secretariat, the
Council and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) can be seen as the
driving forces behind the lesson learning process. They all stress the importance of regular
monitoring and reviewing of the EUPM. For example, CIVCOM initiated to make an Action Plan for
the PSC to follow-up on the review of the first year of EUPM (CIVCOM Document 15809/2/04, 2004).
Another recurring aspect is that the PSC tasked CIVCOM to examine and provide advice after each
review.
1.2 Identified lessons that have been documented
Considering both official and academic literature on EUPM the following main topics can be
identified when it comes to the lessons of the EUPM:
36
1.2.1 The planning phase of EUPM
Although EUPM had a relatively long planning period (from autumn 2001 until December 2002), it
faced several difficulties. In their Joint Paper on the planning phase of EUPM, the Secretariat and the
Commission state that this phase was an important learning experience for the EU, because many of
its lessons are relevant for other civilian or military EU crisis management missions (Councils
Secretariat Document 11206/03, 2003: 2). They reflected on several aspects of the planning process,
including fact finding missions, the EUPM planning team, procurement and financial arrangements.
One of the lessons from the planning of EUPM was the planning team recruitment ought to be more
flexible to attract appropriate civilian and police expertise. Another lesson was that the Fact Finding
Mission (FFM) lacked clear guidelines for structuring the work of the FFM team. Therefore, FFM teams
should leave Brussels with a clearly defined division of tasks and. A third lesson concerned the need
to increase the capacity in Brussels, in particular the recruitment of procurement experts, standby
staff for planning teams and better co-ordination with the Commission (Jansen, 2006 :18).
1.2.2 The mandate of EUPM and the co-ordination of EU actors in BiH
The initial broad and vague mandate of EUPM resulted in the lesson that the division of tasks has to
be precise in the mandates if there are more than one EU actors operating in one country (Orsini,
2006: 2). A lack of such a distinction of roles became problematic after the December 2004 launch of
the military operation in BiH, EUFOR Althea, as there was an overlap between EUPM and EUFORs
anti-organised crime operations (for further elaboration see EUFOR Althea, 2.5 of this Component).
The mandates were adjusted in the second half of 2005, focusing EUPM on police restructuring and
the fight against organised crime. Furthermore, it appears that the EU was unable to learn from other
international organisations such as the UN and OSCE. For instance, although the Brahimi Report
(2001) identifies the need for integrated rule of law teams, the initial mandate of EUPM did not take
this lesson of the UN into account (Juncos, 2007: 78). After the extension of the fist mandate of EUPM,
the mission included some rule of law experts who would support the mandate of the EUPM.
1.2.3 The execution of the mandate of EUPM
During the execution of the mandate the EU Police Mission encountered several problems. For
example, it became clear that the policing reforms of EUPM were hampered by the patchy interface
between Bosnian police agencies and the court system (Merlingen, 2009: 167). To improve this, EUPM
set up a Criminal Justice Interface Unit within the mission to enable it to improve relations between
prosecutors and the police. Furthermore, EUPM needed police officers with specialised skills and
management experience. However, the reality was that most officers sent to EUPM lacked the skills
and experience to effectively mentor, monitor and inspect Bosnias police management. Frequently
the personnel lacked sufficient English, the official language of the mission (Donlon, 2010: 28). The EU
failed to learn from the UNs experience on this account as well, as the UN requires officers to take an
English language test upon arrival (Juncos, 2007: 78; Orsini, 2006: 1).
1.3 Lessons learned?
As the first and longest EU crisis management mission, EUPM has shown a steep learning curve.
Some of the challenges that are mentioned above have been successfully tackled. The adjustment of
the mandate after the first mandate of EUPM and the adjustment to a regional approach after 2005
are examples of this. The experiences and lessons from EUPM have also been used, although not
always successfully, during the (preparation of) the EUPOL Proxima mission in FYROM that was
37
launched in December 2003 (Councils Secretariat 6592/06, 2006: Annex IV, p. 3). Lessons can also be
recognised in the current practices of EULEX Kosovo (see EULEX case study).
The emphasis that Council, the Secretariat, the PSC and CIVCOM placed on identifying lessons and
learning from them, especially during the first year of EUPM, has undoubtedly increased the ability to
learn from experiences during EUPM. However, it should also be noted that the EU was unable to
learn from other international organisations during the first phase of EUPM, as it did not incorporate
lessons from the Brahimi Report (2001) that stressed the need for highly qualified personnel,
integrated rule of law teams and efficient procurement systems.
38
2. EUFOR CONCORDIA IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF
MACEDONIA (FYROM)
At the request of the FYROM government, Operation Concordia took over from NATOs Allied
Harmony Operation on 18 March 2003 (Council Joint Action 2003/92/CFSP). Operation Concordia was
to contribute to a stable, secure environment and to allow the implementation of the August 2011
Ohrid Framework Agreement. Twenty-six countries, including all EU member states except Ireland and
Denmark, contributed to approximately 350 lightly armed military personnel for the operation.
Concordia was the European Unions first operation that made use of NATO assets and capabilities
under the Berlin Plus agreements. The operation terminated on 15 December 2003 and was
followed by the first European police mission, EUPOL Proxima.
Only a few weeks before the end of operation Concordia on 15 December 2003, the Political and
Security Committee (PSC) officially initiated the lessons learned process for the operation. This
resulted in several documents: (1) a report of the Councils Secretariat on political, political-military
and institutional lessons identified on 13 February 2004 (Councils Secretariat Document 6333/04,
2004); and (2) a report of the PSC on the way ahead for the lessons learned from Concordia on 18 May
2004 (PSC Document 7381/04, 2004). To continue the lessons learned process, the results of the two
reports were discussed in two meetings of the PSC on 5 February and 30 March 2004, to which,
among others, the EU Special Representative for FYROM, the EU Concordia Operation Commander
and two Concordia Force Commanders were invited. The lessons were also used during the first joint
crisis management exercise, conducted with NATO in November 2003 (RELEX Document 14500/03,
2003).
The identification of lessons concerning the financial mechanisms used during Operation Concordia
was of crucial influence in the adaption of the ATHENA framework. The process to identify these
lessons started already during the operation, as the report on the financial lessons learned was issued
on 15 September 2003 (Foreign Relations Counsellors, 11154/1/03, 2003).
Considering official documents and academic literature on Operation Concordia the following three
main topics can be identified when it comes to the lessons of Operation Concordia:
2.2.1 Cooperation with NATO within the Berlin Plus arrangements
Operation Concordia was mounted rapidly while the Berlin Plus arrangements, which gives the EU
access to NATO assets in the planning of operations, were being negotiated. Although the smooth
transition from NATO's Operation Allied Harmony to Operation Concordia has demonstrated the
effectiveness of the Berlin Plus arrangements, the transition from NATO to the EU was not completely
without problems. For example, intelligence sharing between the EU and NATO had not been agreed
upon before the launch of the operation and this presented a significant co-ordination challenge
(Gross, 2009: 177). With respect to co-ordination, the chain of command structures that were
established based on the Berlin Plus agreement, and closely modelled on NATO structures, were not
ideal to promote the co-ordination of civilian and military instruments (Gross, 2009: 178). Differences
between NATO and the EU also prevented the establishment of a direct contact between Concordia
and the NATO peace keeping force in Kosovo (KFOR), with the EU Force Commander having to go
through Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) in Naples in order to have contact with NATO,
39
rather than developing field-level contacts, which would have facilitated the running of the
operation.
2.2.2 Co-ordination of EU efforts in FYROM
A second issue that resulted in lessons identified during Operation Concordia was the co-ordination
of EU efforts in FYROM. As a result of internal co-ordination challenges, the respective positions of
Concordia and that of the Council in Brussels, but also that of the EUSR, vis--vis the FYROM
authorities in the field were not always fully coordinated (Gross, 2009: 178). Weekly co-ordination
meetings with all EU actors were held in the office of the EUSR in order to align positions and
activities, and generally good interpersonal relations between the EUSR, the Delegation of the
Commission and Concordia facilitated informal contacts and co-ordination (ibid.: 176). However,
different operating mandates, bureaucratic procedures and political imperatives impeded a closer
structural co-ordination of military, political and economic instruments. Another lesson identified
concerning internal co-ordination of the EU is that the strict delineation between Concordia and the
various EU instruments already in place (i.e. diplomatic staff of the EUSR office) meant that Concordia
did not make use of the expertise during the planning phase of the operation (ibid.: 178). There was
also no serious review early on in the process of the possible impact of the operation on existing EU
engagement in FYROM.
2.2.3 Financial mechanism of Concordia
The main lessons that followed from Operation Concordias concern the financial mechanisms that
were used during the operation. Four shortcomings were identified by the EU (Foreign Relations
Counsellors, 11154/1/03, 2003: Annex p. 6). The unavailability of EU funds in the preparatory and
deployment phases of an operation was the main shortfall identified during Concordia. The
operation showed that the deployment phase of an operation usually represents a significant
proportion of its overall cost (ibid.). A second problem was that the financial mechanism tended to
involve participating third countries late in the decision-making process, complicating timely
coverage of operation costs. For example, Canada withdrew from Concordia as a result of the late
notification. The negotiations with third states were very time consuming and difficult to finalize in
time, especially since the operations was of short duration. The need to improve the efficiency of the
process has been identified in the documents assessing operation Concordia. Furthermore, the
financial rules applicable to the operation were notably complex and the estimates of the common
costs of the operation were produced only late in the decision-making process. The issue of financing
took a big step forward on 22 September 2003, when the Council decided that the EU needed a
mechanism for managing the common costs of military operations of any scale, complexity or
urgency. As of 1 March 2004, the ATHENA mechanism worked to administer the financing of the
common costs of European Union operations having military or defense implications. This
permanent financing mechanism made it possible to make the financial arrangements for Operation
ALTHEA in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
As a relatively short and small operation, Concordia did not manage to effectively learn from all its
lessons identified during the nine months it was operational. It did, however, reveal broader and
enduring challenges for future CSDP operations, for example, the attainment of a working EU-NATO
relationship and the implementation of a comprehensive approach to crisis management (Grevi,
2009). As such, Concordia does not stand out when it comes to internal mission learning. However,
Concordia did serve as an important catalyst for the improvement of CSDP operations, especially
40
when it comes to the financial mechanism ATHENA. A second example of how a challenge during
Operation Concordia influenced future CSDP efforts is the establishment of a small EU cell at SHAPE
and a NATO liaison at the EUMS in 2004, which was meant to improve the preparation of EU
operations having recourse to NATO assets and capabilities under the Berlin Plus arrangements and
to enhance transparency between the EU and NATO (Council Document 10547/04, 2004). In
retrospect, Concordia served as an indication that the EU was ready to assume further security
functions in the Balkans. As such, Concordia represents a prequel for Operation EUFOR Althea, the
operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina launched in December 2004.
41
3. OPERATION ARTEMIS IN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
Operation Artemis deployed to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was the EUs first ESDP
operation outside of the European continent and its first autonomous military operation. The
Operation was launched on 12 June 2003 in response to an appeal by the UN Secretary-General for
the rapid deployment of an Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) in support of the UN
Mission in the DRC (MONUC). In accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1484 (2003), the
mandate of Operation Artemis was (1) to contribute to the stabilisation of the security conditions and
the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia; (2) to ensure the protection of the airport
and of the internally displaced persons in the camps in Bunia; and (3) to contribute to the safety of
the civilian population, UN personnel and the humanitarian presence in the town if the situation so
required (Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP). Operation Artemis ended on 12 September 2003
when full responsibility was handed back to MONUC.
3.1 Process of identifying lessons
Operation Artemis was followed by a structured and high-profile lessons learned process with a
special focus on the EUs rapid reaction capacities. In its Conclusions on Operation Artemis (29
September 2003), the Council stressed the importance of learning from this Operation, together with
all parties concerned, in particular the United Nations (Council Document, 12294/03, 2003).
Furthermore, it tasked the PSC to report on the lessons to be learned from Artemis at an early
opportunity (ibid.). On 17 February 2004, the PSC forwarded a Report on the way ahead following
operation Artemis lessons learned (Council Document, 6324/1/04, 2004) to COREPER proposing a set
of actions to be endorsed by the Council(
13
). In its conclusions on ESDP (17 May 2004), the Council
noted that lessons had been drawn from Operation Artemis and underlined the importance of a
rapid decision-making and planning process for the Unions rapid reaction capacity (Council
Document, 9231/1/04, 2004)(
14
). Following a request by the Council, the Secretary-General/ High
Representative (SG/HR) presented a Report on accelerated decision making and planning process for
EU Rapid Response Operations on 15 March 2005 (Council Document, 7317/05, 2005).
Another lessons learned document worth mentioning is the UN Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit
study on the lessons of the IEMF, issued in October 2004. The study draws lessons from the
deployment of Operation Artemis for the UN and presents 11 recommendations for similar scenarios
in the future.
There are several themes running through official and external evaluations of Operation Artemis.
These can be grouped into the following six categories:
3.2.1 Rapid reaction capacity
Operation Artemis was decided, planned and deployed rapidly. On 5 June 2003, the Council adopted
the Joint Action (Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP); on 12 June 2003 it decided to launch the
Operation; and within three weeks all the troops had been deployed (Faria, 2004: 47). External and

13
Whlle Lhe lLem noLe (Councll uocumenL 6324/1/04) documenLlng Lhe passlng of Lhe reporL from Lhe SC Lo CC8LL8 was
declasslfled, Lhe conLenL of Lhe reporL was noL.
14
1he conLenL of Lhese lessons was noL dlsclosed.
42
official evaluations concurred that lessons regarding the rapid planning and deployment of an
operation should be drawn from Operation Artemis.
3.2.2 Framework Nation Concept
With France as a framework nation, Operation Artemis put the Framework Nation Concept(
15
) to a
first practical test. There is general agreement that Operation Artemis validated the framework nation
concept in militarily terms (Ulriksen, Gourlay and Mace, 2004: 521). However, some questioned the
political validity of the concept due to the correlation between the important French contribution
and Frances historical role and potential interests in the region (ibid.). Ulriksen, Gourlay and Mace
(ibid.) concluded that the lead nation concept should be balanced by broader member state
participation while keeping in mind the need for military efficiency in a military force (ibid.).
3.2.3 Scope and duration of the Operation
Many external evaluations criticised the limited scale and scope of Operation Artemis. The period of
deployment was three months and the area of operations was limited to Bunia. According to the UN
lessons learned study, the limited geographical scope of the Operation simply displaced violence
beyond the environs of Bunia, where atrocities continued (UN, 2004: 14). Regarding the duration of
the Operation, the UN concluded that Operation Artemis was only a very short-term expression of
international support (ibid.: 17). The implicit lesson would be to stretch both the operational area
and the length of future operations in order to ensure an effective and durable impact of an EU
operation.
3.2.4 Operational assets
Operation Artemis highlighted some of the EUs capability gaps. There was a lack of strategic
transport, a need for secure means for long-distance communications, information technology,
intelligence sharing, and a need to improve the interoperability of European armed forces (Ulriksen,
Gourlay and Mace, 2004: 515). There was no strategic reserve, while the PSC had agreed this was
important (ibid.).
3.2.5 Comprehensive approach and civil-military coordination
External evaluations offer a mixed account regarding the assessment of the comprehensive approach
and civil-military cooperation. According to Faria (2004: 44) and Homan (2007: 154), the cooperation
between Artemis and the humanitarian community worked remarkably well. The success of the
cooperation was traced back to intelligent planning and capable human resources (Faria, 2004: 45)
including a civil-military liaison officer that was on the ground together with the first French troops. A
report from the NGOs Saferworld and International Alert (2004), however, deplored that there was no
link between short-term crisis management and longer-term peacebuilding. The report argued that a
senior civilian should have been placed alongside the Operations Commander in order to help link
Operation Artemis to the broader civilian activities (Saferworld and International Alert, 2004: 8).

13
1he Lu deflnes a framework naLlon as 'a Member SLaLe or a group of Member SLaLes LhaL has volunLeered Lo, and LhaL
Lhe Councll has agreed, should have speclflc responslblllLles ln an operaLlon over whlch Lhe Lu exerclses pollLlcal conLrol'
(quoLed ln: WLu 2008). 1he framework naLlon ls expecLed Lo provlde Lhe CperaLlon Commander and Lo make a slgnlflcanL
conLrlbuLlon Lo sLraLeglc and operaLlonal plannlng as well as Lo Lhe operaLlon's asseLs and capablllLles (lbld.).
43
3.2.6 EU-UN cooperation and handover
According to the UN lessons learned study, EU-UN cooperation in the planning phase and pre-
deployment liaison with MONUC were sub-optimal (UN, 2004: 14), but cooperation on the ground
worked much better. However, one of the major shortcomings of the deployment of Operation
Artemis was its handover to the UN (ibid.: 17). None of the participants of Operation Artemis were
willing to re-hat with MONUC, putting the credibility of the UN mission at risk (ibid.). For future
scenarios of this type, the UN recommends that there should be a clear understanding that if IEMF
participants refuse to be re-hatted, at least some if not all of the IEMFs enabling assets will be left
behind in order to ensure that the mission does not lose credibility (ibid.: 15).
Operation Artemis served as a reference model for the development of the EUs Battlegroup Concept.
However, the Battlegroups have not been deployed so far and discussions on their deployment are
often marked by divergent views of the Member States. Furthermore, there is no Battlegroup on
stand-by for the first semester of 2012 leading to the question whether there is the political will to
put this lesson learned into practice.
The EU has learned some of the lessons from Operation Artemis related to operational assets.
According to Homan (2007: 4) action was taken to ensure better and more secure communications
for future operations. Nevertheless, some shortfalls identified in the course of Operation Artemis, like
the lack of strategic airlift or the need to improve interoperability, remain on the EUs agenda.
Finally, Operation Artemis catalysed the institutionalisation of EU-UN cooperation in crisis
management. In their Joint Declaration on EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management (24 September
2003), the organisations established a joint consultative mechanism to increase cooperation in four
areas: planning, training, communication, and best practices. Although the handover from an EU to a
UN mission remains challenging (see section on EUFOR Tchad/RCA), Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA
shows that the EU more readily re-hats troops and assets than was the case for Operation Artemis.
Operation Artemis was a first in many respects and thus represents an important milestone in the
EUs lessons learned process. The Operation triggered the development of the EUs military rapid
reaction instruments. However, as the above overview shows, some lessons identified in the very
early years of ESDP are still on the EUs agenda.
44
4. EUROPEAN UNION POLICE MISSION (EUPOL) PROXIMA AND THE
EUROPEAN UNION POLICE ADVISORY TEAM (EUPAT) FYROM
The European Union Police Mission (EUPOL) Proxima was launched on 15 December 2003 as the EUs
second civilian crisis management mission (Council Joint Action 2003/681/CFSP). Following on from
the military EU Operation Concordia, EUPOL Proxima was initially mandated for a year. The EU used a
so-called dual track approach to reform the police in Macedonia. This approach entailed that the
European Commission assisted the long-term structural changes in the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and
the police in support of the countrys institutional development, whereas EUPOL Proxima tackled
more short-term needs in support of the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA). To do this, EUPOL
Proximas objective was to monitor, mentor and advise senior and mid-level management police
officers to implement the Macedonian National Police Strategy and the Integrated Border
Management Strategy, both adopted by the Macedonian government. In November 2004, the
mandate of the mission was extended until 14 December 2005 with a downsized staff and a mandate
covering three, as opposed to the previous five programs (i.e. organised crime, public peace and
order and border police) (Council Joint Action 2004/789/CFSP).
To bridge the six-month gap between the end of Proxima and the commencement of the
Commission field-level project, the Council decided to launch an EU Police Advisory Team (EUPAT)
from 15 December 2005 until 14 June 2006. EUPAT was similar in its goals, mission and organisation
(Council Joint Action 2005/826/CFSP).
As was the case for the first EU Police mission in Bosnia (EUPM BiH), there has also been a lessons
learned review of the planning phase of EUPOL Proxima (Council Document, 2004). However, it is not
possible to verify when and by whom this report has been carried out, because it is classified.
Furthermore two reviews have been carried out during the mission, one mid-term review in July 2004
(Councils Secretariat Document 11496/04, 2004) and a final review in February 2006 (Councils
Secretariat Document 6592/06, 2006). The mid-term report reviewed the functioning of the mission
at all levels with regard to the question whether or not the mission was optimally positioned to attain
its goals by the end of the year (Councils Secretariat Document 11496/04, 2004: 28). The final report
includes a lesson learned report from the Administration & Support Department (Councils
Secretariat Document 6592/06, 2006: Annex IV), which addresses human resources, medical care,
finances, logistics, and communications & information technology. A fourth official document that
addresses lessons from Proxima is the Joint Paper on Lessons Learned on the transition between the
EU Police Advisory (EUPAT) team in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and a European
Community policing project that the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM)
on 18 December 2006 (CIVCOM Document 16938/06, 2006). It appears that the EUPOL Proxima
mission lesson learning process was not entirely ad hoc, as lessons have been collected and analysed
since the planning phase. Although there are two reviews that solely address the lessons learned of
Proxima and EUPAT, it appears that the lesson learning process of these missions was combined with
the two reviews of the mission. Judging from the official sources, the Head of Mission, the PSC, the
Secretariat, the Council and can be seen as the driving forces behind the lesson learning process.
Considering official documents and academic literature on EUPOL Proxima the following two main
topics can be identified when it comes to the lessons of EUPOL Proxima:
45
4.2.1 The planning phase of EUPOL Proxima
The final report of EUPOL Proxima is very clear about its planning phase, stating that the conditions
of the set up were worse than during the planning phase of EUPM BiH in two aspects: there was a
lack of specific officers on administration, finance, communication, IT, and transport and there was a
very tight timeframe (Councils Secretariat Document 6592/06, 2006: 6). Furthermore, the ad-hoc and
inflexible force generation among the Member States resulted in delays and shortfalls, and led to a
turnover rate meaning that precious relations built with the local police had to be re-built from
scratch (ibid.: Annex IV). As a result of this, the planning phase of the mission, which lasted for two
months, did not provide a solid basis for a smooth kick-off of the mission. According to the final
report, the conditions of this second planning (after the mandate was expanded) were no better than
the initial one, especially in terms of time constraints (ibid.: 9). As a result, continuous trouble-
shooting, instead of proper planning produced expectedly poor consequences (ibid.: 9). The report
therefore concludes that the lessons learned report on the planning phase of EUPM (Councils
Secretariat Document 11206/03) was not fully implemented in the case of Proxima (Councils
Secretariat Document 6592/06: Annex IV p. 3). The report makes several recommendations, among
others to select an experienced and well-trained staff, centralise training, create a centralised Mission
Support Cell for procurement and standardise administrative procedures (ibid.: Annex IV).
4.2.2 The co-ordination between ESDP missions and other EU instruments
A second issue that resulted in lessons identified during EUPOL Proxima is the co-ordination of EU
efforts in FYROM. Despite an elaborate system for political co-ordination among the EU institutions
during weekly informal meetings, led by the EUSR, EU actors faced problems working out how to
best complement each others efforts in FYROM and how to coordinate successfully. For example, the
European Agency for Reconstruction withheld information from Proxima, waiting for the Council
police mission to leave the country before launching its programmes (Loannides, 2009: 194). In
addition, the relations between Proxima and the Delegation of the European Commission were
problematic as well. The inability to achieve successful inter-institutional co-ordination identifies the
lesson that the combination of crisis management and institution building should be part of a single
overarching EU concept. To achieve this, a clear division of responsibilities and proper mechanisms to
oversee a transition from a CSDP mission to EC instruments are necessary (ibid.: 197).
Despite the problems that the mission encountered, especially during the planning phase, EUPOL
Proxima and EUPAT FYROM have shown that they were able to learn from earlier CSDP missions and
their own experience. An example of the latter is that during the mission the work processes and the
mission structure were adjusted because they were not optimally suited to the missions tasks and
activities (Councils Secretariat Document 11496/04, 2004: 28). As a result, five basic principles were
drawn up to revise the mission structure: (1) the creation of five mission programmes, (2) an
enhanced chain of command, (3) a better defined way to periodically review the mission, (4) the
creation of single contact points for the programmes and (5) a more clear distinction between the
terms programmes, projects and activities.
A clear example of the ability to learn from previous CSDP missions is that a joint European
Commission-Council fact-finding mission was conducted before the deployment of EUPOL Proxima
to assess the state of the Macedonian police structures and understand the needs of the country
(Loannides, 2009: 196). It was the first time a joint Commission-Council Secretariat fact-finding
mission was carried out. This would become usual practice for future civilian missions, for example
46
during the planning phase of the EU SSR Mission in Guinea-Bissau (see EUSSR Guinea-Bissau case
study). EUPOL Proxima also incorporated officers from the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and
Herzegovina during its planning phase and sought advice of the OSCO and bilateral actors. However,
the short planning period did not allow the development of a well defined mission statement.
Lastly, benchmarking mechanisms were developed during EUPOL Proxima. In order to fulfil the
programmes objectives, result-based activities tied to a specific timeframe were developed and were
monitored on a weekly basis. The new element of EUPAT was the creation of a consultation
mechanism, designed to improve Proximas benchmarking system. In this system, EUPAT submitted
a progress report to the national authorities every month (Loannides, 2009: 193).
47
5. EUFOR ALTHEA BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Operation EUFOR Althea was launched on 2 December 2004 (Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP),
following the NATO SFOR operation, and is the largest military operation that the EU has embarked
upon to date. As part of the EUs comprehensive approach in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH),
Operation Althea provides a military presence to contribute to a safe and secure environment,
prevent conditions for a resumption of violence and manage any residual aspects of the General
Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH (also known as Dayton/Paris Agreement). Additionally,
EUFOR is tasked to support the Armed Forces of BiH in the areas of capacity-building and training. UN
Security Council Resolution 2019 extended the mandate of EUFOR Althea until November 2012.
The EU institutions that were involved during Operation EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina
(e.g. the Council General Secretariat, including the EUMS) have issued several papers concerning
lessons identified within the operation throughout the years (a list is provided in the bibliography).
The formal EU process to identify lessons from Operation EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina shows
similarities with the process conducted during the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in BiH. Like that of the
EUPM BiH, it focuses on the planning phase of the operation as well as the co-ordination and
coherence between the military operation in BiH (EUFOR Althea), the civilian mission (EUPM) and the
EU Special Representative (EUSR). The EUMS has also taken the initiative to identity lessons
concerning the military aspects of the executive phase of the operation. Lessons are also part of
operations six-monthly reports.
In the publically available official documents, there is no specific reference to a pre-planned, formal
lessons learned process during Operation EUFOR Althea. It would appear that the lessons identified
documents that focused on the co-ordination problems between EUFOR Althea and the EU Police
Mission in BiH (Councils Secretariat Document 15376/06, 2006; EU Military Committee Document
16034/06, 2006) are the result of an ad hoc lessons learned review, since this unforeseen problem
needed immediate attention when it occurred. However, the lesson learning process of EUFOR
Althea does not seem to be completely ad-hoc, as the EUMC published its papers periodically after
certain phases of the operation (i.e. planning and execution phase).
Since 2007, an EU Military Lessons Learned Process (ELPRO) has been developed, which has been
supported by a management tool and lessons learned database known as ELMA (EUMS Lessons
Management Application). Currently there are approximately 30 Lessons Observations for Operation
EUFOR Althea in the ELMA database (EU official, February 2012). There is a vast array of information
provided in the database, including the Lessons Observations, the context of the lessons and the
updates of the analysis and development phases. It seems that as a result of this continuous lesson
learning process there is less need for separate periodic reports.
Considering official documents and academic literature on Operation EUFOR Althea the following
three main topics can be identified when it comes to the lessons of the operation:
5.2.1 The planning phase of EUFOR Althea
Although, in general, the transition from NATO SFOR to EUFOR Althea is considered to be a
considerably less contentious and criticised process than the transition of UN IPTF to EUPM (Donlon,
2010: 36), there were still lessons to be learned for future EU operations. One lesson identified
48
suggests that more in-depth training for personnel without relevant EU experience must be given for
personnel destined for the EU Cell at SHAPE (EU Military Staff Document 8429/05, 2005)(
16
). Another
lesson identified is that the operational relationship between the Special Representative and the EU
peacekeeping force should be taken into account during the planning phase of future EU operations.
This was not clear during the start of the EUFOR operation (Keohane, 2009: 219). To address these
matters, the EUMC issued a classified lessons identified report on the planning phase of Operation
ALTHEA (EU Military Committee Document 8912/05, 2005) in May 2005.
5.2.2 The co-ordination and coherence of EU efforts in BiH
The second theme concerns the co-ordination and coherence of EU efforts in BiH. One clear lesson
identified is that any potential overlap in the mandates of different (civilian and military) efforts of the
EU in one country should be clarified as soon as possible. As mentioned before, the initial relationship
between EUFOR Althea and the EUSR was unclear (Keohane, 2009: 219). Furthermore, the activities of
EUFOR to support the fight against organized crime created tensions with the EU Police Mission
(EUPM), deployed in Bosnia since early 2003, because EUPM was also mandated to support the fight
against organised crime (ibid.: 217). Several measures were taken to resolve these co-ordination and
coherence problems. First of all, EUFOR scaled down its involvement in the fight against organised
crime (ibid.: 218). To clarify the different roles, the PSC also adjusted the mandates of the two
operations in 2006, making EUPM the lead operation for anti-crime measures with the Bosnian
authorities (ibid.: 219). Furthermore, the coordinating role of the EUSR was upgraded, giving him
more say over the coherence of the two operations (Councils Secretariat Document 15376/06: 4,
2004).
Reflecting on these matters, the Secretariat released a paper in November 2006 concerning lessons
for the co-ordination and coherence between the EUSR, EUFOR Althea and the EUPM in BiH between
December 2004 and August 2006 (Councils Secretariat Document 15376/06, 2006). The paper
identifies four key recommendations to further improve EU co-ordination and coherence in BiH. 1)
The Secretariat should set up high-level training for key staff prior to deployment (including
designated EUSRs and Heads of EU missions). 2) Precise guidance (using Crisis Management Concepts)
and coordinating instructions should be provided to each actor. 3) The EUSR should have a strong
coordinating role. And 4) There should be consultation between military and civilian actors.
5.2.3 The military execution of EUFOR Althea
A third theme of lessons identified is the military execution of Operation EUFOR Althea. In October
2007, the EUMC issued lessons identified document, addressing the historical lessons identified from
the execution of operation Althea (EU Military Committee Document 14181/07, 2007). This document
summarises the key military strategic lessons identified from the execution phase of the operation,
drawing together the observations of the Member States and the EU Operation Commander
(December 2004 April 2007). One of the lessons is that every effort should be made to ensure that
lessons from operations are adequately fed into training activities. In the report, the EUMC proposes
to use the EUMS lessons management application (ELMA) to ensure the follow up of lessons learned.

