This document summarizes a court case between La Chemise Lacoste, S.A., a French clothing manufacturer, and Gobindram Hemandas over trademark infringement. La Chemise Lacoste filed a petition for certiorari seeking to nullify a court order granting a motion to quash previously issued search warrants. The court document discusses the background of the trademark registrations and disputes between the parties. It also summarizes the arguments made by both sides regarding the capacity of La Chemise Lacoste, a foreign corporation, to file the petition and whether the court judge committed grave abuse of discretion in quashing the search warrants.
This document summarizes a court case between La Chemise Lacoste, S.A., a French clothing manufacturer, and Gobindram Hemandas over trademark infringement. La Chemise Lacoste filed a petition for certiorari seeking to nullify a court order granting a motion to quash previously issued search warrants. The court document discusses the background of the trademark registrations and disputes between the parties. It also summarizes the arguments made by both sides regarding the capacity of La Chemise Lacoste, a foreign corporation, to file the petition and whether the court judge committed grave abuse of discretion in quashing the search warrants.
This document summarizes a court case between La Chemise Lacoste, S.A., a French clothing manufacturer, and Gobindram Hemandas over trademark infringement. La Chemise Lacoste filed a petition for certiorari seeking to nullify a court order granting a motion to quash previously issued search warrants. The court document discusses the background of the trademark registrations and disputes between the parties. It also summarizes the arguments made by both sides regarding the capacity of La Chemise Lacoste, a foreign corporation, to file the petition and whether the court judge committed grave abuse of discretion in quashing the search warrants.
LA CHEMISE LACOSTE, S. A., petitioner, vs. HON. OSCAR C. FERNANDEZ, !"#$%$&' ()%'" o* +!a&,- .LI., R"'$o&a/ T!$a/ Co)!0, Na0$o&a/ Ca1$0a/ ()%$,$a/ R"'$o&, Ma&$/a a&% GO+INDRAM HEMANDAS, respondents. G.R. No. L-62629 May 2/, 1984 GO+INDRAM HEMANDAS S3(ANANI, petitioner, vs. HON. RO+ERTO 4. ONGIN, $& -$# ,a1a,$0y a# M$&$#0"! o* T!a%" a&% I&%)#0!y, a&% HON. CESAR SAN DIEGO, $& -$# ,a1a,$0y a# D$!",0o! o* a0"&0#, respondents. Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for petitioners in 63796-97. Ramon C. Fernandez for private respondent in 63796-97 and petitioner in 65659.
G3TIERREZ, (R., J.: It is among this Court's concerns that the Philippines should not acquire an unbecoming reputation among the manufacturing and trading centers of the world as a haven for intellectual pirates imitating and illegally profiting from trademarks and tradenames which have established themselves in international or foreign trade. Before this Court is a petition for ertiorari with preliminary inunction filed by !a Chemise !acoste, ".#., a well known $uropean manufacturer of clothings and sporting apparels sold in the international market and bearing the trademarks %!#C&"'$% %C($)I"$ !#C&"'$%, %C*&C&+I!$ +$,IC$% and a composite mark consisting of the word %!#C&"'$% and a representation of a crocodile-alligator. 'he petitioner asks us to set aside as null and void, the order of udge &scar C. .ernande/, of Branch 0!I0, *egional 'rial Court, 1ational Capital 2udicial *egion, granting the motion to quash the search warrants previously issued by him and ordering the return of the sei/ed items. 'he facts are not seriously disputed. 'he petitioner is a foreign corporation, organi/ed and e3isting under the laws of .rance and not doing business in the Philippines, It is undeniable from the records that it is the actual owner of the abovementioned trademarks used on clothings and other goods specifically sporting apparels sold in many parts of the world and which have been marketed in the Philippines since 4567, 'he main basis of the private respondent's case is its claim of alleged prior registration. In 4589, (emandas : Co., a duly licensed domestic firm applied for and was issued *eg. 1o. "*;<<<9 ="* stands for "upplemental *egister> for the trademark %C($)I"$ !#C&"'$ : C*&C&+I!$ +$,IC$% by the Philippine Patent &ffice for use on ';shirts, sportswear and other garment products of the company. 'wo years later, it applied for the registration of the same trademark under the Principal *egister. 'he Patent &ffice eventually issued an order dated )arch ?, 4588 which states that@ 333 333 333 ... Considering that the mark was already registered in the "upplemental *egister in favor of herein applicant, the &ffice has no other recourse but to allow the application, however, *eg. 1o. "*;<<<9 is now being contested in a Petition for Cancellation docketed as IPC 1o. 4A76, still registrant is presumed to be the owner of the mark until after the registration is declared cancelled. 'hereafter, (emandas : Co. assigned to respondent Bobindram (emandas all rights, title, and interest in the trademark %C($)I"$ !#C&"'$ : +$,IC$%. &n 1ovember <4, 45CA, the petitioner filed its application for registration of the trademark %Crocodile +evice% =#pplication "erial 1o. 7?<7<> and %!acoste% =#pplication "erial 1o. 7?<74>.'he former was approved for publication while the latter was opposed by Bames and Barments in Inter Partes Case 1o. 469C. In 45C<, the petitioner filed a Petition for the Cancellation of *eg. 1o. "*;<<<9 docketed as Inter Partes Case 1o. 46C5. Both cases have now been considered by this Court in !emandas v. !on. Ro"erto #n$pin =B.*. 1o. 69695>. &n )arch <4, 45C?, the petitioner filed with the 1ational Bureau of Investigation =1BI> a letter;complaint alleging therein the acts of unfair competition being committed by (emandas and requesting their assistance in his apprehension and prosecution. 'he 1BI conducted an investigation and subsequently filed with the respondent court two applications for the issuance of search warrants which would authori/e the search of the premises used and occupied by the !acoste "ports Center and Bames and Barments both owned and operated by (emandas. 'he respondent court issued "earch Darrant 1os. C?;4<C and C?;4<5 for violation of #rticle 4C5 of the *evised Penal Code, %it appearing to the satisfaction of the udge after e3amining under oath applicant and his witnesses that there are good and sufficient reasons to believe that Bobindram (emandas ... has in his control and possession in his premises the ... properties subect of the offense,% =*ollo, pp. 68 and 65> 'he 1BI agents e3ecuted the two search warrants and as a result of the search found and sei/ed various goods and articles described in the warrants. (emandas filed a motion to quash the search warrants alleging that the trademark used by him was different from petitioner's trademark and that pending the resolution of IPC 1o. 469C before the Patent &ffice, any criminal or civil action on the same subect matter and between the same parties would be premature. 