Velmans argues that the relationship
between subjects and experienced reality is reflexive: some experiences apprehended by the subject are quite
clearly placed “in the world” by the perceiving mind. The contents of consciousness are,thus, not exclusively in the brain, but often in the perceived physical world itself.
Velmans argues that the relationship
between subjects and experienced reality is reflexive: some experiences apprehended by the subject are quite
clearly placed “in the world” by the perceiving mind. The contents of consciousness are,thus, not exclusively in the brain, but often in the perceived physical world itself.
Velmans argues that the relationship
between subjects and experienced reality is reflexive: some experiences apprehended by the subject are quite
clearly placed “in the world” by the perceiving mind. The contents of consciousness are,thus, not exclusively in the brain, but often in the perceived physical world itself.
Max Velmans (born 27 May 1942) is Emeritus Professor
of Psychology at Goldsmiths, University of London. He co-founded the Consciousness and Experiential Psychol- ogy Section of the British Psychological Society in 1994, and served as its chair from 2003 to 2006. He was ap- pointed National Visiting Professor for 20102011 by the Indian Council of Philosophical Research, and in 2011 was elected to the British Academy of Social Sciences. [1] Velmans has around 100 publications in the area of consciousness studies, including Understanding Con- sciousness (2000). In his map of prominent theo- ries of consciousness Francisco Varela categorises Vel- mans work as non-reductionist, stressing the impor- tance of rst-person accounts of the phenomenology of consciousness, [2] as well as third-person accounts of brain states and functions, which in Velmans work are thought of as complementary. [3] Velmans is principally known for the theory of con- sciousness called "reexive monism, in which the materialist/dualist gap is bridged by placing aspects of human consciousness in the experienced world, rather than within the brain; the theory also combines facets of realism with facets of idealism, though it falls short of avowing the necessity of perception to the existence of reality per se (the principle of "esse est percipi"). [4] 1 Understanding Consciousness Velmans Understanding Consciousness (2000) is a com- prehensive summary of his theoretical work, and intro- duces the idea of reexive monism. [5] Reexive monism presents itself as an alternative to both dualism and reductionism. It states that it does not make sense to speak of phenomenological experiences of re- ality as occurring within the brain, given that some of them quite clearly occur within the experienced world it- self (that is, asked to point to the light they experience, almost all rational subjects would point to the light that is experienced rather than to the brain, which is where, ac- cording to dualists and reductionists, the experience ac- tually takes place). Thus, Velmans argues, the relation- ship between subjects and experienced reality is reexive: some experiences apprehended by the subject are quite clearly placed in the world by the perceiving mind. The contents of consciousness are, thus, not exclusively in the brain, but often in the perceived physical world itself; in fact, in terms of phenomenology, there is no clear and dis- tinct dierence between what we normally think of as the physical world, the phenomenal world and the world as perceived. [6] He writes: This sketch of how consciousness ts into the wider universe supports a form of non- reductive, Reexive Monism. Human minds, bodies and brains are embedded in a far greater universe. Individual conscious representations are perspectival. That is, the precise manner in which entities, events and processes are trans- lated into experiences depends on the location in space and time of a given observer, and the exact mix of perceptual, cognitive, aective, social, cultural and historical inuences which enter into the 'construction' of a given experi- ence. In this sense, each conscious construc- tion is private, subjective, and unique. Taken together, the contents of consciousness provide a view of the wider universe, giving it the ap- pearance of a 3D phenomenal world. ... How- ever, such conscious representations are not the thing-itself. In this vision, there is one universe (the thing-itself), with relatively dierentiated parts in the form of conscious beings like our- selves, each with a unique, conscious view of the larger universe of which it is a part. In so far as we are parts of the universe that, in turn, experience the larger universe, we participate in a reexive process whereby the universe ex- periences itself. [6] 2 Changing Places The changing places thought experiment was conceived by Velmans, and discussed in Understanding Conscious- ness. The experiment was designed to demonstrate the diculties in distinguishing phenomenologically between a rst-person experience of an event (a subjective expe- rience of an object) and a third-person experience of the same (that is, the observation of such an experience in a subject). 