16
1he Lu Cell aL SPAL (LuCS), whlch ls parL of Lhe LuMS, ls lmporLanL for Lhe LunA1C lnLerface. CperaLlon AlLhea ls
commanded by Lhe CperaLlonal Commander (CpCdr) wlLh Lhe Lu CperaLlonal PeadquarLers (CPC) aL SPAL.
49
As EUFOR Althea was already established in December 2004, the lessons learned process is a
continuing one. On some accounts, lessons have been learned, on others, old dilemmas and
problems have either re-emerged or not been sufficiently dealt with. Examples of the latter are the
need for better co-ordination of EU instruments, including the call for trained personnel and more
efficient procurement procedures. These aspects have been recognised by both the Council as
continuous problems (Emersen & Gross, 2007: 15). Amongst the lessons identified of Operation
Althea, most progress has been made on the co-ordination and coherence of the different EU
missions/actors in BiH. Although it took around 18 months, a workable solution was found for the
initial confusion between the mandate of EUFOR and EUPM in Bosnia. One practical example of a
measure that was used to pursue co-ordination between the several EU missions in BiH is the
organisation of monthly meetings with the operational EU actors (EUFOR, EUPM, EUMM, the
Commission and presidency). Further lessons have also been learned on the Berlin Plus agreement,
which was first used during the EUFOR Concordia operation in FYROM. According to EUFOR Althea
Commander Gen. Leakey (December 2004 -December 2005) lessons have been learned about cost-
sharing agreements, intelligence-sharing and having a clear delineation of tasks whenever there are
NATO and EU military operations in the same theatre (NATO, 2007).
50
6. EU MISSION TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE FOR SECURITY SECTOR
REFORM, RD CONGO (EUSEC RD CONGO) & EU POLICE MISSION,
RD CONGO (EUPOL RD CONGO)
EUSEC RD Congo was launched on 2 May 2005 (Council Joint Action 2005/355/CFSP), and was quickly
deployed in June of that same year. It is unique as a civilian mission comprised almost entirely of
military staff. The EU Police mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUPOL RD Congo) was
subsequently launched in 2007 (Council Joint Action 2007/405/CFSP). This EUPOL mission followed
directly from the more narrowly mandated EUPOL Kinshasa mission, which supported the Integrated
Police Unit during the 2006 election period (Vircoulon, 2009b: 222). Different originating
circumstances, timelines, and separate budgets for the Police and Military, circumscribed possibilities
for launching a single joined-up mission (Clement, 2009:249). Currently they co-exist in the RD
Congo, both with a Mentoring Monitoring and Advising (MMA) mandate. EUSEC focuses exclusively
on the defence sector, and EUPOL on the Congolese National Police (PNC) and its interaction with the
judicial sector. Collective staffs add up to about 100 persons, a majority based in Kinshasa.
EUPOL fulfils its mandate by supporting, mentoring, monitoring and advising Congolese authorities
as well as providing training activities, and contributing to the fight against impunity in the field of
human rights and sexual violence (Council Decision 2011/537/CFSP). EUSECs current mandate
(Council Decision 2010/565/CFSP) states that the mission will provide practical SSR support,
particularly in implementing short and medium term activities based on the Reform Plan for the
Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC). Its support has also come in the form of
specific projects, such as the Chain of Payment project (to reduce graft of military salaries) as well as
conducting a census and implementing a biometrical identification system for the FARDC. Both
missions have added project cells to their mandates, an infrequent feature of missions. Despite their
attachment to a specific sector, both missions explicitly refer to their support of the Congolese in
undertaking Security Sector Reform (SSR).
Both EUSEC and EUPOL RD Congo submit six-monthly reports, which are to include a lessons
component. However, no full-time staff or designated officer was made responsible for systematically
collecting lessons in either mission (interview EEAS staff, 7 February 2012). Lessons identified and
ways forward were seen to be within the purview of the Heads of Mission, who are responsible for
submitting the periodic reports. Each mission has participated in the CMPDs thematic lessons
learned exercise on mainstreaming human rights and gender (Council Document, 17138/1/10, 2010),
and are currently taking part in a similar thematic lessons process on SSR.
Beyond official EU documents and reporting procedures, external reviewers, academics, and think
tanks have issued several reports and periodic updates on these two missions. Given the challenging
context of the RD Congo and the wider interest in SSR, several workshops and conferences have
been organised to discuss the ongoing missions, often with relevant EEAS staff. These meetings often
result in reports.
A review of the literature above flagged several lessons from the two missions. A few of the most
frequently mentioned are categorised into five themes, developed below.

51
6.2.1 Addressing Political Challenges
Arguably, the most prevalent topic analysed by external experts (but also discussed within the EU), is
the need for SSR support to be engaged in, or at a minimum responsive to, the local political context.
SSR is inevitably and irrevocably a politically-charged undertaking (Clement, 2009b; EPLO, 2011;
Vircoulon, 2008: 228; OECD, 2007: 28). However, both EUPOL and EUSEC are characterised as
performing largely technical activities, which has proven insufficient given the root causes of some
challenges (ZIF, 2007; EPLO, 2011: 4; Clement, 2009: 250; Van Damme, 2008: 12). Post-conflict settings
require political savvy, and this has been judged as a weak point for CSDP in RD Congo (Clement,
2009: 244; Vircoulon, 2009b: 228). Progress in technical projects are often seen as the result of
successful, however latent, political engagement with Congolese counterparts (More and Price, 2011:
35). EUSECs Chain of Payment project, while of a technical nature, required political pressure
(Bloching, 2011: 3; Davis, 2009: 19) Yet, there is wide consensus on the impotency of both EUPOL RD
Congo and EUSEC in operating effectively on more political issues inherent to SSR(
17
). The need to
supplement technical assistance with political engagement is an identified lesson (Council
Document, 11038/08, 2008).
Political engagement regarding SSR support in the RD Congo is most often associated with the
effective and legitimate civilian oversight of state security forces. In the RD Congo, public
accountability of the army and police is a rather novel idea (Davis, 2009: 20). The institutions created
to ensure democratic oversight (e.g. the National Parliament, the Army/Police Inspector General,
State Auditors, etc.) are chronically underfunded, understood to be a political machination rather
than a financial constraint (Clement, 2009b: 98; Oxfam, 2010: 7). In the 2008 Lessons learned in EUPOL
Kinshasa (EUPOL RD Congos predecessor), a CSDP mission is recognised as a political instrument,
which can guide and support local reform and better coordinate the use of state and donor funds
(Council Document, 11038/08: 16). It is not apparent this observation was noted by either EUPOL RD
Congo or EUSEC.
In general, given the instability of the RD Congo, security of the political elite and territorial integrity
is seen to be prioritized over the populations security (Van Damme, 2008: 12). Attention must be
paid to how SSR can be integrated with statebuilding and democratic agendas, and work in the
interest of populations (Vircoulon, 2008: 228; EPLO, 2011; Oxfam, 2010). The situation in RD Congo
emphasises the lesson that Member States must understand the political circumstances in which
CSDP missions operate, as well as the political nature of SSR, to frame their expectations
appropriately (EPLO, 2011: 7).
6.2.2 Local Ownership
Closely related to addressing the political context is ensuring that local counterparts participate in
and are committed to the progress pursued by external actors, what in donor parlance is referred to
as local ownership. In a response the annual Council report to the Assembly of the Western
European Union (WEU) regarding EU engagement in the RD Congo, it is recognised that the Union
provides capabilities and expertise but cannot replace those who are directly concerned [African and
national authorities] (Assembly WEU, 2006: #134). External experts corroborate, Success of efforts to
reform the security sector depends to a large degree on Congolese authorities taking responsibility
for the process (ZIF, 2007: 6). Set in contrast to this ideal, Congolese resistance to reform, often
labelled as the lack of political will, has been identified as a primary challenge to progress on many

17
Many noLe LhaL Lhls was noL always Lhe case, before Lhe elecLlons of 2006, Lhe Lu, and CSu mlsslons lncluded were
more pollLlcally lnfluenLlal (Councll uocumenL, 11038/08: 7, kuovo and uavls, 2009: 464, van uamme, 2008: 10).
52
levels and in many sectors (Oxfam, 2010; Keane, 2008: 218; Davis, 2009; Van Damme, 2008; Vircuolon,
2009).
Local resistance to reform is often related to the power of an individual being linked to an institution,
which builds inertia against changing the status quo (EPLO, 2011: 2; Davis, 2009: 19; Oxfam, 2010). In
that respect, lessons on local ownership are somewhat intertwined with those concerning awareness
of (and engagement in) the local political context. A lesson from EUPOL Kinshasa bears as much
relevance now as in 2008: explicit commitments should be sought from the host government on all
of the issues deemed crucial for the success of the mission (Council Document, 11038/08: 8).
6.2.3 Coordination among multiple SSR actors
Given the numerous donors supporting SSR in the RD Congo(
18
), coordination is essential to ensuring
that comprehensive SSR support is also coherent. EUPOL in particular, with assistance from the
Commission, has taken up the lesson identified by EUPOL Kinshasa, and supported the creation of
coordination structures for the police (Council Document, 11038/08: 5; More and Price, 2011).
However, external reports have evaluated the impact of these and similar meeting as deficient,
particularly with regard to structures for defence (Bloching, 2011: 3; EPLO, 2011: 2; More and Price,
2011: 24; Boshoff et.al., 2010; Ekengard, 2009; Vircoulon, 2009b). EU reports also acknowledge that
the disappointing impact of these coordinating groups (Council Document, 10937/11, 2011).
There is general consensus that the failure to establish more effective coordination mechanisms is
partially the result of Congolese authorities unwillingness to drive forward this element of reform
(EPLO, 2011: 7; Council Document, 10927/11, 2011; More and Price, 2011). The Recommendations of
the PMG on the six-monthly report by EUSEC RD Congo (Council Document, 10937/11, 2011) openly
regrets the lack of a steering committee for the defence sector, and explicitly acknowledges the
Congolese authorities role in its absence. In the same document, the PMG counsels the PSC to
recommend that a political message should be sent out, at a high level, to the Congolese authorities,
particularly on the need to mobilise the steering committee for defence reform (ibid.) Here, the
lesson echoes that of the preceding section: effective security reform requires full demonstrated
commitment of the host country authorities. From an early stage, it should be clear that initiating and
maintaining donor coordination is a key task of SSR, requiring the commitment of the host country
(ISIS, 2010b: 17).
The unsatisfactory level of coordination between EU actors could also be seen as an area to learn
from. In the RD Congo, the European Commission is also very active in police and justice reform, as
are a few Member States most prominently Belgium, France and the UK , which work bilaterally
(Davis, 2009: 29; Bloching, 2011b: 6). A classified joint Council-Commission document from
November 2006, titled Comprehensive EU Approach to SSR in the DRC (7138/1/06) reportedly stresses
the centrality of coordination and outlines mechanisms for EU actors in the RD Congo to harmonize
their activities. However, reports since 2006 testify to the low impact of these good intentions (More
and Price, 2011: 25; Vircoulon, 2009; Clement 2009/2009b; Keane, 2008). The need for well
orchestrated and strategic coordination among EU actors in a host country is relevant for nearly all
CSDP operations, and is particularly acute in RD Congo.
As a last point on coordination, much discussion has focussed on the existence of two separate CSDP
missions in a single country, each dedicated to separate components within the field of SSR (Van