'he petitioner filed its opposition to the motion arguing that the motion to quash was fatally defective as it cited no valid ground for the quashal of the search warrants and that the grounds alleged in the motion were absolutely without merit. 'he "tate Prosecutor likewise filed his opposition on the grounds that the goods sei/ed were instrument of a crime and necessary for the resolution of the case on preliminary investigation and that the release of the said goods would be fatal to the case of the People should prosecution follow in court. 'he respondent court was, however, convinced that there was no probable cause to ustify the issuance of the search warrants. 'hus, in its order dated )arch <<, 45C?, the search warrants were recalled and set aside and the 1BI agents or officers in custody of the sei/ed items were ordered to return the same to (emandas. =*ollo, p. <9> 'he petitioner anchors the present petition on the following issues@ +id respondent udge act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of urisdiction, =i> in reversing the finding of probable cause which he himself had made in issuing the search warrants, upon allegations which are matters of defense and as such can be raised and resolved only upon trial on the meritsE and =ii> in finding that the issuance of the search warrants is premature in the face of the fact that =a> !acoste's registration of the subect trademarks is still pending with the Patent &ffice with opposition from (emandasE and =b> the subect trademarks had been earlier registered by (emandas in his name in the "upplemental *egister of the Philippine Patent &fficeF *espondent, on the other hand, centers his arguments on the following issues@ I '($ P$'I'I&1$* (#" 1& C#P#CI'G '& "H$ B$.&*$ P(I!IPPI1$ C&H*'". II '($ *$"P&1+$1' 2H+B$ +I+ 1&' C&))I' # B*#,$ #BH"$ &. +I"C*$'I&1 '#1'#)&H1' '& !#CI &. 2H*I"+IC'I&1 I1 I""HI1B '($ &*+$* +#'$+ #P*I! <<, 45C?. (emandas argues in his comment on the petition for ertiorari that the petitioner being a foreign corporation failed to allege essential facts bearing upon its capacity to sue before Philippine courts. (e states that not only is the petitioner not doing business in the Philippines but it also is not licensed to do business in the Philippines. (e also cites the case of Leviton %nd&stries v. 'alvador =447 "C*# 7<A> to support his contention 'he Leviton case, however, involved a complaint for unfair competition under "ection <4;# of *epublic #ct 1o. 466 which provides@ "ec. <4 J #. #ny foreign corporation or uristic person to which a mark or tradename has been registered or assigned under this #ct may bring an action hereunder for infringement, for unfair competition, or false designation of origin and false description, whether or not it has been licensed to do business in the Philippines under #ct numbered .ourteen (undred and .ifty;1ine, as amended, otherwise known as the Corporation !aw, at the time it brings the complaintE Provided, 'hat the country of which the said foreign corporation or uristic person is a citi/en, or in which it is domiciled, by treaty, convention or law, grants a similar privilege to corporate or uristic persons of the Philippines. De held that it was not enough for !eviton, a foreign corporation organi/ed and e3isting under the laws of the "tate of 1ew Gork, Hnited "tates of #merica, to merely allege that it is a foreign corporation. It averred in Paragraph < of its complaint that its action was being filed under the provisions of "ection <4;# of *epublic #ct 1o. 466, as amended. Compliance with the requirements imposed by the abovecited provision was necessary because "ection <4;# of *epublic #ct 1o. 466 having e3plicitly laid down certain conditions in a specific proviso, the same must be e3pressly averred before a successful prosecution may ensue. It is therefore, necessary for the foreign corporation to comply with these requirements or aver why it should be e3empted from them, if such was the case. 'he foreign corporation may have the right to sue before Philippine courts, but our rules on pleadings require that the qualifying circumstances necessary for the assertion of such right should first be affirmatively pleaded. In contradistinction, the present case involves a complaint for violation of #rticle 4C5 of the *evised Penal Code. 'he Leviton case is not applicable. #sserting a distinctly different position from the !eviton argument, (emandas argued in his brief that the petitioner was doing business in the Philippines but was not licensed to do so. 'o support this argument, he states that the applicable ruling is the case of (ent)olat&m Co., %n. v. (an$aliman@ =8< Phil. 9<7> where )entholatum Co. Inc., a foreign corporation and Philippine;#merican +rug Co., the former's e3clusive distributing agent in the Philippines filed a complaint for infringement of trademark and unfair competition against the )angalimans. 'he argument has no merit. T)e (ent)olat&m case is distinct from and inapplicable to the case at bar. Philippine #merican +rug Co., Inc., was admittedly selling products of its principal )entholatum Co., Inc., in the latter's name or for the latter's account. 'hus, this Court held that %whatever transactions the Philippine;#merican +rug Co., Inc. had e3ecuted in view of the law, the )entholatum Co., Inc., did it itself. #nd, the )entholatum Co., Inc., being a foreign doing business in the Philippines without the license required by "ection 6C of the Corporation !aw, it may not prosecute this action for violation of trademark and unfair competition.% In the present case, however, the petitioner is a foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines. 'he marketing of its products in the Philippines is done through an e3clusive distributor, *ustan Commercial Corporation 'he latter is an independent entity which buys and then markets not only products of the petitioner but also many other products bearing equally well;known and established trademarks and tradenames. in other words, *ustan is not a mere agent or conduit of the petitioner. 'he rules and regulations promulgated by the Board of Investments pursuant to its rule; making power under Presidential +ecree 1o. 48C5, otherwise known as the &mnibus Investment Code, support a finding that the petitioner is not doing business in the Philippines. *ule I, "ec. 4 =g> of said rules and regulations defines %doing business% as one% which includes, inter alia* =4> ... # foreign firm which does business through middlemen acting on their own names, such as indentors, commercial brokers or commission merchants, shall not be deemed doing business in the Philippines. But such indentors, commercial brokers or commission merchants shall be the ones deemed to be doing business in the Philippines. =<> #ppointing a representative or distributor who is domiciled in the Philippines, unless said representative or distributor has an independent status, i.e., it transacts business in its name and for its account, and not in the name or for the account of a principal 'hus, where a foreign firm is represented by a person or local company which does not act in its name but in the name of the foreign firm the latter is doing business in the Philippines. 