2.1 The experiment Velmans conceives of a situation in which an experi- menter (E) is observing a subject (S) exposed to a 1 2 5 REFERENCES light stimulus. The dierences between the two view- points, Velmans argues, is primarily derived from a dif- ference in interest, reected in a dierence in their re- quired activities. To explain, during the experiment S is required only to report on her experiences of the light, which she needs to communicate to E in an appropriate manner. E, on the other hand, is interested primarily in Ss experience of the light, and thus Es focus is not just on the light (which he now thinks of as a stimulus) but also on the observable events in Ss brain, and on Ss reports concerning what she experiences. Thus, E is interested rst and foremost in the subjects experience, and how these relate to the light stimulus and brain states of S that he can observe. In such a case, Es experience of events would be considered objective or public, while Ss ex- periences are subjective and private"; while Es focus is on recording the neural causes and correlates of visual experiences, S is interested only in reporting about such experiences. However, Velmans points out that all that would be re- quired for S and E to exchange roles is for them to change their respective foci (as he puts it S and E merely have to turn their heads), so that E focuses exclusively on the light and reports his experiences, while S focuses her at- tention not just on the light, but on the events in Es brain and his reports of the experience. In such an event, S be- comes the experimenter and E becomes the subject; thus, following current conventions, S would now be entitled to think of her observations (of the light and Es brain) as 'public and objective' and to regard Es experiences of light as 'private and subjective'. [7] Velmans points out that this outcome is patently absurd, as the phenomenology of the light (that is, the way it is experienced) remains the same from the perspective of S or E, whether it is thought of as being an observed stim- ulus or a subjective experience. Nothing has changed in the nature of the light that either party can observe, save in the contextualising focus of their interests. That is, Velmans concludes, there is no phenomenological dier- ence between publicly observed phenomena and private, subjective experiences. 3 Selected publications Velmans is the author and editor of numerous books and papers on consciousness, including the following: [8] Understanding Consciousness (Rout- ledge/Psychology Press, London, 2000) Understanding Consciousness, edition 2 (Rout- ledge/Psychology Press, London, 2009) The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness (Black- well, 2007) The Science of Consciousness (Routledge, 1996) Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness (John Ben- jamins, 2000) How Could Conscious Experiences Aect Brains? (Imprint, 2003) 4 See also Monism 5 References [1] [2] Varela, F. J. (1999) Present time consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6(23), 111140. [3] biem Graben, P. & Atmanspacher, H. (2009) Extending the philosophical signicance of the idea of complemen- tarity. In H. Atmanspacher and H. Primas (eds.) Re- casting reality: Wolfgang Paulis Philosophical Ideas and Contemporary Science. Springer, pp.99113. Hoche, Hans-Ulrich (2007) Reexive monism ver- sus complementarism: An analysis and criticism of the conceptual groundwork of Max Velmanss re- exive model of consciousness Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 6 (3) , pp. 389409. [4] Blackmore, S. (2003) Consciousness: An introduction. Hodder & Stoughton. Blackmore, S. (2005) Conversations on Conscious- ness: Interviews with wenty minds. Oxford Univer- sity Press. Revonsuo, A. (2006) Inner Presence: Conscious- ness as a Biological Phenomenon. Cambridge: MIT Press. [5] Harris, K. (2009) Review of Max Velmans Under- standing Consciousness. Metapsychology, 13 (52) http://metapsychology.mentalhelp.net/poc/view_doc. php?type=book&id=5300&cn=396 Faw, B. (2009) Book review of Max Velmans, Un- derstanding Consciousness (2nd ed.) Journal of Consciousness Studies. Vol. 16, No.9, pp103-108 http://www.imprint.co.uk/pdf/16-9_br.pdf Zeman, A. (2001) The paradox of consciousness: a review of Understanding Consciousness (2000) by Max Velmans. The Lancet Vol. 357, Issue 9249, p77. http://www.thelancet.com/journals/ lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(05)71582-8/fulltext Batthyany, A (2002) Consciousness in the natu- ral world (a review of M.Velmans, 2000, Under- standing Consciousness). Theory & Psychology 12(3), pp. 415417. http://www.psych.ucalgary. ca/thpsyc/Reviews12(3).pdf [6] Velmans, M. (2009) Understanding Consciousness, Edi- tion 2. Routledge/Psychology Press, p. 298 3 Harris, K. (2009) Review of Max Velmans Understanding Consciousness. Metapsychology, 13 (52) http://metapsychology.mentalhelp.net/poc/ view_doc.php?type=book&id=5300&cn=396 [7] Velmans 2000, p. 175 Harman, W. (1993) Towards an Adequate Epis- temology for the Scientic Exploration of Con- sciousness Journal of Scientic Exploration, 7 (2), pp. 133143. http://www.scientificexploration. org/journal/jse_07_2_harman.pdf [8] list of Velmans publications on consciousness 6 External links Velmans website including list of selected publica- tions with brief descriptions Depository of online papers at Academia.edu with added comments Velmans lecture on The Unconscious Ground of Being, Cortona, Italy, 2009. Velmans lecture on Whos in Control?, National Institute of Advanced Study, Bangalore, India, 2012 Consciousness Studies (on Wikibooks) Indian Council of Philosophical Research (Indian Government) 4 7 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES 7 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses 7.1 Text Max Velmans Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Max_Velmans?oldid=623268985 Contributors: Charles Matthews, Visualerror, SlimVirgin, Gurch, Mholland, Clicketyclack, Ohconfucius, Second Quantization, Widefox, Waacstats, JaGa, Max Velmans, EPadmira- teur, Addbot, Yobot, AnomieBOT, Omnipaedista, RjwilmsiBot, ZroBot, MusikAnimal, BattyBot, ChrisGualtieri, SusanStuart, Karol Alexandre and Anonymous: 2 7.2 Images File:Wikiquote-logo.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fa/Wikiquote-logo.svg License: Public domain Contributors: ? Original artist: ? 7.3 Content license Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0