18
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53
Damme, 2008: 11; More and Price, 2011). This appears to go against of the basic principles of
supporting SSR, which seeks to address the security system as an integrated whole (Council
Document, 12566/4/05, 2005; European Commission, 2006; OECD, 2007). Many experts particularly
those working inside the missions do not see merging the two missions as a realistic or helpful
solution (interview with EEAS staff, 7 February 2012; More and Price, 2011). A preferable option would
be to concentrate efforts on inter-CSDP information sharing, strategic coordination, and resource
sharing (ISIS, 2010c: 20). For example, personnel for public communication could be shared (Council
Document, 11038/08: 6,7). Moreover, it was acknowledged that the missions do not share lessons
learned with each other, missing a clear opportunity to capitalize on best practices or avoid similar
pitfalls (Bloching, 2011: 3-4; Clement, 2009b: 105; More and Price, 2011: 25). The fact that each
mission has separate reporting lines also hampers cross-communication. EUSEC, as an unusual
military-staffed civilian mission, does not report to CPCC, as EUPOL does. Rather, it reports directly to
the PSC, with the CMPD in charge of its strategic review. And while CIVCOM reviews the reports of
EUPOL, the reports of EUSEC are often passed between the PSC and the Politico-Military Group
(EUSECs chain of reporting will be reviewed in 2012). Thus, launching separate but related CSDP
missions in a single country is not advisable but, in the case of RD Congo, perhaps not retractable.
The lesson is to focus more keenly on resource and information sharing, where possible, to enhance
efficiency and to avoid redundancy.
6.2.4 Quick (Visible) Impact vs. Long Term Reform
MMA, while essential to sustainable reform, is difficult to measure, or demonstrate progress. Thus it is
not uncommon for pressure to be put on mission staff to demonstrate progress, or quick wins.
However, there is reason to question the sustainability or relative impact of quick wins (Davis,
2009:16; Van Damme, 2008: 9). Thus, a balance must be struck between making visible reforms on
short-term timelines, and contributing to the grander endeavour of long-term reform (ZIF, 2007: 6).
In some cases, short-term and visible projects are valuable. For example, through technical and
concrete projects, EUSEC has been able to build and strengthen relations with Congolese authorities
as well as attract (and coordinate) the participation of other donors and Member States (Council
Document, 10087/09, 2009; Clement, 2009; More and Price, 2011). An important lesson here,
however, is to give careful consideration to the sustainability of projects. Recognised by EUPOL
Kinshasa, the state needs to have the means to continue to fund the institutions the EU supported
(Council Document, 11038/08: 16). Similarly, the WEU 2006 reply to the annual Council report states,
Pay is a recurring theme in connection with the management of security and defence issues in the
DRC, and the current solutions are not satisfactory for the medium and long term (2006: #73).
The short-term mandates and single year budgets of the missions clearly evidences the EUs short-
term outlook (Van Damme, 2008: 13). This can be linked to the political judgements of the Member
States reluctant to prolong engagement, despite the long-term nature of missions activities (EPLO,
2011: 8). Lessons from EUPOL Kinshasa advocate for giving missions a realistic timeframe from the
outset, in particular where the mission supports a longer-term strategy for SSR (Council Document
11038/08: 6).
6.2.5 Staffing
Staffing issues are common to several CSDP missions, giving a familiar ring to some of the lessons
learned. Yet, some staffing challenges are unique to the RD Congo. Recruitment for EUPOL and
EUSEC is particularly challenging, requiring Franco-phone candidates, preferably with regional or
local experience and the specialization for the position (EPLO, 2011: 10; More and Price, 2011: 38;
54
Vircoulon, 2009b: 229). Moreover, incentives offered to join the missions may not compensate for the
demands and hardships secondees are required to face (interview EEAS staff, 7 February 2012). The
limited resources of EUSEC and EUPOL prompted the sharing of the Human Rights and Gender
Officer. However, this apparently limited the impact of the position and should be reconsidered
(Council Document, 10937/11, 2011; Council Document, 17138/1/10, 2010). Given the needs of the
missions, recruitment could be broadened to Commission staff, such as administrators, who may
provide valuable assets to the CSDP missions (More and Price, 2011: 28). The option of temporary
staff has been used by EUSEC on at least one occasion (Council Document, 10929/11, 2011).
However, longer-term core staff provides important continuity in the mission. Lessons here could
include the need to periodically review recruitment practices, which may be too limited for the
missions needs.
Increasing incidents of cooperation in activities among international actors supporting SSR in RD
Congo, such as EUPOLs support of MONUSCO and EUSEC trainings, is an encouraging sign (ISIS,
2010c: 21). Similar indications of enhanced cooperation between EU actors have also been reported
(Bloching, 2011c: 6). The addition of a project cell to the EUPOL mandate aimed to encourage
Member States to work closely with the mission, tasked to coordinate and facilitate Member State
police support projects (Council Joint Action 2011/573/CFSP). Similarly, EUSEC also had its mandate
adjusted to allow recourse to Member State funding to implement relevant projects. This was also
seen as a way to accommodate for the somewhat ill-fit procurement and financial procedures of the
CFSP budget, an issue also identified in EUPOL Kinshasa (Council Document 11038/08: 13; More and
Price, 2011).
In terms of staffing, there has been noted improvement in Member States seconding Fracophone
candidates (interview EEAS staff, 7 February 2012). The option of recruiting temporary staff for a
specific activity has also been explored, demonstrating a wiliness to trial more flexible staffing and
recruitment practices (Council Document, 10929/11, 2011). With regard to encouraging long-term
approaches, both missions contribute valuably to the formulations of Congolese long-term reform
strategies. EUSECs most recent mandate runs two full years, rather than the typical twelve months
(Council Decision 2010/565/CFSP). Yet, this still falls short of the long-term reform outlooks.
What is remarkable is the recurrence of several lessons that had been identified explicitly by EUPOL
Kinshasa (Council Document, 11038/08, 2008). For example, the need for EU actors to coordinate on
addressing the political implications of SSR is mentioned as crucial (ibid: 5). The need for establishing
a realistic time frame from the outset, particularly in addressing long-term SSR, is also mentioned in
the lessons gathered in 2008 (ibid.: 6). The idea to pool staff positions, and specifically
communications staff to increase EU actor coherence, was put forward by EUPOL Kinshasa (ibid: 6,
7,9). This lesson can be said to have been taken up in another area, but with mixed results(Council
Document, 17138/1/10: 25; Council Document, 10937/11, 2011; Bloching, 2011: 3). In general, the
appearance of recurrent lessons indicates that lessons have not necessarily been learned, or at least
not sufficiently addressed.
55
7. EUROPEAN UNION RULE OF LAW MISSION FOR IRAQ
(EUJUST LEX-IRAQ)
Established on 1 June 2005 as a civilian crisis management mission, EUJUST LEX-Iraq is the EUs first
integrated rule of law mission. In 2010, the mission was extended for the fourth time and currently
runs until June 2012. The main objective of the mission is to strengthen the rule of law and to
promote cultural respect for human rights in Iraq by providing professional development for high
and mid-level Iraqi officials from the criminal justice system (Council Decision 2010/330/CFSP).
Available official and semi-official documents referring to lessons learned include Council Joint
Actions, Decisions and Conclusions, as well as briefings by the former Head of Mission (HoM) Stephen
White in the IMPETUS journal published by the EU Military Staff and the CSDP newsletter. Moreover,
there are frequent official reviews of the mission carried out on a monthly, weekly and six-monthly
basis. Only for the latter it can be assured that reports contain lessons learned. According to the
updated mission mandate from 2010, the Civilian Operation Commander is tasked to report to the
Council through the High Representative (Council Decision 2010/330/CFSP). In 2011, the mission
organized a workshop in Brussels to evaluate the EUJUST LEX-Iraq courses and activities. This brought
the EUMS and the mission staff together in order to exchange lessons learned (Council document,
2011b). More detailed information on the workshop has not been made publicly available.
According to the former HoM Stephen White, one of the main reasons for the mission achievements
has been the attention, which has been paid from the planning stage up until present, to identifying
and addressing mission-critical factors inhibiting or facilitating success (2008: 97). Some of the
established Critical Success Factors (CSF) overlap with lessons identified by external evaluations and
can be grouped into different themes.
7.2.1 Design of the mission mandate
The first lesson relating to the planning phase of EUJUST LEX-Iraq is the essentiality of having a clear
vision of success (White, 2008: 98). Previous to the establishment of the mission, an Iraq Expert Team
(IET) was sent to assess the concrete needs of the Iraqi Criminal Justice System (CJS). This mission was
sent in order to make recommendations and to set out clear objectives as well as propose a desired
end-state (ibid.). Subsequently, it was identified as crucial to build up a strategic plan with
unambiguous priorities and guiding principles (ibid.: 98-99). According to White, EUJUST LEX-Iraq
has a clear and unambiguous mandate, a set of priorities, clearly stated objectives, a series of targets
and plans to achieve them which are also supported by the Iraqi government. Amongst others these
factors have determined the missions success (ibid.).
The concrete tasks of EUJUST LEX-Iraq were narrowly defined, which made it easier to implement the
mandate. The mission thus succeeded in meeting its quantitative targets (Asseburg and Kempin,
2009: 134). Given the missions narrow mandate, cooperation with the European Commission, the
United States and European Member State bilateral programmes was crucial (Korski, 2009: 236). On
the other hand, the sensitive issue of cooperating with the US in Iraq could initially be circumvented
by conducting trainings mainly in Europe (Asseburg and Kempin, 2009: 132).
Another important factor was the availability of appropriate resources. According to White, the
financial budget allocated to the mission proved to be adequate, while the main critical resources
56
were the quality and quantity of human resources (2008: 102). The adequacy of the mission budget
might be explained by the fact that most of the training programmes given thus far have taken place
in the EU Member States that also covered the participation costs (Troszczynska-van Genderen, 2010:
21).
7.2.2 Adequacy of the training curricula
The training has been very technical in focus and conducted almost entirely outside Iraq up until
2009. On this note, one European diplomat assessed EUJUST LEX-Iraq as having had demonstrably
minimal impact on the effectiveness of these (police) institutions due to a lack of sound
management, lack of follow-up, and the fact that Member States have prioritized gesture training
rather than sought to deliver what Iraq needs (quoted in Korski and Gowan, 2009: 77). Asseburg and
Kempin agreed that until 2009, the mission has not yet contributed in a measurable and meaningful
way to strengthening the Iraqi justice system and security apparatus (2009: 134). It is thus important
for the EU to ensure the lasting impact of training activities and involve the Iraqi partners at all stages
of action. On the basis of the training needs analysis and the evaluation of past training interventions,
the mission should work closely with and involve key figures in the Iraqi CJS (White, 2008: 101-2).
Finally, until 2009 the EU had failed to implement one of the key recommendations made by the IET:
to develop a common and detailed curriculum to be applied consistently for all the training courses
in each hosting member state.
7.2.3 Impact of the mission
Until 2010, there has been little evaluation of the impact of the programmes implemented by EUJUST
LEX-Iraq due to security restrictions on travel to Iraq. In 2009, some programmes were allowed to take
place on the ground, but limitations regarding the movement of personnel reduced the impact of
the training courses (Burke, 2010a). The mission has not been able to test for the usefulness of the
training offered or provide post-training mentoring. A systematic assessment of whether course
participants share their knowledge with colleagues in Iraq had not been established (Korski, 2009:
237). In October 2008, a Danish-Dutch non-paper circulated stating that monitoring had been a
problem and concluding that consequently more emphasis should be put on follow-up activities,
including monitoring, course evaluation, and mentoring of former course participants (quoted in
ibid.: 239).
The fact that the EUJUST LEX could, until 2009, only deploy 4 staff inside Iraq made it difficult to
undertake systematic assessments of training needs or evaluate the impact of its training
programme. Furthermore, they were unable to engage in hands-on follow-up training (ibid. 238).
Increased to 8 in 2010, the Baghdad-based EUJUST LEX staff members are also responsible for the
practical arrangements related to obtaining visas and making travel arrangements for the training
participants. According to Troszczynska-van Genderen, this largely logistical support role played by a
small and capable team on the ground demonstrates a clear downside of the out-of-country location
of the mission, resulting in staffs expertise being under-utilised in the current setting (2010: 19). The
EU should thus increase the staff based in Baghdad in order to be able to implement a clear division
of work between logistics and training.
Some of the identified lessons have been addressed by the EU as signs of change in practice can be
detected. As mentioned earlier, the mission increased the staff deployed inside Iraq from four in 2009
to eight in 2010. Regarding its training activities, the mission continuously amends and redesigns the
courses offered and its curricula in response to the needs of the Iraqi CJS (EUMS, 2008). Thus, a
57
planning seminar takes place at each new phase of the missions mandate (ibid.). The last of these
seminars, held in June 2011 in Brussels, aimed to present an update on the Iraqi training needs for the
period of July 2011 to June 2012. According to ISIS Europe, it derived from close consultation with
EUJUST LEX-Iraq, local and international counterparts (2011). Taking up the initial recommendation
made by IET the mission, in close coordination with cooperating EU Member States, has put together
a course syllabus encompassing 16 training modules for the judiciary, police and penitentiary service
officials (Troszczynska-van Genderen, 2010: 20). Moreover, the mission has designed a series of Work
Experience Secondments, where Iraqi senior criminal justice professionals work alongside European
counterparts for short periods. According to the EUMS, this responds the Iraqi request for more
practical learning experiences (2008).
The main lessons learned in the EUJUST LEX Iraq Mission refer to the development of a consistent
training curriculum to be applied by the participating EU Member States as well as to the continuous
redesign of the courses offered according to the Iraqis needs.
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8. EU SUPPORT TO AMIS II (SUDAN)
Since January 2004, the EU and its Member States have provided financial, personnel and political
support to the efforts of the African Union (AU) in stabilising the situation Darfur/Sudan. Following a
request by the President of the AU Commission, Alpha Oumar Konar, on 29 April 2005, the Council
endorsed Joint Action 2005/557/CFSP (18 July 2005) foreseeing a consolidated package of civilian
and military measures to support the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS II) starting from July 2005 (Council,
2005). The package provided the AU with urgently needed equipment and assets, planning and
technical assistance, police training, media support, aerial observation capacity as well as strategic
and tactical air transport for over 2000 troops. In addition, the EU appointed an EU Special
Representative for Sudan and committed over 300 million to AMIS II via the African Peace Facility
(June 2004 - December 2007). The EU support to AMIS ended on 31 December 2007 when the AU
mission AMIS II was handed over to the hybrid AU/UN peacekeeping operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in
accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1769 (2007).
The EU support to AMIS II triggered a lessons learned process regarding civilian-military supporting
actions. The Guidelines for Command and Control Structure for EU Civilian Operations in Crisis
Management (Council Document, 9919/07, 2007) stressed the need to develop a comprehensive EU
concept for EU supporting actions. On 27 June 2008, after receiving advice from the CIVCOM, the PSC
agreed the lessons from the EU Civilian-Military Supporting Action to the African Union Mission in the
Darfur Region of Sudan (AMIS) (Council Document, 9092/2/08 REV2, 2008). The document included
recommendations for establishing a blueprint for similar supporting actions.
Only a few external evaluations explicitly focus on the lessons learned from the EU support to AMIS II.
The supporting action is presented in the light of the EUs contribution to conflict resolution in Darfur
(Gya, 2010), as an example of EU-AU cooperation (ICG, 2005; Wadle, 2007; Derblom, Hagstrm Frisell
and Schmidt, 2008; Pirozzi, 2009), or as a test case for EU-NATO cooperation (Monaco and Gourlay,
2005).
The themes in the lessons learned from the EU support to AMIS II can be grouped into two main
categories:
8.2.1 EU-AU cooperation
While the EU has made a considerable contribution to AMIS II, external observers agreed that the
financial and operational support did not suffice to ensure the missions effectiveness (Franke, 2009:
259). The monthly financial requirements of AMIS II amounted to over 30 million. Despite being
under-staffed, the AU was, for instance, unable to pay wages to its soldiers on a regular basis (Wadle,
2007: 18). Operational EU-AU coordination was difficult due to the multitude of actors on the ground,
the lack of coordination mechanisms, and the absence of a clear delineation of tasks and
competences (ibid.: 20). Franke (2008: 262) recommends that the EU should increase its level of
financial support to AU missions, loosen the restrictive conditions on the funding provided to AU
operations, and put less emphasis on peacekeeping training, since African soldiers often have
relevant experience due to their frequent participation in UN missions. One lesson that the EU has
drawn from its support mission to AMIS II is that it is preferable to coordinate with, rather than to
support, an AU operation (Derblom, Hagstrm Frisell and Schmidt 2008: 41). While the EU provided a
59
lot of financial support to AMIS II, it did not have much influence on decision-making (ibid.). In this
regard, Wadle (2007: 18) recommends establishing joint control mechanisms while respecting African
ownership. He also recommends an increased institutionalisation of EU-AU communication (ibid.: 20).
8.2.2 EU-UN-NATO cooperation
There was a lack of strategic coordination between the EU, NATO, and the UN (Franke, 2009: 258). In
spite of multilateral initiatives for information exchange on security assistance and cooperation
programmes, like the Africa Clearing House and the AU Partners Technical Support Group in Addis
Ababa, EU-NATO-UN cooperation was marked by duplication and overlaps. This increased the
transaction costs for the AU and further strained its already limited absorption capacity (ibid.). An
example for this kind of duplication was the parallel provision of logistical support by the EU and
NATO. Although NATOs Strategic Airlift coordination Centre and the EUs European Airlift Centre are
both located in Eindhoven, they detached separate liaison teams to the AU, thereby increasing the
demands on AU staff and facilities (ibid.). Franke (ibid.: 262) concludes that the EU should improve its
coordination with the UN and NATO as well as among its Member States in order to avoid duplication
in the future.
The EU support to AMIS II has triggered an encompassing lessons learned process on EU supporting
actions. On 24 November 2008, the Council Secretariat issued (draft) guidelines for planning and
conducting EU Supporting Actions (Council Document, 16274/08, 2008). These guidelines, based on
the lessons learned from the EU support to AMIS II, provide generic principles for the planning and
conduct of EU supporting actions applicable to both civilian and military instruments. One of these
principles is to establish appropriate coordination arrangements between EU actors in Brussels and
the international actor receiving EU support in order to help ensure adequate and timely
communication and cooperation in theatre (ibid.). Referring to these guidelines, but noting that
future support to UN peacekeeping could be more complex than the one provided to AMIS II, the
European External Action Service (EEAS) issued a document on further possibilities for enhancing EU
CSDP support to UN peacekeeping operations (ARES (2011) 423594) on 12 April 2011. The document
outlines different possibilities of EU support to UN peacekeeping operations, proposes a
reinforcement of the EU-UN liaison structures, and calls for more synergies in the support to the AU. It
also calls for a more intensive exchange of lessons learned including the possible use of a shared
civilian-military lessons learned database.
The lessons learned process following the EU support to AMIS II provided the conceptual basis for the
so-called modular approach, which would consist in providing certain components of an UN
operation. While this approach has not seen any empirical examples so far, there has been a second
example of EU support to the AU: the EU support to the AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) (April-
December 2007). Calling the EUs assistance to AMISOM half-hearted, Franke (2009: 259) noted that
one of the key lessons identified form the EU support to AMIS II, namely to provide the AU mission
with sufficient resources, had not been learned (ibid.: 259).
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9. ACEH MONITORING MISSION (AMM)
The Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) was a civilian crisis management mission which consisted of
monitors from the European Union and five ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations)
contributing countries. The EU-led mission was established on 15 September 2005 to monitor the
implementation of various aspects of the peace agreement set out in the Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) (Helsinki Agreement, 2005) signed by the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and
the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) on 15 August 2005 in Helsinki (Council Joint Action 2005/643/CFSP).
The AMM, with its headquarters in Banda Aceh, established a monitoring capability comprised of
geographically distributed district offices throughout Aceh. The AMM was the first CSDP mission to
be conducted in cooperation with another regional organisation under the policy of effective
multilateralism (Braud & Grive, 2005: 36). On 15 December 2006, the EU-led Aceh Monitoring Mission
(AMM) completed its mandate.
In a meeting on 19 December 2006, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) tasked the Councils
Secretariat to prepare lessons identified from the AMM experience (Councils Secretariat Document
5252/07, 2007: 2). It also tasked the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM),
the Asia-Oceania Working Party (COASI) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS) to examine and provide
advice on the thematic lessons learned papers (ibid.). To follow up on this task, the Secretariat issued
a report on EU-ASEAN cooperation on 12 January 2007 (ibid.). The Secretariat further indicated that it
would also issue one additional report on the lessons of the planning phase, human rights and
gender issues, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), finances, and public
information and press (ibid.). Not long after the initial report, a paper on the lessons identified and
recommendations from the AMM was issued on 27 February 2007 (6596/1/07, 2007). The information
for this report was provided by the AMM Headquarters (ibid.: 2). Reflecting on these reports, it seems
that the lesson learning process of the AMM was rather ad hoc. There is no indication that lessons
have been collected from the outset of the mission and the papers were issued after the mission had
been completed. Furthermore, there was no separate report on the planning phase of the AMM,
while this had been the case for previous missions. As far as one can judge from the available official
sources, the PSC was the initiator of the process in the last month of the mission.
From EU documents and academic literature on the AMM four main themes can be identified with
regard to the lessons identified of the mission:
9.2.1 The fast deployment of the AMM
The AMM is noteworthy for the very short timeframe between the decision to set up the mission and
its actual deployment. The MoU that lies behind the peace agreement called for a civilian monitoring
mission to be stationed in Aceh immediately after the agreement was signed on 15 August 2005.
However, it was impossible to have a fully functioning mission in operational readiness by 15 August.
Therefore the Council set 15 September as the missions starting date and deployed a fifty-strong EU
Initial Monitoring Presence (IMP) in the meantime (between 15 August and 15 September) to
monitor the peace agreement. The most important lesson identified regarding this very quick
response is that it collided with the protracted bureaucratic procedures for funding a mission
(Heiduk, 2009: 103). To make the deployment possible, the AMM used an unconventional financing
arrangement that was partly funded from the ESDP budget and partly though contributions from the
61
various Member States. However, this arrangement resulted in severe funding bottlenecks on the
ground (Heiduk, 2009: 103). In some cases, IMP staff had to pay for their own plane tickets and
funding delays left them without mobile phones, computers and offices (Schulze, 2007: 5). Although
the adaption of this ad-hoc arrangement shows the flexibility of the AMM, it also highlights
weaknesses in the planning structures that still hamper swift implementation of CSDP missions.
Pieter Feith, the AMM Head of Mission, pointed to the need for a start-up fund for CSDP missions
and a general reduction in bureaucracy (Feith, 2006: 19). Reflecting on experiences from the planning
phase of the AMM, it becomes clear that many of the shortcomings and lessons from the AMM,
including adequate financing and planning support, have already been identified during the Civilian
Capabilities Commitment Conference at the end of 2004 (Braud & Grevi, 2005: 34).
Another lesson from the mission was that the lack of information about the negotiations of the peace
agreement made EU planning for the mission more difficult. The EU had no official role in the drafting
of the MoU which in fact contained provisions impacting on the mandate of the future EU mission.
This created problems when the EU had to define the mandate of its mission in its planning
documents, especially with regard to the monitoring of human rights. The lesson to be drawn is that
the EU should be as close as possible to the negotiations and negotiators, including concerned
NGOs/CSOs, for any similar envisaged EU missions, at least in the part of the talks covering the role for
the EU in the implementation of an agreement (Councils Secretariat Document 10114/08, 2008: 6).
9.2.2 EU-ASEAN cooperation
A third lesson can be identified with regard to the cooperation with ASEAN. Although observers
emphasise the advantages of the EU-ASEAN cooperation, above all in the shape of enhanced
regional expertise and cultural competence, it also led to more complexities in personnel decisions
and appointments, and communication difficulties due to the poor English of some of the Asian staff
(Heiduk, 2009: 102).
9.2.3 The position of the AMM in relation to the conflicting parties
A fourth lesson addresses the position of the AMM in relation to the conflicting parties during the
implementation of the peace agreement. There was no agreement within the mission as to whether
and how to engage with the conflict parties in order to help explain the process or the significance of
a critical piece of national legislation. One can argue that technical assistance would compromise
mission impartiality when it was only requested by one party. The Monitoring Mission in Aceh
therefore points to the need for more guidance for mission personnel on how to share expertise
relevant to maintaining the parties engagement and confidence in the implementation of a peace
agreement (Gourlay, 2010: 15).
9.2.4 The human rights component of the AMM mandate
Although the AMM achieved progress on many aspects of its mandate, it was unable to fulfil the
human rights component of the mandate (Schulze, 2009: 272). Neither the Human Rights Court nor
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission had been established. This can be (partly) explained by the
fact that the task to monitor the human rights situation was not part of the monitors training and
there were no clearly defined strategies, methods or approached on the ground (Heiduk, 2009: 108).
Furthermore, the personnel structure and associated expertise of the AMM did not correspond to
human rights tasks, as it consisted mostly of military or ex-military who had expertise for security
tasks. The lesson that follows from this is that for more comprehensive implementation of the
missions goals of protecting human rights it is necessary to have a staff set-up that matches the
mission goals.
62
9.2.5 Lessons learned?
Although the AMM was the first experience of the EU in monitoring a peace agreement, the mission
proved to be able to learn from previous experiences of the EU. Experiences of the Iraq Expert Team
(considered as the first Crisis Response Team deployed by the EU) were used during the deployment
phase of the AMM. From these lessons, it became clear that the secondment of Council Secretariat
personnel to key positions in the IMP and AMM increased continuity and allowed for intimate
knowledge of the EUs procedures (Braud & Grevi, 2005: 22). The appointment of former Deputy
Director General for ESDP and Operations in the Council Secretariat, Pieter Feith, as the Head of the
IMP and HoM, and the appointment of a senior and experienced EU civilian official from the
Secretariats Civilian Crisis Management Directorate as the Head of the Technical Assessment Mission
(TAM) are examples of this (ibid.) The positive experience on this account during AMM has shown
that the Council Secretariat needs the flexibility and personnel to deploy civilian officials in crisis
management, in conjunction with officials from the Member States and the Commission. Another
positive experience of the AMM is that the Head of Mission also served as the EUs principal political
representative. This suggests that, where EUSRs are not deployed alongside EU CSDP missions, it is
important that the Head of Mission plays a proactive role in engaging the parties in the peace
process at the highest level (Gourlay, 2010: 15).
With regard to the execution of its mandate, the meetings of the Commission of Security
Arrangements (COSA), initially held weekly and later fortnightly, prove to be crucial for the
cooperation between the AMM and the parties to the conflict (Heiduk, 2009: 102).

63
10. EU BORDER ASSISTANCE MISSIONS (EUBAM RAFAH)
Based on the Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA) concluded by Israel and the Palestinian
Authority (PA), which included principles for the Rafah crossing, the EU decided on 15 November
2005 to take over the proposed third-party role at the Rafah Crossing Point between the Gaza strip
and Egypt. On 24 November 2005, it launched the EU Border Assistance Mission EUBAM Rafah
(Council Joint Action 2005/889/CFSP). Initially established for one year, the mission was extended
several times most recently until 30 June 2012. Headquartered in Ashkelon, the mission is currently
10 EU and 8 local staff strong. The mission objective is to provide a third party presence at the Rafah
Crossing Point in order to contribute to the opening of the crossing point and to build up confidence
between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority (Council of the European Union,
2011; comments made by Mission staff members, February 2012). Due to the political and security
conditions in Gaza the mission is on stand-by since 2007. In case of changed conditions on the
ground, EUBAM Rafah has a redeployment plan to rapidly increase the strength of the mission. Until
October 2011, a reactivation of the mission had not been officially requested (ISIS Europe, 2011)(
19
).
However, EUBAM Rafah continues to assist EUPOL COPPS with the training of the Palestinian
Authoritys staff in the field of border and crossing management (ibid.).
EUBAM Rafah has frequently been assessed in weekly, monthly and six-monthly mission reports. A
mid-term review took place after the first half of the first mandate in 2006. In January 2008, a special
assessment report was issued right after violent breaches of the Egyptian border had taken place and
thousands of Palestinians streamed across into Egypt (Asseburg and Kempin, 2009: 96). Moreover,
around the same time the PSC requested a EUBAM Rafah reassessment paper from the Council
secretariat (Council Document 7964/08, 2008). Although the content of the reports are classified, it
stands to reason that the assessments were triggered ad hoc by the outbreak of violence in Gaza. As
stated by ISIS Europe in November 2010, the six-monthly report could have assessed the reactivation
of the mission. Whether this was the case or which other lessons have been identified on EU level
remains unavailable to the public since the mission reports are restricted Council documents.
The number of external evaluations is also limited to a few documents mostly assessing the first years
of the mission dating from 2007 to 2009. This might be explained by the fact that the mission
continues to be on hold since 2007. While the early years of the mission have been seen as rather
successful (Nathanson and Stetter, 2008; Pirozzi, 2008), more recent evaluations tend to describe the
operation as a failure (Asseburg and Kempin, 2009; Bulut, 2009b).
Since there are no official lessons learned documents on EUBAM Rafah publically available, one has to
rely on the lessons identified in think tank evaluations and reports. However, it is possible to group
the lessons into two different themes.

19
AfLer Lhe CperaLlon CasL Lead, Lhe Lu lncreased Lhe mlsslon's sLrengLh Lo be prepared Lo Lake over Lhe Lasks lmmedlaLely
ln case Lhe parLles should requesL Lu8AM's presence aL Lhe 8afah Crosslng olnL (commenLs made by Mlsslon (sLaff)
members, lebruary 2012).
64
10.2.1 Implementation of the mission mandate
Despite its small size, EUBAM was initially able to fulfill its mandate for a period of almost two years.
As long as the mission had a stable partner in Gaza Strip, it could operate effectively and its success
radiated even beyond its immediate area of operation (Nathanson and Stetter, 2008: 100). In the
beginning, the mission received help from all three sides: the PA was eager to control its own border,
the Egyptians aimed at keeping stability in the area, and the Israelis realized that withdrawing from
Gaza would lead to an independent Palestinian border (ibid.: 99). The lesson identified for this and
other missions is that the success of the mission in politically contentious areas depends deeply on
committed partners on all sides (ibid.: 100).
The success in rapidly implementing the mandate should be seen in relation to the adequacy of the
mandate. On one hand, the mission was successful in swiftly deploying its staff; on the other hand, a
longer interim period, wherein the specifics of the AMA and the details of the mission could have
been further explored, might have strengthened the mission in its interaction with the other parties
involved (Bulut, 2009: 306). Thus the agreement could have been more specific, formally comprised
all concerned parties, and established more robust mechanisms for addressing non-compliance and
other issues of implementation (ibid.). Moreover the AMA never came fully into force with all its
protocols. This led to, inter alia, a lack of clear guidelines for the mission staff on how to deal with
suspicious objects or persons(
20
). EUBAM staff had thus to rely on ad hoc arrangements (Asseburg and
Kempin, 2009: 94). According to Asseburg, the Rafah operation has several positive aspects such as
clear objectives and adequate funding and staff and its approach in principle well-suited to
strengthening Palestinian capacities (ibid: 89). The mission made a substantial contribution to the
implementation of the AMA and to confidence-building between the parties. Irrespective of the fact
that operations have been suspended for years, a termination of the mission would send the wrong
political message (comments made by Mission staff members, February 2012).
10.2.2 Impact of the mission
In a complex environment involving several actors, the mission has to manoeuver between the PA
and Israel, between Israel and Egypt, and between Egypt and the Palestinians, all the while trying to
establish and maintain credibility as an impartial, reliable and capable third party (Bulut, 2009: 305;
EU official, February 2012). In the beginning, the mission managed to carry out its monitoring and
advisory mandate. As the Rafah crossing point was operational on a daily basis for almost seven
months, the mission was able to make a difference on the ground. However, operational effect and
political impact should be differentiated. According to a British parliamentary report, the symbolic
significance of the mission outweighed its operational impact (quoted in Bulut, 2009: 307). On the
other hand, this symbolic value and the relatively high level of acceptance from EU Member States
might explain its high visibility vis--vis its low financial and administrative costs (ibid.).
Regarding learning from the experiences in Rafah and relating to the complex and difficult political
and security context, the EU should be wary in perceiving the mission as a major precedent.
Moreover, much cautious consideration should be taken to make proposals for an extension to
crossing points between the Gaza Strip and Israel, which constitute a very different environment
(Bulut, 2009: 308).

65
Since the mission continues to be on stand-by since 2007, it is difficult to draw conclusions on
whether any of the previously identified lessons have been learned or not. A reactivation of the
mission will depend much on the political context on the ground. In 2011, a merger with EUPOL
COPPS by the end of the EUBAM Rafah mandate on 31 December had been discussed (ISIS Europe,
2011). However, on 19 December 2011 the EUBAM Rafah Mission was technically extended until 30
June 2012 on the basis of the previous mandate.