333 333 333 #pplying the above provisions to the facts of this case, we find and conclude that the petitioner is not doing business in the Philippines. *ustan is actually a middleman acting and transacting business in its own name and or its own account and not in the name or for the account of the petitioner. But even assuming the truth of the private respondent's allegation that the petitioner failed to allege material facts in its petition relative to capacity to sue, the petitioner may still maintain the present suit against respondent (emandas. #s early as 45<8, this Court was, and it still is, of the view that a foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines needs no license to sue before Philippine courts for infringement of trademark and unfair competition. 'hus, in +estern ,-&ipment and '&ppl. Co. v. Re.es =94 Phil. 449>, this Court held that a foreign corporation which has never done any business in the Philippines and which is unlicensed and unregistered to do business here, but is widely and favorably known in the Philippines through the use therein of its products bearing its corporate and tradename, has a legal right to maintain an action in the Philippines to restrain the residents and inhabitants thereof from organi/ing a corporation therein bearing the same name as the foreign corporation, when it appears that they have personal knowledge of the e3istence of such a foreign corporation, and it is apparent that the purpose of the proposed domestic corporation is to deal and trade in the same goods as those of the foreign corporation. De further held@ 333 333 333 ... 'hat company is not here seeking to enforce any legal or control rights arising from, or growing out of, any business which it has transacted in the Philippine Islands. 'he sole purpose of the action@ Is to protect its reputation, its corporate name, its goodwill, whenever that reputation, corporate name or goodwill have, through the natural development of its trade, established themselves.' #nd it contends that its rights to the use of its corporate and trade name@ Is a property right, a right in rem, which it may assert and protect against all the world, in any of the courts of the world;even in urisdictions where it does not transact business;ust the same as it may protect its tangible property, real or personal, against trespass, or conversion. Citing sec. 4A, 1ims on Hnfair Competition and 'rade)arks and cases citedE secs. <4;<<, (opkins on 'rade)arks, 'rade 1ames and Hnfair Competition and cases cited.' 'hat point is sustained by the authorities, and is well stated in !anover 'tar (inin$ Co. v. /llen and +)eeler Co. =<AC .ed., 94?>. in which the syllabus says@ "ince it is the trade and not the mark that is to be protected, a trade;mark acknowledges no territorial boundaries of municipalities or states or nations, but e3tends to every market where the trader's goods have become known and Identified by the use of the mark. &ur recogni/ing the capacity of the petitioner to sue is not by any means novel or precedent setting. &ur urisprudence is replete with cases illustrating instances when foreign corporations not doing business in the Philippines may nonetheless sue in our courts. In ,ast 0oard 1avi$ation Ltd, v. 2smael and Co., %n. =4A< Phil. 4>, we recogni/ed a right of foreign corporation to sue on isolated transactions. In 3eneral 3arments Corp. v. 4iretor of Patents =74 "C*# 9A>, we sustained the right of Puritan "portswear Corp., a foreign corporation not licensed to do and not doing business in the Philippines, to file a petition for cancellation of a trademark before the Patent &ffice. )ore important is the nature of the case which led to this petition. Dhat preceded this petition for ertiorari was a letter complaint filed before the 1BI charging (emandas with a criminal offense, i.e., violation of #rticle 4C5 of the *evised Penal Code. If prosecution follows after the completion of the preliminary investigation being conducted by the "pecial Prosecutor the information shall be in the name of the People of the Philippines and no longer the petitioner which is only an aggrieved party since a criminal offense is essentially an act against the "tate. It is the latter which is principally the inured party although there is a private right violated. Petitioner's capacity to sue would become, therefore, of not much significance in the main case. De cannot snow a possible violator of our criminal statutes to escape prosecution upon a far;fetched contention that the aggrieved party or victim of a crime has no standing to sue. In upholding the right of the petitioner to maintain the present suit before our courts for unfair competition or infringement of trademarks of a foreign corporation, we are moreover recogni/ing our duties and the rights of foreign states under the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property to which the Philippines and .rance are parties. De are simply interpreting and enforcing a solemn international commitment of the Philippines embodied in a multilateral treaty to which we are a party and which we entered into because it is in our national interest to do so. 'he Paris Convention provides in part that@ #*'IC!$ 4 =4> 'he countries to which the present Convention applies constitute themselves into a Hnion for the protection of industrial property. =<> 'he protection of industrial property is concerned with patents, utility models, industrial designs, trademarks service marks, trade names, and indications of source or appellations of origin, and the repression of unfair competition. 333 333 333 #*'IC!$ < =<> 1ationals of each of the countries of the Hnion shall as regards the protection of industrial property, enoy in all the other countries of the Hnion the advantages that their respective laws now grant, or may hereafter grant, to nationals, without preudice to the rights specially provided by the present Convention. Consequently, they shall have the same protection as the latter, and the same legal remedy against any infringement of their rights, provided they observe the conditions and formalities imposed upon nationals. 333 333 333 #*'IC!$ 6 =4> 'he countries of the Hnion undertake, either administratively if their legislation so permits, or at the request of an interested party, to refuse or to cancel the registration and to prohibit the use of a trademark which constitutes a reproduction, imitation or translation, liable to create confusion, of a mark considered by the competent authority of the country of registration or use to be well;known in that country as being already the mark of a person entitled to the benefits of the present Convention and used for Identical or similar goods. 