20
Accordlng Lo commenLs made by Mlsslon (sLaff) members, lebruary 2012 Lhere was no lack of guldance. 1he monlLors
were monlLorlng, advlslng and Lralnlng A offlcers accordlng Lo lnLernaLlonal sLandards. ln case of dlsagreemenL, monlLors
wroLe a noncompllance reporL LhaL was senL Lhrough Lhe chaln of command.
66
11. EUROPEAN BORDER ASSISTANCE MISSION (EUBAM) MOLDOVA-
UKRAINE
At the request of Moldova and Ukraine, the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) was launched on
30 November 2005 (Council Joint Action 2005/776/CFSP). EUBAM is an advisory, technical mission
mandated to enhance the border-management capacities of the border guard and customs
authorities and other law enforcement and State agencies of Moldova and Ukraine. By offering
comprehensive support from its headquarters in Odessa and six field offices on either side of the
Moldova/Ukraine common border, EUBAM tries to support border and customs procedures and
standards in Moldova and Ukraine that will ultimately mirror those prevalent in the European Union.
Furthermore, EUBAM hopes to contribute to a peaceful resolution of the Transnistrian conflict.
EUBAM is part of a larger EU effort in the region, which consists of an EU Special Representative
(EUSR) and European Commission Delegations in Chisinau and Kyiv. The mandate of the Mission has
already been extended three times (in 2007, 2009 and 2011), with the current mandate expiring on
30 November, 2015.
Although established by a Council Joint Action in November 2005, EUBAM is financed, managed and
implemented by the Commission, while the EU Council provides political oversight (Huff, 2011: 20).
Based on this distinctive division of roles and contributions of the EU institutions, EUBAM can be
viewed as an institutionally hybrid mission (Dura, 2009: 280). As a result, the lessons learned process
of this mission is somewhat different than other CSDP mission. There are, for example, no official EU
documents that specifically address lessons learned during the EUBAM Mission.
Under the Memorandum of Understanding that was signed between the Government of Moldova
and Ukraine and the European Commission (EC) (European Commission and the Governments of the
Republic of Moldova and of Ukraine, 2005) an Advisory Board was created to review the progress of
the mission and plans for future work(
21
). Although the Advisory Board agreed to issue a report on
lessons learned during the missions first two years at the Eighth Advisory Board Meeting (EUBAM,
2008: 5), this report was either kept for internal use or has not been issued. From the Advisory Board
Meetings, it becomes clear that several lessons learned meetings were organised during the mission
(Councils Secretariat Document 12448/07, 2007: 3).
As far as can be judged from the open sources, the lesson learning process during the EUBAM
Mission can be described as ad hoc. There is no systematic analysis of lessons in the annual reports of
the mission and lessons learned meetings only take place occasionally. Furthermore, it seems that
the mission does not adhere to the Lessons Learned Guidelines of December 2008 as the mission is
financed and managed by the Commission.
Considering official documents and academic literature on EUBAM Ukraine-Moldova the following
three main topics can be identified when it comes to the lessons of the mission:

21
1he Advlsory 8oard ls composed of Lhe represenLaLlves of lorelgn MlnlsLrles of ukralne and Moldova, Moldovan and
ukralnlan CusLoms and 8order Cuard servlces, Lhe Luropean Commlsslon, Lhe unlLed naLlons uevelopmenL rogramme
(unu), Lhe Lu Speclal 8epresenLaLlve for Moldova, Lhe Lu resldency, as well as Lhe CrganlsaLlon for SecurlLy and Co
operaLlon ln Lurope (CSCL) and Lhe lnLernaLlonal CrganlsaLlon for MlgraLlon (lCM).
67
11.2.1 The financial mechanism during the first six months of the mission
When EUBAM started in November 2005 it was initially financed by the Rapid Reaction Mechanism
characterised by the use of several short term contracts financed from different Technical Assistance
to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) Regional Action Programmes. The mechanism
was applied to respond in a rapid and flexible manner to the opportunity that arose in 2005 for
advancing the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict. As a consequence, staff contracts or rental
agreements had to be renewed every few months. The Commission had not foreseen such a major
long-term project (nearly one million euro per month) when programming its activities in the region
(Caldeira, 2009: 14).
11.2.2 The strategic underpinning of the EUBAM
Secondly, it has been argued that the mission struggles to be defined beyond the European
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) framework. This suggests that the level of inter-institutional cooperation
that evolved on the ground was not underpinned by a concrete overarching strategic approach to
ENP-CSDP co-ordination. A report by DG RELEX (Directorate General for External Relations), delivered
to the European Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee in November 2008, conceded this point,
suggesting that the EU should expand its policy of engagement beyond the scope of border
management (Huff, 2011: 21). If anything, this further highlights the inability of Member States to
agree to use CSDP consistently in the Eastern neighbourhood, except as a reaction to events.
11.2.3 The legal advisory capacity of EUBAM
A third lesson that can be identified with regard to the impact of EUBAM on the systemic level of the
recipient countries is that EUBAM lacks a permanent and comprehensive legal advisory capacity
(Kurowska & Tallis, 2009: 62). EUBAMs assertions that we do institutions and others do laws and that
we try to enhance institutions absorption capacity are insufficient and may limit the systemic
impact of the mission (ibid.).
One of the most valuable lessons learned from the EUBAM Mission is the need for fast and effective
systems for information exchange. On 21 November 2006, separate agreements between the
customs services and between border guards of Moldova and Ukraine were signed at the Fifth
Trilateral Meeting on Border Issues, held in Brussels. These agreements were warmly welcomed by
the Mission as having the potential to make a significant step forward in improved cross-border
cooperation (EUBAM, 2007).
One aspect that facilitates the work of the EUBAM is that the Mission emphasizes that it is an
advisory, technical body with no executive powers (Kurowska & Tallis, 2009: 57). By doing so, it
positions itself as a neutral advisor instead of a disciplining superior. It also makes EUBAM more
palatable to Russia and nationalist elements within Ukraine, which may otherwise have baulked at a
fully fledged CSDP mission in its near abroad (ibid.). Furthermore, the Mission also successfully
managed to communicate its key messages to the public as a result of an excellent public relations
service (ibid.: 56). It does this by centring its messages on three clusters: dynamic and ambitious
leadership, the role of EUBAM as a partner rather than a supervisor, and the aggrandisement of
EUBAMs achievements. The Mission realised at an early stage that pure mentoring and advising
without considerable material input on the EUs part was unlikely to yield sufficient local
commitment. Therefore, the EC-funded project of BOMMOLUK (Improving Management on the
Moldovan-Ukrainian State Border) was used to generate material input by arranging study tours to
68
EU Member States, developing training courses and realising the procurement of equipment (ibid.:
55). The implementation of this project is outsourced to EUBAM. This project shows that although
EUBAM had to learn on the job by trial and error, it has managed to bring different, initially reluctant,
actors together, at least at the level of formal commitment. Although many CSDP missions in the past
suffered problems with regard to the co-ordination of EU efforts in one area, this was not the case
during the EUBAM (Dura, 2009: 282). Through the excellent cooperation between the EUSR and the
Head of Mission on the ground the EU foreign policy interests in the region (i.e. that of bringing
security and stability on the EUs eastern border) have been advanced in a coordinated manner.
69
12. EU POLICE MISSION FOR THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES (EUPOL
COPPS)
Established in January 2006 for a period of three years and most recently extended until 30 June
2012, the civilian mission aims at contributing to the establishment of sustainable and effective
policing arrangements under Palestine ownership in accordance with best international standards, in
cooperation with the Unions institution building programmes as well as other international efforts in
the wider context of the Security Sector including Criminal Justice Reform (Council Decision
2010/784/CFSP). Headquartered in Ramallah, the mission is currently 53 EU staff and 39 local staff
strong with contributions from 17 EU Member States and Canada (Council of the European Union,
2012; comments made by Mission staff members, February 2012).
On the EU level EUPOL COPPS has been assessed in weekly, monthly and six-monthly reports since its
establishment in 2006, whereas only the latter certainly contain lessons learned components. For the
years 2006 and 2011 additional special reports can be found. Nevertheless only the renewed
mandate from 2010 officially included a six-monthly review process in accordance with the criteria
set out in the Concept of Operations and the Operation Plan. These evaluations are conducted in
order to review the missions size and scope taking into account the conditions on the ground
(Council Decision 2010/784/CFSP). While the mission reports are all restricted Council documents,
other official and semi-official documents can be publicly accessed. These include Council Joint
Actions and Decisions, EU press releases as well as statements by the spokesperson for EUPOL COPPS.
Moreover, there is a lack of recent external evaluations and most of the open source documents date
from the years 2008 and 2009.
Among the available official documents and external evaluations, the identified lessons can be
grouped into the following themes:
12.2.1 The mission mandate and its implementation
The approach taken by the EUPOL COPPS Mission is based on two factors. First, the diversity of
European policing traditions and judicial systems from which the mission draws its personnel seems
to have a positive effect on the missions work. Second, a division of labour within the mission that
invites bottom-up solutions in working with PCP counterparts at different levels has been
functioning well (Bulut, 2009: 292). However, the mission faces the challenge of combining short-
term impact and long-term effect and should therefore not only rely on transmitting resources,
hardware and new technical skills (Bulut, 2009: 293). An early emphasis on providing equipment at
the expense of capacity-building and reform has been criticized. Thus a quick impact and project-
based focus has limited the policy impact of the operation, which also lacks a strategic planning level
(Asseburg, 2010: 79).
Rigidity in selecting staff for the mission made a skill-based approach difficult. The skills and
competences of contracted EUPOL COPPS staff did not prove to be appropriate in every aspect. The
possibility of hiring specific civilian expertise from outside the participating police services should
therefore be made possible for the mission (Kerkknen, Rantanen and Sundqvist, 2008: 31). It has also
been argued that evaluating the extent to which EUPOL COPPS has successfully implemented its
mandate is hampered. This relate to the fact that the Council Joint Action from 2005 did not define
70
benchmarks or set target dates against which achievements could be measured (Council Joint Action
2005/797/CFSP). Moreover the objectives have been kept relative general and vague (Asseburg and
Kempin, 2009: 91).
12.2.2 Internal and external cooperation
Regarding the relations with other actors involved, such as single EU Member States and the UN,
there are provisions in place at the practical level, in order to streamline efforts in the Palestinian
reform processes (comments made by Mission (staff) members, February 2012). The same is true for
the official declared strategy where an effective division of labour between the EU and the US has
been agreed upon at a high-level conference in June 2008 (Berlin Conference, 2008). On this occasion
the EU and the US declared a blue-green division of their leadership roles. This means that the EU
should take the lead in supporting civil security structures, while the US should lead in assisting
national security forces. However, at the level of objectives, tactics and strategies, a number of
different and as Bulut argues incompatible agendas are at work (2009: 296).
The relations between EUPOL COPPS and the European Union Representative Office (EUREP) in
Jerusalem as well as the wider involvement of the Commission in the mission demonstrated in the
past the interconnectedness of the operation and the Commission objectives (EU official, February
2012). A common understanding of their cooperation seemed to be missing (ibid.).
12.2.3 Support and impact
According to Bulut, the operation has raised the EUs profile in relation to some dimensions of the
conflict (2009: 289). The mission has been able to make a contribution to rebuilding the Palestinian
police and to improve the security in the West Bank. The mission has provided advice, training,
equipment, infrastructure and assessment to civilian policing in the region (ibid.: 291). Despite the
complex political framework, the Mission has supported a closer cooperation between Palestinian
Civil Police and the Israel National Police in a number of areas (traffic, criminal investigation) through
the organization of joint workshops in order to facilitate the solving of operational issues (comments
made by Mission staff members, February 2012).
Some of the identified lessons seem to have been learned as there are signs of changes in practice,
while others remain to be addressed. The establishment of a rule of law component in 2008 was
based on previous experiences, whereby most of the CSDP missions supported police and the rule of
law (Vericat, 2008). However, the EU should ensure that both components police training and the
development of civilian police law and guidelines are integrated into a legal framework that still has
to be created (Asseburg, 2010: 83). Moreover, the mission appears to have responded to the criticism
of its focus on logistical support. As a result, EUPOL COPPS shifted its emphasis from merely
equipping counterparts to increasing support to them on a more strategic level focusing on
institutional and capacity building. The Mission has reinforced its focus on transfer of knowhow in a
number of areas including good governance, oversight, accountability, anti-corruption, police-
prosecution cooperation, gender mainstreaming among others (EU official, February 2012). It has
given wider attention to transformational issues and a more ambitious approach to the policing-
justice continuum (Bulut, 2009: 293). Regarding the skill-based selection of staff, the Council decided
in 2009 to amend the mission mandate making it possible for EUPOL COPPS to hire experts on a
contractual basis should the required expertise not be provided by the Member States (Council
Decision 2009/955/CFSP). Moreover EUPOL COPPS has developed jointly with the EU Representative
Office a series of mechanisms to enhance the comprehensive efforts of the EU in the framework of
71
the security and justice sector, such as the technical assistance programme and a capital investment
programme for the PCP. In 2011, EUPOL COPPS and the US Security Coordinator (USSC)(
22
) have put
in place a series of joint meetings at operational and strategic levels, with the aim of identifying
projects and activities to reinforce each others efforts to build the Palestinian Security Forces. These
joint efforts have led to positive results for the time being and are welcomed by the main
beneficiaries: the Palestinian Civil Police and the National Security Forces (ibid.).
In conclusion, the main lessons learned in the EUPOL Mission include a shift towards focussing on
institution and capacity building, more flexibility in hiring experts as well as efforts towards better
coordination with the US.

22
lor lsrael and Lhe alesLlnlan LerrlLorles.
72
13. EUFOR RD CONGO
In December 2005, the UN invited the EU to consider the possibility of deploying a military force to
assist the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (MONUC) in safeguarding the
democratic elections in the DRC scheduled to take place in summer 2006. In June 2006, the Council
decided to launch Operation EUFOR RD Congo to support MONUC during the election process
(Council Decision 2006/412/CFSP). In accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1671 (2006),
the objectives of Operation EUFOR RD Congo were (1) to support MONUC in its stabilising role during
the election process; (2) to contribute to the protection of civilians; (3) to contribute to airport
protection in Kinshasa; (4) to ensure the protection of its own personnel and installations, and (5) to
execute operations of limited character to evacuate civilians in danger. Operation EUFOR RD Congo
was deployed on 30 July 2006 and withdrew on 30 November 2006.
EUFOR RD Congo was followed by an extensive official lesson learning process with a particular focus
on strategic planning. On 23 February 2007, the EUMC issued an Initial Assessment and
Recommendations on the Military Lessons Identified from Op EUFOR RD Congo (Council Document,
6701/07, 2007) to the PSC. Based on this as well as on other inputs, the PSC approved on 8 May 2007
an Analysis of Lessons from Operation EUFOR RD Congo (Council Document, 7633/1/07, 2007). In July
2007, the EUMC prepared an action plan on the lessons from EUFOR RD Congo for the work within its
remit (Council Document, 11799/07, 2007). On 11 October 2007, the EUMS presented a document to
the EUMC outlining priorities and timelines for advancing lessons from EUFOR RD Congo related to
doctrine (Council Document, 13777/1/07, 2007). This document identified three priority groups:
planning, conduct of operations, and remaining (enabling) issues. Following a request by the Council
at its meeting on 14-15 May 2007, the Secretary-General/ High Representative (SG/HR) presented a
Report on the EUMS ability to conduct planning at the strategic level for EU-led operations in November
2007 (Council Document, 14834/07, 2007). Based on lessons identified from EUFOR RD Congo and
corresponding analyses by the EUMS and EUMC, the report made concrete recommendations for
restructuring the EUMS with the aim of enhancing its overall effectiveness (see below). The Council
endorsed these recommendations at its meeting on 19-20 November 2007.
Considering both official lessons learned documents and external evaluations of EUFOR RD Congo,
four main recurrent themes can be identified:
Preparation and planning of the Operation
Although the political consensus to launch Operation EUFOR RD Congo was reached quickly, the
advance planning and decision-making process did not run smoothly (Tull, 2009: 48). Questions
regarding the Operations tasks, mandate, participation, and leadership caused considerable tensions
between the Member States, the SG/HR, and ultimately also between the EU and the UN (ibid.: 48-
50). These tensions led to delays in the military planning process while the lack of precise military
data on the Operation resulted in a tortuous force generation process (Ehrhart, 2007: 10).
13.2.1 Command of the Operation
Several external evaluations criticised the complexity of the EUFOR RD Congos chain of command as
well as the lack of flexibility of the Operations Commander. The German Operations Commander was
accused of micromanagement (Major, 2009: 316) leaving the Force Commander little room for
73
manoeuvre. Major (ibid.: 317) recommends to respect the principle of subsidiarity within the chain of
command and to better define the competences of the Forces Commander while granting him more
room for manoeuvre.
13.2.2 Time frame of the Operation
One of the recurrent criticisms of EUFOR RD Congo was its limited time frame, or rather the lack of
flexibility regarding its end date. The end date of 30 November 2006 was set before knowing that the
first round of elections would be postponed. As a consequence, the mandate did not cover the whole
length of the electoral process. Since an outbreak of violence could have been expected following
the second round of elections, external assessments of EUFOR RD Congo (ICG, 2006: 8; Kinzel, 2006: 4)
recommended extending the mandate until the end of January 2007. However, Germany insisted on
the November end date due to domestic pressure (Tull, 2007: 72).
13.2.3 EU-UN cooperation
EU-UN cooperation was described as challenging due to inadequate cooperation mechanisms,
coordination problems and a lack of mutual understanding (Major, 2009: 317). The allocation of
responsibilities to different levels in the chains of command hampered communication and
coordinated decision-making between EUFOR and MONUC. Other obstacles to the operational
coordination between EUFOR and MONUC were the complex procedures for committing EUFOR in
support of MONUC; the absence of a formal information sharing agreement; and different logistical
practices (Major, 2009: 317-318). In the aftermath of Operation EUFOR RD Congo, the EU and the UN
carried out a joint After Action Review(
23
) published on 16 November 2006(
24
). The review proposed
four concrete measures to ensure more structured and systematic EU-UN cooperation: 1) to establish
check lists of issues to be dealt with when both organisations are engaged in the same crisis; 2) to set
up practical coordination arrangements; 3) to explore possibilities of having a framework
arrangement on mutual logistical support or a model arrangement on logistical support; and 4) to
increase the use of liaison officers in the context of operations. These measures were to be
implemented in time for the next crisis situation where both organisations would be engaged
(Council Document, 17317/08, 2008).
Based on lessons from EUFOR RD Congo, some action was taken to enhance the EUs strategic
planning capacity. In November 2007, the Council endorsed four concrete measures proposed by the
SG/HR: (1) to enhance the requirement for qualifications (language competence, planning skills and
experience) for existing EUMS posts; (2) to increase the flexibility of the EUMS in managing early
planning with existing EUMS resources; (3) to increase member state intelligence support to the
EUMS; and (4) to increase the EUMS Personnel Establishment by five additional planning staff
(Council Document, 14834/07, 2007).
Lessons appear to have been learned with regard to EU-UN cooperation in crisis management. In
June 2007, the EU and the UN issued a joint statement on EU-UN cooperation in crisis management,
in which they committed to further enhance mutual cooperation and coordination (EU and UN,
2007). They agreed on a number of measures including regular senior-level political dialogue

23
'AfLer acLlon revlews' are a learnlng lnsLrumenL developed by Lhe uS army. lL ls a sLrucLured revlew or debrlef process for
analyzlng whaL happened, why lL happened, and how lL can be done beLLer. 1he Lu and Lhe un carrled ouL such revlews,
!"#$% &'!&( ln Lhe afLermaLh of operaLlon ArLemls, operaLlon LulC8 8u Congo, and operaLlon LulC8 1chad/8CA.
24
1he documenL lLself ls classlfled and could noL be accessed.
74
between the UN Secretariat and the EU Troika on broader crisis management issues; regular
exchange of views between UN Secretariat officials and the PSC, continued meetings of the UN-EU
Steering Committee including ad hoc meetings in crisis situations; the establishment of specific
coordination and cooperation mechanisms for crisis situations where the EU and the UN are jointly
engaged; and systematic UN-EU joint lessons learned exercises following joint engagements in crisis
management (ibid.).
The implementation of these measures was followed up in six-monthly progress reports(
25
). These
reports also included a specific section on the implementation of the measures proposed by the joint
EU-UN After Action Review on EUFOR RD Congo. According to the reports, several check lists for issues
to be dealt with when both organisations are engaged in the same crisis were elaborated (Council
Document, 17317/08, 2008). Liaison officers were exchanged between the EUMS and the UN
Department for Peacekeeping Operations as well as at Headquarters level as in the case of EUFOR
Tchad/RCA (Council Document, 10550/1/08, 2008). Joint templates based on the experience of
EUFOR RD Congo reportedly facilitated joint EU-UN planning in the case of EUFOR Tchad/RCA
(Council Document, 10550/1/08, 2009). In fact, assessments of EU-UN cooperation in the case of
EUFOR Tchad/RCA (see case study in this component) speak of a marked improvement in
comparison to EUFOR RD Congo (Helly, 2010: 3).
The lessons learned progress following EUFOR RD Congo was extensive and yielded some concrete
results. In July 2007, the EUMC stressed that the sheer volume and scope of lessons arising from
EUFOR RD Congo mitigate against them all being resolved in the near term (Council Document,
11799/07, 2007). The fact that enhancing the effectiveness of the EUs strategic planning was high up
on the agenda of the Foreign Affairs Council meeting of 1 December 2011 seems to prove this point.

23
See Councll uocumenLs 10330/1/08, 17317/08, 11431/09, 17341/09.
75
14. EUROPEAN UNION POLICE MISSION (EUPOL) AFGHANISTAN
The European Union Police Mission (EUPOL) was established as a civilian mission in 2007 for a period
of three years and extended in 2010 until 31 May 2013 (Council Joint Action 2007/369/CFSP; Council
Decision 2010/279/CFSP). As a follow-on mission to the German Police Project Office (GPPO) that has
been operating in Afghanistan since 2002, it aimed to expand the existing German efforts to build an
Afghan police force dedicated to civil democratic standards. As of mid-October 2011, the mission
strength accounted for 502 staff of which 321 were international and 197 national (Council
document, 2011). The self-stated aim of the mission is to contribute to the establishment of
sustainable and effective civil policing arrangements and to support the reform process towards a
trusted police service working within the framework of the rule of law and respecting human rights
(ibid.).
As stated by the Council, the mandate is subject to a six-monthly review in order to adjust its size and
scope as necessary (Council Joint Action 2007/369/CFSP; Council Decision 2010/279/CFSP).
Moreover, the legal basis shall be reviewed at least three months before its expiry in order to assess
whether to continue the mission or not (ibid.). Reviews are carried out on a frequent basis. A search in
the Council register resulted in a range of official documents on EUPOL Afghanistan such as weekly
mission reports, monthly assessment reports and six-monthly reports including lessons learned.
According to the mission mandate the Civilian Operation Commander and the Head of Mission
(HoM) report on a regular basis and, if required, to the PSC, responsible to the Council (ibid.).
However, these official reports are restricted Council documents and could therefore not be
accessed. Other official and semi-official EU documents include Council Joint Actions, Decisions and
Conclusions as well as official EU press releases and the CSDP newsletter published by the EU ISS.
In the case of external documents and evaluations, a number of think tank reports and policy briefs
were found. These reports and briefs either evaluate all CSDP missions and operations from 1999 to
2009, for example reports by the EUISS (2009) or the SWP (2009), or deal with the broader political
context (e.g. Gross, 2009). Moreover, International Security Information Services (ISIS) Europe
provides regular updates of all ongoing CSDP missions. The identified lessons in the EU ISS and the
SWP reports try to draw general conclusions on EU crisis management. Particular policy briefs
describe lessons that refer to the broader political context in Afghanistan and the EUs whole
approach towards rebuilding the country. Gross for example assesses EUPOL Afghanistan against the
backdrop of the EUs oft-stated efforts to promote general objectives, such as the rule of law and
good governance (Gross, 2009: 7). However, none of these open source documents contain official
lessons learned.
The method and the sources of information used most often are interviews with EU officials, national
diplomats and mission personnel, as well as existing academic literature. Most of the think tank
assessments of EUPOL Afghanistan were written in 2009 around the mid-term of the first mission
mandate or on a regular basis as by ISIS Europe.
Available official and semi-official documents mainly state the missions successes regarding
particular projects, which could be interpreted as signs for best practice (see below), and ensure the
EUs further commitment from a predominantly positive perspective. Apart from the positive
76
achievements, the external evaluations of EUPOL Afghanistan also present more critical views on the
mission. Accordingly, the identified lessons can be grouped into the following themes:
14.2.1 Adequacy of the mission mandate
Since the operation has no executive mandate, it is limited to advising and assisting the ANP and thus
dependent on the will and the receptiveness of the Afghan government (Gross, 2009: 34). The
mandate was limited to changing the structural framework of Afghan policing, thereby disregarding
the countrys almost total lack of a functioning uniformed police (Asseburg and Kempin, 2009: 145).
According to some external analysts, the EUs approach laid down in the mission mandate was not
suited to the conditions on the ground in Afghanistan (Korski, 2009: 9). It has been considered as too
small in terms of staffing and too weak in terms of financial resources (Asseburg and Kempin, 2009:
145). The Council should therefore adapt the mission mandate regarding its objectives and scope as
well as increase personnel and funding (ibid.: 147).
14.2.2 Deployment
Due to a lack of political commitment among EU Member States on one side and logistical challenges
in a complex environment on the ground on the other, EUPOL Afghanistan had a difficult start-up
phase (ISIS Europe, 2009; Peral, 2009: 331). The reluctance of the Member States made the recruiting
process for the mission too slow, and it was not able to meet its own deadlines (Peral, 2009: 332;
Asseburg and Kempin, 2009: 142). Most Ministries of Defence refused to send highly qualified
personnel (which are scarce and needed at home) for the training of young and inexperienced
Afghan recruits (ISIS Europe 2009). EU bureaucracy further delayed the start of EUPOLs work (ibid.:
143)(
26
).
Understaffing and the lack of qualified personnel also created difficulties for the mission in its aim to
expand activities across the whole Afghan territory (ISIS Europe, 2010; Asseburg and Kempin, 2009:
143). Therefore EU Member States should provide more experts in the area of institutional change
and training also having knowledge of the cultural context in Afghanistan (Bloching, 2011: 7). While
the military is organized in contingencies, which are capable and ready for deployment, civilian staff
such as police officers and agents, judges or administrators have to be taken away from their
workplace at home where they are needed. With low salaries and a high-risk context, the incentives
to work in a civilian CSDP mission are not very high (Koenig, 2010). To improve swift deployment into
CSDP missions, national rules for deployment of other qualified personnel, such as independent
consultants and civil society representatives, should be adopted or created (Bloching, 2011: 5).
14.2.3 Leadership
Frequent changes in the position of the Head of Mission (Gross, 2009: 30) and weak leadership on
the ground initially failed to provide clear direction to the efforts of various member states
(International Crisis Group, 2008: 10). EUPOL should be guided more effectively by political leadership
from Brussels and inside the EU Delegation in Afghanistan. Supported by a solid SSR [security sector
reform] and lesson unit in the EEAS the High Representative should become the driving force for the
EUs support to the police reform in Afghanistan, rather than individual Member States (Bloching,
2011: 8).