'hese provisions shall also apply when the essential part of the mark constitutes a reproduction of any such well; known mark or an imitation liable to create confusion therewith. 333 333 333 #*'IC!$ C # trade name shall be protected in all the countries of the Hnion without the obligation of filing or registration, whether or not it forms part of a trademark. 333 333 333 #*'IC!$ 4Abis =4> 'he countries of the Hnion are bound to assure to persons entitled to the benefits of the Hnion effective protection against unfair competition. 333 333 333 #*'IC!$ 4Ater =4> 'he countries of the Hnion undertake to assure to nationals of the other countries of the Hnion appropriate legal remedies to repress effectively all the acts referred to in #rticles 5, 4A and lAbis. =<> 'hey undertake, further, to provide measures to permit syndicates and associations which represent the industrialists, producers or traders concerned and the e3istence of which is not contrary to the laws of their countries, to take action in the Courts or before the administrative authorities, with a view to the repression of the acts referred to in #rticles 5, 4A and 4Abis, in so far as the law of the country in which protection is claimed allows such action by the syndicates and associations of that country. 333 333 333 #*'IC!$ 48 $very country party to this Convention undertakes to adopt, in accordance with its constitution, the measures necessary to ensure the application of this Convention. It is understood that at the time an instrument of ratification or accession is deposited on behalf of a countryE such country will be in a position under its domestic law to give effect to the provisions of this Convention. =64 &.B. CA4A> 333 333 333 In 5anit. Fair (ills, %n. v. T ,aton Co. =<?7 .. <d 6??> the Hnited "tates Circuit Court of #ppeals had occasion to comment on the e3traterritorial application of the Paris Convention It said that@ K44L 'he International Convention is essentially a compact between the various member countries to accord in their own countries to citi/ens of the other contracting parties trademark and other rights comparable to those accorded their own citi/ens by their domestic law. 'he underlying principle is that foreign nationals should be given the same treatment in each of the member countries as that country makes available to its own citi/ens. In addition, the Convention sought to create uniformity in certain respects by obligating each member nation 'to assure to nationals of countries of the Hnion an effective protection against unfair competition.' K4<L 'he Convention is not premised upon the Idea that the trade;mark and related laws of each member nation shall be given e3tra;territorial application, but on e3actly the converse principle that each nation's law shall have only territorial application. 'hus a foreign national of a member nation using his trademark in commerce in the Hnited "tates is accorded e3tensive protection here against infringement and other types of unfair competition by virtue of Hnited "tates membership in the Convention. But that protection has its source in, and is subect to the limitations of, #merican law, not the law of the foreign national's own country. ... By the same token, the petitioner should be given the same treatment in the Philippines as we make available to our own citi/ens. De are obligated to assure to nationals of %countries of the Hnion% an effective protection against unfair competition in the same way that they are obligated to similarly protect .ilipino citi/ens and firms. Pursuant to this obligation, the )inistry of 'rade on 1ovember <A, 45CA issued a memorandum addressed to the +irector of the Patents &ffice directing the latter@ 333 333 333 ... to reect all pending applications for Philippine registration of signature and other world famous trademarks by applicants other than its original owners or users. 'he conflicting claims over internationally known trademarks involve such name brands as !acoste, 2ordache, Bloria ,anderbilt, "asson, .ila, Pierre Cardin, Bucci, Christian +ior, &scar de la *enta, Calvin Ilein, Bivenchy, *alph !auren, Beoffrey Beene, !anvin and 'ed !apidus. It is further directed that, in cases where warranted, Philippine registrants of such trademarks should be asked to surrender their certificates of registration, if any, to avoid suits for damages and other legal action by the trademarks' foreign or local owners or original users. 'he memorandum is a clear manifestation of our avowed adherence to a policy of cooperation and amity with all nations. It is not, as wrongly alleged by the private respondent, a personal policy of )inister !uis ,illafuerte which e3pires once he leaves the )inistry of 'rade. .or a treaty or convention is not a mere moral obligation to be enforced or not at the whims of an incumbent head of a )inistry. It creates a legally binding obligation on the parties founded on the generally accepted principle of international law of pata s&nt servanda which has been adopted as part of the law of our land. =Constitution, #rt. II, "ec. ?>. 'he memorandum reminds the +irector of Patents of his legal duty to obey both law and treaty. It must also be obeyed. (emandas further contends that the respondent court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned order of #pril <<, 45C?. # review of the grounds invoked by (emandas in his motion to quash the search warrants reveals the fact that they are not appropriate for quashing a warrant. 'hey are matters of defense which should be ventilated during the trial on the merits of the case. .or instance, on the basis of the facts before the 2udge, we fail to understand how he could treat a bare allegation that the respondent's trademark is different from the petitioner's trademark as a sufficient basis to grant the motion to quash. De will treat the issue of preudicial question later. Branting that respondent (emandas was only trying to show the absence of probable cause, we, nonetheless, hold the arguments to be untenable. #s a mandatory requirement for the issuance of a valid search warrant, the Constitution requires in no uncertain terms the determination of probable cause by the udge after e3amination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce =Constitution, #rt. I,, "ec. ?>. Probable cause has traditionally meant such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the warrant that are in themselves sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely upon them and act in pursuance thereof =People v. "y 2uco, 67 Phil. 668>. 'his concept of probable cause was amplified and modified by our ruling in 'tone)ill v. 4io6no, =<A "C*# ?C?> that probable cause %presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed parti&lar acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws.% 'he question of whether or not probable cause e3ists is one which must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations =Central Bank v. )orfe, <A "C*# 9A8>. De agree that there is no general formula or fi3ed rule for the determination of the e3istence of probable cause since, as we have recogni/ed in L&na v. Plaza =<6 "C*# ?4A>, the e3istence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the udge conducting the e3amination. (owever, the findings of the udge should not disregard the facts before him nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason. )ore so it is plain that our country's ability to abide by international commitments is at stake. 'he records show that the 1BI agents at the hearing of the application for the warrants before respondent court presented three witnesses under oath, sworn statements, and various e3hibits in the form of clothing apparels manufactured by (emandas but carrying the trademark !acoste. 'he respondent court personally interrogated *amon $sguerra, "amuel .ii, and )amerto $spatero by means of searching questions. #fter hearing the testimonies and e3amining the documentary evidence, the respondent court was convinced that there were good and sufficient reasons for the issuance of the warrant. #nd it then issued the warrant. 'he respondent court, therefore, complied with the constitutional and statutory requirements for the issuance of a valid search warrant. #t that point in time, it was fully convinced that there e3isted probable cause. But after hearing the motion to quash and the oppositions thereto, the respondent court e3ecuted a complete turnabout and declared that there was no probable cause to ustify its earlier issuance of the warrants. 'rue, the lower court should be given the opportunity to correct its errors, if there be any, but the rectification must, as earlier stated be based on sound and valid grounds. In this case, there was no compelling ustification for the about face. 'he allegation that vital facts were deliberately suppressed or concealed by the petitioner should have been assessed more carefully because the obect of the quashal was the return of items already sei/ed and easily e3amined by the court. 'he items were alleged to be fake and quite obviously would be needed as evidence in the criminal prosecution. )oreover, an application for a search warrant is heard e7 parte. It is neither a trial nor a part of the trial. #ction on these applications must be e3pedited for time is of the essence. Breat reliance has to be accorded by the udge to the testimonies under oath of the complainant and the witnesses. 'he allegation of (emandas that the applicant withheld information from the respondent court was clearly no basis to order the return of the sei/ed items. (emandas relied heavily below and before us on the argument that it is the holder of a certificate of registration of the trademark %C($)I"$ !#C&"'$ : C*&C&+I!$ +$,IC$%. "ignificantly, such registration is only in the "upplemental *egister. # certificate of registration in the "upplemental *egister is not prima faie evidence of the validity of registration, of the registrant's e3clusive right to use the same in connection with the goods, business, or services specified in the certificate. "uch a certificate of registration cannot be filed, with effect, with the Bureau of Customs in order to e3clude from the Philippines, foreign goods bearing infringement marks or trade names =*ule 4<7, *evised *ules of Practice Before the Phil. Pat. &ff. in 'rademark CasesE )artin, Philippine Commercial !aws, 45C4, ,ol. <, pp. 94?;949>. "ection 45;# of *epublic #ct 466 as amended not only provides for the keeping of the supplemental register in addition to the principal register but specifically directs that@ 333 333 333 'he certificates of registration for marks and trade names registered on the supplemental register shall be conspicuously different from certificates issued for marks and trade names on the principal register. 333 333 333 'he reason is e3plained by a leading commentator on Philippine Commercial !aws@ 'he registration of a mark upon the supplemental register is not, as in the case of the principal register, prima facie evidence of =4> the validity of registrationE =<> registrant's ownership of the markE and =?> registrant's e3clusive right to use the mark. It is not subect to opposition, although it may be cancelled after its issuance. 1either may it be the subect of interference proceedings. *egistration on the supplemental register is not constructive notice of registrant's claim of ownership. # supplemental register is provided for the registration of marks which are not registrable on the principal register because of some defects =conversely, defects which make a mark unregistrable on the principal register, yet do not bar them from the supplemental register.> =#gbayani, II Commercial !aws of the Philippines, 458C, p. 947, citing Hy (ong )o v. 'itay : Co., et al., +ec. 1o. <97 of +irector of Patents, #pr. ?A, 456?>E *egistration in the "upplemental *egister, therefore, serves as notice that the registrant is using or has appropriated the trademark. By the very fact that the trademark cannot as yet be entered in the Principal *egister, all who deal with it should be on guard that there are certain defects, some obstacles which the user must "till overcome before he can claim legal ownership of the mark or ask the courts to vindicate his claims of an e3clusive right to the use of the same. It would be deceptive for a party with nothing more than a registration in the "upplemental *egister to posture before courts of ustice as if the registration is in the Principal *egister. 'he reliance of the private respondent on the last sentence of the Patent office action on application "erial 1o. ?A597 that %registrant is presumed to be the owner of the mark until after the registration is declared cancelled% is, therefore, misplaced and grounded on shaky foundation, 'he supposed presumption not only runs counter to the precept embodied in *ule 4<7 of the *evised *ules of Practice before the Philippine Patent &ffice in 'rademark Cases but considering all the facts ventilated before us in the four interrelated petitions involving the petitioner and the respondent, it is devoid of factual basis. #nd even in cases where presumption and precept may factually be reconciled, we have held that the presumption is rebuttable, not conclusive, =People v. !im (oa, B.*. 1o. !4A64<, )ay ?A, 459C, Hnreported>. &ne may be declared an unfair competitor even if his competing trademark is registered =Parke, +avis : Co. v. Iiu .oo : Co., et al., 6A Phil. 5<CE !a Gebana Co. v. Chua "eco : Co., 47 Phil. 9?7>. By the same token, the argument that the application was premature in view of the pending case before the Patent &ffice is likewise without legal basis. 'he proceedings pending before the Patent &ffice involving IPC Co. 469C do not partake of the nature of a preudicial question which must first be definitely resolved. "ection 9 of *ule 444 of the *ules of Court provides that@ # petition for the suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a pre;udicial question in a civil case, may only be presented by any party before or during the trial of the criminal action. 'he case which suspends the criminal prosecution must be a civil case which is determinative of the innocence or, subect to the availability of other defenses, the guilt of the accused. 'he pending case before the Patent &ffice is an administrative proceeding and not a civil case. 'he decision of the Patent &ffice cannot be finally determinative of the private respondent's innocence of the charges against him. In Flordelis v. Castillo =9C "C*# ?A4>, we held that@ #s clearly delineated in the aforecited provisions of the new Civil Code and the *ules of Court, and as uniformly applied in numerous decisions of this Court, =Berbari v. Concepcion, 7A Phil. C?8 =45<A>E #leria v. )endo/a, C? Phil. 7<8 =4575>E People v. #ragon, 57 Phil. ?98 =4597>E Brito;"y v. )alate 'a3icab : Barage, Inc., 4A< Phil 7C< =4598>E )endiola v. )acadael, 4 "C*# 95?E Benite/ v. Concepcion, < "C*# 48CE Mapante v. )ontesa, 7 "C*# 94AE 2imene/ v. #veria, << "C*# 4?CA.> In Buenaventura v. &campo =99 "C*# <84> the doctrine of preudicial question was held inapplicable because no criminal case but merely an administrative case and a civil suit were involved. 'he Court, however, held that, in view of the peculiar circumstances of that case, the respondents' suit for damages in the lower court was premature as it was filed during the pendency of an administrative case against the respondents before the P&!C&). ''he possibility cannot be overlooked,' said the Court, 'that the P&!C&) may hand down a decision adverse to the respondents, in which case the damage suit will become unfounded and baseless for wanting in cause of action.'> the doctrine of pre;udicial question comes into play generally in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action both penned and there e3ists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative 8&ris et de 8&re of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In the present case, no civil action pends nor has any been instituted. Dhat was pending was an administrative case before the Patent &ffice. $ven assuming that there could be an administrative proceeding with e3ceptional or special circumstances which render a criminal prosecution premature pending the promulgation of the administrative decision, no such peculiar circumstances are present in this case. )oreover, we take note of the action taken by the Patents &ffice and the )inister of 'rade and affirmed by the Intermediate #ppellate Court in the case of La C)emise Laoste '. /. v. Ram 'ad)9ani =#C;B.*. 1o. "P;4??96, 2une 48, 45C?>. 'he same 1ovember <A, 45CA memorandum of the )inister of 'rade discussed in this decision was involved in the appellate court's decision. 'he )inister as the %implementing authority% under #rticle 6bis of the Paris Convention for the protection of Industrial Property instructed the +irector of Patents to reect applications for Philippine registration of signature and other world famous trademarks by applicants other than its original owners or users. 'he brand %!acoste% was specifically cited together with 2ordache, Bloria ,anderbilt, "asson, .ila, Pierre Cardin, Bucci, Christian +ior, &scar dela *enta, Calvin Ilein, Bivenchy, *alph !aurence, Beoffrey Beene, !anvin, and 'ed !apidus. 'he +irector of Patents was likewise ordered to require Philippine registrants of such trademarks to surrender their certificates of registration. Compliance by the +irector of Patents was challenged. 'he Intermediate #ppellate Court, in the !a Chemise Laoste './. v. 'ad)9ani decision which we cite with approval sustained the power of the )inister of 'rade to issue the implementing memorandum and, after going over the evidence in the records, affirmed t)e deision of t)e 4iretor of Patents delarin$ La C)emise Laoste &/. t)e o9ner of t)e disp&ted trademark and roodile or alli$ator devie. 'he Intermediate #ppellate Court speaking through )r. 2ustice ,icente ,. )endo/a stated@ In the case at bar, the )inister of 'rade, as 'the competent authority of the country of registration,' has found that among other well;known trademarks '!acoste' is the subect of conflicting claims. .or this reason, applications for its registration must be reected or refused, pursuant to the treaty obligation of the Philippines. #part from this finding, the anne3es to the opposition, which !a Chemise !acoste ".#. filed in the Patent &ffice, show that it is the owner of the trademark '!acoste' and the device consisting of a representation of a crocodile or alligator by the prior adoption and use of such mark and device on clothing, sports apparel and the like. !a Chemise !acoste ".#, obtained registration of these mark and device and was in fact issued renewal certificates by the .rench 1ational Industry Property &ffice. 333 333 333 Indeed, due process is a rule of reason. In the case at bar the order of the Patent &ffice is based not only on the undisputed fact of ownership of the trademark by the appellee but on a prior determination by the )inister of 'rade, as the competent authority under the Paris Convention, that the trademark and device sought to be registered by the appellant are well; known marks which the Philippines, as party to the Convention, is bound to protect in favor of its owners. it would be to e3alt form over substance to say that under the circumstances, due process requires that a hearing should be held before the application is acted upon. 'he appellant cites section 5 of *epublic #ct 1o. 466, which requires notice and hearing whenever an opposition to the registration of a trademark is made. 'his provision does not apply, however, to situations covered by the Paris Convention, where the appropriate authorities have determined that a well;known trademark is already that of another person. In such cases, the countries signatories to the Convention are obliged to refuse or to cancel the registration of the mark by any other person or authority. In this case, it is not disputed that the trademark !acoste is such a well;known mark that a hearing, such as that provided in *epublic #ct 1o. 466, would be superfluous. 'he issue of due process was raised and fully discussed in the appellate court's decision. 'he court ruled that due process was not violated. In the light of the foregoing it is quite plain that the preudicial question argument is without merit. De have carefully gone over the records of all the cases filed in this Court and find more than enough evidence to sustain a finding that the petitioner is the owner of the trademarks %!#C&"'$%, %C($)I"$ !#C&"'$%, the crocodile or alligator device, and the composite mark of !