26
under Lu law Lhe lndlvldual Member SLaLes cannoL supply mlsslons wlLh equlpmenL such as vehlcles and compuLers,
supplles and servlces have Lo be puL ouL Lo Lender wlLh Lhe order golng Lo Lhe lowesL bldder regardless of when Lhey are
able Lo dellver.
77
Moreover, the links between several EU actors on the ground such as EUPOL and the European Union
Special Representative (EUSR) office as well as with European Commission programmes were
described as tenuous. All three institutions sit on the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB)
without clarity on who is assuming the lead role in political guidance (International Crisis Group,
2008: 10). As stated in a joint report of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security
Studies (London) and the Foreign Policy Research Institute (Philadelphia), at an international level it
would clearly be preferable for EUPOL to assume coordination and political leadership of the reform
effort (RUSI 2009: 89).
14.2.4 Corruption and gender sensitivity
The low salary paid to ANP staff through the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOFTA, of
which 50% is financed by the European Commission) aggravates the problem of local
corruption(
27
). The aim of building trusted and efficient civilian Afghan police force will only be
achieved if EUPOL, NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A) and the Afghan Government jointly
manage to reduce corruption by increasing level of literacy and the linkage between the police and
the justice sector (Bloching, 2001: 8). Another remaining problem is the lack of female police advisors.
In the Afghan context, female police recruits can generally only take part in trainings that are
conducted by women. An increase in the number of women within the ANP is likely to improve the
accessibility of services for women (Bloching, 2011: 5). The EU should thus enhance engagement and
consultation with local stakeholders in human rights and gender sensitivity (ibid.: 8).
14.2.5 Cooperation with other actors
There is a discrepancy between the EUs civilian model and other international actors approaches,
namely the more militarized model of the United States (US) (Peral 2009: 333). Given the divergent
visions of the actors involved of the main purpose of the ANP robust vs. civilian policing the EU
and the national and international stakeholders involved should agree on a common strategy
supporting Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan (Bloching, 2011: 8).
The absence of a comprehensive EU-NATO agreement on the provision of security for EUPOL staff
through International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and their inability to exchange classified
information complicated the mission's work and hindered closer cooperation between the two
institutions. As a result, EUPOL had to conclude individual agreements with Provincial Reconstruction
Team (PRT) lead nations. Meanwhile, the PRTs have sometimes functioned as an informal link to share
information on an ad hoc basis between NATO and EUPOL personnel, which otherwise has proven to
be a difficult process. The capacity of the PRTs to host international personnel is especially limited
and security agreements between EUPOL and individual PRTs provide EUPOL staff only a minimum
of protection. The difficulty of ensuring adequate security for the mission staff not only slowed down
but also limited EUPOLs geographic deployment (Peral, 2009: 334). From an outside perspective the
EU was thus advised to work out a comprehensive security agreement with NATO and ISAF (ISIS
Europe, 2007).
Moreover, EUPOL has not been able to better mainstream bilateral efforts of EU Member States on
Afghan police reform (Peral, 2009: 333). Integrating Member States bilateral contributions to SSR in

27
Cn Lhe low salary pald Lhrough LClA1 pollce offlcers are ofLen unable Lo feed a famlly. lnsurgenLs can offer double or
Lrlple Lhe amounL offered by LClA1 and corrupL Lhe lnsLlLuLlonal sLrucLures almlng Lo esLabllsh a rellable pollce force.
78
Afghanistan(
28
) into EUPOL would decrease the number of EU actors on the ground. This could
simultaneously reduce EUPOLs shortages in personnel numbers and resources (Bloching, 2011: 7).
14.2.6 Best practices
As a possible sign of best practices being replicated, successful projects established by EUPOL have
been extended and duplicated as stated in the ESDP newsletter (Council document, 2009a). The
Kabul City Police and the Security Project was established at a request of an Afghan minister based
on a district-by-district SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) (Peral, 2009: 331). The
assessment of this project proved it to be effective (Council document, 2009) leading to its extension
to 12 urban centres outside Kabul (ISIS Europe, 2010). One of the most successful projects the
establishment of a Crime Stopper Hotline for denouncing police misbehaviour in Helmand (Council
document, 2009) was also extended to other regions (DBK, 2010). Another achievement was the
completion of courses for 400 Afghan National Police (ANP) staff, which led to a similar follow-up
programme (Council Conclusions, 2009; Peral, 2009).
As stated in the Council Conclusions, the Council took up some of the above-mentioned issues and
amended the mission mandate. In 2008, the Council took the decision to double the number of the
EUPOL operation personnel (Council Conclusions on Afghanistan, 2008). Though the mission was
able to increase its personnel and to extend deployment to two additional provinces in Afghanistan
in 2009 (ISIS Europe, 2009), the staffing situation remains the missions biggest challenge (Bloching,
2011). As of 1 June 2011, the mission is still short of of its planned target of 400 staff (ISIS Europe,
2011). In 2010, the Council moreover stated, international civilian staff and local staff may also be
recruited by EUPOL AFGHANISTAN [] in duly justified cases, where no qualified applications from
Member States are available (Council Decision 2010/279/CFSP).
To address the shortcomings of the mission in terms of resources and budget, EU Member States
provided financial incentives in order to fill the capacity gap as well as to raise allowances to attract
personnel (ISIS Europe, 2011). The overall budget set to cover the expenditures related to EUPOL
Afghanistan has been increased over the years, while the highest amount unto now was decided on
in 2009 (Council Joint Action 2009/842/CFSP).
An improvement in the EUs internal coordination, especially concerning the working relations
between EUPOL and the European Commission, was noted on the basis of more regular exchanges
both in the form of monthly meetings between EUPOL, the Commission and the EUSR, as well as
more informal exchanges. (Bloching, 2011: 6-7). In the revised mandate from 2010, an additional
reference on the responsibility of the Head of Mission was included. The HoM shall therein
coordinate with other EU actors on the ground and [] receive local political guidance from the
EUSR (Council Decision 2010/279/CFSP).
According to Peral, the initially weak coordination within the IPCB and its low performance improved
in 2009, following reforms introduced by EUPOL (2009: 332). Similarly, the Civilian Operation
Commander declared in 2010 that coordination and cooperation between EUPOL, the US and NATO
have greatly improved (Council document, 2010). Yet neither source clarifies how the cooperation
was changed.

28
AparL from Lhelr subsLanLlal mlllLary conLrlbuLlons Lo lSAl, lndlvldual Lu Member SLaLes have also engaged Lhemselves ln
parLlcular pro[ecLs ln Lhe area of SS8 as for example Cermany ln Lhe case of Lhe CC as well as Lhe unlLed klngdom ln Lhe
area of counLernarcoLlc efforLs or lLaly ln Lhe fleld of [usLlce secLor reform (Cross, 2009: 22).
79
The Civilian Operations Commander clarified in 2010 that EUPOLs primary purpose is to be a
strategic reform mission and not to be a training mission (unlike NATO's mission) (Council document,
2010). Therefore the mission should not be assessed against the number of Afghan Police Officers it
trains, but rather on its impact on more long-term structural reforms. EUPOLs value lies with its high
quality police and rule of law expertise (ibid.). Given that the EU presents its achievements often in
numbers of ANP staff trained (see Best Practices; Council Conclusions, 2009), this lessons has
arguably yet to be learned.
Regarding the coordination and cooperation of EUPOL with other stakeholders involved and the
streamlining of training programmes, an agreement was signed in February 2011 by the Afghan
Ministry of the Interior, EUPOL, NTM-A and the GPPO. This agreement laid out a standardized method
of instruction for police training. Additionally, the three institutions agreed to share the facilities of
the still to be built Kabul Staff College and Bamyan Training Centre. Here training will put an
emphasis on women ANP officers (ISIS Europe, 2011). Further, with regard to actor coordination, a
Council Decision from 2009 established a project cell within the mission with the aim to coordinate,
facilitate and provide advice on projects implemented by Member States and third States (Council
Joint Action 2009/842/CFSP).
Concluding, the EU tried to tackle most of the identified lessons by adopting new provisions and
amending the mission mandate. Whether the lesson of reaching full deployment and increasing
qualified personnel will be learned depends on the Member States and their national rules and
incentives for deployment. Finally, cooperation between EU, the US and NATO has improved
particularly in the area of training. However, the complex security situation in Afghanistan remains
one of the biggest challenges for EUPOL. A comprehensive security agreement between the
stakeholders could not be agreed as yet.
Several of the lessons that have been identified in the case of EUPOL Afghanistan could have been
learned from its predecessor the GPPO. The previous police reform efforts led by Germany also had
too few resources and insufficient numbers of staff. And like EUPOL, the GPPOs approach also
differed quite widely from the US approach, making coordination and cooperation between the two
more difficult (Gross, 2009: 27). Facing the same conditions, EUPOL Afghanistan could have profited
from an effective system of sharing these previous lessons between Germany, as an EU Member
State, and the EU.
80
15. EUFOR TCHAD/RCA
EUFOR Tchad/Central African Republic (RCA) was the largest autonomous military operation ever
deployed by the EU. The aim of the operation deployed in the East of Tchad and in the North East of
the RCA was to support the UN in addressing the humanitarian consequences of the Darfur crisis
(Council document, 2009b). In accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1778 (2007), the
specific objectives of EUFOR Tchad/RCA were (1) to contribute to protecting civilians in danger,
particularly refugees and displaced persons; (2) to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the
free movement of humanitarian personnel by helping to improve security in the area of operations;
and (3) to contribute to protecting UN personnel, facilities installations and equipment and to
ensuring the security and freedom of movement of its own staff, UN staff and associated personnel.
The Operation reached initial operational capacity on 15 March 2008 and was handed over to the UN
Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) on 15 March 2009.
As requested by UN Security Council Resolution 1778 (2007), the EU issued six-monthly reports to the
UN (mid-term and final report). Rather than identifying lessons from EUFOR Tchad/RCA, these reports
provide an overview of the security situation on the ground and take stock of EUFORs activities and
achievements. According to the Single Progress Report on the Development of EU Military Capabilities
for the First Semester of 2010, capability-related lessons from EUFOR Tchad/RCA were processed and
combined with lessons from previous operations (Council document, 2010: 20). Apart from that, no
public reference to the EUs official EU lessons learned documents could be found.
Following the endorsement of the PSC of military advice (ESDP COSDP 855), an EUISS seminar on
lessons from EUFOR Tchad/RCA was convened on 18 March 2010. The objective of the seminar was
to provide and share lessons from EUFOR Tchad/RCA for the planning, conduct and execution of
future CSDP missions as well as on comprehensive aspects of EU operations (Helly, 2010: 1)(
29
). While
using the EUISS as neutral facilitator of debate, the overall objective of the seminar was to
complement ongoing lessons learned efforts by other EU institutions and Member States (ibid.). The
participants of the seminar included representatives from EU institutions, the Member States, the UN,
NGOs, think tanks, and academia. The seminar report was forwarded to the PSC delegations for
information before being published on the EUISS website. It was the first time that the EUISS held
such a comprehensive seminar on a CSDP mission. In the seminar report, the EUISS recommended
that similar lessons learned seminars should be organised more systematically after each military and
civilian crisis management operation (ibid.: 12). The fact that the EUISS led a ten-month lessons-
learned project on EUFOR Atalanta and EU counter-piracy policies, including an expert group
meeting (March 2011) and a PSC-level seminar (June 2011), shows that this practice continued to
evolve.
These official or semi-official documents on lessons learned are complemented by a series of external
evaluations of EUFOR Tchad/RCA, carried out by independent research institutes/think tanks,
academics and NGOs. While academic contributions do not seem to follow a specific timeline, think
tank and NGO assessments cluster around certain dates, namely the start of the Operation
(February/March 2008), its mid-term review (September 2008), and its end date (March 2009).

29
1he 'comprehenslve aspecLs' lnclude lssues relaLed Lo clvllmlllLary coordlnaLlon and Lo Lhe coherence beLween dlfferenL
Lu pollcles or lnsLrumenLs (see Pelly 2009: 912).
81
Although specificity, format and style of the aforementioned documents vary, there are some
recurrent themes in the lessons identified from EUFOR Tchad/RCA. These can be grouped into the
following eight categories:
15.2.1 Adequacy of the mandate
External evaluations of EUFOR Tchad/RCA repeatedly criticised the misfit between the Operations
mandate and the security situation on the ground. The International Crisis Group (ICG) (2009: 19)
remarked that the mandate of EUFOR Tchad/RCA was based on an assessment of the situation in
Eastern Chad in 2005-2006 when rebel groups were a major source of insecurity. By the time of
EUFORs deployment, the most important problem was the increase in banditry and criminality.
However, EUFOR was neither mandated nor equipped to address these security problems. In
September 2008, both the ICG (2008: 33) and OXFAM (2008: 2) recommended to adjust EUFORs
mandate to the new security situation in the course of its mid-term review. More specifically, they
recommended that EUFOR should strengthen its deterrent function by increasing patrols in key IDP
and refugee areas (ICG, 2008: iii; OXFAM 2008: 18).
15.2.2 Operational design
EUFOR Tchad/RCA was designed as an end-date rather than an end-state operation meaning that its
exit strategy was related to a specific date rather than to a change in the security conditions on the
ground. Furthermore, the Operation followed a strategy of humanitarian deterrence (Mattelaer, 2008:
34) in order to achieve a safe and secure environment. Mattelaer (ibid.: 31) pointed out that the
impact of an operation with a humanitarian deterrence strategy and an end-date concept was likely
to be of limited durability. The EUISS report concluded that, while an end-date concept is politically
preferable, an end-state concept is militarily sound. It recommended further work on the end-state
concept and the possibility to link it with a more sophisticated approach to the bridging model (
30
)
(Helly, 2010: 9).
15.2.3 Resourcing (budget, troops and capabilities)
The EU had difficulties in resourcing the Operation. Germany and the UK essentially saw EUFOR
Tchad/RCA as a French project (Dijkstra, 2010: 396). While they did not block the decision to launch
the Operation, they kept the common costs of the Operation to a minimum and refused to provide
troops (ibid.). It then took six months and six force generation conferences for EUFOR to reach initial
operational capacity. Finally, the bulk of the costs were carried by France, who also provided 53
percent of the troops. In the implementation phase, the Operation was faced with important
capability shortages, most prominently a lack of transport helicopters. In order to compensate for this
gap, the EU requested Russian support. However, the negotiations on the use of four Russian
helicopters took nine months from the first meeting to their deployment in December 2008, three
months before the end of EUFORs mandate. Some argue that these resourcing problems in EUFOR
Tchad/RCA underline the necessity for at least one bigger Member State to yield substantial financial
and political support for EU military operations (Seibert, 2010: 54). Furthermore, the Operation
showed that if the EU has to rely on external contributors, outreach should start early on in the
planning process (Helly, 2010: 5).

30
1he brldglng model ls one of Lhe scenarlos for unLu cooperaLlon ln crlsls managemenL. lL descrlbes a slLuaLlon where an
Luled operaLlon lnLervenes flrsL and paves Lhe way for a handover Lo a un operaLlon (1ardy, 2003). 1he operaLlons LulC8
1chad/8CA and ArLemls fall lnLo Lhls caLegory.
82
15.2.4 Logistics
EUFOR Tchad/RCA represented an unprecedented logistical challenge, but there is a general
consensus that this challenge was met (Helly, 2010: 5). Several lessons were identified from this
experience. First, logistics should receive greater attention in the pre-planning phase in order to
anticipate national limitations (e.g. air transport) at an early stage. Second, the Operation showed the
advantages and limitations of having one logistical lead nation. The logistical lead nation, in this case
France, acted as a crucial facilitator in the deployment, sustainment and hand-over of the mission.
However, the applicability of the concept is limited since the logistical lead nation needs to have the
political will, the financial resources and the competence to assume this role (Seibert, 2010: 54). The
concept of the logistical lead nation should thus be deconstructed and redefined in terms of what
that nation can and cannot provide (Helly, 2010: 5). Third, there needs to be greater mutualisation
and centralisation of logistics. Greater cooperation, coordination and mutual logistical support
between contributing Member States would enhance the cost-effectiveness of operations. Finally,
EUFOR Tchad/RCA revealed the advantages and disadvantages of outsourcing logistics. While
outsourcing logistics to private contractors can reduce the number of troops necessary for certain
tasks, it may increase costs and reduce flexibility and responsiveness in unforeseen circumstances
(see Seibert, 2010: 55).
15.2.5 Intelligence
Intelligence gathering, cooperation and sharing were among the weaknesses identified by
evaluations of EUFOR Tchad/RCA. The EUs intelligence structures did not allow the Operation to
proceed based on a common, comprehensive and detailed understanding of the area from the
outset (Helly, 2010: 7). The EU experienced gaps in terms of imagery intelligence, human intelligence
and signal intelligence (Seibert, 2010: 58-59). Monitoring of the situation on the ground should start
at an early stage in order to inform the pre-planning process (Helly, 2010: 7). In order to get a more
comprehensive picture from the outset, the EU should reach out to other relevant information
sources including non-European intelligence agencies, NGOs, think tanks and academics during the
pre-planning phase (ibid.). Furthermore, EUFOR Tchad/RCA revealed the need for increased
information sharing among National Intelligence Cells (NICs) and with the Brussels-based intelligence
structures. According to the EUISS seminar report, the EU should learn lessons from EUFOR Atalanta
in this regard and implement a plug and play philosophy towards the use of Brussels intelligence-
sharing structures (SITCEN, EUMS, SATCEN) (ibid.: 7). In order to enhance the access to imagery
intelligence, Seibert (2010: 61) advised to strengthen the SATCENs overall capacity and to enable the
Force Headquarters to request satellite imagery directly from the SATCEN without having to go
through the Operations Headquarters, as was the case in EUFOR Tchad/RCA.
15.2.6 Comprehensive approach and civil-military coordination
Assessments of the comprehensive approach and civil-military coordination offer a mixed picture.
The 'comprehensive planning' of the EUFOR Tchad/RCA was described as an internal milestone for
the EU (Dijkstra, 2010: 399). Because the Commission had been involved since beginning of the
Council's planning process, it was able to provide funds and other significant accompanying
measures for the Operation. However, as Seibert (ibid.: 62) pointed out, combining these different
instruments on the ground proved to be more difficult. The cooperation between the Commission
and EUFOR in the field was seemingly strained due to the extension of the bureaucratic divide
between security and development policy in Brussels (ibid.). The EUISS report described Operation
EUFOR Tchad/RCA as setting new benchmarks for civil-military cooperation and recommended that
83
templates of coordination agreements between EUFOR and humanitarian actors should be used in
future operations (Helly, 2010: 10). Meanwhile, Seibert (2010: 63) described the cooperation between
EUFOR and NGOs in the field as difficult. Although he acknowledged that the relationship between
them had improved towards the end of the Operation, NGOs were often reluctant to work alongside
EUFOR (ibid.: 63).
15.2.7 Lack of a comprehensive strategy
While there is a consensus that EUFOR Tchad/RCA had a positive impact on the security situation in
the region, many external observers deplored the absence of a coherent political strategy (Seibert,
2008: 3) and of clear common foreign policy objectives (Helly, 2010: 11). The mandate of EUFOR
Tchad/RCA was deliberately detached from the overall political context (ibid.). The EUISS report
underlined that a clear foreign policy concept needs to underpin future EU operations (ibid.). The
relevant EU actors (Member States, Special Representatives, Presidency envoys, political advisors to
EUFOR, European Commission, PSC etc.) should coordinate to design political strategies and update
them at the theatre level in order to provide future operations with foreign policy guidance (ibid.: 12).
15.2.8 EU-UN cooperation and hand-over
Another recurrent theme in the lessons identified from EUFOR Tchad/RCA is the effectiveness of EU-
UN cooperation. There was substantial EU-UN coordination in the planning phase of the Operation
including joint fact-finding missions. The operative cooperation between EUFOR and MINURCAT is
said to have reached unprecedented levels (Helly, 2010: 3). However, diverging priorities, different
organisational cultures, discrepancies in deployment calendars, and misunderstandings with regard
to logistical support stood in the way of effective EU-UN cooperation (ibid.). Furthermore, the
transition from EUFOR to MINURCAT was generally described as a difficult process (ibid.). At the time
of handover, the UN was not ready to deploy and a substantial number of EUFOR troops had to be re-
hatted in order to avoid security gaps. The EUISS report concluded that EU-UN coordination
documents in different fields, like strategic planning, logistics, operational support, communications
and civil-military coordination should be developed and used in future operations (ibid.). In addition,
more frequent and systematic joint EU-UN planning exercises should be conducted to improve
information-sharing (ibid.). Furthermore, the handover of a bridging operation should be planned
from the outset. While the re-hatting of EU troops was seen as an efficient way to ensure a bridging
operation, it requires longer-term troop commitments from the EU Member States (ibid.).
Some of the aforementioned lessons have been learned in the course of the Operation or after its
completion. In order to reduce the discrepancy between the Operations mandate and the security
situation on the ground, the Operation gradually adapted its working methods. With women and
children being the main victims of human rights violations the Operation put more emphasis on
gender issues (Dijkstra, 2010: 401). Furthermore, EUFOR increased its presence in areas with elevated
levels of crime (ibid.). EUFOR also adapted its practice following exchanges with the humanitarian
community. In the beginning, EUFOR used the number of returns of IDPs as an indicator for the
success and impact of the operation. This was opposed by the humanitarian community based on
the suspicion that such an indicator would foster returns despite unfavourable conditions and thus
put civilians in danger. As EUFOR gradually dropped this practice relations with the humanitarian
community improved (Seibert, 2010: 107).
EUFOR Tchad/RCA has served as a catalyst for strengthening institutional arrangements, pooling of
resources, and harmonisation of capabilities. One example was the establishment of the Crisis
84
Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) as a means for improving the EUs capacity of
comprehensive planning (ibid.: 65). Furthermore, EUFOR Tchad/RCA gave new impetus to capability-
related initiatives. Examples are the establishment of the Franco-British helicopter initiative and of
one of the important recent pooling initiatives, the European Air Transport Command (ibid.). As
mentioned previously, the Single Progress Report on the Development of EU Military Capabilities for the
First Semester of 2010 indicates that capability-related lessons identified from EUFOR Tchad/RCA were
processed and combined with previous lessons, the result of which would feed into the updated
version of the 2008 Capability Development Plan (CDP) (
31
). Some of the capability gaps identified in
the course of EUFOR Tchad/RCA such as intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance; availability of
helicopters; multinational logistic support; strategic and tactical airlift, and mobility assurance are
among the top ten priority areas of the updated CDP (European Defence Agency (EDA), 2011).
Meanwhile, lessons identified in the field of logistics have fed into the European Third Party Logistic
Support (TPLS) Platform. Established by the EDA Steering Board two months after the completion of
EUFOR Tchad/RCA, this electronic platform aims at fostering the exchange of best practices and
lessons learned in order to develop a more cooperative approach to contracting in support of crisis
management operations(
32
). The platform is open to registered economic operators (subject to
certain eligibility criteria) and registered contracting authorities.
However, EUFOR Tchad/RCA also showed that some lessons identified in previous operations were
not learned. In the lessons learned process following EUFOR RD Congo, the EU concluded that the
end-date concept was highly inadvisable. Nevertheless, the concept was applied again in EUFOR
Tchad/RCA. According to Mattelaer (2008: 30) the reason why the EU acted in contradiction with its
own recommendations lies in the nature of the EUs current operations, which are geared towards
maintaining a stable and secure environment until a political solution is found. Finally, EUFOR
Tchad/RCA triggered renewed debates on the usability of the Battlegroups and the revision of the
ATHENA mechanism, but these discussions did not yield any substantial results (Seibert, 2010: 65-55).
To sum up, Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA set a precedent for EU-UN cooperation and the
implementation of the comprehensive approach, but also highlighted some of the well-known
weaknesses of the CSDP.