#C&"'$ and the representation of the crocodile or alligator. #ny pretensions of the private respondent that he is the owner are absolutely without basis. #ny further ventilation of the issue of ownership before the Patent &ffice will be a superfluity and a dilatory tactic. 'he issue of whether or not the trademark used by the private respondent is different from the petitioner's trade mark is a matter of defense and will be better resolved in the criminal proceedings before a court of ustice instead of raising it as a preliminary matter in an administrative proceeding. 'he purpose of the law protecting a trademark cannot be overemphasi/ed. 'hey are to point out distinctly the origin or ownership of the article to which it is affi3ed, to secure to him, who has been instrumental in bringing into market a superior article of merchandise, the fruit of his industry and skill, and to prevent fraud and imposition =$tepha v. +irector of Patents, 46 "C*# 759>. 'he legislature has enacted laws to regulate the use of trademarks and provide for the protection thereof. )odern trade and commerce demands that depredations on legitimate trade marks of non;nationals including those who have not shown prior registration thereof should not be countenanced. 'he law against such depredations is not only for the protection of the owner of the trademark but also, and more importantly, for the protection of purchasers from confusion, mistake, or deception as to the goods they are buying. =#sari Goko Co., !td. v. Iee Boc, 4 "C*# 4E Beneral Barments Corporation v. +irector of Patents, 74 "C*# 9A>. 'he law on trademarks and tradenames is based on the principle of business integrity and common ustice' 'his law, both in letter and spirit, is laid upon the premise that, while it encourages fair trade in every way and aims to foster, and not to hamper, competition, no one, especially a trader, is ustified in damaging or eopardi/ing another's business by fraud, deceipt, trickery or unfair methods of any sort. 'his necessarily precludes the trading by one dealer upon the good name and reputation built up by another =Baltimore v. )oses, 4C< )d <<5, ?7 # =<d> ??C>. 'he records show that the goodwill and reputation of the petitioner's products bearing the trademark !#C&"'$ date back even before 4567 when !#C&"'$ clothing apparels were first marketed in the Philippines. 'o allow (emandas to continue using the trademark !acoste for the simple reason that he was the first registrant in the "upplemental *egister of a trademark used in international commerce and not belonging to him is to render nugatory the very essence of the law on trademarks and tradenames. De now proceed to the consideration of the petition in 3o"indram !emandas "uianani u. !on. Ro"erto , &ngpin, et al. =B.*. 1o. 69695>. #ctually, three other petitions involving the same trademark and device have been filed with this Court. In !emandas & Co. v. %ntermediate /ppellate Co&rt, et al. =B.*. 1o. 6?9A7> the petitioner asked for the following relief@ I1 ,I$D &. #!! '($ .&*$B&I1B, it is respectfully prayed =a> that the *esolutions of the respondent Court of 2anuary ?, 45C? and .ebruary <7, 45C? be nullifiedE and that the +ecision of the same respondent Court of 2une ?A, 45C? be declared to be the law on the matterE =b> that the +irector of Patents be directed to issue the corresponding registration certificate in the Principal *egisterE and =c> granting upon the petitioner such other legal and equitable remedies as are ustified by the premises. &n +ecember 9, 45C?, we issued the following resolution@ Considering the allegations contained, issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition for review, the respondent's comment thereon, and petitioner's reply to said comment, the Court *esolved to +$1G the petition for lack of merit. 'he Court further *esolved to C#!! the attention of the Philippine Patent &ffice to the pendency in this Court of B.*. 1o. 96?856;58 entitled '!a Chemise !acoste, ".#. v. (on. &scar C. .ernande/ and Bobindram (emandas' which was given due course on 2une 47, 45C? and to the fact that B.*. 1o. 6?5<C;<5 entitled 'Bobindram (emandas v. !a Chemise !acoste, ".#., et al.' filed on )ay 5, 45C? was dismissed for lack of merit on "eptember 4<, 45C?. Both petitions involve the same dispute over the use of the trademark 'Chemise !acoste'. 'he second case of 3o"indram !emandas vs. La C)emise Laoste, './., et al. =B.*. 1o. 6?5<C;<5> prayed for the following@ I. &n the petition for issuance of writ of preliminary inunction, an order be issued after due hearing@ l. $noining and restraining respondents Company, attorneys;in;fact, and $stanislao Branados from further proceedings in the unfair competition charges pending with the )inistry of 2ustice filed against petitionerE <. $noining and restraining respondents Company and its attorneys;in; fact from causing undue publication in newspapers of general circulation on their unwarranted claim that petitioner's products are .#I$ pending proceedings hereofE and ?. $noining and restraining respondents Company and its attorneys;in; fact from sending further threatening letters to petitioner's customers unustly stating that petitioner's products they are dealing in are .#I$ and threatening them with confiscation and sei/ure thereof. II. &n the main petition, udgment be rendered@ l. #warding and granting the issuance of the Drit of Prohibition, prohibiting, stopping, and restraining respondents from further committing the acts complained ofE <. #warding and granting the issuance of the Drit of )andamus, ordering and compelling respondents 1ational Bureau of Investigation, its aforenamed agents, and "tate Prosecutor $stanislao Branados to immediately comply with the &rder of the *egional 'rial Court, 1ational Capital 2udicial *egion, Branch 0!I0, )anila, dated #pril <<, 45C?, which directs the immediate return of the sei/ed items under "earch Darrants 1os. C?;4<C and C?;4<5E ?. )aking permanent any writ of inunction that may have been previously issued by this (onorable Court in the petition at bar@ and 7. #warding such other and further relief as may be ust and equitable in the premises. #s earlier stated, this petition was dismissed for lack of merit on "eptember 4<, 45C?. #cting on a motion for reconsideration, the Court on 1ovember <?, 45C? resolved to deny the motion for lack of merit and declared the denial to be final. (emandas v. !on. Ro"erto #n$pin =B.*. 1o. 69695> is the third petition. In this last petition, the petitioner prays for the setting aside as null and void and for the prohibiting of the enforcement of the following memorandum of respondent )inister *oberto &ngpin@ )$)&*#1+H)@ .