31
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32
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85
16. EUROPEAN UNION SECURITY SECTOR REFORM (EU SSR) GUINEA-
BISSAU
On request of the Bissau-Guinean authorities, the EU mission in support of Security Sector Reform (EU
SSR) in Guinea-Bissau was launched in June 2008 (Council Joint Action 2008/112/CFSP). This mission
was a non-executive, technical mission that was mandated to advise and to assist the local
authorities in the implementation of the National Security Sector Reform Strategy (NSS) comprising
plans for restructuring the army and the police, and to support the adoption of SSR legal frameworks.
It was the first (civilian/military) integrated Security Sector Reform mission of the EU that operated
across several areas of the security sector. EU SSR Guinea-Bissau is one of the smallest ESDP
operations with only 21 advisors and a limited budget of less than 6 million. EU support to SSR has
also included Commission-funded interventions, particularly through the European Development
Fund and the Instrument for Stability. The lack of cooperation on the side of Guinea-Bissaus political
leaders in re-establishing the constitutional order after a mutiny by individuals from the Guinea-
Bissau military pushed the EU to decide that the EU SSR mission would not be continued beyond the
end of its mandate at the end of September 2010 (Bloching, 2010: 1).
The EU SSR mission was already deployed for about six months when the Council adopted the
Guidelines for identification and implementation of lessons and best practices in civilian ESDP
missions on 10 November 2008 (Councils Secretariat Document 15987/08, 2008). Still, the lesson
learning process of the EU SSR mission has been mostly congruent with the Guidelines. In May 2009,
the General Secretariat issued a report on the lessons identified and recommendations on the
strategic and operational planning phase of the SSR operation in Guinea-Bissau (Councils Secretariat
Document 10164/09, 2009). This report was prepared on the basis of written contributions by the
Commission, Member States, EU SSR Guinea-Bissau and the General Secretariat that were involved in
the planning phase (DG E/PU, CivMil Cell, CPCC, EUMS, SIAC). Furthermore, interviews with key actors
in Brussels and in Guinea-Bissau also contributed to the reports findings. The report mentions that
the lessons from EU SSR Guinea-Bissau are of relevance mainly to (1) future integrated missions, (2) to
the EU SSR Concept and (3) to the planning of relatively small missions. According to the report, the
lessons and recommendations will be integrated and monitored in ongoing processes and tools (e.g.
guidelines on lessons and best practices) to ensure follow-up on the report.
Furthermore, in accordance with the Lessons Learned Guidelines, a questionnaire was developed by
the Secretariat and distributed within the EU SSR Guinea-Bissau to provide information for the
lessons learned reports (CIVCOM, 2009: 18). The guidelines also require that the six-monthly reports
of every civilian CSDP mission report on the lessons identified/learned in the mission (Councils
Secretariat Document 15987/08, 2008: 3). However, it is not possible to verify whether this happened
in the progress reports of the EU SSR mission in Guinea-Bissau, because they are classified. Further to
the closure of EUSSR Guinea-Bissau, a lessons learned report on horizontal aspects of CSDP missions
in the area of SSR was requested by Political and Security Committee (PSC) in the annual Lessons
Learned Report of 2010 (CIVCOM and RELEX Document 17386/10, 2010: 30). This report has not been
issued to date.
Considering official documents and academic literature on EU SSR Guinea-Bissau the following three
main topics can be identified when it comes to the lessons of the mission:
86
16.2.1 The planning phase of EU SSR Guinea-Bissau
The planning phase of EU SSR Guinea-Bissau faced several problems. One problem was that there
was a staffing shortage for almost a fifth of the key positions within the mission, such as
administration, security officers, reporting officers and justice advisors (Helly, 2009: 375; Councils
Secretariat Document 10164/09, 2009: 10). As a result, not all positions of the mission were filled,
some tasks had to be merged in order to be carried out, and the gender-mainstreaming staffing
objectives could not be met.
16.2.2 The coherence of the activities of the Commission and the Council in Guinea-Bissau
Although there was good cooperation between the Council and Commission at the early stages of
planning of the SSR mission in Guinea-Bissau, there was no link made between the planned CSDP
activities and longer-term programming of Commission instruments from the outset. Ensuring an
early connection between the European Development Fund (EDF), the Instrument for Stability (IfS)
and the SSR mission planning processes could have strengthened the plan for EU support to SSR in
Guinea-Bissau (CSDN, 2011: 8). This should have included linking EDF directly with the exit strategy
for the mission, and integrating benchmarks into the mission plan to help manage the phase out
process, and transfer of the bulk of programming to EDF (ibid.).
16.2.3 The SSR policy of the EU in Guinea-Bissau
Several lessons were also identified with regard to SSR strategy and policy in Guinea-Bissau. For SSR
to bring about reform, the EU needs to engage politically as well as technically, and technical aspects
of SSR need to be firmly grounded in the political context. In Guinea-Bissau, the relevant laws needed
for reform have been passed. However, in a country where organised drug crime has infiltrated every
layer of government and the security sector, implementation of these laws is a challenge (ibid.: 5). As
noted in the introduction, it proved difficult to judge the real commitment of the local authorities to
SSR, not only because many sectors and players were involved but also because of the turbulent
political situation (Councils Secretariat Document 10164/09, 2009: 9). Although the Operational Plan
(OPLAN) identified measures of progress for the mission to focus on, an agreement on these
measures with the host country during the planning phase could have helped to provide an
indication of the local commitment to SSR. To be able to assess the commitment of the host country,
country expertise could also be included from the outset in fact finding missions (ibid.: 11).
Another lesson with regard to the policy of the EU SSR Guinea-Bissau is that co-ordination of SSR
projects by the national government (local ownership) is key to success. Therefore, it is vital that SSR
advisors develop close working relationships with their local counterparts. Lessons with regard to the
political engagement of the host country and local ownership had been identified in previous
missions (see EUSEC RD Congo and EUPOL Kinshasa cases). In Guinea-Bissau, the government was
not adequately engaged in formulating the national strategy or in the planning stage of the CSDP
mission (CSDN, 2011: 7). Furthermore, a more thorough political analysis of the power networks at
play and how security is actually delivered could greatly improve the relevance and impact of SSR
projects. In Guinea-Bissau, the emphasis of SSR projects has been on legislative reform, but the main
challenge remains in implementation given the infiltration of organised drug-related crime within
the institutions (Helly, 2009: 376; CSDN, 2011: 7).
Lessons learned from among others EUPOL Proxima showed the relevance of joint Council-
Commission fact finding missions. To ensure complementarity between EU SSR and activities of the
87
Commission Delegation under the European Development Fund (EDF), this lesson was taken into
account during the planning phase of SSR Guinea-Bissau by deploying two joint fact finding missions
prior to the official launch of the mission in May and October 2007 (Bloching, 2010: 3).
At present, there are different types of training courses at the EU-level. To begin with, Member States
personnel appointed to key positions, such as Head of Mission (HoM), Deputy HoM or Chief of Staff,
but also ever more lower-rank staff, receive pre-deployment training in Brussels. As such, in the case
of EU SSR Guinea-Bissau, the CPCC trained the core mission staff (around 10) on SSR before the
official launch of the mission.
The execution of SSR in Guinea-Bissau showed that early efforts to demobilise parts of the army and
to send home former combatants failed, because, after some time, many of these individuals
returned to the armed forces or militias due to lack of income (Councils Secretariat Document
10164/09, 2009: 15). EU SSR got more traction once the local military hierarchy understood that the
reform process would be accompanied with the help of the Commission by a pension fund (ibid.).
88
17. EU RULE OF LAW MISSION IN KOSOVO (EULEX)
4 February 2008 saw the Council Joint Action to launch the EUs largest mission under the Common
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP). However, 2 years before
the first EULEX staff was deployed, an EU Planning Team (EUPT) took up office in Pristina in 2006 with
a coordinating office in Brussels (Council Joint Action 2006/304/CFSP)(
33
). The EU Rule of Law Mission
in Kosovo (EULEX) that was subsequently deployed reached initial operational capability in
December 2008, and has since had its mandate extended to June 2012 (Council Decision
2010/619/CFSP). As envisioned in Article 12 of the Ahtisaari Plan(
34
) the mission is mandated to assist
the Kosovo institutions, judicial authorities and law enforcement agencies in their progress towards
sustainability and accountability. The mission aims to ensure these institutions are free from political
interference and adhere to internationally recognised standards and European best practices
(Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP).
EU actors involved in Kosovo also demonstrate a keen focus on addressing organized and corruption
(for example see, Head of Mission briefs European Parliament, 15 March 2011). The EULEX staff work
primarily through a Monitoring Mentoring and Advising (MMA) approach to building the technical
capacity of Kosovar professionals in Police, Justice and Customs Sectors. It also has an executive
mandate, reserving the ability to make arrests and adjudicate court cases with regards to ensuring
the proper investigation and trial of serious crimes.
A EUPT Kosovo Monthly Assessment Report for June 2006 (Council Document, 11315/06, 2006)
indicates that reports were made by the EUPT. However, no other similar reports are listed in the
Council document register. Sources within the EEAS confirmed that the EUPT Operational Plan
(OPLAN) includes an entire annex on Lessons Learned, demonstrating the strong emphasis placed on
learning from this experience. In June 2009, representatives from Directorate General IX (Civilian
Crisis Management) visited EUPT staff in Prisitina as part of its efforts to build a lessons learned
process (ISIS, 2009). This led to the December 2009 restricted report on lessons and
recommendations from the planning of EULEX (Council Document, 17478/09, 2009).
As with all civilian missions, the CPCC requires a Six-Monthly Report from EULEX, a component of
which is dedicated to identifying lessons from the mission. The restricted documents have been
regularly submitted since 15 January 2009 (Council Document, 5168/09, 2009) up until 5 January
2012 (Council Document, 18828/11, 2011). No formal template is given to direct the collection of
lessons, however most lessons identified in the reports are said to be those relevant to CIVCOM or on
procedural capabilities (interview EULEX staff, 13 February 2012). As part of EULEXs Programmatic
Approach, designed by the EUPT, Annual Programme Reports (2009-2011) measure yearly progress
per sector and provide insights into areas where shortcomings need to be addressed in the coming
months.
Furthermore, weekly and monthly updates, as well as end-of-tour reports from the Head of Mission
(HoM) are submitted to the CPCC in Brussels. While lessons do not constitute an explicit section of
these reports, lessons can be and are occasionally identified herein, acknowledging that the learning
process does not always fit precisely into a prescribed reporting schedule. What is more, EULEX has
the unique benefit of hosting a Best Practices Officer, designated specifically to identifying Best

33
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89
Practices and evaluating new activities. This function goes some way in fulfilling the role prescribed
by the 2008 Guidelines for identification and implementation of lessons and best practices in civilian ESDP
missions (Council Document, 15987/08, 2008). However, it was reported that more support is needed
for this position to realise its potential.
Beyond official or associated EU documentation of lessons, numerous papers by external experts,
journalists, academics (both in and outside of Kosovo) have published reports on the mission.
External reports tend to focus on shortcomings or critical missteps of the mission, or political
dynamics at play, whereas official reports mostly highlight achievements and progress.
Within the official EU documents and reports published by external observers, the identification of
several lessons could be generally categorized into five themes.
17.2.1 Ability to react to a dynamic political situation
The international stalemate on Kosovos status and the eventual unilateral declaration of
independence of Kosovo on 17 February 2008 led to a tenuous political situation, which hampered
the ability of the EU to fully implement its plans (Grevi, 2009; 357; Tamminen, 2010: 66). One
consequence was the confusing dilemma that arose from the double-hatted European Union
Special Representative (EUSR). As was envisioned in the Ahtisaari Plan, the EUSR, Dutch diplomat
Pieter Feith, also fulfilled the role of International Civilian Representative (ICR), supervisor to the
implementation of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement. Given the failure to
secure a UNSCR for this Plan, Feith found himself straddling two unaligned positions on Kosovos
status: publically neutral on Kosovo statehood as EUSR under UNSCR 1244, and unequivocally pro-
status as ICR. This situation could be seen as a lesson to avoid compromising the EUs political clarity
in the future.
Following the failure to secure an UNSCR, ambiguity over how to proceed with the planned
handover from UNMIK to EULEX caused a delayed and cumbersome deployment (International Crisis
Group, 2008: 33-37; Tamminen, 2010: 66). The EU committed to following through with an
unprecedentedly large, robust and complex mission in what was now a political minefield(
35
). This
lack of a plan B was seen to be the consequence of either the EUs inability to anticipate the
eventuality, or political resistance to deviate from the assumption that the UNSC approval would
pass. A member of the EUPT, who contributed to its Lessons Learned Report, stated that this issue
was addressed in a section of the report dealing with the political situation (interview with EEAS staff,
7 February 2012). The extent to which the EUs plans were undermined by rapid political changes
encourages both more preparedness and better responsiveness of the EU, to adjust appropriately
within politically volatile situations.
17.2.2 Coordination among EU actors
The number of EU actors present in Kosovo necessitates attention for consistency and coordination
between. Besides the EULEX mission, the European Commission Liaison Office (ECLO) as well as the
EUSR and several EU Member States, are all active in supporting the rule of law in Kosovo. ECLO, for
example, has Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) projects on training Border and Boundary Police,

35
It should be noted that the Council Joint Action launching EULEX was agreed upon 13 days prior to the unilateral
declaration of independence. The EU itself remains today divided on the issue of Kosovos status, with 5 non-recognizing
Member States.
90
improving legal education and implementing EU standards at the Ministry of Justice (European
Commission, 2008). In the official EULEX Kosovo Information and Communications Strategy (Council
Document, 6692/08, 2008), the EUSR is designated with the primary coordinating role on the ground
in relation to political messages and public statements, which is corroborated in EULEXs mandate
(Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP). Coordination boards and committees exist with a view toward
keeping EU actors on the same page. Yet these measures have not always proven sufficient in
practice (European Commission, 2008: 20).
Coordination and communication is reported to be largely informal (Derks and Price, 2010: 19). While
unofficial contact can be practical, high staff turnover rate risks disrupting coordination that is
primarily based on personal contacts. There is a call to enhance overall consistency of EU activities in
Kosovo (Head of Mission briefs the European Parliament, 15 March 2011).
17.2.3 Resourcing and Administrational Issues
The resourcing of EULEX, in terms of staffing and equipment, was seen as an area in need of
improvement. The procurement of equipment must go through an open tendering procedure, which
can delay the delivery of necessary equipment. Restrictive policies placed on the budget are seen as
incompatible with the tasks of EULEX. For example, in establishing a Special Task Force to probe
organ trade allegations, EULEX requested a separate budget for investigators to keep their travel
destinations confidential. This aspect of witness protection required extensive discussion before the
Task Force could be launched (interview EEAS staff, 7 February 2012).
Human resource challenges also present several issues to be learned from. It was no surprise that the
size of EULEX required unprecedented staffing commitments. However, the profiles for EULEX staff
overlap somewhat with those of EUPOL Afghanistan and EUMM Georgia, putting further strain on
Member States pools of qualified and eligible secondees (Grevi, 2009: 362).
This pool is not particularly deep to begin with, given the practical constraints of seconding civilian
staff. Judges, for instance, are responsible for caseloads in their home countries, and these are not
easily left behind (Derks and Price, 2010: 30). Disparities in Member States national secondment
policies also contribute to inconsistencies in staff salaries, length of deployment as well as levels of
training and qualification (ibid.). Related is the matter of the quick turnover of most seconded staff.
Considering the overwhelming caseloads, the extensive time needed to review complex cases (often
delayed by non-cooperation of witnesses or defendants), or the time required to build trust and
rapport with local MMA counterparts, a typical one-year deployment is considered far too short (ibid;
Bajrami, 2011).
17.2.4 Executive Mandate and addressing serious crimes
EULEX has been very public about its aims and ambitions in tackling corruption and organized crime.
Endemic corruption and organised crime are seen by many as the primary obstacle to establishing
the rule of law (Montanaro, 2009: 10; European Commission, 2011: 13). The pair of crosscutting
themes requires the integration and cooperation of all three components of the EULEX Mission
(EULEX Programme Office, 2011; 12; EULEX Programme Office, 2010: 17). Yet, non-communication
among Kosovo agencies has obstructed effective collaboration (EULEX Programme Office, 2011: 16,
53; EULEX Programme Office, 2009: 36). A lesson here is to focus acutely on the interconnections
between rule of law agencies. The EUPT showed commendable forward thinking in developing and
integrated mission (Council Press Release, 2006). Yet, further exploration into the practical obstacles
deterring inter-agency coordination is necessary.
91
Witness protection and relocation has also been underscored as a serious concern for several years
(the OSCE has carried out reports on the issue for over ten years). As EULEX asserts its competency for
investigating serious crimes within Kosovo, it has come under increasing criticism for its ability to
protect witnesses (Marzouk, 2011; Council Document, 14050/11, 2011). CIVCOM, in its Advice on the
approach to Witness Protection by EULEX has explicitly addressed the link between the ability of EULEX
to fulfil its mandate on organised crime and the need to ensure witness protection (Council
Document, 8324/09, 2009). This points to a greater need to accurately anticipate and deliver on
capacities needed to execute mandates.
17.2.5 MMA in practice
There has been a near constant discussion on the way that EULEX balances its executive mandate
with its MMA activities (Derks and Price, 2010; Tamminen, 2010; Grevi, 2009). MMA is understood as
more important to the long-term goal of building capacity within Kosovos rule of law institutions,
the real key to sustainability. EULEX, along with EUPM BiH are seen to have the most elaborate and
MMA component in CSDP missions. However, MMA is hampered by a few growing pains. More
clarity on which European best practices are to be mentored and advised upon, as well as more
specific training in how to carry out an MMA mandate have been recommended to promote
consistency (Tamminen, 2010: 69; Derks and Price, 2010). MMA requires a good understanding of the
roles of each counterpart. While some secondees find the passive role of observing and providing
advice awkward, it is absolutely core to the EU objective of assisting Kosovo in building capacities
(Tamminen, 2010: 69)
The issue of the EUSR/ICRs conflicting stances on Kosovos status has been addressed. The newly
appointed EUSR, Samuel bogar, is now double-hatted as the Head of the Commission Delegation
(Council Decision, 2012/39/CFSP; Council Document, 5694/12, 2012). This is also expected to
enhance coordination among EU actors more generally, as has apparently worked in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. On this note, EU coordination in practice is said to have improved markedly since the
first years of the mission. ECLO and EULEX can be seen productively collaborating on several projects
that were seen by many as potential areas of overlap and duplication (EULEX Programme Office,
2010). For example, with regards to Border Management, ECLO is able to purchase and provide the
equipment necessary to complement the mentoring and training actions of EULEX for Kosovo Border
and Boundary Police. The catalogue of actions that EULEX produces as part of its programmatic
approach require the identification of other actors working on similar or the same issue, which at
least helps to prevent overlap, and in some cases leads to collaboration.
With regards to financial regulation and procurement, some small steps have been taken. In February
2011, the Foreign Affairs Counsellors Working Party (RELEX) acknowledged that EULEXs
procurement unit devised negotiated procedure to transparently identify companies to be invited to
tender for EULEX procurement demands (Council Document, 6206/11, 2011). However, RELEX points
out that open tender procedures should remain the rule and use of the negotiated procedure should
remain as limited as possible (ibid.). The issue of rapid procurement is decried in nearly all CSDP
civilian missions. Some solutions are being offered, such as the Provisional Warehouse for quick
procurement of basic equipment that was developed for EUPM BiH. In general however,
administration is seen as an area where many lessons are identified, but few addressed.
EULEX has been enhancing its ability to address organised crime in corruption, with most progress
demonstrated in the quick set up of the Specialized Task Force to investigate allegations made in the
92
Marty Report (Council Document, 1270/10, 2010). With full support of the Member States, a revision
to the OPLAN can be approved by the PSC within a matter of weeks. In this regard, the EU can be
seen to be more nimble in such action than the UN. In late November 2011, the mission also
reallocated 600.000 to improve witness protection and strengthen the Specialized Task Force
dedicated to the Marty investigations (Marzouk, 2011). Despite emphatic demand from Member
States that witness protection be enhanced, this will also require Member States to host relocated
witnesses (ISIS, 2011).
Regarding the strengthening of guidance on MMA, annual guidelines are written on MMA for EULEX
Judges (2008-2010). Furthermore, ongoing MMA training programmes are developed by the EULEX
Best Practices and Training Office, and periodically reviewed. Lastly, the CMPD is looking into
conducting a thematic lessons learned study on MMA, as one of CSDPs main tools.
Many identify the deployment of the EUPT as a Best Practice that should be replicated in future
missions (Palm, 2010: 10; Derks and Price, 2010) Specifically, it is mentioned the EUPT benefited from
its local presence in Pristina, its full support of a Council Joint Action and budget, as well as the
comparatively lengthy time it was given to work. It is commended with having adequately drawn
lines of competency between the various EU actors (Derks and Price, 2010: 17; see case study on
EUPM BiH). In future missions, a planning team could be used to explore the links between law
enforcement and adjudication sectors, for enhanced coordination.
93
18. EUROPEAN UNION MONITORING MISSION GEORGIA (EUMM)
The EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia was deployed on 1 October 2008 (Council Joint Action
2008/736/CFSP). The objective of the non-executive EUMM is to contribute to the stabilisation of the
situation on the ground following the August 2008 conflict. It does so by monitoring compliance of
all sides with the EU brokered Six-Point Agreement of 12 August 2008, signed by both Georgia and
Russia and the Agreement on Implementing Measures of 8 September 2008. Four tasks are outlined
in the mandate of the EUMM: Stabilisation, normalisation, confidence building and reporting to the
EU in order to inform European policy-making. The mission was originally mandated for twelve
months and has been extended three times. The current mandate is effective until 14 September
2012.
A month after the deployment of the EUMM, on 10 November 2008, the Council adopted the
Guidelines for identification and implementation of lessons and best practices in civilian ESDP
missions (Councils Secretariat Document 15987/08, 2008). The guidelines state that any new mission,
from the EUMM Georgia mission on, has to consider from the outset and within the planning
documents the arrangements to identity lessons and capture best practices as set out in the
Operation Plan (ibid.: 5). It also states that contributors to the lessons learned process will receive a
questionnaire to guide their contribution. This also happened during the Monitoring Mission in
Georgia (CIVCOM Document 16927/09, 2009: 18). The Annual lessons learned report of 2009
mentions that the software tools that were mentioned in the Guidelines to help store and manage
observations and lessons were not in place in the EUMM up to December 2009 (ibid.). Reflecting on
the lesson learning process during the EUMM Georgia, one can conclude that the process has been
mostly congruent with the lessons learned Guidelines for Civilian Missions from its outset. There has,
for example been a lessons learned report on the planning phase of the EUMM in the first semester of
2009 (Councils Secretariat Document 8141/09, 2009). According to the annual report on lessons
learned in 2009, the report focused on the strategic and operational planning and especially on rapid
deployment and the monitoring of mandates (CIVCOM Document 16927/09, 2009: 11). However, as
this document is restricted, the content of the lessons remains unknown. Furthermore, reporting
lessons learned and best practices takes place in the six-monthly reports of the EUMM (EUMM
9176/10, 2010).
The following four main topics can be identified when it comes to the lessons of EUMM Georgia:
18.2.1 The planning phase of the EUMM
Although the speed and scale of EUMMs deployment have been widely praised as evidence of the
CSDPs positive development, particularly given the extraordinarily delicate political context in which
it operates, there were still a number of technical and logistical problems (Fischer, 2009: 386). For
example, the deployment of multiple exploration teams with different tasks by different EU
institutions proves difficult to coordinate. Secondly, as a result of the urgent situation during the
deployment phase, the recruitment of the mission staff did not follow the usual selection procedures.
Member States were requested to contribute contingents of monitors already endowed with
technical equipment, which led to a nationally biased composition of many teams, which required
reorganisation later on (ibid.: 387). Furthermore, complex procurement procedures complicated the
establishment and equipment of both the Headquarters in Tbilisi and the field offices (Fischer, 2009:
94
387). As a result, technical and other equipment, such as cell phones, computers and desks, was
lacking.
18.2.2 The co-ordination and coherence of EU efforts in Georgia
Another challenge for the EUMM is that Georgia has become a very crowded arena for the EU.
Besides the European Commission, which is involved in the area through the framework of the
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), a EUSR for the Crisis in Georgia and a EUSR for the South
Caucasus (until February 2011) have also been very active in Georgia. While the mandates of these
EU actors are different, there is also a great deal of overlap between the various EUs instruments in
the area (Fischer, 2009: 389). For example, the EUMM, the Commission and the EUSRs were involved
in parallel confidence-building operations (Huff, 2011: 23). The lesson identified is that it requires a
great effort by the EU actors to develop a common strategy for a specific country and to coordinate
their efforts.
18.2.3 The co-ordination with other international actors in Georgia
A third issue that has proven to be a challenge for the EUMM is the overlap of activities of the EUMM
with the other international players in Georgia. When the EUMM was deployed, the UN and the OSCE
were already active in Georgia for about fifteen years. The interaction of these two missions with the
EUMM was complicated, because the missions were being ascribed different political affinities in
relation to the parties to the conflict (ibid.: 388). While the EU mission is perceived as being close to
the Georgian side, the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) was seen as relatively close to the
Abkhaz side. Regardless of repeated public statements by all sides that the three missions did not
overlap but complemented each other, tensions could not be avoided altogether.
18.2.4 The reference to the mission area in the EUMM mandate
A fourth issue of the EUMM concerns the territory that it is to monitor. While the mandates of the
Monitoring Mission state that the mission is active in in Georgia or throughout Georgia, it does not
explicitly mention Abkhazia or South Ossetia. Although the EU mandate applies to the entire
internationally recognised national territory of Georgia, in practice neither the two de facto states nor
Russia has granted the EU access to South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Halbach, 2009: 116). The EU finds
itself in a dilemma here, as Abkhazia and South Ossetia deny the EUMM normal cooperation as long
as the mission insists on access to their territories. On the other hand, the policy of non-recognition is
crucial in the EUMMs relations with the Georgian government.
Despite the technical and logistical problems during the deployment of the EUMM, the mission
serves as a model for future planning of rapid deployment and monitoring mandates (CIVCOM
16927/09, 2009: 18). Member States demonstrated great willingness to contribute to the EUMM
during the deployment phase, which made quick implementation possible (Fischer, 2009: 383). One
example of improved practice is that a team of military planners from the EU Military Staff (EUMS)
supported the planning of the EUMM (Permanent Representatives Committee 16685/08, 2008: 22).
Another aspect that demonstrates lesson learning is that the Operation Plan of the EUMM Georgia is
elaborate with regard to integrating human rights and gender issues, and may serve as an example
for planning similar operations or missions in the future (CIVCOM Document 17138/1/10, 2010: 14).
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19. EUROPEAN UNION NAVAL FORCE SOMALIA (EUNAVFOR)
ATALANTA
On 10 November 2008, the European Union Naval Force Somalia (EUNAVFOR) was officially launched
by the Council to deter and combat piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden (Council
Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP). EUNAVFOR, better known as Operation Atalanta, differs from other
previous EU crisis management or peacekeeping missions in its naval character. The Council Joint
Action set to main objectives: (1) to protect in priority the vessels of the World Food Programme
delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia, and (2) to protect vulnerable vessels in the area
and ensure deterrence, prevention and repression of piracy and armed robbery at sea. The military
operation was initially scheduled for a period of twelve months (until 13 December 2009) and was
extended by the Council until December 2014 (Council Decision 2010/766/CFSP).
The lesson learning process of Operation Atalanta can be described as more random than the
process during Operation EUFOR Althea or Operation EUTM Somalia. There is, for example, no Annex
in the Operation Plan that addresses lessons learned and there is no standard practice of issuing six-
monthly reviews on the mission that might contain lessons (Interview with EU official, January 2012).
Lessons learned did form a large part of the mid-term review of Operation Atalanta of June 2009
(House of Lords, 2010: 12). Lessons from Operation Atalanta are analysed by the EUMS and the EU
Military Committee Working Group/Headline Goal Task Force (EUMCWG/HTF) in order to contribute
to the measurement of progress. The EU Military Staff (EUMS) also closely cooperates with the
European Defence Agency (EDA) for the analysis of lessons learned (Political and Security Committee
Document 8443/10, 2010: 17). The EUMS has regular contact with the lessons group at the Atalanta
Operational Headquarters (OHQ) and the operation has shown to positively respond to calls for
Lesson Observations from the EUMS (EU official, February 2012). The lessons of Operation Atalanta
have been collected in the European Lessons Management Application (ELMA) (Political and Security
Committee Document 8443/10: 17). Currently there are close to 200 Lessons Observations for
Operation Atalanta in the ELMA database (ibid.). There is a vast array of information provided in the
database, including the Lessons Observations, the context of the lessons and the updates of the
analysis and development phases. It seems that as a result of this continuous lesson learning process
there is less need for separate periodic reports.
Considering official documents and academic literature on Operation Atalanta the following five
main topics can be identified when it comes to the lessons of the operation:
The planning phase of Operation Atalanta
The planning phase of Operation Atalanta resulted in several lessons. First of all, the planning was
done by a relatively small but efficient team, contradicting the thesis that large planning structures
are better (Helly, 2011: 9). Secondly, it would have been preferable to benefit from the presence of
planners at the level of the Operational Headquarters (OHQ) from the beginning of the mission.
Another lesson identified was the need to involve CPCC and the Commission more closely in a more
comprehensive civilian-military planning process to encompass the military as well as law
enforcement dimensions of the operation when writing the Crisis Management Concept (CMC) (ibid.:
9).

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19.2.1 The cooperation with international actors
Alongside Operation EUNAVFOR in the Gulf of Aden, there are numerous other actors (e.g. NATO and
the US) working to secure trade routes and fight piracy. By early summer 2009, there were nearly
forty warships in the region (Weber, 2009: 75). In formal terms, the mandate of Operation Atalanta
provides for no cooperation with other interventions, still less for co-ordination. However, the
mandate is flexible in permitting Atalanta vessels to temporarily come under the command of EU
NAVFOR or NATO. As a result, some EU Member States have ships both in the Atalanta group and in
national contingents (Helly, 2009: 399). An evaluation of Atalanta of March 2009 notes that co-
ordination between the Commander and headquarters and between the different ships in the region
takes too long (Weber, 2009: 79). As a result, too much time passes between the sighting of a pirate
boat and a coordinated response. This identifies the lesson that centrally coordinating the efforts of
the various operations (i.e. Atalanta, NATO, Combined Task Force-151 and the national contingents)
is a prime concern.
19.2.2 The detention and prosecution of arrested pirates
The detention and prosecution of the suspected pirates is another area where lessons can be learned.
The Joint Action for EU NAVFOR provides for three possibilities to transfer pirates (i.e. to the state of
the ship that catches the pirates, to a third state participating in Atalanta or to another third state
whose legal system meets international human rights standards). However, no binding arrangement
was set during the planning phase of the Operation (Weber, 2009: 78). There are currently no EU-
wide criminal procedures on piracy and any action against suspected pirates takes place in a national
criminal procedure framework (Helly, 2011: 6). As a result, ad hoc arrangements had to be made for
dealing with captured pirates, which has not proven to be easy. For example, an EU agreement with
Djibouti has not allowed for suspects detention and trial in that country, because of humanitarian
and jurisdictional concerns (Nicolli, 2009: 2). To ensure that arrested suspects of piracy (or any other
crime) can be detained and prosecuted in future CSDP operations, clearly stated arrangements
should be made in the planning phase of the mission.
19.2.3 Fighting the consequences rather than the causes of conflict
As acknowledged by Atalantas Operation Commanders, the EU NAVFOR can only contain one aspect
of the consequences of the unresolved conflict in Somalia (i.e. piracy) and therefore cannot stop
piracy in the long term (Weber, 2009: 76). EUNAVFOR sets out neither to stabilise the situation on
land in Somalia nor to address the root causes of piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Without tackling the
development dimension of the piracy problem, Atalanta can only reach an end date but not an end
state (ibid.: 70). Taking the various challenges and lessons into account, this might be the most
important, and simultaneously the hardest lesson to learn for future CSDP operations.
19.2.4 The use of private companies to secure vessels
Finally, one of the innovations of Atalanta lies in the cooperation between the military and the private
sector (e.g. through the setting up of the Maritime Security Centre-Horn of Africa). One of the lessons
identified is that there is a need for the EU to be more efficient in convincing the participating
countries (EU and non-EU) to issue unilateral declarations allowing Vessel Protection Detachments
(VPDs) aboard their vessels (Helly, 2011: 8).

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Operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta has shown that the use of intelligence, for example to cue pirate
warships to where actual pirate activity is taking place is absolutely pivotal. Having an intelligence-
led operation with a significantly enhanced degree of surveillance capacity is one of the most
significant lessons of Operation Atalanta (House of Lords, 2010: 12).
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20. EUROPEAN UNION TRAINING MISSION SOMALIA (EUTM)
On 7 April 2010, the EU launched a Military Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM Somalia) in order to
contribute to strengthening the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the institutions of
Somalia (Council Decision 2010/197/CFSP). The Operation is the first military training operation of the
EU and takes place within the framework of EUs comprehensive engagement in Somalia. The main
element of the mission is the training of Somali security forces in Uganda. EUTM trained 2,000 Somali
recruits during the first mandate with the aim of strengthening the Somali security forces. The
mandate of EUTM Somalia has been extended from August 2011 to December 2012 (Council
Decision 2011/483/CFSP). The new mandate will focus on developing Command and Control, as well
as specialised and self-training capacities of the Somali National Security Forces.
Lessons were addressed in the mid-mandate review of the Operation by the Operation Commander
in the end of 2010 (Interview with EU official, January 2012). This report provided input for the
Strategic Review of the High Representative to the Horn of Africa (Interview with EU official, January
2012). Furthermore, experiences during the Training Mission have provided several lessons for the
report on lessons and best practices of mainstreaming human rights and gender into CSDP military
operations and civilian missions, which was issued by the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis
Management (CIVCOM) in November 2010 (CIVCOM Document 17138/1/10, 2010). Currently there
are approximately 30 Lessons Observations for EUTM Somalia in the European Lessons
Management Application (ELMA) (interview with EU official, February 2012). The ELMA database was
also used to review lessons from previous EU operations for the planning phase of Operation EUTM
Somalia (Interview with EU official, January 2012). There is a vast array of information provided in the
database, including the Lessons Observations, the context of the lessons and the updates of the
analysis and development phases (ibid.). It seems that as a result of this continuous lesson learning
process there is less need for separate periodic reports.
Because it is a relatively new operation, it is difficult to give a comprehensive overview of lessons that
have been identified, let alone learned, during the EUTM. However, the following two main themes
can be identified with regard to lessons from the EUTM:
20.2.1 The focus on training of the EUTM
The EUTM is only involved in the training of the Somali recruits. As a result, the operation depends on
other actors when it comes to, for example, the recruitment or the reintegration of the recruits in the
Somali security environment (Oksamytna, 2011: 9). Currently, the selection of recruits is done by the
TFG, supported by the US. While the TFG had to be involved in the selection process to increase local
ownership, greater representativeness among recruits could have been achieved by consulting at
least a civil society organization or an actor with an in-depth understanding of Somali realities
(Oksamytna, 2011: 9). With the revised mandate, EUTM is more involved in the medical selection of
recruits (Interview with EU official, February 2012).
20.2.2 The political context of the EUTM
The political context in Somalia is crucially factor in the success or failure of the EUTM Operation
(Oksamytna, 2011: 7). Since the TFG is ineffective and weak and the Somali security sector is in such a
despicable condition, it is hard to tell where recruits end up after their training (Oksamytna, 2011: 7).
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To avoid the risk that recruits end up in the wrong places, AMISOM is mentoring and monitoring the
recruits after their training. Although the TFG command structures seems to be able to take over
operational control better nowadays and the results of the first two intakes from EUTM look
promising (Interview with EU official, February 2012), the political context is an important aspect to
take into account during future (civilian or military) SSR activities. A certain degree of internal peace
and stability, a willing local government and the ability to implement reforms in the interests of their
populations are aspects that are relevant to take into account (Oksamytna, 2011: 10).
The practice of Operation EUTM Somalia shows that it has been able to incorporate lessons from
previous CSDP operations/missions, especially those focused on SSR activities. While many EU
missions have been criticised for being underfunded and understaffed due to the lack of
commitment on the part of Member States, EUTM was launched on schedule, and the size of the
mission is approximately 125 EU personnel (compared with only eight European staff seconded to EU
SSR Guinea-Bissau and approximately 50 working for EUSEC RD Congo). The willingness of Member
States to second staff for the mission might be associated with the fact that, unlike most other
military missions, EUTM does not have an executive mandate, but is just training in a positive,
permissive, favourable environment (ibid.: 8). This has helped EUTM to fulfill its narrowly defined
mandate to provide high-quality, specialised training to Somali security forces (ibid.).
When the training of the EUTM commenced, recruits complained about language problems,
inadequate nutrition, and the insensitivity and rough practices of the Ugandan trainers. The
dissatisfaction grew and almost led disorder among the recruits. In order to design a culturally
sensitive training programme, EUTM hired a handful of Kenyan ethnic Somali former servicemen as
translators and is using senior Somali liaison officers as mentors for the trainees ICG, 2011: 16. In
addition, EUTM increased co-ordination meetings with the Uganda Peoples Defence Force (UPDF)
resulting in more understanding between EUTM and UPDF (Interview with EU official, February 2012).
Future SSR efforts of the EU should therefore take local idiosyncrasies into account (ibid.).
Lessons have also been learned with regard to the execution of the training itself. In order to achieve
maximum impact it has proved useful to concentrate on activities with multiplier effects, such as
training of local trainers instead of/in addition to local officials (CIVCOM Document 17138/1/10, 2010:
20). The training of Somali trainers is a key element of the revised mandate (Interview with EU official,
February 2012).
Furthermore, the EUTM is effectively cooperating with international partners, for example with
AMISON, which is an important role in reintegrating EUTM-trained soldiers into the Somali Defence
Forces (Oksamytna, 2011: 5). Cooperation also exists with the US, who is participating in the selection
of the trainees and providing airlift and individual equipment. Regular meetings with these actors
have been found useful in order to coordinate action and positions. As EUTM Somalia and other
examples show, it is important to clearly define the roles of different organisations and seek to
identify the specific value added of the EU (CIVCOM Document 17138/1/10, 2010: 22).
Lastly, the EUTMs curriculum includes modules on human rights, humanitarian law, gender issues,
and protection of civilians in conflicts, particularly women and children. In addition, EUTM operates a
quota scheme for female recruits: out of 35 trainees selected to attend the junior officers training
based on their performance during the basic training, at least one should be a woman (Oksamytna,
2011: 5). The inclusion of human rights and gender as a standard curriculum was one of the lessons
from EUPOL RD Congo (CIVCOM Document 17138/1/10, 2010: 20). The EUTM shows that early
inclusion of human rights and gender expertise in the planning team for an operation or mission has
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proved essential in order to ensure that those aspects are adequately covered during planning and
then once an operation or mission is deployed (for example, up-stream planning allowed the
inclusion of human rights and gender training in the syllabus used by EUTM Somalia) (CIVCOM
Document 17138/1/10, 2010: 14).
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COMPONENT III: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1. CONCLUSIONS
The Council also recognises the need to continuously improve the performance of CSDP missions
and operations, including through evaluation of outcomes, benchmarking, impact assessment,
identifying and implementing lessons learned and developing best practices for effective and
efficient CSDP action, (Council of the European Union, 2011: 17991/11)
The complexity of the EU engagement in CSDP missions and operations requires the capacity to
continuously assess the effectiveness of the EU activities against the resources available. Moreover
the EU is still a fairly young actor in crisis management. At the same time, the EU has been present in
a variety of theatres and in very different contexts, seeking to accomplish a breadth of different goals.
Hence, much can be learnt from its experience. This is especially so in the field of civilian intervention
where the EU has been involved in very complex settings and, as a consequence, has developed
comprehensive and innovative approaches to crisis management. EUBAM Rafah, for example, must
work with several local actors (i.e. the PA and Israel, Egypt and Israel, and between Egypt and the
Palestinians), while trying to establish and maintain credibility as an impartial, reliable and capable
third party. For these very reasons, learning processes are particularly important for ensuring
continuous improvement and flexibility in sight of the ever changing contexts and theatres of
intervention. On these issues the EU is in line with the greater international trend that attempts to
standardise and improve knowledge management systems. International actors such as the UN,
OSCE and OECD, are moving in the same direction and the first attempt of standardisation of lessons
learned looked at the experiences of these actors as a starting point to build its own systems.
The political sensitivity of lessons learned should not discourage from enhancing the mechanisms in
place and improving the capacity to implement lessons. On the contrary, more focus should be given
to the need to improve the product in a fast changing international background. This is particularly
relevant for the EU to remain a competitive actor in crisis management. Moreover, attention is paid
more and more to the value for money of CSDP missions and operations and lessons learned play an
important role in measuring success and improving performance. Member States (through their
representatives in CIVCOM and EUMC) are increasingly asking for lessons learned cycles to be carried
out and they are ever more aware of the added value of evaluation processes for CSDP (interviews
with EEAS staff; 20 January 2012, 24 January 2012).
The previous chapter has explored how lessons learned processes have been carried out with regard
to specific missions and operations. Specifically, it focused on the results of the formalised
procedures of learning, the outcomes of mission reviews by external experts, and what types of
lessons have been identified in each case study. Both in the discussion of the wider background
concerning CSDP lessons learned and in the findings from the case studies, a number of challenges
to learning have emerged. These areas represent points where the system could and should be
improved in order to maximise the impact of learning mechanisms and increase CSDP efficiency and
impact. This chapter will first discuss these challenges and areas of improvement, drawing from what
emerged in Chapter 1 and 2. Against this background, it will proceed to suggest ways forward for a
more productive and effective system of learning lessons. The chapter will provide pragmatic
suggestions and options on how to achieve a more systematic and organic process of learning from
experience. The chapter will close with specific recommendations on lessons learned and also
recommendations targeted to inform the European Parliament about its role in overseeing and
supporting the development of CSDP missions and operations.
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1.1 Challenges to learning
The analysis suggests that there are several political issues that limit the capacity for institutional
learning with regard to CSDP missions and operations. A fundamental problem that has emerged
consistently during the interviews is the perception that lessons learned processes are a blame and
shame exercise. This theme seems to cut across all EEAS bodies, however it is especially acute for
Member States, which often see lessons identified in reports as potentially damaging to their
reputation. A more systematic inclusion of best practices could help to alleviate this negative
perception. Also the discourse could be shifted from assessment of what has gone wrong to an
effort for improving the product. This, interviewees suggested, would help reduce Member States
squeamishness for lessons learned processes.
This attitude of Member States is especially reflected in the process of approving and finalising
lessons learned documents. The procedure of having all documents pass through the respective
committees (EUMC and PMG for military operations and CIVCOM and PSC for civilian missions) to be
agreed upon unanimously by all Member States represented in the committees result in a polishing
exercise on the language and content of the documents in question. As it was explained in an
interview, Member States representatives sitting in the committees are pulled into two different
directions. On one side, they are aware of the challenges and difficulties that missions and operations
encounter, and of the need for change and constant improvement. On the other side, they represent
their respective national positions, which can undermine conceding shortcomings or committing to
a meaningful process of improving in the interest of defending national reputations (interview with
EU official, 2 February 2012). As many interviewees stated, this will require a mindset shift that can
only be expected at a gradual pace. To respond to these challenges, EEAS officials adopt informal
mechanisms of sharing sensitive lessons and originating change at a political strategic level. In this
sense, informal and personal mechanisms for learning supplement the formal ones. However, it is
unclear how and to what extent these informal systems contribute to change, as there is no way to
track, measure, or substantiate their record with regard to improving practices and policies.
Related to the issue of sensitivity is the problem of access to the lessons learned documents. At the
moment, the majority of lessons learned reports are classified and only few of them are partially
declassified and available to the public. An additional obstacle to learning lessons stands in the fact
that the restriction in the accessibility of the documents applies also to most EU bodies. The creation
of ELMA and CiLMA will help transparency and sharing of lessons between EUMS, CPCC and CMPD.
However, only these three bodies and the respective Council committees will have access to the
databases. This decision not to disclose documents concerning the evaluation and effectiveness of
missions and operations circumscribes the capacity of the actors involved, including Member States,
to improve practices and policies. At the same time, disclosure of these documents could have the
negative effect of further sterilising potentially valuable information from them (interview with EU
official, 24 January 2012). However, bodies outside the EEAS could also benefit from having access to
lessons learned documents, and could valuably contribute to the lessons learning process. The
European Parliament oversight role would surely be enhanced by having access to the evaluation of
CSDP missions and operations. Under the current Council-European Parliament agreement only five
members of Parliament may request specific documents (European Parliament and Council, 2002). In
view of the renegotiation of the agreement, a more targeted system could be found for granting
access.
Due to this reluctance to include sensitive issues in official documents, the political level of CSDP
missions and operations is still scarcely captured by official lessons learning processes. This gap limits
the EEASs capacity to improve the decision-making process with regard to launching a mission or
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operation, or writing an Operational Plan and mandate (interview with EU official, 24 January 2012). It
is unclear in how many cases a mission mandate has been subject to lessons learned processes and
revised as a consequence. On the military side, the fact that Member States can put forward lessons
observations can politicise the process from its inception (interview with EEAS official, 24 January
2012). Assessing the political and strategic level of CSDP missions and operations would create the
space for a more rigorous discussion on the rationale underpinning CSDP intervention and on the
adequacy of the tools adopted in missions and operations to achieve the desired objectives.
Several challenges to learning also emerged concerning the organisation and conducting of lessons
learned processes. To date, both EUMS and CMPD still have to find a successful way to target their
audiences for the dissemination of the lessons learned documents (interviews with EU staff, 24
January 2012). In addition to this, some relevant audiences are completely ignored by the formal
processes. FPI, for example, does not receive and is not involved in lessons learned processes. Only in
two instances were draft papers shared with FPI, with the aim to include their input on the lessons
learned (interview with EU official, 8 February 2012). Considering that financing mechanism issues are
often flagged in civilian missions, a more formal incorporation of the FPI unit in lessons learned
processes could be highly beneficial. It was also suggested that more coordination between FPI,
CPCC and the financial structures within missions would improve the capacity to manage funds and
resources effectively (interview with EU official, 9 February 2012). FPI also runs its own evaluation of
the soundness of the financial management of missions. The results of which should be shared with
CPCC, but currently are used only within the Commission. A more productive dissemination strategy
would also involve the systematic sharing of lessons across missions, especially lessons of a technical
operational nature. The sharing of lessons and best practices between missions could also promote
the cross-fertilisation on successful solutions (see case study on EUSEC and EUPOL RD Congo).
Lessons learned have not yet become routine nor are they entrenched in the working culture of
CSDP. Despite the attempt by the dedicated officers to raise the profile of lessons learned, the
importance of including them in the day-to-day working routine remains more an aspirational
statement than a solid practice. At mission level, for example, the staff receives little feedback from
actors in Brussels on the objectives of lessons learned reports. Nor have they a clear vision on how
their contribution to lessons learned processes within the wider picture of CSDP. This limits the
motivation of mission staff to contribute to efforts to collect lessons learned (interview with mission
staff, 13 March 2012; interview with external senior policy advisor, 15 March 2012).
CMPD and CPCC seem to have found an informal agreement on their respective lessons learned
focuses. Where CMPD tends to concentrate on horizontal thematic lessons, CPCC follows a more
vertical approach that looks at specific missions. In fact, CPCC carries out the 6-month mission reports
without cooperation or consultation with CMPD. The reports are sent directly to CIVCOM without
CMPD ever having seen them. Neither CPCC nor CMPD are the full owners of the learning process
and this results in a lacuna of clear responsibility for the implementation of the lessons. This creates
confusion also for mission staff who would benefit from a more clear leadership on the matter
(interview with mission staff, 13 March 2012). The establishment of CiLMA presents the opportunity
to improve the communication between CMPD and CPCC. The practice of filtering the lessons as they
move between the mission and CPCC, and again between CPCC and CMPD can create barriers to
vertical learning. An interviewee stressed how missions tend to pass up to CPCC mainly those lessons
where Brussels would have an influence. As a consequence, more context specific operational lessons
are often kept at mission level and do not contribute to the CiLMA database. Despite attempts to
improve the communication, much can still be done to bridge the various strategic, planning and
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operational levels. Efforts should be made to increase understanding of the respective roles and
address the challenges faced by each level of engagement.
The limited resources designated to lessons learned also hamper the success of the process. Within
CPCC, all the officials dedicated to lessons learned are double- if not triple-hatted. In CMPD, only one
staff member is solely dedicated to lessons learned. Within EUMS, the situation is slightly better as
two full-time officers are involved in the processes of learning lessons. With the creation with the new
civilian database CiLMA, CMPD could devote more than just one officer to entering all the existing
documents in the system. In the case of EUMS, resources could be allocated to training the lessons
learned point-of-contact officer in each of the various functional areas. This could improve not only
the quality of the lessons observations, but also strengthen the analysis of the lessons to get at root
causes.
The 2008 Guidelines on the identification and implementation of lessons and best practices called for
the appointment of Best Practice officers in each mission. However, to date, only EULEX Kosovo has
been able to appoint dedicated officers whose sole task is to work on lessons and best practices(
36
).
The lack of similar positions in other missions negates the potential for inter-mission communication
and the horizontal comparison, verification and exchange of lessons and best practices between
missions.
Civilian and military alignment on how to conduct lessons learned still has to be achieved. The
different methodologies result in different outcomes. Civilian and military lessons learned processes
will expectedly always run somewhat parallel to each other. However there is space to improve
alignment of the two processes. The creation of a forum where EUMS and CPCC staff can dialogue
and exchange views on missions and operations are a positive step in this direction. Also the 2011
Joint Annual Report on lessons learned represents further improvement. Since the EUMS structure
and concept for lessons learned is more developed and more sophisticated than the civilian one, the
military concept could be used as a template on which to build a civilian version, tailored to the
unique needs of civilian missions.
1.2 Areas of improvement and the way forward
A first area to address is the alignment of lessons learned systems with the EEAS. To improve the
approach to knowledge management, the methodologies, resources and concepts for lessons
learned should be aligned not only between civilian and military side of CSDP but throughout EEAS.
A clear division of labour between CPCC and CMPD would also provide a stronger foundation for a
coherent system. Especially valuable is the formalisation of analysing the root causes of lessons
identified as well as the formalisation of finding potential solutions as a separated step in the learning
cycle. The Lessons Learned Cell within EUMS has devoted great effort into developing these steps of
the process. Formalising these two processes, by designating and defining specific tasks to carry out
as part of the lessons learned cycle would support the successful implementation of lessons for
civilian missions. EUMS has also developed a system to track the movement of a lesson through the
cycle, in this way any obstruction to the learning process can be flagged, as can the successful
implementation of the lessons in policy and practice. However, crucial for the effective running of
such complex processes is clarity about who is responsible for which part of the cycle, and how these
roles connect to each other. Hence, establishing official roles for CMPD and CPCC would be a