&*@ '($ +I*$C'&* &. P#'$1'" Philippine Patent &ffice 333 333 333 Pursuant to $3ecutive &rder 1o. 54? dated 8 &ctober 45C? which strengthens the rule; making and adudicatory powers of the )inister of 'rade and Industry and provides inter alia, that 'such rule;making and adudicatory powers should be revitali/ed in order that the )inister of 'rade and Industry can ...apply more swift and effective solutions and remedies to old and new problems ... such as the infringement of internationally;known tradenames and trademarks ...'and in view of the decision of the Intermediate #ppellate Court in the case of L/ C!,(%', L/C#'T,, './., vers&s R/( '/4+!/1% K#C;B.*. "p. 1o. 4??95 =48> 2une 45C?L which affirms the validity of the )$)&*#1+H) of then )inister !uis *. ,illafuerte dated <A 1ovember 45CA confirming our obligations under the P#*I" C&1,$1'I&1 .&* '($ P*&'$C'I&1 &. I1+H"'*I#! P*&P$*'G to which the *epublic of the Philippines is a signatory, you are hereby directed to implement measures necessary to effect compliance with our obligations under said convention in general, and, more specifically, to honor our commitment under 'etion 6 "is thereof, as follows@ 4. Dhether the trademark under consideration is well;known in the Philippines or is a mark already belonging to a person entitled to the benefits of the C&1,$1'I&1, this should be established, pursuant to Philippine Patent &ffice procedures in inter partes and e3 parte cases, according to any of the following criteria or any combination thereof@ =a> a declaration by the )inister of 'rade and Industry that' the trademark being considered is already well;known in the Philippines such that permission for its use by other than its original owner will constitute a reproduction, imitation, translation or other infringementE =b> that the trademark is used in commerce internationally, supported by proof that goods bearing the trademark are sold on an international scale, advertisements, the establishment of factories, sales offices, distributorships, and the like, in different countries, including volume or other measure of international trade and commerceE =c> that the trademark is duly registered in the industrial property office=s> of another country or countries, taking into consideration the dates of such registrationE =d> that the trademark has been long established and obtained goodwill and general international consumer recognition as belonging to one owner or sourceE =e> that the trademark actually belongs to a party claiming ownership and has the right to registration under the provisions of the aforestated P#*I" C&1,$1'I&1. <. 'he word trademark, as used in this )$)&*#1+H), shall include tradenames, service marks, logos, signs, emblems, insignia or other similar devices used for Identification and recognition by consumers. ?. 'he Philippine Patent &ffice shall refuse all applications for, or cancel the registration of, trademarks which constitute a reproduction, translation or imitation of a trademark owned by a person, natural or corporate, who is a citi/en of a country signatory to the P#*I" C&1,$1'I&1 .&* '($ P*&'$C'I&1 &. I1+H"'*I#! P*&P$*'G. 7. 'he Philippine Patent &ffice shall give due course to the &pposition in cases already or hereafter filed against the registration of trademarks entitled to protection of 'etion 6 "is of said P#*I" C&1,$1'I&1 as outlined above, by remanding applications filed by one not entitled to such protection for final disallowance by the $3amination +ivision. 9. #ll pending applications for Philippine registration of signature and other world famous trademarks filed by applicants other than their original owners or users shall be reected forthwith. Dhere such applicants have already obtained registration contrary to the abovementioned P#*I" C&1,$1'I&1 and-or Philippine !aw, they shall be directed to surrender their Certificates of *egistration to the Philippine Patent &ffice for immediate cancellation proceedings. 6. Consistent with the foregoing, you are hereby directed to e3pedite the hearing and to decide without delay the following cases pending before your &ffice@ 4. I1'$* P#*'$" C#"$ 1&. 46C5;Petition filed by !a Chemise !acoste, ".#. for the cancellation of Certificate of *egistration 1o. "*;<<<9 issued to Bobindram (emandas, assignee of (emandas and CompanyE <. I1'$* P#*'$" C#"$ 1&. 469C;&pposition filed by Bames and Barments Co. against the registration of the trademark !acoste sought by !a Chemise !acoste, ".#.E ?. I1'$* P#*'$" C#"$ 1&. 48C6;&pposition filed by !a Chemise !acoste, ".#. against the registration of trademark Crocodile +evice and "kiva sought by one Dilson Chua. Considering our discussions in B.*. 1os. 6?856;58, we find the petition in B.*. 1o. 69695 to be patently without merit and accordingly deny it due course. In complying with the order to decide without delay the cases specified in the memorandum, the +irector of Patents shall limit himself to the ascertainment of facts in issues not resolved by this decision and apply the law as e3pounded by this Court to those facts. &ne final point. It is essential that we stress our concern at the seeming inability of law enforcement officials to stem the tide of fake and counterfeit consumer items flooding the Philippine market or e3ported abroad from our country. 'he greater victim is not so much the manufacturer whose product is being faked but the .ilipino consuming public and in the case of e3portations, our image abroad. 1o less than the President, in issuing $3ecutive &rder 1o. 54? dated &ctober 8, 45C? to strengthen the powers of the )inister of 'rade and Industry for the protection of consumers, stated that, among other acts, the dumping of substandard, imitated, ha/ardous, and cheap goods, the infringement of internationally known tradenames and trademarks, and the unfair trade practices of business firms has reached such proportions as to constitute economic sabotage. De buy a kitchen appliance, a household tool, perfume, face powder, other toilet articles, watches, brandy or whisky, and items of clothing like eans, ';shirts, neck, ties, etc. J the list is quite length J and pay good money relying on the brand name as guarantee of its quality and genuine nature only to e3plode in bitter frustration and genuine nature on helpless anger because the purchased item turns out to be a shoddy imitation, albeit a clever looking counterfeit, of the quality product. 2udges all over the country are well advised to remember that court processes should not be used as instruments to, unwittingly or otherwise, aid counterfeiters and intellectual pirates, tie the hands of the law as it seeks to protect the .ilipino consuming public and frustrate e3ecutive and administrative implementation of solemn commitments pursuant to international conventions and treaties. D($*$.&*$, the petition in B.*. 1&". 6?858;58 is hereby B*#1'$+. 'he order dated #pril <<, 45C? of the respondent regional trial court is *$,$*"$+ and "$' #"I+$. &ur 'emporary *estraining &rder dated #pril <5, 45C? is ma=i.e. P$*)#1$1'. 'he petition in B.*. 1&. 69695 is +$1I$+ due course for lack of merit. &ur 'emporary *estraining &rder dated +ecember 9, 45C? is !I.'$+ and "$' #"I+$, effective immediately. "& &*+$*$+.