36
Officers within this unit and its Head have been developing a comprehensive framework that envisions a more robust
profile and function of the Best Practices and Training Office and its staff, with regards to collecting, analysing and
sharing lessons.
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necessary first step in this direction. Aligning the civilian and military processes would also support
the EUs commitment to comprehensive approaches. Having isolated approaches to lessons learned
would hamper the capacity of implementing improvement and change. Common terminology and
concepts could be spread through joint training sessions of personnel dedicated to lessons learned
throughout the military and civilian structures as well as through joint exercises and reporting.
Having a strong comprehensive concept, however, does not alone guarantee a successful learning
cycle. Resources are also needed for the tasks of collecting, analysing and implementing lessons to be
carried out. More human resources, a few very strategically placed staff members, are clearly needed
if lessons learned is to be a meaningful process. CPCC needs human resources to dedicate to the
lessons learned full time. EUMS already has a core team of two officers dedicated solely to lessons
learned processes, with a supervising officer to oversee progress. In this case, additional resources
would facilitate lessons learned training for officers within the functional areas to strengthen the
network capacity for conducting evaluations and lessons learned cycles. Such an investment could
even be fulfilled by a specialised expert who is periodically and temporarily placed within the bodies.
CMDP also suffers from the lack of full-time dedicated human capital, with only one dedicated officer.
More importantly, it would be beneficial to strengthen a network of best practice and lessons learned
officers within various missions. One consideration may be to dedicate a full-time officer to best
practices and lessons in each mission, as established in the 2008 Guidelines. Highly experienced
officers could be appointed for such positions, and ideally given access to the Head of Mission so that
problem areas reported to the HoM by different section heads could be delegated directly to the Best
Practices officer. Creating a network of Best Practices officers could also fuel horizontal lessons
sharing among missions.
In the same vein, Best Practices officers could be periodically gathered for thematic conferences to
collect thematic lessons learned on common topics, such as gender mainstreaming, MMA or SSR.
Best Practice officers from the mission level, but also the Brussels level can become a community of
experts to drive change and improvement of the policies and practices of CSDP. Especially at mission
level, Best Practice officers can be problem-solving figures, taking on the task of finding solutions to
the obstacles and issues encountered in the various divisions. Learning would shift from being a
reactive mechanisms to being a proactive exercise that addresses issues and shortfalls as they arise or
are foreseen, rather than a reactive procedure, looking back at what went wrong. Such practices
could contribute to increasing the desired impact of CSDP, which would be equally welcomed by
Member States and by the actors involved in CSDP. The more common inclusion of best practices
alongside lessons identified would help to sell the process and ensure greater buy-in of the actors
involved.
A network of Best Practice and lessons learned officers among the various structures of EEAS would
also facilitate vertical communication between the various bodies and between Brussels and
missions. Measures have been introduced to promote communication but practical filters are still in
place between the various levels, for example the brevity of the lessons section within six-month
reports, or censorship of lessons deemed sensitive. These practices increasingly limit the significance
of the information reaching the relevant actors as it rises up through the ranks. Currently, operational
lessons from the mission tend to stay within the mission. Moreover mission staff needs to be more
actively made aware of the objectives of lessons learned processes in which they participate. By
increasingly including mission staff (including Best Practice officers) in strategic review discussions,
the links between strategic planners and those responsible for implementation would be
strengthened. Facilitating the vertical sharing of lessons could increase the chances of having
Operational Plans and mandates redacted on the basis of operational capacities and feasibility. This,
106
in turn, could increase the ability of the missions to implement the mandates and achieve the desired
impact on the ground.
Considering the crucial role that financing mechanisms play in the conduct of civilian missions, more
effective ways to collaborate and share information among the relevant actors would be welcomed.
In order to enhance coordination between FPI, CPCC and the financial structures within the missions,
direct channels of communications should be created. As it stands, lessons learned documents and
evaluations are not shared among these three actors. The sharing of lessons and joint evaluations
could also help overcome compartmentalism and encourage a focus on finding solutions to the
issues identified at the mission level. Direct involvement of FPI in the training of administrational and
procurement staff members could improve the understanding within missions of financial
regulations and promote the identifications of issues and possible solutions at an early stage of the
mission.
With regard to the access of official Council lessons learned documents, more transparency among
the relevant actors could be fostered. This could encourage a broader effort to find alternative
effective practices and policies. The European Parliament would be able to play its oversight role in a
more meaningful way, were it informed of the lessons emerging from the planning and conduct of
missions. The EP could be a vehicle to encourage actors and the Member States to give due
consideration to recurrent lessons and address those that fall within their purview. However in order
to do so, the EP must be better informed about mission realities. Currently only six members of the EP
have the opportunity to request access to official Council documents(
37
). A more targeted system
could be found that allows for a meaningful access from the EP to the documents without the risk of
future reports being washed of valuable yet sensitive lessons identified. Establishing mechanisms
to ensuring adequate access to such documents would support the EP in its oversight capacity.
Related to the restriction of the documents is the issue of the reluctance to include in official lessons
documents those lessons that capture the political decision making processes. Seminars, such as the
one organised by EUISS on Tchad, and exercises such as those organised by the EUMS, are crucial
opportunities for identifying and discussing lessons at a strategic and political level. These less formal
formats allow for a more open and candid evaluation of the practices and policies guiding the
political-strategic actors during the planning phase. As explained previously, CPCC does not always
have a significant number of officers available to participate in joint exercises. However seminars and
exercises should be promoted as ways of learning and improving performance in a politically neutral
environment. In the case of Atalanta, the ten-month lessons learned project carried out by EUISS led
to an expert group meeting and a PSC level seminar. EUISS proved to be an effective neutral
facilitator for the discussion and sharing of lessons identified among various actors involved in the
missions but also involved, in the case of Tchad, external experts and stakeholders.
To ensure the implementation of lessons into new policies and practices, dissemination strategies
require more attention. Target audiences still need to be identified both on the military and the
civilian side. The military side is a step ahead of the civilian counterparts. Having already in place a
categorisation of the areas to which lessons learned belong helps in directing searches within the
database for lessons pertaining to specific sectors. A more proactive approach would be to identify
the respective recipient(s) of the lessons for each category and send these individuals the lessons
pro-actively. Email alerts could be established that inform the relevant officers about new lessons

37
1hey are Lhe resldenL of Lhe Luropean arllamenL, Lhe Chalrman of Lhe CommlLLee on lorelgn Affalrs, Puman 8lghLs,
Common SecurlLy and uefence ollcy, plus oLher 4 members deslgnaLed by Lhe Conference of resldenLs. lL ls noL clear how
Lhe four addlLlonal members of arllamenL are chosen. 1hls arrangemenL ls up for renegoLlaLlon ln 2012.
107
being identified and learned in a particular geographic or thematic area. The email alert system could
also allow for the subscription to thematic lessons so that each officer receives what is relevant to
his/her position specifically.
During the interviews, it was recurrently stressed how lessons learned processes need a higher profile
within the EEAS and the EU in general. The Annual Report could be used as a vehicle to catalyse
attention and as a reference point for political mobilisation and advocacy. After all, the Annual
reports themselves stress the importance of integrated strategies and sufficient political will to
mobilise the necessary personnel and resources for successful CSDP. In addition, the buy-in of high
profile personalities within EEAS and greater EU community would encourage the allocation of more
resources as well as more attention paid to the lessons identified through the CSDP experience. In
the UN, the so called Bramihi Report gained visibility due to the high profile of the chairman of the
commission putting the report forward. In a similar way, the final review of the AMM Aceh mission
spurred a wave of discussions in Brussels on how to enhance the capacities of civilian CSDP missions
because of the well respected reputation of the Head of Mission, Pieter Feith. The EP was also
identified as a potential promoter of the added value of lessons learned processes. The EP has
significant leverage with Member States, who have it within their capacity to address several
recurring lessons and issues, and this position can be used to support lessons learned system as an
important mechanism to improve both how money is spent and the effectiveness of the CSDP
policies.
108
2. RECOMMENDATIONS
2.1 General recommendations on improving knowledge management
The EUMS, and CMPD could identify the target audience of the lessons learned documents to
improve the strategy of disseminating lessons learned. A proactive approach would be to send
relevant lessons reports to specific officers who can apply them directly in their work.
Including best practices in lessons learned reports could help to alleviate the negative
perception that lessons learned processes are a blaming and shaming exercise.
Aligning lessons learned concepts used by the various bodies within EEAS and adopting
common definitions could enhance civilian and military coordination, and serve a more
comprehensive approach to lessons learned. Similarly, joint training on learning
methodologies and tools for EUMS, CPCC and CMPD Best Practice and Lessons officers could
further promote a common approach.
Formalising the analysis of the root causes underpinning lessons identified as well as
proposing solutions to the issues could help ensure the implementation of the lessons in
procedures and policies.
Given its particular relevance to the lessons on financial procedures, FPI could be more
formally integrated into the lessons learned process of CPCC, similar to the way ATHENA is
involved in the lessons learned cycle of EUMS.
Clarifying the division of labour between CPCC and CMPD with regard to lessons learned could
help to establish a more structured, comprehensible and cooperative system for lessons
learned.
Exercises that involve all levels of actors from Brussels to the missions, such as the one planned
for 2012, could increase the shared understanding of actors respective roles and encourage
more accountability. Also joint training of personnel from CPCC, CMPD and missions could
promote harmonisation and deeper understanding of the dynamics at play at each working
level.
In order to improve the framework for learning lessons at the political strategic level,
consideration should be given to systematising and developing informal tools for sharing and
learning, such as EUISS seminars, workshops and exercises. This could also involve the actors
responsible for the political-strategic aspect of CSDP, providing a new (possibly less political)
forum for discussion.
Mission staff, such as the Political Adviser to the missions or the Best Practice officer, could be
included in strategic evaluations, discussions and analysis of CSDP performance at the Brussels
level.
Designating a Lessons Learned and Best Practice officer per mission (as suggested in the 2008
Guidelines) could lead to building a network of Best Practices officers. More specialised training
could also be provided to all officers involved in lessons learned processes both at mission and
Brussels level.
Allowing ENTRi training institutes to use lessons learned and best practice documents in the
development of courses curricula may be a very cost-effective lesson implementation method.
109
Teams responsible for lessons learned reports could include both EU staff and independent
experts. This could facilitate a more transparent and impartial approach to lessons learned
studies.
The gap between the mission level and lessons learned actors in Brussels should be addressed.
Further research is needed on this aspect in order to identify ways to improve this relationship.
2.2 Recommendations to the European Parliament
The EP is in a position to raise the profile of the added value of lessons learned exercises.
Advocating for the appointment of an influential personality within EEAS to champion
progress in collecting, analysing and implementing lessons, is one way the EP could exercise
their influence.
The EP could advocate for the appointment of dedicated Best Practice and Lessons officers in
each mission (or possibly shared among missions within a single country). This could be
followed up by overseeing the creation of a network of Best Practice officers, including those
within CPCC, CMPD and EUMS to form a community of experts, to enhance horizontal as well
as vertical learning. The EP could promote the idea among Member States (who must second
qualified individuals) and convene conferences of Best Practices and Lessons officers, to
support the activity as well as benefit from it.
Financial mechanisms and budget management can be an entry point for dialogue between
EP and EEAS on lessons learned and best practices, as the EP has a Treaty-based budgetary
oversight role. As part of its civilian mission budgetary oversight capacity, the EP could ensure
that proportionate and adequate portions of the CFSP budget is dedicated to evaluation and
lessons learned mechanisms.
According to their Treaty-based budgetary oversight role, the EP could support the function of
Best Practice Officers in enhancing the cost-effectiveness of missions. Supporting Best Practice
officers in their pursuit of more effective and efficient practices can have positive financial
implications that the EP could endorse.
The EP could encourage debate concerning the accessibility of the Councils official documents
on lessons learned, particularly with regards to the access of EU bodies involved in CSDP,
however placed outside of the EEAS structures. Partial disclosure of relevant sections could be
an acceptable compromise, as could de-classifying lessons of completed missions, especially
their planning processes.
The EP could take the lead in reviewing whether the ENTRi system is effective and fulfilling its
potential. It could also advocate for ENTRi becoming a lessons dissemination and
implementation tool.
Inter-parliamentary networks could be mobilised to improve relevant national training and
recruitment structures and encourage Member States to follow up with the resources they
have committed to CSDP.
The EP could underwrite lessons learned reviews conducted by external actors, such as
impartial research institutes, academic institutes, and NGOs. This could allow for more
transparency and augment the available body of literature on CSDP lessons learned.
The EP could also organise de-briefing sessions for seconded personnel returning from the
missions on a bi-annual bases, and organised per region or theme. This would allow for
110
homogenous de-briefing methods and for informing the EP and staff in Brussels of ground-
level mission experience.
111
Annex I: VISUALISATIONS OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN LESSONS
LEARNED PROCESSES
Military Lessons Learned Processes

112
Civilian Lessons Learned Processes

113
Annex II: LESSONS OVERVIEW MATRIX

114

115
Annex III: CSDP Case studies timeline

116
COMPREHENSIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY
Components I & III:
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management, 13835/03, 23 October 2003.
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Council of the European Union, Council Decision amending Decision 2004/197/CFSP establishing a
mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of the European Union operations having
military or defence implications (ATHENA), 15059/04, 6 December 2004.
Council of the European Union, Civilian Headline Goal 2008, 15863/04, 7 December 2004
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of the guidelines on lessons learned and best practices, 14792/08, 27 October 2008.
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practices in civilian ESDP missions, 15987/08, 19 November 2008.
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into CSDP military operations and civilian missions, 17138/1/10, 30 November 2010.
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best practices in civilian CSDP missions in 2010, 17386/10, 19 April 2010.
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7 December 2010.
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personnel for CSDP, 16109/11, 26 October 2011
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Defence Committee, Planning and conduct of EU operations reply to the annual report of the Council,
A/2086, 30 November2010.
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of the European Communities, C298/1, 20 November 2002.
Gebhard, C., The Crisis Management and Planning Directorate: Recalibrating ESDP Planning and
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2009), EU Institute for Security Studies, 2009.
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Component II: Mission case Studies
1. EUMP BiH
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European Union Police Mission, L 293/1, 2002.
CivCom, Draft CIVCOM Report on the progress of the Action Plan on EUPM Lessons Learned,
15809/2/04, 2004.
CivCom, Draft Action Plan on EUPM Lessons Learned from the first year of operations, 10263/04,
2004.
CivCom, A review of the first 100 days of the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM),
CIVCOM advice, 12269/1/03, 2003.
CivCom, Draft CIVCOM advice on EUPM: lessons from the planning phase, autumn 2001 December
2002, 9809/1/03, 2003.
Donlon, F., EUPM and EUNAVFOR Missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Analytical Report, ATLAS Project,
July 2010.
European Union military Committee, Military Advice on Secretariat's Paper on Co-ordination and
Coherence between the EU Special Representative (EUSR), the EU Military Operation (EUFOR) and the
EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) (December 2004- August 2006): Lessons
Learnt, 16034/06, 2006.
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Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM), Autumn 2001-December 2002, 11206/03, 2003.
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Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM), 11760/03, 2003.
General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, A review of the first year of operations of
the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), 8247/04, 2004.
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General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Co-ordination and Coherence between the
EU Special Representative (EUSR), the EU Military Operation (EUFOR) and the EU Police Mission
(EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) (December 2004- August 2006): Lessons Learnt, 15376/06,
2006.
General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Final Report on EUPOL PROXIMA, 6592/06,
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Hansen, A., Against all Odds- The Evolution of Planning for ESDP Operations, Zentrum fr
Internationale Friedenseinstze, 2006.
Juncos, A., Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in: Emerson, Michael and Gross, Eva (eds.)
Evaluating the EUs Crisis Missions in the Balkans, 2007, pp. 46-80.
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European Security and Defence Policy, The first 10 years (1999-2009), EU ISS, 2009, pp. 161-171.
Orsini, D., Future for ESDP: Lessons from Bosnia, European Security Review, Nr. 29, 2006.
2. EUFOR CONOCORDIA FYROM
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B"!*" +!'!#&%@ *,$%&#!*" !" 1*%+$% C5D*.'&/ E$,5F'!6 *1 G&6$H*"!&, L 34/26, 2003.
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Foreign Relations Counselors, Military Operations Financial issues Lessons learned from the first EU
military operation (CONCORDIA), 11154/1/03, 2003.
General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Operation CONCORDIA Lessons Learned
process, 15484/03, 2003.
General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Report on Political, Political-Military and
Institutional Lessons Identified from Operation Concordia, 6333/04, 2004.
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Security and Defence Policy, The first 10 years (1999-2009), EU ISS, 2009, pp. 173-180.
Political and Security Committee, PSC Report on the way ahead Concordia Lessons Learned, 7381/04,
2004.
RELEX Council, 2541st RELEX Council Meeting, 14500/03, 2003.
3. Operation Artemis RD Congo
Council of the European Union, Conclusions on Operation Artemis, 12294/03, 2003.
Council of the European Union, Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP on the European Union military
operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, L 143/50, 5 June 2003.
Council of the European Union, Political and Security Committee, PSC Report on the way ahead
following operation Artemis lessons learned, 6324/1/04, 17 February 2004.
Council of the European Union, Conclusions on ESDP, 9210/04, 17 May 2004.
Faria, F., Crisis management in sub-Saharan Africa: The role of the European Union, Occasional
Paper, No. 51, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2004.
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Grevi, G., Helly, D. and Keohane, D. (eds.), European Security and Defence Policy, The first 10 years
(1999-2009), European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2009.
Heise, V., Zehn Jahre Europische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik: Entwicklung, Stand und
Probleme, SWP-Studie, S 25, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, 2009.
Hoebeke, H., Carette, S. and Vlassenroot, K., EU support to the Democratic Republic of Congo, Centre
dAnalyse Stratgique, Brussels, 2007.
Homan, K., Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in European Commission (ed.)
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pp.151 155.
Kerttunen, M., Koivula, T. and Jeppsson, T, EU Battlegroups: Theory and Development in the Light of
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Saferworld and International Alert, Strengthening Global Security through Addressing the Root
Causes of conflict: Priorities for the Irish and Dutch Presidencies in 2004, 2004.
Solana, J., Secretary-General/ High Representative, Report on accelerated decision making and
planning process for EU Rapid Response Operations, 7317/05, 2005.
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United Nations and European Union, Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management,
12510/03 (Presse 266), 2003.
United Nations Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, Operation Artemis: the lessons of the interim
emergency multinational force, 2004.
4. EUPOL PROXIMA / EUPAT FYROM
Caldeira, V. (President of the Court of Auditors), Special report No. 12/2009 on the effectiveness of the
Commissions projects in the area of Justice and Home Affairs for the western Balkans, 14845/09,
2009.
Council of the European Union, Council Joint Action 2003/681/CFSP on the European Union Police
Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPOL Proxima), L 249/66, 29 September
2003.
Council of the European Union, Council Joint Action 2004/789/CFSP on the extension of the
European Union Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPOL Proxima), L
348/40, 22 November 2004.
Council of the European Union, Lessons from the planning phase of the EU Police Mission (EUPOL
PROXIMA) in former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, (presented to CivCom in 2004) (Classified doc).
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Police Advisory Team (EUPAT) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (fYROM), L 307/61, 24
November 2005.
CivCom, Joint paper on Lessons Learned on the transition between the EU Police Advisory team in
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and a European Community policing project, 16938/06,
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Loannides, I., EU Police Mission Proxima: Testing the European Approach to Building Peace in: A. N.
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5. EUFOR Althea BiH
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operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, L 252/10, 12 July 2004.
Council of the European Union, Common Operational Guidelines for EUPM-EUFOR support to the
fight against organised crime, 10769/06, 2006.
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July 2010.
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European Policy Studies (CEPS), 2007.
EU Military Committee, Op Althea Consolidated Report on Historical Lessons Identified, from the
Execution of Operation Althea, 14181/07, 2007.
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Phase, 8912/05, 2005.
EU Military Committee, Military Advice on Secretariat's Paper on Co-ordination and Coherence
between the EU Special Representative (EUSR), the EU Military Operation (EUFOR) and the EU Police
Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) (December 2004- August 2006): Lessons Learnt,
16034/06, 2006.
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Friesendorf, C., The Military and Law Enforcement in Peace Operations: Lessons from Bosnia
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EU Special Representative (EUSR), the EU Military Operation (EUFOR) and the EU Police Mission
(EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) (December 2004- August 2006): Lessons Learnt, 15376/06,
2006.
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website.
Keohane, D., EUFOR ALTHEA (Bosnia and Herzegovina), in: Grevi, G., Helley, D. and Keohane, D. (eds.),
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Overhaus, M., Operation Althea and the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Implementing
the Comprehensive Approach, in: Asseburg, M. and Kempin, R. (Eds.), The EU as a Strategic Actor in
the Realm of Security and Defence?, SWP Research Paper, December 2009, p. 16-29.
Political Security Committee, PSC report on the way ahead following the lessons learned identified
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Simn, L., Command and control? Planning for EU military operations, EUISS Occasional paper, 2010.

122
6. EUSEC and EUPOL RD Congo
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Republic of the Congo (DRC) reply to the annual report of the Council, Document A/1954, 20
December 2006.
Bloching, S., CSDP and EU Mission Update February 2011, European Security Review, Briefing 2, ISIS
Europe, 2011.
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Europe, 2011b.
Bloching, S., CSDP and EU Mission Update June/July 2011, European Security Review Briefing 6, ISIS
Europe, 2011c.
Boshoff, H. D. Hendrickson, S. More, T. Vircoulon, Supporting SSR in the DRC: Between a Rock and a
Hard Place, Clingendael Institute, The Hague, 2010.
Clement, C., The EU mission to provide advice and assistance to security sector reform in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSEC RD CONGO) in: European Security and Defence Policy: The
First Ten Years (1999-2009), G. Grevi, D. Helly, and D. Keohane (eds.) European Union Institute for
Security Studies, Paris, 2009.
Clement, C., Security Sector Reform in the DRC: Forward to the Past in: Security Sector Reform in
Challenging Environments, H. Born and A. Schnabel (eds.) Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control
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